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

Centrum Badań
nad Historią Polskiego
Państwa na Uchodźstwie
KUL

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PREFACE

Dear Readers,
We present to you the second issue of our annual journal, *The Exile History Review*, hoping that it will be received as positively as the first one. We have received many signals of interest and support for the idea of publishing a magazine dedicated to the history of political emigration from Central and Eastern Europe during World War II and the Cold War, as pursued by the Center for Research on the History of the Polish State in Exile. We are particularly encouraged by the declarations of cooperation that continue to come to the editorial office from researchers from many parts of the world. In comparison to the first issue of *The Exile History Review*, this time were able to broaden the scope of the topics covered to include texts on Latvian, Estonian, Yugoslavian, Ukrainian, and Russian emigration. This motivates us to continue our efforts to improve the scholarly quality and publishing standards of the journal, as well as its recognition in the academic community.

The second issue of *The Exile History Review* contains 10 articles. The *Articles* section comprises seven texts. It opens with theoretical reflections by Giles Scott-Smith on the issue of exile in the theory of Western world politics. Volodymyr Kravchenko's text is dedicated to the attempts at Ukrainian-Russian dialogue in exile during the Cold War. Andrejs Plakans captures in his study the transformations of the identity of post-war political refugees from Latvia. Kristina Bekere's article addresses the use by the Latvian diaspora – as a problem and political argument, as well as the method of shaping its communication – of the theme of human rights violations in the Soviet Union. "Mercenaries of a Phantom War. The 'Hostile Emigration' in Yugoslavia's Globalized Ideology of Insecurity" is a text by Bernd Robionek, analyzing the attitudes of post-war Yugoslavian emigration, measures taken against it by Yugoslavian services, and the concept of "Special War." Ain Haas outlines the processes of resettlement and adaptation of Baltic political emigrants from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in Sweden, Canada, Australia, and the United States. Jolanta Chwastyk-Kowalczyk's text focuses on the journalism of

Aleksander Bregman, a journalist associated with *Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza*, specializing in international issues.

Two articles are included in the *Materials* section. Veronika Durin-Hornyik explores the idea of the Free University in Exile, a relatively little-known episode in the history of the Paris-based Literary Institute "Kultura." Grzegorz Kulka presents several interesting, previously unknown documents from the "wartime" period of the life of General Wacław Scaevola-Wieczorkiewicz.

In the *In Memoriam* section, we publish the text by Jadwiga Kowalska devoted to Colonel Stanisław Żurakowski, who passed away in July 2023. Colonel Żurakowski was a Siberian exile, a soldier of the Polish Armed Forces in the West, and a social and scientific activist in the United Kingdom.

We hope that the materials included in this issue of the journal will not only be an enjoyable read for you but also a source of scholarly reflection and, perhaps, inspiration for your own research.

Jarosław Rabiński (Editor-in-Chief)
Kamil Świderski (Member of The Editorial Board)

Articles

The Exile History Review
2023, Vol. 2

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Exiles on Main Street: The Centrality of Exile in Transatlantic Relations

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Abstract: This article explores the meaning of exile in political theory and its importance within our understanding of political organization and more specifically transatlantic relations. Attention for the political ramifications of the movement of people across borders is divided among the study of diasporas, forced migration, and cultural transfer, as well as exile. The article covers the definition of the term and its use in the Western political tradition, focusing on its meaning and its relevance for conceptions of political progress under modernity. By examining the use of "exile" in relation to Latin American politics, the article puts forward a contrasting critical sketch of exile in transatlantic relations through the 20th century.

Keywords: exile, diaspora, forced migration, cultural transfer, cold war, transatlantic relations

This article makes the case that the category of exile deserves more importance as a defining feature of, and contributor to, transatlantic relations.[1] Exile has a specific meaning within political science. This discipline has traditionally focused on the functioning of defined units of organization, and how to optimize that functioning. Politics is organized around what brings people together, what creates a sense of belonging and purpose within a certain setting, what enables them to recognize common interests, values, identities, and futures, and how they communicate them. Nation states have legally-grounded definitions of citizenship and what is required to obtain and keep it. Exiles are excluded from this collectivity, being deemed a threat to its existence as defined by specific political interests. The word stems from the Latin *exilium*, meaning "lodging away from one's fatherland," and the word entered common usage from the 14th century onwards. To be exiled is to suffer for holding a specific political stance by being banished from the homeland. Exile results from political instability and the enforcement of irreconcilable

1 This text originated as a lecture at the symposium "Forms of Community in the Modern Era: The Mechanisms of a Construct," University of Tübingen, June 24, 2016. The text is a revised and expanded version of the lecture.

difference, preventing compromise and accommodation. In her discussion of this field, Judith Sklar identified immigrants, expatriates, refugees, and political exiles as the key groups, with exiles being: "A special group of refugees, people expelled against their will by the governments of their countries for political reasons, their opinions, their party affiliation, or their race, class, or nationality."[2]

As a result, exile has been associated with non-Western, authoritarian regimes, and the implication, from a traditional Western perspective, has been that regimes using exile are on "the wrong side of history" – they must still go through a process of mature democratization that will make exile superfluous as a political need or tool. Exile, as a political phenomenon, has been omnipresent in transatlantic relations throughout the twentieth century, yet it is generally placed alongside forced migration, diaspora, and cultural transfer as if they are all of equal interpretive significance. Yet while these other terms refer predominantly to the *movement* involved in displacement from one place to another, exile refers both to the political realities of expulsion and the imagination of alternative political futures thereafter. Exile is a political project, for both expeller and expelled. The title of this article – exiles on main street – emphasizes that exile resides at the center of modern political systems, not at the periphery. Exile therefore becomes a cipher through which the role of politically displaced persons can be more sharply defined, both from the perspective of the host nation and the homeland.

Origins and Terminology

Exiles and emigres have always played (and continue to play) a key role in designing political futures. Exile was a fundamental aspect of the Greek polis. During the period of tyrannical rule, rival elites used it as a stabilization mechanism, expelling opposing factions at will, but in turn creating cycles of instability as the expelled plotted incessantly to return. During the democratic transition that occurred at the end of the 6th century BC, the politics of exile was replaced by the practice of ostracism, "a particularly limited and lawful form of exile." By expelling one individual per year for a limited period of time, the democrats established a moderate alternative to the random, chaotic politics of exile that had preceded it. This was a key element in the establishment of norms and rules within Greek democracy. From then on, exile became a symbol in the Western political canon

2 Judith Sklar, "The Bonds of Exile," in Judith Shklar, *Political Thought and Political Thinkers*, ed. Stanley Hoffman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 205.

for failing political systems. In the words of Sara Forsdyke, it led to "the delegitimization of non-democratic forms of rule through the theme of exile."[3]

The incorporation of this norm into the Western conception of modernity is clear. A political system that uses exile as a means to neutralize opposition, or that forces members of the opposition into exile, signifies that a pluralist stability has not (yet) been achieved. The political systems that indulge in the use of exile use it to stabilize themselves, but they are necessarily unstable, unable to absorb organized dissent, and threatened by the supposed coming democratic revolution (to be triggered by or followed by the exiles' return). In this way, the use of exile as a political tool signifies a weak system, whereas its absence points to a level of political maturity. This is not to argue that an end to exile equals an end to all political conflict. Following the agonistic pluralists such as William Connolly and Chantal Mouffe, it is accepted that conflict between different groups and identities is inevitable but potentially manageable within an emancipatory democracy. Exile is a sign that antagonisms have not been transformed into agonisms – enemies have not yet become simply adversaries, and hence exile is still an option in order to banish opponents.[4]

Strictly speaking, political exile involves the enforced expulsion from one's native land, and entails the continuation of political opposition from abroad. Exiles occupy an undefined middle ground, somewhere between sovereignties, transcending orthodox understandings of separate national and international realms. As Yossi Shain has put it, "throughout history political exiles have challenged traditional boundaries of authority and loyalty."[5] But exiles are vulnerable in an international system framed by national sovereignty. They represent a threat to de facto national control by personalizing resistance. This is a demanding position, and it is hard to maintain both a clear-cut identity and cause over many years. For the political exile, the stay abroad is necessarily *temporary* (at least in name, if not in fact) before the triumphant return. This claim of temporariness is used to avoid the development of hybrid identities and allegiances that will undermine the political cause. Nevertheless, exile complicates the orthodox understandings of obligation and loyalty attached to citizenship.[6]

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3 Sara Forsdyke, *Exile, Ostracism and Democracy: The Politics of Expulsion in Ancient Greece* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 3.

4 Chantal Mouffe, "Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism," *Social Research*, no. 66 (1999): 745–58.

5 Yossi Shain, *The Frontier of Loyalty: Political Exiles in the Age of Nation States* (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2005), xiv.

6 Shklar, "The Bonds of Exile".

Exile, Diaspora, Forced Migration

This determination to maintain the cause separates political exiles from diasporas, who have been dispersed from their homeland but who maintain (or are required to maintain) political, economic, and social links with their homeland. Diaspora dates back to the expulsion of the Jews from Palestine in 70 BC, and so incorporates the tragedy of exile and the longing for return. But since the 1990s the word diaspora has also been in vogue as an alternative term for migrants. Diaspora lays claim to a deeper cultural meaning and significance, in contrast to the term refugee, which points more to the movement of people across borders to escape conflict or persecution.

Forced migration is another, more recent, all-encompassing description of the displacement of people escaping from persecution, conflicts, natural disasters, or environmental change and decline, either within their own country or across borders.[7] The UNHCR has calculated that by mid-2022 there were 103 million people who could be categorized as refugees, asylum seekers, or internally displaced persons, 72 percent originating from only five countries, with Ukraine among them.[8] The international system of states is under stress to accommodate these large movements of people, and not only in Europe.

Neither diaspora nor forced migration encompass the association of the exile with alternative political futures or the loyalty to the homeland that comes with them. What of other approaches to analyzing the meaning of exile? Cultural, film and literary studies have investigated the signs and sounds of exile for many years, using it as a motif to frame discussions on hybrid identities, allegiances, and texts.[9] Three conclusions can be drawn from these studies. Firstly, focusing exclusively on the cultural dimension has led, in the words of Renato Camurri, to "an excessive generalization of the concept of exile," where refugee/migrant/exile all become rolled into one. Secondly, the politics has tended to be downplayed. Based on his study of the inter-war period in Europe, Camurri considered that these representations of exile "underestimate the political aspect of the experience of cultural migration." The political importance of exile was not always linked to the political crises that led to the rise of totalitarian regimes, somehow disengaging the exile from the struggles to overcome those crises.[10]

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7 See: International Association for the Study of Forced Migration, accessed March 27, 2023, http://iasfm.org.

8 See: UNHCR's Refugee Population Statistics Database, accessed March 27, 2023, https://www.unrefugees.org/refugee-facts/statistics/.

9 Robert Hauhart and Jeff Birkenstein (eds.), *European Writers in Exile* (Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018); Wendy Everett and Peter Wagstaff, *Cultures of Exile: Images of Displacement* (New York: Berghahn, 2004); Sharon Ouditt, ed., *Displaced Persons: Conditions of Exile in European Culture* (London: Routledge, 2002); Vytautas Kavolis, "Women Writers in Exile," *World Literature Today*, no. 66 (1992): 43–6.

10 Renato Camurri, "The Exile Experience Reconsidered: A Comparative Perspective in European Cultural Migration during the Interwar Period," *Transatlantica*, no. 1 (2014), accessed March 27, 2023, https://transatlantica.revues.org/6920.

Thirdly, there has been a strong tendency within the Western canon to treat the exile as romantic hero. Edward Said identified this brilliantly in his essay "Reflections on Exile." Said noted that "Modern Western culture is in large part the work of exiles, emigres, refugees," but it is the scale of twentieth century displacements that places it outside of previous historical phenomena: "On the twentieth century scale, exile is neither aesthetically nor humanistically comprehensible."[11] This recognition of scale is another essential element in claiming primacy for the term "exile" alongside its many alternatives. Lastly, exile is often categorized as a *transnational* experience. In the words of Benjamin Tromly: "Political emigrations are inherently transnational in nature, as they serve as nodes of physical, intellectual, and cultural exchange among their country of origin, their land of exile, and sometimes third countries embroiled in their affairs."[12] This position has been echoed by Ashwini Vasanthakamur. In referring to exile politics as "normatively rich and politically complex," she states the following:

> In short, [exiles] are instrumental actors in the countries they have fled, and in the transnational domain into which they are flung....exiles can engage in a 'politics from below' and 'away' that produces alternative sites of power and that can mitigate the several failings of an international system of states in an unequal world.[13]

Exile has traditionally been typecast as a temporary phenomenon, to be solved with the introduction of political stability through respect for difference (from antagonism to agonism) in the homeland. But its transnational status has led exile to become difficult to place, both physically and theoretically, within a state system defined by borders and sovereignties. What was originally an extreme anomaly became, due to crisis after crisis, so commonplace, that its full significance became diluted and, arguably, overlooked.

Latin American Exile vs. Transatlantic Transfer

The example of Latin America provides some insights on this. Over the last twenty years or so, political exile has been recognized as a fundamental component of Latin American politics during the past two centuries.[14] As one study on Latin America has put it,

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11 Edward Said, "Reflections on Exile," in *Reflections on Exile and Other Essays*, ed. Edward Said (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2000), 173–4.

12 Benjamin Tromly, *Cold War Exiles and the CIA: Plotting to Free Russia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 3.

13 Ashwini Vasanthakamur, *The Ethics of Exile: A Political Theory of Diaspora* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), 2–3.

14 Luis Roniger and James Green, "Exile and the Politics of Exclusion in Latin America," *Latin American Perspectives* 34, no. 4 (2007): 3–6 and the subsequent articles in this special issue.

> exile has been a regulatory mechanism for political systems unable to create pluralistic and inclusive models of participation; and although exile developed as an elite phenomenon in the 19th century when political participation was restricted, it became a massive trend in the 20th century as mobilizations and more inclusive participation led to authoritarian rule.[15]

The argument is that this kind of "institutional exclusion" from the national political and public realms is typical for Latin America, so much so that it has "played a vital part in shaping the form and styles" of politics on that continent. This replicates the orthodox interpretation inherited from the Greeks. Those polities that resort to the use of exile to stabilize a particular form of rule are contrasted with more elastic, pluralist and tolerant political communities that are able to accommodate dissidence and oppositional elites. Latin America has in this way confirmed the modern paradigm. The decline in the use of exile signifies a transition to a more stable, all-inclusive, durable, *modern* national political system. In contrast, the presence of exile signifies a brittle, fragile politics that is prone to varying forms of authoritarianism. But beyond this, it is worth returning to Said's recognition above of how exile has shaped Western culture at large. Western democratic nations have never been simply neutral vessels, acting as temporary landing grounds for exiles who either drifted into utopian longing or remained determined to repossess their homeland. Exile politics have consistently become interwoven with the domestic politics of those host nations, taking on forms that have had an impact on the formation of worldviews and the direction of strategies. This has definitely been the case with the United States.

It is worth placing the Latin American interpretations next to the ways that exile has featured in the transatlantic region. Interestingly enough, the tone of the discussion often seems to shift from exile to transfer. Whereas exile has been traditionally interpreted as linked to a failure of political systems and an inability to absorb contesting forces, transfer is often treated as being more politically progressive, or at least leading to a certain beneficial outcome or utility. This approach can be found in much research on transatlantic social politics, which has identified multiple channels – individual, institutional, informal and formal – through which reforms, causes, protests, and best practices were transferred across the Atlantic from the 18th and 19th centuries onwards, in both directions, creating a dense transatlantic space of exchange.[16] The argument is clear – without this exchange, we would not be where we are today, and we should recognize that many progressive developments that we take for granted have their origins outside our national

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15 Mario Sznajder and Luis Roniger, *The Politics of Exile in Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 1.

16 Daniel Rodgers, *Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); Daniel Scroop and Andrew Heath (eds.), *Transatlantic Social Politics 1800-Present* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

contexts. Consider from this perspective the excellent project of the German Historical Institute, "Transatlantic Perspectives," which sought to transcribe and bring into greater focus the interlocking stories of Europeans who migrated across the Atlantic in the modern era and who contributed to binding its two shores closely together. The website describes the project as follows:

> Our broad definition of transnational transfer thus includes the import, export, and circulation of knowledge and practices across national and cultural boundaries. People, goods, ideas, concepts, and institutions are able to move across borders and can thus become objects or agents of transcultural exchanges and transfers, adapting them from the context of one society to that of another... We ask what crossed the Atlantic, how it changed in the process, and how the transferred material was received or what impact it made.[17]

This project is admirable in its all-encompassing approach, and does of course acknowledge the different causes that lay behind such transfer, referring for instance to "forced emigration to the United States" as a significant sub-category. Nevertheless, this does result in a certain watering down of the relevance of exile as a unique category of exchange – it becomes one of several forms, no longer decisive for designating the difference between forms of authoritarianism and democratic rule, or antagonism from agonism. Transfer becomes the all-encompassing term for transnational exchanges, and is generally applied from a positive perspective. A similar approach can be seen in other large-scale projects encompassing the transnational history of Europe through the centuries.[18] One study of the forced migration of Jews from Germany in the 1930s goes so far as to claim it as "the most sweeping and enduring cultural transfer in modern history."[19] Another points out, referring to the intellectual consequences, that "forced migration made possible careers that could not have happened in the smaller, more restrictive university and science systems of Central Europe," and that the networks of innovation released by these migrations would not otherwise have occurred.[20] These claims from the histories of

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17 See: "Welcome to Transatlantic Perspectives," accessed March 27, 2023, https://www.transatlanticperspectives.org.

18 Wolfgang Schmale, "A Transcultural History of Europe: Perspectives from the History of Migration," EGO: European History Online, 2010, accessed March 27, 2023, http://ieg-ego.eu/en/threads/theories-and-methods/transcultural-history/wolfgang-schmale-a-transcultural-history-of-europe-perspectives-history-migration/?searchterm=transfer&amp%3bset_language=en.

19 Claus-Dieter Krohn, "Deutsche Wissenschafts-emigration seit 1933 und ihre Remigrationsbarrieren nach 1945," in *Wissenschaften und Wissenschaftspolitik: Bestandsaufnahmenzu Formationen, Bruchen und Kontinuiteiten im Deuschland des 20. Jahrhunderts*, eds. Rudiger vom Bruchand and Brigitte Kaderas (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2002), 437–45.

20 Peter Weilemann, *Anfänge der Europäischen Atomgemeinschaft: Zur Gründungsgeschichte von EURATOM 1955–1957* (Baden Baden: Nomos, 1983), 192.

science and of ideas apply the terminology of "forced migration" and "cultural transfer," in doing so bypassing the cataclysmic political upheavals and associated violence that led to the exile and that had ongoing effects in terms of the relationship between exile and future political developments. The use of transfer in place of exile to an extent depoliticizes the political significance and focuses on the movement rather than the expulsion and the subsequent projection of alternative futures. Once again, Said's reference to the cultural embeddedness of exile in Western culture as an ever-present signifier for the progress to come is important. Political exile should be recognized, not as an anachronism of modern political systems, but as a justification and legitimation for particular Western strategies claiming to establish a stable political community elsewhere.

The intellectual exile of the mid-twentieth century profoundly altered the direction and dynamics of American cultural and knowledge production across all fields of activity.[21] Recent studies have delved deeper into these relations, examining the impact on specific fields of research and cultural activity.[22] Unpacking Stanley Hoffman's seminal 1977 essay "An American Social Science: International Relations," Felix Rösch has documented the contribution of a generation of lesser-known scholars for the construction and consolidation of IR in the United States in the mid-20th century.[23] Rösch clearly uses the term emigré as a synonym for exile, pointing out the common characteristics of those involved "due to their common intellectual maturation in continental European humanities as well as the experience of the Shoah and forced migration."[24] Not all were based

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21 The classic studies are W. Rex Crawford, *The Cultural Migration: The European Scholar in America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1953); Laura Fermi, *Illustrious Immigrants* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969); Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn, *The Intellectual Migration* (Cambridge MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1969); H. Stuart Hughes, *The Sea Change: The Migration of Social Thought, 1930–1960* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975); Lewis A. Coser, *Refugee Scholars in America: Their Impact and Their Experience* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984); Martin Jay, *Permanent Exiles: Essays on Intellectual Migration from Germany to America* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985); Udi Greenberg, *The Weimar Century: German Emigres and the Ideological Foundations of the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015).

22 Mitchell G. Ash and Alfons Söllner, *Forced Migration and Scientific Change: Emigre German-Speaking Scientists and Scholars after 1933* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Edward Timms and Jon Hughes, *Intellectual Migration and Cultural Transformation: Refugees from National Socialism in the English-Speaking World* (Vienna: Springer, 2003); J.M. Palmier, *Weimar in Exile: the Antifascist Emigration in Europe and America* (London: Verso, 2006); Thomas Wheatland, *The Frankfurt School in Exile* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009); Christian Fleck, *A Transatlantic History of the Social Sciences: Robber Barons, the Third Reich and the Invention of Empirical Social Research* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2011).

23 Stanley Hoffmann, "An American Social Science: International Relations," *Daedalus*, no. 106 (Summer 1977): 41–60; Felix Rösch, *Émigré Scholars and the Genesis of International Relations: A European Discipline in America?* (London: Palgrave, 2014). See also: Nicolas Guilhot, *The Invention of International Relations Theory: Realism, the Rockefeller Foundation and the 1954 Conference on Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

24 Rösch, *Émigré Scholars*, 3.

in Germany, and not all were Jewish, but the infamous Civil Service Reconstitution Law of April 1933 contributed the most to this exodus. As a result up to 25 percent of university-level professorial posts and many other lower positions were vacated by 1936, the main beneficiaries of this exile of pure, applied, social scientific, and humanities expertise being not only the United States but also places such as Turkey.[25] The US became not simply a sanctuary but also a bearer of the values of open enquiry and intellectual freedom that had been crushed. For Hans Speier, a sociologist who joined the New School for Social Research in New York in 1933, it was essential for the exile to contribute to that transformation of the host nation: "the cosmopolitan intellectual exile should dedicate himself or herself to strengthening the United States, which, they implied, was the current bearer of the universalistic values cherished by scholars."[26]

The role of the United States in this repositioning of exile as a central factor, more than simply movement or displacement, in Western modernity is two-fold: as a refuge for exiles, and as a power that recognized the potential political utility of exiles for its political projects abroad. Democratisation campaigns have always relied on their local advocates to provide immediate legitimacy. This was exemplified by US policies during the Cold War.

Exile Politics and the Cold War Transatlantic

The United States, as a nation of immigrants, was culturally well placed to incorporate the political utility of exiles in its own foreign policy designs. It also stood for what were considered to be universal values – liberal democracy, the rule of law, the free market – that could be adopted and promoted by anyone, not just Americans. The onset of intensive conflicts with totalitarian adversaries through the twentieth century turned exiles into a valuable asset for achieving US supremacy. During WW II, the Office of Strategic Services took in around 900 scholars for its Research and Analysis department, many being European exiles (Frans Neumann, Herbert Marcuse, John Herz, to name a few of the most prominent). The OSS episode is interesting for how the expertise of the exiles eventually overcame suspicions of their possible divided loyalties in a wartime situation.[27]

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25 Martin Kohlrausch and Helmuth Trischler, *Building Europe on Expertise: Innovators, Organizers, Networkers* (London: Palgrave, 2015), 188.

26 Daniel Bessner, *Democracy in Exile: Hans Speier and the Rise of the Defense Intellectual* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018), 55.

27 Barry Katz, *Foreign Intelligence: Research and Analysis in the Office of Strategic Services, 1942–1945* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989).

The onset of the Cold War in the late 1940s would give this development a further impetus. Exile organizations from Bolshevik Russia had already been entwined with US foreign relations elites after 1917 in covert plans of varying credibility to undermine the revolution.[28] It is this absorption of exiles by the US, socially, intellectually, and politically, and its incorporation of exile communities as an essential part of its foreign policy strategy that really gives the issue significance from the 1940s onwards.

The linkage of a wide range of exile communities with the US anti-communist crusade during the Cold War, and the way that exile became a motif to consistently justify US Cold War policies from containment to rollback, is undisputable. In the early Cold War period, Central and East European exiles took on greater significance through the national units that were incorporated into the sprawling CIA-financed Free Europe Committee. Established in 1949 ostensibly as the public fund-raising and lobbying front for Radio Free Europe, NCFE was more than simply another CIA outlet for controlling the message. Its founding document, 'The Inauguration of Political Warfare' penned by George Kennan in May 1948, fully understood the mobilizing power of exile politics within an immigrant nation such as the United States, both in terms of the moral argument (the mission to promote universal freedoms), and in terms of political lobbying for the anti-communist cause in Congress, during elections, and in the public sphere at large. Exiles lent the US strategy identity, legitimacy, and credibility. They also provided an additional motivation, through their lobbying and political connections, for attention to be given to their homelands. In this way, exiles were not simply useful political tools but also political actors who used their agency to influence US society. For exiled intellectuals such as Speier, the US represented a remarkable opportunity for blending "enlightened and universalistic cosmopolitanism" with power for good. For exiled politicians, the US was a source of recognition and funds for maintaining their networks – and, should things go their way, for regaining power. Symbolic annual "monuments" to profile the cause, such as Captive Nations Week, are still part of the US political calendar.[29]

In the early Cold War, exile was portrayed as a temporary station on the way to a transformed political future where democracy and freedom would triumph. But that

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28 David Fogelsong, *America's Secret War against Bolshevism: US Intervention in the Russian Civil War 1917–1920* (Raleigh: University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

29 See: Anna Mazurkiewicz, *Voices of the Silenced Peoples in the Global Cold War: The Assembly of Captive European Nations 1954–1972* (Oldenbourg: De Gruyter, 2020); Katalin Kádár Lynn *(ed.), The Inauguration of 'Organized Political Warfare': The Cold War Organizations Sponsored by the National Committee for a Free Europe/Free Europe Committee* (Los Angeles: Helena History Press, 2013); Simo Mikkonen, "Exploiting the Exiles: Soviet Emigres in US Cold War Strategy," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, no. 14 (2012): 98–127; Benjamin Tromly, "The Making of a Myth: The National Labor Alliance, Russian Emigres, and Cold War Intelligence Activities," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 18, no. 1 (2016): 80–111; Bessner, *Democracy in Exile*, 67.

future needed guidance according to the US worldview. A fascinating side-history of this were the exile universities established before and after WW II. In 1933 Alvin Johnson established the University in Exile as an off-shoot of the New School for Social Research in New York, a graduate school that became the academic residency for 183 émigré intellectuals and which was supported by the Rockefeller Foundation.[30] Many of those at Johnson's institute went on to provide research services for the OSS during the war. This linkage between exiles, educational institutions, and intelligence continued in the Cold War in the form of "covert universities." The Free Europe Committee established the Free European University in Exile in Strasbourg in 1951 for Central and East European exiles.[31] Very much representative of the 'Rollback' mentality of US Cold Warriors who considered Soviet control of Eastern Europe to be temporary, the University ran a curriculum that focused on European history, political philosophy, and economic development, coaching its participants for what were hoped to be future leading positions in their home countries (and many graduates did eventually re-enter their national political realms after 1989).[32]

Another exile university was that of Pro Deo. Felix Morlion, a Belgian Dominican, founded the *Centre d'information et publication Pro Deo* in 1932 in Brussels, an anti-totalitarian propaganda organization that sought to make use of the latest methods of communication science. Going into exile in 1940, first to Lisbon and then – thanks to William J. Donovan and the Office of Strategic Services – to New York, Morlion's trans-European Catholic underground began providing reports on occupied Europe. In late 1944 Donovan sent Morlion to Rome to work out of the Vatican of Pope Pius XII. It was there that Morlion founded the School of Mass Communication Media, the graduates of which would form the backbone of Luigi Gedda's Catholic Action. A prominent figure in the anti-communist campaign that focused on the 1948 Italian elections, Morlion was soon on the radar of other determined anti-communist zealots such as Henry Luce and C.D. Jackson, who would go on to lead an affiliate, the American Council for the International Promotion of Democracy under God. By the early 1950s Morlion, now running the U.S.-orientated University of the Social Sciences Pro Deo in Rome, was

30 Claus-Dieter Krohn, *Intellectuals in Exile: Refugee Scholars and the New School for Social Research* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1993).

31 Giles Scott-Smith, "The Free Europe University in Strasbourg: US State-Private Networks and Academic "Rollback"," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 16, no. 2 (2014).

32 See: Veronika Durin-Hornyik, "The Free Europe University in Exile, Inc. and the Collège de l'Europe libre (1951–1958)," in *The Inauguration of 'Organized Political Warfare'*, ed. Kádár Lynn (Los Angeles: Helena History Press, 2013), 439–513, and her ongoing research at https://univexile.hypotheses.org/ (accessed 27 March 2023).

clearly implicated in the same CIA-linked circles as the Free Europe Committee.[33] Interestingly enough, both the Strasbourg and Rome institutions switched to a greater focus on Latin Americans from the late 1950s onwards. Exile universities such as these indicate exile's deliberate cultivation as part of the wider US Cold War strategy. They became sites of learning for what were presented as attainable futures, even as these futures receded further into the distance.

Specific countries have contributed noteworthy exile networks that exerted their influence for decades. The Poles form a special group in this scenario, with exiles from leftist and rightist totalitarianism and strong transatlantic connections in terms of searching for political futures. The Bilderberg meetings had many inputs but the foremost role in initially pulling it together was played by the Pole Jozef Retinger.[34] Czeslaw Milosz produced the seminal work on communist ideology, *The Captive Mind,* following his defection in 1951.[35] The Paris-based and London-based Polish emigré intelligentsia were prominent figures throughout the Cold War, in particular Jerzy Giedroyc and the journal *Kultura*, Konstanty Jelenski, Walter Laqueur and Leo Labedz, these last two running the journal *Soviet Survey* for 32 years, outlasting its original sponsor, the Congress for Cultural Freedom.[36] From the beginning the Congress functioned as a kind of habitus for displaced intelligentsia of both East and West, its executive secretary Michael Josselson having escaped both Soviet control of the Baltics and Nazi control of Paris, only to return as a member of the US occupying authorities of Germany.[37] Spanish and Portuguese dictatorships contributed their own transatlantic networks of exile that linked both Latin and North America with political and cultural designs for change in the homeland.[38] The presence of many Germans expelled from the Eastern territories at the end of WW II brought a significant diaspora into post-war West Germany. At the time of the founding of the Federal republic in 1949, this community was reckoned to be about 17 percent of the population, and "for better or worse, a massive, organized system of expellee pressure

33 See: Valerie Aubourg, "C.D. Jackson, Henry Luce, et le mouvement Pro Deo (1941–1964)," *Revue Francaise d'Etudes Americaines*, no. 107 (2006): 29–46.

34 M.B.B. Biskupski, *War and Diplomacy in East and West: A Biography of Josef Retinger* (London: Routledge, 2017).

35 Andrzej Franaszek, *Milosz: A Biography* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2017).

36 Giles Scott-Smith, "Tracking the Bear: Survey," in *Campaigning Culture and the Global Cold War: The Journals of the Congress for Cultural Freedom*, eds. G. Scott-Smith and Charlotte Lerg (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 167–84.

37 On Josselson see: Sarah Miller Harris, *The CIA and the Congress for Cultural Freedom in the Early Cold War* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016).

38 See: Olga Glondys, *La Guerra fria cultural y el exilio republican espanol: Cuardernos del Congreso por la Liberta de la Cultura (1953–1965)* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas, 2012); Scott Soo, *The Routes to Exile: France and the Spanish Civil War Refugees, 1939–2009* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013); Sebastiaan Faber, *Exile and Cultural Hegemony: Spanish Intellectuals in Mexico 1939–1975* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2002).

groups began to make itself felt," so much so that the Allied occupying powers were seriously concerned as to the effect this would have on political stability.[39] They would continue to wield that influence, particularly in Bavaria, for the next several decades.

Exile has also manifested itself directly in diplomatic relations both during and after the Cold War. An examination of those who have taken refuge in another country's diplomatic mission – a high-profile move emblematic of the threat of violence from the host regime – reveals that embassy exiles come predominantly from Latin and Central America, Africa, and Asia. However, most of these cases have been of a few days in duration, and some of the longest refuges in an embassy have actually taken place in the transatlantic region. The Hungarian cardinal Jozsef Mindszenty spent fifteen years in the US embassy in Budapest following the Soviet invasion of November 1956.[40] Between 1978–83 the so-called Siberian Seven – seven Russian Pentecostals – resided in the US embassy in Moscow demanding the right to emigrate to the United States, which was eventually granted.[41] Julian Assange spent seven years as resident of the embassy of Ecuador in London, claiming refuge from charges of rape in Sweden which he viewed as a politically motivated tactic to arrange his extradition to the United States for the publication of classified material via Wikileaks. Political exile in its classic sense is not entirely absent from these examples, although they could perhaps be classed as anomalies.

This summary is definitely not meant to be exhaustive – on the contrary, it is meant to point to the scale and scope of the collective exile experience of the West, and how this has shaped both Western interpretations of its own political development and its interactions with others. Even when part of a wider strategy, exiles are disruptive elements in both domestic politics and international relations.

Conclusion

Exile has been a part of the "Western" world since the Greeks recognized its usefulness for removing disruptive forces from the polis. The Romans continued in their neighbor's footsteps with the practice of *exilium*, and exile was taken up as part of the political land-

39 H.W. Schoenberg, *Germans from the East: A Study of their Migration, Resettlement, and Subsequent Group History since 1945* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), 78.

40 Jozsef Mindszenty, *Memoirs* (New York: Macmillan, 1974).

41 John Charles Pollock, *The Siberian Seven* (Waco TX: Word Books, 1980); Timothy Chmykhalov, *Release! The Miracle of the Siberian Seven* (Basingstoke: Marshall Morgan & Scott, 1984).

scape of Rennaissance Italy.[42] Since then revolutions – American, French, Russian, Cuban - have produced waves of political exiles who went on to influence the public sphere of their adopted host nations.[43] The failed revolutions of 1848 forced Marx first out of Germany and then out of France. Modern Russia can literally be defined by its struggle with exiles, from Alexander Herzen to Trotsky to Solzhenitsyn to Boris Berezofsky. The United States sought to utilize exiles in the Cold War as actors legitimizing its political warfare with the Soviet Union, but the agency of the exiles themselves in manipulating political agendas should not be overlooked. Wars such as Vietnam and Iraq created significant American exile communities in Canada who have affected bilateral relations. Exile has continued to play a highly publicized role in transatlantic affairs into the twenty-first century, notably through Edward Snowden's flight from Hawaii to Hong Kong to Moscow in 2013. Snowden's exposure of the National Security Agency's methods for information-gathering disrupted relations with allies and questioned the legal and democratic credentials of the US itself. From a national security perspective, this is a significant twenty-first century reversal of the United States as exile refuge during the twentieth.[44] Russia under Vladimir Putin has also pursued a violent campaign against political exiles who have challenged in any form his rule, leading to high-profile assassinations and assassination attempts abroad, particularly in Britain.[45] Yet despite this brief list demonstrating their omnipresence, exiles have generally been regarded as "interfering outsiders," "dismissed as irrelevant," or representing "an unfortunate side effect of forced displacement that will fade away once this unfortunate predicament is cured."[46] The place of exiles within modern transatlantic relations, shaping political discourse and influencing political presents and futures, indicates the prevalence of antagonism in the Western political tradition.

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42 C. Shaw, *The Politics of Exile in Renaissance Italy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); F. Ricciardelli, *The Politics of Exclusion in Early Renaissance Florence* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2007).

43 On Cubans see: Maria de los Angeles Torres, *In the Land of Mirrors: Cuban Exile Politics in the United States* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001).

44 Edward Snowden, *Permanent Record* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2019); Nils Melzer, *The Trial of Julian Assange* (London: Verso, 2022).

45 The most spectacular have been the attempt on the life of Sergei Skripal, a former KGB colonel, with the use of nerve agent Novichok in Salisbury in 2018, and the death of Alexander Litvinenko from polonium poisoning in 2006. Other mysterious exile deaths in Britain include media magnate Boris Berezovsky in 2013, and Yukos cofounder Yuri Golubev in 2007.

46 Vasanthakumar, *Ethics of Exile*, 2.

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In Search of "Good Russians": Ukrainian-Russian Encounters in the United States During the First Cold War

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Abstract: The article is devoted to the topic of Ukrainian-Russian intellectual encounters in exile during the Cold War. The author focuses on Ukraine's and Russia's mutual representations in historical narratives in connection with their respective discourses of national identity. The article also describes sporadic attempts at establishing Ukrainian-Russian public dialogue in exile starting in the early 1960s. All of them were initiated and conducted by Ukrainian public activists and intellectuals. The author concludes that participants on both sides ascribed opposing meanings to historical terms. Russian authors, on the one hand, consistently used the modern designation "Ukrainian" as a synonym for "Little Russian," which automatically situated Ukraine within the "pan-Russian" historical framework. Ukrainian historians, on the other hand, tried to reinterpret "Russian" as a modern national designation rather than an imperial one. Hence the Ukrainian-Russian dialogue had no chance of succeeding unless Russian participants agreed to rethink their discourse of national identity. It is no wonder that many American observers remained confused about the nature of Ukrainian-Russian debates: to them, they looked like a dead-end situation. Thus, rather than trying to find alternative interpretations of Ukrainian and Russian history, most Western specialists followed either one or the other respective national narrative.

Keywords: Russia, Ukraine, exile, Cold War, identity, historiography

Introduction

The Russian aggression against Ukraine, which started in 2014 and escalated into war in 2022, fits into the context of the political reformatting of two overlapping geopolitical regions, former Soviet and East European, which emerged on opposing sides of the "Iron Curtain" after World War II. This radical change of geopolitical landscape has been accompanied by attempts to rethink the entire complex of ideas and symbols associated with the eastern periphery of Europe. Revision of the "Soviet," "European," and "Russian" designations was an important part of this process.

The role of Russian-Ukrainian relations in rethinking and rewriting the eastern edge of Europe was rather underestimated by the Western expert community until recently. The vast majority of research and publication on this topic was initiated and conducted by Ukrainian scholars, with only limited participation of Russian scholars and sporadic contributions from Western specialists.[1] I believe that this fact could be better understood in the context of modern nation-state building. In Ukraine, it developed initially in two entwined discourses of identity, "Little Russian" and "Ukrainian."[2] In the case of Russia, the complexity and ambiguity of "Russianness" remains a subject of endless debate.

In the course of the "short" twentieth century, the "Little Russian" discourse under "Ukrainian" guise established *de facto* the interpretive framework for historians in the Soviet Union, while the "Ukrainian" discourse dominated among Ukrainian scholars beyond the Soviet space. Topics related to the entangled Ukrainian and Russian histories, shared geographies, and national identities – especially those pertaining to Kyivan Rus', the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, and Ukrainian statehood – have acquired different, most often opposing interpretations in the respective narratives. Chances of arranging a dialogue between Ukrainian and Russian historians on these topics appear to be extremely remote.[3] The question arises whether it was even possible.

Today, when Russia is once again challenging world order established on the principles of liberal democracy, views of Russian history and politics dating from the "first" Cold War era seem quite relevant.[4] In particular, the Ukrainian aspects of that legacy might shed additional light on the roots of Russian (self-)identification in time and space. So far, Ukrainian-Russian intellectual encounters during the Cold War have been

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1 *Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter*, eds. Peter J. Potichnyj et al. (Edmonton: CIUS Press, 1992); *Culture, Nation and Identity: The Ukrainian-Russian Encounter (1600–1945)*, eds. Andreas Kappeler et al. (Edmonton: CIUS Press, 2003); *Rossiia-Ukraina: istoriia vzaimootnoshenii*, eds. Aleksei Miller et al. (Moscow: "Iazyki russkoi kul'tury," 1997); *Ukraïna i Rosiia v istorychnii retrospektyvi*, 3 vols., eds. Valerii Smolii et al. (Kyiv: Naukova Dumka, 2004); Georgii Kasianov, Valerii Smolii, and Oleksii Tolochko, *Ukraïna v rosiis'komu istorychnomu dyskursi: problemy doslidzhennia ta interpretatsii* (Kyiv: Instytut istorii Ukraïny, 2013).

2 See: Volodymyr Kravchenko, *The Ukrainian-Russian Borderland: History versus Geography* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2022), 47–78; Faith Hillis, *Children of Rus': Right-Bank Ukraine and the Invention of a Russian Nation* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013); Klymentii I. Fedevych and Klymentii K. Fedevych, *Za viru, t͡sarîa͡ i Kobzarîa͡: malorosiis'ki monarkhisty i ukraïns'kyi nat͡sional'nyi rukh (1905–1917 roky)* (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2017).

3 See: Zenon E. Kohut, *History as a Battleground: Russian-Ukrainian Relations and Historical Consciousness in Contemporary Ukraine* (Saskatoon: Heritage Press, 2002).

4 Theodore P. Gerber, *The State of Russian Studies in the United States: An Assessment by the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES), July 2015* (ASEEES & Carnegie Corporation of New York, 2015), 44, https://www.aseees.org/sites/default/files/downloads/FINAL-ASEEES-assessment-report.pdf.

inadequately studied. Ukrainian scholars have touched upon them only occasionally. Taras Kuzio is one of the few scholars who pays special attention to Russian-Ukrainian studies during the Cold War.[5] Contemporary Russian authors used to interpret them in the spirit of the old Soviet tradition of "struggling with Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism."[6] Other specialists either confined themselves to general observations and comments on this issue or focused on the post-Soviet period.[7]

In this article, I focus on Ukrainian and Russian historians in the United States with the aim of analyzing their respective views on each other's history. I also describe sporadic attempts to establish dialogue between Ukrainian and Russian intellectuals and political activists. Some aspects of these topics have been presented in my book on the history of Ukrainian studies in North America during the Cold War.[8] In this article, they are complemented with new facts and observations.

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5 Taras Kuzio, *Russian Nationalism and the Russian-Ukrainian War*: *Autocracy-Orthodoxy-Nationality* (London and New York: Routledge, 2022); Kuzio, *Crisis in Russian Studies? Nationalism (Imperialism), Racism and War* (Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing, 2020). See also: Thomas Prymak, *Gathering a Heritage: Ukrainian, Slavonic, and Ethnic Canada and the USA* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015); Prymak, *Maple Leaf and Trident: The Ukrainian Canadians During the Second World War* (Toronto: Multicultural History Society of Ontario, 1988), 144–9; Mykola Soroka, "On the Other Side: The Russian–Ukrainian Encounter in Displacement, 1920–1939," *Nationalities Papers* 37, no. 3 (May 2009): 327–48; Frank Sysyn, "English-Language Historiography in the Twentieth Century on the Pereyaslav Agreement," *Russian History/Histoire Russe* 32, no. 3–4 (2005): 513–29; Lybomyr Wynar, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky. Ukrainian-Russian Confrontation in Historiography* (Toronto, New York, and Munich: Ukrainian Historical Association, 1988).

6 Andrei I. Dvornichenko, *Russkii istorik Georgii Vernadskii. Puteshestvie v mire ludei, idei i sobytii* (St. Petersburg: Evraziia, 2017); Petr Bazanov, "Russkii myslitel' Nikolai Ivanovich Ul'ianov o fenomene Ukrainskogo separatizma" ["The Russian Philosopher Nikolai Ivanovich Oulianoff on the Phenomenon of Ukrainian Separatism"], *Vestnik Russkoi khristianskoi gumanitarnoi akademii* 16, no. 1 (2015): 157–68; Bazanov, "Professor N. E. Andreev i ego vklad v izuchenie russkoi istorii i kul'tury" ["Professor N. E. Andreev and His Contribution to the Study of Russian History and Culture"], *Dialog so vremenem*, no. 68 (2019): 215–23.

7 See, for example: Ilya Gerasimov, "Narrating Russian History after the Imperial Turn," *Ab Imperio*, no. 4 (2020): 21–61; Andy Byford et al., "Introduction: transnationalizing Russian studies," in *Transnational Russian Studies* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2019), 1–34; *Russian/Soviet Studies in the United States, Amerikanistika in Russia: Mutual Representations in Academic Projects*, eds. Ivan Kurilla and Victoria I. Zhuravleva (Lexington Books, 2015); David Engerman, *Know Your Enemy: The Rise and Fall of America's Russian Experts* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Mirosław Filipowicz, *Emigranci i Jankesi. O amerykańskich historykach Rosji* (Lublin, 2007); Clarence A. Manning, *A History of Slavic Studies in the United States* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1957).

8 Volodymyr Kravchenko, *Ukrainian Historical Writing in North America during the Cold War: The Struggle for Recognition* (Lexington Books, 2022).

Russian Views

During the late 1940s and early 1950s, the most visionary American politicians and intellectuals became aware that their country was poorly prepared for political, ideological, and cultural conflict with one of its most dangerous adversaries, one that was literally armed to the teeth. According to the historian Robert Byrnes, in the early stage of World War II "Ignorance of things Russian and Soviet was almost total. Libraries were small and usually consisted only of books and journals in Western languages, and interest in strengthening these collections was limited."[9] Highly confusing terminology may also be added to this record, since definitions ("Soviet," "Russian," and "Slavic") inherited from the past did not adequately reflect the new political and social realities.

Awareness of this situation led American elites to establish a new system of producing and disseminating expert knowledge of peoples and states on the Western side of the "Iron Curtain." Accordingly, the new academic disciplines of Sovietology, East European studies, and a number of nation-oriented studies were added to more traditional Slavic studies. In the early stage of the Cold War, these disciplines, according to David Engerman, were conducted mainly by immigrant specialists from that part of the world.[10] Needless to say, most of those immigrants were strongly influenced by their respective national traditions and stereotypes. Russian scholars occupied the very top of the pyramid of knowledge, owing primarily to the powerful waves of intellectual immigration during and after the Great War, and secondarily to the high prestige of the former Russian imperial science and culture. It is no wonder, then, that all those relatively new disciplines were initially dominated by Russian topics, approaches, and arguments.[11]

George (Georgii) Vernadsky, Michael Karpovich, Alexander Dallin, George Florovsky, Sergei Pushkarev, Georgy Fedotov, Nicholas Timasheff, and Marc Raeff, to name just a few, represented the crème de la crème of Russian intellectual emigration to the US. They were the last of their kind, successors to the great imperial tradition destroyed by the Bolshevik "revolt of the masses." Most of them might be labeled "Russian Westernizers" or "Russian Europeans."[12] Politically, they were both anti-communists and Russian imperial nationalists, basically in the same manner as their compatriots and prominent political figures Alexander Kerensky, Anton Denikin, or Boris Nikolaevsky.

Russian exiles tried to draw a strict dividing line between imperial Russia and the Soviet Union in order to present the "Russian people," whoever they were, as allies of the

9 Robert F. Byrnes, *A History of Russian and East European Studies in the United States: Selected Essays* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994), 132.

10 Engerman, *Know Your Enemy*, 130–1.

11 Ibid., 153; Manning, *A History of Slavic Studies*, 85, 98.

12 Engerman, *Know Your Enemy*, 136, 154.

West in their common struggle against world communism. In a collective letter to the *New York Times* published in 1951, representatives of a wide circle of Russian émigrés in America, including Alexander Kerensky, Michael Karpovich, and Georgy Fedotov, tried to historicize the old Russian imperialism by pointing out similarities with its British, French, German, and Austro-Hungarian counterparts.[13] Soviet imperialism, in their interpretation, had nothing to do with Russian national traditions and was considered part of an international, cosmopolitan communist conspiracy. The same line of argument was used by a younger member of the Russian academic community, the historian Nicholas Riasanovsky, in a polemic with his Polish colleague Oskar Halecki.[14]

The popular textbooks and synthetic monographs on Russian history written by Russian historians in the US represented, according to James Cracraft, "old-fashioned imperial history, such as used to be written by British, French, or German historians with reference to other peoples who at one time or another came under British, French, or German rule; and it no doubt draws sustenance from the fact that so much of the old Russian Empire lives on in the Soviet Union."[15] However, there were certain trends in Russian historical thought and writing in the twentieth century with the potential to promote national reidentification and change attitudes toward the Ukrainian question after the dissolution of the Russian Empire.

The Soviet experiment and the Eurasian intellectual movement challenged traditional imperial-Orthodox ideas of Russianness articulated by Count Sergei Uvarov in the 1830s. Soviet nationality policy of the 1920s was based on the need to restrict the imperial dominance of Great Russia and promote affirmative action intended to accelerate the national development of ethnic minorities under Soviet ideological control.[16] The Eurasianist school of historical writing emphasized the importance of local historical and cultural traditions in order to present the "all-Russian" imperial civilization as a unique synthesis of "East" and "West."[17] Both the Soviet and the Eurasian discourses of Russian identity were more sensitive to the ethnic and cultural diversity of the former "Russia." Their adherents also tried to come to terms with Ukrainian national aspirations. The

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13 "Russia's History," *New York Times*, July 8, 1951, 8E. The letter was signed by Alexander Kerensky, Michael Karpovich, and Georgy Fedotov, among other Russian political activists and intellectuals.

14 Nicholas Riasanovsky, "Old Russia, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," *American Slavic and East European Review* 11, no. 3 (October 1952): 171–88; Oscar Halecki, "Imperialism in Slavic and East European History," *American Slavic and East European Review* 11, no. 1 (Feb., 1952): 1–26.

15 James Cracraft, "Introduction," in *From Kievan Rus' to Modern Ukraine: Formation of the Ukrainian Nation*, eds. Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Omeljan Pritsak, and John Stephen Reshetar (Cambridge, MA: Ukrainian Studies Fund, Harvard University, 1984), i-ii.

16 Terry Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the USSR, 1923–1939* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001).

17 *Between Europe and Asia: The Origins, Theories, and Legacies of Russian Eurasianism*, ed. Mark Bassin et al. (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015).

question arose, however, as to the meaning of "Ukrainian" terminology and its relation to the "Little Russian" identity discourse.[18]

In the Soviet Union, the affirmative action policy gave a new impetus to Ukrainian national development under the communist banner during the 1920s. When the process of "Ukrainization" in the Soviet Union was brutally terminated by Stalin, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic turned into a new version of "Little Russia" under the façade of its "Ukrainian" designation. Its ambiguous status became apparent during the pompous celebration of the 300th anniversary of the Pereiaslav agreement between Ukraine and Russia organized by the Kremlin in 1954. It was canonized in the new Soviet/Russian official narrative, which lasted until the end of the Soviet Union.[19]

The Russian Eurasianists' attitude toward Ukraine was similar to the Soviet one. They recognized the existence of a distinct Ukrainian history and even admitted the beneficial Ukrainian impact on Russian imperial culture. Professor George Vernadsky of Yale, himself of Ukrainian ethnic origin, cooperated with Ukrainian diaspora communities in America and was heavily criticized for that by Soviet-oriented circles.[20] He acknowledged the Ukrainians as the second-largest Slavic nation (after the Russians) and proclaimed Ukraine "the pivot of Eastern Europe," essential to an understanding of recent developments in that region.[21]

Vernadsky made a substantial contribution to Ukrainian studies in the United States. Compared to all his predecessors and many contemporaries, he gave more space to Ukrainian topics in his new synthesis of Russian history. Vernadsky supported the English-language edition of Mykhailo Hrushevsky's *History of Ukraine*, and he himself published a popular biography of the Ukrainian hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky.[22] The historian was even prepared to recognize the *de facto* independent status of Ukraine following its political agreement of 1654 with "Great Russia" and acknowledged the historical

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18 Volodymyr Kravchenko, *The Ukrainian-Russian Borderland: History versus Geography* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2022), 17–78; Andreas Kappeler, *'Great Russians' and 'Little Russians': Russian-Ukrainian Relations and Perceptions in Historical Perspective* (Seattle, WA: The Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington, 2003).

