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

Centrum Badań
nad Historią Polskiego
Państwa na Uchodźstwie
KUL

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The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin
Centre for Research on the History of the Polish Government in Exile

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Preface

Dear Readers,
We are pleased to present to you the third issue of the yearbook *The Exile History Review*. The fact that this issue has been published brings us even more joy, as the group of individuals collaborating with the journal continues to grow. The circle of authors and reviewers is being joined by more researchers from Poland and abroad.

At the end of September, the project entitled "Centre for Research on the History of the Polish Government in Exile" came to an end. For three years, the team at the Centre conducted research on the little-known and somewhat forgotten heritage of Polish Exile between 1939 and 1991. The result of this work is numerous publications released by the KUL University Press. Two volumes of the *Słownik Biograficzny Polskiego Państwa na Uchodźstwie*[1] have been published, featuring profiles of members of subsequent Polish National Councils. A brochure addressing the topic of the Polish Government in Exile's stance on the Holocaust[2] has been released. A significant publication includes archival documents – protocols from the meetings of the Council of Ministers (1945–1947)[3] and protocols from the meetings the first National Council (1940)[4]. The team's work also

1 *Słownik biograficzny polskiego państwa na uchodźstwie*, vol. 1, *Członkowie I i II Rady Narodowej RP*, eds. Jarosław Rabiński and Michał Dworski (Lublin: KUL University Press, 2022); *Słownik biograficzny polskiego państwa na uchodźstwie*, vol. 2, *Członkowie III i IV Rady Narodowej RP*, eds. Jarosław Rabiński and Michał Dworski (Lublin: KUL University Press, 2024).

2 Bartosz Czajka, Michał Dworski, and Kamil Świderski, *Polskie Państwo na uchodźstwie wobec Zagłady Żydów* (Lublin: KUL University Press, 2023).

3 *Protokoły posiedzeń Rady Ministrów RP: wrzesień 1945–kwiecień 1947*, ed. Jarosław Rabiński, preparation of documents Bartosz Czajka, Michał Dworski, Jadwiga Kowalska, Jarosław Rabiński, and Kamil Świderski (Lublin: KUL University Press, 2024).

4 *Rada Narodowa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej: styczeń 1940–czerwiec 1940. Posiedzenia plenarne*, eds. Jarosław Rabiński and Bartosz Czajka, preparation of documents Bartosz Czajka, Michał Dworski, Jadwiga Kowalska, and Kamil Świderski (Lublin: KUL University Press, 2023).

includes interactive maps of the Polish community in London,[5] Rome,[6] and New York.[7] The publication of three volumes of the journal *The Exile History Review* is also one of the outcome of the Centre's activities, created in collaboration with many renowned international researchers. The journal will continue to be published, contributing to the dissemination of the topics of wartime and postwar political emigration in the awareness of researchers and readers interested in these issues.

In this issue, we would like to present six texts – five in the *Articles* section and one in the *In Memoriam* section. Researcher Ivan Tepeš from Zagreb highlights the history of Croatians within two significant international emigration parties – the International Peasant Union and the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations. Anna Siwik, representing the AGH University of Science and Technology in Kraków, describes the complicated postwar history of one of the most important Polish emigration groups, the Polish Socialist Party, in a synthetic form. Marek Wierzbicki presents the activities of the Polish scouting community in the United States in the wider context of socio-cultural changes within the Polish community there. Kai Johann Willms from the University of Basel analyzes the attitudes of three Polish scholars working in the United States (Oskar Halecki, Piotr Wandycz, and Ewa Thompson) towards the Cold War discourse on Western civilization. Independent researcher Anna Ambrochowicz-Gajownik addresses the topic of care for civilian and military refugees in southern France between 1939 and 1940, conducted in collaboration between the Polish Consulate in Marseille and the Polish Red Cross.

At the end of last year, Antoni Herkulan Wróbel, OFM, passed away, and Polish scholarship lost a significant researcher of the history of the Argentine-Polish community. A short memorial text by Kamil Świderski is dedicated to Fr. Wróbel's memory.

We wish all readers an enjoyable reading, and we invite interested researchers to collaborate with our Editorial Team.

Jarosław Rabiński
Kamil Świderski

5 https://mapapolskiegolondynu.pl/, eds. Michał Dworski and Jadwiga Kowalska.
6 https://mapapolskiegorzymu.pl/, eds. Bartosz Czajka, Michał Dworski, Uliana Hirniak.
7 https://mapapolskiegonowegojorku.pl/, eds. Bartosz Czajka and Jadwiga Kowalska.

Articles

The Exile History Review
2024, Vol. 3

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Croats in Emigrant Organizations from Central and Eastern Europe during the First Half of the Cold War: International Peasant Union and Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations

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Abstract: Based on relevant literature, emigrant press and Croatian archival sources, the paper presents and compares the activities and the attitudes of Croatian political emigrants in organizations of emigrants from Central and Eastern Europe in the period of the first half of the Cold War from 1945 to the end of the 1960s. Two main groups were active within the Croatian political emigration at that time. One group was gathered around the leadership of the Croatian Peasant Party, the strongest Croatian pre-war party, while the other group was made up of former members of the Ustaša movement, the Nazi war ally. Members of both groups had to go into exile at the end of the Second World War as opponents of the new communist regime. By coming into exile, they very quickly began to connect with other political emigrants from the countries of Central and Eastern Europe on an anti-communist basis. The group gathered around the Croatian Peasant Party found its activities within the International Peasant Union and organizations sponsored by American Free Europe Committee, while the group close to the Ustaša movement found its platform for action in the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations. The aim of this paper is to contribute to a better understanding of the history of Central and Eastern Europe, especially the Cold War activities of political emigrants from that area, through the activities of Croatian emigrants within international emigrant organizations.

Keywords: Croatian political emigration, International Peasant Union, Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, Ustaša Movement, Anti-communism, Cold War

Introduction

Croatian political emigration played a significant role in Croatian political history in the second half of the 20th century. Although in recent years there has been an increased interest in the activities of Croatian emigrants, their undertakings in emigrant organizations in Central and Eastern Europe during the Cold War have been very poorly researched. Some attention has been paid to the activities of the leaders of the Croatian

Peasant Party (HSS) in these organizations,[1] while the pursuits of a group of emigrants associated with the Ustaša[2] movement have remained almost completely neglected, so this paper will present some information about it for the first time. International authors were more interested in the fate of Croatian emigrants in the immediate post-war period,[3] as well as their armed actions[4] and the operations of the Yugoslav secret service towards them.[5] The general interest of international authors in the activities of emigrant organizations from Central and Eastern Europe is somewhat more significant when it comes to organizations sponsored by the American National Committee for a Free Europe/Free Europe Committee[6] (NCFE/FEC),[7] while there is a lack of a more systematic treatment of the remaining organizations.

The time frame of this paper begins with the end of the Second World War, when emigrants went into exile, and ends in the second half of the 1960s, when significant

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1 Ivan Tepeš, *Hrvatska politička emigracija-HSS* [*Croatian Political Emigration-HSS*] (Zagreb: AGM d.o.o., 2021); Ivan Tepeš, "Odnos Vladka Mačeka prema hrvatskom pitanju i Jugoslaviji kroz djelovanje u organizacijama emigranata srednje i istočne Europe od 1947. do 1964. godine" ["Vladko Maček's Attitude towards the Croatian Question and Yugoslavia through Activities in Organizations of Emigrants of Central and Eastern Europe from 1947 to 1964"], in *Zbornik radova međunarodne znanstveno-stručne konferencije "Migracije i identitet: Kultura, ekonomija, država"*, ed. Marina Perić-Kaselj (Zagreb: Institut za migracije i narodnosti, 2020), 869–82.

2 Ustaša is the Croatian name for an insurgent.

3 Amy Schmidt, "Vladko Maček i Hrvatska seljačka stranka: Prizori iz izbjeglištva" ["Vladko Maček and the Croatian Peasant Party: Scenes from Exile"], *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 37, no. 3 (2005): 407–22; Bernd Robionek, *Croatian Political Refugees an Western Allies: A documented History* (Berlin: Osteuropa – Zentrum Berlin, 2010).

4 Mate Nikola Tokić, *Croatian Radical Separatism and Diaspora Terrorism During the Cold War* (West Lafayette, Indiana, USA: Purdue University Press, 2020); Mate Nikola Tokić, *Diaspora Politics and Transnational Terrorism: An Historical Case Study* (Florence: European University Institute, 2009); Kristina Kalfic, "'The Bomb Is Set...': Responses to Croatian Political Activism in Australia, 1947–1989" (Doctoral thesis, University of Wollongong, 2017); Alexander Mitchell Lee, "'They Seem Like a Good Bunch': Liberal Party Support for Violent Croatian Nationalism in Australia 1949–1972" (Doctoral thesis, Australian National University, Canberra, 2022).

5 Christian Axboe Nielsen, *Yugoslavia and Political Assassinations: The History and Legacy of Tito's Campaign Against the Émigrés* (London; New York: I. B. Tauris, 2020); Bernd Robionek, "Mercenaries of a Phantom War The 'Hostile Emigration' in Yugoslavia's Globalized Ideology of Insecurity," *The Exile History Review* 2, (2023): 49–75; Robionek, "State Security out of Control? The Influence of Yugoslavia's Political Leadership on Targeted Killings abroad (1965–84)" (OEZB Working Paper, March 2020).

6 The National Committee for a Free Europe changed its name to the Free Europe Committee in 1954.

7 Katalin Kadar Lynn, ed., *The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare: Cold War Organizations sponsored by the National Committee for a Free Europe/Free Europe Committee* (Saint Helena, Ca: Helena History Press, LLC, 2013); Arkadiusz Indraszczyk, "The Cooperation of Peasant Parties from Central and Eastern Europe in Exile after 1945," in *East Central Europe in Exile*, ed. Anna Mazurkiewicz, vol. 2, *Transatlantic Identities* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013), 193–225; Anna Mazurkiewicz, *Voices of the Silenced Peoples in the Global Cold War: The Assembly of Captive European Nations 1954–1972* (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2021).

changes took place in the activities of international emigrant organizations, but also significant changes on the Croatian emigrant scene. With the death of the president of the HSS, Vladko Maček, in 1964, the activity of Croats in the IPU declined, and at the same time the general passivity of the activities of the IPU began. In the mid-1960s, a crisis began in the operation of the FEC, the most important American organization for financial and logistical support for the activities of emigrants, which was completely ceased to function in 1971. At the same time, on the other hand, the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN) moved from the European framework to the wider world stage in 1967 with the establishment of the World Anti-Communist League (WACL), in whose work Croatian representatives also participated actively.

In addition to the existing relevant literature, the paper mostly relies on the emigrant press, namely the official ABN newspaper *ABN Correspondence*, the official HSS newspaper *Hrvatski glas* and the official gazette of the Croatian Liberation Movement (HOP) *Hrvatska*. From archival sources, the documents of the Yugoslav secret service that are in the collection of the State Security Service of the Socialist Republic of Croatia in the Croatian State Archives in Zagreb were used in the paper.

Before the Second World War, the HSS was the leading Croatian political party that enjoyed the plebiscitary support of the Croatian people in the last pre-war elections in 1938, and on August 26, 1939, its president Maček concluded an Agreement with the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Dragiša Cvetković, which established a more autonomous political unit within Yugoslavia, the Banovina of Croatia. With the attack of Germany on April 6, 1941, Yugoslavia fell apart, and with it the Banovina of Croatia as well. On April 10, 1941, the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) was proclaimed, and power was taken over by the Ustaša movement led by Ante Pavelić, who imprisoned Maček and kept him in internment until the end of the war. During the war, the HSS became stratified, the Ustaša movement was compromised by its collaborating with the Nazis and fascists and the crimes it committed, and the Communist Party entered the scene, which, at the head of the guerrilla anti-fascist Partisan movement, emerged victorious on the Allied side. When they took power, the Communists started committing crimes against war opponents, as well as other political opponents, priests and civilians. The only salvation from the communists was exile, in which tens of thousands of people found themselves, including politicians gathered around the HSS and the Ustaša movement led by their leaders Maček and Pavelić. Although their common enemies were the communists, their mutual rivalry did not diminish when they came into exile. They reproached each other for choosing allies. The HSS members reproached the Ustaše for their alliance with the Nazis during the war, and the Ustaše reproached the HSS members for their pre-war cooperation with the Serbs and their tendency to resolve the Croatian question within Yugoslavia. However, the main conflict was over the question of which of them was the main representative of

the Croatian people. The HSS referred to the results of the last free elections held in 1938, while the former Ustaše based their legitimacy on the fact that the Ustaše movement created an independent Croatian state in 1941.[8] Both operated from these positions within the organizations of emigrants from Central and Eastern Europe.

Both groups understood the importance of international connections by looking for an ally in the internationalization of the Croatian question, and their natural partners in this were emigrants from other countries who had also escaped from communism. But in relation to them, the Croats had a big problem with the outbreak of the conflict between the Yugoslav communist leader Josip Broz Tito and the Soviet leader Stalin in June 1948. After that, the West financially and militarily helped Tito's regime and the integrity of Yugoslavia, hoping that other communist states would follow Tito's example and thereby cause a split in the world communist bloc.[9] Yugoslavia was no longer considered part of the Soviet communist bloc, and expanded its influence on African and Asian countries through the Non-Aligned Movement from the first half of the 1950s.[10]

The Cold War also brought new Western policy settings, according to which all Soviet enemies were welcome. Thus, the old, defeated war rivals grew into new desirable but covert Cold War anti-communist allies, especially those who had war experience in direct combat with the Red Army or with communist guerrilla groups, which was the case with the Croatian Ustaše, and armed forces of other nations from Central and Eastern Europe.[11] However, political emigrants who were not burdened by cooperation with the Nazis during the war received primacy in support for action. Their main stay in the first years of the Cold War was the NCFE/FEC, which helped them generously and was created primarily to conduct political and psychological warfare against the Soviet Union.

