Body, Mind, and Passions in Romans: Paul’s Alternative View within His Philosophical and Religious Context

Craig Keener
Asbury Theological Seminary, Wilmore, KY
craig.keener@asburyseminary.edu
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3430-1998

Abstract: Most ancient thinkers believed that passions corrupted rational thinking, and that reason should control passions; Jewish apologists, however, often chided Gentiles for being ruled by passion, and sometimes offered Jewish law as a way to achieve genuine mastery over passion. Using language familiar to his contemporaries, Paul argues that human passions have corrupted reason’s ability to control them, and even right knowledge of God’s law cannot deliver one from this enslavement. For Paul, however, Christ by the Spirit liberates from bondage to passion, enabling a relationship with and life pleasing to God.

Keywords: passions, Spirit and flesh, Romans 7:14–25, reason versus passion, Paul and the body, mind of the Spirit

This paper surveys some aspects of Paul’s anthropology in Romans in light of some of its ancient context. Paul lacks any Platonic dualism between body and soul, but neither does he articulate his anthropology in ancient Israelite/OT.\(^1\) Of course, Paul could not employ common modern holistic approaches to the human person today, yet, interestingly, Pauline anthropology is not so much partitive (as in Platonism), but rather functional. His anthropological approach is not, however, intended to provide a fully consistent vocabulary:\(^2\) sometimes he distinguishes body and spirit (1 Cor 5:3, 5; 7:34; cf. Col 2:5; flesh and spirit, 2 Cor 7:1), body and mind (Rom 7:23; cf. flesh and mind, 7:25; Eph 2:3), mind and spirit (1 Cor 14:14–15; cf. Rom 8:5 with 8:16), and perhaps (albeit with a holistic emphasis) spirit and soul (1 Thess 5:23).

More to the point of this particular essay, Paul, like many of his contemporaries, sometimes contrasts right reason with bodily passions. While he does not argue, with some of his contemporaries, for complete suppression or annihilation of all passions, he regards illicit ones (cf. Rom 7:7, citing Exod 20:17//Deut 5:21) as present among both gentiles (Rom 1:26) and his fellow Jews (Rom 7:5). Paul envisions the renewed mind in Christ and the Spirit (Rom 6:11; 8:5; 12:2) as liberating the mind from its subjection to passions.

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I adapt here material from my much larger book, *The Mind of the Spirit*, so I ask pardon in advance for the context in ancient sources, especially in Paul’s letters outside Romans, that I must here omit.

1. Body

Some ancient Christian interpreters, presumably influenced by Platonism’s influence in late antiquity, heard in Rom 7 a struggle between the body and the soul. Such a reading has various problems, not the least of which is that Paul never uses the term translated “soul” in this manner. Nevertheless, ancient interpreters’ recognition that Paul connected the mortal body with vulnerability to vice picks up on an idea in Paul that modern interpreters sometimes seem too hasty to avoid. Whatever the reasons, Paul in Romans sometimes does connect sin with the behavior, desires and mortality of the body:

– the “body of sin” (6:6)
– the “desires” of the “mortal [death-destined] body” (6:12)
– “sinful passions” working in bodily members (7:5)
– “the body of this death” (7:24)
– the present body is “dead because of sin” (8:10)
– resurrection hope for “mortal bodies” (8:11)
– one has hope of life if one puts to death the body’s works (8:13b)

For example, Paul’s association of sin (7:18, 25) and death (8:13a; cf. 8:6) with “flesh” also seem relevant. This is not to say that Paul regards the body itself as evil. For Paul, sin also pervades even the law-informed mind (7:23, 25), revealing its vulnerability to sin as well. Paul allows, with many philosophers and Jewish thinkers, that reason should choose to control desires when they contravene moral law (cf. again 7:23, 25). For Paul, however, this consistent success of reason appears even more hypothetical than Stoicism’s ideal sage. (For most Jewish

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3 C.S. Keener, *The Mind of the Spirit. Paul’s Approach to Transformed Thinking* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic 2016). Thanks also to this article’s anonymous reviewers for helpful suggestions.

4 Severian, *Pauline Commentary from the Greek Church on Rom 7:24* (in G. Bray [ed.], *Romans* [ACCS NT 6; Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity 1998] 198).


sources, almost the same could be said for achieving sinlessness.) Nevertheless, Paul argues that one is reckoned as the ideal in Christ; even before attaining full maturity behaviorally, the ideal (or eschatological destiny) has somehow become the premise rather than the goal (Rom 6:1–11; 8:3–11).

Stoics focused not primarily on the bodily character of passions but on the danger of false beliefs. Paul may be closer to the Stoic understanding on this point, though his views are not identical with those of Stoics. Contrary to Stoic expectations, Romans 7 emphasizes that merely correct belief about right and wrong cannot adequately address passion.

This was true even for correct belief based on moral teachings of Scripture. Whereas among Gentiles who lack sufficient revelation the mind ends up party to “fleshly” desires (1:25–28; cf. Eph 4:17–19), the law-trained mind can refuse to assent to such desires and yet find itself unable to extirpate them (Rom 7:22–25). For Paul, the cognitive therapy of rational religion falls short of transformation available in Christ.

2. Flesh

Paul’s use of “flesh” would not be completely novel in a Greek context. Occasionally Greek sources already spoke of the “flesh” (σάρξ) as worthless. Some scholars suggest that the usage stemmed originally from reaction against Epicurus. Epicureans claimed that those made of flesh (σάρκινον) naturally viewed pleasure positively. For one Stoic from this era, the divine consists purely of reason, not flesh (σάρξ), and excellence belongs to

8 See e.g., Jub. 21:21; 1QS 11.9; 1 Esd 4:37; 4 Ezra 7:138–140 (68–70). Some exempted a few persons from sin, such as perhaps Abraham (PeMan 8; T. Ab. 10:13 A); Moses (b. Shab. 55b), Jesse (Tg. Ruth to 4:22), or Yohanan ben Zakkai (Ab. R. Nat. 14A).
11 Hans Hübner (“Hermeneutics of Romans 7,” Paul and the Mosaic Law [ed. J.D.G. Dunn] [Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans 2001] 208) rightly emphasizes in Rom 7 the “many verbs of understanding” (7:7, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 21, 22, 23) and (212–213) verbs of “willing” (7:15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21) but (212) focuses on the inability to understand in 7:15.
13 Despite the partly correct warning about later usage in W.D. Davies, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism. Some Rabbinic Elements in Pauline Theology, 4 ed. (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress 1980) 18. For σάρξ and ψυχή, see e.g., Philo, Cain 61.
14 Epicurus sometimes applied σάρξ to the location of desire (E. Schweizer, “Σάρξ in the Greek World,” TDNT VII, 99–105 [103]), often followed by hellenistic Judaism (105).
15 Plutarch, R. Col. 27, Mor. 1122D. Plutarch also complains of those who view the entire person as fleshly, i.e., bodily (Plutarch, Pleas. L. 14, Mor. 1096E), and notes that the flesh by nature is susceptible to disease (Pleas. L. 6, Mor. 1090EF). But even as late as Porphyry, Marc. 29.453–457, negative “flesh” pertains primarily to externals, so the issue is more “body” and especially “matter.”
16 Epictetus, Diat. 2.8.2.
moral purpose rather than to flesh.\textsuperscript{17} For a later second-century Stoic, one should “d

dain the flesh: it is naught but gore and bones and a network compact of nerves and veins and arteries.”\textsuperscript{18} A third-century Neoplatonist warns against descending “into the flesh \[\text{σάρκα}\].”\textsuperscript{19}