19 *Pereiaslavs'ka rada 1654 roku (istoriohrafiia ta doslidzhennia)*, ed. Pavlo Sokhan (Kyiv: Smoloskyp, 2003).

20 Charles J. Halperin, "(Re)Discovering George Vernadsky," *Journal of Modern Russian History and Historiography*, no. 11 (2018): 134–57; Ernest Gyidel, "Ob 'Ukrainofil'stve' Georgiia Vernadskogo, ili variatsiia na temu natsional'nykh i gosudarstvennykh loial'nostei," *Ab Imperio*, no. 4 (2006): 329–69; Igor Torbakov, "Becoming Eurasian: The Intellectual Odyssey of Georgii Vladimirovich Vernadsky," in *Between Europe and Asia: The Origins, Theories, and Legacies of Russian Eurasianism*, 113–36.

21 George Vernadsky, "Preface," in Michael Hrushevsky, *A History of Ukraine*, ed. Oliver J. Frederiksen (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1941), v.

22 George Vernadsky, *Bohdan, Hetman of Ukraine* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1941); Vernadsky, "Preface."

right of the Ukrainian people to recolonize the southern steppe, even on condition of Russian assistance.[23]

At the same time, all Vernadsky's concessions to the Ukrainian national discourse did not incline him to accept the prospect of a separate Ukrainian past and future. Like his father, Vladimir Vernadsky, the distinguished Russian scholar and thinker of Ukrainian origin, George Vernadsky maintained a "Little Russian" outlook on the Ukrainian question. Following populist Russian and Soviet historiography, he emphasized the weakness of Ukrainian statehood as well as the schism between Ukrainian political elites and the rest of society. George Vernadsky definitely favored Bohdan Khmelnytsky over Ivan Mazepa and approved of the destruction of the Zaporozhian Sich by the Russian tsardom.

The Harvard University historian Mikhail/Michael Karpovich, whose influence on American *Rusistika* surpassed even that of Vernadsky, was very close to the latter in his attitude toward Ukraine. He was ready to discuss Ukrainian topics with his Ukrainian counterparts and once accepted an invitation from the Ukrainian Free Academy of Sciences to deliver public lectures on the histories of Ukraine and Russia. Karpovich recognized the accomplishments of the founding father of Ukrainian national historiography, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, in criticizing the imperial Russian historical narrative, even though he could not agree with the Ukrainian historian's interpretations of Kyivan Rus' and the Russian Empire.[24] Contrary to Hrushevsky, Karpovich treated the former as a "neither 'Russian' nor 'Ukrainian'" polity and considered the latter beneficial for the Ukrainian people.[25]

Both Vernadsky and Karpovich, perhaps the most important representatives of the Russian historians' cohort in the US, were echoed by their contemporaries Michael Florinsky and Nicholas Riasanovsky in their attempts to "expropriate" the Kyivan Rus' legacy for the Russian historical narrative.[26] They all demonstrated the limits of what Russian scholars were prepared to concede with regard to the Ukrainian question. They simply adopted "Ukrainian" terminology and formally recognized the existence of a distinct Ukrainian history and culture while adhering to the "all-Russian" discourse of Russian imperial identity, including "Great Russian," "Little Russian," and "White Russian"

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23 "...the whole area of the southern steppes down to the shores of the Black Sea was thrown open to Ukrainian colonization." With Russian military assistance, Ukrainians "were now able to recover the territory populated by their forebears but long since lost" (Vernadsky, *Bohdan, Hetman of Ukraine*, 125).

24 Wynar, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: Ukrainian-Russian Confrontation*, 46–7.

25 "...it was possible both for the Russians and the Ukrainians to treat the Kiev period as an integral part of their respective national histories for the reason that at that time there were, strictly speaking, neither 'Russians' nor 'Ukrainians.'" Quoted in Wynar, *Mykhailo Hrushevsky: Ukrainian-Russian Confrontation*, 45.

26 Kuzio, *Crisis in Russian Studies*, 19–21.

components.[27] Russian intellectuals simply could not imagine Ukraine outside the boundaries of the "Russian world," neither in the past nor in the future.

Russian exiles of liberal orientation believed that "Russia, freed from communism, should be transformed into a federation of free and equal nations, with the right of every nation to claim its statehood through the democratic process… under the supervision of the United Nations."[28] But such an idyllic picture did not fit well with political realities. It was no accident that Alexander Kerensky, one of the Russian exiles who signed the aforementioned collective letter, stigmatized pro-independence Ukrainians as "separatists."[29] The differences between liberals and their opponents on the left and right of the political spectrum with regard to the Russian future remained insignificant. They were all resolutely opposed to any prospect of the political disintegration of the Russian imperial polity along national or regional lines.

Russian Marxists in exile recognized, in theory, the Ukrainians' right to independence. There was, however, a "but," and in this case, as in all previous cases, it was the part following the "but" that really mattered. According to Lev Trotsky, Ukrainian independence should be supported because it was directly and indissolubly connected to the program of proletarian revolution: "Real liberation of the Ukrainian people is unthinkable without a revolution or a series of revolutions in the West which would lead in the end to the establishment of the Soviet United States of Europe. Independent Ukraine could, and definitely will, join such a federation as an equal."[30]

Far-right Russian nationalists, for their part, rejected any notion of "Ukraine" and spoke only about good old "Little Russia" as a local branch of the "all-Russian" imperial-Orthodox nation. Horace Lunt summarized their views as follows: "Ukrainian is really just a variant of Russian, 'Little Russians' are somewhat backward, but they do have some endearing folk-customs; all they really need is a bit more time and education and they will be proper Russians."[31] "Ukraine," according to this logic, was just an invention of the ever-hostile and perfidious "West" designed to dismember "eternal Holy Russia."[32]

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27 I accept the definition of "imperial nationalism" to describe Russian collective identity (see: Paul Kolsto, "Is Imperialist Nationalism an Oxymoron?" *Nations and Nationalism* 25, no. 1 (2019): 18–44.

28 "Russia's History," *New York Times*, July 8, 1951, 8E.

29 "Dismembering Russia," *New York Times*, July 29, 1951, 118.

30 Lev Trotsky, "Ob Ukrainskom voprose" [On the Ukrainian Question], *Biulleten' oppozitsii*, no. 77–78 (1939), accessed December 14, 2023, https://www.marxists.org/russkij/trotsky/works/trotm465.html.

31 Horace Lunt, "Notes on Nationalist Attitudes in Slavic Studies," *Canadian Slavonic Papers/Revue Canadienne des Slavistes 34, no. 4 (December 1992):* 465.

32 Rt. Rev. Peter G. Kohanik, *Highlights of Russian History and the "Ukrainian" Provocation* (Passaic, NJ, 1955); Rt. Rev. Peter G. Kohanik, *The Biggest Lie of the Century, "The Ukraine": Historical Facts Concerning Russia and "The Ukraine"* (Russian Orthodox Clergy Assoc. of North America, 1952).

The same basic ideas were expressed in the historical pamphlet *The Origin of Ukrainian Separatism* published by Nikolai Ulianov in 1966. Its author was a member of the Union of Struggle for the Freedom of Russia (*Soiuz bor'by za svobodu Rossii*) and lecturer at Yale University, personally close to George Vernadsky. Ulianov had much in common with his spiritual predecessor Sergei Shchegolev, the Russian Black-Hundreder whose pamphlet *The Ukrainian Movement as a Contemporary Stage of South-Russian Separatism* (*Ukrainskoe dvizhenie kak soveremennyi ėtap iuzhnorusskogo separatizma)* was published on the eve of the Great War and used as an instruction manual on combating Ukrainian national activists.

Shchegolev's denunciation of the Ukrainian movement was condemned by at least some Russian émigrés, including Vladimir Ulianov (Lenin). The pamphlet of his namesake, Nikolai Ulianov, as far as I know, was not given such treatment. Not one member of the Russian academic community renounced it publicly. Nicholas Riasanovsky only slightly reproached Ulianov for his excessive emotionality and "simplification" of history, however understandable...[33] Nikolai Ulianov's book might be considered the only monographic "contribution" of the postwar Russian academic diaspora to Ukrainian history.

The following decades brought no substantial changes in the attitude of Russian historians to the Ukrainian question. According to Omeljan Pritsak, "throughout this century, only a very few Russian intellectuals ever dealt seriously with the Ukrainian problem. And even in our own time [the early 1980s], the Ukrainian problem is not on the list of important matters considered by Russian intellectuals."[34] The main reason for that was obvious: for most Russians, "there was nothing to discuss." From this perspective, the second half of the twentieth century was significantly inferior to the first.

Only a few individuals in the Russian émigré community were prepared to acknowledge that the Ukrainian nation-building process was bound to culminate sooner or later in the creation of an independent state. Georgy Fedotov, the famous Russian philosopher and publicist, recognized that the Ukrainians had already consolidated into a separate nation and admitted that Russian society was guilty of overlooking this fact: "A new nation was being born in front of our eyes, but we turned a blind eye to it."[35] Fedotov considered the origin of the Ukrainian movement an "organic," natural phenomenon and did not fear the prospect of the inevitable disintegration of the Russian Empire.

Fedotov truly believed that liberating Russia from its imperial burden would be in the national interests of the Russian people: "For Russia itself, the forcible continuation

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33 Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, "Review: Proiskhozhdenie ukrainskago separatizma by N. I. Ulianov," *Russian Review* 26, no. 4 (Oct. 1967): 411–13.

34 Omeljan Pritsak, "The Problem of a Ukrainian-Russian Dialogue," in *Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter*, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj et al. (Edmonton: CIUS Press, 1992), x.

35 Georgii Fedotov, *Sobranie sochinenii v dvenadtsati tomakh*, t. 9 (Moscow: Martis, 2004), 247.

of its imperial existence would mean the loss of hope for her own freedom." Fedotov was among the few insightful observers who managed to recognize the fascist nature of Stalin's Soviet Union and predicted that "fascism is the only regime capable of prolonging the imperial existence of the [Russian] 'convict prison."[36]

Fedotov's views on Russia and Ukraine met with recognition from the Ukrainian side. Arnold D. Margolin, a Ukrainian activist and intellectual of Jewish origin, considered Fedotov "a great Russian patriot in the best sense of this word" and contrasted him with the younger Pavel Miliukov, a contemporary Russian liberal imperialist and renowned historian.[37] Whether or not Fedotov could be considered the Russian equivalent of Jerzy Giedroyc, a great Polish patriot who managed to overcome the Polish imperialist legacy and recognize Ukraine as an equal partner of his country, remains an open question. In fact, the Russian diaspora failed to produce its own "Giedroyc" and adopted a different attitude toward Ukraine.

Ukrainian Views

The Ukrainian academic community in post-World War II America yielded to the greater influence of its Russian counterpart in the political and academic mainstream. During the early stage of the Cold War there were just a few Ukrainian specialists in the humanities and social studies in North America. It took about two generations of scholars to establish the academic respectability of Ukrainian topics in various university disciplines. But even after that, Ukrainian studies remained a risky enterprise for those seeking an academic career in America. Considered from a distance, however, this may have been a blessing in disguise.

In order to survive, Ukrainian studies in exile needed to become more dynamic, diverse, and open to innovation. Dozens of Ukrainian intellectuals and university scholars worked on the problem of Ukrainian-Russian relations within the contexts of Russian and Soviet studies, compared to only a few Russian authors who were interested in Ukrainian topics. Practically every new publication devoted to recent Ukrainian history also shed light on the Russian/Soviet historical phenomenon.

Ukrainian historical writing in exile fulfilled a triune function: furthering the process of national consolidation; disentangling Ukrainian history from "all-Russian"/Soviet

36 "Fashizm iavliaetsia edinstvennym stroem, sposobnym prodlit' sushchestvovanie katorzhnoi imperii" (Fedotov, *Sobranie sochinenii*, 252).

37 Arnold D. Margolin, *George Fedotov and His Predictions on the Future Fate of the USSR and of Its Enslaved Peoples* (Scranton, PA: Ukrainian Workingmen's Association, 1955).

history and integrating it into the "Eastern European" symbolic space; and backing up a Ukrainian bid for political independence. The Ukrainian metanarrative was based on the historical schema elaborated by Mykhailo Hrushevsky and developed by his followers in light of recent events. Essentially, all Ukrainian activists rejected any notion of a future political union with Russia. Consequently, the Ukrainian and Russian metanarratives developed in direct opposition to each other.

Where their Russian colleagues saw integrity, Ukrainian historians emphasized diversity. Compared to their Russian counterparts, Ukrainian scholars were more sensitive to the difference between the imperial and national components of Russian history and politics. Roman Smal-Stocki expressed his and his colleagues' views on that issue in the following statement: "We are not fighting the Russian nation and all its legitimate rights: we are fighting Russian imperialism and intolerant chauvinism, merged together with Russian communism into a messianistic, dynamic force aimed at world conquest..."[38]

Ukrainian authors also contradicted those Russian émigrés who treated the Bolshevik Revolution as a perverse deviation from Russia's "natural" historical path and sought to disentangle the Russian imperial and Soviet phenomena. Contrary to them, Ukrainian intellectuals approached both Russia and the Soviet Union from the perspective of historical continuity, perceiving them as "natural" components of the "eternal" tradition of Russian imperialism.[39] While Russian authors emphasized factors that included them in European history and symbolic space, Ukrainians stressed unique features of the Russian historical process that set it apart from European development.

In order to substantiate the Russian *Sonderweg*, Ukrainian scholars focused on the Byzantine and Oriental roots of Russian political culture. Hence the popularity in Ukrainian post-war historical writing of such topics as the "Third Rome" doctrine and

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38 Roman Smal-Stocki, *A Tribute of the Shevchenko Scientific Society to Professor Manning. Collection of Papers, Presented at the Conference Honoring Prof. Clarence A. Manning, PHD On His 70th Birthday Anniversary* (New York: Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1964), 4.

39 Konstantyn Kononenko, *Ukraine and Russia: A History of the Economic Relations between Ukraine and Russia (1654-1917)* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1958); Vasyl' Kosarenko-Kosarevych, *Moskovs'kyi sfinks: mit i syla v obrazi Skhodu Evropy* (New York, 1957); F. B. Korchmarchyk, *Dukhovni vplyvy Kyieva na Moskovshchynu v dobu hetmans'koï Ukraïny* [Spiritual Influences of Kyiv on Muscovy in the Era of Hetman Ukraine] (New York: NTSh, 1964); Basil Dmytryshyn, *Moscow and the Ukraine, 1918–1953: A Study of Russian Bolshevik Nationality Policy* (New York: Bookman Associates, 1956); *Russian Imperialism from Ivan the Great to the Revolution*, ed. Taras Hunczak (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1974); *Russian Empire: Some Aspects of Tsarist and Soviet Colonial Practices*, ed. Michael S. Pap (Cleveland, OH: John Carroll University and Ukrainian Historical Association, 1986); Petro Holubenko, *Ukraïna i Rosiia u svitli kul'turnykh vzaiemyn* [Ukraine and Russia in Light of Their Cultural Relations] (New York, Paris, and Toronto: Vydavnytstvo "Ukraïns'ke Slovo," 1987).

Mongol influence on Russian history.[40] In this, Ukrainian scholars were close to their Polish colleagues. Some of them went even further in attempting to explain the expansionist and authoritarian features of Soviet/Russian imperialism by pointing out its irrational components deeply rooted in the Russian psyche and mentality.

In the words of a subscriber to the journal *Ukrainian Quarterly*: "...among the Muscovites, fear is the basis of love. The subservience of Moscow to Stalin is not only compulsory. There is much more in it than the world thinks, of sincerity, truth, even reverence."[41] Others attributed mass support of the Soviet regime from below to the influence of official propaganda. As another anonymous author remarked in the *Ukrainian Quarterly,* "In case of a world crisis, American boys will not fight against 14 degenerates in the Kremlin, but against the millions of Russians indoctrinated to the fact that Russia must rule over the entire world."[42]

Ukrainian and Russian émigrés fought fierce battles for the legacy of Kyivan Rus'. If for Russian historians it was either a Russian or a common Russian-Ukrainian phenomenon, then for most Ukrainian authors it belonged to Ukrainian history alone. When Russian historians tried to convince their audience that union with Russia was beneficial for Ukrainians, their Ukrainian colleagues responded with a long list of crimes and repressions committed against Ukrainians by the Russian "wardens" of the imperial "prison of nations."

Speaking of Soviet Ukraine, Ukrainian authors employed the "captive nation" discourse and contributed substantially to its political and intellectual development in the US. Ukraine was presented as the first victim of Russian/Soviet imperialism, a nation occupied by Moscow and subject to colonial exploitation. Victimization in this case went hand in hand with the heroization of national resistance, which included the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) as well as Ukrainian Soviet dissidents. At the same time, most Ukrainian authors denied Russians the status of a captive nation and held the entire Russian nation responsible for the crimes of the Soviet regime.

The new generations of Ukrainian scholars who became active in their profession before the dissolution of the Soviet Union (including, among others, Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky, George Luckyj, Omeljan Pritsak, George Shevelov, Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak,

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40 O. Ohloblyn, *Moskovs'ka teoriia III Rymu v XVI–XVII st.* [The Muscovite Theory of the Third Rome in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries] (Munich: Church Archeography Commission, 1951); N. Polons'ka-Vasylenko, *Teoriia III Rymu v Rosiï protiahom XVIII ta XIX storich* [The Third Rome Theory in the Course of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries] (Munich: Church Archeography Commission, 1951); B. Krupnyts'kyi, *Teoriia III Rymu i shliakhy rosiis'koï istoriohrafii* [The Third Rome Theory and Pathways of Russian Historiography] (Munich: Church Archeography Commission, 1952).

41 I. Zelenko (pseudonym), "Throwing Away Friends," *The Ukrainian Quarterly* 7, no. 1 (1951): 13.

42 [Anonymous], "Faith in 'Eternal Russia,'" *The Ukrainian Quarterly* 7, no. 3: 202. See also: Kosarenko-Kosarevych, *Moskovs'kyi sfinks*.

Volodymyr Nahirny, Roman Szporluk) elaborated a more sophisticated approach to Russian history, in particular, one that took into account the complexity of the "Russian" historical phenomenon. Their findings also helped to update the Ukrainian national narrative. Nevertheless, the impact of Ukrainian scholars on the mainstream of Western historical writing remained limited.[43]

A Dialogue That Failed

Most Ukrainian and Russian émigrés considered any mutual contacts and discussions about their common historical legacy pointless. However, there were Ukrainian activists who tried to establish a Ukrainian-Russian dialogue about the future on the basis of equality and non-intervention. One of them was Mykhailo Demkovych-Dobriansky, a London-based Ukrainian publicist who served as director of the Radio Liberty Ukrainian service from 1956 to 1972. He believed that the whole future of the Ukrainian nation depended on its ability to resolve the Russian-Ukrainian problem and establish a dialogue with the Russians.[44] In his own words: "In the case of Russia, our people have a neighbor that is three times larger and stronger in many respects. Therefore, as far as the future of our people is concerned, we cannot be indifferent to the issue of what kind of regime rules over Russia. ...Liberation from Russian captivity could be possible only after abolishing Russian imperialism in Moscow."[45]

Another Ukrainian political activist and publicist, Myroslav Prokop, an active member of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and vice president of the Prolog Research Corporation, was close to Demkovych-Dobriansky in his perception of Ukrainian-Russian relations.[46] Prokop spoke in favor of cooperation with those anti-communist Russians who did not support Russian imperialism and chauvinism.[47]

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43 See the brief description of Western historiography of Russia in Kuzio, *Crisis in Russian Studies*, 21–4.

44 Mykhailo Demkovych-Dobrians'kyi, *Ukraïna i Rosiia: istorychni narysy na temy rosiis'koho imperializmu* [Ukraine and Russia: Historical Essays on Russian Imperialism] (Rome: Ukrainian Catholic University, 1989), 11.

45 Ibid., 45.

46 On the Prolog Corporation, see: Taras Kuzio, "US Support for Ukraine's Liberation during the Cold War: A Study of *Prolog* Research and Publishing Corporation," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 45, no. 1 (2012): 51–64. On Prokop's vision of Ukrainian-Russian relations, see: Myroslav Prokop, *Ukraïna i ukraïns'ka polityka Moskvy* (Munich: Suchasna Ukraïna, 1956).

47 Myroslav Prokop, "Do pytannia ukraïns'ko-rosiis'kykh vzaiemyn" [Concerning the Question of Ukrainian-Russian Relations], *Suchasnist'* 6, no. 1 (1961): 49–61. See also: Simone Attilio Bellezza, "Making Soviet Ukraine Ukrainian: The Debate on Ukrainian Statehood in the Journal *Suchasnist'* (1961–1971)," *Nationalities Papers* 47, no. 3 (2019): 379–93.

There is no doubt that he played an active role in organizing public debates on the issue of Ukrainian-Russian relations held in New York City in 1960–61. The idea was supported by the Ukrainian "Round Table Club," the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, and the Prolog Corporation.

The Russian vision for the relations between the two peoples was articulated by the left-wing publicist Boris Nikolaevsky, who advocated a future Russian-Ukrainian federation; in his view, it was dictated by economic ties and would benefit both peoples.[48] The Ukrainian attitude to the issue was expressed by Mykola Lebed and Myroslav Prokop. They rejected any idea of a federation with Russia and spoke out in favor of the principles of national independence, non-interference, and common struggle against imperialism.

Early attempts at Russian-Ukrainian reconciliation provoked vehement commentary in the émigré press. Indeed, the idea was attacked by radical nationalists from both sides. At the same time, such reaction revealed the existence of a middle ground for future discussions on the issue. Response from the academic community was particularly favorable. Ukrainian historians and political scientists led by Professor Peter J. Potichnyj organized the first conference on Ukrainian-Russian relations, held on October 8–9, 1981 at McMaster University in Hamilton, Canada.[49] It brought together many distinguished Ukrainian (Peter Potichnyj, Omeljan Pritsak, Bohdan R. Bociurkiw and others), Russian (Marc Raeff, Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, Gleb Žekulin and others), and American (Edward L. Keenan, John A. Armstrong, James Cracraft and others) scholars.

The Ukrainian organizers of the conference invited Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, a recent Nobel laureate and icon of the Russian dissident movement, to participate, but he refused. In his open letter to the organizers, he merely reiterated the main theses of Russian post-war émigrés concerning Soviet, Russian, and Ukrainian problems briefly described above. The Ukrainian community had to accept that the new generation of Russian anti-communist intellectuals in the Soviet Union remained true to the traditional (imperial national) agenda of their predecessors and were not prepared to imagine a Russian future without Ukraine.[50]

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48 M.V., "Pidsumky dyskusiï pro ukraïns'ko-rosiis'ki vzaiemyny" [Summary of the Discussion on Ukrainian-Russian Relations], *Suchasnist*, no. 6 (1962): 125–7.

49 *Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter*, eds. Peter J. Potichnyj et al. (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press, 1992).

50 Yaroslav Bilinsky, "Political Relations between Russians and Ukrainians in the USSR: The 1970s and Beyond," in *Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter*, 165–200.

Conclusions

Despite sporadic scholarly contacts, the Ukrainian-Russian dialogue in exile produced no significant consequences. The question arises as to the reasons for such a gloomy situation, one that contrasted with the slow but steady progress of Ukrainian-Polish postwar dialogue.[51] First and foremost, the Ukrainian and Russian historical narratives were too deeply connected to their respective national identities. It was difficult for both sides to overcome the inertia of the historical legacy in which "Russia" was synonymous with the "Russian Empire" and "Ukraine" was represented by "Little Russia." The Russian discourse of national identity basically remained within the framework of Count Sergei Uvarov's triune formula of imperial-Orthodox Russianness, including its "Little Russian" (ethnocultural) component. Both the Soviet and the Eurasianist discourses of identity failed to transform the old formula of Russianness into a modern national ("Great Russian") one. Instead, they contributed to the idea of Russian imperial nationalism and a Russian *Sonderweg*.

Ukrainian nation-building was also obstructed by the "frozen" "Little Russian" discourse, as well as by some local or regional discourses of identity that survived World War II. However, Ukrainian intellectual reidentification appeared to be more dynamic than its Russian counterpart. If the Russian post-World War II diaspora in North America was gradually entering a period of decline,[52] the Ukrainian community was on the rise. Ukrainian *Rusistika* appeared to be a more modern, polyphonic, and progressive field within the framework of the American academic mainstream than Russian *Ukrainistika*.

Second, all participants in the Ukrainian-Russian dialogue operated with different categories and confused terminology. For the Russians, "Ukraine" remained the good old "Little Russia," while for the Ukrainians, the idea of national "Russianness" was often confused with the "Great Russian" and "Soviet" imperial categories. As a result, the Russian historical narrative included Ukrainian topics, while the Ukrainian narrative either excluded imperial components from the national narrative or simply "nationalized" them. All this suggests a lack of methodological tools for more nuanced and sophisticated interpretations of historical Ukrainian-Russian relations.

It is no wonder that many American observers remained confused about the nature of Ukrainian-Russian debates: they looked like a dead-end situation.[53] In the words of William Edgerton: "On this question, among scholars of Russian and Ukrainian background

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51 Bohumila Berdykhovs'ka, *Prostir svobody. Ukraïna na shpal'takh paryz'koï "Kul'tury"* (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2005).

52 E.V. Volkov, "Antibol'shevitskaia rossiiskaia ėmigratsiia v SShA: k voprosu o spetsifike diaspory," *Magistra Vitae: ėlektronnyi zhurnal po istoricheskim naukam i arkheologii*, no. 1 (2017): 152–62.

53 Benjamin Tromly, *Cold War Exiles and the CIA: Plotting to Free Russia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 142.

alike, and even among scholars who have no Slavic ethnic heritage at all, dispassionate objectivity is almost as scarce as hens' teeth."[54] Henry R. Huttenbach came to conclusion that "...the relationship of the Ukraine and Russia is intellectually insoluble to the satisfaction of everyone (even to the uninvolved historian)."[55]

American postwar academia has come a long way in rethinking many concepts and stereotypes concerning the peoples in this part of the world. Nevertheless, the process of its intellectual and institutional emancipation from the past has been full of paradoxes and contradictions. I would like to name just two of them. First, it seems that many American scholars simply ignored the existence of the Russian Federation in the Soviet Union and continuously identified "Russia" with the "Soviet Union." Second, despite open skepticism about the academic respectability of Ukrainian studies, at least some Western scholars somehow assimilated many observations and findings made by their Ukrainian colleagues about the historical continuity between Russia and the Soviet Union, as well as the specifics of Ukrainian and Russian nationalisms.

Reviewing the legacy of Ukrainian postwar émigrés in the US is not one of the tasks of this article. However, I would stress that Ukrainian scholars have contributed substantially to Russian, Soviet, and national studies in the West both theoretically and factually. The study of Ukrainian topics has helped many American scholars to understand the historical complexity and cultural heterogeneity of imperial Soviet and regional East European phenomena. It was not the fault of the Ukrainians that the collapse of the Soviet Union and Ukraine's reappearance on the political map took many Western analysts by surprise.

Contemporary anti-Ukrainian discourse in Russia might be considered a reflection of the most reactionary and obscurantist components of the Russian discourse of national identity elaborated by the Russian Orthodox Church, canonized by the imperial authorities, and preserved by Russian émigrés.[56] The medieval idea of Russianness demonstrates its ability to survive many political upheavals and shut itself off from modernity. The contrast between Ukrainian and Russian nation-state building has become more acute and politically dangerous. Whether a new wave of Russian emigration to the West is capable of rethinking the Russian discourse of identity without "Little Russia" remains an open question.

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54 William B. Edgerton, "Review of George S. N. Luckyj, *Between Gogol' and Ševčenko: Polarity in the Literary Ukraine: 1798–1847, by George S. N. Luckyj*," *Slavic Review* 34, no. 1 (March 1975): 189.

55 Henry R. Huttenbach, "The Ukraine and Muscovite Expansion," in *Russian Imperialism from Ivan the Great to the Revolution*, ed. Taras Hunczak (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1974), 167.

56 *Ukrainskii separatizm v Rossii. Ideologiia natsional'nogo raskola* (Moscow: Moskva Press, 1998).

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Mercenaries of a Phantom War
The "Hostile Emigration" in Yugoslavia's Globalized Ideology of Insecurity

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"We are being attacked.
We have of late felt unbelievable pressure, unbelievable pressure."
Josip Broz "Tito" in a speech aired on May 1, 1971[1]

Abstract: Yugoslav state security services became infamous for organizing dozens of targeted killings against hostile emigrants abroad. What can be regarded as an interlinked chain of violence and counter-violence has more to it. First, there is the experience of external threats (not only) common to Communist leaders. But in the Yugoslav case, the global non-aligned position of the country strengthened the insecurity felt by the leadership. This was caused by a close identification with Third World countries affected by Cold War interventions. Officials and politicians concerned with security matters interpreted the continuing aggression of the "hostile emigration" as part and proof of a subliminal "Special War" against the socialist self-administration system. As a response, the state security stepped up the lethal operations in the host countries of the "hostile emigration". The study starts with the development of anti-Communist and pro-Soviet exile activism in the post-war period. It traces the reinforcement of the danger posed by hostile émigrés back to the early 1960s, when Yugoslavia became a prominent member of the Non-Aligned Movement. Also, it analyses the roots of the "Special War" and shows how this idea of external intervention was transferred to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The consequences of the adaptation to the Yugoslav conditions are addressed as well as the outcome for the treatment of the "hostile emigration." A critical assessment of émigré terrorism is followed by the presentation of exemplified cases. This essay seeks for a better comprehension of the mental disposition behind the drastic measures applied by Yugoslav secret services. Therefore, it is focused on the importance of the antagonistic emigration for the concept of the "Special War."

Keywords: Special War, Specijalni rat, UDBA, SDB, targeted killings, Croatian exiles, Serbian exiles, Kosovo-Albanian exiles, terrorism, history of emotions, state security

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1 Quoted after "Analysis of Yugoslav Party Presidium Meeting and Tito's Speech," Radio Free Europe (Slobodan Stanković), May 3, 1971, OSA 300-8-3-10634. Open Society Archive [OSA], Budapest.

Introduction

Criticism on Eurocentric approaches prepared the ground for scientific works on South-East Europe with a wider analytical frame in global dimensions.[2] For the SFRY, which was ideologically and politically entangled with the Third World, an access through the global perspective promises valuable new insights. Scholarly attention for "terrorism" outweighs other aspects of the very heterogeneous political emigration from Yugoslavia.[3] However, especially in the case of the "hostile emigration" vis-à-vis the security system, the global approach has been neglected so far.[4] My contribution goes beyond Yugoslavia's "security dilemma," i.e. the strategic position between the two Cold War blocs,[5] by placing the ideological influence from non-aligned countries at the centre of the security policy. While the "hostile emigration", after the early 1970s, encountered the state security, in the background it also had an abstract encounter with a so-called "Special War," a category of hostilities in view of U.S.-American interventions in formerly colonized countries. In the SFRY, however, which was not directly affected by superpower aggression so typical for the Third World, the concept of a "Special War" developed into a perpetuated scenario of threat. Without the recurrent appearances of the "hostile emigration" it would have been unlikely for this scenario to reach such wide repercussions.

This contribution, based on sources from nine public archives including documents of the Yugoslav state security service (Služba državne bezbednosti, SDB), highlights the imagined role of the "hostile emigration" in the "Special War." It is dedicated to the memory of Natalija Bašić, a pioneer in this field of research.[6]

From West to the East and Back: Enemies in Emigration

It was a hard-won victory for the Yugoslav Partisans in May 1945. The hardcore of the Communists now at the top of the country had gone through a tough school as un-

2 Andrew Wachtel, *The Balkans in World History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Marie-Janine Calic, *Südosteuropa. Weltgeschichte einer Region* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2016).

3 Valentina Perušina, "Hrvatska politička emigracija – sigurnosna prijetnja socijalističkoj Jugoslaviji," *Polemos* 22, no. 1–2 (2019): 13–37. Cf. Matthias Thaden, *Migration und Innere Sicherheit. Kroatische Exilgruppen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945–1980* (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2022).

4 Cf. Srđan Cvetković, "Terorizam i jugoslovenska politička emigracija," *Istorija 20. veka* 32, no. 2 (2014): 171–97.

5 Marko Milivojević, John B. Allcock, and Pierre Maurer (eds.), *Yugoslavia's Security Dilemmas – Armed Forces, National Defence and Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Berg, 1988).

6 Natalija Bašić, "Jeder Tag war „Allgemeine Volksverteidigung" (ONO). Zur militaristischen Kultur und Gewalterziehung im sozialistischen Jugoslawien (SFRJ) 1945–1990," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte und Kultur Südosteuropas* 4, (2002): 69–90, footnote 61.

derground activists in royal Yugoslavia, survivors of the Stalinist party purges, in many cases as volunteers on the republican side in the Spanish Civil War and – last but not least – as anti-Fascist fighters during the Second World War. Resistance was turned into revolution and a historic chance for implementing a socialist system opened up. On the other side, the unexpected rise to power of the Communists provoked widespread disagreement. An estimated 180,000 people left Yugoslavia at the end of the war or stayed abroad as Displaced Persons.[7] Josip Broz "Tito," president of the People's Front, sounded way too optimistic when, in 1945, he spoke of "only a handful of refugees [and] reactionaries abroad,"[8] A report of the State Security Administration (Uprava državne bezbednosti, UDB, colloquially called "UDBA", after 1966 officially SDB) of early 1947, however, pictured a very serious situation: Thousands of former prisoners of war from royalist Yugoslavia, who refused to be repatriated or demobilized, and Chetnik forces at the strength of whole regiments, maintaining their wartime structures of command, remained in Austrian, Italian and German refugee camps. Especially the information about monarchist military personnel as auxiliary police in Western occupation zones of Germany sounded the alarm in Belgrade.[9] According to the Yugoslav press, the Western Allies "enabled and assisted the formation of militant and openly Fascist organizations" in territories under their control.[10] The failure of the Western Powers in meeting the demands of the Yugoslav government to hand over hundreds of individuals wanted for war crimes underpinned the growing distrust towards the former allies.[11]

The anti-Communist forces outside the country appeared as a grave problem when, for example, domestic defenders of the old order reinforced rumours that the exiled leader of the popular Peasant Party in Croatia, Vladko Maček, would return to power with British support and assisted by the army of Władysław Anders in nearby Italy.[12] Obviously the young Partisan government was not yet fully consolidated. One challenge

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7 Leszek Kosinski, "International Migration of Yugoslavs During and Immediately after World War II," *East European Quarterly* 16, no. 2 (1982): 183–98, 194.

8 Quoted in *Dokumenti o spoljnoj politici SFRJ 1945*, edited by Savezni sekretarijat za inostrane poslove (Belgrade: Jugoslovenski Pregled, 1988), 226 f.

9 *Srpska politička emigracija u analima jugoslovenske diplomatije (1945–1971). Prilozi za diplomatiju i diplomatsku istoriju*, vol. 1, ed. Dragan Subotić (Belgrade: Inst. za Političke Studije, 200), 215–48.

10 Quoted in Branko Pavlica, "Migracije iz Jugoslavije u Nemačku. Migranti, emigranti, izbeglice, azilanti," *Međunarodni problemi* 57, no. 1–2 (2005): 121–58, 127. Cf. Marco Cuzzi, "The Refractory Community. Yugoslav Anti-communists in Post-war Italy," *Balcanica* 52 (2021): 159–78.

11 Cf. Bernd Robionek, "'Bleiburg' and the British Treatment of Croatian Collaborators 1945–48," in *1945. Kraj ili novi početak?*, ed. Zoran Janjetović (Belgrade: INIS, 2016), 277–308.

12 *Hrvatska u izvještajima partijskih komiteta 1945–1948*, eds. Marina Štambuk-Škalić and Marijan Jukić, *Fontes* 17 (2011): 13–132, 80. For the ruling Communists this was a reason to worry about 120,000 anti-Communist Polish soldiers in Italy (Josip Broz Tito, *Sabrana djela, vol. 30. 1. decembar 1945 – 18. avgust 1946* (Beograd: Izdavački centar Komunist, 1989), 67, 177).

consisted in hundreds of dispersed guerrilla groups, attacking state officials and looting collective farms.[13] An effective linkup of the insurgents with opponents outside the country was considered a worst case. At the cost of more than 1,000 security operatives killed, the armed resistance was mostly defeated by 1948.[14]

But there was no pause for the state security organs. Yugoslavia's exclusion from the Moscow-obedient Cominform organization in June 1948 was followed by a small-scale war with the Socialist neighbouring countries and a hunt for Soviet sympathizers among the party members.[15] A by-product of the conflict was some 5,000 "informbirovci" émigrés, i.e. comrades who escaped to the Soviet sphere or remained there.[16] Many of them participated in the psychological warfare against their homeland. With the rapprochement between the East bloc and Yugoslavia after Stalin had died in March 1953, however, the anti-Tito activities of their host countries ceased. This was facilitated since these political refugees were under effective control of the authorities.[17] Meanwhile, with an increase of illegal emigration to the West – unstoppable by reinforced border guards – another problem appeared in front of the Yugoslav leadership.[18]

What had turned out quite well in the East caused disappointment towards the Western countries, where adolescent migrants from Yugoslavia, who escaped by tens of thousands in the late 1950s and early 1960s, joined separatist organizations like the Croatian National Committee (Hrvatski narodni odbor, HNO) or the Ustasha-inclined United Croats (Ujedinjeni Hrvati), the anti-Communist Serbian National Defence (Srpska narodnaodbrana, SNO) or the militant Serbian Youth Movement 'Homeland'.[19] Their activities provoked a high frequency of Yugoslav government protests, expecting from

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13 Aleksandar Jakir, "Anti-Communist Guerilla in Croatia 1945–1951," in *Protikomunistický odboj v strednej a východnej Európe. Zborník z medzinárodnej vedeckej konferencie Bratislava 14. – 16. novembra 2011*, ed. Peter Jašek (Bratislava: Ústav pamäti národa, 2012), 434–49.

14 Cf. Milan Milošević, "Organizacija bezbednosno-obaveštajnog sistema FNRJ (1946–1966)," *Bezbednost*, no. 3 (2007): 168–81.

15 Dmitar Tasić, "Kontraobaveštajna služba (KOS) i rezolucija IB. Prilog istraživanju istorije vojne službe bezbednosti," *Istorijski zapisi* 86, no. 1–2 (2013): 151–70.

16 Cf. László Ritter, "Der geheime Krieg zwischen dem Sowjetblock und Jugoslawien 1948 bis 1953," in *Die Alpen im Kalten Krieg. Historischer Raum, Strategie und Sicherheitspolitik*, eds. Dieter Krüger and Felix Schneider (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2012), 277–311. At home, 30,000 members of the party and army staff were purged (among them 1,500 persons belonging to the security organs).

17 Vladimir Cvetković, "Obustavljanje antijugoslovenske propagande u susednim "informbiroovskim" zemljama 1953–1954. godine," *Tokovi istorije*, no. 1 (2012): 135–49.

18 *Zapisnici Politbiroa Centralnoga Komiteta Komunističke Partije Hrvatske*, vol. 3, 1952–1954, ed. Branislava Vojnović (Zagreb: HDA, 2008), esp. 176. Cf. Tatjana Šarić, "Bijeg iz socijalističke Jugoslavije. Ilegalna emigracija iz Hrvatske od 1945. do početka šezdesetih godina 20. stoljeća," *Migracijske i etničke teme* 31, no. 2 (2015): 195–220.

19 For an overview see: Brigitte Le Normand, "Yugoslavia," in *East Central European Migrations During the Cold War. A Handbook*, ed. Anna Mazurkiewicz (Berlin/Boston: de Gruyter, 2019), 368–95; and Mario Jareb, "Hrvatska politička emigracija od 1928. do 1990. Godine," in *Hrvatska politika u XX. stoljeću. Zbornik*

the host countries a definite suppression of the opponents abroad. From time to time the diplomatic pressure fell on fruitful grounds, but often it led to a clash of political cultures. For the Yugoslavs it was hard to accept that the liberal democracies tolerated political activities of immigrants even in contradiction to the international relations.[20] Reluctant reactions from the official representatives of major migration destinations like the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) fuelled suspicions among Yugoslav leaders who accused the West of supporting the exile organizations. According to Spehnjak and Cipek only a small part of the political emigration can be regarded as democratic opposition. Most of the emigrants kept on as "prisoners of the past" and were not able to overcome their greater nationalist aims.[21]

In the Communist way of thinking, the massive emigration was fostered by foreign secret services. It did not fit the self-image of a People's Republic that thousands of young people, most of them belonging to the working class, left Yugoslavia on their own initiative. Only on very few occasions admitted the rulers of the one-party state that it was a mistake to deny the offspring of families with a pro-Fascist wartime background equal access to scholarships for higher education.[22] And, first of all, the highly acclaimed self-management system was unable to offer sufficient job perspectives for the entire youth. In America, West Germany, Sweden or Australia the newcomers, who – for reasons of social company and employment opportunities – were seeking contacts to experienced immigrants, became an easy prey for the organizations of the older exiles.[23]

Surrounded by Enemies

Pupils learned to list Yugoslavia's neighbours with an inflected variation of the word "worries" (Bugarska, Rumunija, Italija, Grčka, Austrija, Mađarska, Albanija = "brigama"). "They say Yugoslavia is surrounded by worries, but Yugoslavia is surrounded by friends!" is what the kids made of it.[24] This mockery encapsulates the essence of the ex-Partisan

radova sa znanstvenog skupa održanog u paliči Matice hrvatske od 27. do 29. travnja 2004., ed. Ljubomir Andrić (Zagreb: Matica hrvatska, 2006), 307–36.

20 "Yugoslav Emigre Activities in Britain," Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Bullard) to East European and Soviet Department (Sparrow), London, July 24, 1972, PRO FCO/28/2153.

21 Katarina Spehnjak and Tihomir Cipek, "Disidenti, opozicija i otpor – Hrvatska i Jugoslavija 1945.–1990.," ČSP 39, no. 2 (2007): 255–97, 267.

22 "Zapisnik sa sastanka sa sekretarima Općinskih komiteta SKH-e, sa područja kotara Karlovac održanog 5. travnja 1963 god.", HDA 1220/663.

23 Vladimir Ivanović, "Ekstremna emigracija u SR Nemačkoj i Jugoslavija," *Istorija 20. Veka*, no. 1 (2009): 139–47.

24 "Kažu da je Jugoslavija okružena brigama / ali Jugoslavija je okruženima [sic...] prijateljima!". Quoted after Iris Adrić, "Brigama," in *Leksikon YU mitologije* (Belgrade, Zagreb: Postscriptum & Rende, 2023), accessed

mindset. On the one hand, troublesome experiences with bordering countries had occurred frequently; but after the mid-1950s, Yugoslavia established regional partnerships in both ideological camps. Against this background, the paranoia became schizophrenic. Foreign rule as a historical theme – which could be dated back to the Middle Ages and had reached a climax in the Fascist invasion of 1941 – was engraved on the collective memory. After the Ustasha, returning from the Italian exile, had been installed at the top of the Croatian state in April 1941, the fear of a defeat by foreign powers – assisted by the hostile emigration – did not come out of the blue. Having this in mind, the appearance of violent acts by militant émigrés in the 1960s had a retraumatizing effect.[25]

Around 1962/63, two trials in Ljubljana against twelve persons accused of involvement in firearms trafficking for the "Organisation of Slovenian Anti-Communists," which had a stronghold in the FRG, did obviously not succeed in bringing the underground group down. After the arrest of three other members who had clandestinely entered Yugoslavia in the summer of 1963, two more were apprehended in 1964 by the West German police on charges of conspiracy and illegal possession of weapons.[26] Moreover, separatist organizations in the spirit of the Ustasha tended to "liberate" Croatia (enlarged by Bosnia-Hercegovina) from the "Serbian yoke." Apart from interethnic conflicts and harassments against loyal Yugoslavs, some emigrants carried the violence to their homeland.[27]

The Yugoslav side tended to deescalate by announcing an amnesty for oppositional émigrés who had not committed grave offences and were willing to return on goodwill. Not only was this offer widely rejected, clandestine cells of adversaries abroad appeared like a boomerang. In the summer of 1963 nine members of the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood (Hrvatsko revolucionarno bratstvo, HRB) sneaked into Croatia for

April 21, 2023, http://www.leksikon-yu-mitologije.net/brigama/.

25 While discussing the activities of extremist émigrés, Maksimilijan Baće, a veteran of the Spanish Civil War and the anti-Fascist struggle from 1941 to 1945, stated towards his comrades of the inner party circle that "history appears in front of us." ("Autorizovane stenografske beleške sa 77. Proširene sednice Izvršnog biroa Predsedništva Saveza komunista Jugoslavije, održane 23. III 1971 god.," PSKJ (Executive bureau), Belgrade, March 29, 1971, AJ 507 IV/139, 1–5).

26 British Embassy (Morgan) to Foreign Office, Belgrade, February 13, 1963, PRO FO371/169665; "Activities of Yugoslav Émigrés," Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, [Cologne], summer 1964, PRO FO371/177807.

27 "Ausschreitungen kroatischer Emigranten im Sammellager Zirndorf b. Nürnberg am 6./7.1. 1962 – Tätigkeit der kroatischen HOP in der BRD," Forschungsdienst Osteuropa (Mende) to AA (Starke), Düsseldorf, January 18, 1962, PA AA B42/94. Cf. Christopher Molnar, "Croatian Émigrés, Political Violence, and Coming to Terms with the Past in 1960s West Germany," in *German-Balkan Entangled Histories in the Twentieth Century*, eds. Mirna Zakić and Christopher A. Molnar (Pittsburgh: Univ. Press, 2020), 216–30. The official representations in Australia were almost literally besieged by offensive protesters ("Aide-Mémoire, Annex No. 4," Yugoslav Embassy, Canberra, July 1972, PRO FCO28/2158).

sabotage strikes. All of them were captured in the early stage of their mission, which had been initiated in Australia. A delicate detail turning up in the subsequent trial was a coincidental meeting of an Ustasha training camp with an army squadron near Wodonga in early 1963, posing together for photos. Although the Australian government did its utmost to avoid the impression that its military had been involved in neo-Ustasha activities,[28] the incident reinforced the suspicions of the Communist leadership.

The Croatian minister for internal affairs held West German and U.S. intelligence services as particularly supportive of anti-Yugoslav activities.[29] Officially, there was little reason to believe this. Even with normalizing relations between Yugoslavia and the East bloc, the State Department still excluded "Yugoslav exile groups" from Cold War assistance.[30] Not only had Anglo-American agencies in late 1951 consented to refrain from subversion against Yugoslavia, at that time the CIA and UDB (together with the MI6) started to cooperate in destabilizing the Albanian regime. Another liaison had been the exchange of military intelligence until August of 1955, when the Yugoslav side closed this channel due to the improving relations with the socialist camp.[31] However, as intelligence services not only enable governments to pursue an informal foreign policy, but process data obtained from public and secret sources in the first place, refugees from Yugoslavia were still of interest in this aspect.[32] Noting that Western intelligence services conducted systematic interrogations in the reception camps, the assumptions gained some substance.[33] However, operatives of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) regarded exposure to Yugoslav secret services by public exile activism as an additional risk in the dangerous intelligence business. The exiles of Yugoslav extraction under surveillance of the West German domestic secret service "Verfassungsschutz" ("Protection of the Constitution") or those observed by the FBI surely outnumbered Yugoslav spies in service of the BND or CIA.

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28 Frank Cain, "The Australian Security Organization. An Unofficial History," Ilford/Es., Portland/Or.: Cass, 1994, 207

29 *Zapisnici Izvršnoga komiteta Centralnoga komiteta Saveza komunista Hrvatske 1959. – 1963*, vol. 5, ed. Marijana Jukić (Zagreb: HDA, 2018), 756.

30 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Eastern Europe; Finland; Greece; Turkey*, vol. 10, Part 2, eds. Ronald D. Landa, James E. Miller, William F. Sanford, and Sherrill Brown Wells (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1993), 355–421.

31 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980*, vol. 20, Eastern Europe, eds. Carl Ashley and Mircea A. Munteanu (Washington DC: United States Government Publishing Office, 2015), 857. Cf. Jurij Hadalin, "Načrti Jugoslavije in Zahoda za menjavo albanskega režima v času po resoluciji informbiroja," *Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino* 51, no. 2 (2011): 91–104.

32 Norman Goda, "The Ustaša. Murder and Espionage," in *U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis*, eds. Richard Breitman et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005), 203–26.

33 "Sprovodjenje Zakona o unutrašnjim poslovima i stanje u Službi državne bezbednosti," SSUP (SDB), Belgrade, November 4, 1967, ARS 1931/2304.

For the capitalist countries the formula was quite simple: As long as Yugoslavia remained independent from the Soviets, it could count on their support. To this end, a close monitoring of Yugoslav politics – providing opportunities for concealed interference – was necessary.[34] That the Communists in charge looked with circumspection on the West was also a heritage of the immediate post-war years, when Western Allied military and intelligence staff maintained friendly ties with anti-Communist Croats, Slovenes and Serbs abroad, among them Chetnik intelligence officer Andrija Lončarić (killed in 1969) who was "on mission to Serbia to organise [a] Nationalist Nucleus in touch with and directed by Right wing exiles."[35] Moderate exiles like the royalex-ambassador to the U.S. Konstantin Fotić or Croatian Peasant Party primus Maček were sponsored by the CIA in the late 1940s.[36] That Yugoslav officials afforded the enemy émigrés – whose organisations often followed in the tradition of the wartime collaborationist regimes – hardly any own capability, derives from the name of the "State Commission for the Investigation of the Crimes of the Occupiers and Their Helpers(!)." The latter were reduced to an appendix of the invaders. Without the Axis attack in 1941 there would have been at most just a tiny chance for their takeover. From the Communist point of view, this was logical because ordinary people would betray their own interests by joining reactionary forces. Only misguidance by "traitors" could make them act against liberation by the Partisans.[37]

After 1945, this scheme was modified and adapted to the relations with the West, which had challenged the Soviet state from the outset. During the Cold War, Western aggression continued against the states behind the Iron Curtain, giving East European spokesmen the foundation for widespread suspicions against "imperialist agents."[38] The spy scare among Communists developed a dynamic on its own. For instance, Soviet leaders clung to the claim that the Poznań uprising of 1956 had been an "imperialist plot," despite statements of Polish politicians to the contrary.[39] By externalizing the causes for opposition, the responsible rulers sought to immunize themselves against criticism

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34 "Kontakte KPdSU-BdKJ auf ideologischem Gebiet", BND (Schaefer), February 5, 1973, PA AA R112617.