Croats in IPU and Emigrant Organizations Sponsored by the American NCFE/FEC

NCFE was founded in May 1949 and was formally made up of private United States (US) organizations and prominent anti-communist public figures, such as various politicians,

8 Tepeš, *Hrvatska politička emigracija-HSS*.

9 Lorraine M. Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War* (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).

10 For more on the Yugoslav foreign policy position during the Cold War, see: Martin Previšić, *Breaking Down Bipolarity: Yugoslavia's Foreign Relations during the Cold War* (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2021).

11 Thomas Boghardt, *Covert Legions: U.S. Army Intelligence in Germany, 1944–1949* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army, 2022); Christopher Simpson, *America's Recruitment of Nazis and Its Effects on the Cold War* (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1988).

military officials, and US businessmen, among whom were the later US President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the later Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Allen W. Dulles, but in reality it was backed by the US government and the CIA. NCFE/FEC supported more than a hundred organizations around the world, among which the most famous were Radio Free Europe, which broadcast programs for people behind the Iron Curtain, and the Assembly of Captive European Nations (ACEN).[12]

The main Croatian representatives in the organizations sponsored by the NCFE/FEC were from the group around the HSS and its president Maček, who stayed in Paris from 1945 to 1947, and then, from 1947 until his death in 1964, in Washington. Given that he enjoyed pre-war political electoral legitimacy as the leader of the Croatian people, Maček immediately began to establish international contacts after his arrival in Paris, using his pre-war acquaintances, such as the French politician Robert Schuman.[13] In July 1945, Maček gave an interview to *The New York Times*, in which he sharply criticized the new Yugoslav communist government and mentioned the Iron Curtain that the Partisans had lowered over Yugoslavia.[14]

Maček became more active in connecting with the leaders of the East European peasant parties in September 1946, after a meeting in Pittsburgh with the leader of the Bulgarian Peasant Party, Georgy M. Dimitrov, who had defected to the USA shortly before. The founding of the IPU was officially presented to the public in Washington on July 3 and 4, 1947, and the first congress was held in Washington from May 24 to 27, 1948, by which time all the leaders of the peasant parties from Central and Eastern Europe ended up in exile. Stanislaw Mikolajczyk from Poland was elected President, Vladko Maček from Croatia, Ferenc Nagy from Hungary, Grigore Niculescu-Buzesti from Romania and Milan Gavrilović from Serbia as Vice-Presidents, and Georgi Dimitrov from Bulgaria as Secretary General.[15] The IPU immediately became active, acting towards the USA and the United Nations, appealing against communism and the occupation of the homelands of their members by the USSR, citing the figure of 100 million peasants fighting communism and totalitarianism in the area.[16] The leaders of the peasant parties were politicians who in the first post-war years until 1947/48 cooperated with the communists in coalition governments, receiving a lot of votes in the process.[17]

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12 For more details on the Committee, see: Katalin Kadar Lynn, "At War While at Peace: United States Cold War Policy and the National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc," in *The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare: Cold War Organizations sponsored by the National Committee for a Free Europe/Free Europe Committee*, ed. Katalin Kadar Lynn (Saint Helena, Ca, SAD: Helena History Press, LLC, 2013), 7–70.

13 Tepeš, *Hrvatska politička emigracija-HSS*, 49–51.

14 Cyrus Leo Sulzberger, "Matchek Predicts Tito Dictatorship," *The New York Times*, July 23, 1945, 6.

15 Tepeš, *Hrvatska politička emigracija-HSS*, 185–90.

16 Ibid., 191–2.

17 For more on coalition governments in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, see: John Connely, *Od Naroda do nacija: Povijesti stočne Europe* [*From Peoples Into Nations: A History of Eastern Europe*] (Zagreb:

During its activity, IPU had financial support from the NCFE/FEC. The IPU was most active during the 1950s, when it also had a network of offices in the USA, Canada and Western European countries, and in the early 1960s the activity of the IPU began to weaken.[18] In the late 1950s, the IPU included peasant parties from the Baltic countries and Ukraine, which were then part of the USSR, as well as from Central and Eastern European communist countries.[19] Like Maček, who invoked pre-war electoral legitimacy, the IPU was considered a representative of those parties that had enormous electoral legitimacy in the post-war elections before the complete "Soviet subjugation" of their countries in 1947/48.[20]

However, at the same time as the period of the greatest activity of the IPU, there was also a separation of the interests of political emigrants and their patrons from the USA, which began to support the policy of appeasement and agreement with the USSR, i.e. reproachment and peaceful coexistence, especially after the death of Stalin in 1953.[21] The IPU condemned such a policy towards communism, considering it a license for the communist destruction of democracy by all possible means.[22]

The IPU advocated the unified positions of overthrowing communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the departure of the Soviet army and allowing free democratic elections under international supervision. The ruling communist parties considered an extension of the USSR without influence among the people. The IPU further demanded the right of the people to self-determination, personal freedoms and private ownership of land. Since 1948, the IPU advocated the idea of a European gathering into a federation of states whose components would include their liberated peasant homelands.[23]

Maček and his HSS, operating within the IPU, made additional efforts to explain to the West that the positive policy pursued towards Yugoslavia after 1948 was wrong. Maček had to keep repeating that Tito and the Yugoslav communists were no different from the Soviets, and he denied the West's thesis that the so-called "Titoism" and "National Communism" were better forms of communism. He assured that the Yugoslav communists in the late 1940s carried out the violent collectivization of peasant estates

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Fraktura, 2022), 635–74; Odd Arne Westad, *Povijest Hladnog rata* [*The Cold War: A World History*] (Zagreb: Fraktura, 2021), 90–108.

18 For more details on the IPU, see: Indraszczyk, "The Cooperation of Peasant Parties," 193–225.

19 Tepeš, *Hrvatska politička emigracija-HSS*, 231.

20 "Resolution of the Fifth Congress of the International Peasant Union on International Affairs," *Hrvatski glas* [*Croatian Voice*], November 12, 1956, 1.

21 Kadar Lynn, "At War While at Peace," 51.

22 "Resolution of the Fifth Congress of the International Peasant Union on International Affairs," *Hrvatski glas*, November 12, 1956, 1.

23 "New Year Declaration of the International Peasant Union," *Hrvatski glas* [*Croatian Voice*], February 3, 1948, 3.

on the model of the Soviets in the early 1930s. Maček also criticized Western financial aid to Yugoslavia, believing that it helped the dictatorship and supported the communist repressive apparatus, and that it undermined the morale of the people in Yugoslavia. He emphasized the persecution of the Church and priests in Yugoslavia and warned of the persecution and imprisonment of the Archbishop of Zagreb, Alojzije Stepinac. He was convinced that the peasantry in Yugoslavia strongly resisted communism, and the communist abandonment of the forced collectivization of peasant estates in Yugoslavia was proof of this. He warned that yielding to Tito would not lead to democracy and capitalism in Yugoslavia, nor to its foreign policy turning to the Western camp. Aware of American foreign policy, he did not insist on breaking up Yugoslavia, although he insisted on emphasizing the uniqueness of the Croatian people.[24] The HSS belittled Tito's Non-Aligned Movement while promoting the IPU as a more important and powerful organization,[25] but in the end Maček was still convinced that the West did not give it the necessary importance.[26]

Croatian emigrants around the HSS, in addition to the IPU, also participated in other emigrant organizations that were sponsored by the NCFE. From August 1949, Maček was NCFE's advisor for Croatia, while several dozen Croatian emigrants close to HSS worked in various departments of NCFE/FEC. Through the funds received from the NCFE/FEC, HSS members managed to secure scholarships for several Croatian students to study at The Free Europe University in Exile, which operated from 1951 to 1958. University's headquarters were in New York and its component was the College de l'Europe libre in Strasbourg, France.[27] During the 1950s, HSS members, through their Croatian Association of Free Journalists, were also active in the International Federation of Freelance Journalists, which had been gathering emigrant journalists since 1948.[28]

In addition to the mentioned organizations sponsored by NCFE/FEC, there were also those that did not open their doors to Croatian emigrants, and the most important among them was certainly ACEN, which operated from 1954 to 1972. ACEN was a kind of parliament of representatives of enslaved peoples in which, due to American respect for Tito, there were no political emigrants from Yugoslavia, but also representatives of emigrants from Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, so as not to further conflict with

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24 Tepeš, *Hrvatska politička emigracija-HSS*, 200, 221–32, 237, 435.

25 "Povodom kongresa Međunarodne seljačke unije" ["On the Occasion of the Congress of the International Peasants' Union"], *Hrvatski glas*, September 18, 1961, 3.

26 Vladko Maček, *In the Struggle for Freedom* (USA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park and London, 1957), 273.

27 Tepeš, *Hrvatska politička emigracija-HSS*, 214–9.

28 Ibid., 209.

the USSR.[29] The HSS members were extremely dissatisfied with the non-admission of representatives of the Croatian people to ACEN's membership, so Maček forbade his members to attend ACEN sessions indirectly through the IPU, which was also respected by political emigrants from Serbia and Slovenia at Maček's urging.[30]

A part of the Croatian emigration gathered around the HSS, more precisely its general secretary Juraj Krnjević,[31] enjoyed the support of British political circles, including Winston Churchill himself, who included them in the work of the European Movement (EM). EM was an organization that was founded in 1948 with the aim of unifying Europe. In its activities, EM also enjoyed the support of ENFC/FEC. HSS members within the EM became involved in the work of the Commission for Central and Eastern Europe, which operated until 1953. Krnjević was also present at the first congress of the EM held in the Dutch city of The Hague in May 1948, which was attended by several prominent European statesmen. Krnjević passivated his activities in the EM after 1953, which was obviously a consequence of Tito's visit to Britain that year.[32]

Croatian Emigrants in ABN

Another group of Croatian emigrants, former military and civilian officials of the NDH, found their allies within the ABN. Unlike Maček, who was one of the founders and a prominent official of the IPU, the Croatian representatives in the ABN were respected, as were their organizations around the world, but no Croat found himself in the very leadership of the organization.

The ABN was founded at a conference held on November 21 and 22, 1943 in the forests of western Ukraine, near the town of Zhytomir, on the initiative of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists of Stephan Bandera (OUN-B) and under the protection of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). At that time, representatives of 12 nations from the territory of the USSR and a representative of Hungary gathered and set goals for the fight against communism and the liberation of the people under the rule of the Soviet Union. After the end of the war, the ABN held its first post-war conference in Munich

29 Anna Mazurkiewicz, *Voices of the Silenced Peoples*.

30 Neda Prpić, *Dr. Juraj Krnjević – Tri emigracije I: razgovori-pisma-prilozi* [*Dr. Juraj Krnjević – Three Emigrations I: Conversations-Letters-Contributions*] (Zagreb: Udruga za promicanje hrvatske političke povijesti Neda Prpić-Gamiršek, 2004), 164.

31 Juraj Krnjević went into exile on Maček's order in April 1941 with the Yugoslav government after the German attack on Yugoslavia. From then until his death in 1988, he worked in London.

32 For more details on the activities of the HSS in the EM, see: Tepeš, *Hrvatska politička emigracija-HSS*, 201–8.

on April 16, 1946, and the former short-term Ukrainian Prime Minister Jaroslav Stetsko was proclaimed the president of ABN.[33] At that time, representatives of peoples from the Baltic and other European Soviet satellite countries also joined the ABN.[34] In addition to the overthrow of communism, the ABN also advocated the stratification of the USSR,[35] which brought them into conflict with the Russian anti-communist émigrés, especially with the strongest organization, The National Alliance of Russian Solidarists (NTS).[36] The ABN's main objective was to fight Bolshevism by operating on the ground within the territory behind the Iron Curtain, so it was not considered an émigré organization. The ABN committee was considered only a body for the coordination of homeland activities,[37] representing 200 million people behind the Iron Curtain ready to fight against communism.[38] In its activities, ABN enjoyed the support of British intelligence services, especially MI6, and after 1951 it also had the support of the West German government, given that his headquarters were in Munich.[39]

Those individual members and officials who collaborated with the Nazis during the war were the target of ABN opponents, who readily used the argument to discredit ABN.[40] Its officials did not hide their cooperation, but they had an explanation for that as well. They claimed that many of them fought in alliance with the Germans for the national interests of their peoples for liberation from Russian imperialism and Bolshevism, which did not mean that they were Nazis because of this. As a counterargument, they mentioned the example of the cooperation of the Western Allies with the Communists during the war, which did not mean that the Westerners were automatically Communists.[41] They also considered it unfair that they were accused of collaborating with the Nazis, while on the other hand, some political émigrés, such as Ferenc Nagy from Hungary, Georgy Dimitrov from Bulgaria and Petr Zenkl from Czechoslovakia, were

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33 Yaroslav Stetsko was the Ukrainian Prime Minister appointed by Stephan Bandera on June 30, 1941 after the declaration of Ukrainian independence. On July 12, the Germans annulled the proclamation, and Stetsko was taken to a concentration camp where he stayed until the end of the war. More about the creation of ABN during the war and the first post-war years, see: Grygoriy Riy, "Reasons for the Creation of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN): Eastern European and Ukrainian Dimensions," *Almanac of Ukrainian Studies* 19 (2021): 149–57.