Especially given Paul’s contrast between “flesh” and (God’s) “Spirit,” however, Paul’s lan

guage echoes Jewish usage much more clearly. Scholars have sometimes jumped too quickly from the usual OT holistic usage to Paul’s usage\textsuperscript{20} as if Paul were simply writing to ancient Israelites using equivalent Greek terms.\textsuperscript{21} Against the expectations of some, the LXX often uses \textit{σώμα} with physical connotations.\textsuperscript{22} Jewish sources sometimes commented on the difference between bodily and nonbodily parts or aspects of a person;\textsuperscript{23} although this is more common in Diaspora Jewish sources, even one Tanna attributed the soul to heaven and the body to earth.\textsuperscript{24}

Despite some similarities of language elsewhere, Paul’s contrasting use of “flesh” and “Spirit” in Rom 8:4–6, 9, 13,\textsuperscript{25} reflects especially his background in Judean thought, such as in the Dead Sea Scrolls.\textsuperscript{26} The contrast appears in Scripture in Isa 31:3 but most notably in Gen 6:3;\textsuperscript{27} a section of Scripture highly influential in early Jewish thought.\textsuperscript{28}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{17} Epictetus, \textit{Diatr.} 2.23.30; cf. similarly 3.7.2–3, also against an Epicurean.
\bibitem{18} Marcus Aurelius, \textit{Medit.} 2.2 (LCL 58, 26f.).
\bibitem{19} Porphyry, \textit{Marc.} 9.172–173 (SBLTT 28, 55); instead, one should flee from the body (\textit{ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος}; 10.176), gathering the dispersed elements of one’s soul up from the body (10.180–183).
\bibitem{21} D. Flusser, \textit{Judaism and the Origins of Christianity} (Jerusalem: Magnes 1988) 63. Commentators after Bultmann (with his commendable modern appreciation on the whole person) have often shied away from such non-“Hebrew” ideas. Thus Hans Conzelmann (\textit{The Theology of St Luke} [London: Faber & Faber 1960] 176) emphasizes holism in Paul; nevertheless, on 177 he acknowledges a sort of anthropological dualism.
\bibitem{24} \textit{Sipre Deut.} 306.28.2; later, cf. \textit{Gen. Rab.} 8:11.
\bibitem{25} See also Gal 3:3; 4:29; 5:16–17; 6:8; Phil 3:3; cf. Rom 7:14; 1 Cor 3:1. Sometimes in contrasts with the Spirit \textit{σάρξ} refers simply to the body (John 3:6; 1 Tim 3:16; 1 Pet 3:18; 4:6), as also when the contrasted spirit is human (Mark 14:38; 1 Cor 5:5; 2 Cor 7:1; Col 2:5; 2 \textit{Glem.} 14.5; Ign. \textit{Magn.} 13.1; Ign. \textit{Tiatl.} pref.: 12.1; Ign. \textit{Pbd.} 11.2; Ign. \textit{Snyryn.} 1.1; Ign. \textit{Pol.} 5.1).
\bibitem{27} Though the Hebrew is worded differently in 4Q252 1:2, the LXX of Gen 6:3 uses the same words for “flesh” and “Spirit” that Paul does.
\bibitem{28} Cf. also \textit{Jub.} 5:8; \textit{1 En.} 106:17. Even in Philo, \textit{Heir} 57, the Spirit alongside reason, contrasted with fleshly pleasure, is the divine spirit.
sources the contrast is between mortal creatures (such as humanity) as flesh and God’s own Spirit.\textsuperscript{29} In the OT, humans as flesh were mortal and prone to weakness.\textsuperscript{30}

Paul often uses “flesh” as weakness\textsuperscript{31} but also goes somewhat further,\textsuperscript{32} yet in a way consistent with some Jewish circles’ development of the language. Unlike some other early Jewish sources,\textsuperscript{33} the Qumran scrolls develop the sense of weakness in a moral direction, including susceptibility to sin,\textsuperscript{34} a sense that the roughly equivalent Greek term often bears in Paul.\textsuperscript{35} Clearly when Paul contrasts flesh and the Spirit in Rom 8:4–9, 13 he speaks of God’s Spirit, as the full context shows (cf. also 1:3–4; 7:6; 1 Cor 5:5; Gal 3:3; 4:29; 5:17; 6:8; the clear Pauline exceptions being 2 Cor 7:1 and Col 2:5).\textsuperscript{36}

2.1. Bodily Desires in Ancient Thinking

As noted earlier, some philosophic approaches highlighted the classic struggle between reason and the passions—passions that were merely generated biologically and sociologically shaped, not guided by sound reason.\textsuperscript{37} In Jewish teaching, the law was supposed to liberate

\textsuperscript{29} Robinson, \textit{Body}, 11–14, argues that the Old Testament was so holistic that it lacks a term for “body” and a distinction between “body” and “soul” (perhaps an exaggeration; cf. Isa 10:18 in Masoretic Text and LXX). Humans are flesh also in traditional Jewish sources such as e.g., \textit{Jub.} 5:2; Sir 28:5; physicality seems implied in e.g., Gen 17:11–14; Jdt 14:10.


\textsuperscript{31} For flesh as humanity, e.g., Rom 3:20; 1 Cor 1:29; Gal 1:16; for weakness, e.g., Rom 6:19; 8:3; 1 Cor 7:28; 2 Cor 1:17; 5:16; 7:5; Gal 4:13–14; for mortality, 1 Cor 15:50; 2 Cor 4:11; Phil 1:22, 24.


\textsuperscript{33} The decomposition of flesh (\textit{m. Sanh.} 6:6; \textit{M. Q.} 1:5), even understood as atoning for sin (e.g., \textit{Pesiq Rab Kab.} 11:23; b. \textit{Sanh.} 47:b), does not suggest that the body was viewed as evil.


\textsuperscript{35} In Greek, in \textit{T. Job} 27:2 (\textit{OTP})/27:3 (R.A. Kraft et al., \textit{The Testament of Job according to the SV Text} [SBLTT 4; Missoula, MT: Scholars Press 1974]), Satan contrasts himself as a spirit with Job as “a fleshly person,” i.e., weak and mortal.

\textsuperscript{36} James D.G. Dunn (\textit{Romans} [WBC 38A; Dallas, TX: Word 1988] I, 370) correctly notes that “it is precisely the weakness and appetites of ‘the mortal body’ (= the flesh) which are the occasion for sin.” Likewise, “The problem with flesh is not that it is sinful \textit{per se} but that it is vulnerable to the enticements of sin—flesh, we might say, as ‘the desiring I’ (7.7–12)” (\textit{Dunn, Theology}, 67).


Although the human mind’s activity is more connected to neurochemistry than ancient thinkers imagined, and many concrete expressions of instinct are influenced by human experience and choices, ancients were right in recognizing sexual instincts, sudden fear reactions, and other innate drives as somehow connected to the body. They could not of course have anticipated the complexity of the connectedness in terms of hormones, the amygdala, or even how the brain adapts to new stimuli in conjunction with thinking.
or protect one from passion’s control.\textsuperscript{38} In Rom 7:14–25, however, Paul depicts the law as facilitating the identification and thus power of biologically-driven passions, suppressed but not defeated.

Many ancient thinkers, not limited to but especially reflected in the Platonic tradition, connected passions with the body.\textsuperscript{39} (While Stoicism was more dominant in northern Mediterranean discourse in Paul’s day, the eclectic Middle Platonism of prominent Diaspora Jewish thought reflected in Wisdom of Solomon and Philo suggest that Paul would need to engage such ideas as well.) A Cynic text, for example, has Socrates insist that a philosopher “disdains the demands of the body and is not enslaved by the pleasures of the body.”\textsuperscript{40} Elsewhere Socrates reportedly asks who is less enslaved by passions of the body than he.