35 General Staff Intelligence (XIII Corps) to Allied Forces Headquarters, May 14, 1946, PRO WO 204/12835.

36 British Embassy to Foreign Office (Reilly), Washington D.C., July 8, 1950, PRO FO 371/88233.

37 Quoted after "Excerpts from Transcript of Interview with Tito in Advance of His Trip to the U.S.," *The New York Times*, March 3, 1978: "Frankly speaking, I would not like to live in America. True, there is democracy, in some respects even too much while in others there is none. Whenever I visited America as head of state there gathered at the place where I stayed a whole bunch of the Ustashi and Chetniks who [had] escaped from our country as traitors and collaborators of the Fascist occupiers. In America they are free to do what they please. They disturbed me day and night, shouting the most derogatory insults."

38 Cf. David S. Foglesong, *America's Secret War Against Bolshevism. U.S. Intervention in the Russian Civil War, 1917–1920* (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1995); Gregory Mitrovich, *Undermining the Kremlin. America's Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947–1956* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000).

39 In this case, the emphasis on domestic origins of the unrest was intended to avert Soviet intervention (Mark Kramer, "Soviet-Polish Relations and the Crises of 1956. Brinkmanship and Intra-Bloc Politics," in

and protests from outside their ranks. Yugoslav Communists applied the same mechanisms and developed a similar paranoia of hostile conspiracies. Therefore, the enemies in emigration played the role of a "sixth column" (in conjunction to the "fifth column," i.e. the domestic enemies), which was seen as the decisive link between opponents within the state borders and foreign hostile powers.[40] Included into such a united front, even marginal groups like the Danube Swabians in the FRG appeared as a danger.[41]

Balkan Vietnam: The "Special War"

According to Yugoslavia's position between the blocs, the suspicions of the security staff were directed against both sides.[42] Of course, the decision-makers knew about the friendly relations with NATO member states, but an outlet was found in the distinction between official politics and the work of "reactionary circles" like intelligence services combined with émigrés.[43] Ronald Reagan provided possibly the most prominent case of this divergence: As Governor of California in the late 1960s he signed a proclamation condemning the alleged "terror exerted by Yugoslavia" against Croatia.[44] Almost sixteen years later, the U.S. president "reiterated the resolve of the United States administration to prevent the terrorists and other hostile activities against Yugoslavia which are, at the same time, directed against the good Yugoslav-American relations and cooperation."[45]

The supposed "entanglement of the political emigration and the external factor" was not a sideshow. Even the specialists of the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry believed to observe "very obvious oscillations in the intensity of terrorist-diversionist activities depending

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Kommunismus in der Krise die Entstalinisierung. 1956 und die Folgen, ed. Roger Engelmann (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), 61–126).

40 Cf. Novo Seratlić, *Šesta kolona. Terorističke akcije jugoslovenske neprijateljske emigracije* (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački i Novinski Centar, 1989).

41 Bernd Robionek, "Hybride Identitäten in der Emigration. „Volksdeutsche" und die jugoslawische Staatssicherheit," *JKGE* 3, (2022): 227–40.

42 "Discussions in Yugoslavia. Record of Conversation," Commonwealth Police Force (Manton), [Canberra], September 10, 1974, NAA A5034/2136.

43 Cf. Dan Morgan, "Belgrade Begins Crackdown on Croat Nationalism," *The Washington Post*, July 28, 1972: "Several Yugoslav officials have claimed that the CIA was backing the Croats without the knowledge of the U.S. government."

44 Quoted after "Akcija ustaške emigracije u S. Francisku," DSIP (Uprava za konzularne poslove), Belgrade, May 10, 1968, HDA 1409/IV/106, 62.

45 "Remarks of President Reagan and President Mika Spiljak of Yugoslavia Following Their Meetings," February 1, 1984, accessed May 4, 2023, https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/remarks-president-reagan-and-president-mika-spiljak-yugoslavia-following-their.

on the international situation."[46] Shortly after the Six-day War, state security servants thought the conflict in the Middle East to be a motivator of exile hostilities, especially the installation of six simultaneous time bombs at Yugoslav missions in North America.[47] There was, however, hardly any probability that the Serbian suspects were actually agents of the Mossad.

Despite common ideological roots, the Soviet Union was also blamed for assisting emigrants in anti-Yugoslav activities.[48] Using a great deal of abstract imagination, an internal memo of 1970 presented a recent series of violent attacks by emigrants in or from the West, among them explosions at the main station and a cinema in Belgrade, as a reaction to Tito's open sympathies with the Czechoslovak reformers who toppled over the Soviet intervention.[49] Probably, the assumption alluded to the appearance of the "New Platform" around the HNO president Branimir Jelić, hoping that – after the suppression of the Prague Spring – the Soviets might intervene in favour of Croatian national independence. But references to Soviet-supported militancy collected by the SDB were only based on "unconfirmed information."[50] Nonetheless, the exile propaganda produced severe psychological effects.

The deep impact of external developments can be seen by the Total People's Defence (Opštenarodna odbrana, ONO), an institutionalized partisan army of all citizens, which was introduced after the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Treaty states.[51] In the same move, however, the staff of the Foreign Ministry in Belgrade summarized that the political emigration "certainly plays a specific role in the plans of the NATO countries."[52] Beyond the bipolar confrontation of ideological systems, this official interpretation of the exile scene was influenced by Yugoslavia's prominent position in the Non-Aligned Movement. The orientation towards the Third World contributed to the paranoia of

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46 "Problemi vezani za aktivnost političke emigracije i potreba stalne i koordinirane protuakcije," DSIP, Belgrade, June 5 1970, HDA 1409/IV/108, 78.

47 "Sprovodjenje Zakona o unutrašnjim poslovima i stanje u Službi državne bezbednosti," SSUP (SDB), Belgrade, November 4, 1967, ARS 1931/2304.

48 Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972*, eds. James E. Miller, Douglas E. Selvage and Laurie Van Hook (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2007), 562.

49 "Problemi vezani za aktivnost političke emigracije i potreba stalne i koordinirane protuakcije," DSIP, Belgrade, June 5, 1970, HDA 1409/IV/108, 78.

50 "Neki podaci iz emigrantskih izvora o navodnim kontaktima Jelić dr Brankasa SSSR-om," SSUP (SDB), Belgrade, May 19, 1972, ARS 1931/1177.

51 Zdenko Čepič, "Politične okoliščine uvajanja vojaške doktrine splošne ljudske obrambe," *Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino* 50, no. 3 (2010): 79–100. Cf. Viktor Bubanj, *Doktrina pobjede* (Belgrade: Narodna armija, 1972), 35.

52 "Problemi vezani za aktivnost političke emigracije i potreba stalne i koordinirane protuakcije," DSIP, Belgrade, June 5, 1970, HDA 1409/IV/108, 78.

hostile encirclement. Since it played a leading role in the organization of non-aligned states, the country found itself isolated from the new faraway friends overseas.[53]

Not only politicians were sympathetic over anti-colonial movements in other parts of the world. In 1961, the same year when the first congress of non-aligned states in Belgrade was celebrated as an epoch-making event in world politics, mass protests in major cities broke out as a reaction to the assassination of the Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and the failed invasion of Cuba by anti-Castro émigrés in conjunction with the CIA. The aggravation of the U.S.-intervention in Vietnam led to further public outrages in the SFRY.[54] Along with 16 other non-aligned states, Yugoslavia appealed for a peaceful settlement of the conflict.[55] Because the socialist state was founded on the heritage of the anti-Fascist liberation struggle, this historical background played an important role for the identification with anti-imperialistic movements in former colonies. Hence, Yugoslav military men paid a lot of attention to the ongoing armed struggle in South-East Asia.[56] The conflict in the style of David vs. Goliath reminded them of the anti-Fascist resistance in their region. And, in accordance with Yugoslavia's global positioning, they followed the North Vietnamese perspective.[57]

A key interpretation of the U.S. intervention in South-East Asia was the concept of "Special War" coined by North Vietnamese defence minister Vo Nguyen Giap. It ranged from the covert "special war," which was carried out by South Vietnamese troops under the auspices of U.S. instructors and secret services, to the "limited war" with regular U.S. forces in the region. The last stage would have been a "general war" – the global clash actually avoided by the superpowers (as could be seen during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962).[58] The Special War (actually Special Warfare) was not an invention of Giap. In fact, it existed in the shape of the U.S. Special Group, a governmental body in charge of anti-Communist counterinsurgency in Third World countries. In addition to the initial target area (Thailand, Laos and Vietnam), the scope was expanded to Burma, Cambodia,

53 Cf. Alvin Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970).

54 Péter Apor, James Mark, Piotr Osęka, and Radina Vučetić, "'We Are with You, Vietnam'. Transnational Solidarities in Socialist Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia," *Journal of Contemporary History* 50, no. 3 (2015): 439–64.

55 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume II, Vietnam, January–June 1965*, eds. David C. Humphrey, Ronald D. Landa, and Louis J. Smith (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), 507.

56 At a discussion of army experts, General-Major Rajko Tanasković noted that "the experiences from this war [in Vietnam] have a great significance for us" (quoted after „Teritorijalna odbrana," *Vojno delo* 22, (1970): 12–74). Cf. Dušan Vilić and Mihajlo Vučinić, "'Specijalni rat' u Vijetnamu," *Vojno delo* 25, (1973): 120–46.

57 Cf. Jovan Čavoški, "U potrazi za novim smislom. Jugoslavija i kriza globalne nesvrstanosti 1965–1970," *Istorija 20. veka* 39, no. 2 (2021): 353–74.

58 Cf. *U.S. "Special War" in South Viet Nam*, ed. Democratic Republic of Vietnam (Hanoi: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1964).

Cameroon (which was soon replaced with Bolivia), Iran, Ecuador, Colombia, Guatemala and Venezuela.[59] From its establishment during the Kennedy administration until February 1967, the Special Group supervised more than 300 covert operations.[60] A "Special Warfare Center" for counterinsurgency training was set up in Fort Bragg.[61]

The "special war" became a blueprint of U.S.-interventions in the Third World.[62] The term was disseminated to a broader public through the Vietnam reports of the Australian journalist Wilfred Burchett.[63] A Serbo-Croatian edition of his reports, published in 1966 as "The Truth about the War in Vietnam,"[64] had a strong influence on Yugoslav security officers.[65] As can be seen by the example of Viktor Bubanj, chief of the General Staff and architect of the ONO, who addressed the Special War as a prelude to a large scale armed conflict,[66] the expression advanced to a great career in the SFRY. After, in October 1982, a conference on "The Special War as a Substitute for Armed Aggression" had been held in Belgrade by the People's Army, the military journal "Vojno delo" dedicated three issues to the "Special War" topic.[67]

At the beginning of the 1970s, however, the term "special war" (in Serbo-Croatian: "Specijalni rat") was not yet so well-established. Until then, it was mostly used by specialists concerned with national defence, among them Tito's personal security advisor General Ivan Mišković. At an internal session on security matters in March 1972, he repeatedly mentioned a "special war" in the shape of CIA's counterrevolutionary "Contingency"

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59 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement*, eds. Evans Gerakas et al. (Washington DC: Department of State, 1997), 987.

60 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII. Vietnam July 1970–January 1972*, eds. David Goldman and Erin Mahan (Washington DC: Office of the Historian, 2010), XXXV.

61 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy*, ed. David W. Mabon (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), 254.

62 Nguyen Van Hieu, *'Special War' – an Outgrowth of Neo-Colonialism* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Pr., 1965): „The peoples of the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America are well aware that the U.S. imperialists are testing their "special war" in South Vietnam in order to apply it to the suppression of the national liberation movements in other parts of the world." Cf. Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War. Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Univ. Press, 2007).

63 Cf. Angelika Bator, *USA-Politik gegen Asien. Die strategischen Grundzüge nach dem 2. Weltkrieg* (Berlin: Militärverlag der Dt. Demokrat. Republik, 1986).

64 Vilfred G. Barčet, *Istina o ratu u Vijetnamu* (Beograd: Kultura, 1966).

65 Mihajlo Vučinić, "Dve strategije rata u Vijetnamu. Neka gledišta o američkoj vojnoj strategiji u Vijetnamu," *Vojno delo*, no. 2 (1967): 69–91; Petar Knežević, "Specijalni rat – međunarodnopravni aspekt i nastanak doktrine," *Vojno delo* 29, (1977): 120–8, fn. 13.

66 Viktor Bubanj, "Osnovi vojne doktrine i strategije oružanih snaga SFRJ," *Vojno delo* 23, (1971): 3–23.

67 In the late 1970s, the ministry of defence was entrusted by the federal security council with a research project "on the special war against the SFRJ" ("Kratkoročna i dugoročna programska orijentacija istraživanja neprijateljske i druge društvenostetne delatnosti (nacrt)," SSUP (Uprava za istraživanje, analize i informisanje), Belgrade, June 19, 1978, ARS 1931/3093).

plans which – like other non-aligned countries – allegedly affected his homeland.[68] Obviously, the escalation of the war in Vietnam manipulated his perception. In view of the prevailing conditions there was no credibility to his claim. Principally, the doctrine of "U.S. Overseas Internal[sic!] Defense Policy" aimed at assisting "friendly countries" against "subversive insurgency."[69] As a consequence of friendly U.S. relations with the SFRY, an inclusion of the country into the programme of the "Special Group" would have meant for the Americans to prop up socialist security forces in resistance against anti-Communist attacks.[70] Even the overtures of the "Agency for International Development", encompassing training to indigenous police cadres "to improve riot control," were limited to Asia, Africa and Latin America.[71] Hence, the scenario of a "Special War" against the only European member of the Non-Aligned Movement was still missing a breeding ground on which it could flourish. But only three months after Mišković had made his remarks, this changed dramatically when Yugoslavia experienced its own "Bay of Pigs" in miniature.

On June 20, 1972, 19 heavily armed anti-Yugoslav Croats crossed the wooded border from Austria in order to stir up a rebellion in the Croatian parts of Yugoslavia where a nationalist reform movement – the so-called Croatian Spring – had been suppressed earlier that year. Eventually, the intruders fought their way through central Bosnia, killing 13 members of Yugoslav forces before being stopped. Although the efforts of the security apparatus had been enormous, it took the defenders more than four weeks to corner all the enemies. The subsequent state security report stressed that "the infiltrated diversionist-terrorist groups" were "based on the well-known principles of the strategies and tactics of the special war," emphasizing that one of the aggressors had done service

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68 „Magnetofonski snimak sa sednice Saveta za poslove državne bezbednosti, održane 21. marta 1972. Godine na Brionima," Presidency of the SFRY (Savet za poslove državne bezbednosti), Belgrade, March 21, 1972, ARS 1931/1404.

69 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume II, Vietnam, 1962*, eds. John P. Glennon, David M. Baehler, and Charles S. Sampson (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1990), 48. Cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy*, ed. David W. Mabon (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1996), 464.

70 One document points to U.S. efforts directed against Croatian exiles: At the end of 1971 "[West German Chancellor Willy] Brandt noted that German intelligence indicated that the Soviets were working with nationalist anti-communist [!] Croatian forces abroad and were hopeful of imposing Soviet hegemony. Brandt urged that the United States undertake some measures to assist Tito without appearing to interfere. Tito needs an image of good relations with the United States and Western Europe. President Nixon instructed [his Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs] General Haig to follow up on this issue." (*Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972*, ed. David C. Geyer (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2008), 949.)

71 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volumes VII, VIII, IX, Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy, Microfiche Supplement*, eds. Evans Gerakas et al. (Washington DC: Department of State, 1997), 1684.

in the Australian army.[72] In a twist of perceptions, an article in "The New York Times" suggested that the intruders had imitated "Fidel Castro's small band that landed in eastern Cuba in 1956."[73] Paradoxically, militant exiles – as noted by the SDB – indeed found a replacement of the outworn Ustasha style with the fashion of anti-imperialist fighters like Ernesto "Che" Guevara.[74] Although a strong current of the political emigration was still directed against the socialist system, with the rise of the "Croatian spring" –headed by a new generation of Croatian top Communists – many exiles found themselves ready to side with the Communist compatriots provided that they followed nationalistic aims.[75] Thus, especially the younger adherents of the Croatian political emigration in the 1970s and 1980s can rather be called anti-Yugoslav than anti-Communist.[76]

The guerrilla action gave Yugoslavia's leading ex-Partisans a confirmation of their "Special War" theory. It had a far-reaching effect on security politics as it contributed to the establishing of the "Social Self-Defence" (Društvena samozaštita), i.e. the public defence measures in the civil sector complementing the paramilitary-style ONO.[77] In response to the raid of 1972, Tito issued a directive in which he asserted that the SFRY was in the same manner affected by a subtle "Special War" as other countries of the Non-Aligned Movement.[78] He held agitated speeches, demonstrating his anxiety to the public.[79] Directly concerned with the events was General Franjo Herljević, the Bosnian territorial defence minister in command of the counterinsurgency operation. In May of 1974 he became the interior minister on federal level and as such a staunch advocator of operations against the extremist emigration.[80] His personal union of the military and

72 "Akcija 'Raduša,'" SSUP (SDB), Belgrade, May 4, 1973, ARS 1931/1160.

73 Raymond Anderson, "Rebel 'Invasion' Stirs Yugoslavs," *The New York Times*, August 20, 1972: 18.

74 "Akcija 'Raduša,'" SSUP (SDB), Belgrade, May 4, 1973, ARS 1931/1160.

75 On the Croatian Spring see: Ludwig Steindorff, "Der Kroatische Frühling. Eine soziale Bewegung in einer sozialistischen Gesellschaft," in *Der Balkan. Eine europäische Krisenregion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*, ed. Jürgen Elvert (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1997), 197–210.

76 Bernd Robionek, "Outsiders of the Cold War? Changing Attitudes towards anti-Communism within the Croatian Political Emigration (1945–80's)," in *Politický exil z krajín strednej a východnej Európy. Motívy, stratégie, aktivity a perspektívy na Východe a Západe, 1945–1989*, ed. Peter Jašek (Bratislava: Ústav pamäti národa, 2017), 84–94.

77 Davor Marijan, "Koncepcija općenarodne obrane i društvene samozaštite – militarizam samoupravnoga socijalizma," *ČSP*, no. 3 (2021): 953–87.

78 „Direktiva. 21. jula 1972. godine," President of the Federation and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (Tito), Brioni, July 21, 1972, ARS 1931/1404.

79 "Tito Threatens Domestic and Foreign Enemies of Yugoslavia," RFE (Stanković), September 12, 1972, OSA 300/8/3/10802.

80 Pero Simić and Zvonimir Despot (eds.), *Tito strogo poverljivo. Arhivski dokumenti* (Belgrade: Službeni Glasnik, 2010), 494.

state security contributed to the establishment of the "Special War" scheme among the SDB personnel.[81]

Faking "Terrorists" – Breaking "Terrorists"

With the opening of the summer season in 1975, Tito announced a state of emergency to leading security circles. His updated directive, asserting that the country was "permanently exposed to pressure and attacks from the external and internal enemy," was followed by a vigilance campaign with reinforced border controls.[82] While millions of tourists spent their vacation on the eastern Adriatic, the authorities were deeply concerned about public safety. Since the SFRY was a highly frequented transit route, complete control of border traffic seemed impossible.[83] In addition to public protests and a great variety of propagandistic papers, which were occasionally smuggled into the homeland,[84] the exile violence continued. However, it is doubtful whether the "terrorism" was really as massive as quantified by Yugoslav sources.

In relation to a detailed compilation of 148 violent incidents from exiles of different origin, the 120 "terror acts" exclusively attributed to the HRB seem out of proportion.[85] There were, of course, sensational events like the homicide on the Yugoslav ambassador in Stockholm (1971), the hijacking of a Swedish plane in order to negotiate the release of the two perpetrators (1972),[86] the hijacking of an airliner in New York – intended to catapult the issue of "an obscure Balkan province" to the headlines of the daily news

81 "Sprovodjenje zaključaka Izvršnog biroa PSKJ i odluka i stavova drugih nadležnih tela i organa /oblast unutrašnjih poslova/," SSUP, Belgrade, April 29, 1974, ARS 1931/1362. Cf. "Jugoslawiens Furcht vor inneren und äußeren Feinden," *Osteuropa-Archiv*, no. 3 (1979): 190–5.

82 "Direktiva za organizaciju i pripreme aktivnosti i mera na suzbijanji eventualne krize situacije u zemlji," President of the Federation and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces (Tito), Belgrade, June 27, 1975, ARS 1931/2233; "Zusammenarbeit in der Verbrechensbekämpfung mit Jugoslawien. Besprechung mit Vertretern des Bundessekretariats für Innere Angelegenheiten der SFR Jugoslawien am 6. Oktober 1975 im BMI," BMI (Kranz), Bonn, October 8, 1975, PA AA ZA 116705.

83 Cf. William Zimmermann, *Open Borders, Nonalignment, and the Political Evolution of Yugoslavia* (Princeton NJ: Univ. Pr., 1987), 79.

84 "Émigré Publication", British Embassy (Rennie) to FCO (Research Dept.), September 7, 1972, PRO FCO28/2158.

85 Milenko Doder, *Jugoslavenska neprijateljska emigracija* (Zagreb: Centar za Informacije i Publicitet, 1989), 263–74; cf. Milo Bošković, *Antijugoslovenska fašistička emigracija* (Belgrade, Novi Sad: Sloboda, 1980), 88, fn. 141.

86 "Croat Hijacking of a Scandinavian Airlines Aircraft," British Embassy (Millard) to Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Stockholm, September 26, 1972, PRO FCO28/2158.

(1976)[87] – and, in 1978, the hostage-taking in the federal German consulate general in Chicago with the aim of blackmailing the government in Bonn to release Stjepan Bilandžić, held in custody pending a decision on his extradition to the SFRY. At that time the official Belgrade presented Bilandžićas Public Enemy Number One. But his militant organization "Otpor" ("Resistance", short for "Croatian National Resistance") – originally founded by Vjekoslav "Maks" Luburić, ex-commander of the Croatian concentration camps – attracted only a few members in Europe.[88]

In the late 1960s, the SDB assessed the global manpower of the HRB, which had the reputation of being the biggest and most aggressive militant organization, realistically at fifty.[89] One decade later, however, Vladimir Bakarić frightened his comrades in the Central Committee by speaking of some 2,000 "terrorists" abroad.[90] An explanation for this inflation can be found in the broad definition of "terrorists," laid down by Herljević for the SDB as "all persons in Yugoslavia or abroad who are involved in the preparation [!], attempt or execution of diversionist-terrorist acts."[91] The Croatian ministry of internal affairs lumped together "the leaders of all extreme organizations" as preparing terror acts.[92] For a Yugoslav top diplomat the oppositional organizations in the West were not the actual perpetrators but "always moving on the edge of terrorism."[93] In this logic, the umbrella organization "Croatian National Congress" (Hrvatsko narodno vijeće, HNV), with almost 7,000 members worldwide in the early 1980s, was denounced as "terroristic."[94] The SDB emphasized that outspoken militant members like Bilandžić belonged to the HNV and the moderates around Ivan Jelićdid also not expressively rule out violent

87 Quoted in Jeffrey D. Simon, *The Terrorist Trap. America's experience with terrorism*, 2nd ed. (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana Univ. Press, 2001), 116.

88 "Verbotsverfügung", BMI to HNOtp (Bilandžić), Bonn, June 1, 1976, PA AA ZA 116705.

89 "Sprovodjenje Zakona o unutrašnjim poslovima i stanje u Službi državne bezbednosti," SSUP (SDB), Belgrade, November 4, 1967, ARS 1931/2304. Cf. Josip Mihaljević, "Aktuelno stanje posle 21. Sednice Predsedništva CK SKJ i ocene bezbednosne situacije u Jugoslaviji u 1971. godini, SSUP (SDB)," *Fontes* 27, no. 1 (2021): 735.

90 "Yugoslav Central Committee Discusses Internal and External Threats," RFE (Stanković), December 27, 1978, OSA 300/8/3/11443.

91 "Uputstvo o vođenju centralizovane evidencije lica koja su predmet rada Službe državne bezbednosti", SSUP (Herljević), February 17, 1976, ARS 1931/2236.

92 "Prikaz situacije i sadašnja djelatnost hrvatske neprijateljske emigracije prema SFRJ," RSUP SRH, Zagreb, October 21, 1969, HDA 1409/IV/106.

93 "Protokoll über die Besprechungen zwischen VLR I Frau Dr. Finke-Osiander und dem Leiter der Westeuropa-Abteilung Maksić im jugoslawischen Außenministerium am 8. und 9. Mai 1974," AA (Dpt. 214), Bonn, May 13, 1974, PA AA ZA 116707.

94 For a general outline on the HNV see: Tanja Trošelj Miočević, "Hrvatsko narodno vijeće od 1974. do 1990.,"*Obnovljeni Život* 75, no. 2 (2020): 229–45.

methods.[95] Following an anti-Yugoslav display in "The New York Times" in which the HNV, shortly after Tito's death, prophesied that Yugoslavia would be finished soon, the official Belgrade accused the HNV of causing an explosion with material damage in front of the Yugoslav Bank in New York. The HNV, however, clearly distanced itself from this bombing.[96] Nevertheless, the Communist party organ "Borba" ("The Struggle") in Belgrade branded the HNV as a front organization for terrorism.[97]

Whereas Herljević, at a session of the Yugoslav parliament, presented an impressive record of almost eighty averted "terroristic acts" from 1975 to 1978 and over two hundred persons indicted for "terrorism," in a confidential exchange with his West German counterpart he failed to give any details on "14 terrorists" who – according to him – had been arrested in Yugoslavia after having received "terrorist training" in the FRG.[98] Information on organizational ties to specific crimes was mostly vague.[99] Yugoslav state security officers held different exile group leaders responsible for the very same act of violence.[100] Seeing that the accusations lacked substance, criminal investigators in the West harboured doubts whether certain crimes were really initiated by Croatian exiles or in fact "activities of the Yugoslav intelligence service."[101] Exile organizations were infiltrated by Yugoslav secret agents at a ratio of about ten percent, providing a potential for provocations and false flag operations.[102] Already in the late 1960s, the SDB claimed to have a crucial part of the hostile groups abroad "under control."[103] Furthermore, there are

95 "Hrvatski narodni odbor – Jelićevci," SSUP, Belgrade, June 29, 1984, ARS 1931/3093; "Ergebnisvermerk über die Besprechungen im jugoslawischen Bundessekretariat am 29./30. September d. J. in Belgrad," BMI (Werthebach), Bonn, October 3, 1980, PA AA B83/1314.

96 Chuck Sudetic, "Yugoslavia Will Not Survive. A Statement by the Croatian National Congress," *The New York Times*, March 14, 1980: 11; John Darnton, "Yugoslavia Asks U.S. to Curb a Croat Exile Group Suspected of Violence," *The New York Times*, March 23, 1980: 3.

97 "Der Kroatische Nationalrat im Exil (KNR)," BND, April 7, 1982, BA B206/1105. Cf. Petar Dragišić, "Hrvatska politička emigracija i Jugoslavija početkom osamdesetih godina. Pripreme za završni obračun," *Istorija 20. Veka* 38, no. 2 (2020): 203–18.

98 "Ergebnisvermerk über die Besprechung der Minister Baum und Herljevic am 24. März d.J. im BMI von 10,30 – 12,00 Uhr," BMI (PI 1), Bonn, April 14, 1981, PA AA B83/1314.

99 Vladimir Vodinelić, *Deset verzija više jedna jednako istina. Zapisi o bonskom i stockholmskom procesu ustaškim teroristima* (Split: Marksistički centar, 1973).

100 Cf. Dragan Marković, Nikola Milovanović, and Đuro Rebić, *Ratnici mira, Volume 3. Specijalnirat* (Belgrade: Sloboda, 1979), 207; Đuro Rebić, *Teror Crne Internacionale* (Belgrade: Sloboda, 1979), 113.

101 "Zusammenarbeit mit Jugoslawien bei der Verbrechensbekämpfung. Politisch motivierte Ausländerkriminalität," BMI (P I 1), Bonn, July 2, 1981, PA AA B83/1314.

102 "Die nationalistischen Organisationen der Ostemigranten, III. Teil. Jugoslawische Emigration." Bavarian Office for the Protection of the Constitution, [Munich], January 15, 1963, PA AA B42/99; cf. Ivica Lučić, "Security and Intelligence Services in Bosnia and Herzegovina," *National Security and the Future* 2, no. 1 (2000): 80.

103 "Sprovodjenje Zakona o unutrašnjim poslovima i stanje u Službi državne bezbednosti," SSUP (SDB), Belgrade, November 4, 1967, ARS 1931/2304.

strong indications that some militant appearances were actually fabrications of Yugoslav secret services.[104]

Often the strategy of the extremists was aimed at preparedness for "Day X."[105] This implied the avoidance of attacks on Yugoslav representations abroad, lowering the repression by the authorities of the host states. Instead, it seemed more appropriate to carry out pinpricks against Yugoslavia proper.[106] But in expectation of "Day X," this was also disputed. Because damage to the Yugoslav state was the primary intention, it was particularly inconvenient when citizens of the host countries were affected as bystanders. During the hostage-takings, the perpetrators tried to avoid excessive harm to the random victims.[107] At the beginning of the 1980s, a Bosnian top security officer stated that "the Fascist emigration has committed over 200 grave acts of terrorism and has attempted many more."[108] Although this high frequency is obviously exaggerated, the security officers were caught up in the self-cultivated demon of the "Special War."

After the armed attacks of the early 1960s, Yugoslav state security services performed the task "of liquidating at least some of the most prominent emigrant organizers" as a means of preventive counterterrorism.[109] In concurrence with this principle, not only the actual perpetrators but also their real or alleged backers were targeted.[110] To some extent the registration as a "terrorist" relied on hearsay reports from informants on the spot. Collected data on militant underground activities was forwarded with high priority to the SDB headquarters. Another criterion was the subjection to law enforcement by the authorities of the host states. Most of the Croats killed abroad had been sentenced for offenses like the illegal possession of weapons or submitted to restrictions due to other militant behaviour. Because the penalties were mostly mild at first, the problem reappeared

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104 "Kroatische Emigrantengruppen," AA, (II 5), December 5, 1963, PA AA B42/94; cf. Branko Pavlica, *Antijugoslovenska aktivnost neprijateljske emigracije u SR Nemačkoj (1951–1984)* (Smederevo: Naš Glas, 1990), 68; Milo Bošković, *Šesta kolona. Nastanak, organizacija i delovanje antijugoslovenske fašističke emigracije* (Zagreb, Novi Sad: Birotehnika, 1985), 428, fn. 8.

105 "Kriminalpolizeiliche Erkenntnisse über das Verhalten jugoslawischer Emigranten und Gastarbeiter in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," BKA (Sicherungsgruppe), Bad Godesberg, July 18, 1963, PA AA B42/99.

106 Cf. Paul Hockenos, *Homeland Calling. Exile Patriotism & the Balkan Wars* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 2003), 71.

107 With the intention of "no bloodshed or anyone to get hurt," Bilandžić persuaded the hostage-takers via phone to give up (quoted after John O'Brien, "No Blood Is Shed. Chicago Passes 1st Test of Terrorism," *Chicago Tribune*, August 20, 1978: 5).

108 Andjelko Maslić, "Terrorism by Fascist Emigration of Yugoslav Origin," *Socialist Thought and Practice* 21, no. 3 (1981): 54. Even an academic publication is based on fantastic figures like these (Mate Tokić, "Landscapes of Conflict. Unity and Disunity in post-Second World War Croatian Émigré Separatism," *European Review of History* 16, no. 5 (2009): 739–53).

109 Quoted after Wollfy Krašić, "A Failed Assassination Attempt on the Deželić Family in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1965 by the Yugoslav Security Service," *Zbornik Janković*, no. 5–6 (2021): 263.

110 „Borivoje Blagojevic und seine Organisation," BND (v. Weiterhausen), March 14, 1975, PA AA ZA116705.

on the agenda as soon as they were released from prison. While Yugoslav appeals for stricter punishment usually fell on deaf ears, the SDB took matters into its own hands. By the mid-1980s, federal German criminal investigators arrived at 28 killings and 16 attempts most likely ordered by Yugoslav secret services.[111]

On the one hand, state security operatives considered the "liquidation" of a (potentially) dangerous exile principally "as a last resort,"[112] given that nonviolent attempts of "passivization" (e.g., persuasion by relatives or recruitment as an informant) would be in vain. But the elements of the "Special War" propelled the high frequency of "liquidations." Before Ratko Obradović of the Serbian ultranationalist "Zbor" organization in Munich was assassinated in 1969, the SDB had deemed him a „leader of diversionist bands" with foreign intelligence connections.[113] Internally, however, the SDB admitted that it lacked "sufficient data and evidence of a direct connection between the activities of the emigration and the domestic enemies with the work of foreign intelligence services."[114] Nevertheless, the presumed links of exiles to foreign forces were an integral part of the imagined "Special War" against the SFRY.[115] After a series of targeted killings abroad had taken place, the violence faded at the beginning of the 1970s.[116] In view of Yugoslavia's tainted reputation, the drastic measures became a matter of controversy among the Communist leadership and probably would have ended.[117] But in the aftermath of the incursion in the summer of 1972, the SFRY waged an undeclared war of low intensity similar to Israeli or U.S. counterterrorism after 9/11.[118]

How much the construct of a „Special War" contributed to the perpetuation of lethal operations turns out in the case of Dušan Sedlar, president of the royalist "Serbian National Defence." Although West German intelligence categorized this organization as nonviolent, the 72-year-old émigré was shot in broad daylight by two unknown perpetrators

111 "Aktivitäten jugoslawischer Dienste in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," AA, Bonn, May 15, 1985, PA AA B150/618.

112 Quoted in Tomislav Krolo, *Hrvatski politički emigrant 1941.–1991.*, ed. Ivan Čizmić (Zagreb: self-published, 2009), 451.

113 Quoted after Ratko Lompar, "Prilog istraživanju borbe jugoslovenskih vlasti protiv pokreta Zbor u zemlji i emigraciji 1944–1974.," *Istorijski zapisi* 94, no. 3–4 (2021): 118.

114 "Bezbednosna situacija i sprovodjenje Direktive Predsednika Republike," SSUP, Belgrade, September 16, 1972, ARS 1931/1362, 1179-1212.

115 Cf. Vladimir Brdar, "Snage za vođenje specijalnog rata," *Vojno delo* 35, no. 3 (1983): 69–74.

116 "Aktivitäten der kroatischen Emigrantenorganisationen in der BRD," MfS (HV/A), Berlin, December 6, 1971, BStU, MfS, HV/A 398.

117 Bernd Robionek, "State Security out of Control? The Influence of Yugoslavia's Political Leadership on Targeted Killings abroad (1965–84)," *OEZB Working Paper*, March 2020.

118 John Schindler, "Defeating the Sixth Column. Intelligence and Strategy in the War on Islamist Terrorism," *Orbis* (2005): 705: "Belgrade secret police's counterterrorism strategy stands as a model of how to wage a vigorous covert war against terrorists living abroad in de facto safe havens."

in Düsseldorf, North-Rhine Westphalia, on April 16, 1980.[119] Stanko Čolak, chief of the anti-emigration department in Belgrade, implicitly justified this targeted killing by pointing to a „Sedlargroup," said to prepare "measures against Yugoslavia" on bases of the British Army on the Rhine.[120] Placed into the context of a "Special War," this groundless suspicion – reminding of the British contacts maintained by Serbian exiles immediately after the Second World War – seems plausible.

Other incidents letting us wonder why Yugoslav authorities applied lethal methods occurred when nationalist riots in the Albanian-inhabited Kosovo broke out in 1981, shifting the attention of the SDB to exiles from that region.[121] Some of them called for more autonomy of the province, while the irredentists advocated a Greater Albania. This was particularly problematic, because – after the experiences with the "hot" border during the Cominform conflict – the Albanian intelligence service was perceived as the most aggressive.[122] Herljević blamed a dubious "Red Front" organization, consisting of Kosovo-Albanian "guest workers" in the West supported by Albanian secret agencies and right wing circles (!), on pulling the strings behind the uprising.[123] Since the Kosovo-Albanian nationalists took the place of the "Ustasha emigration" as prime troublemakers, it seemed necessary to apply countermeasures in their countries of residence.[124] In 1981 and 1982 five Kosovo-Albanians in the FRG and Belgium became victims of assassination attempts with obvious traces to Yugoslav security services.[125] But except for rhetorical statements in favour of militant means, there was no evidence of an involvement of Kosovo-Albanians abroad in terrorist activities.[126] Here again, the transnational constellation reinforced the threat. Yugoslav leaders were afraid that the unrest in Kosovo would spread across the country.[127] According to the theory of a "Special War," the emigration and

119 "Anschläge und sonstige Gewaltaktionen in der Zeit vom 1. Januar 1978 bis 31. Dezember 1981," Bf V, January 6, 1982, BA B141/83654.

120 "Ergebnisvermerk über die Besprechungen im jugoslawischen Bundessekretariat am 29./30. September d. J. in Belgrad," BMI (P I 1), Bonn, October 3, 1980, PA AA B83/1314.

121 Cf. Jurij Hadalin, "Odnos varnostno-obveščevalnih služb do albanske manjšine v Jugoslaviji po izbruhu demonstracij na Kosovu leta 1981," *Prispevki za novejšo zgodovino* 51, no. 1 (2011): 313–28, esp. 324.

122 Cf. Zoran Janjetović, "Sticking to Guns. The Disarmament Action in Kosovo 1955/56," *Godišnjak za društvenu istoriju*, no. 1 (2021): 73–90.

123 "The Kosovar Dilemma," RFE Background Report (Louis Zanga), May 20, 1981, OSA 300-8-3-276.

124 Cf. Branko Pavlica, *Jugoslavija i SR Nemačka 1951–1991* (Belgrade, Smederevo: B. Pavlica, 2002), 134.

125 "Ermittlungsverfahren gegen Unbekannt wegen Mordes an jugoslawischen Staatsangehörigen albanischer Volkszugehörigkeit am 17.1.1982 in Untergruppenbach, Krs. Heilbronn," Leading Supreme Public Prosecutor Heilbronn (Koch) to the General Public Prosecutor at the Supreme Provincial Court Stuttgart, Heilbronn, January 21, 1982, PA AA B83/1314.

126 "Bezbednosneocene", SSUP (SDB), Belgrade, January 1983, HDA 1561/4.0/95.

127 Barney Petrovic, "Tourist Plans Hit by Yugoslav Riots," *The Guardian*, May 30, 1981: 7.

domestic enemies were forming a union.[128] Under these conditions, Kosovo-Albanian exiles appeared as extraordinary dangerous adversaries.

Concluding Remarks

The SDB was well aware of the "psychological pressure" from hostile émigrés.[129] But did this also apply to the effect on the mentality of Yugoslav stakeholders? Having experienced situations of serious insecurity, the leadership was highly sensitive about threats from abroad. Since the early 1960s, the new international constellation went along with an increase of exile activism.[130] This synchronicity gave the false impression of causality. Instead of searching for the causes of rising exile militancy in the personal backgrounds of the troublemakers, i.e. the disadvantageous environments surrounding them, the official Yugoslav side preferred to link the hostile activities to international tensions. Whereas the international context first served as an explanation for exile hostilities, with the shock provoked by the armed incursion of 1972, this relation turned around. From now on, the increased significance of anti-Yugoslav activities, heightened by the cultivation of a permanent threat, served as an affirmation of the "Special War" scenario.

It was common practice among Communists of various countries to perceive hostilities by emigrants as a result of encouragement from foreign forces. On these grounds, the Yugoslav comrades developed their own type of paranoia determined by the global political position of the country. The identification with the Third World updated the conflict situation. Exile activism – for want of other open hostilities from outside – was the decisive cornerstone on which the construct of the "Special War" was built. It provided a continuous confirmation of endangerment and eventually the frame for a multitude of inimical forces.[131]

As an object of subtle war, Yugoslavia's decision-makers felt entitled to apply measures of strict self-defence. This contributed to an overreaction in the form of targeted killings abroad. Therefore, it is open to debate if the extent of lethal operations was rooted in

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128 "Notiz über ein Gespräch zwischen dem Bundessekretär des Inneren der SFRJ – Genossen Generaloberst Herlevicz – und dem Minister für Staatssicherheit der DDR – Genossen Generaloberst Mielke – im Zusammenhang mit dem Besuch der Partei- und Staatsdelegation der DDR unter Leitung des Generalsekretärs des ZK der SED und Vorsitzenden des Staatsrates der DDR – Genossen Erich Honecker – am 12. 01. 1977 in Belgrad," MfS (HA X, Damm), Berlin 1977, BStU (Zentralstelle), MfS Abt. X/246, 489-493.

129 "Sprovodjenje zaključaka Izvršnog biroa PSKJ i odluka i stavova drugih nadležnih tela i organa (oblast unutrašnjih poslova)," SSUP, Belgrade, June 1974, ARS 1931/1362.

130 Cf. Nenad Đorđević, *Bezbednost i Jugoslavija* (Zagreb: Jugart, 1985), 231.

131 Cf. "Hostile Activities Increasing, Yugoslav Interior Minister Complains", RFE (Slobodan Stanković), May 17, 1983, OSA 300-8-3-12050.

Communist ideology or rather an outcome of Yugoslavia's placement into world politics. The "Special War" represented by the "hostile emigration" certainly increased the nervousness inside the Yugoslav security system. How much the chimera became a factor in the outbreak of the dissolution wars would be a subject for further examination. At least in a session of Yugoslav counterespionage experts, held on the brink of the federation's break-up, the "Special War" was still prevalent.[132]

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From "Exile" to "Diaspora": The Shift in Self-Identification Among Refugee Latvians, 1944–2023

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Abstract: The 175,000- Latvians who fled their northeastern European homeland in the final year of World War II (1944–45) eventually resettled in some four continents and twenty different host societies. Their tasks were many, ranging from "freeing" Latvia among the politically minded to building a new life in their host societies. For some ten years after the war, their official status remained uncertain, as did the terms they used to describe themselves. Eventually, the agreed upon frame of reference became *trimda* (Eng. exile). It was the rare social, cultural, and political activity that was not discussed within the exile framework, and an impressive cultural superstructure was built upon it from the 1950s to the 1980s. This framework, however, became anachronistic after 1991 and the collapse of the USSR. Western Latvians could no longer claim to be in exile, but relatively few of them showed a willingness to return to the old homeland. Two decades of discussion about identity eventually led the new Latvian government and social-science researchers in Latvia to propose the term *diaspora* for all Latvians living outside the country's borders. This term has been generally accepted, even by the still living World War II refugees and their descendants, who now refer to themselves as the *vecā trimda* (Eng. old exile) component of the diaspora.

Keywords: Latvia, refugees, World War II, exile, diaspora, incipient diaspora

Introduction

In contemporary English-language research on populations living outside their homelands, the term "diaspora" has achieved nearly universal scholarly acceptance.[1] Even so, the historical development of these population fragments may differ substantially and thus create the need for theory. Theory, however, is not the intent of the present study. Rather, in the following pages I will examine the connection between the current Latvian diaspora and one of its components that predated it, namely, the approximately

[1] See, for example, the journals: *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* (Vol. 1, 1991) and *Diaspora Studies* (vol. 1, 2007), as well as the books referenced and reviewed therein.

175,000 Latvians who fled westward from their homeland – Latvia, one of the three Baltic states – during the final year of World War II (1944/45) and a half decade later dispersed over several dozen countries and four continents. Initially thinking of themselves as temporary "refugees" (Latv. *bēgļi*) living "in exile" (Latv. *trimdā*),[2] some seventy-five years later they – the remnants of the original refugee population and their descendants – appear to have accepted the designation "diaspora" (Latv. *diaspora*). Their initial numbers, of course, have been severely diminished, not only by natural mortality, but also comparatively by several waves of later emigrants from Latvia after 1991, the year in which the country regained its independence with the collapse of the USSR.[3]

In his 2003 pioneering comparative study of the politics of ethno-national diasporas, Gabriel Sheffer introduced the category of "incipient diasporas."[4] This phrase referred to populations that in 2003–04 were living outside their original homelands but did not have full-fledged diaspora characteristics. Sheffer's tables identified thirty such "incipient diasporas," among them a Latvian diaspora with an estimated 120,000 persons living in such host countries as the US, Canada, and Australia.[5] This was numerically the smallest on the list, dwarfed by such giants as the Mexican (est. 20 million), the Russian (est. 25 million), and the Korean (est. 3.5 million). Sheffer, however, offered a word of warning about all such numbers: "...It is extremely difficult to obtain anything approaching precise figures on the actual sizes, compositions, and dispersals of ethno-national diasporas."[6]

Sheffer's study also made clear that diasporas tend to have different origins, varying levels of consciousness, and highly differentiated ties to the old homeland. Thus, for example, the term "diaspora" itself was totally absent from the Latvian vocabulary of refugee self-identification until the early twenty-first century. For about sixty years Latvians living in western countries after World War II viewed themselves as something else, namely, a collectivity with an identity that had frozen, so to speak, in 1940 – the first year of the Soviet occupation – but still embodied the spirit of the interwar state. As an "imagined community,"[7] this collectivity was perceived by its members to be more authentically "Latvian" than what the interwar state had become after 1945, namely, the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic.

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2 The macron over the "ā" in "*trimda*" signifies the appropriate ending of the locative case of the word in Latvian.

3 Andrejs Plakans, *The Reluctant Exiles: Latvians in the West After World War II* (Leiden/Paderborn: Brill/Ferdinand Schöningh, 2021), 587–681.

4 Gabriel Sheffer, *Diapora Politics: At Home Abroad* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 106.

5 Ibid., 104–8.

6 Ibid., 99.

7 This perception had to be preceded by an act of imagination similar to that for an entire "nation," as described in Benedict R. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Revised and extended* (London: Verso, 1991) (first edition 1983).

The Population in Question

During the final year of World War II (1944–45), approximately 175,000 Latvians fled their homeland.[8] Many adults among them had experienced the first Soviet occupation from 1940 to 1941, and expected that their short stay as refugees elsewhere would be followed by return after the western democracies turned against their wartime Soviet ally and restored pre-war Latvia to its independent status. This outcome turned out to be illusory, and the post-war geopolitical configuration, described in 1946 by Winston Churchill as involving an "Iron Curtain," intensified the western Latvian feeling of exile during the rest of the 1940s.

The Latvian westward flight initially had carried most of these refugees to two countries: neutral Sweden (around 5000 persons), and Germany and German-occupied territory (around 170,000 persons). Most of those who fled to Sweden remained there. Most of those who arrived in German-controlled territory, however, spent the next 4–5 years there and eventually became part of the millions of so-called "displaced persons" (DPs) whose resettlement after 1945 was supervised by the United Nations (UNNRA) initially and then by the IRO. Refugeehood was followed during the 1948–1951 by the departure of most of this Latvian population – some 60–70% – to some dozen host countries further west, including Canada, the USA, Australia, and South American lands.[9]

By the mid-1950s, the wartime Latvian refugees had created settlements (which they called "colonies") throughout the world, ranging from several thousands in large western cities to handfuls in lesser communities. Several features of this "western' Latvian population continued to remain fixed from this period onward. First, its aggregate number was not replenished by new migration from the old homeland, because Soviet law almost totally forbade out-migration. Second, return migration from the "west" (from Sweden or from DP camps in Germany) to what was now Soviet Latvia remained minimal, possibly no more than two thousand during the decade after the war. Third, the "western" Latvian population was in constant motion initially, because well into the 1960s there was continuous internal re-migration in the host countries, as Latvians sought and found homesites closer to relatives or friends, better working opportunities, and active Latvian communal organizations. Fourth, the proportion of Latvians on the western side of the Iron Curtain thus continued to represent only about 5–6% of all Latvians, the others

8 The exactitude of this total remains problematic due to the nature of the primary sources, see: Plakans, *The Reluctant Exiles*, 40–6, especially footnote 75.

9 Several decades later, this Latvian departure from Europe was given the sobriquet "the great dispersion" by a prominent refugee poet; see: Valdis Krāslavietis, *Tā lielā izklīšana* (Ann Arbor, MI: Ceļinieks, 1973). This metaphor and the image it suggested remained a part of Latvian refugee lore from that point onward.

having chosen to stay or having failed to complete their flight.[10] The total population of the Latvian SSR had lost about one-third of its pre-war size as a result of war and flight, and this deficit was being corrected by Communist Party decisions favoring mostly Slavic-speaking in-migrants from other republics of the USSR. The proportion of Latvians in the population of the Latvian SSR began to inch downward, gradually moving the Russian language to center stage in the Republic and placing further Latvian cultural development into a "Soviet" framework supervised by the Communist Party of the USSR.

Statelessness and Identity

Hurried flight, an uncertain post-war settlement of borders, a hated regime in the old homeland, and the prolongation of their stay in unfamiliar circumstances all had the effect of creating a sense of statelessness among the Latvian refugees.[11] This "lost homeland" syndrome was only slightly modified by the policy of "non-recognition" articulated by the post-war western democracies, i.e. their continued refusal to grant legitimacy to the Soviet incorporation of the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) into the USSR.[12] Consequently, rejecting repatriation left Latvian refugees at the mercy of the western governmental authorities, who now needed to solve the "refugee problem." For nearly a decade, therefore, the refugees had to live with a variety of official designations of themselves: as "refugees," of course, as "displaced persons" (the official designation used by UNRRA and the IRO)[13], as "exiles," and as "resident aliens." These were all terms of civic status, meant to classify the relation of an individual or group in relation to the permanent members of a host society. All these classifications were understood by the Latvian refugees to be temporary, but they were nevertheless frustrating because they seemed to imply that the existence of the national state that provided meaning to their basic identity – i.e., the Latvian state – had become the subject to doubt. For most, the "non-recognition policy" was a poor substitute for the homeland they had left.

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10 Juris Krūmiņš, "Iedzīvotāju skaits," in *Nacionālā enciklopēdija: Latvija*, ed. Valters Ščerbiniskis (Riga: Latvijas nacionālā bibliotēka, 2018), 496–99.

11 Andrejs Plakans, "Neteritoriālais nacionālisms latviešu trimdas domā pēc II Pasaules kara," in *Nācijas hronikas: Latvija 2014 debates*, compiled by Pauls Daija, Deniss Hanavs, and Ilze Jansone (Riga: Avens un partneri, 2014), 103–26.

