

A “Clash of Definitions”? Polish Émigré Scholars and the Cold War Discourse of Western Civilization

KAI JOHANN WILLMS

Universität Basel
kai.willms@unibas.ch

Abstract: In the course of the twentieth century, the idea of “the West” as a community of shared cultural values acquired fundamental importance in international politics. What constitutes the identity of this community and how exactly its geographical scope should be defined has often been a matter of debate. This article examines how Polish scholars, who spent part of their academic careers in Cold War America and opposed the communist regime in their homeland, participated in such debates and how they imagined the relationship between Poland and “the West”. Focusing on three individual cases representing different generations of the émigré community, the article shows to what extent Polish émigré scholars’ ideas about the identity of “the West” were compatible with contemporary American discourse, how they were related to concepts of “modernization,” and how they evolved in the context of generational change.

Keywords: Polish exile, Cold War, civilization discourse, modernization theory, postcolonialism

More than three decades after the end of the Cold War, the idea of “the West” as a distinct civilizational entity remains a central means of mentally mapping the political world – be it as an element of positive self-identification with “Western values” or, as in the case of the recent Russian concept of “the collective West,”¹ as an element of cultural othering. Historians of “the West” as a political concept have emphasized that this duality can be traced back to its origins: Already in the nineteenth century, the emergence of a French and German discourse that associated “the West” with liberalism and modernity was closely linked to the rise of a Russian self-image as “non-Western” in the context of the debate between Slavophiles and Westernizers.² A conceptual history of “the West” must therefore take into account the transnational dimension of Occidentalist discourses.³

¹ This term has become widespread in Russian media since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Cf. Natalia Bogatyreva, “Enemies Inside and Out: How Russians Believe Conspiracy Theories,” *Zeitschrift für Psychologie* 232, no. 1 (2024): 42.

² Cf. Riccardo Bavaj, “‘The West’: A Conceptual Exploration,” *European History Online (EGO)*, November 21, 2011, accessed August 23, 2024, <https://www.ieg-ego.eu/bavajr-2011-en>.

³ Cf. also Jasper M. Trautsch, “‘Der Westen’: Theoretisch-methodische Überlegungen zu einer Begriffsgeschichte,” *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte*, no. 60/61 (2018/2019), 434–40.

In analyzing such discourses historically, it is crucial to consider how ideas about the identity of “the West” have changed over time. In his influential critique of Samuel P. Huntington’s concept of a “clash of civilizations,”⁴ Edward W. Said has argued that instead of conceptualizing civilizations as homogeneous and antagonistic cultural entities, scholars should recognize that cultures had developed in constant exchange with one another and that they had always been pluralistic and dynamic in themselves. In particular, the question of what constituted the identity of “Western civilization” had been answered differently at different times, and it had often been the subject of debate. The real problem, therefore, was not a “clash of civilizations” but a conflict over how to define the identity of particular cultures – a “clash of definitions.”⁵

This article examines how Polish émigré scholars in the United States became involved in Cold War debates about the identity of “the West,” how they sought to shape American imaginaries of this civilizational entity, and how they conceptualized the relationship between their home country and “the West.” The case of Polish attitudes toward “the West” is particularly interesting because of what can be described as a history of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion.⁶ On the one hand, Poland has often been portrayed as a defender and disseminator of “Western values,” be it Western Christianity, democracy and the rule of law, or the free market and property rights – especially in the context of its centuries-old geopolitical antagonism with Russia.⁷ On the other hand, Poland has often found itself excluded from the community of “the West” – either physically, as during the Cold War, or discursively, as in times when “the West” was primarily associated with modernity and Poland was considered too “backward” to be “Western.” With regard to the nineteenth century, historian Jerzy Jedlicki has shown that also within the Polish discourse, attitudes toward “the West” were closely linked to perspectives on modernity: While Polish liberals had conceptualized “the West” as a model of social development that could help Poland overcome its perceived “backwardness,” conservative adherents of Romantic nationalism had constructed pre-partition Poland as the epitome

⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

⁵ Edward W. Said, “The Clash of Definitions,” in Said, *Reflections on Exile and Other Essays* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 569–90.

⁶ In this respect, the relationship between Poland and “the West” can be compared to that between “Eastern Europe” and “Europe.” Cf. on the latter Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), 7.

⁷ Cf., for instance, Andrzej Sulima Kamiński, *Republic vs. Autocracy: Poland-Lithuania and Russia, 1686–1697* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); Andrzej Nowak, *Polska i Rosja: Sąsiedztwo wolności i despotyzmu X–XXI w.* (Kraków: Biały Kruk, 2022). For a historiographical analysis of this discourse cf. Andrew Kier Wise, “Russia as Poland’s Civilizational ‘Other,’” in *The East–West Discourse: Symbolic Geography and its Consequences*, ed. Alexander Maxwell (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2011), 73–92.

of a “truly” Western culture, distinct from the allegedly degenerate industrial civilization of late nineteenth-century Western Europe.⁸

Focusing on three scholars representing different generations of the Cold War Polish émigré community – historians Oskar Halecki (1891–1973) and Piotr Wandycz (1923–2017), and Slavist Ewa Thompson (*1937) – I show how Polish imaginaries of “the West” have evolved since 1945 and how these imaginaries have been linked to shifting discourses of “modernity.” While previous scholarship has told the story of changing imaginaries of “the West” among Polish émigrés as a story of idealization and disenchantment,⁹ I argue that examining the ideas of scholars who sought to engage with debates in their host society reveals two paradigmatic shifts in Polish Occidentalist discourse: from an early Cold War anticommunist vision that still contained traces of interwar antimodernism, to a paradigm that associated “the West” with an affirmative understanding of “modernity,” and finally to an increasingly critical perspective on “modernization” as an allegedly hegemonic concept in the context of postcolonial theories during the late Cold War and early post-Cold War period.

These paradigmatic shifts are characteristic of discourses in many Western countries and reflect the rise and fall of modernization theory during the Cold War.¹⁰ However, as I will show below, the fact that Polish émigré scholars in the United States did not always make these shifts in synchrony with their host society did at times lead to “clashes of definition” regarding the conceptualization of “the West.”

“The West” as a Community of Timeless Spiritual Values: Oskar Halecki

Oskar Halecki is commonly known as the originator of the concept of “East Central Europe” as a distinct historical region. Many aspects of his life and work have been thoroughly researched: we know that his multiethnic ancestry, which linked him to the history of two European empires that were crucial for the historical genesis of “East Central Europe” – the Habsburg Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth – as well as

⁸ Cf. Jerzy Jedlicki, “A Stereotype of the West in Postpartition Poland,” *Social Research* 59, no. 2 (1992): 345–64; in more detail also: Jedlicki, *A Suburb of Europe: Nineteenth-Century Polish Approaches to Western Civilization* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999).