The Platonist tradition disparaged the body more than did many other thinkers.\textsuperscript{42} Platonists expressed concern about bodies distracting people from divine reality;\textsuperscript{43} Plato himself complained that “the body and its desires” lead to violence for the sake of money and, worst of all, distraction from philosophic study.\textsuperscript{44} A second-century orator with Middle Platonist preoccupations warns that, “The function particular to the flesh,” which humans share with animals, “is Pleasure, that particular to the intelligence is Reason,” which mortals share with the divine.\textsuperscript{45} Most pervasively in ancient sources, the body, often in contrast to true being, was mortal.\textsuperscript{46} Some spoke of the body as a prison or chains detaining the soul.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{38} 4 Maccabees, perhaps with apologetic for potential Gentile hearers in view, depicts the deliverance more strongly than the rabbis’ in-house discussions, though for the latter the Torah remains an antiseptic for sin.


\textsuperscript{40} Socrates, \textit{Ep.} 14 (SBLBS 12, 257, 259).

\textsuperscript{41} Xenophon, \textit{Apol.} 16, τας τοις σώματος ἐπιθυμίας.

\textsuperscript{42} Seneca, for example, thought that the body, though temporary, can be of service to the mind (\textit{Dial.} 7.8.2; cf. Rom 6:13). Stoics viewed everything, even spirit (πνεύμα) and virtues (Arius Didymus, \textit{Epit.} 2.7.5b7, p. 20.28–30) as “bodies.”

\textsuperscript{43} Plutarch, \textit{Isis} 78, \textit{Mor.} 382F; Maximus of Tyre, \textit{Or.} 11.10; Iamblichus, \textit{Letter} 16, frg. 2, lines 1–2 (Stobaeus \textit{Anth.} 3.1.49). Any particularities weakened the original, universal whole (Proclus, \textit{Poet. Essay} 5, K52.7–19, 23–24).

\textsuperscript{44} Plato, \textit{Phaed.} 66CD (LCL 36, 231).

\textsuperscript{45} Maximus of Tyre, \textit{Or.} 33.7 (trans. Trapp, 266); cf. 6.1, 4; 41.5; see also Epictetus, \textit{Diatr.} 1.3.3; cf. \textit{Sipre Deut.} 306.28.2. For the true nature of deity being intelligence rather than “flesh” (σάρξ), see Epictetus, \textit{Diatr.} 2.8.2. For passions vs. reason ruling lower animals, see e.g., Aristotle, \textit{Pol.} 1.12.13, 1254b. Philosophy thus converts a person from a beast into a god (Marcus Aurelius, \textit{Medit.} 4.16).

\textsuperscript{46} E.g., Cicero, \textit{Resp.} 6.26.29; Seneca Y., \textit{Dial.} 1.5.8; Epictetus, \textit{Diatr.} 2.19.27; Iamblichus, \textit{Pyth. Life} 32.228; Marcus Aurelius 4.4; 10.33.3.

\textsuperscript{47} E.g., Plato, \textit{Gorg.} 493AE; \textit{Phaed.} 82E; \textit{Cratylus} 400B; Heraclitus, \textit{Ep.} 5; Epictetus, \textit{Diatr.} 1.9.11–12; Maximus of Tyre \textit{Or.} 7.5 (recalling \textit{Rep.} 514A–516B); 36.4; Philostratus, \textit{Vit. Apoll.} 7.26; Iamblichus, \textit{Letter} 3, frg. 2 (Stobaeus \textit{Anth.} 3.5.45); \textit{Gnomologium Vaticanum} 464 (in A.J. Malherbe, \textit{Moral Exhortation. A Greco-Roman
With its limitations, materiality itself sometimes became a problem. Even some Stoics depicted people as souls who did not even own their bodies; whereas the heavens were pure, bad things happened on earth because it consisted of corruptible matter. Far more, later Platonists sought to purify their immortal souls from passions and attention to perishable matter. Some later sources developing the Platonic tradition even present love of the body as evil.

Such attitudes toward the body, ranging from ambivalent to hostile, naturally could lead to asceticism. Carneades, a second-century BCE Skeptic, ascetically neglected his body, supposing that this would increase his intellectual concentration. For a mildly ascetic later Christian source, it is love of pleasure that makes the body unbearable for the soul.

Hellenistic Jews did not escape the influence of such language. Thus they could associate the body with passions. Philo, an influential Jewish Middle Platonist, speaks of the soul entombed within a body in this life; death was an escape. “Flesh” (σάρξ) is alienated from what is divine. The soul is presently enslaved to the body through its passions.

Sourcebook [LEC 4; Philadelphia, PA: Westminster 1986] 110). Thus a philosopher being ground to death “declared that he himself was not being ground, but only that thing of his in which, as it chanced, he had been enclosed” (Dio Chrysostom [Favorinus], Or. 37.45 [LCL 376, 45]).

E.g., Epictetus, Diatr. 1.11–12 (though Richard Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind. From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation [New York: Oxford University Press 2000] 215, commenting on 1.22.10, suggests that such ideas may have been Epictetus’s innovation).

Hierocles, How Should One Behave toward the Gods? (Stobaeus, Anth. 2.9.7).

Iamblichus, Soul 8.39, §385; 8.43, §456. Cf. earlier Plato, Rep. 10.611C.

Porphyry, Marc. 14.244–250; 25.394–395 (though the real source of evils come from choices in the soul, 29.453–457). Love of the body is ignorance of God (13.227–229), and one must hold the connection with it lightly (32.485–495). Cf. Plotinus, Enn. 1.8, on the secondary negativity of the body; matter is evil (1.8.4), worthless (2.4), and unreal (3.6.6–7). Many gnostic thinkers also apparently found matter problematic (Hippolytus, Haer. 6.28; 7.20).

Valerius Maximus 8.7, ext. 5; cf. a later Neoplatonist in Eunapius Lives 456 (albeit reported differently in Porphyry, Vit. Plot. 11.113). Seneca indulged the body for health, but otherwise was hard on it to subdue it to his mind (Seneca Y., Lucil. 8.5; cf. even the rhetorical claim in Fronto, De Nepote Amisso 2.8).

Sent. Sextus 139a–139b. Passion is dangerous and must be suppressed in Sent. Sextus 204–209. In Ep. Diogn. 6.5–6, σάρξ wars against the soul (cf. 1 Pet 2:11). Later Christian asceticism drew from existing trends in late antiquity (see e.g., Judge, Jerusalem, 223).

E.g., Philo, Alleg. Interp. 2.28; Abel 48; Cain 96, 155; Immut. 111; Husb. 6a; Planter 43; Abr. 164; Mos. 2.24; T. Jud. 14:3.

Philo, Alleg. Interp. 1.108; Immut. 150; Conf. 78–79; Laws 4.188; cf. Alleg. Interp. 3.21; Heir 85; so also the Christian work, Ep. Diogn. 6.5.

Philo, De Cherubim 114.

Philo, Giants 29 (usually employing σῶμα in this way, but using σάρξ here because he quotes Gen 6). It is our fleshy nature (σαρκός φύσις) that hinders wisdom’s growth; souls “free from flesh and body (ἀσαρκοῦ καὶ ἀσώματοι)” can celebrate with the universe (Giants 30 [LCL 227, 460–461]); flesh prevents people from being able to look up to heaven (Giants 31).