34 Niko Nakashidze, *The Truth About A.B.N.* (München: A.B.N. Press and Information Bureau, 1960), 15.

35 Ibid., 30.

36 "Fight of the ABN," *ABN Correspondence*, February 1950, 7.

37 Ibid., 1.

38 Niko Nakashidze, "20 Years' Activity Of A.B.N.," *ABN Correspondence*, October–December 1963, 41.

39 Stephen Dorril, *MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 222–48, 442–54.

40 [unknown author], *What is ABN: Freedom for Nations! Freedom for Individuals* (Executive Committee Ukrainian Liberation Movement, 1958).

41 Nakashidze, *The Truth About A.B.N.*, 14.

admitted into NCFE/FEC sponsored organizations as democratic elements without any condemnation, although from 1945 to 1947/48 they collaborated in coalition governments with the communists, who committed a number of crimes at that time.[42] In addition, ABN members generally resented the existence of double standards in the West, according to which, for example, Francisco Franco's authoritarian regime was condemned, and on the other hand, Tito's dictatorship was rewarded, while attitudes towards Stalin, Leon Trotsky, Nikita Khrushchev and others were changed if necessary.[43]

From the beginning of its post-war activity, the ABN, like the NCFE/FEC sponsored organizations, advocated the idea of the European Union, with the Union recognizing the freedom and full sovereignty of all peoples.[44] They believed that in the interest of the then existing efforts for European integration, the full liberation of the peoples within the USSR should be advocated, and that Europe should learn a lesson from the Third Reich, which, according to them, did not understand this and therefore lost the war in the East. It was especially disputable to them that the peoples of Africa could gain independence, while the old European and Eurasian nations could not.[45]

The inclusion of the people of the USSR in the Resolution by which the US Congress established the Captive nations Week in July 1959, which was held annually in the third week of July, was considered a great success.[46] Such equating of the enslavement of the peoples of the USSR with the peoples of other European Soviet satellite countries was not always the case.

It was for this reason that the ABN had conflicts with ACEN, which was criticized for not representing the right to freedom of all subjugated peoples, such as the peoples of multinational communist states like the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and even the Germans from East Germany. The only exception for ACEN was the Baltic states, as the USA did not recognize their Soviet occupation. ABN also believed that ACEN, with American help, is misrepresenting itself as an assembly of legitimate representatives of peoples living in countries behind the Iron Curtain. In contrast to that, ABN considered that ACEN's true role is to preserve the status quo in Europe, which was established by Moscow.[47]

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42 Ibid., 31; Dalibor Pokorny, "What Is The ACEN," *ABN Correspondence*, May–June 1960, 25–6.

43 Nakashidze, *The Truth About A.B.N.*, 32–3.

44 "Fight of the ABN," 7; "ABN and the European Movement," *ABN Correspondence*, March 1950, 1.

45 Stefan Panov, "European Integration and the Freedom of the Peoples in the East," *ABN Correspondence*, June 1952, 5–6.

46 Nakashidze, "20 Years' Activity," 44; "The American People Defend The Subjugated Nations," *ABN Correspondence*, September 1959, 1.

47 Pokorny, "What Is The ACEN," 25–6; A.W. Bedriy, "ACEN Against The Liberation Of The Enslaved Nations," *ABN Correspondence*, July–August 1967, 42.

Croats joined the ABN during its post-war reactivation,[48] had a representative at the ABN conference in Munich on April 16, 1946,[49] and from 1949 they became full members of the ABN.[50] From August 1949[51] until his death in 1959, the main Croatian representative in the Central Committee of the ABN was former Ustaša colonel Hinko Alabanda, who also served as the deputy president of the ABN Military Commission.[52] Alabanda was succeeded by Andrija Ilić, who in the second half of the 1950s became a high-ranking official of the HOP,[53] an organization founded in Argentina by Pavelić in 1956 and which has been the only Croatian organization in the ABN since then.[54] Before the founding of the HOP, these were alternately the Croatian National Resistance and the Croatian National Committee, and accordingly, due to mutual conflict, for a short time in the first half of the 1950s, Stjepan Buć was also the Croatian representative in the ABN.[55]

In addition to the above, many other Croatian emigrants and their societies around the world, in the USA, Australia, England, Europe, Canada and Argentina, had an active participation in the activities of the ABN. Croats were involved in ABN events and public gatherings everywhere,[56] and where the Croatian community was strong and organized, such as the one in Australia, it was also the host of ABN gatherings.[57]

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48 Croats from the Ustaša movement and Ukrainians from the OUN have maintained ties since the 1930s, and a congratulatory telegram was sent from the OUN-b's headquarters in Krakow on the proclamation of the NDH in April 1941 (Per A. Rudling, "The OUN, the UPA and the Holocaust: A Study in the Manufacturing of Historical Myths," *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian & East European Studies*, no. 2107 (2011): 7).

49 Nakashidze, "20 Years' Activity," 41.

50 "Hrvatski oslobodilački Pokret na svjetskom kongresu Anti bolševičkog bloka naroda (ABN) i Europskog vijeća za slobodu (EFC) u Londonu od 17. do 22. listopada 1968" ["The Croatian Liberation Movement at the World Congress of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (ABN) and the European Council for Freedom (EFC) in London from 17 to 22 October 1968"], *Hrvatska* [*Croatia*], November 30, 1.

51 HR-HDA-1561-SDS RSUP SRH, Dossier Alabanda Hinko, no. 301799, p. 30.

52 "Major-General Hinko Alabanda," *ABN Correspondence*, September 1959, 3.

53 HR-HDA-1561-SDS RSUP SRH, 10.10/1, "Hrvatski oslobodilački pokret (HOP)" ["Croatian Liberation Movement (HOP)"], p. 77.

54 "'United in Genuine Friendship'," *ABN Correspondence*, November–December 1958, 5; "Croatian Leaders in Munich," *ABN Correspondence*, October–December 1964, 59.

55 "Plenary Meeting of the A.B.N.," *ABN Correspondence*, March–April 1953, 6; HR-HDA-1561-SDS RSUP SRH, 10.7/7, "Hrvatski narodni odbor – Jelićevci" ["Croatian National Committee – Jelićevci"], p. 8–12; Mile Boban Otporaš, ed., *Pisma Vjekoslava Maksa Luburića 1952-1969: Izvorna povijesna građa* [*Letters of Vjekoslav Maks Luburić 1952–1969: Original Historical Material*] (Zagreb: Despot Infinitus d.o.o., 2014) 25, 35–6.

56 Andrija Ilić, "Dvadeset i peta godišnjica Antiboljševičkog Bloka Naroda" ["The Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations"], *Hrvatska*, January 25, 1969, 5.

57 "ABN in Australia and New Zealand," *ABN Correspondence*, January–February 1961, 28; "ABN Activity in Australia," *ABN Correspondence*, January–February 1965, 43.

As the ABN constantly emphasized its support for the guerrilla freedom fighters behind the Iron Curtain, Croatian representatives also tried to show the strength of Croatian resistance in their homeland by mentioning in 1950 news about Croatian "Crusaders", i.e. insurgents[58] who were active in Croatia in the period between 1945 and 1950.[59] There was even mention of obvious misinformation about the visit of the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian insurgent UPA Army, Taras Chuprynka, to the General Staff of the Croatian Crusaders in 1946.[60] In general, Ukrainians and Croats in the ABN emphasized their Ukrainian-Croatian harmony and mutual assistance of the Croatian and Ukrainian people for the freedom of their homelands.[61]

Croatian representatives, like others in the ABN who collaborated with the Nazis during the war, also offered their arguments for such cooperation. They claimed that the Croats had begun their struggle for independence long before the existence of fascism and Nazism, and that members of the armed forces of the NDH had fought only against the Bolsheviks, Communists and Serbian Chetniks, and that they had never fought against the armies of the Western Allies.[62] Alabanda said that it was true that Croatia fought as an ally of the German people, but it did not fight for the goals of Hitler and Mussolini, but it was a fight for its freedom and state independence, a fight against world communism and for the whole of humanity, and not a single bullet was fired against British or American troops.[63] To support these claims, he provided some details about Pavelić's alleged rejection of Stalin's offer at the end of the war. Accordingly, Stalin guaranteed the survival of the NDH, but at the cost of the unimpeded passage of Soviet troops across its territory to the Adriatic and further to the north of Italy. By rejecting it, Pavelić initiated the fight against the Red Army in the north of the NDH and thus saved Western Europe from catastrophe and general Bolshevization in the long run.[64]

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58 Dr. A.I. (pseudonym of Andrija Ilić), "Croatia's Crusaders Are Fighting in the Stepinac's Spirit," *ABN Correspondence*, March 1950, 6.

59 For more details on the Crusaders, see: Zdenko Radelić, *Križari: gerila u Hrvatskoj 1945.-1950.* [*Crusaders: Guerrilla in Croatia 1945–1950*] (Zagreb: Alfa d. d. i Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2011).

60 "Govor hrvatskog ABN delegata" ["Speech of the Croatian ABN Delegate"], *Hrvatska*, November 18, 1950, 3.

61 "The Common Front Against Moscow," *ABN Correspondence*, March–April 1962, 29–30.

62 Andrija Ilić, "On the Anniversary of Croat Independence," *ABN Correspondence*, May 1951, 8–9; Hinko Alabanda, "The Croatians Reply," *ABN Correspondence*, June 1952, 8.

63 Vladislav Škaričić (pseudonym of Hinko Alabanda), "Croatia's Sacrifice for the West," *ABN Correspondence*, May–June 1958, 6.

64 Ibid.; Based on this text, Croatian historian Jere Jareb wrote a scientific article on Croatian-Soviet ties during World War II. See: Jere Jareb, "Sovjetski dodiri s dr. Antom Pavelićem od rujna 1944. do veljače 1945." ["Soviet Contacts with Dr. Ante Pavelić from September 1944 to February 1945"], *Časopis za suvremenu povijest* 27, no. 1 (1995): 7–31.

As in the case of Croatian emigrants sponsored by NCFE/FEC, the Croatian representatives in the ABN also had significant problems due to the favorable international position of Yugoslavia after 1948. That is why the peoples of Yugoslavia were not explicitly mentioned in the Resolution of the Captive Nations Week,[65] but regardless of this, Croats participated in its celebration every year and were mentioned in the proclamations of some American cities where the events were held.[66]

Croatian representatives in the ABN also publicly explained on all possible occasions that communism in Yugoslavia was no different from communism in the USSR and other satellite communist countries, and that it was only a communist tactic for further expansion around the world, and concluded that the Western experiment with support for Yugoslav communism in favor of the schism in the Eastern Bloc had failed.[67] Croatian representatives in the ABN also explained the uselessness of Yugoslavia for the West from a military point of view, claiming that the Yugoslav army would immediately disintegrate after the attack of the Soviets and their satellites, like the army of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia during the German attack in April 1941, because it was composed of oppressed peoples who were not ready to defend it, especially not the Croats.[68] They spoke publicly about Tito's crimes and murders of Croats immediately after the end of the war until 1948, giving figures from 150 thousand to half a million.[69] They also talked about the persecution of the Church in Croatia and Archbishop Stepinac, who was considered a Croatian spiritual leader, and his sacrifice and suffering as an inspiration in the fight against communism.[70] Tito's policy in the Non-Aligned Movement was also criticized, believing that Tito hypocritically supported the rights to self-determination of African

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65 In addition to the constituent republics of the USSR and European Soviet satellite countries, the Resolution explicitly mentioned North Korea, North Vietnam, Mainland China and Tibet. The Czech Republic and Slovakia are also not separated, but Czechoslovakia is mentioned. See: "Senate Joint Resolution 111," *ABN Correspondence*, September 1959, 1.

66 "Captive Nations Week," *ABN Correspondence*, September–October 1960, 2; "Captive Nations Week, 1965," *ABN Correspondence*, November–December 1965, 37–40; "In Australia," *ABN Correspondence*, November–December 1965, 44; "Observance of Captive Nations Week 1967 in New York," *ABN Correspondence*, September–October 1967, 34–5.

67 Andrija Ilić, "National Communism A Contradiction In Itself," *ABN Correspondence*, March–April 1959, 5; "Croatia Under Tito's Yoke," *ABN Correspondence*, September–October 1961, 29–31; "Croats Demand Independence," *ABN Correspondence*, October–December 1964, 39–41.

68 "Marching Orders against Tito Imminent?," *ABN Correspondence*, April 1951, 1–2; "Croatian Memorandum," *ABN Correspondence*, November–December 1953, 10.

69 "Request to Extradite Dr. Artukovic Dictated by Hatred," *ABN Correspondence*, July–August 1958, 15; Andrija Ilić, "United in Struggle," *ABN Correspondence*, January–February 1964, 19; "Penalty for Insulting Tito," *ABN Correspondence*, May–June 1964, 38.