⁹ Cf. Łukasz Mikołajewski, *Disenchanted Europeans: Polish Émigré Writers from Kultura and the Postwar Reformulations of the West* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2018).

¹⁰ Cf. on the latter: Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007).

his Catholic faith provided an important background for his historiographical work.¹¹ It has also been shown how, during the interwar period, Halecki developed a vision of a multiethnic, federalist Poland that would build on the tradition of the Jagiellonian dynasty in pursuing an alleged civilizing mission towards the East, and how, already at that time, he sought to promote internationally the idea that Poland had always had close ties with the Western world.¹² Finally, it is known that after emigrating to France in 1939 and then to the United States in 1940, Halecki played a crucial role in organizing the activities of Polish émigré scholars, and that he tried to popularize the idea that the region of “East Central Europe” constituted the “Borderlands of Western Civilization.”¹³ But what shaped Halecki’s understanding of “Western civilization”?¹⁴ How was it related to his perspective on “modernity,” and how was it influenced by his own transcultural experience, especially his perception of American culture?

During Halecki’s studies at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków, then part of the Habsburg Empire, one of his most influential lecturers was Waclaw Sobieski. Sobieski advocated an “optimistic” view of Polish national history, according to which affirmative interpretations should strengthen the national consciousness of Poles and encourage them in their struggle for national independence.¹⁵ In an obituary for his teacher, Halecki later emphasized that this patriotic approach to historiography did not amount to nationalistic parochialism: “Ardent patriotism never narrowed the horizons of this thoroughly national historian. On the contrary, he was one of those rare Polish historiographers who, even before the war, recognized the need to link Polish history organically to universal history [...]”¹⁶ As evidence, Halecki cited, among other publications, an

¹¹ Cf., for instance, Grzegorz Ryś, “Chrześcijaństwo jako klucz interpretacyjny historiozofii Oskara Haleckiego,” in *Oskar Halecki i jego wizja Europy*, Vol. 1, ed. Małgorzata Dąbrowska (Warsaw, Łódź: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2012), 9–15; Christoph Augustynowicz, “Wiedeńska genealogia Oskara Haleckiego,” in *Oskar Halecki i jego wizja Europy*, Vol. 2, ed. Małgorzata Dąbrowska (Warsaw, Łódź: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2014), 15–20.

¹² Cf., among other publications, Krzysztof Baczkowski, “Oskara Haleckiego jagiellońska wizja dziejów,” in *Oskar Halecki*, Vol. 1, 56–77; Marek Kornat, “Profesor Oskar Halecki w życiu politycznym Polski i na forum międzynarodowym,” in *Oskar Halecki i jego wizja Europy*, Vol. 3, ed. Małgorzata Dąbrowska (Warsaw, Łódź: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2014), 232–88.

¹³ Cf. Oskar Halecki, *Borderlands of Western Civilization: A History of East Central Europe* (New York: Ronald Press, 1952). For an overview of Halecki’s scholarly activities in the United States cf.: Rafał Stobiecki, *Klio za wielką wodą: Polscy historycy w Stanach Zjednoczonych po 1945 r.* (Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2017), 135–169.

¹⁴ A first step towards answering this question was made by Rafał Stobiecki, “Oskar Halecki jako historyk cywilizacji?,” in *Oskar Halecki*, Vol. 2, 124–44.

¹⁵ Cf. Hans-Jürgen Bömelburg, “Zwischen imperialer Geschichte und Ostmitteleuropa als Geschichtsregion: Oskar Halecki und die polnische ‘jagiellonische Idee,’” in *Vergangene Größe und Ohnmacht in Ostmitteleuropa: Repräsentationen imperialer Erfahrung in der Historiographie seit 1918*, eds. Frank Hadler and Mathias Mesenhöller (Leipzig: Akademische Verlagsanstalt, 2007), 104.

¹⁶ Oskar Halecki, “Waclaw Sobieski,” *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, no. 49 (1935): 483.

essay on the role of Tadeusz Kościuszko and Kazimierz Pułaski in the American War of Independence, subtitled "Uniting the Ideals of Poland and America," which Sobieski had published in 1918 – the year in which Woodrow Wilson outlined his Fourteen Points, which included the restoration of an independent Polish state.¹⁷ In this essay, Sobieski argued that there were broad similarities between the political systems of the early United States and the late Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: both were based on the principles of federalism and the decentralization of power, and just as the Americans had defended these principles against the British king, the Poles had attempted to do so against the absolutist monarchs of Russia and Prussia. Their defeat and the partitions of Poland had marked the moment when Europe had taken a different historical path than America.¹⁸

This positive view of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as a fundamentally Western system became a cornerstone of Halecki's thinking during the interwar period, and he soon advocated the idea that the Second Polish Republic should follow in its footsteps. In 1920, at the height of the Polish-Soviet War, he argued that Poland's eastern border of 1772 should be restored because "to renounce the land for which our ancestors died in countless wars and uprisings would offend our most sacred national feelings."¹⁹ In Halecki's eyes, the creation of a federation encompassing the territories inhabited by Poles, Lithuanians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians would not only satisfy Poland's "historical rights," but would also be the best way to implement Wilson's principle of national self-determination. A federal state structure would be useful in winning the support of the Western Allies.²⁰

The outcome of the Polish-Soviet War left no room for the realization of federalist ideas. While Halecki did not openly criticize the drawing of Poland's new eastern border and the policies toward national minorities in the Second Polish Republic, he remained loyal to his "Jagiellonian Idea" as an abstract ideal of Polish statehood: he continued to believe that the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had acted as a bulwark against the "Muscovite-Tatar-Turkish East" and that it had "extraordinarily extended the reach of the Latin civilization of the West."²¹ As can be seen from these quotes, Halecki's interwar understanding of "Western civilization" was not tied to a vision of "modernization" but

¹⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, 486.

¹⁸ Cf. Wacław Sobieski, "Kościuszko i Pułaski w Ameryce. (Zjednoczenie ideałów Polski i Ameryki)," in *Pol-ska w kulturze powszechnej. Część I: Ogólna*, ed. Feliks Koneczny (Kraków: Krakowska Ekspozytura Biura Patronatu dla Spółek Oszczędności i Pożyczek, 1918), 92.

¹⁹ Oskar Halecki, "Granica z r. 1772 a nasz program obecny," *Wschód Polski* 1, no. 4 (1920): 2.

²⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, 9. For two opinions of Ukrainian historians on Halecki's federalist ideas cf. Oleksandr Avramchuk, "Między ideą jagiellońską a Międzymorzem: Ewolucja kwestii ukraińskiej w poglądach politycznych Oskara Haleckiego (1891–1973)," *Klio Polska* 9, (2017): 57–79; Gennadii Korolov, "Dwie Europy Środkowe' Oskara Haleckiego w 'cieniu imperializmów,'" *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 124, no. 4 (2017): 677–98.

²¹ Oskar Halecki, "Idea jagiellońska," *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 51, (1937): 509.

referred to a pre-modern state of European culture that should serve as a model for the present. He also explicitly subscribed to an anti-modernist discourse that was prevalent in many European countries at the time, although he did not identify with its radical political manifestations: reviewing a book by the Swiss traditionalist thinker Gonzague de Reynold for the daily *Kurjer Warszawski* in May 1934, Halecki agreed with Reynold's interpretation of modern European history as a history of decline and argued that the "anthropocentrism" of the "so-called modern world" should be replaced by a revival of medieval "theocentrism." Unlike Reynold, however, Halecki did not claim that movements such as Italian Fascism or German Nazism could be useful in achieving this goal.²²

After emigrating to the United States during World War II, Halecki was not one of those émigrés who believed that Polish intellectual traditions should be substantially reassessed in light of the global political changes of the war and early postwar period. He remained faithful to his "optimistic" view of the history of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and insisted that the ethnically mixed eastern borderlands annexed by the Soviet Union should be returned to Poland.²³ He also adhered to an understanding of "Western civilization" that emphasized long historical continuities, as can be seen in his influential book *The Limits and Divisions of European History*.²⁴ An important point of reference for him was the approach of Arnold J. Toynbee, who had achieved international fame as the author of the twelve-volume *A Study of History* – especially in the United States, where he was generally regarded as the greatest living historian.²⁵ Halecki and Toynbee had known each other since the interwar period and kept in touch after the former's emigration to America.²⁶ They agreed that nation-states were an inadequate framework for historiography because they were part of larger cultural entities – civilizations, which Toynbee conceived as an "intelligible field of study."²⁷ But while Toynbee had studied the emergence, growth, and collapse of civilizations in a comparative way, Halecki favored the study of individual cases and focused on Europe, which he portrayed as exceptional because of its high cultural diversity in a small territory.²⁸

²² Cf. idem, "U podstaw kryzysu," *Kurjer Warszawski*, 27 May 1934, 8–10.

²³ Cf. for instance Oskar Halecki, "Mit linii Curzona," *Instytut Józefa Piłsudskiego w Ameryce: Biuletyn* 16, no. 2 (1959). Cf. also Avramchuk, "Między ideą jagiellońską a Międzymorzem," 77.

²⁴ Oskar Halecki, *The Limits and Divisions of European History* (London, New York: Sheed & Ward, 1950).

²⁵ Cf. Jürgen Osterhammel, "Arnold Toynbee and the Problems of Today," *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute Washington* 60, (2017): 70.

²⁶ Cf. the correspondence between Halecki and Toynbee in the PIASA Archives, Fonds No. 17: Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences of America, f. 146.

²⁷ Cf. on this aspect Paul Costello, *World Historians and Their Goals: Twentieth-Century Answers to Modernism* (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1993), 78.

²⁸ "Whatever is colossal and uniform is definitely un-European, and that is the secret of all the refinement and distinction of European civilization." Halecki, *The Limits and Divisions*, 12.

Halecki also argued that Europe should not simply be equated with "the West," as this would imply a conceptual marginalization of the eastern half of the continent. Instead, he offered a historical framework according to which a Mediterranean (Greco-Roman), a European and an Atlantic civilization were "affiliated" to each other – a term that he borrowed from Toynbee.²⁹ Rejecting the traditional periodization of ancient, medieval, and modern history, Halecki argued that the Mediterranean civilization had not collapsed in 476, but had been replaced by the European civilization around the year 1000, when most of Northern and Eastern Europe had been Christianized. For him, it was legitimate to regard European civilization as essentially Christian. The thirteenth century, with its supposed harmony between Christian and humanist traditions, had been the greatest epoch in European history, while the process of secularization had meant the decline of European civilization. In the first half of the twentieth century, the "European age" had finally come to an end.³⁰

Despite this critical perspective on European modernity, Halecki did not indulge in the cultural pessimism that Oswald Spengler had expressed three decades earlier in *The Decline of the West*.³¹ Instead, he expressed hope that the emerging Atlantic civilization would be even more closely "affiliated" to the European civilization than the latter had been to the ancient Mediterranean civilization, and that the heritage of European culture would survive in the New World.³² In line with what Sobieski had written earlier, Halecki described America as a continuation of European civilization:

It is no exaggeration to call the Western hemisphere, as a whole, a New Europe [...]. For the entire heritage of European culture, which included its well-preserved heritage of Mediterranean, Greco-Roman civilization and the whole Christian tradition in the form of all the different denominations, was brought to the other side of the Atlantic.³³

Since the new Atlantic community was based on the same – Christian – values as the older European one, the countries of East Central Europe would continue to act as a "bulwark" of Western civilization if they were liberated from Soviet rule.³⁴

²⁹ Cf. Stobiecki, "Oskar Halecki jako historyk cywilizacji?," 134.

³⁰ Cf. Halecki, *The Limits and Divisions*, 45–61; Stobiecki, "Oskar Halecki jako historyk cywilizacji?," 136.

³¹ Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, 2 Vols. (New York: Knopf, 1947). For the original edition cf. idem, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes: Umrisse einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte*, 2 Vols. (Vienna: Braumüller, 1918–1922).

³² Cf. also Małgorzata Morawiec, "Oskar Halecki (1891–1973)," in *Europa-Historiker: Ein biographisches Handbuch*, Vol. 1, eds. Heinz Duchhardt et al. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), 236.

³³ Halecki, *The Limits and Divisions*, 55.