For others, drunkenness allowed pleasure to stir the body to adultery.\textsuperscript{59} Satan blinded one “as a human being, as flesh [σαρκί], in my corrupt sins” until he repented.\textsuperscript{60}

\section*{2.2. Paul and the Body}

When Paul speaks of the “flesh” or associates passions with the body, he adapts some of the language of his day to argue his point. But does Paul, like later Neoplatonists and many gnostics, view the body as evil? Does he envision a conflict between body and soul? Despite pagan criticisms,\textsuperscript{61} and against some gnostic thinkers, even patristic writers defended materiality in the “flesh.”\textsuperscript{62}

Paul’s language sometimes distinguishes elements in human personality,\textsuperscript{63} but such distinctions can be overstated. Some of Paul’s ancient interpreters suggested that he desires liberation from the body and its passions in a way resembling the thinking of Platonic philosophers.\textsuperscript{64} This comparison certainly risks exaggeration, especially in view of Paul’s expectation of the body’s resurrection (8:11, 13, 23; perhaps 7:24b–25a),\textsuperscript{65} a Jewish expectation more evident in Judean than Diaspora Jewish sources.

In Paul, the body, guided by a renewed mind (Rom 12:2–3), can be used for good (Rom 12:1; cf. 6:13); but under other circumstances, the body can also be used for sin (Rom 1:24; 6:12–13; 7:5), and even be closely associated with it (Rom 6:6; 8:10, 13; cf. 7:24). Relevant to a discussion of the “fleshly mind,” bodily passions may war against the mind (7:23). Though the mind might disagree with bodily passion (7:23, 25), it can find itself subject to it and corrupted by it (1:28). Thus the frame of mind shaped by the flesh, by human frailty susceptible to temptation, cannot please God (8:8). In this context, only new life in the Spirit can free one (8:2).


\textsuperscript{60} Some pagans critiqued Christians for their high view of the body (e.g., Origen, Cels. 8.49; J.G. Cook, The Interpretation of the New Testament in Greco-Roman Paganism [Peabody, MA: Hendrickson 2002; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2000] 113).

\textsuperscript{61} Scholars cite here Tertullian, Carn. Chr. 15; Chrysostom, Hom. Cor. 17.1; Hom. Rom. 11 (on 6:13); Theodoret of Cyr, Interp. Rom. on 6:13 (PG 82, 109); and Augustine, Contin. 10.24. Still, cf. Augustine, C. Jul. 70.


\textsuperscript{64} Schlatter himself makes distinctions between Paul and Platonism here (Romans, 167).
For Paul and for the Jewish tradition he follows, creation and bodily existence are good. One is not delivered from some bodily limitations, such as mortality, until the resurrection (Rom 8:11), but the presence of the Spirit nevertheless gives life in the present so the body can be an instrument for good rather than evil (6:13, 19). By itself, however, bodily existence is susceptible to a range of drives (to use modern language) that are not themselves cognizant of right and wrong. These necessary drives can intersect with what Jewish people considered fundamental behaviors of pagan life, such as sexual impropriety or eating food offered to idols (1 Cor 10:6–8).  

No one, including Paul, would have denied that virtually everyone has such biological passions as hunger, necessary for survival, or urges that promote procreation, necessary for propagation of humanity. Nevertheless, whereas in principle reason can veto the proposals raised by passions, the pull of these passions pervade the functioning of the intellect, a pervasiveness exposed all the more plainly by the law. One might avoid acting on covetousness, but covetousness itself arises in the heart before the law can suppress it. Indeed, by exposing right and wrong the law appears to spotlight it rather than root it out (cf. 7:5, 7–11). 

For Paul, the “flesh” and the Spirit generate contradictory desires, although Paul seems more often comfortable associating the language of “desire” especially with the predilections of the flesh (Gal 5:16–17; cf. 5:24; Rom 6:12; 13:14; Eph 2:3). Although in principle believers’ desires are dead (Gal 5:24) as believers are in principle dead to sin (2:20; Rom 6:2–10), in practice one must continue to address these desires when they arise (cf. Rom 6:2–13; Gal 5:13–16; 6:1; Col 3:5), not least by reckoning them dead (Rom 6:11). Increasingly identifying with Christ and the Spirit one may embrace the Spirit’s desires; a life with the Spirit would protect one from living merely for physical impulses (Gal 5:16–17). In any case, Paul does not treat the divided person as the ideal (cf. Rom 7:14–25). 

Paul affirms the body, whose destiny is resurrected glory (Rom 8:11, 23; 1 Cor 6:14; 15:42–54; Phil 3:21), but flesh is connected to a side of existence dominated by bodily passions, some of which if unrestrained lead to violation of God’s law. Translating such language into modern terms might help us understand more concretely the sorts of concepts

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66 Cf. e.g., Rev 2:14, 20; Acts 15:20; Sib. Or. 3.757–766; t. Abod. Zar. 8:4; b. Sanh. 56a, bar; Pesiq. Rab Kab. 12:1.
67 Cf. the positive side of the yetzer hata in later rabbinic thought; cf. Sipre Deut. 32.3.1; Gen. Rab. 9:7; Ecl. Rab. 3:11, §3; Davies, Paul, 22; cf. good sexual desire in T. Reu. 2:8; Musonius Rufus 14, p. 92.11–12; frg. 40, p. 136.18–19; in C.E. Lutz, “Musonius Rufus: ‘The Roman Socrates,’” YCS 10 (1947) 3–147.
that Paul was articulating, although at many points ancient and modern psychologies lack exact correspondences. Today we understand that someone who develops a chemical dependency will have a craving for those chemicals on a physical level; because of neuroplasticity, our brains also adapt chemically to other stimuli.

Religious convictions do not automatically change patterns in the brain; one may be disgusted by and reject habitual responses on the level of one’s conscious will, but the predilection or “temptation” remains. Paul seems aware that mere religious practice, of whatever kind, by itself does not ordinarily alter such patterns; elsewhere, he can even associate the flesh polemically both with religion (Gal 3:2–3) and sinful behavior (5:16–21, 24). The best that mere religion can do is recognize right from wrong, cover over the wrong, and insist on different behavior.

2.3. Thoughts Corrupted by Passions

Many ancient thinkers opposed reason to the passions; the wise would overcome passions through truth. In Rom 1:18–32, Paul paints a more complicated picture of reason and passions, one that fits Jewish condemnations of paganism. Most ancient thinkers believed that passions corrupted rational thinking, and that reason should control passions; Jewish apologists, however, often chided gentiles for being ruled by passion, and sometimes offered Jewish law as a way to achieve genuine mastery over passion. 69 In Rom 1:24–27, in keeping with Jewish polemic against idolatry, 70 humanity’s corrupted thinking subordinates them to irrational passions (1:24, 26).