12 *20.gadsimta Latvijas vēsture*, ed. Daina Bleiere and Kangeris Kārlis (Riga: LU Akadēmiskais apgāds, 2022), 223–38.

13 UNRRA – United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency; IRO – International Refugee Organization.

Of the cluster of official classifications, several moved to the forefront during the post-war transition period. For a time western Latvians accepted with a resigned realism the notion that they were "refugees" (Latv. *bēgļi*) in the conventional sense of the term. By the late 1940s, however, self-description had begun to shift toward the general acceptance of the term "exiles" (Latv. *trimdnieki*; from Latv. *trimda* – exile).[14] Another term – the "displaced persons" (DPs) mentioned earlier – was introduced into western Latvian discourse by UNRRA and IRO officialdom with the creation of the DP camp system in the American and British zones of occupied Germany.[15] The abbreviation "DPs" was quickly Latvianized and popularized as *dīpīši* (plural of the singular *dīpītis*) and remained a somewhat sarcastic standard component of self-reference as long as the existence of the DP camps. By the end of the 1940s, however, the term *trimda* (Eng. exile) had begun to trump all other designators, because the word appeared to recognize that the absence from the old homeland would be a long one. For the Latvian adults who left Europe in the years 1948–1951 the word best expressed their inner feeling of attachment to a national state that no longer existed on many European maps.

It would be erroneous, however, to claim universality for any of these terms of self-classification. Depending on the subpopulation, there existed considerable variety. The vast majority of Latvians who fled to Sweden, for example, had no "displaced person" phase in their lives, and in Germany, the "DP" designation applied only to those admitted to camps by the authorities. As DPs, such persons were entitled to food, clothing, and shelter: not being a "DP" meant being on one's own. Socio-cultural cleavages were, however, never absolute, because underlying all official designators there existed a unifying ethnic (or national) element that remained a steadfastly influential base of personal and collective identity among refugee adults. This was the Latvian language and the cultural activities expressed in it.

The persistence of this unifying dimension of refugee life was not surprising. The adults who had fled Latvia in 1944–45 had brought along an essentialist view of national identity, which held that there existed a Latvian *tauta* (Ger. *Volk*, Eng. nation, people) into which its members were born. For adults, therefore, national identity was fixed and virtually impossible to abandon.[16] This philosophy of the self-reached back into the nineteenth-century Latvian "national awakening" that had drawn copiously from German

14 To older refugees, the term *trimda* linked their current situation to an earlier phase of Latvian history when during World War I some half a million refugees fled the Latvian-language Baltic provinces to the interior of Russia to escape the rapid German advance into Russian territory.

15 The best survey of the "displaced person" camps remains Mark Wyman, *DPs: Europe's Displaced Persons, 1945–1951* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998) (first edition 1989). For DPs as an international problem, see: Kim Salomon, *Refugees in the Cold War* (Lund: Lund University Press, 1991).

16 An erudite example of Latvian refugee essentialism can be found in all the writings of the Latvian philosopher Pauls Jurēvičs (1891–1981) who emigrated to and settled in Australia; see: Pauls Jurēvičs, V*ariācijas par moderno cilvēku* (Stockholm: Daugava, 1956); Pauls Jurēvičs, *Kultūras sejas* (Stockholm: Daugava, 1960).

ideas about nationality and nationhood.[17] The post-WWII decade, the westward flight and subsequent dispersion were too short and evidently too powerless to dislodge this essentialism. For Latvian adult exiles individually and collectively, ethnicity (or nationality) meant loyalty to the national state, founded in 1918, to which Latvians "belonged." The post-WWII entity now referred to as the "Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic" was for these adults an artificial construct: the "real Latvia" was the land in which they had spent their childhood and in which they had been educated and had founded families.

As a result, these adults now had to juggle three different images of Latvia. The first was the experienced homeland of personal and collective memory. The second involved the increasingly Sovietized and Russianized Latvian SSR, whose officials viewed the western Latvians as "traitors of the Latvian working people" and "Nazi sympathizers" and were viewed in turn by the westerners as a "slavish occupation regime kept in power only with the help of Moscow." The third grew out of the western "non-recognition policy" and consisted of only a *de jure* reality, symbolized by a vastly reduced number of diplomats stationed in the major western capitals. On the basis of this triad, the Latvian adults who fled in 1944/45 erected a political philosophy of exile that they hoped to pass on to the next generations, even though these had been relocated to and grown up in many foreign lands.

The Externalization of Ethnic Identity

Amidst the millions of refugees in post-WWII western Europe, having one's Latvian identity recognized and acknowledged was not an easy task. At the individual level, being Latvian carried no distinctive physical traits: physically, refugee Latvians resembled northern Germans and Scandinavians in being moderately tall, white-skinned, with blond, brown, or black hair. Their everyday attire was similar to that of post-war Europe's impoverished urban masses. This was especially the case of the Latvian DPs in Germany, whose apparel was usually drawn from the used clothing supply depots of the camps administered by UNRRA and the IRO. The visual differences were perhaps somewhat greater in Sweden, where Latvians entered a civilian population less touched by wartime shortages. The differences between the host-country population and the refugees would quickly emerge when official "papers" were produced: those of the Latvians normally

[17] The Latvian "national awakening" is normally dated between 1856 and the 1890s and is referred to as such because of the nationalistic activities of a new generation of young university-educated Latvians; see: Vita Zelče, "The New Latvians," in *Latvia and Latvians*, vol. 2, ed. Jānis Stradiņš et al. (Riga: Latvian Academy of Sciences, 2018).

included an indication of birthplace (Latvia) and also their (and their children's) status of "resident aliens" or "displaced persons." By the end of the 1940s, further conversations could also reveal major differences in the refugees' future plans. Most of those who had fled to Sweden had started to find acceptable social and occupational niches for themselves, while those in Germany were just starting to ponder emigration to other, more than likely overseas, host countries. In negotiations with UNRRA and the IRO, numerous countries had already passed special "displaced person laws" and thus shown their willingness to give the refugees new homes.

Thus, it would not have been difficult for individual Latvian refugees to fade into the general populations now surrounding them; an accented spoken Swedish and German, even among permanent residents, was not unusual in the post-war years. But for most of the Latvian adults, identity preservation held a deep meaning. There existed a sense of mission, the belief that only the western Latvians were capable of keeping alive the idea of the "true Latvia." Giving free rein within one's family circle and among friends to another language and the culture it had produced seemed somehow to be a betrayal of the old homeland. Moreover, there was a stubbornness in the face of acculturation and assimilation. Fate had dealt unjustly with the old homeland, and giving in now to the process of *pārtautošanos* (Eng. change of nationality) would be to compound life's unfairness.[18] Consequently, most adult refugees in the post-WWII years took every opportunity to express this attitude outwardly.

This externalization of ethnicity (or nationality) correlated with the social makeup of the Latvian refugee population. A very high proportion of it (possibly from 16–20%) consisted of well-educated people (secondary schools and beyond); that is, it consisted of much of the pre-war Latvian intelligentsia – schoolteachers, journalists, academics, publishers, established and novice authors of fiction and non-fiction, literary critics, pre-war and wartime government workers, clergymen, and university professors and students.[19] Believing themselves to be Latvians, they did not hesitate to reject outright a change of their basic identity, even though now they were officially "stateless." Their resistance to merging with the host-country populations commonly took the form, first, of Latvian language usage among themselves and, second, of organizations that remained Latvian linguistically and programmatically and interacted with the UN and Swedish authorities only as much as was strictly necessary. One major result of this organizational effort was a robust cultural superstructure in Sweden and in the German DP camps that buttressed the personal use of the Latvian language and was oriented toward the written

18 The demographic concerns involved in this, to national activists, negative process are laid out in Edgars Dunsdorfs, *Trešā Latvija* (Melbourne: Kārļa Goppera fonds. 1968).

19 Calculation based on Konstantīns Ozoliņš, "Mazā Latvija un latviešu dzīve Vācijā," in *Latviešu trimdas desmit gadi*, ed. Heronims Tichovskis (Toronto: Astra, 1954).

word – newspapers and other periodicals, camp newsletters, published books of original Latvian prose and poetry, translations from the literature of other countries, and even literature for children.[20] Virtually all the DP camps and the Swedish "colonies" created supplementary Latvian-language elementary schools, and the larger DP camps had enough students for secondary grades as well. The Latvian Evangelical Lutheran Church in Exile made sure that all DP camps and the Swedish "colonies" organized religious congregations, mostly Evangelical Lutheran and Catholic, with clergy who used the Latvian language in services, hymnals, and confirmation classes.[21] Most "colonies" housed some number of artists and craftsmen willing to organize workshops in their specialties; some of the DP camps had traveling theater troupes; others had in residence soloists of the Latvian National Opera and of pre-war orchestras who were always willing to present individual performances. The larger DP camps, such as Esslingen in the American zone, quickly became centers of Latvian culture in exile, and Stockholm, because of its high concentration of literary intellectuals, was such a center from the immediate post-war years onward.[22]

Existing accounts of the Latvian exile population during the half decade after World War II tend to highlight its positive features, particularly its achievements in creating a self-sustaining western Latvian-language cultural world. The existence of this environment meant that those who produced it and their offspring were able, for a time, to remain somewhat apart from their two main host societies, as well as from the changes that were taking place in the Latvian SSR. The cultural activity of the period, when defined inclusively, was substantial enough to exhibit at least the beginnings of the history of a Latvian exile subculture with its own unique institutions, forms of entrepreneurship, literary productivity, and ways of thinking.[23] Yet a close reading of the Latvian-language sources of the period yields worried comments among participants. How an unknown and unpredictable future would affect the cultural efforts of the DP camps and those of the Latvian intelligentsia in Sweden remained in the realm of guesswork, or, to put it differently, the externalization of ethnic (or national) identity not being anchored in a national state, would likely become particularly vulnerable.

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20 The variety of Latvian exile writing is covered in detail in *Latviešu trimdas desmit gadi*, 121–236.

21 One estimate places the proportion of Lutherans at 90% of the refugee population and Roman Catholics at 10%; see: ibid., 29, 37.

22 After the "great dispersion" and the dissolution of the camp system, Esslingen lost its role as an intellectual center while Stockholm continued its earlier reputation that, however, now took second place behind such "colonies" in North America as New York City and Toronto.

23 An effort was made by the DP-camp activists to promulgate a kind of "oath of allegiance" to the old homeland, but it remains uncertain how many refugees knew about it: Valters Nollendorfs, "Literatūra trimdā: ievads, vēsturiskais fons, raksturojums," in *Latviešu literatūras vēsture*, vol. 3, ed. Viktors Hausmanis (Riga: Zvaignze ABC, 2001), 350–401.

Thus, for example, there was concern about the brute fact of dispersion: activities in western Germany involved some 300 different camps, with this number being entirely beyond the refugees' control. Some commentators worried about the dominance everywhere of the adult generations and pointed out that younger Latvians were already seeking to further their education in German and Swedish universities, with uncertain linguistic consequences. There was also the lure of overseas locations: starting in 1946 from England but growing in size each year came DP labor recruitment by interested governments. Opinion-makers among the DPs preferred Eurocentrism – the old homeland was, after all, a European country, and England, the first country to recruit DPs, was still acceptable. But by 1948, large overseas lands – the US, Canada, Australia – had started to open their doors, creating the possibility that dispersion would become even more entrenched. Some commentators observed that the number of refugees who continued to think of themselves as Latvians was probably shrinking. Some of those who were "disappearing" deliberately disguised their wartime activities with assumed names and sought to live incognito, especially in Germany.[24] For others, relocation to Sweden and Germany was the first step toward a new and better life, reflecting the indifference they had already felt toward ethnic identity. In Germany, moreover, still others did not seek to enter the camp system, or were not admitted to it, and thus eventually lost contact with the Latvian atmosphere of the camps. There were also those who felt no animosity toward their Latvian past and simply allowed themselves to drift away for social reasons such as marriage. The total number of such persons remains unresearched, but it is nearly certain that the aggregate number of Latvians who arrived in Sweden and Germany during the last year of the war was appreciably higher than those who participated in the dispersion during the years between 1948 and 1951, when overseas countries were added to the list of hosts.

As it turned out, however, the organizational momentum of the 1945–1950 "European" years proved to be robust, and thus by the early 1950s virtually all of the new host countries – in Europe and overseas – had become sites of local and national Latvian organizations. It is estimated that in the US alone there were already some 300 such local, urban-based groupings before the American Latvian Association (ALA) – the unifying national organization – was founded in 1951.[25] This momentum continued with the founding of the World Association of Free Latvians (PBLA) in Washington DC in

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24 The most notorious example of this strategy was practiced by the refugee Viktors Arājs, a prominent Holocaust perpetrator in Latvia during the German occupation (1941–1945); see: Richards Plavnieks, *Nazi Collaborators on Trial during the Cold War: Viktors Arājs and the Latvian Auxiliay Security Police* (London: Palgrave/Macmillan 2018).

25 For the early history of the ALA, see: Bruno Albats and Klīve Visvaldis, *ALA: Amerikas latviešu apvienība 1951–1986* (Washington, DC: Amerikas latviešu apvienība, 1986); Andrejs Plakans, "Western Latvian

1956. An attempt to form a government-in-exile having come to naught earlier in the DP camp period, the PBLA now assumed the main leadership role of all Latvians living in the western democracies. In its policy pronouncements, the PBLA took for granted that the views for all western Latvians, regardless of generation, gravitated upward through local organizations, and, having done so, formed a single voice of this fragment of the Latvian *tauta*-in-exile. The PBLA, of course, had no enforcement mechanism to bring about the desired unity, and therefore the social history of the exiles was diverse. There was no disunity, however, on the point that the pre-1940 homeland had been "occupied" by the USSR and that all organizational efforts at all levels should be designed to "free" it. Thus, there was no doubt where western Latvian organizations stood within the context of the Cold War: they were fiercely anti-communist and supportive of all geopolitical efforts to weaken the USSR.

Trimda (Eng. Exile) as Framework

During the poetically described "great dispersion," the Latvian DPs were largely preoccupied with the identity labels the relocation process created. Officially, as they left Europe, they became transients, then, after landing, contract employees if their host-country "sponsors" required it, then some became internal migrants in search of better opportunities, and finally all stayers became resident aliens waiting for citizenship. Each phase of the transition was accompanied by feelings of impermanence that, by the mid-1950s, reinforced the idea of exile – *trimda*. This was a versatile word that became a companion of the ethnic (national) designator "Latvian" and rapidly replaced the terminology of officialdom, until virtually all aspects of Latvian life in the new host countries were understood to be suffused by the spirit of *trimda*. It was easy to assume that all western Latvians one encountered in the 1950s were exiles – *trimdnieki* – and that all had had similar, if not identical, recent life stories – occupation regimes in the old homeland, flight, DP camps, relocation to new host societies in Europe or overseas by ship, difficult circumstances in the initial years after arrival.[26] This imagined collectivity, however, belied the fact that the western Latvian DPs had become more fragmented than ever after dispersion from Europe – about 55,000 in the US, some 19,000 in Canada, about 32,000

exile 'foreign affairs': ideas and work," in *The Centerary of Latvia's Foreign Affairs*, eds. Diāna Potjomkina, Andris Sprūds, and Valters Ščerbinskis (Riga: Latvijas Ārpolitikas Institūts, 2016), 103–21.

26 An earlier Latvian emigration before World War I had brought some 5000 Latvians, largely political emigrants, to the US, but their interaction with the later DPs remained minimal and took place mostly in the larger "colonies" such as Boston, New York, and Philadelphia.

in Australia, with the main European host countries remaining Sweden, the Federal Republic of Germany, and England.[27] The main assignment of western Latvian "national" activists now became the maintenance of an "imagined" community consisting of some dozen or more different linguistic and cultural environments of everyday life.

If the 1950s can be considered the decade of re-settlement then the next thirty years of *trimda* life can be designated as a long period of adaptation, during which all successes and failures were viewed by western Latvian opinion-makers as linked to exile. In other words, *Trimda* became the universal framework of explanation of western Latvian life for those who wanted to describe it in its totality.[28] Accomplishments were attributed to the "Latvian" ability to overcome all hardships, while imperfect adaptation was rationalized by reference to the omnipotence of the competitive societies in which western Latvian adults were now living. The motivation for staying somewhat apart from the host societies was attributed to, at one extreme, an admirable and persisting loyalty to the old homeland and, at the other, to an unwelcoming attitudes of "natives" toward newcomers. Thus, virtually all adult Latvians learned the language of the host country for employment purposes, but normally spoke it with an accent and with grammatical errors. It was much less stressful to be in the company of other Latvian speakers. Organizers of Latvian-language supplementary schools regretted the "egoism" of Latvian parents who spent their weekends in other, personally more enjoyable, activities. Newspapers and journal reviews of concerts, exhibits of artwork, and theatre performances evaluated them with gratitude for the event *per se* rather than by reference to the highest standards of a particular art form. Political activity remained at the "petitioner" level, with elective offices evidently considered beyond the reach of first-generation immigrants. Many Latvian adults preferred employment below their pre-war education and established skills, believing that a regular paycheck for a niche in a self-perpetuating governmental or corporate hierarchy was preferable to the riskier paths of entrepreneurship.

During the 1950s, all western Latvian organizations grew in size as the membership of "colonies" stabilized, the earnings of adult Latvians increased and therefore also their organizational "tithing" as well, and *trimda* life developed an events calendar at all levels as well as a voluntary elite to implement it. By the early 1960s, however, it became

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27 A well-informed comparative table of Latvians in Western countries after World War II can be found in Ilgvars Veigners, *Latvieši rietumzemēs un vēl dažās zemēs* (Riga: SIA Drukātava, 2009), 59. His table lists altogether twenty countries to which an appreciable number of Latvians had migrated.

28 Thus, for example, *Latviešu trimdas desmit gadi* (Toronto: Astra, 1954) entitled his survey 'Latviešu trimdas desmit gadi' (Eng. The Latvian *trimda* After Ten Years) and all four volumes of Benjamiņš Jēgers, *Latviešu trimdas izdevumu bibliogrāfija*, vol. 1–4 (Stockholm: Daugava, 1968–1988). Monumental bibliography of exile publications bore the Latvian title "Latviešu trimdas izdevumu bibliogrāfija" (Eng. The Bibliography of Latvian *trimda* Publications).

apparent that all statements about the number of western Latvians needed to be taken with a grain of salt. Even such erudite Latvian publications as *Archīvs*, edited by the historian Edgars Dunsdorfs in Australia, ultimately had to fall back on educated estimates.[29] Quantitative difficulties were created by problematic host-country census categories, the absence of reliable local listings of those who continued to think of themselves as "Latvians" (many changed their given names and surnames), the drift away from Latvianness resulting from marriage to host-country partners, and a growing indifference, as noted by activists, toward a strict interpretation of ethnic identity. Many local organizations and supplementary weekend schools reported that their participants represented no more than about 15–20% of the Latvian population round about.[30]

In other words, the 1960s clearly showed that the processes of acculturation and assimilation were working their way, especially in the host societies (Australia, Canada, the US) with a long history of absorbing newcomers. "Naturalization" of all kinds affected adults as well as younger people. For adults, middle-class aspirations leading to house- and car-ownership, the acquisition of a specialized vocabulary in one's profession through attendance of adult education courses, and the inescapable learning of the intricacies of local and state laws and regulations – all merged to add to the personalities of recent adult arrivals a component that already existed among native-born resident of the host country.

Younger Latvians, who after arrival were still wholly or partially dependent on their parents for resources, had a much harder time in maintaining the *trimda* framework as the dominant fact of their lives. This age cohort of the exile population had been born toward the end of interwar independence, during the war years and the half-decade following them, and during the first decade in the host societies. Of course, they had been or were growing up in "Latvian families," which meant the continuous use of Latvian language at home, and, in the larger "colonies," of weekend supplementary schools and summer camps. At the same time, however, this experientially varied generation seemed to adapt to their host societies relatively easily. Their host-society language became native-like quickly, they had as many friends among host-society peers as they did among Latvians, and their everyday responsibilities, especially in the educational system, transformed a somewhat exotic and threating world into an increasingly familiar habitat in

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29 An annual publication, *Archīvs* issued its first volume in 1960 and its last in 1992. It was devoted entirely to all aspects of exile, with its editor, the historian Edgars Dunsdorfs, recruiting authors from all Latvian "colonies" throughout the world.

30 No exact percentages exist for either organizational membership or supplementary school attendance. The question remained sensitive after the "great dispersal," with activists supporting higher numbers and statisticians lower ones. On school attendance, see: Edgars Dunsdorfs, "Kā aplēst latviešu bērnu skaitu?," *Archīvs*, no. 17 (1977), 117–28.

which they felt "at home." Their desire to please their parents by continuing to think of themselves as "exiles" – *trimdnieki* – lessened, even if seldom becoming a complete rejection of Latvianness. Becoming adults in the 1960s, this generation was forced to make choices, and many from it frequently became replacements for the older Latvian activists who had begun to die or retire. Others launched successful professional host-country careers but retained contact with Latvian society by subscriptions to Latvian publications and paying membership dues to Latvian organizations. They had become more acculturated than their parents but less than their own children would be, and therefore their active contact with Latvianness and the *trimda* framework had not been completely severed.[31] They now constituted a substantial pool of Latvian-language-using talent from which the activist core could draw temporary, usually *pro bono,* assistance, such as preparing a contract for the purchase of a Latvian society building, creating blueprints for a new structure, and serving for limited amounts of time on various committees and subcommittees of Latvian organizations. This type of membership in *trimda* society was now being rendered by persons whose normal waking-hour activities closely resembled those of their host-country peer groups.

These generational shadings did not much hamper the Latvian externalization of ethnic identity, however. Indeed, it is possible to speak about the two decades after 1960 as the cultural flowering of the *trimda* framework.[32] This, despite the fact that the parental and pre-dispersion age-groups were both undergoing a type of acculturation that yielded little free time for Latvianness. All "colonies" continued to rely on a core of local activists to assume offices and continue the earlier momentum. The size of religious congregations and secular organizations appeared to have stabilized, though at relatively low levels, and volunteer teaching staffs could always be found to work at weekend supplementary schools and summer camps. The purchase and building of "Latvian centers" continued, relying on the contributions of increasingly well-to-do Latvian middle-class families.[33] Periodic festivals of Latvianness – such as the quadrennial song-and-dance festivals[34] – became the apogee of celebratory activities and could be counted on to have attendance numbers in the thousands.

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31 Though not severed, the contact was often characterized, on the side of those educated in the host countries, by a considerable amount of irony bordering on sarcasm, about topics other adults did not want satirized. Such lack of reverence often led to simmering disputes among adults, see: Valters Nollendorfs, "Tā sauktā *Jaunās Gaitas* lieta," (1959) Part 1, no. 21; Part 2, no. 24. The journal *Jaunā Gaita* was considered especially irreverent by many of its adult readers.

32 Plakans, *The Reluctant Exiles*, Chapter 6.

33 For a discussion of the monetary value of real estate acquired by western Latvians by the 1970s, see: Edgars Dunsdorfs, "Latviešu sabiedrisko īpašumu vērtība," *Archīvs*, no. 13 (1973): 115–27.

34 A detailed history of the song festivals from the DP camp period to the mid-1960s is Valentīns Bērzkalns, *Latviešu dziesmu svētki trimdā* (New York: Grāmatu Draugs, 1968).

These decades also witnessed the conclusion of a long period of host-country schooling among younger Latvians, their entry into skilled professions, and the slow but steady reduction in the age of organizational leadership. The average age of the activist core of the larger organizations reflected this change, though it was also true that in the smaller "colonies," due to shortage of candidates, the same cadre was reelected repeatedly, suggesting a growing lack of interest in the still-younger generation.[35] In their annual addresses to members, organizational leaders nearly always continued to position their reports within the *trimda* framework, despite the fact that their organization might be having its twenty-fifth or thirtieth anniversary. To younger Latvians who had made peace with the host societies, deference toward the older generation rendered such rhetorical flourishes acceptable, but most probably did not affect the next generation's composite sense of belonging, in which an equilibrium had been reached between "old homeland concerns" and "host society demands."

Emergence of a Latvian "Diaspora"

The thirty years after 1980, however, altered this equilibrium and forced the remaining post-war *trimdnieki* and many of their descendants to think of themselves differently. This shift in the terminology of self-reference was the byproduct of two major events, namely, the 1991 renewal of the Latvia's independence, and the beginning of the outflow of its population.[36] The first of these created, or, more precisely, re-created, a national state, rendering the term *trimda* obsolete. The second eventually expanded vastly the number of Latvians living outside the country's borders and required that analysts find a new designator for all of them, regardless of the date of departure. The new label was the term "diaspora" (Latv. *diaspora*). Picking up momentum after 2004 when Latvia became a member of the European Community, by the end of the decade an 'incipient diaspora' (as Sheffer called it in 2003) had become a full-fledged one, with the Latvian government appointing a succession of ministerial-level administrators to deal with this new mix of Latvian "externals." In this process, the post-WWII Latvians and their descendants lost their status as the most important external Latvian grouping and became

35 The changing nature of western organizational leadership is explored in Plakans, *The Reluctant Exiles*, 398–406.

36 Both these phenomena extended over a number of years: Juris Dreifelds, *Latvia in Transition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Mihails Hazans, "Emigration from Latvia: Brief History and Driving Forces in the 21st Century," in *The Emigrant Communities of Latvia: National Identity Transnational Belonging, and Diaspora Politic*s, eds. Rita Kaša and Inta Mieriņa (New York: Springer, 2019), 6–40.

one of several similar subpopulations that differed primarily with respect to the date of their departure.

As noted earlier, even by the early 1980s opinion-makers among western Latvians were still using the term *trimda* as if all their constituents had in fact been driven out of the old homeland or at least should feel as having been driven out. Now, after 1991, the doors to the ancestral homeland were wide open, and therefore the term *trimda* began to sound dubious. Most western Latvians, in fact, could no longer even justify feeling "stateless." Since the 1950s, most adult Latvians in all "colonies" had established permanent residence and obtained citizenship, and in some of them their offspring had received citizenship as a birthright. The sudden reappearance of the old homeland as a *bona fide* national state created a dilemma, because four decades of life in the host societies could not be easily shrugged off. Consequently, the number of westerners who "returned" (repatriated) after 1991 continued to remain low.[37] A handful rearranged their lives so as to spend a part of the year in the old homeland and another part in the host country. Numerous western Latvians applied for and were granted dual citizenship by the renewed Latvian state, even though they kept their host-country residence.[38] This contributed to the inching downward of the aggregate population of the renewed Latvia, a phenomenon that was interpreted negatively by those who worried about the labor force, but positively by those for whom the country's "proportion" of Latvians (which inched upward every year because of the departure of Russian-speakers) was of greater concern.

For about a decade after 1991, therefore, the self-description of western Latvians remained under a question mark. Who were they now, if *trimda* no longer existed? An answer to this question was put forward forcefully by government officials and researchers in the old homeland, who increasingly insisted on using the term "diaspora" to refer to those living externally. This usage carried considerable weight for several reasons, though anecdotal evidence suggests that the term was often jarring to western Latvian ears. Yet the westerners were in no position to present a counterargument. The cultural superstructure of the western Latvian "colonies" had been thinning since the early 1980s. One after another, important publications that for decades had been central to western discussions of identity either fell silent or renewed publication in the new Latvia. The number of Latvian-language books and periodicals published in the west fell severely during the 1990s, with their role being superseded by the output of publishing firms in the renewed republic. The principal Latvian-language international periodical, the newspaper *Laiks,* which had circulated from New York City since 1949, moved its base of operations to Riga,

37 Plakans, *The Reluctant Exiles*, 623–44.

38 Because the number of people in these categories depends of accurate self-reporting, precision tends to be rare. For a discussion of the category "dual citizen," see: Dual Citizenship, accessed May 8, 2023, https://latviansonline.com/dual-citizenship-the-search-for-an-unknown-number-of-potential-latvian-citizens/.

the capital of the new Latvia, during 2000–2001. The main publication dealing solely with *trimda* matters – the annual *Arhīvs*, published in Australia – issued its last volume in 1992, which meant that western Latvians would now need to turn to old-homeland publications for information about themselves. These old-homeland sources consisted of official data-gathering governmental organizations and the studies of academic researchers specializing in the demographic matters.[39] Research and educated guesswork periodically suggested total outflow numbers ranging from 370,000 to 500,000, especially in the decades after 2004 when Europe became the market for Latvian labor.[40] These large numbers were also due to the fact that, progessively, Latvian governmental definitions of an external Latvian became less strict. Among the 1944/45 refugees the ability to speak Latvian was almost always the minimum criterion of national identity; now, analysts and political leaders were willing to expand the definition to persons with minimal Latvian language abilities, and in some cases to those with none at all, if they were descendants of Latvians or had demonstrated sympathetic attitudes toward the country.

This search for a better self-description did not, however, hinder the work of erstwhile *trimda* "national" associations, which by that time were drawing on the second and even third generation of activists for leadership but now became the main contact points. Such persons, understandably, were now coming from host-country "Latvian" populations whose outlook and Latvian language use had been shaped for many decades by personal and collective acculturation. Their activism tended to fall into the "heritage" category: they had no intention of repatriating, were frequently married to host-country partners, and had children or grandchildren who were friendly toward but distant from Latvianness. They were no longer an "exile" population *per se* but one linked to the old homeland by many forms of reverence that translated into financial assistance, material contributions such as books and computers, and *pro bono* hard work.

Conclusion

The Latvian essentialist philosophy of the *tauta* (nation) had predicted that all its members, regardless of residence, would always recognize their spiritual oneness, but this dynamic was not always at work outside the country's borders in the renewed independence years. There were altogether too many personal and collective differences between

39 Such as, for example, *Latvijas emigrantu kopienas: cerību diaspora*, ed. Inta Mieriņa (Riga: Filozofijas un socioloģijas institūts, 2015).

40 Mihails Hazans, *Diasporas apjoma novērtējums. Pētijuma rezultāti* (Riga: LU Diasporas un migrācijas pētījumu centrs; 2. papildināta redakcija, 2020).

the descendants of the post-WWII refugees and the more recent so-called "economic migrants" for either to feel completely at ease in each other's company. Anecdotal accounts of interaction carried many different messages. In some "colonies" interaction was fruitful and in others hesitant and in still others never materialized. For many younger westerners Latvian had become a "heritage language," while recent "economic migrants" used it as their primary means of communication. In the western countries where World War II Latvian refugees had been scarce, the new "economic migrants" began to form entirely new "colonies." Unsurprisingly, the internal differentiation of this external Latvian population strengthened the Latvian government and population researchers in Latvia in their collective decision to continue the *diaspora* usage.[41] The term appeared to fit the functions of a general descriptor: it had a neutral, even academic, connotation, and did not imply, as the word *trimda* (exile) had, that the *trimdnieki* had been driven out of their homeland, nor did it highlight the motives of the "economic migrants." Moreover, it was a flexible term, so that it could be used even as the numbers in newer centers of activity such as Europe came to exceed those of the earlier host continents, primarily North America (the US, Canada). And, in addition, it was more useful than any others for international comparisons. Having received the imprimatur of the Latvian government, by the 2020s the term "diaspora" now occupied center stage. All "external Latvians" who have had reasons to refer to themselves had adjusted their vocabularies to the new usage. The term *trimda* and its various derivatives have become "historical" in the full sense, referring to a historically delineated Latvian subpopulation the influence of which still lingers through its descendants but no longer has the same emotional weight. If Latvian researchers now need to refer to the subpopulation of World War II refugees and their descendants in the west, the most frequently used term has become *vecā trimda* (Eng. the old exile).

Even so, it is important to recognize that this "old exile" (in Sheffer's terms, the "incipient diaspora") in its heyday showed itself as robust and wholly capable of creating and sustaining a Latvian-language cultural environment of considerable scope and intensity. From an academic viewpoint, the Latvian "incipient diaspora" has its own unique history – its own "narrative," spanning a half-century – that remains to be fully investigated because it possessed the power to attract the emotions of tens of thousands even before it became a *bona fide* "diaspora."

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41 A decade of discussion about externally-living Latvians eventually led to the passage of the Diaspora Law (Latv. *Diasporas Likums*) of 2019, which intended to formalize the diaspora-homeland relationship; see: Plakans, *The Reluctant Exiles*, 656–7.

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New Tools against the Soviet Union in the Political Work of the Latvian Diaspora in the 1970s–1980s: The Case of Human Rights Violations in the Soviet Union

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Abstract: Starting with, and initiated by, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in the first half of 1970s, the topic of human rights violations in the Soviet Union, and specifically in the Baltic states, became part of the Latvian diaspora's political argumentation when lobbying against the Soviet Union in host countries. Almost unknown before, this topic was very prominent in the political activities of the 1970s and 1980s up until the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The issue of human rights violations in the political argumentation of the Latvian and Baltic diasporas as a whole has always been inextricably linked to the main political goal of these diasporas – the restoration of the right to political self-determination for the Baltic states. Without self-determination, human rights cannot be realized – this is how the basic principle of the diaspora's position could be summarized. The diaspora's rapid focus on human rights violations in particular demonstrates its ability to react quickly to current trends in society and to use issues of current public concern to shape its communication and advance its political cause.

Keywords: Latvian diaspora, anti-communism, Baltic States, USSR, Human Rights violations

Introduction

The Latvian diaspora in places such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and the countries of South America and Western Europe grew immensely after the Second World War, with more than 100,000 refugees leaving German Displaced Persons camps for various countries. This influx changed the entire structure and mood of the diaspora. The Latvian diaspora after the Second World War belonged to a group of diasporas marked by strong anti-communist sentiment, and was also characterized by its activities for the preservation of Latvian identity abroad.

Latvians considered the diaspora period a temporary state of affairs, and their main self-imposed task was to preserve their Latvian identity abroad and to promote the restoration of Latvia's independence. In a broader sense, practically the entire set of activities aimed at the maintenance of Latvian culture and language abroad was for the Latvians an affirmation of the belief that, sooner or later, an independent Latvian state would be restored. In the first post-war decade, the diaspora developed a broad and branched structure of organizations that made it possible to carry out concerted political actions, coordinate educational work, maintain contacts, and effectively disseminate information both within the host society and among Latvians themselves. The diaspora community contributed directly towards their aim of restoring the independence of occupied Latvia through political work. This included informing the host societies about the Baltic states, as well as engaging in direct political lobbying of the host governments, politicians, and international organizations. The Latvian diaspora in the United States was particularly politically active, which was natural in the Cold War context – the United States were the main counterforce to the communist countries as well as the main ally of the diaspora. This political work in the 1950s and even in the 1960s was characterized by first of all settling in the host countries, establishing an organizational network, and at the same time being very active and enthusiastic in any activities that were even partly related to the resistance to the Soviet Union as a political force or to communism as an ideology. The strong anti-communist sentiment in the United States at that time created a fertile ground for such activity. Parallel to the involvement in the U.S. anti-communist policy, this period of activity is characterized by attempts to justify, to some extent, the existence of the diaspora through political activity – to underline its value and to explain its national character with historical arguments. The second half of the 1960s was a period of certain stagnation and searching for new paths in the political activity of the diaspora.[1]

The nature of the diaspora's political activity changed markedly in the early 1970s, and the reasons for this change were a combination of external and internal factors. The external factors were events in the international realm, mainly the rapprochement processes between the Soviet Union and the United States, including the Helsinki process, as well as the attempts by several countries to reconsider the policy of legal non-recognition of the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union (for example, the 1974 decision of Australia to recognize the incorporation). In addition to these external challenges, gradual but very significant internal changes took place within the diaspora around the beginning of the 1970s. It was then that the leadership of political organizations was taken over by the new generation, i.e. those Latvians who had already grown

[1] For a more detailed analysis of the different periods in the political work of the diaspora, see: Kristīne Beķere, *Latvijas labā. Politiskā darbība trimdā 20. gadsimta 40.-80. gados* (Rīga: LU Akadēmiskais apgāds, 2022).

up and been educated in the diaspora. These changes were due to both natural factors (ageing of the first generation) and the younger generation's different understanding of the operational strategies to be applied.[2]

One of the manifestations of the changes during this period was a shift in the arguments and rhetoric used in diaspora political struggles, with a number of new arguments that were much broader than before. While the early political demands of the diaspora were often based on the historical injustices inflicted on the Baltic states – later turning into a struggle against communism in all its forms – at this time the diaspora was becoming increasingly focused on social issues and justifying the need for the restoration of the Baltic states' independence through issues such as environmental protection, world peace, etc. One of these new arguments that was the most visible was the issue of human rights violations in the Baltic states, and the linking of this problem with the issue of political self-determination – an issue characteristic of that period, as emphasized by the diaspora.

The aim of the article is to analyze one of the manifestations of the changes triggered by various factors starting in the 1970s: the emergence and placing of the argumentation on human rights violations in the Soviet Union in the political work of the Latvian diaspora in their host countries.

Previous research on this topic is rather fragmentary. Research on the activities of the Latvian diaspora's political lobby has so far been rather episodic and fragmentary in Latvia. The results of this research have been published in the form of several conference proceedings.[3] A valuable collection of interviews and memoirs on the topic of diaspora political activities has also been published.[4] Of the individual political actions of the diaspora, the most visible have naturally received the most attention. A number of larger and smaller scholarly articles have been devoted to Australia's decision to *de jure* recognize the incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR,[5] which can safely be considered the most studied of all political actions. Some articles have also been devoted

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2 For a brief overview of the generational differences, see: Ieva Zake, "Multiple Fronts of the Cold War: Ethnic Anti-Communism of Latvian Émigrés," in *Anti-Communist Minorities in the U.S.: Political Activism of Ethnic Refugees*, ed. Ieva Zaķe (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 136–9.

3 *Latvija ārpus Latvijas. Kultūra, vēsture, emigrācija un nacionālā identitāte. Konferences rakstu krājums* (Rīga: Latvijas Nacionālais arhīvs, 2014); *Konferences Trimda, kultūra, nacionālā identitāte referātu krājums* (Rīga: Nordik, 2004); *Latviešu trimdas loma Latvijas neatkarības idejas uzturēšanā: Apvienotā Pasaules latviešu zinātnieku III un Letonikas IV kongresa sekcijas materiāli* (Rīga: LZA, 2011).

4 *Nyet Nyet Soviet. Stāsti par latviešu politiskajām demonstrācijām trimdā* (Rīga: "Latvieši Pasaulē", 2018).

5 Kristīne Beķere, "Latviešu trimdas loma Baltijas valstu okupācijas neatzīšanas politikā Austrālijā un Jaunzēlandē," *Latvijas Zinātņu Akadēmijas Vēstis*, no. 1/2 (2011): 30–61. lpp.; Ineta Didrihsone-Tomaševska, "'Austrālijas kauja': Austrālija atzīst Baltijas valstu *de jure* iekļaušanu Padomju Savienības sastāvā," *Latvijas Arhīvi*, no. 1 (2012).

to the activities of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)[6] or, for example, to the issue of extradition to the Soviet Union of Baltic gold deposited in the United Kingdom[7] or the participation of the diaspora in events in Latvia in the late 1980s.[8] The issue of the use of human rights violation arguments in the political work of the Latvian diaspora is very briefly outlined in the author's dissertation and the resulting book,[9] which is also currently the only comprehensive study of the political activities of the Latvian diaspora. Outside Latvia, the most popular topic has been the place of the Baltic question in U.S. politics[10] or international politics,[11] as well as histories of diaspora communities in certain countries.[12] It should be noted that the study of the human rights argument is greatly facilitated by the serious international study of human rights violations in the CSCE process and in the end of the Cold War in general.[13]

The main sources used in this study are the documentation of diaspora organizations (correspondence, minutes of meetings, and activity reports, etc.) in archives in Latvia, Sweden, the United States, and elsewhere. Publications in the major Latvian diaspora press have also been used.

Human Rights Issues in the CSCE and Involvement of the Latvian Diaspora

The main center of anti-communist political activity of the Latvian diaspora was located in the United States. Although the political work of the diaspora did in fact take place

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6 Jānis Taurēns, "Helsinku process un latviešu trimda 20. gadsimta 70. gadu pirmajā pusē," in *Latvijas Vēsture* 67, no. 3 (2007).

7 For example, the series of articles by A. Zunda "The Undying Glitter of Latvia's Gold" in *Latvijas Vēstnesis* in 2005. Zunda has also addressed the Baltic gold issue in several other articles.

8 Jānis Taurēns, "Latviešu trimda un Trešā atmoda (1988–1990): starp tradīciju un revolūciju," *Journal of the University of Latvia. History*, no. 13/14 (2022): 101–14.

9 Beķere, *Latvijas labā*.

10 J.H. L'Hommedieu, "Exiles and Constituents: Baltic Refugees and American Cold War Politics, 1948–1960" (PhD diss., University of Turku, 2011).

11 John Hiden, Vahur Made V., and David J. Smith, eds., *The Baltic Question during the Cold War* (London: New York: Routledge, 2008).

12 Ieva Zake, *American Latvians. Politics of a Refugee Community* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2010).

13 For example: Aryeh Neier, *The International Human Rights Movement. A history* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020); Sarah B. Snyder, *Human Rights Activism and the End of the Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Nicholas Badalassi and Sarah B. Snyder, *The CSCE and the End of the Cold War. Diplomacy, Societies and Human Rights, 1972–1990* (Berghhahn books, 2019); Sarah B. Snyder, *From Selma to Moscow. How Human Rights Activists Transformed US Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018).

in other locations (Western Europe, Canada, Australia, and even South America[14]), the United States were undoubtedly central to the diaspora's understanding of its political tasks and spheres of work. In the minds of the Latvian diaspora, the United States were its biggest and most important ally – the only force that could even theoretically oppose the diaspora's main enemy, the Soviet Union. The central importance of the United States is evidenced by the fact that the central political organization of the Latvian diaspora, the World Federation of Free Latvians, was based in the United States, and that the American Latvian Association played a key role in its activities[15] and, accordingly, in diaspora political activities throughout the world to a certain extent as well.

Therefore, the domestic political mood and trends in U.S. domestic politics were of importance in terms of the possibilities for political lobbying in favor of the restoration of the independence of the Baltic states. Various human rights issues had been on the agenda in the United States since the mid-1950s, but the U.S. government's interest in human rights largely did not extend beyond the borders of its own country until the early 1970s. After the events in Chile in 1973, the United States adopted a resolution that, for the first time, directly addressed human rights violations in another country. It called for the denial of any economic or military assistance other than humanitarian aid until the government of Chile protected the human rights of all individuals.[16] At the same time as these events, the European Security and Cooperation Conference in Helsinki was taking place, and the U.S. society was becoming increasingly interested and concerned about human rights abuses in the Soviet Union, particularly with regard to the Jewish exodus from the Soviet Union that was being prevented.[17]

In parallel to the developments in U.S. politics, the Helsinki process gave incomparably more attention than ever before to human rights in interstate negotiations. This is evidenced by the fact that in the Helsinki Final Act, principle 7 of the "Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States" referred to respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and thus the principle of respect for human rights was considered as important as the principles of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the like.[18] Some scholars have even suggested that the Helsinki process and the related

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14 Kristīne Beķere, "Latvieši Dienvidamerikā 1945–1991: darbība Latvijas neatkarības idejas saglabāšanai," *Journal of the University of Latvia. History*, no. 4 (2017): 141–58.

15 The first WFFL President from a Latvian organization from a country other than the United States was Linards Lukss (Latvian National Association of Canada), who was in office from 1988 to 1989.

16 Neier, *The International Human Rights Movement*, 161–5.

17 Ibid., 165.

18 Final Act of Helsinki; Arie Bloed, ed., *The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Analysis and Basic Documents, 1972–1993* (Dordrecht: Kluwer International publishers, 1993), 146.

human rights advocacy activities were among the important factors leading to the end of the Cold War.[19]

The Helsinki process attracted worldwide attention, and the Baltic diaspora was no exception. As the CSCE process negotiations in Helsinki and Geneva progressed, diaspora organizations also developed their own political action plans and strategies for the Conference. As early as 1972, while the CSCE preparatory negotiations were still in progress, the WFFL drew up its own list of key political activities for the CSCE. This included preparing memoranda with political and legal arguments; visiting delegations of anti-communist CSCE member states, heads of state, and foreign ministers; being present during the Conference and organizing both press conferences and public demonstrations; and coordinating with the Lithuanians and Estonians.[20] The funds for these activities were to be raised through a global fundraising campaign among Latvian diaspora members in all continents and countries. That campaign was launched in the spring of 1973.[21]

In cooperation with the other Baltic global organizations, establishment of the Baltic World Council (also called the Baltic World Conference) was achieved. Although most political actions were carried out on behalf of all Balts, the Baltic World Council was established and functioned largely thanks to the initiative and perseverance of Latvians living in the United States. This was especially true in terms of funding: the Latvian Freedom Fund enabled the Latvian diaspora to finance political actions, while the Estonians and Lithuanians had no such funds.[22] The Latvian Freedom Fund was founded in 1973, at the Congress of the American Latvian Association in Cleveland. The contributions from its members formed an untouchable capital fund, the interest from which was used for financing the political and informational activities of the WFFL, as well as covering the administrative expenses of the Fund. In total, more than 3,000 individuals, families, and diaspora organizations contributed to the Fund. The Fund's untouchable capital reached one million U.S. dollars in 1983, and further grew to two million U.S. dollars in 1989.[23] The Freedom Fund continues to operate today.

In accordance with the WFFL's previously developed action plan, the central organizations in the diaspora prepared extensive information on the Baltic states in preparation

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19 Snyder, *Human Rights Activism*, 2–4.

20 Priorities for the preparatory work of the PBLA Security Conference. 14 November 1972 – ALA Archives, Rockville Office, PBLA Collection, folder: European Security Conference; file: 1972.

21 PBLA information for compatriots on EDSA activities – Swedish National Archives, Lettiska Centralradet, folder "PBLA Board 1972, 1973".

22 Ilgvars Spilners, *Mēsuzvarējām!* (Rīga: autora izdevums, 1998), 34.

23 Jānis Lucs, "Latvijas Brīvības fonds – ieguldījums Latvijas neatkarības atjaunošanā," in *Pasaules Brīvo latviešu apvienības ieguldījums Latvijas neatkarības atgūšanā un tās stiprināšanā* (Rīga: LU Akadēmiskais apgāds, 2017), 88–91.

for their political lobbying work at the Conference. On behalf of the WFFL, the well-known lawyer Dietrich Andreas Loeber drafted a memorandum on the legal aspects of the CSCE. In it, he stressed that security in Europe could only be achieved once the consequences of the Second World War, which had been perpetrated by methods and means incompatible with the principles of international law, including the occupation of the Baltic states, were eliminated. The Memorandum demanded that the Conference declare the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 null and void with respect to the Baltic states from the moment of its conclusion, and that the Conference find a political solution to the situation of the Baltic states in accordance with international law and the principle of self-determination.[24] The Baltic states sent the memorandums and informational material to the governments and ministers of the various countries,[25] and distributed them to the delegations of the member states. During the CSCE process and before the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, diaspora activists also met with various heads of state and foreign ministers to urge them to defend the interests of the Baltic states and not to abandon the existing policy of non-recognition. For example, the Baltic delegation was received very favorably at the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[26]

During the opening of the Helsinki Conference and during the negotiations in Geneva, there were also representatives of the Latvian diaspora present. As it was neither possible from the point of view of resources, nor expedient to be active at all times, the WFFL representatives were in Geneva on several separate occasions, with intervals of time that allowed them to adapt to the course of the negotiations. The work tasks of the WFFL delegations in Geneva followed a standard pattern: to meet with representatives of the CSCE member states in various committees and provide them with written Baltic recommendations and prepared materials; to meet with international media journalists; and to organize a demonstration or similar public political action to "remind the Soviets that they have not been forgotten."[27]

During the long negotiations in Geneva, three separate WFFL delegations were active. The work of the delegations was carefully planned, including the responsibilities

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24 Memorandum by D.A. Loeber on the Legal Aspects of the European Security and Cooperation Consultation, see: *4. maijs: Rakstu, atmiņu un dokumentu krājums par Neatkarības deklarāciju*, ed. Tālavs Jundzis (Rīga: LU žurnāla "Latvijasvēsture" fonds, 2000), 386–90.

25 For example, the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany. See letter of U. Gravas to V. Schell, 17 May 1973 – LNA LVA, 2176.f., 1v. Apr., 154, p. 4.

26 Letter from T. Kronberg, President of the Baltic Federation of Canada, to A. McEachen, Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 10 February 1975 – HIA, Janis Lejins Collection, Box 1, folder "European Security Conference 1972-77".

27 Spilners, *Mēsuzvarējām!*, 26–7.

among the delegation members, handouts and negotiating arguments, etc.[28] The first delegation – Imants Freimanis, Pauls Reinhardts, and Adolfs Šilde – stayed in Geneva for a week in early December 1973, and visited the heads of the German, Dutch, Vatican, Luxembourg, Austrian, British, American, Canadian, Belgian, French, Swiss, and Italian delegations, and also held a joint meeting with representatives of the Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, and Icelandic delegations.[29] The WFFL delegation distributed its organization's memoranda to delegations and press agencies, more than 70 in English, 45 in French, and the same number in German.[30] The second delegation – consisting of Pauls Reinhardts and Ilgvars Spilners, as well as Arnold Joonsson of the Estonian World Council – was in Geneva during February 18–22, 1974, and visited 12 Western delegations and diplomats. The third delegation consisted of Augusts Abakuks and Pauls Reinhardts, who were in Geneva at the end of April 1974.[31]

The issue of human rights violations was directly present in these diaspora activities. The memoranda and compilations of information submitted to the delegations inevitably contained the most important legal information concerning the unlawful incorporation of each of the respective Baltic states into the Soviet Union, the treaties and international documents violated by the Soviet Union, etc. However, a large part of these compilations was devoted to specific human rights violations in the Baltic states. The documents explained with precise examples how any statements made against the Soviet Union's methods of management in the Baltic states (such as exaggerated industrialization, russification, discrimination against the Latvian language, etc.) were punishable under criminal law as anti-Soviet agitation, with sentences of up to seven years in a forced labor camp. Also addressed was the lack of freedom of movement, characterized by the impossibility for citizens to leave the Baltic states or for foreigners to enter freely; the issue of family reunification was also linked to this.[32] A memorandum on the problem of political prisoners and other human rights violations was handed over to all delegations of the member states at the end of the Conference, either in person or by post.

The Memorandum addressed such issues as: the right to leave the Soviet Union freely; the need to give scientists the right to participate in international conferences of their choice; and the right of artists and writers to perform abroad of their own free choice, regardless of the Committee on Cultural Relations with Compatriots Abroad; allowing

28 PBLA circular – plan of action for the Geneva Stage 1 delegation – LNA LVVA, 293.f., 1.apr., 1208.p., 35–36.

29 Spilners, *Mēsuzvarējām*!, 24.

30 Report of I. Freimanis on the work of the PBLA delegation in Geneva from 2–8 December 1973 – LNA LVVA, 293.f., 1.apr., 1208.p., 3–4.