³⁴ In his 1952 book *Borderlands of Western Civilization*, Halecki stated explicitly that the countries of East Central Europe were "more eager than ever before to join that world [the Western world, K.J.W.] in the

This conceptualization of “the West” was not entirely foreign to the contemporary American environment. Early American notions of an Atlantic community often drew on shared Christian values as a unifying principle.³⁵ However, Halecki had to acknowledge that influential participants in the American discourse on the identity of “the West” expressed ideas that differed from his own. A leading proponent of such a different conceptualization of “the West” was the historian William H. McNeill. In 1963, McNeill published *The Rise of the West*, which quickly became a best-seller in the United States as an optimistic counterpoint to Spengler’s *The Decline of the West*.³⁶ While he also referred to Toynbee’s idea of civilizations, he rejected its metaphysical implications³⁷ and shifted his methodological focus from historical comparison to the analysis of the diffusion of techniques and ideas across civilizations. In his view, the rise of “the West” had begun around 1500, when Europeans began discovering distant regions of the world and adopting technological innovations from other civilizations. He argued that the ability to transform itself had become a cornerstone of “the West’s” superiority, and that “an accelerating pace of technical and social change bids fair to remain a persistent feature of Western civilization.”³⁸

This emphasis on change and innovation was hardly compatible with Halecki’s belief in timeless Christian values, and McNeill’s interest in the exchanges between civilizations contrasted with the former’s rhetoric of “bulwark.” When McNeill turned his attention to what Halecki had called “East Central Europe,” the clash of definitions became clear: in his 1964 book, *Europe’s Steppe Frontier*, McNeill explored how the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires had managed, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, to establish hegemony over the territory between them. He argued that these empires had been able to organize power more efficiently than their local competitors, especially Poland and Hungary with their self-assertive nobility. Disappointed that a prominent

spirit of their own democratic tradition and cultural heritage” and “could be a stronghold of peace at the very frontier of Western civilization.” Cf. idem, *Borderlands of Western Civilization*, 474, 515.

³⁵ Cf. Emiliano Alessandri, “The Atlantic Community as Christendom: Some Reflections on Christian Atlanticism in America, circa 1900–1950,” in *Defining the Atlantic Community: Culture, Intellectuals, and Policies in the Mid-Twentieth Century*, ed. Marco Mariano (New York, London: Routledge, 2010), 47–70; Giuliana Chamedes, “Transatlantic Catholicism and the Making of the ‘Christian West’” in *The Transatlantic Reconsidered: The Atlantic World in Crisis*, eds. Charlotte A. Lerg, Susanne Lachenicht, and Michael Kimmage (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2018), 139–55.

³⁶ McNeill had read Spengler’s book in 1936. Cf. Costello, *World Historians*, 189.

³⁷ In 1961, McNeill wrote that he was “disturbed by some of Toynbee’s mythological and theological language.” William H. McNeill, “Some Basic Assumptions of Toynbee’s *A Study of History*,” in *The Intent of Toynbee’s History: A Cooperative Appraisal*, ed. Edward T. Gargan (Chicago, IL: Loyola University Press, 1961), 45.

³⁸ William H. McNeill, *The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community. With a Retrospective Essay* (Chicago, IL, London: University of Chicago Press, 1991) [first edition: 1963], 567.

American historian had interpreted as a "victory of bureaucratic empire"³⁹ what appeared to him to be a victory of despotism over freedom, Halecki reviewed the book for the émigré weekly *Wiadomości*, noting that "one may doubt whether such interpretations, even when they appear under the pen of distinguished American historians, are in keeping with the liberal traditions of Washington's and Wilson's United States."⁴⁰

By the 1960s, Halecki had to acknowledge that postwar American culture was gradually distancing itself from the European spiritual heritage that he regarded as the foundation of the Atlantic community and that he wanted to be preserved. As he expressed in his 1963 book *The Millennium of Europe*, he saw "materialism" as a major threat to the Western world:

It is particularly instructive to observe that the frequent criticisms of the Orientals, who blame the West for the materialistic features of its culture, is directed against Europeans no less than against the Americans. This is for both of them a serious warning to revitalize the spiritual elements of their heritage, if they want it to survive and not to be submerged by the machine age.⁴¹

But this perspective found little support in an intellectual environment that saw social change and technological innovation as essential features of "the West's".

"The West" as Center of Political, Social and Cultural Innovations: Piotr Wandycz

While the first generation of Polish émigré scholars, members of the intellectual elite of the Second Polish Republic, often saw it as their duty to preserve the scholarly heritage of the interwar period, a younger generation was more willing to acculturate into their host society. Historian Piotr Wandycz can be considered a typical representative of this second generation.⁴² Born in Kraków and educated in Lwów, he emigrated with his parents at the outbreak of World War II (via Romania) to France, where he began studying history at the University of Grenoble before joining the Polish Armed Forces in "the West's" in 1942. After the war, he continued his studies at the University of Cambridge and the London School of Economics and Political Science. Focusing on the history of international relations and political ideas, Wandycz adopted the stance of

³⁹ Cf. idem, *Europe's Steppe Frontier, 1500–1800* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 125–80.

⁴⁰ Oskar Halecki, "Amerykańska interpretacja europejskich 'dzikich pól,'" *Wiadomości*, May 16, 1965, 3.

⁴¹ Halecki, *The Millennium of Europe* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963), 382.

⁴² Cf. Andrzej Nowak, "Emigracja 'drugiego pokolenia': Refleksje i pytania na marginesie biografii Piotra Wandycz i Leopolda Łąbedzia," *Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej* 50, no. 1 (2015): 103–17.

a sober empiricist, skeptical of grand narratives and historical determinism.⁴³ Politically, he identified with British liberalism.⁴⁴ In 1951 he received his doctorate with a thesis on “Liberal Internationalism: The Contribution of British and French Liberal Thought to the Theory of International Relations” and moved to the United States, where his father had lived since 1944.⁴⁵

Upon his arrival in New York, Wandycz soon became acquainted with Halecki. Their relationship was cordial, but not entirely free of disagreements. On the one hand, Wandycz appreciated Halecki’s efforts to popularize the concept of East-Central Europe in American scholarship. He himself was active in Polish émigré organizations that promoted a federalist organization of the region, such as the movement “Independence and Democracy” (*Niepodległość i Demokracja, NiD*)⁴⁶ and the Union of Polish Federalists (*Związek Polskich Federalistów*). Halecki was the patron of the latter.⁴⁷ In his scholarly work, Wandycz soon adopted Halecki’s concept of East-Central Europe, criticizing the region’s marginal role in American scholarship and historical education.⁴⁸

On the other hand, Wandycz was well aware that Halecki’s historical thinking was out of touch with contemporary American debates. In a 1975 obituary, he wrote that Halecki had “not adapted to the style of American scholars” and had “not been particularly popular in the American historical world.”⁴⁹ In his correspondence with Jerzy Giedroyc, the editor of the émigré magazine *Kultura*, Wandycz explicitly wrote that Halecki’s highly affirmative perspective on Polish history had been the main reason for his limited impact on American scholarship: Halecki and other émigrés of the older generation were “considered Polish propagandists in the (Anglo-Saxon) West, and from our point of view they gloss over significant errors of the past.”⁵⁰

While Wandycz remained loyal to Halecki’s attempts to introduce a Polish perspective into American historical research, his socialization in British and American academia

⁴³ Cf. Stobiecki, *Klio za wielką wodą*, 246–7.