In ordinary conversation people might use the language of passions or desires positively. 71 Nevertheless, many intellectuals considered desire a fundamental evil; thus one philosophically-informed second-century orator opined, “The greatest human evil is desire.” 72 Many therefore warned against passions and desires; 73 such cravings were, they felt, insatiable. 74 Many thinkers spoke of slavery to passions and sought freedom from their

72 Maximus of Tyre, Or. 24.4 (trans. Trapp, 203); cf. Apoc. Mos. 19:3. For the sake of brevity, I am treating together ἐπιθυμία, which Paul often uses (even in Romans: 1:24; 6:12; 7:7–8; 13:14), and πάθος, which appears in Pauline literature rarely (only Rom 1:26; Col 3:5; 1 Thess 4:5).
73 E.g., Epictetus, Diatr. 2.1.10; Iamblichus, Pyth. Life 31.187; Porphyry, Marc. 27.438.
74 Galen, Grif. 42–44, 80; Iamblichus, Pyth. Life 31.206; Porphyry, Marc. 29.457–460; cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 9.52.6; Maximus of Tyre, Or. 36.4. Passions spawned all crimes (Cicero, Sen. 12.40) and illnesses of the soul (Porphyry, Marc. 9.157–158). Vice proliferates passion (Lucian, Nigr. 16), and one can become psychologically ill through addiction to pleasures (Arius Didymus 2.7.10e, p. 62.20–23).
tyranny.\textsuperscript{75} Overcoming desire was thus praiseworthy,\textsuperscript{76} and some philosophers were said to have worked to rid the world of passion.\textsuperscript{77} The ideal Stoic sage was supposed to lack passions, at least in the form of negative emotions;\textsuperscript{78} Stoics valued this objective because passion was a kind of impulse not subject to reason.\textsuperscript{79} Later Platonists warned that passions defiled the soul.\textsuperscript{80} Even Epicureans affirmed that controlling the passions leads to happiness.\textsuperscript{81}

Stoics counted pleasure (ἡ δονή) a fundamental form of passion.\textsuperscript{82} Although ordinary people surely often viewed pleasure positively,\textsuperscript{83} Stoics viewed it indifferently or negatively.\textsuperscript{84} Many other thinkers also viewed it negatively, although especially when embraced in excess.\textsuperscript{85} Epicureans demurred, valuing pleasure, but this was partly because Epicurus defined desire as a kind of impulse not subject to reason.\textsuperscript{79} Later Platonists warned that passions defiled the soul.\textsuperscript{80} Even Epicureans affirmed that controlling the passions leads to happiness.\textsuperscript{81}

\begin{itemize}
  \item Xenophon, \textit{Occ.} 1.22; Musonius Rufus 3, p. 40.19; Pliny, \textit{Ep.} 8.22.1; Plutarch, \textit{Bride} 33, \textit{Mor.} 142E; Arius Didymus 2.7.10a, p. 58.15; Iamblichus, \textit{Letter} 3, frg. 3.4–6 (Stobaeus, \textit{Anth.} 3.5.46); Porphyry, \textit{Marc.} 34.522–525; \textit{4 Marc} 13:2; \textit{T. Jos.} 7:8; \textit{T. Ascher} 3:2; pleasure in Maximus of Tyre, \textit{Or.} 25.5–6; 33:3; 36:4.
  \item Xenophon, \textit{Hell.} 4.8.22; Polybius, \textit{Hist.} 31.25.8; Publius Syrus, \textit{Sent.} 40, 181; Dio Chrysostom, \textit{Or.} 8.20; 9.12; T. \textit{Reu.} 4:9; Josephus, \textit{Ant.} 4.328–329. Alexander as an example (as in Arrian, \textit{Alex.} 7.28.2) was not possible outside eulogy (Seneca \textit{Y.}, \textit{Lucil.} 113.29–31; Plutarch, \textit{Flatt.} 25, \textit{Mor.} 65F; Dio Chrysostom, \textit{Or.} 4.4, 60; cf. b. \textit{Tamid} 32a).
  \item Apuleius, \textit{Flor.} 14.3–4, on Crates the Cynic.
  \item Arius Didymus 2.7.10, p. 56.1–4; 2.7.10a, p. 56.24–25; 2.7.10b, p. 58.17–18. As a type of passion, pleasure also disobeys reason (2.7.10b, p. 58.29).
  \item Porphyry, \textit{Marc.} 13.236–237.
  \item Cicero, \textit{Fin.} 1.18.57–58.
  \item Arius Didymus 2.7.10, p. 56.6–7; see also Engberg-Pedersen, \textit{Paul and Stoics}, 311, n. 32.
  \item E.g., Achilles Tatius, \textit{Lec. Clit.} 2.8.3. On positive Epicurean views of pleasure, see e.g., Cicero, \textit{Fin.} 1.9.29; Plutarch, \textit{R. Col.} 27, \textit{Mor.} 1122D; Athenaeus, \textit{Deipn.} 12.546ε; A.A. Long, \textit{Hellenistic Philosophy. Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics} (New York: Scribner 1974) 61–69; H.-J. Klauck, \textit{Epicureans, Sceptics and Stoics' criticisms, see Cicero, \textit{Fin.} 2.12.35—2.13.43; Seneca \textit{Y.}, \textit{Lucil.} 59.1; \textit{Dial.} 7.11.1; Arius Didymus 2.7.10, p. 56.13–18; 2.7.10b, p. 60.1–2. Earlier Stoic tradition apparently viewed it among the \textit{adiaphora} (indifferents); see Arius Didymus 2.7.5a, p. 10.12–13; as not a good, Musonius Rufus 1, p. 32.22; at least when associated with what is dishonorable, Musonius Rufus 12, p. 86.27–29; frg. 51, p. 144.8–9; see Brennan, “Theory,” 61–62, n. 31.
  \item E.g., Xenophon, \textit{Mem.} 1.12.23–24; 4.5.3; \textit{Hell.} 4.8.22; Cicero, \textit{Sen.} 12.40; Dio Chrysostom, \textit{Or.} 1.13; 3.34; 8.20; Pliny, \textit{Ep.} 5.5.4; Plutarch, \textit{Bride} 33, \textit{Mor.} 142E; Maximus of Tyre, \textit{Or.} 7.7; 14.1–2; 25.5–6; 33.3–8; 38.6; Menander Rhetor, \textit{Treat.} 2.10, 416.19; Proclus, \textit{Poet.} 6.1, K121.14–15; Iamblichus, \textit{Pyth. Life} 31.204–206; Libanius, \textit{Comparison} 1.7–8, 5.7; \textit{Speech in Character} 16.2; Porphyry, \textit{Marc.} 6.103–108; 7.125–126, 131–134; 33.508–509; 35.535–536.
  \item For Stoic criticisms, see Cicero, \textit{Fin.} Bk. 2, esp. 2.4.11—2.6.18; Arius Didymus 2.7.10a, p. 58.8–11; for others’ criticisms, see e.g., Cicero, \textit{Pis.} 28.68–69; Aulus Gellius, \textit{Att.} 9.5; Maximus of Tyre, \textit{Or.} 30–33, especially 30.3–5; 31; 33; Galen \textit{Grief} 62.68. See also Keener, \textit{Acts}, III, 2584–2593, on Epicureans, and 2593–2595 on Stoicism. Cf. Seneca’s attack on the Epicurean goal of pleasure in Henry Dyson, “Pleasure and the Sapiens: Seneca De vita beata 11.1,” \textit{CP} 105/3 (2010) 313–318 (on \textit{De vita beata} 11.1).
A major emphasis in ancient philosophy was thus how to overcome one’s passions.\footnote{See e.g., Xenophon, Mem. 1.2.24; Valerius Maximus 3.3. ext. 1; Musonius Rufus 6, p. 52.15–17; 7, p. 56.27; 12, pp. 86.39—88.1; Maximus of Tyre, Or. 1.9; 7.7; 25.6; Lamblichus, Letter 3, frg. 3 (Stobaeus, Anth. 3.5.46); Porphyry, Marc. 31.479–481; Let. Aris. 256; 4 Macc 13:1; A.J. Malherbe, “The Beasts at Ephesus,” JBL 87/1 (1968) 71–80. Many sources use figurative war imagery, as in Rom 7:23 (see Keener, The Mind of the Spirit, 110–111). Control of oneself was the greatest conquest (Seneca Y., Nat. 1. pref. 5; 3. pref. 10; Lucil. 113.29–31; Publilius Syrus 137; Prov 16:32; cf. Xenophon, Mem. 1.5.1).} Aristotle’s followers, the Peripatetics, merely wanted to moderate passions, but some others, notably Stoics, wanted to eradicate them.\footnote{Tobin, Rhetoric, 229; J.M. Dillon, “Philosophy,” DNTB 796. In 4 Macc 3:2–5 reason expressly controls and fights passions rather than eradicates them.} Philosophers in the Platonist tradition felt that thinking about virtue or the divine, which was pure intellect, would free one from passions.\footnote{E.g., Philo, Sce. 45; cf. discussions of 2 Cor 3:18; Phil 4:8 in Keener, The Mind of the Spirit.} Thus one later Platonist emphasized that philosophy should cast passion from the soul, as medicine drives sickness from the body.\footnote{Porphyry, Marc. 31.483.}