31 Spilners, *Mēsuzvarējām*!, 30–4.

32 Eva Liepiņa, *Latviešu trimdas darbība Baltijas jautājuma aktualizācijā EDSA konferencēs 1975–1983* (master's thesis, Latvijas Universitāte, Rīga, 2022), 43–6.

foreigners to enter the Soviet Union freely and to meet the local population; lifting restrictions on the freedom of movement of foreign journalists, allowing them to visit the Baltic states; abolishing or at least reducing the high customs duty on aid packages sent from abroad; lifting the ban on sending high-value medicines and medical aid from the West to the Soviet Union; removing restrictions on the import and export of books, newspapers, magazines, sound records, tapes, and microfilms; ending interference with radio broadcasts, including Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe; and requiring that no political prisoner be deported to serve his sentence outside Latvia.[33]

From the coverage in the diaspora press, the WFFL delegations were positive about their opportunity to make a positive impact through this informational material. The delegates noted that the demands of this so-called "humanitarian memorandum" had been given serious consideration by Western CSCE delegates and acknowledged that at least some of them had a chance of being won, as they differed little from the baseline of demands they had set out.[34]

The most worrying point for the diaspora in the context of the CSCE was the paragraph of the final negotiating text, which declared the inviolability of borders and the territorial integrity of states as a fundamental principle, and thus essentially provided for the recognition of the existing national borders in Europe. With the declaration of such a principle, there was a risk that the Western countries would abandon their policy of non-recognition of the annexation of the Baltic states, which they had maintained until then, and internationally confirm the Baltic states' belonging to the Soviet Union. Recognition of the borders would strengthen the Soviet Union's claim to the Baltic states and make the diaspora's goal of restoring the independence of the Baltic states much more difficult. Thus, it is understandable that the WFFL and other organizations paid a great deal of attention to the CSCE.

When it became clear that the text of the document to be signed could not be changed, it was important for the diaspora to at least get the United States to publicly state that the fact of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act would not change the United States' attitude towards the occupation of the Baltic states. On July 25, 1975, U.S. President Gerald Ford met with representatives of several Eastern European ethnic groups shortly before flying to Helsinki to sign the Final Act. This meeting was attended not only by Balts, but also by representatives of Ukrainian, Polish, Hungarian, Czech, Slovak, Armenian, and Belarusian organizations. The Latvians were represented by WFFL President Uldis Grava.[35] In his statement on the meeting, President Ford stressed that the

33 Ādolfs Šilde, "Kustības brīvību Baltijas valstīs," *Latvija Amerikā*, December 22, 1973.

34 "Latviešu delegāti Ženēvā," *Austrālijas latvietis*, December 21, 1973.

35 Minutes of a meeting with Americans of Eastern European origin, July 25, 1975; *Foreign Relations of United States*, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIX, document 322, p. 926.

outcome of the CSCE would not affect the official U.S. policy of non-recognition of the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union.[36] During the meeting, several participants, including Lithuanian representative Pauls Dargis on behalf of the Balts, requested that the President make a public declaration in Helsinki on the continuation of the policy of non-recognition of the United States, regardless of the Final Act. President Ford promised to consider this suggestion, but no public statement was made in Helsinki. During the meeting, the President also stressed that the statement he had made was public and could be safely disseminated, including to countries behind the Iron Curtain via Voice of America or Radio Free Europe, and therefore, in his view, no further public statements were necessary.[37]

After the signing of the Final Act, it became even more important for the Baltic diaspora to achieve a public, official statement at the highest level possible of the United States' continuation of the policy of non-recognition, either by Congress or Senate resolution. Diaspora organizations continued active political lobbying in the U.S. Congress to get a resolution passed, both by demonstrating and by visiting members of Congress to try to persuade them to support such a resolution.[38] Finally, on December 2, 1975, the U.S. Congress passed House Resolution 864, in which the U.S. Congress declared that the signing of the Helsinki Final Act had in no way altered the existing U.S. policy of non-recognition of the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union.[39] A similar resolution was passed by the Senate on May 5, 1976, which underlined the existence of the U.S. policy of non-recognition despite the signing of the Helsinki Final Act.[40] The huge efforts made by the diaspora to achieve the adoption of these two resolutions demonstrates the extreme importance that this issue had for the Baltic diaspora.

As with the Helsinki Conference, the Baltic diaspora saw it as its duty to remind the great powers of the Baltic issue and to call on them to address it at the subsequent Review Conferences (Belgrade 1977–1978, Madrid 1980–1983, Vienna 1986–1989). Following the example set in Helsinki, for each of the Review Conferences the diaspora organizations prepared a compilation of documents and other materials detailing the situation in the Baltic states in the context of the issues discussed at the conference, including

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36 U.S. President George W. Ford's statement on his meeting with Americans of Eastern European origin, July 25, 1975; *J. Ford Presidential Library Archives*, Box 12, "7/25/75 – Presidential Remarks, Meeting with Americans of Eastern European Background".

37 Minutes of a meeting with Americans of Eastern European origin, July 25, 1975; *Foreign Relations of United States*, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIX, document 322, pp. 926–30.

38 "Svarīgsbijakatrsdeputāts," *Laiks*, January 24, 1976, 1.

39 "H.Res.864 – 94th Congress (1975–1976)," Congress.gov, accessed December 27, 2019, https://www.congress.gov/bill/94th-congress/house-resolution/864.

40 U.S. Senate Resolution Nr. 406, *Documents on Disarmament 1976* (Washington: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1978), 285–7.

human rights violations. Diaspora activists were also on the ground at crucial moments during the conferences, visiting member state delegations and, where possible, holding various public demonstrations to attract attention.

The memorandum drafted by diaspora organizations in the context of the Belgrade Conference was composed of several parts, each of which referred to one of the "baskets" of the Helsinki Final Act, which could be circulated together or separately. The memorandum and other informational materials were distributed not only to the delegations of the Conference member states, but also to the foreign ministries. In 1977, for example, a report on the conditions in occupied Latvia and a memorandum on the Belgrade Conference were prepared and submitted to the British Foreign Office by members of the British Latvian National Council in cooperation with other nationalities within the European Liaison Group.[41] In addition, various submissions and requests to the Belgrade Conference were made not only by Baltic organizations, but also in cooperation with diaspora organizations of other Eastern and Central European nations. For example, in June 1977, a joint appeal to the societies and governments of the free world and to international organizations in Stockholm to demand that the Soviet Union respect human rights in the Baltic states was signed by Latvian, Lithuanian, Estonian, Polish, and Hungarian organizations in Sweden, as well as by the head of the Assembly of Captive European Nations delegation in Sweden and the chairman of the Baltic Committee.[42]

The diaspora action in Belgrade was the first time that activists tried to carry out political activities directly in a non-democratic, Eastern bloc country. Shortly before the opening of the Conference, a WFFL delegation arrived in Belgrade: Oļģerts Pavlovskis, head of the American Latvian Association External Information Office, and Mudīte Krasta, board member of the Swedish Latvian Central Council. On October 5, the two Latvians visited the Swedish CSCE delegation and handed over a compilation of material on human rights violations in the Baltic states. After this visit, they were arrested, all the informational material they had brought was confiscated, and both were expelled from the territory of Yugoslavia. The arrest and expulsion attracted considerable media attention, and also caused a diplomatic scandal, with the U.S. delegation protesting against the expulsion of a U.S. citizen.[43] To a large extent, this scandal ensured that at later conferences, and later delegations of representatives of Baltic organizations in Belgrade, could visit the delegations of member states unhindered. It was recognized that organizations had the right to visit delegations

41 Report by J. Andrup, Head of the Information Branch of the LNPL, on the work of the Branch in 1977. *British Latvian Documentation Centre "Straumēni"*, LNPL collection, folder "5-1 LNPL external information".

42 Appeal for Human rights in the Baltic States. June 1977. *LNA LVVA*, 293 f., 1 Apr., p. 1218, 41–2.

43 Oļģerts Pavlovskis, *Pasaules Brīvo latviešu apvienības darbība Eiropas Drošības un sadarbības organizācijas ietvaros. Pasaules Brīvo latviešu apvienības ieguldījums Latvijas neatkarības atgūšanā un tās stiprināšanā. PBLA 60. gadskārtas konferences referātu krājums* (Rīga: LU Akadēmiskais apgāds, 2017), 74–5.

and to lobby on the issues and topics raised in the Helsinki Final Act or on the agenda of the Review Conferences, including human rights. Accordingly, further Baltic delegations in Belgrade could act without hindrance.[44]

The human rights issue had come to light with the Helsinki Final Act and the subsequent Review Conferences, and since the situation in the Baltic states was bad enough, the human rights issue was a good argument to use in the political struggle of the diaspora. Despite the fact that the primary concern of the diaspora was the recognition of the borders (i.e. the legal confirmation of the Baltic states' belonging to the Soviet Union), the members of the diaspora delegations themselves recognized already on the spot at the Helsinki Conference that it was the human rights and humanitarian issues in general that were most suited to the atmosphere and attention of the Conference.[45] Diaspora organizations did not hesitate to capitalize on this insight, both in Helsinki and at later meetings.

Latvian Diaspora Activities at the Ottawa Expert Meeting

In addition to the general Review Conferences, the Helsinki process also included meetings devoted to specific issues, including human rights. The most important meeting on human rights was held in Canada: the Ottawa Meeting on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, from May 7 to June 17, 1985. This meeting was characterized by completely opposing views on the subject of the Western and Eastern bloc countries. The Western countries expressed their concern about human rights violations in certain Eastern European countries, including the suppression of religious freedom, the abuse of psychiatric institutions for political purposes, and the violation of minority rights, including the violation of the right of individuals to freedom of movement, etc. The Eastern bloc countries, on the other hand, were reluctant to address such issues and put Western problems, such as mass unemployment, on the agenda. The meeting of experts ended without any results. The opinions of the member states, even on the issues to be discussed at the meeting in general, were so different that no joint outcome document could be drawn up.[46]

The international urgency of the human rights issue created a new set of arguments with which the exiles tried to convince the West that the Baltic states needed to exercise

44 Celle O. Trimdas latviešu devums Latvijas neatkarības atjaunošanā. Blūzma V., Celle O. u.c. *Latvijas valsts atjaunošana 1986–1993* (Rīga: Latvijas Zinātņu akadēmijas Baltijas stratēģisko pētījumu centrs, 1998), 422.

45 "15 minūšu protests pie 10. Zālesdurvīm," *Laiks*, December 15, 1973, 1.

46 Bloed, *The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe*, 89.

their right to self-determination. Improving that the Soviet authorities mismanaged the Baltic states and failed to respect human rights, the exiles stressed that the situation could be changed by allowing Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians to freely choose their own democratic form of government.

During this period, organizations specifically addressing the issue of respect for human rights in the Baltic states were founded and operated. One such organization was the Canadian Committee for Human Rights in Latvia, chaired by Pēteris Vasariņš and vice-chaired by Elma Miniate. P. Vasariņš was also the head of the external information branch of the Canadian diaspora organizations *Daugavas Vanagi* Board,[47] and the Canadian *Daugavas Vanagi* External Information Working Group, which operated under this name in principle.[48] The purpose of the Committee was to inform the Canadian public, press, and politicians about violations of human, religious, and national rights in Soviet-occupied Latvia.[49] To achieve this goal, the organization wrote letters to politicians, and published press releases and information leaflets.[50]

The Canadian Committee on Human Rights in Latvia was active in the context of the Ottawa Expert Meeting on Human Rights in the CSCE countries. Prior to the start of the meeting, the Committee published a report on the human rights situation in occupied Latvia, entitled "Report on continued violation of the Helsinki Final Act in Soviet occupied Latvia since the convention of the Madrid Review Conference in 1980." The report illustrated Soviet efforts to russify Latvia, as well as to deny freedom of communication and suppress religion. All interested persons could obtain the leaflets from the publishers.[51] They were also sent to the Canadian CSCE delegation, and all Canadian MPs and senators.[52] Derek Fraser, Head of the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe Division of the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, in his reply to Pēteris Vasariņš, pointed out that Canada had always reprimanded the Soviet Union for human rights violations on its territory and would continue to do so at the Ottawa Conference. He thanked the Committee for sending the leaflet, and assured that it would be presented to the Canadian delegation at the Ottawa meeting.[53] For his part, the head of the delegation, Harry Jay, thanked P. Vasariņš for his participation in the consultation event organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as for the many written materials he had sent,

47 "Aicinājums atbalstīt darbu brīvībai," *Laiks*, June 6, 1985, 1.

48 "Demonstrācija par cilvēkatiesībām Toronto," *Turpat*, December 12, 1984, 5.

49 Similar groups emerged in other diasporas as well, for example, the Polish Committee in Support of Solidarity, created in New York in 1981, and others.

50 P. Vasarins letter to N. Graber, 15.01.1985. *LNA LVA*, 2451. f., 1.v apr., p. 4, p. 26.

51 Canadian Committee for Human Rights in Latvia News report, April 30, 1985. *LNA LVA*, 2451. f., 1.v apr., 4. l., p. 45–6.

52 Cover letter of P. Vasarins to Senators, 30.04.1985. Ibid., 47.

53 Letter from D. Fraser to P. Vasarins, 29.05.1985. Ibid., 49–50.

the information contained in which had enabled the delegation to better prepare for the meeting of experts.[54]

These and several other letters sent by Foreign Ministry officials and members of the delegation went well beyond formal letters of thanks and explained in sufficient detail the attitude of the writers towards the human rights issue in the Baltic states and the Soviet Union. For example, after the Ottawa conference and in preparation for the next meeting of CSCE experts in Bern, which was devoted to human contacts, the Canadian CSCE coordinator wrote a four-page letter to P. Vasariņš outlining the position of the Canadian delegation. In the letter, he also asked for the views of the Canadian Committee on Human Rights in Latvia on the situation in this area, and for information on the restrictions it was aware of that Canadian citizens had to face when dealing with the Soviet bloc countries in the course of family reunification, or when making private, religious, or professional contacts with people in the Eastern bloc countries.[55] Unlike the brief and formal letters of thanks often written over the decades by the offices of various state institutions or officials, these letters, by their content, confirm that the materials sent to the recipients were indeed useful or at least interesting in some way, and that the work of the Committee headed by P. Vasariņš was noticed and positively appreciated by both the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the members and administration of the Canadian CSCE delegation.

On June 17, 1985, the Canadian Committee for Human Rights in Latvia, in cooperation with Lithuanians and Estonians, also organized a protest demonstration in Ottawa's Confederation Square at the end of the Ottawa experts' meeting to "remind the world that this June marks 45 years since Soviet soldiers destroyed the independence of the Baltic states" and to ask "when the right to self-determination proclaimed in the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act will be extended to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania."[56] Buses were organized to transport the demonstrators from Toronto (where most Latvians were residing) to Ottawa.[57] Around 100 Latvians took part in the demonstration, leaflets were distributed, and interviews were given to the press and television. A report on the demonstration and an interview with P. Vasariņš were shown on the Ottawa CTV station.[58] The human rights issue in the context of the Ottawa expert meeting, which concluded with a demonstration on the final day, was a successful argument to attract public attention.

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54 Letter from H. Jay to P. Vasarins, 27.03.1985. Ibid., 94.

55 Letter from V. Bauer to P. Vasarins, 15.01.1986. Ibid., 100–3.

56 Canadian Committee for Human Rights in Latvia News release, June 13, 1985. *LNA LVA*, 2451. f., 1.v apr., 4. l., p. 58–9.

57 "Aicinājums 17. Jūnijā braukt uz demonstrāciju Otavā," *Laiks*, June 12, 1985, 1.

58 "Izcils informācijas darbs," *Turpat*, July 3, 1985, 1.

The Canadian Committee for Human Rights in Latvia is just one example of the work of one organization, which illustrates the importance of the issue of human rights in the political arguments of the diaspora at that time. Of course, in the context of the Ottawa expert meeting, various political actions were also carried out by other diaspora organizations, including the WFFL: the Information Office was active, a total of five demonstrations were held during the short duration of the meeting, as were press conferences and meetings with delegations from various countries.[59]

The Human Rights Factor in Diaspora Public Political Actions

Human rights and human rights violations in the Baltic states also appeared in the themes of public political actions organized by the diaspora, i.e. actions aimed at attracting as much public attention as possible, such as marches, demonstrations, theatrical street performances, etc. In the diaspora, it was very common to mark various festivals and commemorations with political events or documents such as petitions or resolutions.

A typical example in the context of human rights is the celebration of Human Rights Day on December 10. Human Rights Day was established on this date in 1950, by a resolution of the UN General Assembly commemorating the adoption on this date of the most important human rights instrument, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in 1948. However, despite the existence of this day since 1950, there are only a few references to it or calls for its observance among the Latvian diaspora in the 1950s and 1960s, most of which occured in the second half of the 1960s. For example, in 1967, there were only very brief announcements in the Latvian diaspora press that the Assembly of Captive European Nations would organize the day with a public demonstration and the adoption of a resolution protesting against the denial of human rights and fundamental freedoms to the people of Central and Eastern Europe.[60] The Latvian diaspora delegation was, of course, present at the Assembly and took part in the following events. However, it was not really the Latvian diaspora organizations that were involved in any special events to mark the day, just as the issue itself or day of human rights does not appear in the diaspora's internal debates on the tasks and directions of its political action in the 1960s.

The situation regarding Human Rights Day was different in the second half of the 1970s. On this day in 1976, diaspora youth staged a demonstration in Stockholm against forced labor in the Soviet Union, calling for the cancellation of the 1980 Olympics in

59 "Mēs prasām savas tiesības," *Turpat*, May 15, 1985, 1.

60 "ACEN atzīmēs cilvēka tiesību dienu," *Laiks*, December 2, 1967.

Moscow if the Soviet Union did not release political prisoners by then.[61] In 1977, the *Daugavas Vanagi* organization in Canada used the symbolic significance of the day to present a commemorative tribute (made by a Latvian woodworker) to former Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker in gratitude for his support for the right of self-determination of the Baltic states. The presentation was also covered by the local press.[62] In 1975, Latvians in Canada took part in a large demonstration in Toronto that was organized by various ethnic groups, the largest being Ukrainians and Poles.[63] Press conferences were also held.[64] In 1978, around 100–150 Latvians took part in the International Human Rights Day demonstration in Bonn, Germany, where more than 10,000 people gathered.[65] Similar events such as demonstrations and resolutions, to name a few, happened in other years, too.

Diaspora organizations also held events in other seasons to highlight human rights issues. For example, on September 24, 1977, Baltic diaspora youth organizations, on the initiative of the Lithuanian Youth World Council, organized the Baltic Human Rights Rally at the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C. The aim was to draw the attention of the world press to the human rights defenders and fighters of the Baltic states – not only in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, but outside them, as well: in Soviet prisons, in exile, etc. – and to demand the restoration of the right to self-determination for the Baltic states. This event had an unusually large budget for diaspora activities, amounting to USD 15,000.[66] Around 4,000 Balts participated in the event. It was preceded by a press conference. The rally itself was addressed by State Department spokesman Mark Sneyder, several U.S. Senators and Congressmen, several Russian dissidents, and various written congratulations were also read out. A proclamation addressed to President Carter was also adopted during the demonstration. The official part of the speeches was followed by a cultural program with performances by a Lithuanian traditional dance ensemble and a concert.[67]

This event is in line with another specific thematic strand of political activity in the diaspora that flourishes in the period under review: the support for the so-called prisoners of conscience and dissidents in the Soviet Union, i.e. people who were imprisoned for initiatives focused on the preservation of national culture, fair dealings in the court system, or freedom of religion or expression (for examples, see the cases of Jānis Rožkalns

61 "Starptautiskajā cilvēka tiesību dienā...," *Laiks*, January 1, 1977.
62 "Pateicības velte par drosmīgu vārdu," *Laiks*, December 28, 1977.
63 "Nākotnes fondā 23000 dol.," *Laiks*, November 1, 1975.
64 "Parlamentāriešiem jādod konkrēti fakti," *Laiks*, December 17, 1975.
65 *Nyet Nyet Soviet*, 103.
66 "Baltiešu cilvēka tiesību un pašnoteikšanās sanākme," *Laiks*, June 8, 1977.
67 "Demonstrācija," *AKKA Raksts*, December 1, 1977.

and others below). The support given to certain Soviet dissident scientists, or the question of the right of Jews to emigrate from the Soviet Union, if desired – these were human rights violations that in the late 1960s and early 1970s had acquired a permanent place in the political lobbying scene of the U.S. Congress.[68] But the interest of the Latvian diaspora was specific. While there was also general support for Soviet dissidents, diaspora events focused more on expressing support for political prisoners of Latvian origin, emphasizing the need to provide the Baltic states with the rights these people had demanded – freedom of expression and political self-determination.

The year 1985, which marked the 10th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, was particularly notable for a number of diaspora political actions in support of political prisoners. In Sweden, three Latvian youths staged a protest on August 1 by chaining themselves to the fence of the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm. The young people symbolically embodied three Latvian political prisoners – Jānis Rožkalns[69], Ints Cālītis,[70] and Gunārs Astra[71] – by writing their names on their clothes. On white T-shirts, they wrote the name of the political prisoner and the sentence, for example "Jānis Rožkalns – 5 years hard labour." The press was informed, informational handouts were prepared, and

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68 See: Snyder, *From Selma to Moscow*.

69 J. Rožkalns was active in the underground Latvian Independence Movement, reproduced and distributed leaflets with anti-Soviet content, secretly flew the then banned red-white-red flags of the independent Republic of Latvia in public places, and was one of the publishers of the *Latvian Independence Movement Bulletin*. In 1983, he was arrested and sentenced to five years' imprisonment in the Perm regional correctional labor camp. He was released in 1987, and upon his return to Latvia became involved in the work of the Riga branch of the human rights group Helsinki 86.

70 I. Cālītis headed a youth underground organization at Riga City High School No.1 in 1947. In 1948, he was arrested for distributing proclamations and sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment in the GULAG penal camp. After Stalin's death in 1956, he was allowed to return to Riga. In 1958, he was arrested for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda and sentenced to 6 years imprisonment in the Mordovia labor camps, returning to Riga in 1964. In 1979, as one of 45 Baltic citizens, he signed a protest document, also known as the "Baltic Memorandum" or "Baltic Charter." In 1983, he was arrested for the third time and sentenced to 6 years' imprisonment, from which he was released in 1986.

71 G. Astra is the best known of the Latvian dissidents. In February 1961, he was arrested and accused of anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, and later of treason and espionage, because in 1958, he had met two U.S. embassy employees and corresponded with Gaida Prieditis, a Latvian living in the United States. He was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment (with confiscation of property) in the labor camps of the Mordovia and Perm regions. He returned to Latvia in 1968, where he continued to maintain contacts with like-minded people who were trying to maintain Latvian national self-confidence or were in some way working against the Soviet Union occupation regime. He was arrested in 1983, and tried for possession, reproduction, and distribution of "anti-Soviet" literature (including George Orwell's *1984* and others). The court found Astra to be a particularly dangerous recidivist and sentenced him to seven years' imprisonment in a special regime colony and five years in a labor camp. As a result of an international campaign, he was amnestied in 1988, and released from detention on February 1. He died in Leningrad in March of the same year after a sudden illness under suspicious circumstances.

other diaspora activists took photographs of the event. The protest was featured in several major daily newspapers in Sweden.[72] In 1985, Latvian youth also carried out similar protests in the United States in Washington, as well as in Brussels, London, Paris, and Italy, chaining themselves to the gates or fences of Soviet embassies to draw attention to Latvian political prisoners and the denial of freedom of expression.[73]

A visually impressive street theatre in support of political prisoners was performed by members of the American Latvian Youth Association in Washington on November 29, 1985. A gallows was erected in the park, where three Latvian youths were symbolically hanged, each representing a particular Latvian political prisoner. The hanging scene was very well prepared technically. Mountain climbing equipment was fastened around the young people's shoulders, and they were actually hanging in special harnesses that were successfully concealed under their clothes – it appeared as though they were really hanging by ropes around their necks. The hanging scene was therefore very realistic and attracted a lot of attention. Alongside the action, leaflets on human rights violations in the Baltic states and the fate of political prisoners were distributed.[74]

Typically, many if not most of the various human rights-related events were organized and implemented by diaspora youth or youth organizations. "Adult" or traditional diaspora central organizations were often involved in the events but were not the main organizers. In the various audiovisual materials that have been produced in recent years on the history of the Latvian diaspora, one of the most prominent themes remembered by former activists in the diaspora, at that time young people, is precisely the activities in support of dissidents.[75]

Conclusions

The emergence of the issue of human rights violations in the Soviet Union into the political argumentation of the Latvian diaspora can be linked to a number of broader developments in international politics and opinions, as well as to the development of the internal dynamics of the community itself. The emergence of this new argument coincides with a marked shift in attitudes towards human rights violations in the world and in the United States. Although the change in attitudes towards human rights during this period was a broad phenomenon and spanned many countries, what was particularly

72 *Nyet Nyet Soviet*, 171–3.
73 Ibid., 181.
74 Ibid., 183–5.
75 For example, the documentary "Valiant. A Journey to a Free Latvia."

important in terms of the political views and actions of the Latvian diaspora was the fact that in U.S. policy, respect for human rights in other countries began to be linked to the U.S. foreign policy of the time and became a criterion for guiding attitudes towards one country or another.

The issue of human rights violations entered into the negotiations between the two opposing camps of the Cold War, i.e. the United States and the Soviet Union, with the Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe, and is prominently reflected in the final document of that Conference, signed in 1975. It is safe to conclude that it was these external influences that primarily caused the Latvian diaspora to address this issue and raise it in their political demands and arguments.

Raising awareness of human rights violations in the Soviet Union and offering evidence of such violations to Western countries entered the diaspora's argumentation with the Helsinki process. It very quickly became a significant and important part of the range of issues addressed by the diaspora. The role of information broker, passing on information (often obtained illegally from the point of view of Soviet authorities) from the Baltic states to the home governments and CSCE delegations for use in negotiations with the Soviet Union, became a stable and integral part of the political work of the diaspora. At the same time, the arguments of human rights violations were also widely used in the public political actions of the diaspora, as evidenced by various events, including the celebration of Human Rights Day, events in support of dissidents and prisoners of conscience, etc. However, the issue of human rights violations in the political argumentation of the Latvian and Baltic diasporas as a whole has always been inextricably linked to the main political goal of these diasporas: the demand for the restoration of the right to political self-determination for the Baltic states. Without self-determination, human rights cannot be realized – this is how the basic principle of the diaspora's position could be summarized.

Overall, the diaspora's rapid focus on documenting human rights violations and incorporating these issues into its rhetoric demonstrates its ability to react quickly to current trends in society, and to use issues that are relevant to society at the time to shape its communication and advance its political cause. It demonstrates the ability of Latvian diaspora organizations, especially youth organizations, to respond flexibly to events and to take advantage of opportunities presented by external developments to effectively address host governments on issues of interest to them.

At the present stage of research, it seems reasonable to assume that this flexibility is related to the entry of a new, already diaspora-educated generation into the political leadership of the Latvian diaspora in the early 1970s, as well as to a certain accumulation of experience in political work in diaspora organizations. However, further detailed research would be needed to understand more clearly not only the role of external factors,

but also the role of internal factors –in particular, generational change – in the clearly visible changes in the Latvian diaspora political activity from the 1970s onwards.

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Baltic Refugees of World War II and Their Descendants: Resettlement and Adaptation in Four Lands

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Abstract: At the end of World War II, an unprecedented burst of politically motivated emigration occurred from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, to escape incorporation into the Soviet Union. This report describes processes of resettlement and adaptation in four lands: Sweden, Canada, Australia, and the United States of America. The analysis examines how refugees' and descendants' experiences were shaped by selectivity of evacuation, camps for displaced persons, clustering patterns, and host country policies. The traumas, disruptions, and deprivations experienced during several years of war, foreign occupation, and rootlessness in refugee camps did not prove to create enduring disadvantages, as the second generation more than made up for the ground lost (at least for several years) by their parents. The yearslong journey of the refugees in finding new homes and new careers turned out to be most conducive to the creation of a global network of cohesive, viable, and interdependent ethnic communities. The Baltic refugees prefer to think of themselves as maintaining the traditions of their homelands, but they learned to do some important things differently on the way to new lands, through a process of social levelling and cooperation within their own local ethnic group, as well as through interacting with other local communities of their own kind, with other Baltic groups, and with their new neighbors in the host countries. Later generations will not continue to do everything like their elders did, but substantial numbers of descendants still show a rather high degree of commitment to maintaining their cultural and even linguistic heritage in some form.

Keywords: Baltic refugees, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania

Introduction

For thousands of years, the population in each of the Baltic countries consisted mostly of the same core group, despite influxes of immigrants from nearby countries and departures of natives. Changes in ethnic composition accelerated after the incorporation into nearby empires in recent centuries. The outflow of natives, mostly to Russia and the New World, was long motivated primarily by economic factors, as emigres sought land or jobs.

In late 1944, unprecedented numbers rushed to leave Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The motive was political: fear of a regime change. This report examines the basis for this exodus, the process of relocation, and adaptations in four of the main destination lands – Sweden, Canada, Australia, and the United States of America (USA). Each of these countries drew thousands of refugees from at least two of the Baltic groups. Britain and Germany were also quite important as new homelands for Latvian refugees, with counts of 14,000 and 12,000 respectively by 1951's end, but Britain's count dropped to 10,000 by the end of the 1950s, reflecting resettlement in the other main English-speaking countries.[1]

Sources of Information

The analysis uses census reports and other publications about Baltic refugees. The author also draws on his personal experiences in the Estonian communities of Gothenburg (Sweden) and Indianapolis (USA), as well as observations made during frequent visits to Baltic communities elsewhere. Some material comes from the memoirs of Erich Haas (my great-uncle) and from my interviews with return migrants in the post-Soviet era.

The latter group comprises 109 Estonians, 41 Latvians, and 19 Lithuanians contacted between 1996 and 2014. It was not a random sample, as there was no comprehensive list of return migrants available, but it includes almost all such persons whom I learned about and could contact. Three generations are included: those born in the old homelands, their children born outside these lands, and grandchildren at least 18 years of age. Inclusion required residence in a post-Soviet Baltic country for at least six months. Some opted not to establish permanent residence there, and returned abroad. The semi-structured interviews were conducted primarily in face-to-face meetings with tape-recording, a few by telephone with note-taking, and a few by e-mail correspondence. Excerpts of responses given in the Estonian or Swedish languages are presented here in English.

Another basis for characterizing refugees and descendants is my own study of the small Estonian community of Indianapolis, in the north-central region of the USA (1992). It included all Estonian Society members in the metropolitan area who had Estonian ancestry and joined between its founding in 1952 and May 1, 1991, plus descendants and spouses of Estonian ancestry. Data on 138 persons came from membership

1 Andrejs Plakans, *The Reluctant Exiles: Latvians in the West after World War II* (Leiden: Brill/Ferdinand Schöningh, 2021), 141, 162.

applications and interviews with two dozen informants who had lived in the city for at least three decades.

Reasons for Leaving

The Baltic lands endured a year of Soviet occupation from June 1940. Many of those deemed as hostile or unreliable elements endured brutal treatment, especially during the Soviet retreat from Nazi German forces. Similar violence had occurred in 1918–20, when the Baltic republics were established and communists fought for regimes modelled after and allied with Soviet Russia. As Soviet forces returned in September 1944, people who had not aligned with them but had acquired fighting skills, occupied prominent positions, owned businesses, or displayed leadership abilities had good reasons to fear deportation, repression, or execution. This included military and police officers, government officials, teachers, lawyers, doctors, and clergy. Those in creative professions – artists, writers, actors – could again expect interference and censorship under Soviet rule, if their work was judged inimical to the communist movement to overthrow the capitalist order and abolish private enterprise, ostensibly to benefit the lower classes.[2] The great selectivity of the refugee stream is aptly illustrated in detailed reports for Latvia. Putniņš notes departures from the homeland for 58% of medical professionals and dentists, 70% of pharmacists, and 42% of engineers.[3] For active ministers of Lutheran congregations, Plakans reports a number of departures which amounts to 60%. If departures had been proportional to the refugees' share of Latvia's population, only 10% would have fled, in any given occupational category. For Lithuania, Dapkutė reports the departure of 50% of the academic staff at Vytautas Magnus University in Kaunas, about 70% of the Writers' Union's members, 25% of priests, and almost 100% of ballet and opera artists in Kaunas.[4] A departure proportional to refugees' share of Lithuania's population would have been just 2% from each category.

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2 Milda Danys, *Lithuanian Immigration to Canada after the Second World War* (Toronto: Multicultural History Society of Ontario, 1986), 9; Toivo U. Raun, *Estonia and the Estonians* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution, 1991), 150–1, 153–6; Plakans, *The Reluctant Exiles*, 13, 32–3.

3 Aldis L. Putniņš, *Latvians in Australia: Alienation and Assimilation* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1981), 16, citing E. Dunsdorfs' 1968 book, *Trešā Latvija*.

4 Daiva Dapkutė, "Lithuanian Diaspora: From Displaced Persons to Diaspora Politics," in *Population Displacement in Lithuania in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Thomas Balkelis and Violeta Davoliūtė (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2016), 243.

Even farmers had reasons to fear Soviet rule, on the basis of newspaper coverage of collectivization of farms in the Soviet Union in the 1930s. Farmers could draw inferences from their own experiences under the first Soviet occupation of 1940–41, when some collective farms were set up in Baltic lands. Although participation was voluntary then, it was clear from burdensome taxation, production delivery requirements, low fixed prices, and discriminatory treatment of private farmers, especially prosperous ones, that Soviet policy meant to promote collectivization.[5] Yet farmers were loath to leave the land only recently granted to veterans who had fought for national independence, or acquired in the previous generation or two. Farmers also hesitated to abandon buildings they had made, animals dependent on them, and crops almost ready for harvest.[6] In the study of Estonians in Indianapolis, only 1 of 69 (1%) individuals whose occupational situations were known was involved in farming at the time of departure,[7] despite Estonia's predominantly rural population (67% in 1939).[8] In 1947, a registry of 111,495 Latvians in DP camps, compiled by the exiles' Latvian Central Committee, listed an occupational category of "agriculture-related occupations" for 20.2% of the individuals, only slightly less than the 20.5% for the largest category, of white-collar (non-manual) professions and occupations. If students are excluded, then the two largest categories each account for about 26% of Latvia's labor force. This still means a substantial underrepresentation of farmers, in light of census data on urbanization, at 34.6% in 1935.[9] With about two-thirds living in rural areas, where the overwhelming majority of people were involved in farming, proportional representation would require much more than a quarter of the refugee stream to be comprised of agriculturalists.

Refugees' departure on the eve of Soviet reoccupation in September 1944 was typically contemplated beforehand, but final arrangements were often made hastily, after the rapid collapse of the front. Those who fled did not necessarily think they were abandoning their homeland forever.[10] Erich Haas wrote (1960–68): "At that time, the thought was that it might not be necessary to go far, we will soon turn back again, when the opportunity comes for that and the situation at the front improves."[11]

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5 Raun, *Estonia and the Estonians*, 152–3; Andrejs Plakans, *The Latvians* (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1995), 145–6.

6 Erich Haas, *Mälestusi võõrsilt*, Indianapolis, 1960–68 (Unpublished memoirs in 6 handwritten volumes. A copy is archived at the Estonian Literary Museum in Tartu.); Plakans, *The Reluctant Exiles*, 3.

7 Ain Haas, "The Estonian Community of Indianapolis," in *Proceedings of the Eighth Meeting of the Finno-Ugric Studies Association of Canada*, ed. Joel Ashmore Nevis and Juta Kõvamees Kitching (Vancouver: FUSAC, 1992), 9.

8 Raun, *Estonia and the Estonians*, 131.

9 Plakans, *The Latvians*, 108.

10 Dapkutė, "Lithuanian Diaspora," 242; Plakans, *The Reluctant Exiles*, 43.

11 Haas, *Mälestusi võõrsilt*.

Escape Routes

Escape depended on relatively accurate information about troop movements, as well as access to transportation by ships, trains, and convoys of motor vehicles. Urbanites had advantages in these respects, thus their overrepresentation amid the refugees. Among Indianapolis Estonians, for example, refugees from the three largest cities of Tallinn, Tartu, and Pärnu were especially common. Only 23% of the sample came from rural areas, although 42% had been born in them. The population of Estonia was still overwhelmingly rural (67%) in the 1939 census.

The main escape route went south to Germany. Those not belonging to minorities slated for extermination in Nazi ideology (such as Jews and Roma) generally found the German occupation more bearable than Soviet rule, so evacuating alongside German troops was not so daunting. The widespread knowledge of the German language in the Baltic lands was helpful in arranging transport, lodging, medical care, etc. in Germany, as well as in new lands with sizable German immigrant communities. Some lower estimates of the number of Baltic wartime refugees arriving in Germany range from 160,000 to 190,000.[12] Up to 40,000 more used the secondary escape route through Sweden, discussed below.

In his review of relevant literature, Kasekamp reports a total of 280,000 Baltic wartime refugees.[13] The latter figure comprised 140,000 Latvians, 75,000 Estonians, and 65,000 Lithuanians. The last of these figures is only slightly higher than other estimates.[14] It represents about 2% of the prewar population of 2,900,000 in 1939 (excluding Klaipeda region). Raun suggests that the Estonian figure may actually have been up to 100,000, which would have been about 9% of the prewar population of 1,134,000 in 1939.[15]A recent count of Latvian refugees puts their total at 171,000 civilians in Germany; 25,000 ex-soldiers who became prisoners of war in western Allied zones in various Central European lands; and 5,000 asylum seekers in Sweden. These counts add up to 201,000, which would have been about 10% of the prewar population of 2,000,000 in 1939.[16] Adding Raun's count for Estonians, Plakans' for Latvians, and Kasekamp's for Lithuanians yields a grand total of as many as 366,000 Baltic refugees, or 6% of the three countries' total prewar population.

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12 Inta Gale Carpenter, "Baltic Peoples," in *Peopling Indiana: The Ethnic Experience*, ed. Robert M. Taylor Jr. and Connie A. McBirney (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1996), 60.

13 Andres Kasekamp, *A History of the Baltic States* (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 139.

14 E.g. Dapkutė, "Lithuanian Diaspora," 241, citing *Lietuvių enciklopedija* 1955, 5: 148.

15 Raun, *Estonia and the Estonians*, 166, 181.

16 Plakans, *The Reluctant Exiles*, 45, 56, 152.

In Germany, most refugees crowded into camps with barracks set up for prisoners of war. They were often put to work, for example, to repair bombing damage that Germany endured until the end of the war in May 1945. Refugees usually spent two to four more years in camps during the Allied occupation of Germany. Opportunities to enter Canada and Australia arose in 1947, and in late 1948 admission to the USA began.[17]

There was an alternative water route westward to Sweden, typically in open fishing boats. Many on the western coast and islands of Estonia chose this option. Some Latvians also did so, after Soviet planes began bombing large ships en route to Germany. In Sweden there were also camps for refugees, but these were occupied only for a few weeks or months, due to rapid dispersal to cities.

Destinations

The exodus to Sweden actually began in 1940, after the establishment of Soviet bases on several Estonian islands. Evacuation of some 8,000 people of the Swedish-speaking minority from insular and coastal areas continued under German occupation. Displaced fishers and farmers were initially sent to fishing harbors and farms, where they found it demeaning to work under others for little reward. Most resettled in the Stockholm area. This was facilitated by the expedited granting of Swedish citizenship, with the right to relocate freely.[18]

Swedish-Estonians' ancestors had come to Estonia, starting in the early 13th century. Descendants spoke their own dialects of Swedish, but adapted well to standard Swedish, particularly when their children went to regular schools and household conversation drifted toward this form of the language. Standard Swedish was already familiar to them before evacuation, through their own newspapers, as well as religious literature and other materials from Sweden. Publication of their newspaper was eventually transferred to Sweden. Much new research on this minority's history, traditions, and dialects has been published, annual reunions feature performers of their folk music and dancing, and they have a library and museum in Stockholm (now at the Estonian House). Swedish-Estonian refugees assimilated easily, but retained a distinctive identity, even in subsequent generations.

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17 Carpenter, "Baltic Peoples," 60.

18 Elmar Nyman, "En minoritet i minoriteten: estlandssvenskarna i Sverige," in *De första båtflyktingarna: En antologi om balterna i Sverige*, ed. Lars-Gunnar Eriksson (Stockholm: Statens Invandrarverk, 1985), 90, 97–106.

The wave of refugees arriving in Sweden in late 1944 was much larger. By December 1, there were 31,500 from Estonia, including Swedish-Estonians.[19] The numbers of Latvians and Lithuanians were unspecified. By April 1, 1945, 22,092 refugees had been counted as born in Estonia, 2,863 from Latvia, and 287 from Lithuania.[20] The Estonian figure of 22,092 evidently excluded up to 5,000 children under age 16. Adding the proportionate numbers of such minors to the Latvian and Lithuanian figures yields a total of 30,955. It is unclear whether Swedish-speaking refugees from Estonia were included. Erlander reportedly did include them in December 1944.[21] Yet they may have been excluded in April 1945,as they had received Swedish citizenship by then. Adding Nyman's figure of 8,000 Swedish-Estonians brings the total to nearly 40,000.

After many moved on to other lands and others arrived from Germany, the 1950 census revealed these counts of foreign-born residents, including small numbers of prewar immigrants: 25,062 from Estonia, 4,423 from Latvia, and none listed for Lithuania. The figures for 1960 showed 20,384 from Estonia, 3,625 from Latvia, 330 from Lithuania. In 1980, the figures dropped to 15,331 from Estonia, 2,664 from Latvia, and 255 from Lithuania.[22] The declining figures reflect mortality of elderly refugees, and do not include descendants born in Sweden.

Such counts are somewhat misleading, as birthplace does not necessarily correspond to ethnicity. Some born in the Baltic lands belong to ethnic minorities rather than native majorities. Some born in Russia in the tsarist era migrated to their Baltic ancestors' homelands and might identify as being of a Baltic nationality.

There were many reasons for Baltic refugees to feel comfortable in Sweden. The climate, diet, and material culture there were familiar. There were no marked physical differences in appearance that made it hard to blend in with Swedes. Both Estonia and North Latvia had undergone relatively benign Swedish rule before annexation by the Russian Empire in the early 18th century. "The good old Swedish time," as it was called by both Estonians and Latvians, left a legacy that included the predominance of the LutheranChurch and the establishment of village schools. In an earlier era, there had been Baltic involvement in the Vikings' extensive trade network and a shared material culture, including similar ships, weaponry, and decorative styles that still inspired Estonian and Latvian craftsmen and illustrators of works about their ancestral heritage.

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19 Bernard Kangro, *Eesti Rootsis* (Lund: Eesti Kirjanike Kooperatiiv, 1976), 43, citing eventual prime minister Tage Erlander.

20 Ibid., 42, citing Statistical Yearbook for Sweden, 1946.

21 Ibid., 43.

22 Sven Alur Reinans, "Balterna i Sverige– några demografiska aspekter," in *De första båtflyktingarna: En antologi om balterna i Sverige*, ed. Lars-Gunnar Eriksson (Stockholm?: Statens Invandrarverk, 1985), 68.

A few months after arrival in Sweden, Estonians and Latvians began to gravitate toward smaller cities with factory jobs. By the 1980s, concentration in large cities was evident, especially by younger refugees with some schooling in Sweden. Exact figures on place of residence were found only for the Estonia-born, of whom 60% lived in large cities by the 1980s, 44% in the Stockholm area alone.[23]

Baltic refugees were too few to form residential enclaves, which limited opportunities to start businesses serving other refugees. As new housing became available in suburbs, usually in the form of apartments or rowhouses, distances between Estonians' or Latvians' homes grew, limiting intraethnic socializing. Similar trends developed in other countries, but houseowning was more common in North America and especially Australia. Studies in the latter case found home ownership rates of 70–84% (of households) already in the 1950s, compared with an estimated 50% as the typical rate elsewhere.[24] In Sweden, spacious yards for outdoor activities were uncommon. Instead, refugees could get plots in urban gardening colonies or cottages in scenic forest or island settings. Sweden's tradition of "allemansrätten" (every man's right [to roam]) gave them access to natural areas on private lands, for berry-picking, mushroom-hunting, hiking, even camping.

Despite a rather smooth adjustment, many refugees felt insecure in Sweden, given its proximity to the Soviet-controlled zone. Concern was exacerbated by the deportation of 7 Estonians, 147 Latvians, and 22 Lithuanians who sought asylum in German military uniforms. In January 1946, they were turned over to Soviet custody, despite strong protests and even suicide attempts, including a few successful ones. Sweden's Social Democratic government, with its base of support in labor unions where leftist ideology prevailed, had been quick to give *de facto* recognition to Soviet annexation of the Baltic lands. Refugees therefore wondered whether other concessions would be made to Soviet demands, at their expense.[25] Thus, interest in relocating to more distant lands grew.

The preferred destination was North America, where the reputed availability of land, jobs, and business opportunities had lured earlier streams of Estonians, Latvians, and especially Lithuanians before World War I. All three groups of Baltic wartime refugees could benefit from organizations, sponsorships, and support services set up by such earlier migrants, mainly in cities of the East Coast and the Great Lakes in Canada and the USA. Some of the earlier migrants were leftist exiles who had arrived after the aborted Revolution of 1905 in the Russian Empire. Others had endured harsh working conditions, union-busting, and economic depressions in their homelands and in the new lands.

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23 Ibid., 77.

24 Plakans, *The Reluctant Exiles*, 289, 392–3, citing Edgars Dunsdorfs' 1974 article in *Arhivs* 14.

25 Kangro, *Eesti Rootsis*, 44; Karl Aun, *The Political Refugees: A History of the Estonians in Canada* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1985), 25; Raimo Raag, *Eestlane väljaspool Eestit* (Tartu: Tartu University; 1999), 67; Plakans, *The Reluctant Exiles*, 81.

Pro-Soviet sentiments among such earlier migrants were a source of conflict with the new arrivals, whom the former sometimes labelled as fascists and Nazi sympathizers. So the new refugees typically set up their own newspapers, congregations, and community centers, even if informal socializing with the old migrants continued in some places. The new arrivals had better relations with religious folks among the earlier migrants, especially clergy.[26]

Canada began to admit war refugees in 1947, initially just young people without dependents or serious health problems. Toronto became the main place of settlement, with notable concentrations also in Montreal and Vancouver. Annual reports on ethnic origins of immigrants during 1922–1965[27] showed surges for all three Baltic groups from 1947 to the mid-1950s. For 1947–53, the three groups had roughly equal totals: 13,037 Estonians, 12,911 Latvians, 11,187 Lithuanians. In 1954–59, Latvians' figure was still relatively high at 1,854, compared to 1,069 Estonians and 989 Lithuanians, and then came a steep dropoff for all three groups. For similar spans of years before the postwar surge, the totals were quite low, except that Lithuanians had a rather large number in the earliest period for which data were available (4,941 in 1922–29, compared to 529 Estonians and 340 Latvians). There was a similar earlier wave of Lithuanian immigration to the USA in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

Figures for the USA are not as precise, as they are based on decennial censuses rather than annual tallies. The only prewar data listing all three Baltic groups are from the 1930 census: 3,550 persons born in Estonia, 20,673 in Latvia, 193,606 in Lithuania.[28] The 1960 census was the first conducted after the wave of political refugees. It counted 13,991 born in Estonia, 50,681 in Latvia, 121,475 in Lithuania, including prewar immigrants. Lithuanians' figures dropped more steeply in later censuses, due to earlier immigrants' mortality. By 1980, there were 12,169 born in Estonia, 34,349 in Latvia, 48,194 in Lithuania. In 1990, almost half a century after the mass exodus of 1944, the figures were 9,210 for Estonia, 26,179 for Latvia, 29,745 for Lithuania.[29] By then, almost all prewar immigrants had died, and little new immigration had occurred, due to travel restrictions in the Soviet-occupied homelands. Thus, the 1990 census is the most appropriate for assessing relative sizes of the three Baltic groups among the political refugees.

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26 Jaan Pennar, Tönu Parming, and P. Peter Rebane, *The Estonians in America: 1627–1975* (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana, 1975), 4, 8–16, 24–8, 32–3, 37; Danys, *Lithuanian Immigration to Canada*, 80–8, 225, 227–9, 301.

27 Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, *Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism IV* (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, 1970), 240–5.

28 Campbell Gibson and Kay Jung, *Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-Born Population of the United States: 1850 to 2000* (Washington DC: Population Division, Bureau of the Census, 2006), Table 4.

29 Ibid., Table 3.

The 1990 census reveals areas of concentration that include subsequent generations born outside the old homelands, via state tallies for languages spoken at home.[30] By this measure, Illinois (with the city of Chicago) stands out as the foremost center for Lithuanian settlement, accounting for 25% of all persons in the USA who spoke Lithuanian at home. Other centers were also in states where prewar Lithuanian immigrants had concentrated: New York and nearby New Jersey at 8% + 5%, Massachusetts (including Boston) at 10%, and Pennsylvania (including Philadelphia and Pittsburgh) at 10%. Estonian was most frequently spoken in New York and nearby New Jersey at 19% + 15%, with California coming in next at 12%. Latvian-speakers had notable concentrations in New York and New Jersey at 12% + 5%, California at 11%, Michigan at 10%, and Illinois at 8%. West Coast cities, especially in California, had been added to previous destinations in the East Coast and Great Lakes regions.

Australian census data give a very clear picture of the wave of wartime refugees. The 1947 census listed 1,102 persons born in Estonia, 447 in Latvia, 273 in Lithuania – about the same as in 1933. The 1954 census indicated that there were 5,523 more Estonia-born persons who entered Australia during the preceding seven years (between mid-1947 and mid-1954), 16,667 more from Latvia, 8,069 more from Lithuania – a total of 30,259. Highest concentrations were in the southeastern states of New South Wales (including Sydney) and Victoria (including Melbourne). Each drew about a third of the Baltic-born (35% and 31%, respectively). South Australia (including Adelaide) drew about half of the remainder (17%). The Estonia-born were much more concentrated in New South Wales at 49%, compared with 21% in Victoria and 14% in South Australia. The Latvia- and Lithuania-born were both slightly more likely to settle in Victoria: 33% and 35%, respectively. New South Wales drew 31% of both of these groups, and South Australia drew about half of the rest. Already by 1954, the Baltic-born had gravitated toward metropolises (72% in all three groups) rather than smaller cities (16–19%) or rural areas (10–12%).[31]

Australia's census in 1981 counted 5,040 persons born in Estonia, 12,061 in Latvia, 5,844 in Lithuania, for a total of 22,945.[32] So there was substantial attrition of the first-generation cohort. This would be expected among those who were middle-aged or elderly when fleeing in 1944.