⁴⁴ Cf. Piotr S. Wandycz, *O federalizmie i emigracji: Reminiscencje o rzeczach istotnych i błażych. Rozmowy przeprowadził Sławomir Łukasiewicz* (Lublin: Towarzystwo Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, 2003), 24.

⁴⁵ On Wandycz’s biography cf., among other publications, Antony Polonsky, “Piotr Wandycz: An Appreciation,” in *Ideology, Politics and Diplomacy in East Central Europe*, ed. M.B.B. Biskupski (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2003), xiii–xix; and, more extensively, Stobiecki, *Klio za wielką wodą* (as cited in note 13), 233–67.

⁴⁶ Cf. on Wandycz’s ties with this organization: Wandycz, *O federalizmie i emigracji*, 24–41 and *passim*.

⁴⁷ Cf. Piotr Wandycz, “Garść wspomnień po latach,” in *Oskar Halecki*, Vol. 2, 10.

⁴⁸ Cf. Wandycz, “The Treatment of East Central Europe in History Textbooks,” *The American Slavic and East European Review* 16, no. 4 (1957): 515–23.

⁴⁹ Wandycz, “O dwóch historykach,” *Zeszyty Historyczne* 32, (1975): 63.

⁵⁰ Letter from Piotr Wandycz to Jerzy Giedroyc, 24 May 1967, in: Archive of the Instytut Literacki “Kultura,” correspondence between Jerzy Giedroyc and Piotr Wandycz, f. 1, p. 134.

allowed him to view Polish history with greater analytical distance.⁵¹ This had an impact on the way he portrayed Poland's historical ties with Western, and especially American, culture, as can be seen in his 1980 book *The United States and Poland*. Instead of arguing that the federal democratic system of the United States had much in common with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Wandycz analyzed how the political actors of the late eighteenth century had perceived each other. He found that American leaders such as Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison had viewed Poland as an example of how a democratic federation should not be organized, because it lacked political efficiency and defensibility, and that they had taken little notice of contemporary Polish reform efforts.⁵² On the other hand, Polish reformers and conservatives alike had invoked the example of the United States in their debates about the future political organization of their country, which resulted in the Constitution of May 3, 1791.⁵³ In Wandycz's account, it was political innovation, as exemplified by this enlightened constitutionalism, rather than a timeless spiritual heritage, that bound Poland to the Western world.

This shift in understanding of what constitutes the identity of "the West" also had implications for Wandycz's conceptualization of East-Central Europe. As he noted in his 1992 book *The Price of Freedom*, which he dedicated to Halecki and the British historian Hugh Seton-Watson, the term "Western Europe" is usually associated not with the continent's western fringes – Iceland, Ireland, or Portugal – but with centers of political, social, and cultural innovation, such as Great Britain and France. Finding a purely geographical and cultural terminology inadequate, Wandycz adopted the vocabulary of Immanuel Wallerstein's world-systems theory, which distinguishes a dominant core, a dependent periphery, and an intermediate semi-periphery. He argued that East-Central Europe, along with a few countries geographically located in Western Europe, such as Spain and Portugal, constituted the continent's semi-periphery.⁵⁴ He noted that the region had suffered from relative economic backwardness compared to Western Europe. However, he also emphasized that "it would be a mistake to see the Czecho-Polish-Hungarian area

⁵¹ The epistemic benefits that Wandycz drew from his position between two cultures are also emphasized by Stobiecki, *Klio za wielką wodą*, 251.

⁵² Cf. Piotr S. Wandycz, *The United States and Poland* (Cambridge, MA, London: Harvard University Press, 1980), 34–5.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 43, 46.

⁵⁴ Cf. Piotr S. Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom: A History of East Central Europe from the Middle Ages to the Present* (London, New York: Routledge, 1992), 3–4; It is noteworthy that Wandycz did not refer directly to Wallerstein at this point, but to a variant of his model developed by Hungarian scholars. Cf. also: Rafał Stobiecki, "Europa Środkowo-Wschodnia w myśli historycznej Piotra Wandycza," in *Piotr Wandycz. Historyk, emigrant, intelektualista*, eds. Marek Kornat, Sławomir M. Nowinowski, and Rafał Stobiecki (Bydgoszcz: Oficyna Wydawnicza Epigram, 2014), 23.

as a passive member of the European community, always a taker, never a giver.”⁵⁵ On the contrary, significant innovations in the spiritual and political fields had originated in the region, and East-Central Europe had at times resembled “a laboratory in which various systems are being tested.”⁵⁶ From this perspective, the fact that Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia (or Bohemia, in earlier times) had participated in all the major upheavals of European history – such as the Renaissance, the Reformation, or the Industrial Revolution – made them an integral part of “the West.” At the same time, Wandycz acknowledged the existence of “orientalizing” elements that at certain times had made the countries of East-Central Europe resistant to innovations from “the West’s”, such as Polish “Sarmatism” – the political ideology of seventeenth-century Polish nobles who traced their origins to the ancient Iranian people of the Sarmatians, regarded the system of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as perfect, and opposed any attempts at political reform. Wandycz left no doubt as to how he judged these elements. He wrote that “Sarmatian xenophobia combined with parochialism and opposition to change” and that by the early eighteenth century the Polish nobility “was not only losing civic virtues, but [...] was growing ever more bigoted and intolerant.”⁵⁷ As an émigré who had successfully assimilated into the culture of his Western host society, Wandycz had developed a skeptical attitude toward those forces in his homeland that had staunchly resisted processes of modernization – which, from this point of view, also implied “Westernization.”

Not surprisingly, Wandycz’s impact on the American discourse surpassed that of Halecki. While Halecki was most popular among fellow émigrés and circles of Catholic intellectuals, Wandycz soon joined the elite of American academia, becoming a full professor at Yale University in 1968. Nevertheless, he formulated his conception of East-Central Europe as part of the liberal, innovative West at a time when such an understanding of “Western civilization,” which would have been fully compatible with McNeill’s ideas of the 1960s, had already passed its zenith. Meanwhile, a heightened awareness of ecological issues was challenging the affirmative concept of progress; critical engagement with racism and colonialism was undermining the belief in Western moral superiority; and the rise of social constructivism was challenging traditional modes of historical inquiry. Wandycz did not participate in these shifts and tended to see them as limiting the attempts of Polish émigrés to influence American debates. In his preface to the second edition of *The Price of Freedom*, published in 2001, Wandycz expressed skepticism about “the tendency to treat all these terms [such as the term East-Central Europe, K.J.W.] as artificial concepts which exist only in the minds of those who apply them.” He explicitly

⁵⁵ Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom*, 5.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 89, 113.

referred to Benedict Anderson's conceptualization of nations as "imagined communities" and Larry Wolff's study of how Eastern Europe had been "invented" in the Age of Enlightenment.⁵⁸ Wandycz remarked: "All these discussions, however intellectually stimulating they are, have not altered the basic approach adopted in this book."⁵⁹ One might conclude that his role at the end of his career was not so different from the one Halecki had played several decades earlier – while the latter had sought to defend an understanding of Western civilization derived from late medieval Christian faith against the challenge of twentieth-century modernity, Wandycz, at the dawn of a postmodern era, adhered to an affirmative imagination of Western modernity.