70 Dr. A.I., "Croatia's Crusaders," 6.

and Asian peoples in the process of decolonization, and he did not want to apply the same principle in his own country.[71]

Unlike the Croatian group sponsored by NCFE/FEC, the Croats in the ABN were not ready for Yugoslav solutions but demanded exclusive Croatian independence and the breakup of Yugoslavia, explaining that this state was an artificial creation in which the Serbs had dominance, and the Croats were neglected. They also denied the idea of Pan-Slavism, considering it a creation of Russian imperialism, claiming that Croats and Serbs are not the same race, just as there are differences between Ukrainians and Russians.[72] In this respect, they shared views with the leadership of the ABN.[73]

The leadership of the ABN generally accepted all criticism of Tito and Yugoslavia by its Croatian representatives as its official policy and used every opportunity to portray Western policy towards Tito as wrong. It advocated the stratification of the artificial multinational creations of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia created after the First World War against the will of the Croats and Slovaks, and which, with the help of Russia, survived even after the Second World War.[74] They also demanded the stratification of the USSR, which they considered the last surviving colonial empire, complaining that at the time of decolonization and liberation of African and Asian peoples, the same right was not recognized by the peoples of the USSR.[75] The leadership of the ABN supported the Croats in criticizing Tito's Non-Aligned Policy, and the general policy of the Non-Aligned Movement and their role as the Third Force in the World were also criticized. Instead, the ABN claimed that they were the real third force and considered the Non-Aligned Movement an extension of communism. They argued that there could be no neutral states in the world, but that each should declare itself in favor of one bloc, with the most ideal being joining the Western democratic bloc.[76]

A particular thorn in the side of the ABN[77] and the Croats in the ABN[78] was the policy of peaceful coexistence of the two blocs, which they considered to be the weakness of the West and a means of leaving the subjugated peoples at the mercy of the communists.[79]

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71 "From Letters to ABN," *ABN Correspondence*, November–December 1961, 34.

72 Stjepan Buć, "Panslavism," *ABN Correspondence*, August–September 1951, 3–4.

73 "Pan-Slavism – A Russian Idea," *ABN Correspondence*, May–June 1962, 15–6.

74 "On Captive Nations Week," *ABN Correspondence*, August–October 1965, 35.

75 Niko Nakashidze, "The World-Front Against Bolshevism," *ABN Correspondence*, August–September 1956, 5.

76 "'The Third Force': Neutralists are not a Separate Force," *ABN Correspondence*, March–April 1961, 21–2; "Russian Colonial Policy in Captive Nations," *ABN Correspondence*, January–February 1962, 34.

77 "Against a Policy of Coexistence," *ABN Correspondence*, April–May 1956, 1; Niko Nakashidze, "Moscow's Coexistence Swindle," *ABN Correspondence*, March–April 1960, 1.

78 Ilić, "National Communism," 5.

79 "The Fiery Signs of Desperation," *ABN Correspondence*, August–September 1956, 9.

They believed that instead of a policy of coexistence, it was better to strongly support the peoples behind the Iron Curtain in the struggle for self-determination, because this was the most powerful Western Cold War weapon that would lead to the collapse of communism and the Soviet Union.[80]

From the mid-1950s ABN began to look for allies beyond the European framework, looking for ways to get involved in the wider international anti-communist struggle, especially among the Asian peoples who were also fighting strongly against communism at that time. ABN President Stetsko visited the Chinese branch of The Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League (APACL) for the first time in October 1955 in Taipei, Taiwan,[81] and in March 1957 he participated for the first time in the APACL conference in Saigon, South Vietnam.[82] In 1958, together with APACL, Stetsko attended the preparatory conference for the creation of a world anti-communist organization, which was finally realized with the founding of the WACL in 1967.

APACL conference in Saigon in October 1963 was particularly important for the Croats, when the ABN leadership for the first time managed to unanimously push through the part of the conference resolution in which the problem of Croatia was mentioned, which until then had encountered significant opposition at APACL conferences due to the special position of Yugoslavia in international politics,[83] but also Tito's long-term campaign among Asian nations, especially through the Non-Alignment Movement.[84] The same was done at the APACL conferences for the next two years. The resolutions expressed support for the Croats in the restoration of national independence and the fight against Tito's tyranny in the artificial creation of Yugoslavia, and Tito was called a communist Trojan Horse that pushes the non-alignment of the countries of Africa and Latin America in the interest of Moscow. It is interesting that these parts of the resolution were mostly protested by representatives of ACEN and NTS, who attended the discussions at the meetings of the preparatory committees as guests.[85]

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80 "From the Address by Dr. Stjepan Bućić, Representative of Croatia," *ABN Correspondence*, June–July 1951, 6.

81 "No Compromise in the Anti-Communist Fight," *ABN Correspondence*, January–March 1956, 15.

82 "ABN at the Asian Conference in Saigon," *ABN Correspondence*, May–June 1957, 1.

83 "The 9th Conference of APACL," *ABN Correspondence*, October–December 1963, 18.

84 "IX. Konferencija APACL-a u Saigonu u prilog hrvatske državnosti" ["9th APACL Conference in Saigon in Favor of Croatian Statehood"], *Hrvatska*, Božić [Christmas] 1963, 5.

85 "APACL Conference for Liberation Policy," *ABN Correspondence*, October–December 1963, 20; "The Main Topics of the Conference Were:," *ABN Correspondence*, January–February 1965, 19; "Resolution on Soviet Russian Colonialism and the Liberation of Subjugated Peoples," *ABN Correspondence*, January–February 1965, 23; "APACL Conference," *ABN Correspondence*, November–December 1965, 4–5; "Resolution on the Liberation of Nations Subjugated by Soviet Russian Imperialism and Communism," *ABN Correspondence*, November–December 1965, 7.

The introduction of the Croatian problem to the wider world stage through the APACL conferences was only a prelude to the later involvement of Croatian representatives in the WACL during the 1970s and 1980s, which was the result of strong support from the ABN leadership. In 1967, ABN also participated in the creation of the European Freedom Council (EFC), which was an extended arm of ABN in Western European countries. For ABN, WACL and EFC were the beginning of a stronger engagement in the fight against communism at the European and world level.[86]

Conclusion

Both Croatian emigrant groups expected a great conflict between the Western democracies and communism and sought their space in it, expecting Western help to return to power in Croatia. The group around the HSS strengthened its position in cooperation with peasant parties from Central and Eastern Europe and counted on the support of the peasantry from these countries, while the group around the former Ustaša relied on advocates of armed guerilla anti-communist resistance in all nations behind the Iron Curtain, including those from the Soviet Union. Due to the Cold War circumstances of the status quo and American policy, the group around the HSS was much more pragmatic and inclined to resolve the Croatian question within the Yugoslav framework, while the group around the former Ustaša insisted on Croatian independence and the stratification of Yugoslavia, which was then a radical solution disrupting the balance of power against Western interests. After the conflict between Tito and Stalin in 1948, the West saw Yugoslavia closer to the Western camp, regardless of its communist regime, so no emigrant group could undermine it. In the end, the Croats only took advantage of the favorable international situation after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to overthrow communism and gain independence. At the same time, the maximalist demands of other Eastern European emigrants also came true. Communism was overthrown, the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia disintegrated, and most of the newly formed countries joined the EU.

86 "Here and There," *ABN Correspondence*, January–February 1968, 1–3.

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"The Goal and the Way" – the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) in Exile

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Abstract: The article is devoted to the activity of the Polish Socialist Party (Polish abbreviation: PPS) in exile in the years 1945–1989. The political goals of the Polish emigration and the activities of the Polish Socialists are presented in this context. The differences in the strategy of the various political centers, as well as the possibilities of using the Socialist International (SI), including the Socialist Union of Central-Eastern Europe (SUCEE) for the "Polish cause" are also outlined. The point was to ensure that the problem of the countries behind the Iron Curtain did not disappear from the international agenda. The article presents the differing approaches of the main ideologues of the Polish socialist movement (Zygmunt Zaremba and Adam Ciołkosz) to the changes in Poland after 1956. The essence of the dispute at the time was the answer to the question of whether the Polish political system was subject to evolutionary transformation towards democracy, or whether the communist system was inherently undemocratic and therefore any changes were merely cosmetic. Both activists personified the argument – which gained most notoriety in the 1960s in the West – assuming a gradual convergence between capitalist and communist societies. Ultimately, history conceded the point to Ciołkosz, who said that "liberalisation of the communist dictatorship is impossible" and that the goal of socialists in exile is "its liquidation."

Keywords: Polish Socialist Party, Socialist Union of Central-Eastern Europe, émigré socialists, Polish Political Emigration after WWII, The Socialist International.

PPS in the Country

In Polish history, the Polish Socialist Party played an important role in the quest for, and subsequent development of, an independent Polish state. The PPS was founded in exile in Paris in 1892, when Poland did not exist on the map of Europe. The emigrant circles associated with socialist thought were divided into a national and an internationalist current. The PPS definitely belonged to the camp that placed the main emphasis on the struggle to regain Poland's independence. The programme stressed that the political system of the future Republic of Poland should be built on democratic principles.

The Party's programme guaranteed direct universal suffrage, equal rights for all peoples living in Poland, equal rights for all citizens regardless of race, nationality, religion and gender, freedom of the press, speech and assembly, progressive taxation, an eight-hour working day, a minimum wage, equal pay for men and women, a ban on child labor (up to the age of 14), free education and social assistance in the event of injury at work.[1] The foundation of the party's identity was to combine the idea of independence with that of socialism.

In the 1930s, when the Great Depression caused a huge pauperization of society, an apparent radicalization occurred especially among the younger generation. Many of the young were willing to seek a common front with the communists, especially in the face of the growing influence of fascism. Older socialist activists were strongly opposed to this. The outbreak of war in 1939 and the occupation did not eliminate the divisions over attitudes to the Communists and had a decomposing effect on the socialist movement. The problem intensified as the Soviet Union took the initiative on the Eastern Front and the Red Army began to approach the Polish borders. The geopolitical interests of the United States and Soviet Russia in particular were on a collision course with those of Poland.

Structures of an underground state were established in the country, with the Polish Socialist Party[2] playing the leading role. The formation of the Provisional Government of National Unity on 28 June 1945, and especially the withdrawal of recognition of the government in exile by the Western powers in July of that year, strengthened the conviction of the PPS-WRN (Polish Socialist Party – Freedom, Equality, Independence) leadership that it was at home that the direction of political and political change would be decided. It should be recalled that Kazimierz Pużak was General Secretary of the PPS-WRN and Chairman of the underground parliament, the Council of National Unity. Arrested on March 27, 1945 by the NKVD, he was later tried in June 1945 in the Trial of the Sixteen. His place in the leadership of the underground PPS-WRN was taken by Zygmunt Zaremba. In the rapidly changing conditions, the party leadership decided on a formula for legalizing the activities of the underground PPS.

Gathered at an underground meeting, the members of the pre-war PPS Supreme Council on July 5, 1945 recognized the Provisional Government of National Unity in Warsaw and expected it to create the conditions for any "democratic group" to begin activity. They hoped for the possibility of overt activity not only by members but also by the

1 Michał Śliwa, "Polscy socjaliści – ruch niespełnionych nadziei?," in *Niepodległość i socjalizm. Studia i szkice z dziejów Polskiej Partii Socjalistycznej*, eds. Maciej Żuczkowski and Kamil Piskała (Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2020), 14–34 (literature there too).

2 Maciej Żuczkowski, *Polska Partia Socjalistyczna Wolność-Równość-Niepodległość w Polskim Państwie Podziemnym X 1939–VII 1945*, doctoral thesis written under the supervision of Professor Andrzej Friszke (Warsaw: Instytut Historii PAN, 2023).

leadership of the underground PPS-WRN. These assumptions turned out to be wrong. Moscow was setting its sights on other socialists.

In the areas occupied by the Red Army's counter-offensive, the XXV Congress of the so-called reborn PPS was held in Lublin in September 1944. The retention of the numbering of the pre-war party's congresses was intended to suggest a continuation of its traditions. The participants were dominated by people who during the occupation had been in opposition to the Polish underground state, the PPS-WRN leadership and its political line. "The new," also referred to by some as the "concessionary," PPS was rapidly expanding its ranks, fed also by members of the underground PPS-WRN who were not fully aware of the situation.

Held from June 29 to July 1, 1945, the XXVI Congress of the "reborn" PPS stressed the correctness of the current policy of close cooperation with the communists and the USSR and condemned the "anti-communist and anti-Soviet concepts of the WRN socialist right." Despite this, part of the PPS-WRN leadership believed that if members of the underground PPS WRN joined the "reborn" PPS, they would manage to control the party leadership and thus influence a change in the party's political line. These calculations turned out to be misguided. The mechanism for eliminating political opponents worked very effectively. In the newly elected, 100-strong Supreme Council, the leadership was given to Stanisław Szwalbe, an advocate of "a united front of the working class and cooperation with the PPR," the head of the Central Executive Committee was again Edward Osóbka-Morawski, and Józef Cyrankiewicz was elected General Secretary.[3] The PPS found itself on a downward spiral and was finally absorbed by the communists in December 1948.

The situation in the country was gradually deteriorating. The communists did not yet have a full monopoly of power, but using the "salami" method, they were steadily removing their competitors from political life.

In January 1946, a secret meeting of the top leadership of the PPS-WRN from the period of the occupation took place in one of the premises in Warsaw: Kazimierz Pużak, Józef Dzięgielewski, Feliks Misiorowski, Tadeusz Szturm de Sztrem, Zygmunt Zaremba and Franciszek Białas decided that, in view of the growing threat, the only chance to preserve the socialist identity was to develop the party in exile[4]. As Zaremba wrote: "given

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3 Kazimierz Ćwik, *Problemy współdziałania PPR i PPS w województwie krakowskim 1945–1948* (Kraków: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1974), 53.