In all lands where large numbers of Baltic refugees settled, they found their way to temperate and relatively moist zones. In such places, the climate was similar to that

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30 *Language Spoken at Home and Ability to Speak English For United States, Regions and States: 1990. Report 1990 CPH-L-133* (Washington DC: Population Division, Bureau of the Census, 1994), Tables 6–56.

31 S.R. Carver, ed., *Census of the Commonwealth of Australia, 30th June, 1954: Statistician's Report, VIII Australia* (Canberra: Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics, 1962), 148–50.

32 Betty Birškys, Antanas Birškys, Aldis L. Putniņš, and Inno Salasoo, *The Baltic Peoples in Australia* (Melbourne: AE Press, 1986), 52, 104, 165.

of their homelands. They avoided frigid areas of Sweden and Canada, as well as hot and dry parts of the USA and Australia. Everywhere the refugees were drawn to large cities, where educational and economic opportunities were greatest. This helped them adapt successfully in their new homelands.

Schooling and Employment

Generally Baltic refugees can be described as overachievers, both in terms of education and occupation. This is especially true for those with some schooling in the new homelands, as well as for the second generation, born abroad. There are systematic studies that confirm the impressions of success.

In Sweden, most refugees came from fisher-farmer families in small villages and had only a six-year elementary education. They could not get high-status jobs, so factory work was commonly chosen by the older cohort. Women did so in higher numbers initially, although housekeeping was also an option. Men often came to factory work after a stint in more physically demanding jobs like lumbering, peat extraction, road construction, and farm labor. Compared to Sweden's population as a whole, both Estonia- and Latvia-born refugees were overrepresented in blue-collar jobs (manual work) in 1950. Thirty years later, they were still overrepresented in manufacturing, where most jobs are blue-collar. This pattern was found for both genders of both nationalities, except among those in the youngest cohort, who had arrived in 1944 as children under 9. The latter group, who got most or all of their schooling in the new land, had a higher rate of finishing high school (gymnasium) than was typical in Sweden in 1980.[33]

An age-cohort analysis was also done for refugees in Canada.[34] In the 1971 census, all age cohorts that were at least 25 years old at arrival had higher educational attainment than typical of Canadians and most immigrant groups. Among people of Estonian ethnic origin who were at least 25 years old in 1971 (typically born outside Canada), a majority (52%) had completed secondary education, 11% had college degrees, and 3% had graduate degrees. In the youngest of these cohorts (ages 25–34 in 1971), who typically arrived in Canada as minors ages 5–14, 27% had attained college degrees and 8% had graduate degrees. Thus, younger refugees markedly exceeded their elders' relatively high educational attainment, which was above the Canadian average.

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33 Reinans, "Balterna i Sverige," 72–6.

34 Aun, *The Political Refugees*, 53–4.

Occupational status was also higher than typical of Canadians in 1971. Estonians were overrepresented in the highest category, among professionals and managers. In the subcategory of natural sciences, both Estonians and Latvians were strongly overrepresented, at the top of the list for Canada's ethnic groups. In terms of income, a correlate of occupational status, people of Estonian origin (typically first- or second-generation) were about one third higher than Canada's average, surpassed only by Latvians and Jews.[35]

A detailed analysis from the USA is the study of Indianapolis Estonians. Among first-generation adults (age 21 or more at 1944's end), most men (53%) and many women (22%) had gone through an institution of higher learning. Both figures are higher than the 16% shown in the 1980 census for metropolitan Indianapolis. The gender gap disappeared among younger Estonians. Among those who were minors at 1944's end or at least age 25 in the second generation, 65% finished four years of college by 1991, including 19% with graduate degrees. Among 32 members of the second generation who finished high school, 4 were valedictorians, with the highest grade averages in their graduating classes.[36]

The highest level of occupational status is the high white-collar category (professional, managerial, technical). This was attained by 53% of first-generation adults in Estonia, dropping to 26% among them in Indianapolis, where low blue-collar jobs (unskilled manual labor) were much more common (59%). This reflects disadvantages in the labor market, such as lack of full fluency in English and the need to get recredentialed. The comparable figure for high white-collar jobs in the 1980 census for the local area was 25–31%, depending on whether part-time workers are included.[37]

Younger members of the first generation, who finished school abroad, fared much better. High white-collar jobs were attained by 70%. These jobs tended to be technical jobs like engineering, accounting, laboratory research – requiring numerical or visual rather than verbal acuity. In the second generation, born en route to or in the USA, the figure was 74%. Teaching was their most common career, as it had been for adult refugees in Estonia.[38]

Evidence of such success for Baltic refugees in Australia is less comprehensive in the available material. Anecdotal examples can be found in Birškys et al. (1986).[39] Putniņš presents findings from a 1971 census study where age-group differences were standardized and the sexes were examined separately in educational comparisons. Baltic-born men (who finished their educations either before or after arrival in Australia) were 2.2

35 Ibid., 55–6.
36 Haas, "The Estonian Community of Indianapolis," 6, 8.
37 Ibid., 8–10.
38 Ibid., 7–10.
39 Birškys et al., *The Baltic Peoples in Australia*.

times more likely to have a university degree than typical for Australia's male population. Baltic-born women were 3.8 times more likely to get such a degree than typical for Australia's female population.[40] My sample of returnees who moved back to the old homelands had 15 individuals from Australia, all from high white-collar positions there (100%), within all three Baltic groups. Comparable figures are 86% for 25 individuals from Sweden, 89% for 24 from Canada, 82% for 46 from the USA, 71% for 7 from other lands. This sample may have been skewed toward occupational success, which would give people more skills and resources for relocation. Yet other high achievers might have been deterred by the thought of what they would be giving up in the West for an uncertain future in the Baltic homeland.

Language and Cultural Issues

Most Baltic refugees went to English-speaking countries, where their knowledge of German and Russian was not much of an asset. Some did find work as translators and instructors of those languages, even in camps for displaced persons (DPs). Estonian refugees had the greatest linguistic disadvantage, as their tongue is not in the Indo-European family and thus diverges most from English (as well as Swedish). All three groups benefitted from familiarity with the Latin alphabet and rather similar pronunciation of letters in their own tongues. They also had high literacy rates, so they could benefit from printed learning materials.

It helped that they were generally housed in ethnic clusters in refugee camps and typically settled where others of their own kind went. They could thus use their native languages to learn from others' experiences, to engage with social networks, and to enjoy entertainment. Newspapers and books were available in their own languages and circulated widely, generally in newly produced form from intellectuals among them rather than transported from their homelands.

Children in camps attended classes in their parents' languages, but also got instruction in other tongues. After resettlement and enrollment in regular schools alongside agemates of the host country, children learned locals' language quickly. Often, they also got lessons in their mother tongue at part-time schools, where instruction and creation of learning materials were done by teachers trained in the old homeland.

Sweden's government was especially helpful in promoting instruction in minority languages. In the 1960s, a program for school-based tutoring in the mother tongue was

40 Putniņš, *Latvians in Australia*, 44.

begun, initially depending on voluntary involvement by local districts (communes), but mandatory for them since 1977, if requested by at least 5 students of a given minority in a district. Government support was even provided for full-time Estonian-language schools in Gothenburg and Stockholm, with some lessons in Swedish. The elementary school in Gothenburg had to close in 1994 after 34 years, as did the high school in Stockholm after two decades.[41] Enrollments dwindled as families moved out to the suburbs and students' commuting times became overlong. In Stockholm, however, enrollment in the elementary school, founded after camp schools were defunded in 1945, has grown to some 200 students, and middle-school grades have been added. This school's unique viability has been enhanced by the recent influx of families relocating from Estonia. Parents working at their homeland's embassy, businesses with operations in both countries, academic or research positions, and other temporary assignments want their children prepared for further schooling in their native language in Estonia.

Another special case of a school set up for newly arrived refugee children and operated for decades longer is the Latvian high school (gymnasium) in Germany. With funding from the (West) German government, it operated from 1946 to 1998 in three locations, longest in Münster. The number of graduates was small (up to 8 per year), but the school drew students even from other countries with its rigorous curriculum.[42] Similar opportunities for immersion in the ancestral language now exist in all the Baltic homelands, for high school and university students.

Commitment to transmitting Baltic languages and lore to subsequent generations has been quite high in refugee communities. Many parents of the first generation enrolled their children in part-time ethnic schools. In the Soviet era, such schools were seen as a way to counteract russification policies in the old homeland, which put survival of both linguistic and cultural heritage at risk. Many such schools still operate, serving refugees' grandchildren and offspring of post-Soviet migrants. A Canadian study of 16 ethnic groups measured intensity of interest in transmitting ethnic heritage by comparing enrollment in each group's part-time ethnic schools to its population in Canada. The three Baltic groups came out at the top of the list of enrollment rates.[43] In the 1971 census, persons of Baltic origin also had some of the highest rates of learning their ancestral language (79% for Estonians, 78% for Latvians, 62% for Lithuanians), using it as their main language at home (49%, 46%, and 34%, respectively), and maintaining it as the predominant mother tongue, with little change over the previous decade in all three groups.[44]

41 Raag, *Eestlane väljaspool Eestit*, 85–6.
42 Plakans, *The Reluctant Exiles*, 154.
43 *Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism*, 151.
44 Aun, *The Political Refugees*, 177–8.

There is a dearth of published census data on language retention among descendants of the foreign-born, especially among small minorities. However, there is an interesting finding for the largest Baltic group: in 1990, there were 55,781 at-home speakers of Lithuanian in the USA,[45] yet only 29,945 persons born in Lithuania. That speakers are twice as numerous as first-generation immigrants, almost half a century after the latter's exodus from their homeland, indicates that the language is passed on to descendants at a rather high rate. Counts of at-home speakers of Estonian and Latvian were much lower: 8,822 and 25,333, respectively, about the same as the numbers for those born in the old homelands (9,210 and 26,179, respectively).

The contrast with Lithuanians' language situation seems due to a large influx of Lithuanians at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. This earlier influx meant more time to produce a large third generation. Also, the earlier Lithuanian wave came when family sizes were larger – before effective birth control and postponement of childbearing to pursue higher education. Bigger family sizes meant more descendants who could be involved in at-home usage of Lithuanian.

The difference cannot be attributed to stronger commitment to language preservation among Lithuanians. This is clear from other figures in the same 1990 U.S. Census. Persons born in Latvia and Lithuania who spoke their mother tongue at home numbered 19,145 and 20,758, respectively.[46] Dividing these figures by the numbers born in those countries yields 73% and 70%, respectively, for first-generation immigrants living in a setting favoring language transmission. The previous census of 1980 yielded virtually identical results, at 73% and 68%, respectively. So there was no trend toward speaking only English at home. Language use in the smaller Estonia-born group was not reported.

Of course, parents of the same ethnicity may talk with each other in their native tongue, but use the host country's language with their children. This might be done if parents think they would thus help their children do better in school or if parents want to practice the new tongue for their own benefit. There are also households where parents in a mixed (interethnic) marriage use the non-Baltic spouse's language between themselves, but the Baltic spouse speaks his/her mother tongue with their offspring.

In places with a small ethnic community, linguistic assimilation into the majority is accelerated. In the Indianapolis study, there were so few potential mates available for the offspring of Estonian refugees that mixed marriages became the norm, which did not favor language transmission. Only a third (32%) of the second generation spoke

45 Bureau of the Census 1994.

46 Campbell J. Gibson, Emily Lennon, Kay Jung, and Marie Pees, *Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-born Population of the United States: 1850-1990. Working Paper POP-WPO29*, (Washington DC: Population Division, Bureau of the Census, 1999), Table 5.

Estonian, which became virtually extinct in the third generation, with only two sisters in one household learning it.

Assimilation occurs more slowly in places with large ethnic communities. The best available data are for persons of Estonian origin in Canada in 1971. Ethnic endogamy was the norm for age cohorts in their 40s, 50s, and older, but about two-thirds of both males and females in their 30s and younger married non-Estonians. The language spoken most at home was Estonian for about three-quarters in the cohorts of age 45 or older, but English for about two-thirds of younger cohorts. The trends were not as stark in the area of greatest Estonian concentration (metropolitan Toronto). Here, a slight majority of married folks in their 30s, among both males and females, had paired with other Estonians, but among those in their 20s or younger, only 37% of married males and 46% of married females did so. Around five-sixths in cohorts of age 45 or older spoke mostly Estonian at home, but slight majorities of younger cohorts spoke mostly English at home.[47]

Small ethnic communities are unfavorable for the preservation of cultural heritage. If they cannot afford to keep a community center, practice sessions and performance venues for choirs, orchestras, theater troupes, folk dancers, etc. become hard to arrange. There is a dearth of people who share enough interest in a certain cultural activity to become participants. Great variety of cultural organizations cannot be sustained except in cities with large Baltic communities.

Some recent trends alleviate such problems. One is the development of stronger links and symbiotic relationships between ethnic groups from the Baltic Sea area. Folk music and dance groups may have members from more than one Baltic group, and may include Scandinavian and Finnish members as well, as they delve into similarities of instrumentation and repertoire. Joint participation in international festival displays, Midsummer celebrations, and Christmas markets occurs in some cities. If a certain Baltic group is too small to maintain its own community center, it may use facilities of another Baltic group that is larger, in exchange for rent or labor contributions.

Another factor enhancing the vitality of smaller Baltic communities is the arrangement of regional, national, and even international conferences and festivals. These provide opportunities to observe, learn, and perform traditional folk arts, even for individuals from places where few of their kind live. Such opportunities are also offered at summer camps, serving not only youths but also adults, with new links to the old homelands via guest lecturers and performers.[48] Academic organizations develop networks of scholars within and between the Baltic groups, and involve non-academics in collecting and preserving documents, publications, memoirs, oral histories, recordings of interviews and

47 Aun, *The Political Refugees*, 180, 182.

48 Silvija Meija, *Latvians in Michigan* (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2005), 50–7.

performances, artifacts of historical or ethnographic value, etc. The Internet obviously favors such networking.

Experiences and activities of Baltic refugee communities were generally similar, regardless of which country they settled in. This is to be expected from similarities in their traditional cultures and their common refugee camp experiences. Yet, there was some divergence, because of varying opportunities and policies in the host countries. This is most evident among Estonians, due to the large number ending up in Sweden, so close to their homeland and with a more socialistic and collectivist political culture. The other three major destinations were all former British colonies with large populations, a longer history of great ethnic diversity, and more emphasis on individualism and entrepreneurialism.

There were similar consequences from concentration of refugees in certain cities, Toronto for Estonians and Latvians in Canada, Chicago for Lithuanians in the USA. The latter was a rather unique situation, due to the great prewar immigration there and less dispersal to other lands. There was also a noteworthy instance of bipolarity, in that the city of Stockholm had an outsize importance as a center of Estonian refugee settlement, comparable to Toronto's. A similar bipolarity is also evident for Latvians, involving the same two cities.

In Sweden, there was less incentive to organize protests against Soviet oppression, as the dominant Social Democratic Party showed no inclination to reverse its acceptance of Soviet annexation of the Baltic lands. In the USA, there was much more concern about communist infiltration and spying. So representatives of the Baltic countries could draw news coverage of their testimony about the flaws of communism and injustices of Soviet occupation, at Congressional hearings and street demonstrations at the Soviet embassy in the capital city of Washington. The location of the United Nations headquarters and important news organizations in New York City also meant opportunities to draw media attention to appeals for support against Soviet occupation. In contrast to Sweden, public opinion in the USA, Canada, and Australia was more sympathetic to the Baltic countries' plight and more skeptical of Soviet leaders' intentions, so Baltic demonstrators could feel that their efforts had impact. A noteworthy example of impact happened in Australia, when the Labour government granted *de jure* recognition to Soviet occupation of the Baltic lands in 1975. All three Baltic groups organized protests and urged the opposition Liberal Country Party to reverse the new policy. A quick reversal did come after the next election led to a change in government. In 1978 the offending Labour Party showed that it was chastened by the affair, when its federal caucus voted unanimously to promise that it would never again reinstate its pro-Soviet policy on *de jure* recognition.[49]

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49 Putniņš, *Latvians in Australia*, 20–1.

Sweden played a major role as a source of Estonian- and Latvian-language publications. Labor-market counsellors' efforts to find workers employment matching their skills and experience meant that Estonian and Latvian intellectuals had good chances to continue the kind of writing and research they did in their homelands, sometimes only through clerical jobs in archives and libraries where they had easy access to valuable materials. More books, both fiction and nonfiction, were printed in Sweden than elsewhere and were distributed to Estonians worldwide. The Latvian Encyclopedia was published in Sweden, as well as many works by intellectuals who relocated there from DP camps in Germany.[50] Sweden also had a prominent role in the early years of exile as a center for Estonian music recording projects, until an alternative emerged in Toronto.

Sweden's proximity to the Baltic lands and transportation links with them created opportunities for Baltic refugees and their adult children to get work assignments as travel agents, guides, ferry and airline staffers, etc. Visits from neutral Sweden to the Soviet-occupied homelands were easier to arrange, with less complicated visa procedures. In the post-Soviet era, Swedish companies seeking to expand their operations on the other side of the Baltic Sea sought people of Baltic origin to be their agents there. So it is no wonder that living in Sweden was associated with visiting the old homelands sooner and more often, for both Estonian and Latvian subsamples in the study of Baltic return migrants. (There were no Lithuanians from Sweden in the study.)

Sweden also became the place where information from the Baltic countries flowed more freely, particularly for Estonians. A bookstore in downtown Stockholm, connected with a newspaper for the exile community, offered many publications from Soviet Estonia. Sweden was also visited more often by scholars and performers from Soviet Estonia, who were not always relentless apologists for the Soviet regime. This meant opportunities to learn more about contemporary trends and new research on Estonian heritage. Writing before Gorbachev's reforms to open up Soviet society to outside contacts, Putniņš suggested that the lack of such opportunities for Latvians in Australia and North America was a major factor in the second generation's lack of identification with Latvians in Latvia, and worried that it might portend a decline in effective political action to free the homeland.[51]

Concentration of some 10,000 Estonian refugees in Toronto stimulated development of a web of economic enterprises and support services in Canada. The young men initially favored for entry to Canada often worked on construction projects, which gave them experience to serve as subcontractors and builders for both later arrivals and Canadian customers. Some 180 Estonian enterprises were involved in the construction

50 Plakans, *The Reluctant Exiles*, 51, 83–5, 156–60.

51 Putniņš, *Latvians in Australia*, 83, 108.

sector just in Toronto by the mid-1950s. Such firms were involved in building suburban neighborhoods, high-rise apartments, and office complexes, not only in the Toronto area but also in British Columbia.[52] College dormitories were also built in several cities. One beside the University of Toronto's campus had lower floors allocated to an Estonian archive, library, museum, meeting spaces for conferences – important resources for the university's Estonian Studies program that was set up with support from Estonian donors. Other sectors where Estonian entrepreneurs prospered were manufacturing, newspaper publishing, music recording, handcrafts, a credit union, bakeries and delicatessens. The organizational ability, leadership, creativity, and financial acumen developed in such diverse undertakings enabled Canadian Estonians to take the initiative in arranging quadrennial Estonian World Festivals, from 1972 to 2013. These were held in seven countries, but Toronto was the most frequent venue.

Realizations

The sample of Baltic return migrants was asked about their experiences within their ethnic community. No major differences were found between the four main countries in which the refugees settled. The focus here will be on generational differences in reactions to their upbringing abroad.

When asked whether they have always thought of themselves as mostly Estonian/Latvian/Lithuanian, something else, or both, there was a clear generational trend. Those who were minors during the exodus and thus lived in refugee camps felt overwhelmingly Baltic (90%). In the second generation, two-thirds said "Baltic"(62%) and one-third said "Both" (32%). The third generation was split between "Baltic" (36%), "Both" (27%), and "Other" (36%). Living in the ancestral homeland strengthened the sense of Baltic identity for the third generation (42%), more so than for the second (29%) or first (19% among minors of 1944).

When asked what their parents said about the old homeland, social problems were rarely brought up. This could lead to disillusionment when first encountering the reality. A second-generation Estonian man from Canada noted: "What surprised me was that there are all sorts of Estonians. I was used to all of them being well-behaved, middle-class doctors, teachers, etc. That Estonians are also thieves and beggars and great drunkards, that was surprising." A second-generation Estonian woman from Australia had a similar reaction: "The range is wider here. There comes a disappointment... that there are

52 Aun, *The Political Refugees*, 60–1.

Estonians who are liars, bums, and scoundrels... Not all [Estonians abroad]...are nice and polite, but there is that tendency. But the Estonians are like any people. Not all of them are intelligent, beautiful, and honest." A second-generation Lithuanian man from the USA recalled: "[There were] standard romantic tales of a happy, prosperous, patriotic people, diligent, virtuous. The shortcomings of Lithuanian life were glossed over." A woman of the same background said of her parents: "Their memories became more rosy than any sort of reality could have been."

Refugees may have felt more pressure to behave, for two reasons. First, their ethnic community was small enough to function like a village, where gossip and ostracism keep people in line, as there is no anonymity or escape from disapproval. Second, they are acutely aware of their role as guests and representatives of a small nation seeking support for its liberation, and feel a responsibility to make a good impression on their hosts. This was an especially acute concern in the DP camps, when refugees worried about how to impress the gatekeepers and screeners controlling their access to work assignments, amenities, resources, and resettlement options. Even those born long after the DP camp experience could feel constrained in such ways, as shown in a 1976 study of second-generation Estonian high school students in Adelaide, Australia. Those classified as more involved in their ethnic community (less alienated from it) tended to show more conscientiousness, shyness (lack of social boldness), group dependence, (self-)control, and aspiration to seek high-prestige occupations.[53]

With regard to parents' accounts about the Soviet system, overwhelming majorities of all three generations felt these tales were accurate. Some even said the reality they encountered during their first visit was actually worse. A second-generation Lithuanian woman from the USA noted: "My first trip was in 1987, and everything looked much better than I expected... As I got to know people, the reality unfolded, and it was probably more devious than anything my parents even knew about-like the system of stealing, lying, turning in your friends and neighbors to the KGB [secret police]..."

Those who had been active in cultural activities in the West were sometimes disappointed that such things did not seem to be taken as seriously in the old homeland. A second-generation Latvian woman from the USA remarked:

> I had the feeling that maintaining a distinct Latvian identity is more prevalent in the emigre community than it is in Latvia. In terms of the traditional cultural arts (choir singing, folk dancing), I had the impression that Latvians in Latvia wish [rather] to be seen as progressive and liberal in their presentation – perhaps to demonstrate that they are a "Western" country now, not a "backward" country.

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53 Putniņš, *Latvians in Australia*, 51 (citing unpublished honors thesis by P.E. Ķiploks).

On the other hand, some experienced a sense of relief, knowing that they did not have to make great exertions personally to save the culture, when there are plenty of people in the old homeland who can help do that. A second-generation Latvian man put it this way:

> I used to travel incredibly long distances to be with other Latvians, regardless of whether I had other common interests with them. I would not do that now [laughs]... That's the minority['s] predicament, because you have to exert a lot of effort to maintain your identity. But I'm living in the mother ship now and I'm of the majority, so it doesn't really require an effort on my part.

When asked to assess how refugees' organizations had fared in raising the next generation, most of the first-minor and second generation thought they had done things right for the most part. The third generation was more neutral, but not really critical. A Lithuania-born man who was a minor in 1944 said: "I think they were doing everything right, but you cannot maintain the second generation in your image. Integration into the local country['s] culture is a normal process and nothing can stop it." A second-generation Latvian woman from the USA commented on patriotic ceremonies: "I can see it was very national[istic] upbringing... [W]hen I'm doing it for my own sons, I call it brainwashing [laughs]... But I don't think it was a bad thing."

Finally, there is an ironic outcome, in that some returnees realize they want to retain a distinct identity or legacy as Westerners in the old homeland. In Estonia, a group of entrepreneurs and officials formed an informal Sauna Club, to socialize regularly and commiserate about the challenges of de-Sovietization. Latvians from the West formed a choir in Riga, to enjoy making music like they did before relocating. Some second-generation parents question the urgency of teaching their ancestral language to their children, when the latter are immersed in it anyway in the old homeland. A second-generation mother realized that in Latvia her children might forget the English and Swedish they once spoke fluently, so the children now attend an English school in Latvia and are encouraged to speak English at home and to watch Swedish films.

A Lithuanian researcher, who was raised under Soviet rule and spent years working abroad, conferred with others like himself about how to apply their foreign experience in their homeland. He had come to really appreciate efforts of refugee organizations in the West to preserve their religious and cultural heritage, rather than acquiesce in assimilation as emigres of the post-Soviet era seem more prone to do. He expressed hope that more of the latter would learn from the example of the World War II refugees and their descendants, and bring back knowledge to help accelerate reforms benefitting the homeland. Thus, such returnees are trying to retain some distinctiveness and resist assimilation

into the local society they dreamed of rejoining for so long, in ways reminiscent of what the wartime exiles opted to do in the West.

Conclusion

Previous migration studies have identified many factors favoring successful adaptation in new lands. Generally, these apply to the Baltic groups, which enjoyed advantages like education, job skills, urban experience, organizational ability, compatible values, indistinctive appearance, hospitable reception, and language familiarity (at least with regard to German). Such factors help explain why the Baltic groups had a migration experience with little resemblance to that found for earlier streams.[54] The Baltic groups fit better under Kim's concept[55] of new urban immigrants, as well as Rose and Pertzoff's[56] notion of smaller-scale and more dispersed migration. The Baltic groups' migration differs from the latter types in its suddenness, brief intensity, and political motivation. So they align best with groups fleeing dispossession and persecution from revolutionaries, autocrats, or invaders. Among such cases, the Baltic exodus is distinctive in terms of the small size of the groups involved. This accounts for their great concern about linguistic and cultural extinction, as well as their great commitment to preserving their heritage.

Despite generally successful adaptations, Baltic refugees have shown some dysfunctional patterns. Putniņš points to psychiatric treatment admissions, suicides, alcohol abuse, men's never marrying – all found more often among first-generation Baltic refugees than among host country natives and sometimes even among other East European immigrants.[57] There may still be some applicability of certain classic notions about dysfunctional aspects of any immigrant experience. Particularly germane may be social-disorganization or marginal-man theories, about how exposure to contradictory sets of social rules creates stress over social expectations and confusion about one's identity.[58] Yet Baltic refugees showed unusual resilience and cohesion in coping with their lot, as their situation led to a sense of mission and a source of self-esteem that few other groups can match.

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54 E.g. William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, vol. 2 (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1927).

55 Illsoo Kim, *The New Urban Immigrants: The Korean Community in New York* (Princeton: Princeton University, 1991).

56 Peter I. Rose and Liv Olson Pertzoff, *Strangers in their Midst: Small-Town Jews and their Neighbors* (Merrick, New York: Richwood, 1981).

57 Putniņš, *Latvians in Australia*, 34–42.

58 Robert Ezra Park, "Human Migration and the Marginal Man," *American Journal of Sociology* 33, no. 6 (1928): 881–93.

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Interpretation of the World by Aleksander Bregman, a Far-Sighted Commentator on International Affairs in Exile, in the London-Based *Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza*

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Abstract: The article presents the views and journalistic activities of the foreign-educated doctor of political science, émigré Polish journalist, correspondent, anti-communist Aleksander Bregman, a pioneer of Polish-German reconciliation, who preached the unpopular post-World War II views of German reunification, and the creation of an economic community of European states. This international relations expert was one of the few publicists in exile who managed to make a name for himself outside the circle of the Polish diaspora. Gifted with Benedictine diligence, he left behind countless articles scattered in the émigré press, English, French, Swiss and German journals, as well as many books whose contents are still relevant today. He was also a contributor to Radio Free Europe. Throughout all of his wartime and subsequent exile life in the UK, he was particularly associated with the London-based *Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza*, where he served as editor-in-chief from 1959 to 1962. In Poland, the magazine was completely banned from printing until 1989. Methods used in writing the article: qualitative press content analysis, press, heuristic, historical-critical microbiography.

Keywords: Aleksander Bregman (1906–1967), 20th century Great Britain, Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza, German unification, idea of economic European community

Aleksander Bregman was born on August 14, 1906 in Warsaw, where he graduated from high school.[1] After Poland regained independence in 1918, he studied in Vienna, Paris (Ecole des Sciences Politiques) and at the University of Geneva, where he earned a doctorate in political science in 1932 for his dissertation on Poland's place in the European system. He then began a career in journalism. From 1932, he was a correspondent for the Polish Telegraphic Agency in Geneva – the headquarters of the League of Nations and *Gazeta*

1 Biographical data taken from: Aleksander Bregman, "Zaczęło się pod namiotem w Szkocji," *Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza* [hereafter: *DPiDŻ*], July 12, 1960, 5; Paweł Ziętara, "*Aleksander Bregman*," in *Dopóki jest „Dziennik" – jestem...*, ed. Katarzyna Bzowska (London: Polska Fundacja Kulturalna, 2000), 319–20; Jacek Tebinka, "Słowo wstępne," in *Najlepszy sojusznik Hitlera,* ed. Aleksander Bregman, (Warsaw: Fronda, 2009), 7–11; Jacek Tebinka, "Słowo wstępne," in *Dzieje pustego fotela. Konferencja w San Francisco i sprawa polska (1945–1946)*, ed. Aleksander Bregman (Warsaw: Fronda, 2009), 11–4.

Polska, which prepared him for his later coverage of the 1945 San Francisco Conference. He also worked as editor of the foreign section of *Expres Poranny* and *Wieczór Warszawski*.

After the September defeat, he joined the Polish Army being formed in France. There he graduated from the elite cadet school in Coëtquidan. After the fall of France, he made his way to Great Britain, where he organized the press for the soldiers of the 1st Corps of the Polish Armed Forces in the West stationed in Scotland. Years later, columnist Maciej Feldhuzen recalled those times: "In the town of Cupar, the place where the rifle brigade was stationed, Aleksander Bregman and Bohdan Witwicki launched 'Wiadomości' on a duplicator".[2] Bregman was also editor of *Nowiny Pierwszej Brygady* and, with other journalists, also the Glasgow-based *Dziennik Żołnierza*[3] [hereafter: DŻ], where, according to Stefania Kossowska, "cadets with military censorship worked including such dynamic, talented young journalists as Tadeusz Horko, Aleksander Bregman, Maciej Feldhuzen, Ksawery Pruszyński, Konstanty Jeleński, Mikołaj Szumski and others, several of whom later became editors of *Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza*"[4] [hereafter: DPiDŻ]. Feldhuzen also recalled that Bregman was the political editor of DŻ.[5] Printer Edmund Goll added that when DŻ was headed by Bregman, Maciej Feldhuzen and Roland Węckowski joined the editorial team and the magazine was "made lively and beat in terms of popularity"[6] the government

2 Maciej Feldhuzen, *Dziennikarstwo – nieuleczalna choroba*, in: *Dopóki jest „Dziennik" – jestem...*, ed. Katarzyna Bzowska (London: PFK, 2000), 92.

3 *Dziennik Żołnierza* – counted among the Polish camp press; published by the 10th Armoured Cavalry Brigade in Scotland (Douglas-Forfar-Cupar-Glasgow-London); the first issue appeared on 29 June 1940, transcribed on a typewriter in three copies under the title *Dziennik 2. Brygady*, the last issue on 31 December 1943; the editors-in-chief were successively: Ludwik Rubel (1940–41), Paweł Starzeński (1941–42), Klemens Dunin-Kęplicz (1942), Tadeusz Horko and Aleksander Bregman (1942–43); it was later printed on stone, initially in an edition of 16 copies; this period is called the "stone age." After 2 weeks, it was renamed *Dziennik Żołnierza* [hereafter: DŻ]. The magazine was issued every day except Sundays and holidays. The circulation was 1,000 duplicate copies. As of December 20, 1940, DŻ became to be printed by Polish soldiers-typesetters, and several thousand copies were distributed throughout Scotland. 1977 copies of the magazine were printed in May 1942, and 9990 a year later. After a year of existence, DŻ become the official organ of the I Corps and was moved to Glasgow, where it was issued in the "Press Palace" until its forced merger in December 1943 with *Dziennik Polski*. From 3 January 1944, edited as *Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza* until July 15, 2015; after: Bregman, "Zaczęło się pod namiotem w Szkocji," 5; Jan Kowalik, *Bibliografia czasopism polskich wydanych poza granicami Kraju od września 1939 roku*, vol. 1 (Lublin: Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski, 1976), 152; ibid., vol. 5 (Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1988), 179; Jan Kowalik, "Czasopiśmiennictwo," in *Literatura polska na obczyźnie 1940–1960*, ed. Tymon Terlecki, vol. 2 (London: B. Świderski, 1965), 379, 480–1; Witold Leitgeber, *W kwaterze prasowej. Dziennik z lat wojny 1939–1945. Od Coëtquidan do „Rubensa"* (London: Katolicki Ośrodek Wydawniczy Veritas, 1972), 252; Juliusz Łukasiewicz, "'Dziennik Żołnierza': pierwszy krok," in *Dopóki jest „Dziennik"*, 65–105; Jolanta Chwastyk-Kowalczyk, *Londyński „Dziennik Polski" w latach 1940–1943* (Kielce: Wydawnictwo Akademii Świętokrzyskiej, 2005), 9–21, 32–3.

4 Stefania Kossowska, "Nasze brylantowe gody," in *Dopóki jest „Dziennik"*, 46.

5 Feldhuzen, "Dziennikarstwo – nieuleczalna choroba," 94.

6 Edmund Goll, "Od Forfar do Hove," in *Dopóki jest „Dziennik"*, 272.

mouthpiece, the official organ of the Ministry of Information and Documentation, and the London-based *Dziennik Polski*[7] [hereafter: DP].

Articles written by Bregman, "a seasoned journalist who has been familiar with international politics for many years,"[8] appeared every day on page 3 of DŻ. For the 20th anniversary of *Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza* in 1960, the journalist presented the early days of editing the paper, which became very popular among soldiers.[9]

General Sikorski's conciliatory policy towards the USSR had many opponents in the army. This critical attitude was evident in the articles of the DŻ, which was repeatedly published with the whitewash of censorship. Among other things, these issues influenced the forced merger with the government-owned London-based *Dziennik Polski* in December 1943,[10] as described by Aleksander Bregman in the July 1960 anniversary issue of DPiDŻ. Among other things, he recalled Tadusz Horka's uncompromising article that appeared after the discovery of the Katyn graves in April 1943. The political dispute between Stanisław Mikołajczyk, Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile, and Stanisław Kot, Minister of Information, and General Kazimierz Sosnkowski, Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces in the West, reached its climax in autumn 1943. The civilian authorities realized that they had to absolutely control the Polish press, and the only way to do this was to neutralize the military source of information, the DŻ, which the soldiers trusted. After many weeks of heated discussions, a compromise solution was found in the form of a merger of the two titles, henceforth known as *Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza* (Polish Journal and Soldier's Journal), based in London, in the initial phase of the new formula headed by Kot's man, Democratic Party and National Council member Mieczysław Szerer. From DŻ, the new editorial team was augmented by Aleksander Bregman, Maciej Feldhuzen, Tadeusz Horko, Marek Święcicki and Bohdan Witwicki, who arrived from Scotland.

Karol Zbyszewski commented on the situation with his usual sarcasm: "The newcomers from Glasgow blew away the entire London team. It was an invasion of thugs on the headquarters of idiots."[11] In addition to him, who previously also worked at DP, the editorial board included Horko, Bregman, Święcicki, Mikołaj Szumski and Witwicki.[12] Bregman claimed that from January 1, 1944 (issue 1 of DPiDŻ went out on January 3, Monday), an internal struggle began between the two editorial teams. It ended only

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7 For more information, see: Chwastyk-Kowalczyk, *Londyński „Dziennik Polski".*

8 Ibid., 95.

9 Bregman, "Zaczęło się pod namiotem w Szkocji," 5.

10 Leitgeber, *W kwaterze prasowej*, 252.

11 Karol Zbyszewski, "'*Dziennik* to wszystko przetrwał," in *Dopóki jest „Dziennik,"* 37.

12 The composition of the editorial board was confirmed by Sheila Patterson-Horko, "Jak „Dziennik Polski" osiadł w Hove," in *Dopóki jest „Dziennik,"* 123.

after the fall of the Mikołajczyk government and the change of the editor-in-chief to Jan Czarnocki (in 1945–1947).

After the war ended, Bregman remained in London, providing commentary on international affairs. It was he who, as a journalist in the spring of 1945, observed the founding conference of the United Nations in the United States, publishing, through the publishing house of the Polish Press Agency Światpol three years later in 1948 in London, a book entitled *Dzieje pustego fotela. Konferencja w San Francisco i sprawa polska. (1945–1946)*.

The San Francisco Conference began on April 25, and ended on June 26, 1945 with the signing of the UN Charter. It was attended by 46 Allied countries – but without representatives of Poland, through Stalin's political efforts. Bregman outlined in his publication the circumstances of how this happened and who courted the presence of representatives of the Polish government-in-exile at this meeting. By the time it appeared on the publishing market, there was no longer any hope, after the communist had rigged elections to the Sejm, that Poland would remain outside the Kremlin's sphere of influence. Bregman's earlier journalistic activity in the émigré press in February and March 1945 proved that he had no illusions about this issue after the Yalta arrangements.

Despite the passage of 75 years, Bregman's journalistic book, which combines elements of reportage and memoir, does not lose its value, fully capturing the drama that befell Poland. Its reading for the Polish reader is shocking because it clearly shows the times when the Poles, the previous Allies with their Polish government in exile in London, were not allowed to participate in the founding conference of the UN. The United States of America and Great Britain did not agree to Stalin's demand that Poland be represented in San Francisco by envoys of the Communist Provisional Government, resulting in an empty seat for the Poles.

In *Dzieje pustego fotela*, we learn about the American and British reaction to the event, as well as other Polish aspects of the UN founding conference. At the time, Bregman, other journalists or even the FBI had no knowledge of Soviet spies who were active in American structures, such as American diplomat Alger Hiss, responsible for keeping the minutes of the conference proceedings, and also an agent of the NKVD.[13]

Bregman considered it his duty to write this book, as he was there "as the only Polish observer of the events in San Francisco who was present for the entire nine weeks of its duration."[14]

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13 Ibid., 14.

14 Aleksander Bregman, "Słowo wstępne do pierwszego wydania," in *Dzieje pustego fotela. Konferencja w San Francisco i sprawa polska (1945–1946)* (London: Światpol, 1948), 6–7.

The journalist as a correspondent for DPiDŻ attended more than a dozen international conferences, in addition to the one in San Francisco, including the so-called Geneva Summit on July 18–23, 1955.

As early as February, Bregman discussed in a London daily the Yalta resolutions from the perspective of a decade, stating that they were the logical culmination of Allied strategy and policy during the war.[15] Beginning in March 1955, in a new series of *Dokumenty jałtańskie* – his regular political commentaries and other articles – he described the background and atmosphere of the event, recalling the shattered illusions of regaining freedom by Poles and other nations under Moscow's rule.[16] He saw no chance of an agreement.[17] That he was not wrong was shown by the proceedings of the Geneva conference and his further reflections on the subject, published on an ongoing basis in the journal – in the column titled *Idee, ludzie, zdarzenia*,[18] until the end of the year and in subsequent years. The narrative of these articles boiled down to the claim that the meeting resembled a growing auction of peace platitudes, concern was raised about the appeasement and ultimate capitulation of Dwight D. Eisenhower toward the Soviets, there was talk of a "propaganda battle," of the total defeat of the "subjugated nations,"[19]

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15 Aleksander Bregman, "Jałta z perspektywy 10 lat," *DPiDŻ*, February 10, 1955, 2.

16 Aleksander Bregman, "Dokumenty jałtańskie," *DPiDŻ*, March 25, 1955, 2; *DPiDŻ*, March 26, 1955, 2; *DPiDŻ*, March 29, 1955, 2; *DPiDŻ*, March 30, 1955, 2; *DPiDŻ*, April 6, 1955, 2; *DPiDŻ*, April 12, 1955, 2; *DPiDŻ*, April 13, 1955, 2; Bregman, "Co Dulles powiedział o Jałcie? Historia ogłoszenia dokumentów," *DPiDŻ*, April 21, 1955, 1, 4; Bregman, "Austria i Sowiety osiągnęły porozumienie w sprawie traktatu kończącego okupację," *DPiDŻ*, April 15, 1955, 1; Bregman, "Gdy Austria odzyskuje wolność," *DPiDŻ*, May 13, 1955, 2; Bregman, "Sowiety godzą się na konferencję, ale… dyskusja narodach Wschodniej Europy – 'niedopuszczalna,'" *DPiDŻ*, May 27, 1955, 1–2; Bregman, "Nie wolno mówić o ujarzmionych. Senat USA zostawia i Eisenhowerowi wolną rękę," *DPiDŻ*, June 24, 1955, 1, 4; Bregman, "Dulles piętnuje niewolę Europy Wschodniej," *DPiDŻ*, June 25, 1955, 1, 4; Bregman, "Bilans rozmów w San Francisco. Mołotow rozwiał złudzenia. Małe szanse porozumienia w Genewie," *DPiDŻ*, June 27, 1955, 1, 4.

17 Aleksander Bregman, "Bilans konferencji genewskiej równy zeru. Kapitulacja Eisenhowera w sprawie narodów ujarzmionych," *DPiDŻ*, July 25, 1955, 1, 4; Bregman, "Po Genewie – przed Genewą," *DPiDŻ*, August 2, 1955, 2.

18 Aleksander Bregman, "Chruszczow jedzie do Genewy pilnować Bułganina," *DPiDŻ*, July 15, 1955, 1, 4; Bregman, "Coraz większa licytacja frazesów pokojowych w Genewie," *DPiDŻ*, July 18, 1955, 1, 4; Bregman, "Narody Europy Wschodniej nie odzyskały wolności," *DPiDŻ*, July 19, 1955, 1, 4; Bregman, "Zgadzając się na zaczęcie dyskusji o kwestii niemieckiej, Mołotow nie dopuścił do porządku obrad spraw narodów ujarzmionych," *DPiDŻ*, July 20, 1955, 1, 4; Bregman, "Mołotow uniemożliwia zgodę w sprawie Niemiec," *DPiDŻ*, July 21, 1955, 1, 4.

19 Aleksander Bregman, "Ustępliwość Eisenhowera budzi niepokój," *DPiDŻ*, July 22, 1955, 1, 4; Bregman, "Bitwa propagandowa w Genewie," *DPiDŻ*, July 23, 1955, 1, 4; Bregman, "Zachód wreszcie stracił cierpliwość w obliczu brutalnego „niet" Mołotowa," *DPiDŻ*, November 10, 1955, 1, 4; Bregman, "Idee…Kartki z genewskiego notatnika," *DPiDŻ*, November 10, 1955, 2; Bregman, "Dzięki nieustępliwości Mołotowa koniec złudzeń w Genewie. Plan Eisenhowera też pogrzebany," *DPiDŻ*, November 12, 1955, 1; Bregman, "Agonia konferencji w Genewie," *DPiDŻ*, November 14, 1955, 1, 4; Bregman, "Jak dyplomaci USA tłumaczą bierność w sprawie narodów ujarzmionych," *DPiDŻ*, November 15, 1955, 1, 4.

about Molotov's killing of the "the spirit of Geneva."[20] He wondered who would win the big game for Germany.[21] His summary of 1955 came out very pessimistic.[22]

Bregman published in émigré journals, and became one of the most important Polish commentators on international affairs in the press of the free world after the war.[23] His reflections were also featured in foreign journals such as *Scotsman*, *Daily Telegraph*, *Tribune de Genève* and others.

Politically, he was associated with the Polish Freedom Movement "Independence and Democracy" (PRW "NiD"), "promoted in his journalism the Movement's federation concepts and the idea of creating a neutral belt in Central Europe. He took a keen interest in the integration processes taking place in the western part of our continent, analyzing their significance from the point of view of Polish interests,"[24] also in the pages of the London-based *Trybuna*, which was the organ of the PRW "NiD". Bregman's activity in this field and in his Radio Free Europe program "Kalejdoskop" has been researched and described.[25] We can find observations of the directions of changes taking place in Western Europe and the idea of federalism in addition to Bregman's book *Polska i nowa Europa* (London 1963) in other studies.[26]

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20 Bregman, "Rosja liczy na paraliż Zachodu. Dlaczego Mołotow zabił „ducha Genewy"?," *DPiDŻ*, November 16, 1955, 1, 4.

21 Bregman, "Kto wygra wielką grę o Niemcy," November 16, 1955, 2.

22 Bregman, "Podsumowanie 1955 roku," *DPiDŻ*, December 31, 1955, 2.

23 Bregman, "Richard Nixon w Białym Domu?," *DPiDŻ*, October 6, 1955, 2; Bregman, "Niemcy zawsze ci sami," *DPiDŻ*, October 27, 1955, 2.

24 Ziętara, "Aleksander Bregman," 319–20.

25 Artur M. Trudzik, *Polska i Europa Środkowo-Wschodnia w perspektywie londyńskiej „Trybuny" po 1956 r.* (Szczecin: Zet, 2016); Trudzik, "Aktywność Polskiego Ruchu Wolnościowego „Niepodległość i Demokracja" (PRW „NiD") oraz publicystyka na łamach „Trybuny" w aspekcie upamiętnienia wydarzeń historycznych i pielęgnacji polskości na obczyźnie," *Dzieje Najnowsze* 51, no. 2 (2019): 211–28; Trudzik, *Myśl społeczno-polityczna Polskiego Ruchu Wolnościowego „Niepodległość i Demokracja" (PRW „NiD") w latach 1945–1955* (Warsaw: Neriton, 2010); Trudzik, *Polski Ruch Wolnościowy „Niepodległość i Demokracja" i jego organ prasowy – „Trybuna". Dzieje Ruchu, periodyku i innych czasopism wydawanych przez PRW „NiD"* (Warsaw: Neriton, 2009); Trudzik, "Media a polityka i społeczeństwo w perspektywie „Kalejdoskopu" – audycji Aleksandra Bregmana w Radiu Wolna Europa," *Kwartalnik Nauk o Mediach*, no. 2 (2015); Trudzik, "Między Wspólnym Rynkiem a Wspólnotą Brytyjską – Wielka Brytania w „Kalejdoskopie" emitowanym na falach RWE (1960–66)," *Studia Europaea Gnesnensia*, no. 1–2 (2010).

26 Jan Radomyski, *Polski Ruch Wolnościowy „Niepodległość i Demokracja"* (London: nakładem Komisji Likwidacyjnej PRW „NiD", 1995); Piotr Wandycz and Ludwik Frendl, *Zjednoczona Europa: teoria i praktyka* (Londyn: Polonia Book Fund, 1965); Bregman, "*Polska i nowa Europa*," in *O jedność Europy. Antologia polskiej XX-wiecznej myśli europejskiej*, texts selected by Sławomir Łukasiewicz (Warsaw: Urząd Komitetu Integracji Europejskiej, 2007), 211–34; Sławomir Łukasiewicz, *Partia w warunkach emigracji. Dylematy Polskiego Ruchu Wolnościowego „Niepodległość i Demokracja" 1845–1994* (Lublin-Warsaw: IPN-ISP PAN, 2014).

Bregman's writing and journalism reached Poland thanks to the efforts of Radio Free Europe. In Polish People's Republic, Bregman was banned as a fierce enemy of communism. The Security Service gave him the code name "Emu."[27] In the decade after his death, Communist censors ordered "the unconditional elimination of his name and any mention of his work (except in scientific works and specialized books)."[28]

He became very popular among Polish readers in exile with his book *Najlepszy sojusznik Hitlera. Studium o współpracy niemiecko-sowieckiej 1939–1941* (London: Orbis, 1958). Notably, there was a formal ban on its citation in scientific publications in the country until 1989. It was created on the basis of microfilmed archival documents of the German Foreign Ministry, hidden in a park near Schönberg Castle, which were transported to London. The most valuable document is the secret protocol of the non-aggression treaty signed on August 23, 1939 in Moscow by the heads of diplomacy of the USSR and the Third Reich, Vyacheslav Molotov and Joachim von Ribbentrop. The document included plans to divide Central and Eastern European countries, including Poland, into spheres of influence. The German original was burned in Berlin by Allied air raids.[29]

Jacek Tebinka, describing the context of these materials in the Foreword to the Polish edition (Fronda 2009), cited other publications on the subject. He reminded his readers that with the onset of the Cold War in 1948, the Americans published a collection of captured German diplomatic documents titled *Nazi-Soviet Before the War Against the Third Reich 1939–1941*, revealing the behind-the-scenes cooperation between the two dictators, to which Poland fell victim in September 1939 Stalin responded with a personally edited book titled *Fałszerze historii* (Forgers of History), attacking the policy of appeasement that Britain and France pursued against the Third Reich. Kremlin denied the existence of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact until 1989.

Bregman questioned the theses of this publication in his *Polemiki* (Polonia Book Fund, London, 1963). He was also critical of contemporary Soviet publications: a book by Grigory Deborin titled *Second World War* (Polish translation, Warsaw 1960) and the 2-volume *Second World War 1939–1945*, edited by Semyon Platonov (Warsaw 1961).

A publicist, one of the leaders of PPS at home and in emigration – Adam Ciołkosz, in his *Foreword* to the London the third edition ("Orbis", 1967) wrote that "Despite the passage of time, this publication is valuable, it has not been made obsolete by new historical studies. They did not undermine Bregman's thesis, claiming that the German-Soviet

27 Tebinka, "Słowo wstępne," 13.

28 Ibid., 11.

29 Tebinka, "Słowo wstępne," in Bregman, *Najlepszy sojusznik Hitlera. Studium o współpracy niemiecko-sowieckiej 1939–1941*, ed. 3 (London: Orbis Księgarnia Polska, 1967), 8–16.

pact of August 23, 1939, whose cement was the joint partition of Poland, enabled Hitler to start the war."[30]

Bregman's study has been reprinted in London nine times (the last one in 1987). It has become one of the most popular historical studies providing a behind-the-scenes look at the totalitarian dictatorships ruled by Hitler and Stalin. Having lived to see twelve editions, it was also a best-seller of the second publishing circuit in Poland in the 1980s.