"The West" as Poland's "Surrogate Hegemon": Ewa Thompson

While Wandycz remained skeptical of postmodernism and continued to associate the identity of "the West" with liberal ideas of progress, another Polish-American scholar developed a decidedly conservative understanding of cultural identity by selectively drawing on specific elements of postmodernist thought.⁶⁰ Slavist Ewa Thompson, who was initially educated in the People's Republic of Poland and became part of the Cold War émigré community after moving to the United States in the late 1960s, is best known today for interpreting Polish culture from a postcolonial perspective. Her main thesis, as elaborated in the monograph *Imperial Knowledge*⁶¹ and numerous articles,⁶² is that various historical forms of Russian domination over Poland, including Soviet domination over the People's Republic of Poland, can be characterized as colonial. Thompson acknowledges that there are differences between the case of Polish subordination to Russia and the maritime colonialism of Western European imperial powers; for example, the Polish territories of the Tsarist Empire were economically more developed than the Russian imperial core, which contradicts the idea of a colonial "civilizing mission," and the

⁵⁸ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983); Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe*, 7.

⁵⁹ Piotr S. Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom: A History of East Central Europe from the Middle Ages to the Present* (London, New York: Routledge, 2001), xii.

⁶⁰ While Thompson embraces postcolonial theory, she nonetheless rejects other elements of postmodernism, in particular anti-essentialism. Cf. Ewa M. Thompson, "Ways Out of the Postmodern Discourse," *Modern Age* 45, no. 3 (2003): 195–207.

⁶¹ Thompson, *Imperial Knowledge: Russian Literature and Colonialism* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000).

⁶² Cf., for instance, Thompson, "It Is Colonialism after All: Some Epistemological Remarks," *Teksty Drugie, Special Issue – English Edition*, no. 1 (2014): 67–81.

People's Republic of Poland was formally an independent state governed by Polish authorities, not Soviet colonial masters. However, Thompson defends the use of the term "colonialism" because it signified "the subjugation of both territory and people whose national consciousness is either already developed or is still developing under colonial domination, political and economic exploitation of a given territory, as well as hindering or even halting development"⁶³ – criteria that she believes were met in the Polish case.

For Thompson, this postcolonial interpretation of Polish culture has implications not only for understanding Poland's history, but also for its present. She describes the elites of post-communist Poland as suffering from a "colonial mentality"⁶⁴: accustomed to a culturally subordinate status, they tried to imitate Western models and constantly sought the approval of Western opinion leaders. "The West" had thus replaced the Soviet Union as Poland's source of cultural models – it had acquired the status of a "surrogate hegemon" (*hegemon zastępczy*).⁶⁵ To overcome their desire for subordination, Polish elites should instead try to cultivate their native cultural traditions. According to Thompson, the "Sarmatism" of early modern Polish nobles, who proudly celebrated their own way of life rather than seeing Western cultural habits as superior, could serve as an inspiration for the present.⁶⁶

Many critics have pointed out inconsistencies in Thompson's application of postcolonial theory to the Polish case.⁶⁷ Perhaps most persuasively, Stanley Bill has argued that Thompson's explicitly essentialist vision of an "authentic" Polish culture is based on false premises – since virtually all cultures have developed in exchange with the outside world, cultural hybridity should be considered the rule rather than the exception. In particular, the culture of the late Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which Thompson regards as the epitome of Polish cultural authenticity, was – despite its partial self-orientalization in

⁶³ Ibid., 69.

⁶⁴ Ewa M. Thompson, "W kolejce po aprobatę: Kolonialna mentalność polskich elit," November 5, 2007, accessed August 21, 2024, <https://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/wydarzenia/artykuly/59821,w-kolejce-po-aprobate.html>.

⁶⁵ Cf. Thompson, "Postkolonialne refleksje: Na marginesie pracy zbiorowej 'From Sovietology to Postcoloniality: Poland and Ukraine from a Postcolonial Perspective' pod redakcją Janusza Korka," *Porównania* 5, (2008): 113–25.

⁶⁶ Cf. Thompson, "Sarmatism, or the Secrets of Polish Essentialism," in *Being Poland: A New History of Polish Literature and Culture since 1918*, eds. Tamara Trojanowska, Joanna Niżyńska, and Przemysław Czapliński (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2018), 3–29. Thompson also served as longtime editor of the Texas-based journal *The Sarmatian Review*.

⁶⁷ Cf., for instance, Dorota Kołodziejczyk, "Postkolonialny transfer na Europę Środkowo-Wschodnią," *Teksty Drugie*, no. 5 (2010): 22–39; Grażyna Borkowska, "Perspektywa postkolonialna na gruncie polskim – pytania sceptyka," *Teksty Drugie*, no. 5 (2010): 40–52; Tomasz Zarycki, *Ideologies of Eastness in Central and Eastern Europe* (London, New York: Routledge, 2014), 93–100; Marta Cobel-Tokarska, "Problems and Contradictions in Polish Postcolonial Thought in Relation to Central and Eastern Europe," *Postcolonial Studies* 24, no. 1 (2021): 139–58.

the context of “Sarmatism” – highly receptive to influences from Western Europe, such as German law, French poetry, and Italian architecture.⁶⁸ Notwithstanding these criticisms, the fact that Thompson’s perspective on Polish culture has met with a lively response in Polish intellectual circles indicates a remarkable shift in Polish attitudes toward “the West,” especially when compared to earlier interpretations such as those of Halecki and Wandycz. While the latter sought to persuade their American contemporaries that Poland should be considered an integral part of “Western civilization,” either defined as an essentially Christian community or as a group of highly dynamic and innovative “modern” nations, Thompson has questioned the universality of Western cultural models. Unlike Wandycz, who criticized Polish deviations from the Western path of historical development, such as early modern “Sarmatism,” as instances of bigotry and intolerance, perhaps even as a cause of “backwardness,” Thompson argues that contemporary Poland should stop trying to imitate Western models in order to restore its supposedly authentic cultural self. It is noteworthy that these different conceptualizations of Poland’s relationship with “the West” were all formulated by Polish émigré scholars in the United States, for whom the need to assimilate to a “Western” culture was not an abstraction but an everyday biographical experience.