Despite differences among particular schools, most intellectuals agreed that one must use reason, guided by virtue, to at least control the passions.\footnote{Cicero, Inv. 2.54.164; Off. 2.5.18; Leg. 1.23.60; Sallust, Catil. 51.3; Plutarch, Lect. 1, Mor. 37E; Maximus of Tyre, Or. 33.3; Porphyry, Marc. 6.99; 29.453–460; 31.478–483; 34.521–522; cf. in other cultures, e.g., traditional Morocco (D.F. Eickelman, The Middle East. An Anthropological Approach [Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall 1989] 205).} Passions could challenge and overpower reason if the latter were not sufficiently strong.\footnote{Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 5.8.6; Cicero, Sen. 12.40; Chariton, Chaer. 2.4.4; Aries Didymus 2.7.10a, p. 58.5–6, 12–16; Marcus Aurelius, Medit. 3.6.2; Porphyry, Marc. 9.154–155; for passions as a distraction from attention to God, see Maximus of Tyre, Or. 11.10. One or the other would be in control, with passion being more feminine (Maximus of Tyre, Or. 33.2, from an androcentric perspective; cf. Philo, Immurt. 111). Greek thinkers often associated passion both with females and with barbarians; see D.E. McCoskey, Race, Antiquity and Its Legacy (New York: Oxford University Press 2012) 56 (for barbarians as like beasts, e.g., Libanius, Invent. 2.1; Common Topics 2.6).} Stoics and Platonists alike agreed that one must distinguish real happiness from transient pleasures, and that one learns this discernment by “repeated, deliberate choice, a lifelong struggle for rational mastery.”\footnote{W.A. Meeks, The Moral World of the First Christians (LEC 6; Philadelphia, PA: Westminster 1986) 47.} Thus one collector of historical anecdotes concluded that Philosophy “drives away every unseemly and useless emotion,” making reason “more powerful than fear and pain.”\footnote{As with the limitations of Stoicism (Sorabji, Emotion, 153–154), cognitive therapy when used by itself is more useful for some disorders than others (e.g., for reducing phobias but not helpful for anorexia; 155).}

For Stoics the process was purely cognitive: genuinely understanding what was true would eradicate the emotions that were tied to false assumptions about what really mattered.\footnote{Valerius Maximus, Mem. 3.3. ext. 1 (LCL 492, 275).} Although the Stoic approach offered some positive insights that can be used even today in cognitive psychology,\footnote{See Sorabji, Emotion, 2–4; Stowers, “Self-Mastery,” 540; Epictetus, Diatr. 1.28.6. Cf., however, Aries Didymus 2.7.10a, p. 58.11–16, where passions overpower teaching.} in practice it also severely underestimated (for all the Stoic emphasis on living according to nature!) the physiological connections between natural
bodily instincts and emotion, as well as connections between emotion and reason. Modern research has shown that powerful stimuli can alert the brain’s amygdala, generating emergency physical responses, before the signals are even processed by the cortex. Only at that point can stimuli be rationally evaluated and, when needed, deescalated rationally.97

Stoics were nevertheless sensitive to experiences they inevitably encountered when seeking to subject emotion to reason. Recognizing that humans experience physical reactions that precede cognitive judgments, Seneca counted these reactions “first movements,” a sort of pre-emotion that could be nipped in the bud by rational decisions once one had opportunity to consider them.98 Because Origen misconstrued “first movements” themselves as cognitive, Christians later imagined “many intermediate degrees of sin,” provoking new questions, such as “Did you let it linger? Did you enjoy it?”99 Although such exercises stimulated and developed self-discipline, they may also have often bred the very sort of fixation on sin that Romans 7 parodies.

Although details varied among ancient thinkers, most viewed reason and passion as mutually opposed. In Rom 1, however, those who fancied themselves wise (Rom 1:22) have become slaves of passion (1:24–27; cf. 6:12, 16; 16:18). In 1:27, Paul not only speaks of intense desire (ὄρεξις) but also uses the image of “burning” (ἐξεκαύθησαν, from ἐκκαίω), an image to which he appeals more explicitly in depicting intense emotion (2 Cor 11:29),100 including, as often elsewhere, consuming sexual passion (1 Cor 7:9).101

97 Sorabji, *Emotion*, 6, 144–155 (esp. 145–150). Galen viewed emotion as flowing from bodily states (see esp. 253–262). The Stoic emphasis on indifference is not natural or desirable for modern therapy (pp. 169–180).

98 Sorabji, *Emotion*, 2–5. Seneca would have included among such first movements the involuntary stimulation of male organs, more rapid respiration when provoked, loss of color when startled, and the like (11). Such “first movements” become problematic only if, once wrong judgments are identified, one chooses them, allowing emotion to become worse (see more fully pp. 55–65). Thus if one assents to the movement rather than preferring reason, it becomes full-fledged emotion (73); but it is not a matter of choice so long as it remains involuntary, like anything that befalls the body (73–74, citing Seneca Y., *Anger* 2.2.1—2.4.2). Earlier Posidonius, who felt that judgments were not always necessary for emotion to occur (Sorabji, *Emotion*, 121–132; cf. others in 133, 142), accepted something like first movements, but without denying that they involved some emotion (118–119).

99 Sorabji, *Emotion*, 8–9 (quotations from 9); more fully, 343–356 (on Origen, esp. 346–351). This led further to the seven cardinal sins (357–371) and Augustine’s philosophic and linguistic misunderstanding of Stoics regarding emotion, through which sin was thought to pervade every layer of one’s being (372–384). Though respecting Augustine, Sorabji prefers Pelagius’s approach to lust (417).


3. Passion and the Law in Hellenistic Jewish Sources

Paul does not limit damaging passion to gentiles; for him, knowledge of even God’s law is not sufficient to overcome passion. Hellenistic Jewish authors, like many gentile philosophers, saw passions as harmful (and, beyond most gentiles, as sinful). For the first-century Jewish philosopher Philo, for example, the mind that loves the body and passion, enslaved to pleasure, cannot hear the divine voice. Like most gentile philosophers, Diaspora Jewish thinkers contended that the key to overcoming passions was reason.

For Jewish thinkers, the epitome of this reason that overcomes passion was found in the Torah. There is strong evidence suggesting that the Jewish community in Rome had a highly developed knowledge of the law and belief in its superiority to other ancient legal collections.

Jewish thinkers found in the law of Moses explicit warrant against passion. The tenth commandment, “You shall not covet” (αὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις, Exod 20:17 and Deut 5:21 LXX, using ἐπιθυμέω) specifically addressed overcoming passion. Citing this very commandment (Rom 7:7), Paul will argue that the law was never meant to eradicate passion; only Christ frees one from sin.