4 Zygmunt Żuławski, *Od sanacji do PRL* (Chicago: "Polonia" Book Store and Publishers, 1983), 78; Zbigniew Zygmunt Kaleniecki, *Konspiracja WRN-owska w Polsce Ludowej* (Warsaw: Wyższa Szkoła Oficerska MSW im. F. Dzierżyńskiego, 1986), 138 et seq.; Zygmunt Woźniczka, "Podziemna PPS-WRN w latach 1945–1948," *Zeszyty Historyczne* 112 (1995): 123 et seq.; Marek Łatyński, *Nie paść na kolana. Szkice o opozycji lat czterdziestych* (London: Polonia Book, 1985), 241.

the political shape of the post-war world, the party must be at the forefront of efforts in exile to regain independence."[5] It was also deemed necessary for Zygmunt Zaremba and Franciszek Białas to take advantage of the still-functioning opportunities for crossing the border illegally and leaving Poland. The two PPS envoys were given powers to set up a PPS Foreign Delegation. In addition to Białas and Zaremba, it was to include representatives of the Foreign Committee. A certain period in the history of the PPS-WRN was coming to a close. The people most involved in the structures of this organization, who had managed to survive the war and the German occupation, had to capitulate in the face of the new occupation. In the order imposed by Moscow, there was no longer any place for the "enemies of people's democracy." All those who formed the Polish underground state subordinate to the government in exile were considered to be such. As Zaremba wrote: "We will go on a new path, with a sense of duty fulfilled and many achievements that history is yet to judge. We will go with an unyielding conviction of the rightness of the democratic idea, rejecting the restraint of organisation, press and speech."[6]

In Exile

As a result of the outbreak of the Second World War, hundreds of Poles found themselves outside the country, initially mainly in France. Of the Socialists, only Herman Lieberman had been there since 1933; others joined later: Adam Pragier, Jan Stańczyk, Tadeusz Tomaszewski, Alojzy Adamczyk, Józef Beluch-Beloński, Ludwik Grosfeld, Adam and Lidia Ciołkosz.[7] Some held high-ranking positions in the party: Adamczyk, Ciołkosz, Grosfeld, Lieberman and Stańczyk were members of the Supreme Council appointed by the XXIV PPS Congress in Radom in 1937, while Ciołkosz and Stańczyk were also members of the Central Executive Committee, of the last pre-war term, and Tomaszewski was a member of the Central Party Court.

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5 Letter from Zygmunt Zaremba to the Foreign Committee of the PPS, 3 July 1946, Adam and Lidia Ciolkosz Archive in London (hereafter ALC), ALC 161, collection 133a, Polish Underground Movement Study Trust, London.

6 Letter to members of the Polish Socialist Party, 15 July 1945, quoted in: Żuczkowski, *Polska Partia Socjalistyczna*, 449. Zaremba and Białas spent the rest of their lives in exile. Pużak, Zdanowski, Misiorowski, Dzięgielewski, Szturm de Sztrem and others, were arrested in 1947 and sentenced to several years in prison. Pużak died in prison, Zdanowski and Dzięgielewski, terminally ill with tuberculosis, died soon after his release from prison.

7 Jerzy Tomicki, *Polska Partia Socjalistyczna 1892-1948* (Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, 1983), 393; Dorota Urzyńska, *Polski ruch socjalistyczny na obczyźnie w latach 1939–1945* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Adama Mickiewicza, 2000), 35.

On January 22, 1940, these activists formed the Central Executive Committee Abroad, headed by Lieberman as Chairman and Grosfeld as Vice-Chairman. The committee consisted of Tomaszewski, Adamczyk, Ciołkosz and Stańczyk. Under this name, the CEC operated until the defeat of France. After the evacuation to England, in March 1941, the name of the PPS Foreign Committee (Polish abbreviation KZ PPS) was adopted, which reflected the actual state of affairs, meaning that the party leadership existed in the occupied country, with only the Foreign Committee in exile. In practice, such an arrangement did not quite work smoothly and there were tensions over competences. It should be mentioned as an aside that in the past, during the period of partition in the 19th century, socialists also had to solve the problem of co-operation between the domestic and foreign centers.

On October 21, 1941, Herman Lieberman died. After his death, there was a change in the composition of the Committee. Adam Ciołkosz and Jan Stańczyk became Vice-Chairmen, Ludwik Grosfeld became Secretary. The post of Chairman remained vacant until May 1942, when Jan Kwapiński arrived from exile in Siberia. Kwapiński was unanimously elected Chairman.

The formation of the Provisional Government of National Unity and the withdrawal of recognition of Tomasz Arciszewski's government in exile by the USA and the United Kingdom on July 5, 1945, and later by other Western countries, came as a shock to the political class in exile. Formally, from then on, Warsaw and the government operating there became the center of decision-making. The actions taken by Polish politicians remaining abroad should be considered in this context.

As mentioned above, at home on July 5, 1945, the members of the pre-war PPS Supreme Council recognized the Provisional Government of National Unity in Warsaw and urged comrades abroad to return to continue their activities. The PPS Foreign Committee did not accept this and, in a separate resolution of 30 July 1945, stressed that there was a need to preserve the Foreign Committee in exile in order to carry out political action "for the full realisation of Poland's independence, socialism and democracy."[8] Moreover, the Committee's role was to grow, not only as a superior body to all PPS centers in exile, but also as a coordinator of the political activities of other parties and an active participant in the forum of the Socialist International (SI). The intention to develop the PPS in exile was also evidenced by the fact that a recruitment drive was launched as early as July of that year.[9]

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8 Resolution of the Foreign Committee of the PPS of 30 July 1945, Private Collection of Stanisław Wąsik in London.

9 Minutes of meetings of the Foreign Committee of the PPS of 3 August, 5 October, 5 November and 12 December 1945, Private collection of Stanisław Wąsik in London.

Information coming out of Poland about numerous arrests and terror against political opponents only strengthened the socialists in exile in their conviction that building an independent socialist party at home would not be possible. On February 16, 1946 the PPS Foreign Committee adopted another resolution stating that, despite the entry of "Zygmunt Żuławski and comrades into the ranks of the PPS," the party did not constitute an authentic representation of the Polish socialist movement because its leadership, which had been largely imposed by "foreign factors," consisted of people who had had nothing to do with the PPS, its program and ideological assumptions in the past. Consequently, the Foreign Committee – "standing firm in its position of remaining faithful to the party's ideology and programme" – and aware of the political conditions making it impossible to carry out activities according to the PPS programme, decided to continue "to be an advocate in the world of the cause of Polish socialism and the Polish cause."[10]

This took place almost at the same time when, in Warsaw, in conspiracy, the top leadership of the PPS-WRN, headed by Pużak, finally decided that there was no chance for the existence of an independent PPS in the country. The center of gravity therefore shifted to exile. It could be said, however, that it was the PPS Foreign Committee that better understood the historical processes taking place, outlining the tasks of the PPS in exile as late as July 1945 and embarking on its expansion.

As soon as Zaremba and Białas arrived in France on August 9, 1946, the Foreign Delegation was constituted in Paris. Zygmunt Zaremba became Chairman, and Vice-Chairmen: Franciszek Białas and Adam Ciołkosz.

Almost immediately after the Foreign Delegation was constituted, its Chairman addressed a letter to the former Chairman of the Socialist Workers' International, Camille Huysmans (Belgian Prime Minister 1946–1947), explaining that "in view of the impossibility of the legal development of the Polish Socialist Party on Polish territory" the domestic and émigré

> leadership elements of our movement, had decided to set up a Foreign Delegation with the aim of:
> – maintaining and continuing the 54-year legacy of the PPS,
> – coordinating the efforts of the PPS foreign and domestic outposts in the struggle for the full independence of the country and, in particular, the right to exist as an independent PPS,

[10] Resolution of the Foreign Committee of the PPS on the concessionary PPS, 16 February 1946 in *„My tu żyjemy jak w obozie warownym". Listy PPS-WRN Warszawa-Londyn 1940–1945* (London: Polonia Book, 1992), 497.

– representing the PPS before the fraternal socialist parties and contributing to the work of rebuilding the Socialist International.[11]

As the document testifies, the Foreign Delegation claimed to be the sole representation of Polish socialists abroad. This must have aroused objections from members of the Foreign Committee headed by Tomasz Arciszewski. Another, no less important element of division among the PPS was the attitude to the Polish authorities remaining in exile.[12] The dividing line in this case seemed to depend on the degree of involvement in governmental structures. Tomasz Arciszewski – Prime Minister, Jan Kwapiński and Adam Pragier – Ministers, and Tadeusz Tomaszewski – President of the Supreme Audit Office, were all declared supporters of maintaining the government center not only as a symbol of an independent Poland, but as an actual, legal representative of the Polish authorities. They did not accept the fact that this Government was not recognized by most countries. For them, the situation in Poland bore the hallmarks of temporariness. Gustaw Herling-Grudziński wrote of this milieu: "there is a general conviction there that it is enough to represent patiently and to cut coupons from the pension of legality."[13]

The second direction was represented by Adam Ciołkosz and Zygmunt Zaremba. They assumed that the situation in Poland would take on the characteristics of permanence. In their view, social sentiment had shifted to the left and not all reforms proposed by the authorities in Warsaw were rejected by the people. They believed that the burden of the struggle to reform the political system in Poland should shift from the diplomatic to the ideological plane, which could be done through the Socialist International. They were aware of the weakness of the Arciszewski. Government, whose role was reduced to expressing protests, but – at least for the time being – they could find no other structural solutions. Besides, they both believed that the government's alliance with the national right was not beneficial to the Socialists. As Ciołkosz wrote:

> [...] I do not see any need for us to continue to accompany political bankrupts, without a thought, without a future, and only with platitudes about honour [...] Detach ourselves from them at the earliest opportunity, if it is not too late, and do not allow ourselves to be concreted over, as Stanisław (Arciszewski's pseudonym, A.S.) did, with the prospect of forever "standing at the post," but only standing.[14]

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11 Letter from the Foreign Delegation of the PPS to the President of the Socialist International, 20 August 1946, ALC 161.

12 In the end, only a few countries recognized the Polish government in London: Holy See, Spain, Ireland, Lebanon, Cuba.

13 Letter from Gustaw Herling-Grudziński to Zygmunt Zaremba, 9 March 1947, ZZ6/1, Archive of the Polish Scientific Institute (hereafter: APIN), New York. For more on Grudzinski's activity in the PPS in exile: Anna Siwik, "Gustaw Herling-Grudziński – mniej znany socjalista," in *Człowiek i społeczeństwo. Political Studies*, ed. Adam Ilciów (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe FNCE, 2021), 107–18.

14 Letter from Adam Ciolkosz to Zygmunt Zaremba, 14 December 1946, ZZ 4/1, APIN.

Around the New Formula – "Legalism" or "Committee"

The problem of political representation of political refugees did not only concern the Polish diaspora. Refugees from all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that fell under the USSR's sphere of influence were in a similar situation. After the initial shock of losing their homelands and adapting to the new conditions, a tendency to create supra-party structures representing the subjugated peoples emerged. They were united mainly by a more or less radical anti-communism, the recognition of the installed governments as puppets of Moscow and the conviction that, in the bipolar world that emerged after Yalta, the orientation should be towards the United States. The consequence of this was to make the political exile of the countries behind the Iron Curtain dependent on the political strategy of the United States in relation to Moscow. US policy towards Central and Eastern Europe was not only conditioned by US-Soviet relations, but was also derived from them. The evolution of US policy after 1947, which came to be known as the Truman Doctrine, implied a global commitment by the United States to defend the free world against communism. In this doctrine, Eastern Europe, as this part of the European continent was consistently called, was recognized as an area already dominated by communism. In practice, this meant preventing the further expansion of communism into the West, rather than liberating the East. In the document Aide Memoire Polish Emigration Possibilities of Its Participation in the Anti-Communist Front of June 1948, the possibility of using emigration for anti-communist activities was indicated.[15]

In the words of the deputy director of the State Department's Bureau of European Affairs, Llewellyn Thompson, "the liberation and restoration of independence" was to come in the longer term, and for the time being the Americans' aim was to keep the hopes and morale of the Poles alive, and to show a continuing interest in and sympathy for Poland.[16] From the American point of view, the biggest problem hindering the political use of emigration was its fragmentation. In a report to Washington, the counsellor of the American embassy in London reported that Polish emigrants were united by three strong feelings: "1) ardent patriotism 2) desire to return home 3) hatred of communism. These factors reinforce their sense of community, so that they can become a Cold War asset on our side."[17]

Particularly strong US pressure towards uniting the Polish emigration was undertaken in the spring of 1949, when preparations were being finalized for the establishment

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15 Andrzej Mania, *The National Security Council i amerykańska polityka wobec Europy Wschodniej 1945–1950* (Kraków: Uniwersytet Jagielloński, 1994), 73 et seq.

16 Anna Mazurkiewicz, *Uchodźcy polityczni z Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej w amerykańskiej polityce zimnowojennej 1948-1954* (Warsaw–Gdańsk: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2016), 28.

17 Paweł Machcewicz, *Emigracja w polityce międzynarodowej* (Warsaw: Więź, 1999), 45.

of the Free Europe Committee, which was to take over the burden of contacts with the exile from behind the Iron Curtain. The Americans made it clear that the Free Europe Committee would cooperate with a representation (committee/commission) selected from the broad spectrum of émigré politicians, but that this could not be an institution linked to the émigré government. The Americans recognized the government in Warsaw and did not want to enter into a collision in this field.