Conclusion

As can be seen from the examples of Halecki, Wandycz and Thompson, Polish intellectual imaginations of “the West” underwent two significant paradigmatic shifts in the twentieth century. An early twentieth-century discourse that identified “the West” with timeless Christian values and considered the history of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as evidence of the “Western” character of Polish culture was initially maintained by anticommunist émigré scholars like Halecki. In the 1960s, it lost its plausibility because it proved incompatible with the American discourse that linked “Western” identity to concepts of “modernization.” Émigré scholars who, like Wandycz, belonged to a younger generation adopted this affirmative perspective on “Western” modernity: while continuing to argue that Poland was an integral part of “Western civilization” by emphasizing “innovative” phases such as enlightened constitutionalism, they developed a critical attitude towards historical periods when Poland seemed to deviate from the

⁶⁸ Cf. Stanley Bill, “Seeking the Authentic: Polish Culture and the Nature of Postcolonial Theory,” August 12, 2014, accessed August 21, 2024, <https://nonsite.org/seeking-the-authentic-polish-culture-and-the-nature-of-postcolonial-theory/>.

Western path of modernization. In contrast, Ewa Thompson, who can be considered a member of the third generation of Polish émigrés, has used arguments from postcolonial theory to challenge the idea that Western paths of development can be considered universal. However, Thompson's explicitly essentialist rejection of Polish attempts to "imitate" "the West's" has remained controversial both in Poland and internationally. Taken together, these three cases demonstrate that the highly ambiguous development of Polish conceptualizations of "the West" in the twentieth century cannot be reduced to a linear path from idealization to disenchantment, and that "clashes of definitions" are likely to persist both between and within particular "Western" societies.

References

- Alessandri, Emiliano. "The Atlantic Community as Christendom: Some Reflections on Christian Atlanticism in America, circa 1900–1950." In *Defining the Atlantic Community: Culture, Intellectuals, and Policies in the Mid-Twentieth Century*, edited by Marco Mariano, 47–70. New York, London: Routledge, 2010.
- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso, 1983.
- Archive of the Instytut Literacki "Kultura," Le Mesnil-le-Roi: Correspondence between Jerzy Giedroyc and Piotr Wandycz.
- Augustynowicz, Christoph. "Wiedeńska genealogia Oskara Haleckiego." In *Oskar Halecki i jego wizja Europy*, Vol. 2, edited by Małgorzata Dąbrowska, 15–20. Warsaw, Łódź: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2014.
- Avramchuk, Oleksandr. "Między ideą jagiellońską a Międzymorzem: Ewolucja kwestii ukraińskiej w poglądach politycznych Oskara Haleckiego (1891–1973)." *Klio Polska* 9, (2017): 57–79.
- Baczkowski, Krzysztof. "Oskara Haleckiego jagiellońska wizja dziejów." In *Oskar Halecki i jego wizja Europy*, Vol. 1, edited by Małgorzata Dąbrowska, 56–77. Warsaw, Łódź: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2012.
- Bavaj, Riccardo. "'The West': A Conceptual Exploration." European History Online (EGO), November 21, 2011. Accessed August 23, 2024. <https://www.ieg-ego.eu/bavajr-2011-en>.
- Bill, Stanley. "Seeking the Authentic: Polish Culture and the Nature of Postcolonial Theory," August 12, 2014. Accessed August 21, 2024. <https://nonsite.org/seeking-the-authentic-polish-culture-and-the-nature-of-postcolonial-theory/>.
- Bogatyreva, Natalia. "Enemies Inside and Out: How Russians Believe Conspiracy Theories." *Zeitschrift für Psychologie* 232, no. 1 (2024): 38–43.
- Bömelburg, Hans-Jürgen. "Zwischen imperialer Geschichte und Ostmitteleuropa als Geschichts-region: Oskar Halecki und die polnische 'jagiellonische Idee'." In *Vergangene Größe und Ohnmacht in Ostmitteleuropa: Repräsentationen imperialer Erfahrung in der Historiographie seit 1918*, edited by Frank Hadler and Mathias Mesenhöller, 99–129. Leipzig: Akademische Verlaganstalt, 2007.

- Borkowska, Grażyna. "Perspektywa postkolonialna na gruncie polskim – pytania sceptyka." *Teksty Drugie*, no. 5 (2010): 40–52.
- Chamedes, Giuliana. "Transatlantic Catholicism and the Making of the 'Christian West.'" In *The Transatlantic Reconsidered: The Atlantic World in Crisis*, edited by Charlotte A. Lerg, Susanne Lachenicht, and Michael Kimmage, 139–55. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2018.
- Cobel-Tokarska, Marta. "Problems and Contradictions in Polish Postcolonial Thought in Relation to Central and Eastern Europe." *Postcolonial Studies* 24, no. 1 (2021): 139–58.
- Costello, Paul. *World Historians and Their Goals: Twentieth-Century Answers to Modernism*. DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1993.
- Gilman, Nils. *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007.
- Halecki, Oskar. "Amerykańska interpretacja europejskich 'dzikich pól.'" *Wiadomości*, May 16, 1965.
- Halecki, Oskar. *Borderlands of Western Civilization: A History of East Central Europe*. New York: Ronald Press, 1952.
- Halecki, Oskar. "Granica z r. 1772 a nasz program obecny." *Wschód Polski* 1, no. 4 (1920): 1–11.
- Halecki, Oskar. "Idea jagiellońska." *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 51, (1937): 486–510.
- Halecki, Oskar. "Mit linii Curzona." *Instytut Józefa Piłsudskiego w Ameryce: Biuletyn* 16, no. 2 (1959).
- Halecki, Oskar. *The Limits and Divisions of European History*. London, New York: Sheed & Ward, 1950.
- Halecki, Oskar. *The Millennium of Europe*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963.
- Halecki, Oskar. "U podstaw kryzysu." *Kurjer Warszawski*, May 27, 1934.
- Halecki, Oskar. "Wacław Sobieski." *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 49, (1935): 478–93.
- Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.
- Jedlicki, Jerzy. "A Stereotype of the West in Postpartition Poland." *Social Research* 59, no. 2 (1992): 345–64.
- Jedlicki, Jerzy. *A Suburb of Europe: Nineteenth-Century Polish Approaches to Western Civilization*. Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999.
- Kamiński, Andrzej Sulima. *Republic vs. Autocracy: Poland-Lithuania and Russia, 1686–1697*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993.
- Kołodziejczyk, Dorota. "Postkolonialny transfer na Europę Środkowo-Wschodnią." *Teksty Drugie*, no. 5 (2010): 22–39.
- Kornat, Marek. "Profesor Oskar Halecki w życiu politycznym Polski i na forum międzynarodowym." In *Oskar Halecki i jego wizja Europy*, Vol. 3, edited by Małgorzata Dąbrowska, 232–88. Warsaw, Łódź: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2014.
- Korolov, Gennadii. "'Dwie Europy Środkowe' Oskara Haleckiego w 'cieniu imperializmów.'" *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 124, no. 4 (2017): 677–98.
- McNeill, William H. *Europe's Steppe Frontier, 1500–1800*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1964.
- McNeill, William H. "Some Basic Assumptions of Toynbee's *A Study of History*." In *The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Comparative Appraisal*, edited by Edward T. Gargan, 27–46. Chicago, IL: Loyola University Press, 1961.