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4.7.6; 5.9.9; 6.3.3; 6.4.5; 6.7.1; Achilles Tatius 1.5.5–6; 1.11.3; 1.17.1; 2.3.3; 4.6.1; 4.7.4; 5.15.5; 5.25.6; 6.18.2; Apuleius, Metam. 2.5, 7; 5.23; Xenophon, Eph. Tale 1.3, 5, 9, 14; 2.3; 3.6.

102 E.g., 4 Macc 3:11; T. Dan 4:5; T. Ash. 3:2; 6:5; also Sir 18:30–32 (cf. 6:2, 4); the origin of all sin, in Apoc. Mos. 19:3; sexual in T. Jud. 13:2; T. Jos. 3:10; 7:8; T. Reu. 4:9; 5:6. Philo castigates “lovers of pleasure” in Creation 157–159; Alleg. Interp. 3.161; Sacrifice of Cain and Abel 32; cf. sexual “pleasure” in T. Iss. 3:5. T. Reu. 2:8 maintains the biblical posture that desire for intercourse is good, but warns that it can lead to love for pleasure; Philo (Creation 152) complains that woman brought man sexual pleasures, introducing sins. Rulers must avoid being distracted by pleasure (Let. Aris. 245), for people are prone to pleasure (277; cf. 108, 222).

103 Philo, Immut. 111. This contrasts with the sacred mind uncorrupted by shameful matters (Immut. 105). For Philo, the garden’s serpent is pleasure (e.g., Creation 157–160, 164; Alleg. Interp. 2.71–74; Husb. 97).


106 See 4 Macc 2:23; see also D.A. Campbell, The Deliverance of God. An Apocalyptic Rereading of Justification in Paul (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans 2009) 564. For law providing self-mastery over passions in Josephus and Philo, see Stowers, “Self-Mastery,” 532–534. In principle, good laws were supposed to make good people (Polybius, Hist. 4.47.3–4), since law is not ruled by passion (Aristotle, Pol. 3.11.4, 1287a).


108 Tobin, Rhetoric, 231–232, citing 4 Macc 2:4–6; Philo, Decal. 142–153, 173–174; Spec. 4.79–131. In Philo Special Lutes 4.80, desire for what one lacks is the most troublesome passion.

4. Unlawful Desire

It is possible to define desire here too broadly. Unlike the most extreme hellenistic thinkers, Paul would not demand the conquest of every bodily desire. Paul probably does not, for example, oppose sexual desire in marriage or appreciation for food. On such points, Paul reflects not the austerity of some gentile thinkers but thoroughly conventional, mainstream Jewish views (as well as the common views of most ordinary people in antiquity).

When Paul speaks of passions, he does not, unlike some philosophers, define them, but his association of forbidden desire with the law’s command not to covet probably presupposes what the biblical commandment contextually specifies: desiring what belongs to someone else. What the body desires may even be necessary for survival or the biblically mandated propagation of humanity; but the mind remains responsible to limit the fulfilment of those desires to what God’s law permits. A thirsty person’s craving for water or a person’s reproductive drive are not wrong in themselves, but desiring someone else’s spouse or donkey is wrong. Desire must be harnessed rather than running amok.

The problem of conquering desire arises when desires that were created for good if directed by moral reason instead rule the person. As Paul laments, “I see a different law in my members, battling against the law in relation my mind, and taking me prisoner by the law in relation to my members, the law that reveals sin. … Who will free me from the body thus doomed to death? … Thus, with respect to the mind, I’m emphatically serving God’s law—but, with respect to the flesh, the law in its role of revealing sin” (paraphrasing Rom 7:23–25).

5. New Identity in Christ (Rom 6:11)

My elaboration of previous points leaves me less space to elaborate Paul’s answer to the problem he so graphically depicts. In Rom 4:3–25 (and possibly also 5:1–11), Paul offers an extended midrash on Gen 15:6: “And Abraham trusted God, and it was reckoned to his account as righteousness.” Although Paul by no means limits his use of λογίζομαι (“reckon”) to accounting language (cf. e.g., probably 8:18, 36; 14:14), it is no accident


Most opposed excessive desire rather than proper desire (W. Deming, Paul on Marriage and Celibacy. The Hellenistic Background of 1 Corinthians 7, 2 ed. [Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans 2004] 45, 69, n. 70, 128, nn. 85–86); for Stoics some desires or interests could be morally indifferent and thus acceptable provided they were kept within natural bounds.

Like others, he was even capable of using ἐπιθυμία in a positive way in the right context (Phil 1:23; 1 Thess 2:17).

See 1 Cor 7:9 (despite the way that some interpreters understand 1 Thess 4:4–5). In earlier Jewish sources, see comment in C.D. Mueller, “Two Faces of Lust,” TBT 41/5 (2003) 308–314.

See Rom 14:2–3, 6; 1 Cor 9:4; Col 2:16; cf. the echo of a traditional Jewish benediction in 1 Tim 4:3–5.
that his greatest cluster of the term appears in his exposition of this verse from Genesis (Rom 4:3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 22, 23, 24—eleven times). In Rom 4, God reckoned righteousness to Abraham’s account, and thus to the account of those who, like their spiritual father Abraham, believe.


That is, having already been made right by trusting God, they now ought to trust the reality that God has accomplished—that God has made them right in Christ. This includes the reality that they have a new identity in Christ as those who have died to sin. This reckoning follows God’s reckoning; it recognizes rather than confers a new identity.

Origen recognized both the reality of temptation and the higher dimension of reality of what his identification with Christ entailed: “Whoever thinks or considers that he is dead will not sin. For example, if lust for a woman gets hold of me or if greed for silver, gold or riches stirs me and I say in my heart that I have died with Christ ... the lust is immediately quenched and sin disappears.”\footnote{Origen, Comm. Rom. on 6:11 (FC 2, III, 188); Bray, Romans, 162.}

Paul was not alone in considering the role of reason and new perspective in overcoming passion. Ancient thinkers emphasized focusing one’s mind on what was good (cf. Phil 4:8).\footnote{Such as focusing the mind on nature, to live in harmony with it (Musonius Rufus, frg. 42, p. 138.9–11), or on the soul (Plutarch, Pleas. L., 14); the gods would reward a good mind (Maximus of Tyre, Or. 8.7). One’s thinking (φρόνημα) should always be “turned toward God” (Porphyry, Marc. 20.327–329 (SBLTT 28, 63); one’s speaking would thus be inspired ἔνθεος (20.329). Oaths to Caesar could even promise mental loyalty to Caesar (CIGRR 3.137; OGIS 532; R.K. Sherk [ed., trans.], The Roman Empire. Augustus to Hadrian [New York: Cambridge University Press 1988] §15, p. 31).}

Philosophy was a matter of using reason and contemplating what was necessary.\footnote{Musonius Rufus 16, p. 106.3–6, 12–16.}

Right thinking was crucial for Stoics. A Stoic could contend that what matters most is to think rightly, unafraid of fortune and joyful in hardship.\footnote{Seneca Y., Nat. 3, pref. 11–15.}

By discipline of the mind people can learn to abstain from any pleasure, to endure any pain.\footnote{Seneca Y., Dial. 4.12.4–5. Cora E. Lutz (“Musonius Rufus,” 28) observes that Musonius also opined that through disciplining his mind (Musonius Rufus 6, p. 54.16–25) a wise person would achieve self-mastery (6, p. 54.2–10).}

Stoics developed cognitive exercises in order to form habits of interpreting reality according to their philosophic beliefs.\footnote{See Sorabji, Emotion, 165, 211–227. Some techniques remain useful today, e.g., relabeling (222–223).}

For Stoics, the way things appeared was not necessarily

\footnote{See Sorabji, Emotion, 213.}
reality; appearances were distorted by wrong thinking about them.\footnote{Sorabji, Emotion, 165.} On this point Paul apparently agreed.