> Bregman's book is a document of the struggle for historical truth, which is the greatest advocate of the Polish cause. Bregman has done his country a great service by gathering and organizing the facts of the critical years 1939–1941.The narrative of these facts is more powerful than the entire apparatus of Soviet and Communist propaganda.[31]

In addition to the cited best-known publications, he has also published other works, such as:

- *Liga Narodów 1920–1930: bilans dotychczasowej działalności. Studium polityczne* (with the foreword by Franciszek Sokal, Warsaw: Księgarnia F. Hoesicka, 1931).
- *La politique de la Pologne dans la Société des Nations* (Paris: Libraire Félic Alcn, 1932).
- *La Pologne et la Société des Nations* (Genève: Université de Genève, 1932).
- *Appeasement charter? A Study of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals* (London: Max Love Publishing, 1945).
- *Faked Elections in Poland as Reported by Foreign Observers, forew. by George Dallas*, ed. The Polish Freedom Movement "Independence and Democracy", London 1947 (bd.).
- *Czy możemy liczyć na Amerykę? Wrażenia ze Stanów Zjednoczonych* (Rome: 2nd Corps Cultural and Press Branch, 1946).
- *Polska i nowa Europa* (London: Polonia Book Fund, 1963).
- *Jak świat światem? Stosunki polsko-niemieckie wczoraj, dziś i jutro* (London: Polish Cultural Foundation, 1964).
- *Rubieże wolności. Reportaże z pogranicza świata komunistycznego w Europie i Azji* (Londyn: Poets' and Painters', 1968) – published after the author's death to consolidate Bregman's journalistic output – compiled by his wife Emilia Bregman with the assistance of friends; prepared for publication in 1966/67.
- *Zakamarki historii: wybór rozpraw*, ed. Adam Ciołkosz (London: Polish Cultural Foundation, 1968) – came out after the author's death; prepared for publication in 1966/67.

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30 Adam Ciołkosz, "Słowo wstępne," in Bregman, *Najlepszy sojusznik Hitlera*, 13.

31 Ibid., 16.

– *Podróż do Azji* – A. B. travelled there at the invitation of the Formosa and Korean governments [Part 1 – *U sąsiadów imperium sowieckiego* (Finland, Turkey); Part 2 – *Na frontach Azji* (China, Korea, Makao, Japan, India)].

Taking over as editor-in-chief of the London-based DPiDŻ in October 1959, Bregman laid out his journalistic credo in an introductory article, outlined his views on the role and tasks of the only Polish daily newspaper in Britain.[32] According to him, the most important task of the Polish press in exile is "to provide reliable, honest and objective information about the life of the country, emigration and world events."[33] He believed that the pages of the journal were to be a platform for an all-encompassing broad exchange of the various political views of the émigré independence movement. While rejecting the possibility of compromise with the communist system and assessing the Soviet Union in unequivocally negative terms, he also saw the need to seek ways of understanding with Germany, becoming a forerunner of Polish-German reconciliation.[34]

He believed that it was the duty of émigré journalism to point out the omissions of those in power in Germany on issues of settling accounts with Nazism because former Nazis took positions in Germany that world public opinion rightly demands their removal. He also reminded that the Soviets also continue to have close associates of Stalin remaining in power. In his view, Hitler would not have started the war had he not secured friendly neutrality on his part in the form of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. He called for the remembrance of Auschwitz, the countless places of execution, Katyn, the gulags, Kolyma and the graves at the bottom of the White Sea. He also noted that anti-Semitism is now stronger in communist countries than in West Germany.

Bregman had exceptionally broad horizons and covered a wide range of topics in his articles. He was interested in current world politics.

With no illusions, he commented on Khrushchev's meeting with President Eisenhower in December 1959 at Camp David.[35] He demonstrated the failure of these talks and subsequent efforts at relaxation and peaceful existence, that they only fostered the status quo of the fate of subjugated nations.[36] He diligently followed developments in the case of halting nuclear experiments.[37] He wrote about nuclear fears affecting the international policies of the superpowers, and the changes in both blocs, seeing "missile diplomacy" and subsequent conferences and meetings as "new forms, but old content."[38]

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32 Bregman, "Dziennik wczoraj, dziś i jutro," *DPiDŻ*, October 30, 1959, 1.
33 Ibid.
34 Bregman, "My i Niemcy," *DPiDŻ*, February 2, 1960, 2.
35 Bregman, "Duch z Camp David," *DPiDŻ*, December 3, 1959, 2.
36 Bregman, "Dyplomacja na Syberii," *DPiDŻ*, March 14, 1961, 2.
37 Bregman, "Godzina atomowych decyzji," *DPiDŻ*, January 12, 1960, 2.
38 Bregman, "U progu nowej dekady," *DPiDŻ*, January 2, 1960, 1, 4.

In the 1960s, he commented extensively on Russian-Chinese relations.[39] Bregman reviewed the two countries' interactions from 1921 to 1962, looking for similarities in the ways in which the regimes acted against their own societies, i.e., leading through internal and external policies to famine, economic collapse, escalating terror and purges.[40]

He also published his reviews of scholarly books on the subject that appeared on the British publishing market, for example, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict* by Donald S. Zagoria (Priceton University Press and Oxford University Press, 1962).[41]

Bregman also focused his attention during this period on national liberation movements around the world, the dismantling of colonial empires in Asia and Africa.[42] He wrote about Soviet efforts to colonize Africa, especially the new countries that had broken free from white supremacy.[43] He warned that the Communists are trying to take advantage of any upheaval in Asia, Africa, or South America.

Journalist even discussed a book by a disillusioned young Nigerian, Aderogba Ajao, who spent six years of his life in East Germany, where the Russians tried to make him an agent and agitator, titled *On the Tiger's Back* (London: George Alen & Unwin, 1962).

According to him, the civil war in Greece of 1944–1949 or the communist coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948 dispelled the Yalta illusions. Having signed the Atlantic Pact, the West once again hoped that the Soviets would respect the established lines of political division. In 1955, the "spirit of Geneva" was born, and a year later it was buried by Soviet tanks murdering Hungarians. He then recalled the "Camp David spirit" fiasco.

In the late autumn of 1962, he explained the context of the China-India border conflict.[44] He reflected on the presidential election campaigns in the United States of America, political leadership in Germany and the effects of the elections on the world.[45] He returned repeatedly in his journalism to the issues of nuclear arms control,[46] as well as to the mood of the pragmatic US administration.[47] He explained Algeria's fate, and America's intransigence on Berlin.[48] He denounced all the misrepresentations of Soviet propa-

39 Bregman, "Kto naśladuje Stalina," *DPiDŻ*, February 21, 1961, 2; Bregman, "O co właściwie chodzi?," *DPiDŻ*, August 8, 1960, 2; Bregman, "Fakty czy „dezinformacja"?," *DPiDŻ*, May 29, 1962, 2.

40 Bregman, "Rosja 1921 – Chiny 1962," *DPiDŻ*, July 31, 1962, 2.

41 Bregman, "Pojedynek komunistycznych olbrzymów," *DPiDŻ*, August 28, 1962, 2.

42 Bregman, "Na co możemy liczyć?," *DPiDŻ*, August 16, 1960, 2.

43 Bregman, "Czarne i czerwone," *DPiDŻ*, November 13, 1962, 2.

44 Bregman, "Dunkierka premiera Nehru," *DPiDŻ*, November 8, 1962, 2.

45 Bregman, "Dwa probierze," *DPiDŻ*, Sepember 6, 1960, 2; Bregman, "Pierwsze dni po wielkiej zmianie," *DPiDŻ*, February 7, 1961, 2; Bregman, "Rewolucja w Białym Domu," *DPiDŻ*, April 18, 1961, 2.

46 Bregman, "Ludzie nie są neutralni," *DPiDŻ*, April 25, 1961, 2; Bregman, "Telefon, zakładnicy i pokój," *DPiDŻ*, July 24, 1962, 2.

47 Bregman, "Nie ma tego złego," *DPiDŻ*, May 2, 1961, 2; Bregman, "Czy to ma być nowa polityka Ameryki?," *DPiDŻ*, August 22, 1961, 2.

48 Bregman, "Cudu w Wiedniu nie było...," *DPiDŻ*, June 13, 1961, 2.

ganda on issues of relations with Washington.[49] He followed and explained the political situation in Cuba to readers in real time.[50]

He bitterly commented on the 1960 UN assembly to be held, where "the old countries with a thousand-year tradition, will be represented by Soviet puppets, or, like Hungary, by the most monstrous oppressors in its history, such as Kadar, and territories that in their historical development did not exceed the 10th or 11th century in Europe, [...] will have their own representatives."[51]

He explained to readers in early 1961 the impasse over Communist China's admission to the UN.[52] This was important because China was working on its own atomic bomb, and no disarmament deal would be an option once it was banned from becoming a UN member. The issue at the time was complicated because none of the divided countries were admitted to the organization: neither West Germany, East Germany, South Korea, North Korea or any of the Vietnams. National China, on the other hand, belonged to the organization because it became part of the UN even before the Communist victory on Chinese soil. UN issues periodically returned in Bregman's[53] comments.

Bregman was a keen observer of national affairs, always showing them in a broader political context.[54] He believed that Radio Free Europe's 18-hour broadcast was a breath of freedom for the oppressed Polish nation, but above all a truth that could not be drowned out.[55]

He discussed political, economic, social, cultural events in the UK on an ongoing basis. He was particularly interested in the intricacies of political life – elections,[56] the activities of political parties,[57] successive prime ministers,[58] the granting of complete independence to India,[59] Anglo-Soviet meetings – where he insisted that "peaceful coexistence, is just a new Soviet label for the Cold War,"[60] activities regarding nuclear arms issues.[61] Bregman was

49 Bregman, "Rewolucja w strategii," *DPiDŻ*, July 3, 1962, 2.
50 Bregman, "Wojna o Kubę?," *DPiDŻ*, October 3, 1962, 2.
51 Bregman, "Czarno przed oczami," *DPiDŻ*, September 20, 1960, 2.
52 Bregman, "Chińskie cienie w ONZ," *DPiDŻ*, January 17, 1961, 2.
53 Bregman, "Parlament świata czy forum dyskusyjne?," *Tydzień Polski*, no. 38 (1962): 1.
54 Bregman, "Zwycięstwo czy klęska Nikity Chruszczowa w Polsce," *DPiDŻ*, November 25, 1959, 2.
55 Bregman, "Prawda, której nie można zagłuszyć. Gomułki wróg numer jeden," *DPiDŻ*, July 30, 1960, 1, 4.
56 Bregman, "Churchill odchodzi," *DPiDŻ*, April 7, 1955, 2; Bregman, "Wybory w Wielkiej Brytanii," *DPiDŻ*, April 27, 1955, 2; Bregman, "Rozczarowania premiera Edena," *DPiDŻ*, August 18, 1955, 2; Bregman, "Ostatni ambasador brytyjski w wolnej Warszawie," *DPiDŻ*, November 23, 1955, 2; Bregman, "Tragiczny paradoks Hugh Gaitskella," *DPiDŻ*, October 9, 1962, 2.
57 Bregman, "Rozłam byłby lepszy...," *DPiDŻ*, September 13, 1960, 2.
58 Bregman, "Nowy wiatr na Downing Street," *DPiDŻ*, December 6, 1960, 2.
59 Bregman, "Przyjaciel wart więcej od niewolnika," *DPiDŻ*, January 31, 1961, 2.
60 Bregman, "Smażone kule śnieżne," *DPiDŻ*, March 7, 1961, 2.
61 Bregman, "Mimo „trafalgarskiej" batalii – fala opada," *DPiDŻ*, September 26, 1961, 2.

particularly critical of the political statements made by Labour Party representatives during the Vietnam War (1955–1975), when they sharply criticized the United States of America for providing aid and sympathizing with pro-Western and anti-communist forces in Laos.[62] He alleged that politicians did not understand what was happening in Southeast Asia and that trying to hand Laos over to the Kremlin was a crime.

His account of the 1962 negotiations in Brussels on Britain's accession to the European Economic Community was also interesting.[63] According to him, the success was hindered by anti-European propaganda in the British Isles and the de Gaulle government in France.[64]

Bregman was also highly critical of some British historians who "fantasized" about World War II in their studies.One of these was a publication by A.J.P. Taylor titled *The Origins of The Second Word War* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1961).[65] Nevertheless, he shared the opinion of David J. Dallin, who in his work *Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin* (London: Methuen and Co., 1962), argued that Russia was an empire that must fall.[66]

He considered morally indefensible the excerpts published in the British press of diplomatic documents released in the U.S. in 1942, containing an extremely harsh assessment of British ideas at the time to acknowledge Soviet conquests on the part of U.S. diplomats.[67] It should be added that the American documents were supplemented with Polish records issued at the time by the Sikorski Institute in London. The course of events was well-known, if only from Churchill's memoirs. They show that "Roosevelt, so tough in early 1942, competed against Churchill in appeasement toward the Soviets in the following years and decisively surpassed him."[68]

He noted the publication in the winter of 1962 of two books on the issue of nuclear proliferation by British authors: the well-known politician of socialist orientation, former Minister of War in the Labour Party government – John Strachey – *On the Prevention of War* (London: Macmillan, 1962) and two journalists from the liberal daily newspaper *The Guardian* – Leonard Beaton and John Maddox – *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons* (London: The Institute of Strategic Studies of London University, 1962).[69] Introducing the subject, Bregman wrote that "the entire Labour Party, not just its left wing, and the entire Liberal Party are in favour of Britain renouncing its nuclear weapons and

62 Bregman, "Nie morderca jest winien, ale zamordowany," *DPiDŻ*, January 10, 1961, 2.

63 Bregman, "Kto wygra tę wielką batalię?," *DPiDŻ*, August 21, 1962, 2.

64 Bregman, "W stolicy Europy," *Tydzień Polski*, no. 48 (1962): 3; Bregman, "Niepomni braci zza Łaby," *DPiDŻ*, December 4, 1962, 2; Bregman, "Ci, którzy rządzą Europą," *Tydzień Polski*, no. 49 (1962): 3.

65 Bregman, "Metoda w tym szaleństwie," *DPiDŻ*, May 16, 1961, 2.

66 Bregman, "Imperium, które musi upaść," *DPiDŻ*, August 7, 1962, 2.

67 Bregman, "Moralnie nie do obrony...," *DPiDŻ*, May 23, 1961, 2.

68 Ibid.

69 Bregman, "Nieistniejąca zmora i szalone pomysły," *DPiDŻ*, December 12, 1962, 2.

leaving them to allied America. These two parties have a majority vote in society."[70] He criticized Strachey's idea for the United States of America to form an alliance with the USSR to jointly thwart further work by other countries to acquire nuclear weapons. According to other authors, only China had a realistic chance of joining the club of nuclear powers between 1963 and 1975. Bregman showed that India, Canada, Sweden and Israel had the same capabilities.

In detail and with expertise, Bregman discussed the published new secret documents of German diplomacy, in broad political contexts of various countries, covering the years 1918–1945 – *Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918–1945. Series D, Volume XI* (London: HMSO, 1961).[71]

He engaged in substantive polemics with various views of émigré journalists, such as Wacław A. Zbyszewski, Zdzisław Stahl, Zygmunt Zaremba on the issues of the Polish diaspora in the United Kingdom and concerning Poland.[72]

As the Berlin crisis developed and deepened, Bregman intensified his commentaries concerning the essence of the processes taking place in the summer of 1961.[73] The situation posed a real threat of another war, which made Bregman readdress these issues.[74] He was of the opinion that the West should prepare a plan to create a wide neutral belt encompassing Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Germany – a plan to restore independence to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and reunify Germany on mutually acceptable terms. From under his pen emerged the fundamental question of whether "the United States should risk nuclear war for the defence of Berlin."[75]

In the context of international political tension, Bregman argued in his articles that the issue of German reunification is important to the interests of Poland.[76] He argued with émigré supporters of the idea that German reunification was not in Poland's interest, and believed that the current situation perpetuates the status quo and condemns Poland to remain in communist captivity.[77]

On the first anniversary of the division of Berlin by the wall on August 13, 1961, Bregman wrote that it "became the most glaring symbol of communist tyranny and the

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70 Ibid.

71 Bregman, "Ile milionów za Suwałki?," *DPiDŻ*, June 20, 1961, 2.

72 Bregman, "August Zaleski cz. 6," *DPiDŻ*, March 31, 1955, 2; Bregman, "August Zaleski cz. 7," *DPiDŻ*, April 1, 1955, 2; Bregman, "Fantazje dwóch panów Z.," *DPiDŻ*, December 13, 1960, 2; Bregman, "Blaski i cienie „Sowietologii"," *DPiDŻ*, July 10, 1962, 2; Bregman, "Nie wszechpotężni," *DPiDŻ*, January 24, 1961, 2.

73 Bregman, "Umierać za Berlin?," *DPiDŻ*, June 27, 1961, 2.

74 Bregman, "Wojna znów instrumentem polityki?," *DPiDŻ*, July 4, 1961, 2; Bregman, "Przygotowania wojskowe nie wystarczą," *DPiDŻ*, July 11, 1961, 2.

75 Bregman, "Nerwy słabe i mocne," *DPiDŻ*, July 25, 1961, 2.

76 Bregman, "Berlin, Niemcy i interes Polski," *DPiDŻ*, September 5, 1961, 2.

77 Bregman, "„Argument" nie do przyjęcia," *DPiDŻ*, January 29, 1962, 2.

tragic division of the world, and at the same time of the bankruptcy of communism, which will solve nothing."[78]

In October and November 1962, he anxiously reported on the new crisis over Berlin, and criticized Western politicians who proclaimed that "Berlin is not worth the war," who thereby deepened the lack of unity between the allies, which the Soviets painstakingly exploited with propaganda.[79] He expanded his deliberations with publications in the self-contained Saturday-Sunday supplement to DPiDŻ, *Tydzień Polski*.[80] He analyzed the inevitable confrontation, as well as the mistakes of Kennedy and calculations of Khrushchev.[81]

Bregman monitored the policies of Charles de Gaulle and Poland's role in France's international policy at the time.[82] He stigmatized attacks by the French terrorist group Organisation de l'Armée Secrète, OAS, which operated from 1961 to 1962 in France and Algeria,[83] also the failed assassination attempt on President Charles de Gaule in 1962.[84] He explained the causes of the tensions between Paris and Washington caused by the refusal of the United States of America to help France obtain its own nuclear weapons.[85]

As regards the development of television, he was also preoccupied with the possibilities, problems and dangers of a free press in various countries in Western Europe and the Americas.[86] He was an optimist, believing that, despite the many difficulties, crises and pressures it must resist, the press of the free world remains a powerhouse.

In the early 1960s, Bregman analyzed various aspects of European unity, mainly matters of the political forms of European union, Britain's participation, in general the borders and defense of Europe and its position in the world.[87] As a proponent of the idea of

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78 Bregman, "Pierwszy rok berlińskiego muru," *DPiDŻ*, August 14, 1962, 2.

79 Bregman, "Berlin - kiech znowu burza?," *Tydzień Polski*, no. 42 (1962): 3.

80 For a more extensive discussion of *Tydzień Polski*, see: Jolanta Chwastyk-Kowalczyk, *Londyński „Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza" w latach 1944–1989. Gazeta codzienna jako środek przekazu komunikatów kulturowych* (Kielce: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Humanistyczno-Przyrodniczego Jana Kochanowskiego, 2008), 86–94.

81 Bregman, "Punkt zwrotny," *DPiDŻ*, October 29, 1962, 2; Bregman, "Jak „pomóc" Chruszczowowi," *DPiDŻ*, November 21, 1962, 2.

82 Bregman, "Między Paryżem a Warszawą," *DPiDŻ*, June 26, 1962, 2.

83 Bregman, "Jak to możliwe," *DPiDŻ*, April 3, 1962, 2.

84 Bregman, "Pięć centymetrów od katastrofy," *DPiDŻ*, September 4, 1962, 2.

85 Bregman, "Kto ma rację: De Gaulle czy Kennedy," *DPiDŻ*, June 19, 1962, 2; Bregman, "Od króla słońca do gen. De Gaulle'a," *DPiDŻ*, July 7, 1962, 2; Bregman, "Nikłe szanse urzeczywistnienia wizji europejskiej de Gaulle'a. Europa nie chce niczyjej hegemonii," *DPiDŻ*, July 14, 1962, 1; Bregman, "Na napoleońskim szlaku," *Tydzień Polski*, no. 35 (1962): 6.

86 Bregman, "Sukcesy, problemy i bolączki wolnej prasy," *DPiDŻ*, July 28, 1962, 2.

87 Bregman, "Zjednoczona Europa i przyszłość Polski," *DPiDŻ*, September 12, 1962, 2; Bregman, "Polska, Niemcy, zjednoczona Europa," *DPiDŻ*, September 25, 1962, 2; Bregman, "Czy odżyje idea armii europejskiej?," *DPiDŻ*, October 16, 1962, 2.

European unification, he saw its positive consequences for Poland: regaining independence from Russia, recognition of the Polish-German border, and finally benefits in the economy. The ideal situation for him was the participation of a free Poland in a united Europe.[88] Years before Poland's accession as a member of the European Union (May 2004), although he knew it was a distant process, Bregman predicted that full European unification would end the centuries-old Polish-German antagonism. He argued with conviction that the more closely West Germany was fused with other Western European countries, the more difficult it would be for them to put forward revisionist slogans.

Bregman supported the idea of creating a European strike force that would avoid the proliferation of independent national nuclear forces in Europe.[89] He considered it natural to combine British and French capabilities. He called for reminding the free world that Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, Romanians, and Baltic nations are the same Europeans as Belgians, French, Italians, and English. He also called for maintaining and developing economic, cultural ties. In the context of the functioning of the European Community, Bregman outlined the direction of German policy in the 1960s, noting that while German-French friendship would remain an important element, cooperation with the United States of America and the United Kingdom would be equally crucial.[90] He predicted a change in Germany's policy toward Eastern European countries, especially Poland, and proclaimed the twilight of the French language on the continent.[91]

At the end of 1962, Bregman compiled a summary of international politics in the world of the past period in *Tydzień Polski*.[92] He claimed that the outcome looked more optimistic than for previous years: the Cuba issue settled, the clear military superiority of the United States of America, the end of the war in Algeria, the success of the Common Market, the failures in the communist world – the reduction of Soviet influence in Africa and Asia, the bankruptcy of the policy of threats in Berlin. On the negative side, he noted: the worsening of the Soviet-Chinese conflict and the crisis in agriculture.

Conclusion

While observing the ongoing state of rivalry between the two ideological blocs, the Communist and the free world since 1947, Bregman sought to comment on the major events of the Cold War. The last major event of this period, to which he devoted his at-

88 Bregman, "Nasz program europejski," *DPiDŻ*, October 23, 1962, 2.
89 Bregman, "Czy odżyje idea armii europejskiej?," *DPiDŻ*, October 16, 1962, 2.
90 Bregman, "Koniec ery Adenauera," *DPiDŻ*, December 18, 1962, 2.
91 Bregman, "Europa idzie do szkoły," *Tydzień Polski*, no. 50 (1962): 3.
92 Bregman, "Czy świat się zmienił w 1962 roku?," *Tydzień Polski*, no. 52 (1962): 1.

tention for three years, was the Vietnam War, which began in 1965, when U.S. military forces defended South Vietnam against an invasion by North Vietnam, supported by the communist states – the USSR and China. Bregman, who died in 1967, did not live to see its end in 1975.

His journalistic output in the years 1959–1962, when he was editor-in-chief of DPiDŻ, was consistent, coherent and sought to create the opinion of the Polish émigrés on international politics. It should be added, however, that Bregman had a de facto influence on the magazine's policy until his death in 1967.

Bregman – as editor-in-chief, appreciated debuting journalistic talents. Krystyna Cywińska recalled the following words: "She is being a bit controversial. But let her try. I tried. We hit it off."[93] She said he was guided by his own judgement of the international political situation, away from stereotypes, and preached views that were unpopular at the time. "He wrote about and promoted reconciliation with Germany, when hatred and bitterness, understandable at the time, made us all unreasonable. And of all the predictions of the future, the ones that was most stigmatized in the emigration past have turned out to be true."[94]

Katarzyna Bzowska-Budd believed that the creation of the Saturday edition of *Tydzień Polski*[95] – a self-contained supplement of DPiDŻ, was an excellent idea.[96] In her opinion, Bregman, "a journalist of real standing," taking over as editor-in-chief of DPiDŻ made it a magazine full of flair because "he looked at Poland in the context of the whole of Europe, not limiting himself to the emigration perspective."[97] She recalled that Bregman conducted many radio interviews – mainly for Radio Free Europe with politicians, primarily Englishmen. He had a great sense of who was worth talking to. Even after his death, many of his interlocutors made significant political careers, becoming ministers and members of the House of Commons. The interviews were conducted in the studio in English and then translated into Polish.

Bregman was also described as a leading publicist of DPiDŻ by Józef Garlinski, who had been publishing in *Tydzień Polski* from 1961.[98] Bogdan Czaykowski and Bolesław Sulik praised him as such in their study entitled *Polacy w Wielkiej Brytanii*.[99] They acknowledged

93 Krystyna Cywińska, "Kibicowanie," in *Dopóki jest „Dziennik"*, 147.
94 Ibid., 152.
95 For more on this supplement, see: Chwastyk-Kowalczyk, *Londyński „Dziennik Polski i Dziennik Żołnierza"*, 88–96.
96 Katarzyna Bzowska, "'Tygodniowe' początki," in *Dopóki jest „Dziennik"*, 223.
97 Bzowska, "Redaktorzy, których znałam," in *Dopóki jest „Dziennik"*, 308.
98 Józef Garliński, "Moja publicystyka na łamach „Tygodnia"," in *Dopóki jest „Dziennik"*, 255.
99 Bohdan Czaykowski and Bolesław Sulik, *Polacy w Wielkiej Brytanii* (Paris: Instytut Literacki, 1961), 515.

that during this period *Dziennik* was a daily newspaper "reporting impartially and reliably on world and domestic events, and providing a platform for a broad exchange of opinions."[100]

Bregman as an anti-communist, argued for reconciliation with Germany. This international relations expert was one of the few publicists in exile who managed to make a name for himself outside the circle of the Polish diaspora. He was gifted with impressive diligence and left behind countless articles scattered in the émigré press, English, French, Swiss and German journals.

The perspective of decades separating his insights, observations and analyses, allows us to consider his journalism as far-sighted, his comments on the current foreign policy practiced by the countries of the two blocs, the free world and the communist one in the international arena, as accurate, and his predictions as on-point. He was right that eventually the hegemony of the Soviets would collapse, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe would free themselves from the supremacy of communist influence, and that a European Union would be formed, with new democracies joining it. He fully understood the problems facing the modern media and that journalists are absolutely essential to the functioning of all democracies. The tragic timeliness of Bregman's anti-communist stance and warnings directed to the politicians of the free Western world against the Soviets' imperialist inclinations and their quest for restitution was reflected in the occupation of Crimea by Russian troops in 2014, as well as the unleashing of war by the Russians in Ukraine on February 22, 2022. After the schisms and divisions that have taken place so far in the 20th and 21st centuries, Europe appears united for the first time and, together with the US, is trying to remedy the situation that threatens a third world war. Bregman with all his journalism, argued that one should only talk to the Soviets from a position of strength and constantly rearm, because only such arguments will stop Russia from trying to change the established world order.

Aleksander Bregman died on August 8, 1967 in London. His journalistic heritage is still waiting to be fully explored and described.

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100 Ibid., 125.

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Materials

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Kultura and Its Forgotten University in Exile

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Abstract: *Instytut Literacki Kultura* (ILK) was the core of anti-communist resistance during the Cold War: it promoted independent political thought and understanding among central and eastern European countries while showing resilience against Communist regimes. Although ILK is mostly known for its monthly exile magazine *Kultura*, edited in Polish, its founder-editor Jerzy Giedroyc had anticipated another project in addition to a Literary Institute after the war. Foreseeing a long period of exile because of the Soviet occupation of Poland, he envisioned setting up a university for young Poles. His idea, which was delayed a few years because of the beginning of the Cold War, developed into a project with Józef Czapski to create a university for young refugees fleeing their communist countries from behind the Iron Curtain. After three years of preparation within ILK, the Free Europe University in Exile and its study center, *Collège de l'Europe libre*, were established in 1951 under the auspices of the American anti-communist organization National Committee for a Free Europe, yet Giedroyc and Czapski were excluded from its activities. The aim of this article is to trace the history of this essentially unknown initiative of the Polish exile group using archival holdings in Europe and the United States, and to highlight its importance within ILK.
Keywords: *Kultura*, Jerzy Giedroyc, refugee students, university in exile, National Committee for a Free Europe, research, archives

Instytut Literacki Kultura (Kultura Literary Institute), established in Maisons-Laffitte, France, was the intellectual lighthouse of Polish emigration during the Cold War that sought to reach communist Poland behind the Iron Curtain, as well as the Polish diaspora around the "free world." Founded by Jerzy Giedroyc in collaboration with his intimate wartime friends, Józef Czapski, Zofia and Zygmunt Hertz as well as Gustaw Herling-Grudziński, it outgrew itself into a sort of think-tank on the future of central and eastern Europe under Soviet occupation throughout 637 issues of its monthly magazine *Kultura*, all meticulously crafted by Giedroyc and complete with 172 issues of *Zeszyty Historyczne* (a journal devoted to topics regarding Poland's history) and hundreds of books from leading contemporary Polish and foreign writers.[1] By upholding independ-

[1] These publications are available online: https://kulturaparyska.com/pl/publication/2/year/1947, accessed July 13, 2023.

ent political thought as well as promoting understanding and reconciliation among eastern European nations, the "categorically anti-communist" and "categorically anti-nationalist" Polish exile group – as Czapski defined it in a French documentary film[2] – became the core of anti-totalitarian resistance for over half a century.[3]

In addition to establishing a Literary Institute, Giedroyc had another brainchild at the end of the war that received almost no attention: a university for Polish youth who were forced to live in foreign lands, outside of Soviet-occupied Poland. With the beginning of the Cold War, the idea then expanded to include exiled students from central and eastern Europe following the Communist takeover. The Free Europe University in Exile (FEUE) finally came to fruition in 1951. Founded under the auspices of the American anti-communist organization National Committee for a Free Europe (NCFE) in New York City, it helped approximately two hundred exiled youth per year to gain access to higher education in western Europe.

Beyond its noble aim of saving the intelligentsia from the destructive consequences of Sovietization behind the Iron Curtain and building the foundation for lasting peace within central and eastern European nations, which was Giedroyc and Czapski's original idea, the American-sponsored University in Exile also pursued an openly political aim: to train future liberal, democratic-minded leaders among these refugee students in case the peoples' democracies in the Soviet bloc collapsed. This task was entrusted to the FEUE's study center called *Collège de l'Europe libre* (ang. Free Europe College), which opened its doors on November 12, 1951 at the *Château de Pourtalès* in the eastern suburb of Strasbourg in France. The study center, which also served as a housing facility, offered the refugee fellows "national seminars" to keep their national sentiment alive while in exile, as well as a series of summer lectures held by both Western and exiled lecturers, along with their university studies.

Although Giedroyc and Czapski planted the first seeds in establishing the FEUE and the *Collège de l'Europe libre* without "any shadow of personal ambition,"[4] both were left

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2 Documentary film entitled "Comte Joseph Czapski" in the collection "Archives du XXème siècle", directed by Philippe Collin and produced by *Société française de Production* in 1971 (in French), file CPD06021230, Archives of the French National Audiovisual Institute - Inathèque.

3 The French Association of *Instytut Literacki Kultura*, that inherited the task of preserving and shedding light on *Kultura*'s intellectual heritage after Giedroyc's passing, published the first comprehensive anthology devoted to the Polish exile group's multifaceted achievements this year, with more than twenty essays written by international scholars: Anna Bernhardt, Anna Ciesielska-Ribard, Iwona H. Pugacewicz, ed., *Penser la démocratie et agirenexil : Les leçons de Jerzy Giedroyc et de Kultura, 1947–2000* [Thinking Democracy and Acting in Exile: Lessons from Jerzy Giedroyc and *Kultura*] (Paris: Association Institut Littéraire Kultura/ Centre de civilisation polonaise Sorbonne Université 2023), 560.

4 Letter from Czapski to Burnham (in French), 24 October 1950, Archives *Instytut Literacki Kultura* - ILK, KOR RED Burnham T.1.

out of the institutions' endeavors. The story is all the more interesting as the NCFE and its activities – the well-known Radio Free Europe (Polish: *Radio Wolna Europa*), exile organizations of all kinds across the "free world," research and publication services, and fundraising campaigns – were all American Cold War assets, secretly run and financed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). They covertly took part in the United States' strategy to roll back Soviet power and liberate the satellite countries from the USSR's orbit by means of psychological warfare.

The *Kolegium Wolnej Europy* (English: Free Europe College) is addressed in only five articles in *Kultura* from 1952 to 1955. Nothing else was written about it. This is not only because both Giedroyc and Czapski were excluded from the institutions, even though the magazine remained their only chance to speak out, but also because they were aware of the NCFE's secret governmental support, and they had to keep silent. Organizing the university and contacting the NCFE was confidential and required the utmost care. If the CIA's involvement had been revealed, it would have put everyone involved in the project in a compromising position. Even more, *Kultura* never received any financial support from the CIA, as the exile magazine's life-long contributor Konstanty Jelenski stated in his 1981 article in the French intellectual review called *Le Débat*.[5] At the same time, "foreign money is nothing to be ashamed of," if it is provided openly and in the form of a gift, as Juliusz Mieroszewski, *Kultura*'s political writer and correspondent in London, wrote in issue No. 3/185 in 1963.

The history of the FEUE and its study center – especially its early years when Giedroyc and Czapski came up with the idea and the NCFE took it over – demonstrates that a dichotomy existed between central and eastern European emigration networks and the United States. Although émigré groups considered Americans their allies in breaking down totalitarian regimes behind the Iron Curtain, exiled voices struggled to be heard and to stay independent when faced with the overwhelming influence of the U.S. Giedroyc never overcame this. As he said in a conversation with Barbara Toruńczyk in 1981, "the only things the West can give you are tears and money."[6] In his autobiographical book, Giedroyc acknowledged the NCFE's support, but also expressed his reservations about Free Europe's interference in émigré affairs: "It is unfortunate that the Committee's archives are not accessible to researchers; if that were the case, it would be possible to say to what extent my reservations are justified, which would also help to dispel certain legends."[7]

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5 Konstanty Jelenski, "Kultura, la Pologne en exil," *Le Débat*, no. 9 (1981): 65.

6 *Penser la démocratie*, 493. Piotr Kłoczowski quotes Timothy Snyder who cited Giedroyc in his book co-authored with Tony Judt. Tony Judt and Timothy Snyder, *Thinking the Twentieth Century* (London: Penguin Books, 2012).

7 Jerzy Giedroyc, *Autobiografia na cztery ręce*, 4th ed. (Warsaw: Czytelnik, 2006), 344.

The aim of this article is to provide insight into the materials related to the FEUE and the *Collège de l'Europe libre*, guiding its readers from one archival collection and record to another. It brings together a wide range of sources with the purpose of providing a comprehensive history of the University in Exile and its importance within *Kultura*. The archival sources will be presented in chronological order according to the origins and history of the University in Exile, summarizing the results of more than 10 years of research, based on records disseminated around the world and written in English, French and Polish, creating challenging language barriers for a non-Polish speaking researcher.[8]

Tracing the University in Exile in the Archival Holdings in France and Poland

At the onset of this research, it was initially unknown that Giedroyc and Czapski had initiated the FEUE and the *Collège de l'Europe libre*. An aide-mémoire on the university project from 1950, located in the Departmental Archives of Bas-Rhin in Strasbourg, helped reveal the origin of these endeavors. According to the document's introduction, the idea for the university was developed in 1948 by *Kultura* – "an independent and progressivist group of Polish intellectual émigrés" – and supported by the Congress of Cultural Freedom.[9] Moreover, the American intellectual James Burnham also mentioned the subject in his latest book. This brief information led us to the exile magazine and its archival holdings at *Instytut Literacki Kultura* (ILK) in Maisons-Laffitte, France.

The keystone in tracing the history of the University in Exile is the relationship between Giedroyc and Czapski. They first met in the 1930s at literary salon meetings with Russian-Polish émigrés in Poland. They crossed paths again in 1942 in the Middle East, where thousands of Polish soldiers and civilians had been evacuated from the Soviet Union after the Sikorski-Mayski agreement. Czapski was the chief officer of information and propaganda of the Polish Second Army, while Giedroyc supervised the periodicals and books section under his control. From then on, they became inseparable for the rest of their lives. Even though Giedroyc and Czapski spent much of their time together afterwards when living with the Hertz couple and Czapski's sister, Maria Czapska, at *Kultura*'s headquarters in Maisons-Laffitte, their correspondence in Polish during their time

8 On the FEUE and the Collège de l'Europe libre, cf. Veronika Durin-Hornyik, "Kultura séduit l'élite américaine (1948–1958)", in *Penser la démocratie*, 305–336.

9 Aide-mémoire with a letter from Professor Redslob to the Secretary of University of Strasbourg's Rector (in French), 19 February 1951, Departmental Archives of Bas-Rhin, Rectorate of Strasbourg, 1161 W, box 43.

apart – located at ILK and in the process of publication[10] – provides insight into their concerns and social interactions.

The mission of the Polish Second Army was not limited to defeating the German troops in Italy. It also took care of thousands of civilians: elderly people, women, youth, and adolescents. The army set up high schools and technical colleges across the Middle East for Polish boys and girls who had received no education since the beginning of the war. Young Poles who passed their baccalaureate at these schools were encouraged to continue their studies at Italian universities. Czapski first paid tribute to this extraordinary educational endeavor in the Middle East in the 1965 German edition of his book entitled *Inhuman Land* (*Na nieludzkiej ziemi*), first published in Polish in 1949, and later in the French documentary film as well.

Education was key for Giedroyc. After the successful campaign at Monte Cassino in May 1944, his duty consisted of training soldiers while the Polish army was stationed in Italy. On February 9, 1945, he wrote a long letter to Czapski, who had been waiting for a new assignment in Rome, to complain about the pro-Russian nature of Polish films he had to show to young soldiers and its propaganda effect on those who no longer knew Poland. Giedroyc understood the devastating effects of Soviet indoctrination in the current political context – the insurrection in Warsaw, the "liberation" of Poland from Nazi occupation by the Red Army, and the Yalta Conference – which sealed the fate of Poles living outside and inside the country. Further on in the letter, he wrote of his university project for young Poles that he had already suggested to Czapski:

> I can see that you're not very enthusiastic about the university project. That's where the Domaradzkis and Maurers come in. Keep in mind that the university is about creating and influencing a new generation of elite. It's up to you to do it and consult me personally. How nice it would be to have the magazine and a publishing house in Rome.[11]

As a result, Giedroyc founded the *Instytut Literacki* in Rome in 1946, which he relocated to France the following year to be closer to both émigré circles and Poland. The Literary Institute and its team moved to a building that Czapski rented to store the records of his wartime service on Avenue Corneille in Maisons-Laffitte, a western suburb of Paris.[12] By 1947, the merged second and third issue of *Kultura* had already been published in Paris. While the launch of the magazine had priority over the university project, the latter remained of equal importance to Giedroyc.

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10 The first volume was published this year: Rafał Habielski, ed., *Jerzy Giedroyc – Józef Czapski, Listy 1943–1948* (Warsaw: Więź, 2023), 825.

11 Letter from Giedroyc to Czapski (in Polish), 9 February 1945, ILK, PoJCz 19/01.

12 Konstanty Jelenski, "Le rôle du mensuel *Kultura* en France," *Revue du Nord*, Special Issue, No. 4 (1988): 222.

On January 4, 1948, Czapski met James Burnham at a conference hosted by Charles de Gaulle. His meeting with the American intellectual led to *Kultura*'s participation at the Congress for Cultural Freedom two years later.[13] Czapski's first letter to Burnham refers to their meeting in Saint Étienne. Decades later, Czapski remembered the "chance meeting" he had with Burnham, even if he had forgotten the details of that meeting.[14] Giedroyc also recalled that Czapski met Burnham "by chance at a conference of de Gaulle in 1948."[15] Thanks to a video recording available online, we can watch de Gaulle's visit to southeastern France.[16] Attended by tens of thousands of people and given a presidential welcome, the general was officially there as the party leader of the recently established *Rassemblement du peuple français*. How was Czapski able to meet, at a political rally of such scale, the iconic Burnham, former Trotskyist and ardent anticommunist, who owed his world-wide reputation to his book *The Managerial Revolution* – published in 1941 and inspiring such novels as George Orwell's *1984* – in which he predicted a social evolution into technocracy instead of capitalism and socialism? The answer is the man who can be seen on de Gaulle's left throughout the footage: André Malraux.

Czapski's personal archives, located at the National Museum of Krakow, Poland, provide insight into his correspondence with Malraux. Czapski met the French intellectual in Paris during the interwar period, who, after the war, entered politics on de Gaulle's side as a disillusioned Communist and fellow traveler. Czapski first visited Malraux when General Anders appointed the former as a representative of the Polish Second Army in Paris in 1945 to defend the interests of the Polish government-in-exile against the official recognition and thus gaining influence of the communist-led Lublin government. Malraux received his Polish friend with "a sentiment of fellowship"[17] and support-

13 For more details, read Veronika Durin-Hornyik's essay "The Free Europe University in Exile, Inc. and the Collège de l'Europe libre (1951–1958)," in *The Inauguration of 'Organized Political Warfare': The Cold War Organizations sponsored by the National Committee for a Free Europe/Free Europe Committee*, ed. Katalin Kádár Lynn (Saint Helena: Helena History Press, 2013), 440–51; and in Polish: Andrzej S. Kowalczyk, *Wena do polityki. O Giedroyciu i Mieroszewskim* (Warsaw: Więź, 2015), 221–47. For additional reading in Polish, cf. Miroslaw A. Supruniuk, *Przyjaciele Wolności: Kongres Wolności Kultury i Polacy* (Warsaw: DIG, 2008), 176.

14 Józef Czapski, "James Burnham (1905–1987)", *Kultura*, no. 10/481 (1987): 138.

15 Giedroyc's note to Priscilla L. Buckley on Burnham's role in the support of *Kultura*, sent on July 1, 1987 (in English). ILK, KOR RED Burnham T.2. The note was later published in the special issue of *National Review* dedicated to Burnham's life (11 September 1987, Vol. XXXIX, no. 17), without the comment "by chance", 35–6.

16 "General Charles de Gaulle at St Etienne," British Movietone, accessed July 13, 2023, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FWnbZ5NdF6M.

17 Józef Czapski, "Malraux", *Kultura*, no. 1/352–2/353 (1977): 30–5. The English translation is available online: Józef Czapski, "Malraux", Kultura. Szkice. Opowiadania. Sprawozdania," accessed July 13, 2023, https://kulturaparyska.com/en/topic-article/malraux.

ed Czapski and *Kultura* from 1947 onwards, as their correspondence in Krakow and Maisons-Laffitte testifies.

Their friendship aligned not only their artistic interests but also their political ones. De Gaulle's political party openly advocated an anticommunist policy, which was a bold political program in a country where the communists were holding civil disobedience strikes, the NKVD was openly kidnapping people in the streets, and Stalin's USSR was enjoying international recognition for its role in ending World War II. Malraux acknowledged Czapski's recollections of the brutality of the Soviet Union and the disappearance of ten thousand Polish soldiers in Soviet camps, as well as the importance of launching *Kultura* as the only Polish exile magazine.

Simultaneously, intellectuals close to de Gaulle, in particular Raymond Aron, became aware of Burnham's work and promulgated it in France. The American intellectual, a critic of the USSR, was also interested in the development of international relations and the polarization of political forces in Europe. With this convergence of interests between French and American anticommunist forces at the beginning of the Cold War, Burnham traveled to France in late 1947 (the first time he had been to Europe since 1932) and attended de Gaulle's political rally on January 4, 1948. It was thus through Malraux – "a man of incessant action"[18] – that Czapski met Burnham in Saint Étienne.[19]

As a result of this meeting, *Kultura* and Burnham began their correspondence on April 9, 1948. Czapski and Giedroyc wrote letters in French or translated them into English, while Burnham understood French perfectly well but always answered in English. The decades of correspondence are divided into two periods, and the period 1948–1952 contains almost twice as many records (300) as the 1953–1987 folder (175). This clearly reflects the dynamics in the early Cold War period and the emergence of anticommunist forces, anti-USSR politics, and organizations on a transatlantic scale. Moreover, the Burnham-*Kultura* correspondence very quickly refers to the university project and the role it was expected to play in the ongoing political context, which underlines the fact that it had received much attention from the Polish exile group. On September 23, 1948, Czapski wrote the following:

> If America does not want Central Europe to turn against itself in the event of a conflict, it must find a way to counterbalance the enormous amount of hatred and denigration in the propaganda released by the press at Moscow's will. But then America must create centers where thought, science, and intellectual practice can exist for the people there [i.e. in central and eastern Europe]. This is what gave us the idea for an American University in Europe for displaced youth and for those fleeing

18 Ibid.

19 At this occasion, Burnham met Malraux as well which led to their friendship and collaboration – they co-authored *The Case for de Gaulle: A dialogue between Andre Malraux and James Burnham*, published in early 1948.

> from behind the Iron Curtain. Allow me to send you the project. I will not forget the impression I had when I left Soviet Russia and discovered an admirable and exemplary American hospital in Mashhad on the border of Afghanistan, but even more, we admired the American University in Beirut where Arabs, Jews, and Poles could study freely. Remember that Central Europe is moving towards barbarization. All the elites were massacred or deported by either the Germans or Russians, and the youth who are eager to learn only receive an education distorted by Soviet propaganda. (...) [The idea would be] a great American university where young Americans could study the problems of Europe alongside youth from behind the Iron Curtain who have experienced Russian communism and its destruction in Poland, Hungary, or Romania, with economics and history professors, and professors from these central European countries.[20]

Burnham became increasingly enthusiastic about the university project, which he propagated in the United States at Czapski's request. From the outset of his relationship with Czapski and Giedroyc, and because of his appreciation and unconditional trust in them given Malraux's introduction, Burnham made it no secret that he had extensive contacts in the American government and military. Burnham was not only acquainted with the American elite but was himself trying to shape the US government's Cold War policy. His early 1950 book entitled *The Coming Defeat of Communism* called for an offensive politico-subversive American policy against the USSR and mentioned a project – implicitly referring to *Kultura* – which was "put forward in explicit detail by a number of refugees, now centered in Paris, for the foundation of an East European Institute, or University."[21] Meanwhile, in 1949 he was secretly recruited by the Office of Project Coordination (OPC), a top-secret unit within the CIA under the direction of Frank G. Wisner, whose mission consisted of formulating and pursuing psychological warfare against the USSR and its satellite countries to dismantle Communist regimes.[22]

Reciprocally, at the turn of 1949–1950, *Kultura* adopted Burnham's political theory called "one world," one of the different concepts that the exile magazine published concerning the future of Iron Curtain countries and their liberation from the Soviet occupation. It called for the United States to take an active role in safeguarding peace and saving the world from the Soviet Union's threatening physical and cultural destruction, as well as strengthening and mobilizing Western societies to fight communism.[23] *Kultura* not only adopted Burnham's theory but published excerpts from his book called *The Struggle for the World* (1947) in five serial issues (No. 9/26, 1949 – No. 5/31, 1950) and the book itself (*Walka o świat*) in 1950.

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20 Letter from Czapski to Burnham (in French), 23 September 1948, ILK, KOR RED, Burnham T.1

21 James Burnham, *The Coming Defeat of Communism* (London: Johnathan Cape, 1950), 202–4.

22 Daniel Kelly, *James Burnham and the Struggle for the World: A Life* (Wilmington: ISI Books, 2002), 149–53.

23 Janusz Korek, *Paradoksy paryskiej „Kultury": Styl i tradycje myślenia politycznego* (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 2008), 92–6 and 111–7.

Fig. 1. A rare photograph showing the inner circle of *Kultura* with James Burnham on his visit to the Literary Institute on Avenue Corneille in Maisons-Laffitte. From left to right: Jerzy Giedroyc, James Burnham, Zygmunt Hertz, Józef Czapski, Zofia Hertz, Maria Czapska, and the writer Czeslaw Milosz (*Instytut Literacki Kultura*, Sygn. FIL00838, fot. Henryk Giedroyc).

Czapski's trip to North America in early 1950 changed the fate of *Kultura*'s university project. The correspondence between Czapski and Giedroyc – written with encoded reference to people for fear of being persecuted by Soviet and Polish secret services – contains breathtaking accounts of the "Foreign Minister" of *Kultura*'s countless efforts to advertise the exile magazine and other projects on American soil. Thanks to Burnham's support, lots of doors opened for Czapski, including the inner circles of the National Committee for a Free Europe (NCFE), which was covertly a psychological operation run by Wisner's OPC. In New York, Czapski met the NCFE's key members in their private residences and at the committee's office at the Empire State Building. These included Joseph C. Grew (Chairman of the Board of Directors), Frank Altschul (Treasurer), Dewitt C. Poole (President), Frederic R. Dolbeare (Secretary), and Allen W. Dulles (Chairman of the NCFE's executive committee), who was the liaison between Free Europe and the OPC.

Czapski was enlivened by his visit to the United States, as various archives testify. His essays were published in the 1950 issues of *Kultura* alongside his drawings of American cities and landscapes, and his personal diary – located in the National Museum of Krakow – contains sketches of places he visited and memos of meetings he held with, among others, Burnham as well as Free Europe representatives.[24] He literally found himself at the center of the American elite, just as he portrayed himself at the top of Rockefeller Center in the heart of Manhattan, holding a *Kultura* flag in his hand, on a postcard sent to Giedroyc during the tumultuous meetings with the NCFE.

As for Giedroyc, he assembled all the press clippings about Czapski's meetings with the Polish diaspora and American academic audiences and put them in a book, kept now at ILK. However, Czapski's talks with the representatives of the leading American anticommunist organization did not lead to any results, except Dulles' slight interest in the university project. Consequently, Burnham took *Kultura*'s project into his own hands. He confidentially informed Czapski about a project in progress as follows: "He [i.e. Burnham] plans to build a group of about ten people, without a single opportunist, who could start an anti-Soviet business on a large scale. He said that we could bring people in and, if all goes well, it may be a start... of the institute."[25]

This led Czapski and Giedroyc to attend the first Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) meeting in West-Berlin between June 26–30, 1950, which was secretly created by Burnham's efforts within the OPC. It was on this occasion that Czapski publicly

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24 A selection from Czapski's diary has been published in an album entitled *Jozef Czapski: Wybrane strony, Z dzienników 1942–1991* (Warsaw: Instytut Dokumentacji i Studiów nad Literaturą Polską, 2010), vol. 1, which contains references to his meetings with Burnham as well as with Poole and Altschul on behalf of the NCFE in 1950 (p. 70), and later in 1951, on the *Collège de l'Europe libre* (p. 107).

25 Letter from Czapski to Giedroyc (in Polish), 10 March 1950, ILK, PoJCz 19/03.

Fig. 2. Józef Czapski's postcard from New York City to Jerzy Giedroyc in Maisons-Laffitte on March 18, 1950, portraying himself at the top of Rockefeller Center during his tumultuous meetings with the National Committee for a Free Europe's key members. On one of these occasions, Allen W. Dulles became aware of the university project that the NCFE established on Dulles' initiative in 1951 (*Instytut Literacki Kultura*, PoJCz 19/03).

presented the idea of creating a university for exiled youth, anticipating the loss of their cultures due to the destructive Sovietization behind the Iron Curtain. The ILK's digital photograph collection takes us back in time to witness this historic moment.[26] The project was then approved at the first CCF meeting, and a University Commission was elected at the CCF's second meeting in Brussels on November 30, 1950.[27] Headed by Czapski in Europe and Burnham in the United States, the commission's task was to lay the groundwork for the future university.