- McNeill, William H. *The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community. With a Retrospective Essay*. Chicago, IL, London: University of Chicago Press, 1991 [first edition: 1963].
- Mikołajewski, Łukasz. *Disenchanted Europeans: Polish Émigré Writers from Kultura and the Post-war Reformulations of the West*. Oxford: Peter Lang, 2018.
- Morawiec, Małgorzata. "Oskar Halecki (1891–1973)." In *Europa-Historiker: Ein biographisches Handbuch*, Vol. 1, edited by Heinz Duchhardt, Małgorzata Morawiec, Wolfgang Schmale, and Winfried Schulze, 215–40. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006.
- Nowak, Andrzej. "Emigracja 'drugiego pokolenia': Refleksje i pytania na marginesie biografii Piotra Wandycza i Leopolda Łabędzia." *Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej* 50, no. 1 (2015): 103–17.
- Nowak, Andrzej. *Polska i Rosja: Sąsiedztwo wolności i despotyzmu X–XXI w.* Kraków: Biały Kruk, 2022.
- Osterhammel, Jürgen. "Arnold Toynbee and the Problems of Today." *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute Washington* 60, (2017): 69–87.
- Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences of America Archives (PIASA Archives), New York: Fonds No. 17 [Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences of America], f. 146.
- Polonsky, Antony. "Piotr Wandycz: An Appreciation." In *Ideology, Politics and Diplomacy in East Central Europe*, edited by M.B.B. Biskupski, xiii–xix. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2003.
- Ryś, Grzegorz. "Chrześcijaństwo jako klucz interpretacyjny historiozofii Oskara Haleckiego." In *Oskar Halecki i jego wizja Europy*, Vol. 1, edited by Małgorzata Dąbrowska, 9–15. Warsaw, Łódź: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2012.
- Said, Edward W. "The Clash of Definitions." In Edward W. Said, *Reflections on Exile and Other Essays*, 569–90. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000.
- Sobieski, Wacław. "Kościuszko i Pułaski w Ameryce. (Zjednoczenie ideałów Polski i Ameryki)." In *Polska w kulturze powszechnej. Część I: Ogólna*, edited by Feliks Koneczny, 90–103. Kraków: Krakowska Ekspozytura Biura Patronatu dla Spółek Oszczędności i Pożyczek, 1918.
- Spengler, Oswald. *Der Untergang des Abendlandes: Umriss einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte*. 2 Vols. Vienna: Braumüller, 1918–1922.
- Spengler, Oswald. *The Decline of the West*, 2 Vols. New York: Knopf, 1947.
- Stobiecki, Rafał. "Europa Środkowo-Wschodnia w myśli historycznej Piotra Wandycza." In *Piotr Wandycz: Historyk, emigrant, intelektualista*, edited by Marek Kornat, Sławomir M. Nowiński, and Rafał Stobiecki, 15–28. Bydgoszcz: Oficyna Wydawnicza Epigram, 2014.
- Stobiecki, Rafał. *Klio za wielką wodą: Polscy historycy w Stanach Zjednoczonych po 1945 r.* Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2017.
- Stobiecki, Rafał. "Oskar Halecki jako historyk cywilizacji?" In *Oskar Halecki i jego wizja Europy*, Vol. 2, edited by Małgorzata Dąbrowska, 124–44. Warsaw, Łódź: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2014.
- Thompson, Ewa M. *Imperial Knowledge: Russian Literature and Colonialism*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000.
- Thompson, Ewa M. "It Is Colonialism after All: Some Epistemological Remarks." *Teksty Drugie. Special Issue – English Edition*, no. 1 (2014): 67–81.
- Thompson, Ewa M. "Postkolonialne refleksje: Na marginesie pracy zbiorowej 'From Sovietology to Postcoloniality: Poland and Ukraine from a Postcolonial Perspective' pod redakcją Janusza Korka." *Porównania* 5, (2008): 113–25.

- Thompson, Ewa M. "Sarmatism, or the Secrets of Polish Essentialism." In *Being Poland: A New History of Polish Literature and Culture since 1918*, edited by Tamara Trojanowska, Joanna Nizyńska, and Przemysław Czapliński, 3–29. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2018.
- Thompson, Ewa M. "Ways Out of the Postmodern Discourse." *Modern Age* 45, no. 3 (2003): 195–207.
- Thompson, Ewa M. "W kolejce po aprobatę: Kolonialna mentalność polskich elit," November 5, 2007. Accessed August 21, 2024. <https://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/wydarzenia/artykuly/59821,w-kolejce-po-aprobate.html>.
- Trautsch, Jasper M. "'Der Westen': Theoretisch-methodische Überlegungen zu einer Begriffsgeschichte." *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* 60/61, (2018/2019): 409–40.
- Wandycz, Piotr. "Garść wspomnień po latach." In *Oskar Halecki i jego wizja Europy*, Vol. 2, edited by Małgorzata Dąbrowska, 9–14. Warsaw, Łódź: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2014.
- Wandycz, Piotr S. "O dwóch historykach." *Zeszyty Historyczne* 32, (1975): 61–5.
- Wandycz, Piotr S. *O federalizmie i emigracji: Reminiscencje o rzeczach istotnych i błahych. Rozmowy przeprowadził Sławomir Łukasiewicz*. Lublin: Towarzystwo Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, 2003.
- Wandycz, Piotr S. *The Price of Freedom: A History of East Central Europe from the Middle Ages to the Present*. London, New York: Routledge, 1992 [second edition: 2001].
- Wandycz, Piotr S. "The Treatment of East Central Europe in History Textbooks." *The American Slavic and East European Review* 16, no. 4 (1957): 515–23.
- Wandycz, Piotr S. *The United States and Poland*. Cambridge, MA, London: Harvard University Press, 1980.
- Wise, Andrew Kier. "Russia as Poland's Civilizational 'Other'." In *The East–West Discourse. Symbolic Geography and its Consequences*, edited by Alexander Maxwell, 73–92. Oxford: Peter Lang, 2011.
- Wolff, Larry. *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994.
- Zarycki, Tomasz. *Ideologies of Eastness in Central and Eastern Europe*. London, New York: Routledge, 2014.