Among the refugee groups from Central and Eastern Europe, the Polish milieu played a key role not only because of its numbers, but also because of Poland's position among the Soviet satellites. Refugees from these countries set up organizational structures aspiring to be the political representation of their own nations. However, they tried to avoid a formula based on the "legal continuation of state structures," as the Poles did.[18]

In 1947, there was a crisis in the émigré authorities which split into two opposing camps. Each claimed to be the sole legitimate representative of the subjugated nation, and created institutions that copied the state authorities. The crisis was precipitated by the withdrawal of the already agreed presidential nomination for Tomasz Arciszewski. President Władysław Raczkiewicz, who was terminally ill, appointed August Zaleski as President. Zaleski appointed a government, which, however, was boycotted by the main political parties, who in December 1949 formed the Political Council. The mission to reconcile the feuding parties was undertaken by General Kazimierz Sosnkowski. However, although after long negotiations it was possible to get both sides to sign the Act of Unification on March 14, 1954, the General's efforts failed. Zaleski did not resign from his post, thus creating the camp known as the "Castle" (in Polish: Zamek) with a Government, a President and a National Council. In turn, the "Unification" (In Polish: Zjednoczenie) camp established the Council of Three purporting to be the President, the National Unification Executive in the role of government and the Provisional Council of National Unity considering itself the parliamentary representation of the nation.[19]

Thus, despite American pressure, it was not possible to establish a single center representing political exile. In addition, both "Castle" and "Unification" were based on the concept of a "state in exile," which the Americans did not recognize. However, this did not mean that the containment policy failed to exploit opportunities to influence Polish

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18 There is a large literature on this topic, including *East Central Europe in Exile*, vol. 2, *Transatlantic Identities*, ed. Anna Mazurkiewicz (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013); *Political Exile from Central and Western Europe. Motives, Strategies, Activities and Perception in the East and the West 1945–1989*, Bratislava 2017; Mazurkiewicz, *Uchodźcy polityczni*; Paweł Ziętara, "Rada i Komitety. Rada Narodowa Rzeczpospolitej na tle emigracyjne przedstawicielstw politycznych narodów ujarzmionych," in *Depozyt Niepodległości. Rada Narodowa Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej na uchodźstwie (1939–1991)*, eds. Zbigniew Girzyński and Paweł Ziętara (Toruń: Adam Marszałek, 2018), 369–400.

19 Committee of Signatories of the Act of Unification, AIPMS 408/277, Polish Institute and General Sikorski Museum, London.

society through the exile centers. This was particularly true of the communication and courier channels available to the political forces of the "Unification" camp, especially the National Party (in Polish: Stronnictwo Narodowe), but also the PPS. This action culminated in the compromising "Berg affair," which was used by propaganda in the communist regime in Poland to finally crack down on opposition in the country.[20]

However, looking from a historical perspective, it turned out years later that it was the "Castle" camp[21] that was "historically right" in sticking to national imponderables. When communism collapsed in 1989 and Poland's first President was elected in universal and free election in 1990, it became almost a necessity to refer to national imponderables. It was then, on December 22, 1990, that the last remaining guardian of the symbols of presidential power, Ryszard Kaczorowski, President in exile, handed over to President Wałęsa, elected by the nation, the insignia of power: the flag of the Republic of Poland, the seal of the President's Chancellery, the original of the Constitution of 1935, as well as the Orders of the White Eagle and Polonia Restituta.

The Goal – Independent Poland

The post-war Polish exile represented a broad political spectrum: from opposition groups – nationalists, Christian Democrats, socialists and people's party – to the Sanacja camp, which had ruled before the war. They were all united by anti-communism and the aspiration to regain Poland's full independence. The goal formulated in this way, however, outlined a distant time horizon. As mentioned above, the current task was to choose a political formula for organizing the exile. Another differentiating issue was the attitude to the economic and social transformations taking place in Poland. Here, too, the socialists took a more nuanced position.

The communists, coming to power, introduced reforms that were part of the socialists' program postulates (nationalization, land reform, free education), but at the same time "stole" all the slogans, symbols and emblems that had for years built up the PPS's credibility as an independence party, a progressive party fighting for social and economic reforms. The appropriated symbols, serving only propaganda and tactical purposes, caused confusion in society. This was an extremely dangerous process, proceeding almost asymptomatically. First, the ideas from which the concepts were adopted were appropriated,

20 In more detail: Anna Siwik, "Sprawa Bergu: współpraca Emigracyjna Rady Politycznej z zachodnimi wywiadami," *Studia Historyczne* 44, no. 2 (2001).

21 Finally, in 1972, after the death of August Zaleski in 1972, the merger of the castle camp and the unification took place after long and arduous talks.

often giving them a contradictory meaning, and in the end no one "in these words of ours, slyly changed by shysters" recognized their original sense any longer.[22] From the point of view of émigré socialists, it was very important to make people at home aware of the fundamental differences between democratic socialism and communist dictatorship.

As Adam Ciołkosz wrote: "If the understanding of the Polish workers is erased that both the aim and the way of the socialists is completely different from that of the communists, the history of the Polish socialist movement will come to an end."[23]

The moral rebuilding of Polish society and sustaining the shaken faith in democracy were equally important. Gustaw Herling-Grudziński,[24] writer and columnist, with his experience in Soviet labor camps, wrote in a letter to Zygmunt Zaremba:

> Only from the camp of socialism can come out a fierce and uncompromising struggle against communism only the left can restore the meaning of the struggle against Russia by enriching it with ideological accents. Anyone can get along with Stalin: a Christian, a conservative or a landlord – as long as it is only a matter of dividing spheres of influence. But a socialist from the Second International will never get along with him, because in this section the stakes are more serious, the danger more serious.[25]

The Socialist International

Polish socialists were quicker than their western European colleagues to give up any illusions about arranging cooperation with the communists. From the beginning they ruthlessly fought against any form of cooperation with it. They considered it their main duty to expose the totalitarian character of the regimes of the countries behind the Iron Curtain. They accused the Western Social Democrats of having allowed the "heavy defeat" of the socialist movement in Central and Eastern Europe. However, despite the disappointment they had suffered, they believed that only through the Socialist International was there a real possibility of influencing world opinion on the Polish question.

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22 Andrzej Mencwel, *Etos lewicy* (Warsaw: Krytyka Polityczna, 2009), 264.

23 Adam Ciołkosz, "*Cel: Polska socjalistyczna*, *Droga: Walka z komunizmem. Uwagi o polityce socjalistów polskich*," "Lewy Nurt" Summer 1966, no. 1, in Adam Ciołkosz, *Walka o prawdę. Wybór artykułów 1940–1978* (London: Polonia Book, 1989), 60.

24 Gustaw Herling-Grudzinski (1919–2000) – writer, essayist, author of *Inny* świat and *Zapiski sowieckie*, among others. From 1947, he was a member of the PPS in exile.

25 Letter from Gustaw Herling-Grudziński to Zygmunt Zaremba, 13 February 1947, ZZ 4/1, PIN.

The PPS sought membership of the Socialist International, which was established in July 1951 at a congress in Frankfurt am Main.[26] The problem was that, as a party remaining in exile, it could not be a full member of the International. Other social democratic parties from countries behind the Iron Curtain were in a similar situation: The Czech Republic, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and also Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Ukraine, which continued to work in exile. These parties – with considerable activity on the Polish side – established close cooperation and on July 4, 1949 formed the Socialist Union of Central-Eastern Europe (SUCEE), which after strenuous efforts became a member of the Socialist International, albeit not with full rights.[27] The Socialist International, bringing together parties that ruled alone or in coalition in Europe, was an influential organization. The participation of Central and Eastern European socialists in it was undoubtedly important, all the more so because the émigrés lacked effective tools to influence Western opinion. It was all about constantly reminding of the oppression by communist regimes of societies living east of the Iron Curtain.

However, the possibilities of breaking through with the issues of these countries were a reflection of the general policy of the West towards the USSR. After 1956, in a climate of warming, the ideas of creating a demilitarized zone in Central Europe and solving the problem of the division of Germany emerged. The Polish side's position on this issue was unequivocal: any discussion of German reunification was conditional on the recognition of the Oder-Neisse border and the adoption of a pact guaranteeing Poland's security.[28] At the beginning of the 1960s, the Socialist International Council set up the Study Group on Eastern Europe, consisting of socialists from Central and Eastern Europe (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, Romania and Lithuania) and Western Europe (Austria, France, Germany and Sweden). The first meeting of the Group was held in Bonn, despite the reservations of the Polish side, which feared undue influence of the German Socialists on the other members of the SUSEE.[29] It is worth remembering that Zygmunt Zaremba, as Chairman of the Union, actively participated in its work. The group prepared a number of reports on Central and Eastern Europe, and its mixed composition extended to include representatives of Western social democracies was supposed to provide a more "objective" view. In a sense, the concerns of the Polish side were confirmed in the decisions of the 6th SI Congress in Hamburg on July 14–17, 1959, when the concept

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26 Talbot C. Imlay, *The Practice of Socialist Internationalism: European Socialists and International Politics, 1914–1960* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), chapter 6.

27 See more: Anna Siwik, "Cooperation Among East European Emigres: The Socialist Case," in *East Central Europe in Exile*, vol. 2, 177–92 (chapter 12).

28 Speech by Adam Ciołkosz at the 5th IS congress in Vienna on 3 July 1957, ALC 1957. Speech by Otto Pehr at the 6th IS congress in Hamburg on 14–17 July 1959, *Robotnik*, no. 6/7, 1959.

29 Letter from Zygmunt Zaremba to Stanisław Wąsik, 7 March 1963, Anna Siwik's own collection.

of a combined treatment of the German question with the question of the nations of Central and Eastern Europe was adopted.

Willy Brandt's election as Chancellor in 1969 and his new Eastern policy were reflected in the political line of the International. The 1970 treaty between the USSR and West Germany became the starting point for the new German Ostpolitik. There was a marked relaxation between the two antagonistic political blocs. The extreme anti-communist émigré parties, although relatively uninfluential, were becoming politically inconvenient ballast. In 1976, at the 13th SI Congress in Geneva, changes were made to weaken their status.[30] It should be remembered that more than 20 years had passed since the end of the war and the political role of the émigrés was necessarily diminishing. The war generation was leaving and the young were not coming in. The émigré socialists were finding it increasingly difficult to define their role in the International.

While just after the war it was hoped that the solutions in Central Europe would be temporary and that democratic systems in which the socialists could play a dominant role could return, as time passed, the situation there took on the characteristics of permanence. Constantly reminding people that democracy was a sham there became ineffective. Moreover, some communist leaders such as Edward Gierek enjoyed the support of the West, including the social democrats, especially the German ones.

At the 13th SI congress in Geneva on November 26–28, 1976, Willy Brandt became President. His influence on the International was so great that one can successfully speak of the Brandt era. The main direction of activity was determined by the policy of detente and the strategic exit of the SI outside Europe. There was an opening up to the problems of the so-called third world. Issues of lack of civil and labor freedoms in Central and Eastern Europe had no place on the SI agenda and were simply politically inconvenient.

The best example of this was the silence of the Geneva Congress on the pacification of workers in Radom and Ursus in June 1976, even though President Brandt had received a detailed report on the subject, and the representative of the Socialist Union, Stanisław Wąsik, devoted his speech to discussing the situation in Poland. In response, Willy Brandt, in a letter addressed to the émigré PPS, wrote rather euphemistically that, although "numerous difficult problems" needed to be solved, the Polish government, compared to others in this part of Europe, was much less tough. Furthermore, he reassured that "a close cooperation between all Europeans countries" would improve the situation.[31]

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30 Wojciech Ziętara, *Międzynarodówka Socjalistyczna a socjaldemokracja Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej* (Lublin: UMCS, 2012), chapter 2.

31 Willy Brandt to the Polish Socialist Party, 11 November 1977, Private collection of Stanisław Wąsik.

Following the imposition of martial law in Poland, the International limited itself to a moderate statement signed by Willy Brandt and Bernt Carlson on December 29, 1980. Outraged, the French called a meeting of the Council of the International to Paris, but Brandt did not attend. This time, the condemnation of martial law, the demand for its lifting and for an end to repression was put in a much more emphatic form.

It was only in the second half of the 1980s that the International turned towards Eastern Europe again. This was undoubtedly influenced by Mikhail Gorbachev's assumption of the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee in March 1985. An expression of this interest was the resumption of the Study Group on Eastern European Affairs after a hiatus of years, and in December 1985, SI Chairman Willy Brandt paid a visit to Warsaw. History accelerated. Year 1989 ended the Yalta era and opened the way to democracy for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The paradox of history was that the Socialist International included parties from Central and Eastern Europe, most of them with origins in the formerly ruling Communist parties.[32]

Independent but Democratic

As already mentioned, the socialists did not completely negate the reforms introduced in Poland. They rejected the totalitarian character of the state. They believed that the big industry of steel mills, mines and transport and monetary policy should remain in the hands of the state. Medium and small industry was to be private or cooperative. The agricultural sphere had to be reformed. The overpopulation of the countryside could only be eliminated through the development of industry, which would absorb the surplus labor. An active state policy was also to manifest itself in the sphere of redistribution, thanks to which it would be possible to meet basic social demands, such as free education, social care, the fight against unemployment and equal access to cultural goods. In the international sphere, the PPS postulated the elimination of the division into spheres of influence, the active participation of the United Nations in conflict resolution, the fight against all forms of subjugation of nations, and the rejection of war as a means of conflict resolution. Comparing the program of Polish socialists with the program of Western European social democracy, the doctrinal basis of which was contained in the document *Objectives and Tasks of European Socialism*,[33] it can be concluded, apart from some solu-

32 For more on this, see: Ziętara, *Międzynarodówka Socjalistyczna*.

33 Aims and Tasks of Democratic Socialism: Declaration of the Socialist International Adopted at Its First Congress Held in Frankfurt-on-Main on 30 June – 3 July 1951, Socialist Party (U.S.), Socialist International, 1951.

tions adapted to Polish specifics, that the views of Polish socialists coincided with the systemic concepts of Western social democrats of the party.

Socialists rejected the scenario: first independence, then discussion of the system. They argued that there could be no national unity when there was "reactionary political, social and economic content" behind it. This approach, however, carried the danger of alienation from the political structures of the émigrés, which could not be completely ignored. It was therefore optimistically assumed that it would be possible to "democratize" these structures, which in socialist terms meant eliminating right-wing forces. In this respect, however, fundamental obstacles were encountered due to the lack of unanimity within the party leadership. Some were strongly in favor of sticking firmly and consistently to the formula of the "state in exile" embodied by the "Castle" camp. Adam Pragier and Tadeusz Tomaszewski took this side.