UNIVERSITY for STUDENTS from BEHIND IRON CURTAIN'S NATIONALITIES

The existance of an University College for the youth recruited among the emigrants from the countries behind the Iron Curtain would enable to educate and bring up a group of young people in the aim of European unity and antinationalistic feelings. In future this people could act as the best element fighting for freedom and reconstruction of Eastern Europe based on new fundament. Beside it would bring a strong propaganda effect.

The students should recruit from all behind Iron Curtain nationalities - not excluding Russians.

The number of students would depend from material resources - but not less than 1000. The University has provide board and lodgin for the students, as the material situation of emigrants is bad. The system of boardinhouses has also pedagogical aspect. The lecturers should be recruited among emigrant-scientists as well as American professors. The management should be in American hands.

The University should be attached to an existing university what brings the possibility to reduce the general costs and to use existing faculties, laboratories etc. Two special faculties, most essential for the University, should be formed:

1. Faculty of Law-Economics and Social science
2. Faculty of Literature and History of East European Countries

The most suitable place for such a University seems to be one of French provincial University Colleges

Since over a year, especially in the USA the project of such University has been discussed. ~~Mr.~~ prof James Burnham writes a chapiter on that theme in his last book "The coming defeat of communism". Lately, on the Congress for Cultural Liberty, this matter was aim of Joseph Czapski conference and the Congress ~~precised~~ took a resolution concerning the University.

Realisation

The name of Congress for Cultural Freedom seems to be most suitable for the realisation of this project. The Congress formed a permanent International Committee and Secretariate which will work in Paris. The first meeting of this Committee will be held in September 1950 in Paris. It should be advisable that during this meeting the members of it would form two commissions: French and American.

American Commission - under the management of prof. James Burham has to:

1/ form an University Foundation. This foundation gives a legal aspect ~~personality~~, and first of ~~facilitate~~ all facilitate the collection of necesary funds. In case forming a special Foundation would be difficult there exist a possibility to find an existing Foundation which would take the University under its protection.
2/ issue a manifesto to American Universities as well as to West European High Schools, scientific foundations, persons etc. In order to collent funds.
3/ plan the managemnet and prepare the list of American lecturers

French Commission under the management of the Secretary or a Member of Secretariate of the Congress. Besides in this Commission should enter prof. dr. George Brzozowski, director of the Institute of Polish Studies in Brussels who has a great experience in organisation of scientific institutions and a specialist in emigrants studies /not Polish only/ and prof. dr. Adam Rose, late vice minister of Commerce and Industries in Poland - before and after the war - since a half year emigrant, leaving in Paris, outstanding economist and specialist for Eastern European questions.

The French Commission has to:

1/ negociate with French authorities / place of future University, scientific rights, scientifical helps etc.

2/ prepare the plan of studies

3/ prepare the preliminary budget of the University

4/ ~~list~~ prepare a list of emigrants scientists of all nations

5/ prepare the project of recruiting students and plan ~~the project~~ of entering examinations for them.

It should be reckon that the works of both Commission would take 3-4 months from the moment of Committee decision. After that time both Commission should meet to exchange their experiences and communicate the results of their works

Both commission should have sufficients funds for their works, office expences, travels etc.

Fig. 3a and 3b. Draft of the university project, issued after the Congress for Cultural Freedom's first meeting held in West Berlin from June 26–30, 1950 (*Instytut Literacki Kultura*, KOR RED KWK, T.3).

26 „Kongres Wolności Kultury", Kultura. Szkice. Opowiadania. Sprawozdania, accessed July 13, 2023, https://kulturaparyska.com/pl/collection/media/show/kongres-wolnosci-kultury.

27 Pierre Grémion's fundamental book on the CCF contains some allusions on the university project at the movement's first and second meeting: *Intelligence de l'anticommunisme: Le Congrès pour la liberté de la culture à Paris (1950–1975)* (Paris: Fayard, 1995), 44–64.

The archives held at ILK under the title "KWK" (*Kongres Wolności Kultury*), stored in three volumes (some 700 records), contain all items related to *Kultura*'s participation in the CCF meetings during 1950–1951, including their concerns about and critiques of the intellectual movement. Since the university project was associated with the CCF, the archives related to the *Collège de l'Europe libre* produced by Czapski and Giedroyc between 1951 and 1958 are also in this collection.

"To Dispel Certain Legends": American Archives on the University in Exile

The Giedroyc-Czapski correspondence contains additional elements which explain how the CCF's growing support for the university project was a catalyst for Free Europe to embrace *Kultura*'s project. As a matter of fact, the NCFE's key person, Dulles, began to think seriously about the project after talking face-to-face with Czapski in New York. When the CCF approved the university project at its inaugural meeting in June 1950, Dulles rushed to meet Czapski in July during his stay in Europe. Czapski reported to Giedroyc on his conversation with Dulles in an encoded letter as follows:

> D. [i.e. Dulles] carefully read all the notes I had given him. He will send them immediately to Washington and give us an answer, probably before he arrives. Of all the subjects, he was most interested in the university. He repeated his request for B. [i.e. Burnham], upon his return, to speak to his superior [i.e. Dulles' superior, Frank G. Wisner], who could not only give us about twenty thousand [i.e. dollars] for organizational expenses, but its foundation could also do advertising for us.[28]

According to Giedroyc's reply to Czapski, "Burnham was very excited about this information and promised to take up his mission without delay."[29]

Several documents issued from July to November 1950, located in the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) collection on the Free Europe University in Exile (FEUE) at the Hoover Institution Archives at Stanford University, show that the NCFE started outlining a fellowship program for central and eastern European student refugees. Furthermore, additional records at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library held in the collection of the diplomat Adolf A. Berle, Jr. – who would become the FEUE's leading figure – and in the collection of the University of Strasbourg at the Departmental Archives of Bas-Rhin in Strasbourg, France, prove that the NCFE approached the French university

28 Letter from Czapski to Giedroyc (in Polish), 24 July 1950, ILK, PoJCz 19/03.

29 Letter from Giedroyc to Czapski (in Polish), 1 August 1950, ILK, PoJCz 19/03.

in August 1950 and attempted to set up the university of exile based on *Kultura*'s project, without any mention of *Kultura*, Czapski, Giedroyc, Burnham, or the CCF.

Regarding Czapski and Giedroyc, they were unaware of the NCFE's early actions during the summer and autumn of 1950. Burnham was somewhat aware of them since he regularly kept *Kultura* informed of some "favorable developments" in the United States, without providing any details.[30] In the meantime, Czapski and Giedroyc started spreading the word about the CCF-backed university project on the pages of *Kultura* (No. 7/33-8/34, 1950 and No. 9/35, 1950) as well as in their personal correspondence with Jerzy Stempowski in Switzerland – who closely followed the project from 1949 until the creation of the *Collège de l'Europe libre* in 1951, and even long afterwards – Mieroszewski in London, as well as Jelenski in Italy.[31]

The archives of the French Foreign Ministry keep the record of Czapski's meeting in January 1951 with key diplomats, Robert Rochefort and Jean Laloy – who were his prewar acquaintances – to survey the political support and legal conditions of the project's creation in France.[32] In February 1951, Czapski made a trip to France to visit three university towns, including Strasbourg, to find the right place for the future University in Exile, as evidenced by the record held at the Departmental Archives of Bas-Rhin. Moreover, in his appearance on the French national radio to discuss the liberty of culture alongside CCF members (Raymond Aron, Georges Altman, Denis de Rougemont and John Lowe), he implicitly spoke of the university project for exiled youth from behind the Iron Curtain who no longer knew what it meant to live in liberty.[33]

In mid-March 1951, Free Europe finally embraced the project: its president, Dewitt C. Poole, was eager to come to Paris with the mission of establishing a university in exile alongside the CCF. Records located at the Hoover Institution Archives and at ILK elucidate the reason for Free Europe's rapid move. There was a competing project to create a central and eastern European Institute, developed by Polish exiles Bolesław Wierzbianski and Dr. Zygmunt Nagórski, supported by another American anticommunist organization, the International Rescue Committee. On top of this, Józef Retinger – a London-based Polish exile and gray eminence of the European Movement who "pokes

30 Letter from Burnham to Czapski (in English), 19 October 1950, ILK, KOR RED Burnham, T.1.

31 These correspondences were published by *Czytelnik* publisher in Warsaw in the collection *Archiwum KULTURY* as follows: Andrzej S. Kowalczyk, *Jerzy Giedroyc – Jerzy Stempowski, Listy 1946–1969*, vol. 1–2, Warsaw, 1998; *Jerzy Giedroyc – Juliusz Mieroszewski: listy 1949–1956*, vol. 1–2, Warsaw, 1999; and Wojciech Karpiński, *Jerzy Giedroyc – Konstanty A. Jeleński Listy 1950–1987*, Warsaw, 1995.

32 Note for the Directorate-General of Cultural Relations (in French), 26 January 1951, Archives of the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs – La Courneuve, "Europe (1944–1970)", box 248QO/51.

33 The broadcast entitled "La liberté de la culture" [French: Cultural Freedom] in the program "Tribune de Paris" was produced by *Radiodiffusion française* and broadcasted on February 19, 1951. Inathèque, file PHD86032297.



Fig. 4. After the establishment of the Congress for Cultural Freedom's University Commission at the end of 1950, Jerzy Giedroyc's diary was filled with appointments with American, French, and exiled figures during which he hoped to give an impetus for the project (*Instytut Literacki Kultura*, PoJG, 03.02.19).

his nose into everything"[34] – was also well aware of the university project. After having expressed his concerns about *Kultura*'s plan, Retinger told Czapski and Giedroyc that the general Wladyslaw Sikorski also had a plan during the war to set up an Eastern European Slavonic Nations University, because of the "great importance of democratic educational reconstruction throughout Europe after the defeat of Germany."[35] Endorsed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in December 1942, his plan never materialized.

According to the NCFE's records on the FEUE at the Hoover Institution Archives, Czapski entered the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on March 21, 1951 along with NCFE's president Poole and NCFE's European representative, Royall Tyler, to start negotiations with French officials. He was consulted by Poole once before and a few times after the meeting at Quai d'Orsay. On March 26, Czapski already complained to his prewar friend, Nicolas Nabokov – who was appointed Secretary of the CCF's Parisian

34 Letter from Giedroyc to Burnham (in English), 15 February 1951, ILK, KOR RED Burnham, T.1

35 Letter from General Sikorski to President Roosevelt (in English), 16 December 1942, The Sikorski Institute in London sent this historic record to Czapski at Retinger's request on February 5, 1951. ILK, KOR RED KWK, Lesniowski.

office – that the organization of the university looked "as if [he] should be eliminated from the essential work."[36]

The internal correspondence of NCFE members in 1951 contains only a few references to Czapski, which makes it clear that they had no intention of involving him in the organization nor in the membership of the future University in Exile. The official answer on behalf of the NCFE was that Czapski's application "would be a provocation towards the Russian."[37] Meanwhile, the CCF's University Commission decided to abandon the university project during Czapski's second visit to New York in May 1951, leaving its fate to Free Europe. Burnham – who was also bypassed by Free Europe but was consulted in the end because of his reputation and position – sought to change NCFE's mind concerning Czapski's application:

> I had been given to understand that Joseph Czapski was to be drawn into close collaboration with the University, both in his own individual right and also as representative of the Kultura group and of the Congress of Cultural Freedom. (I recall being told that in order to accomplish this, Czapski was to be asked to become a consultant of NCFE.) This has not been done. Czapski may seem a little eccentric or Bohemian to some of those who are being assembled around the University. But it happens that there are few men in Europe whose integrity and courage, in life and war as in art, are more widely known and respected, especially among the youth from (and for that matter still in) the satellite nation. It should be added that the idea of such a University as ours was first formulated and made public by *Kultura*.[38]

The reaction of the NCFE president, C.D. Jackson, to Burnham's claim left no doubt about Free Europe's ignorance of Czapski in New York:

> I am totally mystified by the reference to Czapski [in Burnham's letter]. Czapski has had the run of our office while he was here, has been welcomed by both Mr. Poole and Mr. Tyler in Paris whenever he wished to see them; his proposals have been listened to, several of them adopted, including giving him a monthly grant for Kultura. I believe Mr. Poole can add several paragraphs on the subject of Mr. Burnham's confusion on the Czapski situation.[39]

NCFE's harsh refusal was even more disingenuous because Dulles remained in contact with *Kultura* until the autumn of 1951 – according to the Burnham-*Kultura* correspondence, in which the American was encoded as "D" – because of his plans with Czeslaw

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36 Letter from Czapski to Nabokov (in French), 26 March 1951, ILK, KOR RED KWK 07, Nabokov.

37 Ibid.

38 Letter from Burnham to Levering Tyson (in English), 17 August 1951, Hoover Institution Archives, RFE/RL Corporate Records, Alphabetical File 1948-1988, box 201, folder 7.

39 C.D. Jackson to Tyson (in English), 20 September 1951, Hoover Institution Archives, RFE/RL Corporate Records, Alphabetical File 1948-1988, box 201, folder 8.

Milosz, who had secretly escaped to Maisons-Laffitte in February 1951, and a plan to post a *Kultura* correspondent in Berlin. However, these plans never came to fruition.

The Free Europe University in Exile educational corporation was created on July 22, 1951 in New York City, composed of NCFE members as well as American scholars, such as Burnham.



Please Post

The Free Europe University In Exile

of the National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc.

Opening November 1, 1951

OPEN TO: Young exiles and refugees from the Eastern European countries behind the Iron Curtain who are in need of special assistance to continue the education and training that will enable them to assume leadership in their native lands when they are again free.

LOCATION: Students will be placed at recognized Western European and Near Eastern universities and colleges, the largest group of which will constitute the FREE EUROPE COLLEGE and be located at the University of Strasbourg.

EXPENSES: The value of scholarships covering Board, Room, Tuition, Books, Clothing and Incidentals will be $800 for a twelve month year.

Consult the information bureau of this organization

The FREE EUROPE UNIVERSITY IN EXILE is one of the educational activities of the National Committee for a Free Europe Inc., a non-profit organization founded by a group of private American citizens, united in their conviction that freedom is indivisible, and embarked upon a program of positive action against Soviet enslavement and to combat the Big Lie.

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The information bureau of this organization has a copy of the Announcement Bulletin for 1951-1952. Application blanks are available or may be obtained from the address below.

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Fig. 5. Flyer from the Free Europe University in Exile, 1951 (Hoover Institution Archives, RFE/RL Corporate Records, Alphabetical File 1948–1988, box 202, folder 3).

The French association of *Collège de l'Europe libre*, which provided the legal basis to run the study center in Strasbourg, included French, American and exiled members. Ironically, Czapski's former acquaintances (Nicolas Nabokov, Anatol Mülhstein, Jacques Maritain), who in one way or another knew about the project, became members of the French entity, though not Czapski himself.

The *Collège de l'Europe libre* leadership kept *Kultura* informed of the progress during the summer of 1951 prior to the opening, but merely as a gesture of courtesy. Czapski and Giedroyc, both on an individual basis as well as at the Berlin Youth Festival, held in West-Berlin in August 1951, continued to send suggestions about student recruitment and applications for exiled teacher positions. The exile magazine even advertised the FEUE on its back cover in the special issue of 1952. While Burnham attended the opening in Strasbourg on November 12, 1951, *Kultura* was not even invited. Their further correspondence at ILK and Burnham's papers in the Hoover Institutions Archives testify how much the American intellectual relied on *Kultura*'s judgment about the institution that he sought to disseminate to the FEUE's Trustees in New York.

While the FEUE and its study center became part of the American psychological warfare towards the liberation of Soviet satellite countries according to declassified records located at the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, the *Collège de l'Europe libre* started moving away from the concept that *Kultura* had first dreamed of, that of a politically engaged institution with a well-developed academic curriculum. The exile magazine remained the only free platform to voice their concerns. The first article was based on Giedroyc and Czapski's impressions after their visit to Strasbourg.[40] Despite the initial friendly tone, the following articles attacked the institution head on.[41] In parallel, Burnham's new book called *Containment or Liberation?* – published in 1953 and edited in Polish (*Bierny opór czy Wyzwolenie?*) by *Instytut Literacki Kultura* the same year – also criticized the FEUE as a failure of containment policy and called for a policy of liberation.

In late 1954, the FEUE had undergone operational changes as a result of the Trustees' decisions. According to the latter, the *Collège de l'Europe libre* ceased to operate as a boarding school from the year 1955/1956 and all FEUE fellows were free to study at any western European university, with the obligation to participate in the summer lectures series held at the *Château de Pourtalès* in Strasbourg. Consequently, Burnham and *Kultura* lost interest in the endeavor. The *Collège de l'Europe libre* was last mentioned in their correspondence on January 31, 1955 and in the March 1955 issue of *Kultura*.[42]

40 Józef Ursyn, „Kolegium Wolnej Europy," *Kultura*, no. 1/51 (1952): 71–9.

41 Zbigniew Różycki, „Kolegium Wolnej Europy," *Kultura*, no. 12/74 (1953): 65–74; Wojciech Zaleski, „Uwagi i wnioski w sprawie Kolegium Wolnej Europy," *Kultura*, no. 1/75–2/76 (1954): 125–35; John Pelenyi et al., „Jeszcze o Kolegium Wolnej Europy," *Kultura*, no. 6/80 (1954): 101–10.

42 Wojciech Zaleski, „Jeszcze o Strasburgu," *Kultura*, no. 3/89 (1955): 89–92.



NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR A FREE EUROPE

Free Europe University in Exile

Cover cut: Château de la Robertsau, Strasbourg, France

FOREWORD

NOVEMBER 1, 1951 the Free Europe University in Exile will begin its first academic year with a student body composed of more than 100 undergraduates from the Eastern European countries now behind the Iron Curtain.

The purpose of the University is to provide a study center for young people of both sexes, without distinction as to race or faith who find themselves exiled from their countries of origin. Since they are not citizens of their newly adopted countries they are in need of special assistance in order to obtain the educational facilities to which their previous academic experience and their manifest interest in the continuation of their studies appear, in the judgment of the Awards Committee, to entitle them. The purpose of such scholarships is by no means limited simply to helping the recipients continue their general education. A more intensive purpose is to equip them for future leadership in their native lands by providing for them the same type of instruction in the national cultural heritage they would have received in school at home had the national life not been so rudely interrupted. The Western branch of the University and its French auxiliary, Collège de l'Europe Libre, will be organized and in a position to begin its first academic year by the 1st of November 1951.

This bulletin is being published for and directed to those young exiles who feel that they can qualify for the scholarships which are to be awarded. The following pages contain information which will be helpful to young exiles in determining whether they might qualify, and discusses steps necessary to be taken in obtaining applications, filling them out and forwarding them as soon as possible to the Awards Committee in Paris.

September 1, 1951

DeWITT C. POOLE
President

Fig. 6a and 6b. Announcement Bulletin for 1951–1952 from the Free Europe University in Exile (Hoover Institution Archives, RFE/RL Corporate Records, Alphabetical File 1948–1988, box 202, folder 3).

Kultura's disinterest in the University in Exile was also part of a fundamental breakthrough in the exile magazine's political stance in 1954–1955 on the United States and western Europe in defense of Soviet-occupied Poland and Iron Curtain countries. *Kultura* observed that American foreign policy was principally driven by the desire to defend its territory and by political and economic interests. Therefore, it would only react if its military and political domination would be threatened. Since Washington was indifferent to the Soviet occupation of central and eastern Europe – because this region did not pose a direct threat to American territories or interests – *Kultura* ceased to believe in the United States as a center of moral renewal, the heart of a new security system, and a liberator of oppressed nations. As regards to western Europe, the European unification encountered many difficulties, without considering the question of eastern Europe. This issue was ignored in complete silence on the international forum out of fear that the USSR would see it as a provocation. Because of its disillusion of the west, *Kultura* – which moved its headquarters to 91 Avenue de Poissy where it still stands[43] – turned its attention more and more to Poland and central and eastern Europe.[44]

As to the *Collège de l'Europe libre*, three years later, according to the FEUE Trustees' decision on July 31, 1958, both the University in Exile in New York and its study center in Strasbourg had closed. The official announcement of the closure stated that both endeavors had only a temporary mission, namely, to assist refugee students who were displaced because of World War II or who later fled the Communist takeover behind the Iron Curtain. The Free Europe Committee's internal records show, however, that the geopolitical considerations – the consolidation of the Soviet bloc after the failed Hungarian Revolution in 1956 and the evaporated hopes for a swift liberation of satellites countries – and internal considerations – the CIA's loss of interest in financing the FEUE – led to the University in Exile's phase out.

Reviving Jerzy Giedroyc's Legacy

Decades later, Giedroyc took a retrospective view about his life in his autobiographical book as well as in a Polish documentary film. He remembered Burnham as *Kultura*'s only American friend.[45] Despite their opposite political views, the "right-wing" American intellectual from the "antiliberal" National Review and the "liberal and left-wing" *Kultura*

43 On Malraux's help to *Kultura* in purchasing the property of its new headquarters in 1954, see: Czapski, "Malraux", 33–34, and Giedroyc, *Autobiografia na cztery ręce*, 193.

44 Korek, *Paradoksy paryskiej „Kultury"*, 212–4.

45 Giedroyc, *Autobiografia na cztery ręce*, 172.

mutually respected each other's beliefs and were "faithful and selfless" friends.[46] Giedroyc also recalled the *Collège de l'Europe libre*, which was his initiative at the CCF, supported by Burnham. He acknowledged the value of the institution, which allowed hundreds of young refugees to study in the "free world," but he did not hide his regrets by concluding: "My idea of founding a scientific institution which could also unify eastern Europe failed."[47] Although the institution closed in 1958, the idea of a university unifying central and eastern European youth was reborn in 1991 under Central European University.[48]

After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of Soviet occupation in central and eastern Europe, *Kultura*'s political program and main predictions became a reality – the United States' victory over the Soviet Union, the strengthening of international law and the United Nations as per the "one world" theory, the emergence of the European Union and the integration of a united Germany into its framework, the de-Sovietization process in the USSR and the democratization progress in the Soviet bloc, the independence of Poland's eastern neighbors (Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus). Even if its assumption that the central and eastern European countries could rely on their own potential as a federation and provide an alternative solution for both the West (Germany) and the East (Russia) did not come to pass – this was the price of integrating a unified Germany into Europe to stabilize the continent – *Kultura* succeeded in getting rid of eastern European complexes and developed an independent attitude towards the so-called West and the so-called East, by standing up for freedom of expression.[49]

In recognition of this program and his own life's work in exile, Giedroyc received numerous honorary doctorates from universities in Poland and state awards from various countries. He supported the initiative of his Ukrainian correspondent and friend, Bohdan Osadchuk – whom Giedroyc met at the first CCF meeting in West-Berlin – in creating a Polish-Ukrainian University. Founded in 2000, the European College of Polish and Ukrainian Universities (EKPU) in Lublin operated from 2001 to 2011. After Giedroyc's passing, the Senate of the Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin established the Jerzy Giedroyc Prize for research on the heritage of *Kultura* and the creative continuation of Giedroyc's message in the sciences. Today, a journalism school and a university library, among other institutions, bear his name in Poland. This year, the University of *Łódź* opened the Jerzy Giedroyc Center, devoted to disseminating *Kultura*'s legacy, while the distinguished Austrian *Institut für die Wissenschaftenvom Menschen* (Institute

46 Londyńczyk (alias Juliusz Mieroszewski), „James Burnham o 'Kulturze'," *Kultura*, no. 11/169 (1961): 121.

47 Giedroyc, *Autobiografia na cztery ręce*, 189. The extract of the Polish documentary film, in which Giedroyc recalled the *Collège de l'Europe libre*, is available online: https://vimeo.com/66932500, accessed July 13, 2023.

48 Włodzimierz Bolecki, "*Kultura* (1946–2000)," in *The Exile and Return of Writers from East-Central Europe: A Compedium*, eds. John Neubauer and Borbála Zsuzsanna Török (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1999), 159.

49 About *Kultura*'s achievement, see: Korek, *Paradoksy paryskiej „Kultury"*, 471–80.

for Human Sciences) launched the Jerzy Giedroyc Fellowship for research on Poland and its north-eastern European relations.

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Unknown Documents Related to Gen. Wacław Scaevola-Wieczorkiewicz from the World War II Period

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Abstract: Gen. Wacław Scaevola-Wieczorkiewicz was renowned for his commanding abilities, courage and conscientious character since the days of the legions. This caused him to quickly climb the military career ladder in the Second Republic. During this time, he acquired practical and theoretical experience, which earned him the general's rank in 1927. He served longest in the military unit in Jarosław (1926–1935), to spend the last years before the outbreak of war at DOK (Corps District Command) number X in Przemyśl as its commander. During World War II (after the Polish campaign) he emigrated, thus beginning his soldier-refugee life. Among other places, he stayed in France (where he was assigned in the Chief Commander's Training Inspectorate) and then in Switzerland, where he remained after the war until his death in 1969. This publication presents two hitherto unknown documents created during World War II, which concerned the person of Gen. W. Scaevola-Wieczorkiewicz. According to them, he was accused of abusing his authority as an officer in the construction of his own house in Rozwadów, near StalowaWola, and had to clarify the matter. This was important, since at that time several institutions were established in exile that sought and collected information that could later become the basis for lawsuits, especially against those associated with the pre-war Sanation. Those undoubtedly included Gen. W. Scaevola-Wieczorkiewicz. Presumably, the so-called "strong evidence" could not be collected, as Gen. Scaevola-Wieczorkiewicz did not appear in court as a defendant. Nonetheless, these two documents show, on the one hand, a meticulous effort to hold the previous power camp accountable and to remove it from any real influence on Polish refugee state policy, and on the other, they make clear the multifaceted nature of the potential allegations that could have formed the basis for an indictment.

Keywords: Gen. Scaevola-Wieczorkiewicz, Registration Office of the Ministry of Military Affairs, World War II

The figure of General Wacław Scaevola-Wieczorkiewicz is fairly well known in Polish military historiography. His story lived to see one biography by Jerzy Majka,[1] dictionary[2] and publishing-type biographies.[3] He is not as widely recognized Piłsudski-era Polish

1 See: Jerzy Majka, *Generał brygady Wacław Scaevola-Wieczorkiewicz 1890–1969. Krótka biografia wojskowa* (Rzeszow: Wydawnictwo Libra PL, 2018), 98.

2 Piotr Stawecki, *Słownik biograficzny generałów Wojska Polskiego 1918–1939* (Warsaw: Bellona, 1994), 347–8; Tadeusz Kryska-Karski and Stanisław Żurakowski, *Generałowie Polski Niepodległej* (Warsaw: Editions Spotkania, 1991), 160.

3 Władysław Mądzik, "Wacław Scaevola-Wieczorkiewicz. Zapomniany generał," *Powiśle Lubelskie*, no. 2 (2017): 2–5.

Army general as Edward Rydz-Śmigły or Gustaw Orlicz-Dreszer, but his career until September 1939 seems similar to most of them. W. Wieczorkiewicz (born on June 25, 1890) was active in the Riflemen's Association, then served in the Polish Legions.[4] One of his most spectacular feats was his steadfast attitude in the Battle of Marcinkowice (December 5–6, 1914), where he and his company "persevered for the longest time at the most threatening point under the crossfire of artillery and machine guns."[5]

In the Second Republic of Poland he was permanently associated with the Polish Army, gaining successive officer ranks, including major in 1918 and colonel in 1920. After his studies at France's École supérieure de guerre, and later already in Poland at the Wyższa Szkoła Wojenna Military Academy (1924–1927),[6] he received his general's medals. From May 1926 to October 1935, he was commander of the 24th Infantry Division stationed in Jarosław. He sometimes combined his official duties with political tasks, for example, during the 1930 parliamentary election campaign (the so-called Brest elections), he took part in an informal meeting of senior officers to determine electoral tactics, where he "stressed the need to give starosts clear and decisive instructions, which have so far been lacking. These are people [as allegedly claimed by Gen. Scaevola-Wieczorkiewicz] brought up in the Austrian school and administrative discipline, who, given the dispositions, will carry out the elections."[7] Since October 1935, he took command of the District Corps number X in Przemyśl, which he held until 1939. Despite the earlier positive service opinions he received from his superiors, for example, in 1930 from General Andrzej Galica,[8] there were also less favorable ones related to, among other things, the possibility of commanding an operational group at DOK X.[9]

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4 His person is mentioned in the Legions' memoirs – see: Tadeudz Furgalski 'Wyrwa', *Dziennik 1913–1916*, ed. Piotr Cichoracki (Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, Fundacja Centrum Dokumentacji Czynu Niepodległościowego, 2011), 87, 167; Roman Starzyński, *Cztery lata wojny w służbie Komendanta. Przeżycia wojenne 1914–1918* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Tetragon, Instytut Wydawniczy Erica, 2012), 68, 393.

5 Józef Piłsudski, *Pisma zbiorowe*, vol. 4 (Warsaw: Instytut Józefa Piłsudskiego Poświęcony Badaniu Najnowszej Historii Polski, 1937), 343.

6 See: Piotr Stawecki, *Generałowie Polscy. Zarys portretu zbiorowego 1776–1945* (Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR: Bellona, 2010), 90; Andrzej Wojtaszak, *Generalicja Wojska Polskiego w latach 1935–1939 (analiza grupy funkcjonalno-dyspozycyjnej)* (Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego, 2018), 69.

7 Kordian Józef Zamorski, *Dzienniki (1930–1938)*, eds. Robert Litwiński and Marek Sioma (Warsaw: Instytut Józefa Piłsudskiego; Łomianki: Wydawnictwo LTW, 2011), 50 (entry made on 28 September 1930).

8 Majka, *Generał brygady Wacław Scaevola-Wieczorkiewicz*, 46.

9 Such doubts were raised by Colonel Stefan "Grot" Rowecki, evaluating General Scaevola-Wieczorkiewicz as follows: "meticulous, detail-oriented, probably without a broader operational horizon. I doubt that he can handle commanding an operational group, more of an administrative commander type without much ability. He would be best suited for representative functions, such as the head of the President's military office." – Wojtaszak, *Generalicja Wojska Polskiego*, 144.

Shortly before the outbreak of World War II, General Scaevola-Wieczorkiewicz, while still remaining head of DOK X in Przemyśl, was appointed commander of the "Kraków" and "Carpathian" military districts. During the Polish campaign, he was given the opportunity to fully prove himself on the battlefield, as by a directive from the Commander-in-Chief had to withdraw with his unit to Hungary.[10] The poor flow of information about this order caused anger and consternation among some of his subordinates. This is how it was recalled by Gen. Jan Chmurowicz:[11] "The intended departure of Gen. Wieczorkiewicz along with his staff was simply a blow to me [...] I pondered [...] the issue of Gen. Wieczorkiewicz's withdrawal, but I could not find a solution to the puzzle."[12]

After crossing the Polish-Hungarian border, Gen. W. Scaevola-Wieczorkiewicz made his way through Yugoslavia and Italy to France. There, he was assigned to the Commander-in-Chief's Training Inspectorate. After France's defeat to Germany (June 1940), he remained on the Seine, where he became involved in resistance activities in the Vichy state. In August 1943 he moved to Switzerland, from where in the post-war years he actively participated in the political and social life of the Polish emigration, for example, on November 27, 1962 he spoke at the unveiling ceremony of the monument to General Langiewicz in Grenchen[13] or during the last day of the proceedings of the First World Congress of "Fighting Poland" (May 21, 1966).[14]

Gen. W. Scaevola-Wieczorkiewicz died on December 7, 1969 in Geneva. He was buried in the St. Joseph's cemetery in the same city.

After briefly presenting the figure of the protagonist of the following documents, it is worthwhile to introduce their location and characteristics. Both are deposited in the Polish Institute and Gen. W. Sikorski Museum in London, in a fond: Ministry of Justice. Commission established in connection with the outcome of the 1939 Military Campaign (ref. A.20.5) in file no. 36 named: *Akta podlegające skierowaniu do Wojskowego Trybunału Orzekającego 1939–1940* (Eng. *Files Subject to Referral to the Military Tribunal 1939–1940*).

Document 1 is a one-page typescript signed by Gen. Izydor Modelski, while Document 2 is a three-page response to the letter (i.e., Document 1) handwritten and signed

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10 Tadeusz Jurga, *Obrona Polski 1939* (Warsaw: Pax, 1990), 668–9.

11 In September 1939, Gen. J. Chmurowicz served as deputy of Corps District No X and commander of the Defence of Przemyśl.

12 [Jan Chmurowicz], *Artylerzysta Piłsudskiego. Wspomnienia gen. Jana Chmurowicza*, ed. Krzysztof Drozdowski (Warsaw: Agencja Wydawnicza CB, 2019), 104.

13 Janusz Rakowski, "Szwajcaria," in *Akcja niepodległościowa na terenie międzynarodowym 1945–1990*, ed. Tomasz Piesakowski (London: Polskie Towarzystwo Naukowe na Obczyźnie, 1999), 412–3.

14 Artur Rynkiewicz, "*Światowe Zjazdy Wolnych Polaków*," in *Kierownictwo obozu niepodległościowego na obczyźnie 1945–1990 (Materiały do dziejów uchodźstwa niepodległościowego 1945–1990, vol. III)*, ed. Aleksander Szkuta (London: Polskie Towarzystwo Naukowe na Obczyźnie, 1996), 568–9.

by Gen. W. Scaevola-Wieczorkiewicz. These are unknown sources, i.e., not in scholarly circulation, which supplement both the biography of Gen. Scaevola-Wieczorkiewicz and the activities of the so-called Registration Bureau of the Ministry of the Army.[15] The latter included several bodies[16] collecting so-called "dirt" on former Sanation members associated with the administrative or military (especially officers) community. Although their powers were heavily duplicated,[17] they constituted, together with the Military Adjudication Tribunal [hereinafter: WTO][18] and the Officers' Courts of Honour,[19] a smoothly functioning machine "excluding" from the officer corps those suspected of ties to the Sanation or of dishonorable acts.

The Registration Bureau of the Ministry of the Army, under the direction of Colonel Izydor Modelski (from May 4, 1940, with the rank of brigadier general), was very active from its inception in "investigating the behaviour and activities of officers in the interwar period and during the September campaign."[20] The overzealousness of its head in seeking out and collecting all evidence of the guilt of persons connected with the pre-war system

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15 See: Józef Smoliński, *Polskie władze państwowe i wojskowe na uchodźstwie* (Warsaw: Oddział Edukacji Obywatelskiej, KONJAN, 1999), 55–6; Jerzy Łunkiewicz, "Naczelne Władze Polskich Sił Zbrojnych na Obczyźnie w latach 1939–1945," *Bellona* (London), no. 2–3 (1957): 43. For more on the establishment of the Registration Bureau, see: Marcin Kwiecień, *Wśród potępieńczych swarów. Prawne aspekty rozliczeń politycznych wśród uchodźstwa polskiego we Francji i Wielkiej Brytanii 1939–1943* (Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2013), 159–68.

16 These were: 1) General Józef Haller's Commission – This refers to the so-called Registration Commission, which was established on 10 October 1939, and its tasks focused on collecting "[...] comprehensive information, materials and documents, relating to the course of recent events in Poland and the determination of their causes" – see: "Obwieszczenie z dn. 15 XI 1939 r. w sprawie Komisji Rejestracyjnej," Monitor Polski 1939, no. 252–257, 16 November; and 2) Commission in connection with the outcome of the 1939 war campaign – see: "Decree of the President of the Republic of Poland dated 30 May 1940 on the establishment of a Commission in connection with the outcome of the 1939 war campaign," Dziennik Ustaw RP 1940 (Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland, hereinafter 'Dz. U. RP'], no. 10, pos. 27. For more on this Commission, see: Kwiecień, *Wśród potępieńczych swarów*, 241–72.

17 This included Gen. Haller's Commission and the Registration Bureau of the Ministry of the Army – see: Stanisław Schimitzek, *Na krawędzi Europy. Wspomnienia portugalskie 1939–1946* (Warsaw: PWN, 1970), 105.

18 The Military Tribunal was established "for the consideration of charges, brought against officers in connection with their activities during the 1939 war campaign, in particular, charges of abandonment of their unit, neglect of duties as commander, misappropriation of war equipment, misappropriation of state property, and to determine the degree of their responsibility in this regard." – "Decree of the President of the Republic of Poland dated 30 November 1939 on the responsibility of officers for their activities during the war campaign of 1939", Dz. U. RP 1939, no. 103, pos. 1007, dated 6 December.

19 During the war, Officers' Courts of Honour operated under the "Statute of Officers' Courts of Honor" of 1927 – see: Rozkaz Ministra Spraw Wojskowych z dn. 21 XI 1939 r. o organizacji i wyborach do oficerskich sądów honorowych w czasie wojny, Ref. R.94, Dziennik Rozkazów Tajnych 1940, The Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum, London.

20 Kwiecień, *Wśród potępieńczych swarów*, 166–7.

of government sometimes took on a character that caused consternation even in government spheres in exile:

> Col. Modelski,' as Stanisław Stroiński described him,[21] 'from then on excelled in untimely teasing, when, rather focusing his attention on some cases that really required some consequences, generally a lot could be evened out with calmness, without retribution [...] With time, Gen. Kukiel was to bear the troublesome burden of restraining the excesses of Izio's [Izydor's] zeal.[22]

Nevertheless, Gen. Modelski took an interest in the affairs of, among others, Gen. Kazimierz Schally, which he tried to clarify to the end with the cooperation of other bodies.[23] The following sources testify that the case was the same with Gen. Scaevola-Wieczorkiewicz, while investigating allegations made against him, probably about the abuse of his official position in the construction of his own house in Rozwadów in 1939.[24] The explanation (Document 2) proved sufficient, as Gen. Scaevola-Wieczorkiewicz never faced the Tribunal.

Document 1

II DEPUTY MINISTER OF THE ARMY
Ref. 1482/40/Rej/Tj.
Angers, 28 May 1940

BRIGADIER GENERAL WACŁAW WIECZORKIEWICZ
Training Inspector of Polish Army
Coëtquidan.

Allegations were made against the General as follows: that plans for a house on a parcel of land purchased by the General in Rozwadów, on the orders of the General as Commander of District Command X in Przemyśl, were carried out by technical personnel

21 Stanisław Stroński (1882–1955) – lawyer; in the Second Republic he was a member of the Polish Sejm; during World War II he headed the Ministry of Information and Documentation in the government of General Sikorski.

22 Stanisław Stroński, *Polityka rządu polskiego na uchodźstwie w latach 1939–1942*, vol. 1, ed. Jacek Piotrowski (Nowy Sącz: Goldruk, 2007), 153. Gen. I. Modelski was widely regarded as a person who "hunted down" former Sanation members. He sought "dirt" on them to keep them out of any state positions. Gen. Modelski's character made other people (superiors) restrain his exploratory drive.

23 See: Grzegorz Kulka, "Próba „politycznego" rozliczenia gen. Kazimierza Schally'ego w 1940 r.," in *Studia i szkice o dwudziestoleciu międzywojennym*, eds. Tomasz Chłopecki and Paweł Fiktus (Kraków: AT Wydawnictwo 2020), 213–24.

24 Rozwadów is now part of Stalowa Wola, while the house of Gen. Scaevola-Wieczorkiewicz has survived to the present day and is located at 37 Rozwadowska Street. Due to the fact that it was several stories high, in the past it served as a hospital or educational institution, among other things.

from Military Construction, during business hours, in the office, despite the fact that each of the technical clerks was overloaded with official work, thus rendering them unable to cope with said official work. And so:

1) Eng. Turkowski made a plan for the house,
2) Eng. Zawisza – electrical installation project,
3) Eng. Sandor – calculation of reinforced concrete stairs,
4) Eng. Lt. Paweł Boćko – performed the static calculation and design of the ceilings,
5) the head of construction drove a military car to inspect the works,

Senior Sergeant remained permanently at the construction site of the house, as the work manager while being paid by the Treasury.

In addition, Eng. Turkowski had to cover an expense of 50 zlotys. The purpose was making prints in connection with the development of a house plan.

In addition, the General gave orders to Major Dobrzański and Senior Sergeant Potykanowicz, officers of the Construction Headquarters of the District Command in Przemyśl, to remain in Jarosław to see to and take custody of his property.

In view of the above allegations, I ask the General to take a stand and provide me with a proper explanation in writing as soon as possible.

II Deputy Minister of the Army
(signature -) Brig. Gen. I. Modelski, Ph.D.

Document 2

(annotated stamp) Paris 1.6.1940
Ministry of the Army
Registration Bureau
Submitted on: 10 June 1940
Ref. 1758/40 RejTj.

II Deputy Minister of the Army
in Paris

In response to the letter dated 28 May 1940. Ref. 1482/40 Rej./Tj. I explain:

In the context of the reality, that is, the construction of my house, I personally know the following names mentioned in the above letter.

'1) Eng. Turkowski made a plan for the house'

I represent that on the recommendation of Mr Major Zdebski, Head of Construction, I commissioned the above-mentioned Eng. Turkowski to execute the project for a fixed fee, while the plan that I accepted and which was approved and according to which the building was executed in 1939, was delivered to me and signed by Civil Engineer Przestępski.

'2) the head of construction drove a military car to inspect the works.'

I represent that the head of construction Maj. Zdebski was only on his own initiative on one occasion, as far as I know, while driving along a particular road next to a construction site that had begun, and after visiting it as I indicated above on his own initiative and willingness to show me his service, he gave me his professional advice.

'6) Senior Sergeant remained permanently at the construction site of the house, as the work manager while being paid by the Treasury.'

I represent that it was not Senior Sergeant Potykanowicz, but a civilian construction technician ZbigniewPotykanowicz, residing in Jarosław (whose father, as far as I know, was the Senior Sergeant mentioned above in the letter in question), that was reported by me and paid as supervisor of the works.

The construction manager, on the other hand, was civilian construction foreman J. Kociek from Radomyśl, who had no connection with military construction.

'In addition, the General gave orders to Major Dobrzański....'

I represent that Eng. Dobrzanski has been retired and out of military service for a number of years, and he was also my acquaintance from the old years. I met him in Stryj at the time of evacuation, i.e. on 17 or 18 September 1939, and he decided to remain in the country as a civilian – returning to Jaroslaw. I asked him to take care of my family and my property left there. I did not give any 'orders' or instructions to anyone 'to guard and take care' of my property.

What I represent above is the only truth. As with the other names, the people mentioned in the letter I received, I personally had nothing to do with in matters of the construction of my house, or in my personal affairs.

I can provide the detailed documentation of the above explanations at any time after returning to the country, where I left the receipts and approved plans and where the people I mentioned reside.

(-) Wacław Wieczorkiewicz
General.

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In Memoriam

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In Memory of Stanisław Żurakowski

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Colonel Stanisław Żurakowski died on the July 27, 2023. He was an important figure of the post Second World War Polish political exiled community. He left his mark on the lives of many organizations and individuals.

Żurakowski was born in Wołomin near Warsaw at the end of the Polish-Bolshevik War of 1919–1920, on July 24, 1920. He was the seventh of nine children. His mother, who was pregnant with him at the time, and five elder siblings (one of his younger sisters having died in childhood) escaped before the advancing Bolsheviks during the Polish retreat from Kiev from the family estate of Żytniki in the Ukraine.

His father, Stanisław Ludwik Żurakowski, was a civil servant and a local government official between the wars. Until the September 17, 1939 he was the Mayor of the border town of Ostróg on the Horyń. Arrested by the NKVD, he was murdered in the Katyń Forest Massacre in the spring of 1940.

His mother, Maria Żurakowska maiden name Jastrzębska, survived the Second World War as a deportee in Kazakhstan. After being released, she was evacuated with the Polish Army to Iran and then the Lebanon. She reached the United Kingdom, where she made her home and lived until her death in London in 1970.

Along with his three sisters and four brothers, Stanisław was brought up and educated in an independent Poland. All of them took part in the Second World War. His brother Edmund, serving in the 19th Infantry Regiment of the Polish Forces in the USSR, died of typhus on April 17, 1942 in Karshi. His brother Józef, who served in the 1st Battalion of the 3rd Carpathian Rifle Division, was killed on May 12, 1944 during the battle for Monte Cassino. He is buried in the Monte Cassino Polish War Cemetery. The youngest of the brothers, Antoni, served in the 3rd Battalion of the 3rd Carpathian Rifle Division. He was killed on the Chienti River on June 22, 1944 and is buried in the Polish War Cemetery in

Loretto. His first cousin and a close friend was Squadron Leader Janusz Żurakowski from Lublin, a Battle of Britain pilot and a distinguished test pilot in Boscombe Down. After the war he settled in Canada becoming a well know test pilot throughout the world.

Stanisław Żurakowski left the family home on October 14, 1939 with the aim of reaching and joining the Polish Army in France. A fortnight later he was stopped and arrested by the Soviet border guards. He was subsequently imprisoned in Worochta, Nadwórna, Stanislawów and Chernihov. In June 1940 he was sentenced to five years in a labor camp. He was taken there via Vitebsk, Leningrad, Vologda to Archangel and from there to Najran-Mar. Taken into forced labor, Żurakowski was made to fell trees and build the railway line to Uchta and further in the direction of Kozva and Abiz.

Following the signing of the Polish-Soviet Pact on July 30, 1941, he was released in September 1941 and taken by railway transport to Tockoye. There, on September 28, 1941, he joined the Polish Army under the command of General Władysław Anders. On October 1, he enlisted in the 16th Infantry Regiment, later reorganized into the 16th Lwów Rifle Battalion. He took part in the Italian Campaign of 1944–1945. He was involved in horrific fighting in the of taking Monte Cassino during the Battle of Monte Cassino. He completed the Reserve Infantry Officer's School in Madera on January 18, 1945 and became an Officer-Cadet. Promoted to 2nd Lieutenant with seniority as of January 1, 1946. He came to Great Britain in October 1947 and was demobilized on January 12, 1948.

In civilian life, Żurakowski found several employments: in a coal mine in Midsomer Norton, in the Avon rubber factory in Melksham, in a television production factory in London. Whilst taking a draughtsman's course (1958) he worked for Joseph Parks and Son Limited after which he worked for British Rail until his retirement in 1978.

Żurakowski regarded his marriage to Doreen Frances Stilman on December 5, 1949 as the most important event in his life. She died on November 11, 2001.

He had a high regard for work, calling it a blessing, while he treated charitable work as an ordinary duty. He was generous in regularly donating to numerous charitable causes, supporting various Polish organizations and institutions in Great Britain, Ukraine, Poland and Africa especially those dealing with veterans and welfare. However, he gave his time, knowledge and heart to one organization. This was the Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum, where, with his wife's support, he worked as a volunteer from 1965. It was here where his duty to Poland and his respect for history met. However, Żurakowski believed that all periods of time, every life and all events are important and should be treated with attention, not just concentrating on past epochs. He saw history in the events of today.

Żurakowski published two books and participated in several joint publications. In cooperation with Tadeusz Kryska-Karski and Henryk Barański, he helped prepare *Piechota Polska* (Eng. *Polish Infantry*), which was published in instalments from 1970

to 1976. He co-authored *Generałowie Polski Niepodległej* (Eng. *Generals of Independent Poland*), published in London in 1976. This was the first publication of its kind and became a much sought-after book. A second, expanded edition was published in Warsaw in 1991. He edited *Listy z Kozielska Burmistrza miasta Ostroga* (Eng. *Letters from Kozielsk of the Mayor of Ostróg*), published by the Artists and Poets Publishing house in London in 1989. In 1995 he published a collection of his own memories entitled *Ot, bajki... niebajki* (Eng. *Just Stories... or Not Stories*).

After the war, Żurakowski was promoted several times by the legal Polish Government-in-Exile. In 1964 he was promoted to Lieutenant and in 1990 to Captain. Following Poland's regaining of independence that year, he was promoted to Major and Lieutenant-Colonel, then on his 100th birthday to the rank of Colonel in 2020.

Żurakowski was a highly decorated, soldier. During the war, he was awarded the Cross of Valour for Monte Cassino and a bar following his part in the capture of an intact bridge on the Sillaro River. He was also awarded the (Polish) Army Medal with two bars, the Monte Cassino Commemorative Cross and the British 1939–1945 Star, the Italy Star, the Defence Medal and the War Medal. After the war, he received – the Silver Cross of Merit (1968) for his charitable work from the Polish Government plus the Gold Cross of Merit (1973), Chevaliers Cross of the Order of the Rebirth of Poland for his long-term contribution to the Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum (1985). After Poland regained its independence in 1990, he was honored by the Polish Government in Warsaw with the Commander's Cross with Star of the Order of the Rebirth of Poland (2020), as well as ministerial awards: Pro Memoria Medal, Pro Patria Medal, Medal of Carer of National Remembrance Monuments, Medal of Merit for Defence of the Country, Medal of the Polish Army.

Colonel Stanisław Żurakowski lived for 103 years. He died peacefully in the early hours of Thursday July 27, 2023 at home, where he had lived since 1956. During his 55 years of voluntary work at the Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum, he left his mark on several generations of staff and volunteers, as well as on researchers and visiting members of the public. His funeral took place on Tuesday August 15, 2023 at noon from the chapel in Mortlake Cemetery (Clifford Avenue). Following the service his coffin was taken to North Sheen Cemetery (Lower Richmond Road) where he was buried in the family grave alongside his wife and mother.

His wonderful and venerable age did not lessen the sadness that followed his death. *Pan Stanisław* created unique bonds with each and every person. He was very frank: at moments perhaps painfully so and a truly sincere person. He built his relations with people without unnecessary or false words. He was without pretence. He managed to bring out the best in people, giving them the benefit of trust, which put an obligation upon them. He inspired people and fired them with enthusiasm to value simple things. In

a natural way, he reminded one of the world's universal truths, and gave ordinary words literal meaning. He always saw the best in others. Many, many people feel a sense of gratitude for his having been in their lives.

His one and only visit to his family regions in Poland and Ukraine was with his wife Doreen in the summer of 1993. For him, it was a very important and moving personal journey. He brought back symbolically a panoramic picture of long lost family fields swaying with ripening rye, an image which stayed with him to the end of his days.

They were dying, they die, they will continue to die,
As they live and have lived.
Graves of those who toiled with work,
Grow long and spread with straw.
And mighty is the path, full of strength,
A field soaked with abundant blood.
On these graves, on these fertile tombs,
Let us sow rye, let us sow rye, let us sow rye.

[Leopold Staff, *The Road* (Pol. *Droga*), trans. Katarzyna Danilewicz]

May He Rest in Peace