6. Renewing of Mind: Neuroplasticity (Rom 12:2)

The most relevant Gentile ideas regarding a transformed mind appear in philosophers, who were those who addressed such issues. Thus, for example, Seneca insists that mere learning of what to do and not to do is insufficient; one becomes a truly wise person only when one’s “mind is metamorphosed \[transfiguratus est\] into the shape” of what one has learned.\footnote{Seneca Y., Lucil. 94.48 (LCL 77, 42–43). In Lucil. 6 (in Malherbe, Moral Exhortation, 64) Seneca claims that he was experiencing a transformation, though it was not yet complete. Stoics emphasized transformed thinking (R.M. Thorsteinsson, “Stoicism as a Key to Pauline Ethics in Romans,” Stoicism in Early Christianity [eds. T. Rasmussen – T. Engberg-Pedersen – I. Dunderberg] (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic 2010) 24–25). Peggy Vining ("Comparing Seneca’s Ethics in Epistulae Morales to Those of Paul in Romans," ResQ 47/2 [2005] 83–104) views Paul’s emphasis on reason and ethics as parallel to yet not dependent on the same Stoic emphasis.} The Platonic tradition also valued being conformed to the divine likeness.\footnote{See A.D. Nock, Early Gentile Christianity and Its Hellenistic Background (New York: Harper & Row 1964) 55. One honors God by making one’s thought like him (Porphyry, \textit{Marc}. 16.265–267), through virtue which draws the soul to what was like it (16.267–268); a mind like God gravitates toward him (19.315–316; for the divine law stamped in the mind, see 26.410–411, 419–420).} The wise person becomes good only “by thinking the good and noble thought which emanated from the divine.”\footnote{Porphyry, \textit{Marc}. 11.199–201 (SBLTT 28, 55).} Like some other philosophers,\footnote{E.g., Marcus Aurelius, \textit{Medit.} 10.8.2 (and comparable sources cited by Haines [LCL 58, 270, n. 1]).} the Jewish philosopher Philo emphasizes being conformed to God.\footnote{Philo, \textit{Creation} 144; cf. \textit{Abr.} 87; \textit{Decal.} 73; \textit{Virt.} 168. Philo uses the verb ἐξομοιόω and its cognate noun 46 times, sometimes with reference to nature’s conformity to God’s nature. Judeans also could emphasize the importance of right thinking about the law (e.g., 1QS 9.17; 4Q398 f14–17i.4).}

Ancient popular philosophic vocabulary would allow Paul’s audience to understand some of his language, but they might also recognize that he employs it somewhat differently. For Paul, of course, the transformation is into Christ’s image (cf. Rom 8:29; 2 Cor 3:18).\footnote{For the relevance of 2 Cor 3:18 and Hellenistic and Jewish conceptions of vision of the divine, see discussion in Keener, \textit{The Mind of the Spirit}, 206–215. These texts about Christ’s image employ cognate terms in a relevant manner. On Christ as God’s image embodying expectations for divine wisdom (cf. 2 Cor 4:4; Wis 7:26), see e.g., discussion in C.S. Keener, \textit{1 and 2 Corinthians} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005) 169–171, 174; cf. the \textit{logos} in Philo \textit{Dreams} 2.45.} Imitation of God is also prominent in philosophic discourse;\footnote{See e.g., Cicero, \textit{Tusc.} 5.25.70; Seneca Y., \textit{Dial.} 1.1.5; Epictetus, \textit{Diatr.} 2.14.12–13; Marcus Aurelius 10.8.2; Heraclitus, \textit{Ep.} 5; Plutarch, \textit{Borr.} 7, \textit{Mor.} 830B; \textit{Let. Aris.} 188, 190, 192, 208–210, 254, 281; Philo, \textit{Creation} 139; \textit{T. Asb.} 4.3; \textit{Mek. Shirata} 3.43–44; \textit{Sifra Qad.} par. 1.195.1.3; \textit{Sent. Sect.} 44–45; C.G. Rutenber, \textit{The Doctrine of the Imitation of God in Plato} (New York: King’s Crown, Columbia University Press 1946) chs. 2–3; cf. Eph 5:1.} but in the context of Romans it is God’s Spirit rather than human ability (or innate divinity) that effects the transformation.
Most philosophers emphasized that one should not follow the views of the masses;¹³⁰ but for Paul, lack of conformity to this “age” belongs to his realized approach to a conventional Jewish “two ages” schema (cf. Rom 8:11, 23; 1 Cor 2:9–10; 10:11; 2 Cor 1:22; Gal 1:4). Likewise, while philosophic ideals often emphasize transformation,¹³¹ Paul applies related language to eschatological transformation (Rom 8:29; Phil 3:21), an image at home in Jewish apocalyptic sources.¹³²

In view of the preceding context of Rom 12:2, Paul thinks partly of God’s own mind or wisdom revealed in salvation history (11:34).¹³³ God provides them retroactive insight into his purposes.¹³⁴ If the preceding context offers God’s sovereign plan as a foundation for transforming the mind, the following context offers one objective of this transformation. The right way of thinking (12:2–3) puts each believer’s embodied contribution (12:1) in the wider context of Christ’s body (12:4–8).

A Stoic might seek to transcend embodied individual limitations through recognizing God’s mind in the cosmos, viewing the universe¹³⁵ and even the state as a body. For Paul, both salvation history and God’s people offer a context beyond the individual. Paul’s point is not simply a context beyond one’s limited personhood, as in Stoicism, but rather a life beyond human autonomy in its willful rejection of God’s perspective. Individual believers’ bodies can serve the higher purposes of Christ’s body (Rom 12:1, 5).¹³⁶ For Paul, Christ dwells in his body, working through all believers. Although God works in the cosmos (Rom 1:19–20; Col 1:15–16) and in all of history, he is revealed most fully in the history of his people and his current work among his people in Christ.

¹³⁰ E.g., Musonius Rufus frg. 41, p. 136.22–24; Philo, Abr. 38.
¹³² Cf. e.g., Dan 12:3; 4 Ezra 7:97; 2 Bar. 51:3, 5; 1 Cor 15:51–53; Phil 3:21; cf. Segal, Convert, 63–65.
¹³³ Adapting Isa 40:13; cf. Paul’s use of the same question from Isa 40:13 in 1 Cor 2:16, where Paul responds with the “mind of Christ.”
¹³⁵ E.g., Cicero, Fin. 3.13.64 (providing the Stoic view); Seneca Y., Lucil. 95.52; Epictetus, Diatr. 1.12.26.
Conclusion

By engaging the popular intellectual language of his contemporaries, Paul seeks to communicate his distinctly Christocentric message. Reason’s ability to control passions, as promoted by contemporary philosophy, is shown by Paul to be compromised by the ways passions have corrupted it. Moreover, Paul asserts that even right knowledge of God’s law, as generally suggested by Jewish thinkers, cannot deliver one from this enslavement. Paul, thus, presents a new way of dealing with passions, namely that Christ by the Spirit liberates from bondage to passion, enabling a relationship with and a life pleasing to God.

Bibliography


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