The second much more numerous group: Tomasz Arciszewski, Jan Kwapiński, Adam Ciołkosz and Zygmunt Zaremba were associated with the "Unification" camp, which also appealed to "legalism." However, over time a rupture occurred here too. Symbolically, this orientation was represented by Zaremba, who drew most of the PPS members mainly from France and Belgium (where the socialist influence in the mining districts went back to pre-war times), and also some British socialists. At the fifth PPS congress in Belgium in 1961, they severed all ties with the "Unification" camp.

Two Roads – Zaremba and Ciołkosz

When discussing the road leading to the goal of an independent Poland, two orientations can be distinguished among socialists: one embodied by Zygmunt Zaremba, the other by Adam Ciołkosz. In general, both agreed on the essence of the communist system, as an undemocratic system dependent on Moscow. Differences emerged in the assessment of the changes that took place in Poland after October 1956.

Broadly speaking, Zaremba adhered, as did Juliusz Mieroszewski of the Paris-based "Kultura,"[34] to the view that the communist system was evolving and, as a result of working-class pressure and internal party contradictions (the activities of the so-called revisionists), would move towards democracy. It was therefore necessary to support all forces that could accelerate this process.

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[34] Juliusz Mieroszewski, "Kronika angielska," *Kultura*, no. 12 (1958); Juliusz Mieroszewski, *Ewolucjonizm* (Paris: Instytut Literacki, 1964).

It can be assumed that this approach was derived from Zaremba's attitude to what was happening in the country. Although, like other émigrés, he was a declared enemy of communism, it was not total anti-communism. He saw the positive changes in Poland. "The malicious delight demonstrated in the émigré press over every misfortune or failure of society," he treated as "an émigré degeneracy that must be fought as a morbid phenomenon."[35] He separated the state and society from the prevailing communist regime. He believed that a negative attitude to the Polish state condemned the "camp of the unbroken" only to "hostility and derision." According to Zaremba, the correct assessment boiled down to a statement: the Polish state is dependent on the USSR politically and economically, but despite this dependence the Polish state exists, and within its borders the Polish nation lives, works and develops, and "the fate of this state cannot be indifferent to any Pole."[36] For these reasons it was not possible to formulate goals for the emigration analogous to those formulated before World War I, when the rebuilding of the state was the main content of the Independence slogan. Now it was a matter of "extending the independence of the Republic of Poland both in international politics and in internal relations." This is why the émigré PPS formulated the restoration of full independence as its main objective, because in the restriction of the freedom of the Polish state "lies the crux of the matter in the present period." Zaremba answered his opponents who believed that the PPS program was designed for Yalta Poland: "One can go either way: in any case, not for the shadow of London Poland, but for the Poland that exists, such as it is. For we want our programme to become an element of transformation in Polish life on the Vistula, Warta and Oder rivers, and not on the Thames or Seine."[37]

Zaremba was a pragmatist who calculated in terms of profit and loss. After Gomułka came to power, he did not even rule out the possibility of returning to the country if it turned out that there were chances for the rebirth of an independent PPS. He was convinced that egalitarian socialist ideas were firmly rooted in Polish society; they just needed to be restored to a genuinely socialist content. This was proved by the demonstrations in Poznań, where demonstrators demanded socialism with a "human face." Zaremba therefore focused on the theoretical preparation of a "socialist alternative" as a platform for overcoming communist totalism. The role of the PPS was to show society "a picture of a desirable future."[38]

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35 Zygmunt Zaremba, *Cel i droga* (Paris: Wydawnictwo "Światło", 1963), 9.

36 Even more decisively on this subject, he wrote to Felix Gross: "For it would be worthwhile [...] to analyse and shatter the myth of the connectivity of our emigration with the great emigration that lost the state, and we were removed by violence from influence on the state that remained, and who knows if not in a better shape than the one that emerged from the turmoil of the First World War." Letter from Z. Zaremba to Feliks Gross, 13 March 1966, Feliks Gross's private collection in New York.

37 *Robotnik*, no. 3–4, March–April 1961.

38 Letter of Zygmunt Zaremba to K. Majkowski dated 28 May 1961. Private collection of K. Majkowski made available to the author.

Seeking an analogy with General Franco's regime in Spain, which gradually opened up opportunities for organizations to the right of center, Zaremba expected the Gomułka regime to create such opportunities for left-wing groups.[39] He was even willing to make concessions with the authorities in the communist Poland regarding the "form of organisation of the PPS" at the price of its return to the political scene. For he believed that breaking the political monopoly of the Polish United Workers' Party (Polish abbreviation: PZPR) was worth the price. He was convinced that every smallest crack in the wall of dictatorship should be exploited to transmit the ideas of democratic socialism through it. Zaremba was isolated (not only in the PPS) in his optimism about the transformation in the communist camp. His views were not shared by his SUSEE colleagues, as became evident in September 1963 in Amsterdam during the SUSEE conference traditionally held on the eve of the next Congress of the Socialist International. There Zaremba sketched a picture of the ongoing changes in the communist movement associated with the weakening ideological pressure from Moscow. He cited as evidence the evolution of views in Western communist parties, especially in Italy, and the emergence of revisionists in the Soviet bloc. He foresaw the emergence of conditions for an evolutionary transition from dictatorship to socialist democracy. In view of this, he postulated a revision of the socialist attitude towards the communist camp.[40] Zaremba's views were critically received by socialists from Central and Eastern European countries who did not share the Polish politician's optimism. Consequently, such deep differences in the assessment of the evolution of the communist system led Zaremba to withdraw from the Union and the Socialist International. This was undoubtedly a defeat for this eminent socialist, who gradually withdrew from political life in exile. A progressive illness, made it impossible for him to return to his country. He died in France on October 5, 1967.

Zaremba, together with other socialists from Central and Eastern Europe, drafted a document outlining an alternative socialist model to the communist dictatorship, entitled Socialist Alternative for Eastern Europe. The document was adopted on October 20, 1961 at the 11th SUSEE conference in Rome. It was developed on the basis of the declaration Goals and Objectives of Democratic Socialism, but with an emphasis on the differences between democratic socialism and "real socialism."

Adam Ciołkosz was strongly critical of Zaremba's predictions. He believed that the *sine qua non* condition for the construction of genuine democratic socialism was the liberation of Poland from Moscow's control. The role of Polish socialists in exile should therefore be to focus on the fight against Soviet imperialism, because only after breaking

39 Jan Rowiński, *The Polish October 1956 in World Politics* (Warsaw: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, 2007), 311.

40 Twelfth conference of the Socialist Union of Central-Eastern Europe, Amsterdam, 7 and 8 September, 1963; 'Labour's Call from behind the Iron Curtain', October 1963, Private collection of Stanisław Wąsik.

dependence on the USSR will it be possible to build a democratic socialist system in Poland. Unlike Zaremba, he did not make subtle distinctions between more or less liberal communists. He regarded communism not as a Bolshevik faction of socialism, but as a separate and opposed current in history. Co-existence with communism was not possible because communism excluded coexistence. For Leninism, coexistence meant only a tactical endeavor. A common language with the communists was not to be sought internationally, let alone in Poland. The Polish example of "coexistence" between socialists under the sign of Edward Osóbka-Morawski ended in total failure, and this was sufficient proof that the PPS could not enter into any agreements with the communists.[41] Ciołkosz allowed only one type of communists with whom the socialists could negotiate: it was communists of the Milovan Djilas or Imre Nagy type, but only because they had moved to the position of integral democracy and *ipso facto* ceased to be communists.

The only acceptable formula for Poland, Ciołkosz wrote, is through free and democratic elections. And there cannot be half-hearted solutions in this regard, for example by agreeing to legalize the PPS in the first place – as Zaremba allowed. According to Ciołkosz, this was a fundamental mistake. The first step must be to regain the right to full freedom of action for all political parties in Poland, including the Communist Party. "We are fighting not for an amendment to the communist dictatorship, not for its liberalisation, but for its abolition. The alternative to dictatorship is democracy, and democracy – like independence – must be for everyone, not just for socialists,"[42] he concluded. In the long run, a fully democratic system, allowing even the most extreme parties, is healthier than the concession method. History proved, Ciołkosz argued, that banned groupings always found a way to operate under "various covers" if they had enough supporters. He understood the evolution of the system in communist countries as allowing free elections to the constituent assemblies that would give these countries their political, economic and social system.

Ciołkosz's road to socialism led through an emphasis on maintaining communication with the country and familiarizing himself with the ideological and practical achievements of Western social democracy. The aim of socialists in exile was not to "liberalise the communist dictatorship," but to liquidate it.

In conclusion, one can say that the process of liberalization of the system, initiated after October 1956, was quickly halted and in this sense it was Ciołkosz who was right. On the other hand, it was thanks to the pressure of the working class in Poland that the first free trade union, Solidarity (in Polish: Solidarność), was established. The idea of establishing such unions was in the program of the émigré PPS.

41 Ciołkosz, "Cel: Polska socjalistyczna."

42 Ibid., 56.

One should also mention the socialists who belonged to the "intransigent" group. They looked at the country's affairs and the role of emigration from a completely different perspective. Undoubtedly, Adam Pragier,[43] a prominent socialist intellectual associated with the "Castle," was one of them. In a nutshell, his attitude could be described as follows: detachment from domestic reality was on the one hand an element of weakness, but on the other hand an element of strength for the emigration. For it opened up the possibility of approaching issues, not from the point of view of the practical needs of the socialist movement, but from the "fundamental positions" inherent in its own tradition and the humanism of Western European socialism from the period "before it had access to power." He believed that Western social democrats were "unashamedly opportunist." Pragier, however, apart from his criticism, did not bother to present a coherent program, written from a principled position, which would be the quintessence of socialist doctrine in the Polish version.

The role of the socialist emigration is difficult to overestimate and manifests itself in several areas. Firstly, the huge involvement of the PPS in the international forum of the Socialist International, where there was an opportunity to expose the problems of the "Eastern Bloc" from a Polish perspective. Secondly, a rich theoretical and journalistic output presenting the evolution of Western social democracy and the resulting programs for Poland. Thirdly, material assistance to the persecuted in the People's Republic of Poland, from the Stalinist era to the martial law.

In conclusion, it is hard to resist the reflection that the verdicts of history are not just, and it is ironic that those who fought for an independent and democratic Poland for years have been swept from the political scene. One can only hope that the ethos of the left will preserve the achievements of these outstanding representatives of Polish democratic socialism.

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[43] Before the war – member of parliament, member of the Supreme Council of the PPS in the years 1921–1937. See also: Paweł Chojnacki, *Prof. Adam Pragier – wykładowca i doktor honoris causa PUNO – jako adwersarza „Kultury" i Juliusza Mieroszewski*, accessed October 20, 2023, https://www.omp.org.pl/artykul.php?artykul=433.

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Scouting in the USA in the Light of Socio-cultural Changes in the Polish Emigrant Community

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Abstract: Scouting – at first, Polish scouting – appeared in the USA already before the First World War, mainly thanks to its founder, Andrzej Małkowski. Nevertheless, its heyday came in the interwar period, when the American-Polish community realized that it could become an effective tool for promoting Polish culture and interest in the land of their forefathers among Polish youth. After a pause caused by the Second World War, scouting activity resumed, but in a completely different form, i.e. as part of the post-war political and pro-independence emigration, which aimed to rebuild a sovereign Polish state, then in the Soviet sphere of influence. American scouting was then – as a US division – part of the Polish Scouting and Guiding Association (ZHP), which was temporarily active outside Poland and had its structures in several countries around the world. Politically and culturally oriented, and varied in form, the activities of post-war scouting have left a lasting mark in the USA. Among other things, it contributed to slowing down the assimilation of American Poles into the culture of their country of settlement and formed many outstanding social activists, such as leaders at various levels in the structures of the Polish American Congress. However, in the 21st century, it is facing more and more obstacles due to the decreasing number of Polish emigrants and the progressive assimilation of the younger generation of Poles into the culture of the country of settlement. The key process that determined the shape of the scouting movement in this country turned out to be the situation, structure, interests and values of the old and new emigration, as well as the evolution of its ideology and sense of national identity. Nevertheless, despite the difficulties, the ZHP USA continues to operate.

Keywords: scouting, emigration, Polish diaspora, USA, Cold War

Scouting in the USA before the Second World War

At the beginning of the 20th century, the American Polish diaspora constituted the largest concentration of Poles outside Poland. It was initiated by the establishment of the first Polish settlement, Panna Maria, in the state of Texas, in 1854, but the largest emigration wave from Polish territory took place between 1890 and 1914. Thanks to it, at the end of this period the size of Polish economic emigration ("for bread") was

estimated at about two million people. The majority of its representatives settled in large cities and industrial districts in the Northeast of the USA and therefore had a predominantly working-class character. Concentration in urban centers and significant numbers influenced the high degree of integration and dynamism of the Polish diaspora. In this environment, political, social and cultural life flourished, centered on Catholic parishes led by Polish priests. In the specific conditions of separation from their native land, the role of the Catholic clergy as spiritual and life guides became even more important, which translated into the dominant influence of parishes on the development of the socio-cultural life of the first generation of Polish emigrants. In addition, Polish national and Catholic organizations, which enjoyed the mass support of emigrants from Poland, played an important role in their everyday life. Among the largest were the Polish Roman Catholic Union (Zjednoczenie Polskie Rzymsko-Katolickie, 1873), the Polish National Alliance (Związek Narodowy Polski, 1880) and the Union of Polish Falcons of America (Związek Sokołów Polskich w Stanach Zjednoczonych, 1894).[1]

Remarkably, these and other organizations were associations of mutual assistance, which as part of their activities provided insurance against extraordinary accidents (e.g. loss of life), which in a foreign environment provided their members and families with an elementary sense of security. Polish-language press of various political and philosophical hues played a particularly important role in integrating this community. Most of the Polish émigrés of the time regarded their stay on American soil as temporary, still bearing in mind their obligations to their homeland suffering under the partitions. This, in turn, strengthened their Polish national identity and their sense of integration into the foreign, American environment. This attitude was also fostered by the fact that Polish emigrants were placed at the bottom of the US social hierarchy at the time. Poorly educated Poles, alongside Italians, acted as the primary reservoir of unskilled labor, deprived of higher wages, prestige and social security. It was therefore no coincidence that in 1910 – after several decades of internal consolidation of the Polish diaspora in the US, the so-called "Seym of Exile" (Sejm Wychodźstwa) defined its purpose for functioning in this country as efforts to rebuild an independent Polish state, describing it as the "fourth partition district." The ideology thus outlined further reinforced the natural tendency for emigrants from Polish lands to become integrated and to isolate themselves from their American surroundings in the form of voluntary confinement in Polish ghettos – neighborhoods of large cities – as well as to direct the activities of emigration associations, giving them an unambiguously political character.[2]

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1 Marcin Borys, *Polska emigracja do Stanów Zjednoczonych do 1914 roku* (Toruń: Adam Marszałek, 2011), 135–207.

2 Grzegorz Babiński, *Polonia w USA na tle przemian amerykańskiej etniczności* (Kraków: Oficyna Wydawnicza ARM, 2009), 327–30.

The First World War (1914–1918) accelerated the birth and popularization of Polish scouting abroad, including in the USA. As early as 1912, the American structures of the "Falcon" (TG Sokół) movement began – on the occasion of military training before the expected war – to popularize the scouting idea as an original and attractive synthesis of modern pedagogical thought, healthy lifestyle and the idea of fighting for Polish independence. By the outbreak of the First World War, there were already a dozen or so Polish scouting groups in the USA, but formally they operated within the Boy Scouts of America (BSA). In mid-1915, Andrzej Małkowski, the co-founder of Polish scouting, arrived in the USA and, as the most competent in this field, was quickly appointed Chief Scoutmaster of the Polish Falcons in America. Małkowski immediately threw himself into organizational and educational work, publishing many articles and several books and pamphlets on scouting, building and visiting the structures of Polish scouting and preparing human resources for the Polish army he wanted to create in the USA and Canada. In the first of his fields of activity he achieved considerable success, organizing new troops, conducting training and courses and popularizing the scouting ideals in the Polish media. As a result of his efforts, at the beginning of 1917, there were 1448 boy and girl scouts in the ranks of Polish scouting in the USA under the auspices of the "Falcon" (Sokół).[3]

In the latter field, he did not achieve so much, mainly because of the reluctance of Canada and the USA to form Polish units under the Canadian banner. In addition, he carried out conspiratorial activity in the USA, not in agreement with "Sokół," creating clandestine cells under the name of the Polish Legion (Legion Polski), treated as cadres of a future Polish army. For this reason (the United States was then still a neutral country) he was forced to resign from his position as Chief Scoutmaster and move to Canada, where he enlisted in the Canadian Army, later fighting in France.[4]

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3 Monika Piotrowska and Krzysztof Wasilewski, "Geneza i rozwój harcerstwa wśród Polaków na obczyźnie w latach 1912–1918," in *Studia z dziejów harcerstwa na obczyźnie 1912–1946*, ed. Sylwia Łopato, Leonard Nowak and Marek Szczerbiński (Gorzów Wielkopolski: Zamiejscowy Wydział Kultury Fizycznej Poznańskiej AWF w Gorzowie Wielkopolskim, Polskie Towarzystwo Naukowe Kultury Fizycznej Oddział w Gorzowie Wielkopolskim, Polskie Towarzystwo Historyczne Oddział w Gorzowie Wielkopolskim, Instytut Historii i Archiwistyki Polonijnej Oddział w Chicago, Polskie Towarzystwo Naukowe na Obczyźnie w Londynie, 2012), 45–9. According to W. Kukla and M. Miszczuk, the result of A. Małkowski's work was an increase in the number of Polish scouts in the USA to 20,000–25,000 scouts and girl scouts, "which is more than in the Polish lands." It is difficult to explain such a large discrepancy in data; perhaps the authors meant all Polish scouts in the USA, not only those under the auspices of the Polish Falcons of America and the BSA. For example, in the years 1915–1918, there were approximately 4,000 members in the Scouting Branches of the Polish National Council, which supported the legionary act. However, these scouts were listed separately by the authors. Cf. Wiesław Kukla and Marian Miszczuk, *Dzieje harcerstwa na obczyźnie 1912–2006. Zarys problematyki* (Warsaw: Tomiko, 2006), 18–9.

4 A. Małkowski died in a shipwreck. On his life and activities, see: Aleksander Kamiński, *Andrzej Małkowski* (Łódź: Wing, 2000).

After the end of the First World War, Polish emigration in the USA quickly took on the characteristics of Polonia, i.e. following the restoration of the independent Polish state, it abandoned the prioritization of its interests in favor of concern for the interests of Poles living on American soil. This new direction of activity caused disputes within its elite due to the fact that the older activists of Polish-American organizations, considering themselves first and foremost Americans of Polish origin, did not want to submit to the policy of the reborn Polish state, which demanded that Polonia pursue the political and economic interests of the Second Polish Republic on the territory of their countries of settlement. For example, at the Second Congress of the World Union of Poles Abroad (II Zjazd Światowego Związku Polaków Zagranicą) in 1934, representatives of the American Polish community refused to sign a resolution with such content, explaining that it conflicted with their sense of loyalty to the United States – the country of their residence. Younger activists, on the other hand, were inclined to accept the concept, which provoked a lively discussion and even sharp polemics in the pages of the Polish-American press in the USA.[5]

One of the fields of activity of the Polish community at that time, on which the activists of almost all its organizations were mostly agreed, became the restoration of Polish scout troops, which, after the departure of A. Małkowski had mostly ceased their activities. In the 1920s, some of these Polish scouting circles remained, e.g. there were about 5,000 scouts under the auspices of the Polish National Council (Polska Rada Narodowa). In addition, in the Falcon Association (Związek Sokołów) in the United States, scout troops were organized under the so-called Dziatwa Szkolna, i.e. the children's and youth branch of this association. In turn, the Polish scout troops belonging to the Boy Scouts of America included 600–700 girls and boys, especially in Buffalo (New York, Scoutmaster Leonard Gabryelewicz) and Hammond (Indiana, Scoutmaster Ostrowski). Most of these Polish scouts spoke little Polish, but considered themselves Polish. In contrast, a minority claimed to be Americans of Polish descent.[6]

A real breakthrough occurred in 1931, when Jan Romaszkiewicz became President of the Polish National Alliance. At that time, he began to realize the idea of creating a large scout organization, based on the structures of this association. The reasons for this decision were both down-to-earth and ideological in nature. Firstly, the new President wanted to increase the number of members, and at the same time those insured in the Alliance. Secondly, by doing so, he planned to strengthen his position in political games

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5 Cezary Lusiński, *II Rzeczpospolita a Polonia 1922–1939. Geneza i działalność Rady Organizacyjnej Polaków z Zagranicy i Światowego Związku Polaków z Zagranicy* (Warsaw: Instytut Historii PAN, 1998), 35, 73–6, 103–4.

6 Robert K. Daszkiewicz, *Harcerstwo Polskie poza granicami kraju od zarania do 1930 roku w relacjach i dokumentach*, prepared for publication by Leon Formela (Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1983), 149–55.

within the organization. Thirdly, in this way he attempted to halt the rapid Americanization of the younger generation of the Polish community, combined with the loss of Polish national consciousness. He enlisted the help of, among others, Stanisław Kołodziejczyk, a former Sokół activist in the United States. He took up the post of Chief Scoutmaster of the Polish Scouting and Guiding Association. From then on, over the next few years, the dynamic development of the new organization continued, with its numbers growing at an impressive rate, i.e. 200 members in 1932, 23,000 in 1933, 56,000 in 1934, and 80,000 and 1,441 instructors in 1938. The secret of such great organizational success was the use of the widely developed structures of the Polish National Alliance, its large human potential (300,000 members in 1936) and its financial potential (USD 25 million in 1936). Between 1933 and 1938, scouting delegations travelled to Poland five times for scouting courses, training and camps. In turn, two instructor expeditions went to the USA in 1936 and 1937 to support the young scout organization through training, courses and camps.

Nevertheless, the demise of this ambitious project came very quickly. In 1939, J. Romaszkiewicz lost the election, and his successor, Karol Rozmarek, under pressure from the Boy Scouts of America, agreed to transform the organization into Youth Troops (Drużyny Młodzieżowe), which meant that they effectively lost their scouting character. However, even if they had been able to continue their activities they would most likely not have been able to achieve lasting success of an organizational and educational nature. The reason for this was the top-down, administrative creation of scout troops and the lack of ideological, methodologically experienced and pedagogically trained instructional staff. For this reason, PNA Scouting resembled the proverbial "house of cards" organization.[7]

On the other hand, another scouting organization, much smaller in number, was built at the Polish Roman Catholic Union (Związek Polski Rzymsko-Katolicki), which in the 1930s had about 160,000 members, united by national and religious ties. The men's organization was part of the BSA, while the women's troops, known as Córy Zjednoczenia, were directly subordinate to the Chief Scoutmaster of the Union. The Chief Scoutmaster was Jan Troike, an American of Polish descent from a Kashubian family, who was also a troop leader of the BSA. This double organizational affiliation was good for Polish scouting, because it was subject to both the Alliance and the BSA, which contributed to raising the level of its programme and educational work. The basing of its activities on the Polish parish network also had a positive effect, because Catholic priests were better prepared to take care of scout troops than randomly selected Polish National Alliance scouting instructors. In 1938, PRCUA (ZPRK) scouting numbered 7,500 scouts and scoutmasters and 460 male

7 Kukla and Miszczak, *Dzieje harcerstwa*, 43–7.

and female instructors. In addition, scout troops were still being formed at the Union of Polish Women's Alliance in America (Wianki Związek Polek), within the Scouting Association of the Sons of Poland (Stowarzyszenie Synów Polski) and as "Orlęta Macierzy Polskiej" (creator Stanisław Kołodziejczyk – 800 members). After the USA joined the war in December 1941, the activities of these scouting organizations and structures ceased due to pressure from the Boy Scouts of America and the Girl Scouts of America and the appointment of most instructors to the American army.[8]

Genesis and Organizational Development of PSO USA (ZHP USA)

During the Second World War, scouting activity in the United States virtually died out. The main reason for this phenomenon was the lack of male and female instructors, most of whom joined the American army or worked for the state elsewhere. Nevertheless, many former Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts worked in the leadership of the largest organization of Poles in America, i.e. the Polish National Alliance (Związek Narodowy Polski) and the Polish American Congress (Kongres Polonii Amerykańskiej) formed under it in 1944. It was they who supported the first, post-war initiatives to establish new scout units. Meanwhile, during the war and in the first years after its end, another wave of Polish emigration (approximately 200 000 people) came to the USA, distinguished by a relatively higher level of education than that of the "old" Polish community, and by different aspirations. Above all, this "new" group had a political orientation, i.e. it set itself the goal of rebuilding an independent and fully sovereign Polish state under the leadership of the supreme authorities of the Republic of Poland with its seat in London. It was therefore part of the pro-independence camp with precisely outlined intentions and a vision of Poland.[9]

Significantly, 1946 marked the beginning of a new stage of scouting activities abroad. On February 2, 1946, in Enghien near Paris, the instructors of the pre-war Polish Scouting and Guiding Association (ZHP), gathered together with its leader Dr. Michał Grażyński, decided to continue the organization's activities in exile, i.e. outside the borders of Poland. The extraordinary nature of the functioning of ZHP was emphasized by the addition of the term "in Exile" (Poza Granicami Kraju) in its name. However, it was not a new organization, but the same one which was established in the years 1910–1911

8 Ibid., 47–8.

9 Babiński, *Polonia w USA*, 330–40.

in the Polish lands, then operating on the territory of the Second Republic in the inter-war period.[10]

In the first years after the end of the war, representatives of the instructor corps and senior scouts who belonged to the ZHP began to arrive in the USA – mainly from Germany and Great Britain – and who, on the one hand, had great experience from scouting activities in pre-war Poland, the Middle East during the war or in post-war Germany, as well as enthusiasm for educational work using the scouting method. On the other hand, they were naturally looking for opportunities to start such activities. This was encouraged by the chief authorities of the ZHP with its headquarters in London, and some were even sent there with the specific mission of creating structures for a scouting organization on American soil. This meant completely different conditions for building a scouting organization compared to the pre-war period, when experienced instructors were practically non-existent. Initially, the first troops and patrols were formed in major cities with large Polish communities, such as Chicago, Buffalo or Detroit.[11]

As rightly noted by Beata Pawlikowska, this did not mean that their first steps on American soil were easy. ZHP members were often intellectuals, i.e. people who were educated or aiming to gain new qualifications overseas. They persevered in learning English, acquiring degrees and climbing the ranks of professional careers in the American realm. However, they were often met with incomprehension by the established, so-called old émigrés, who prided themselves on their thriving Polish organizations and institutions. They did not understand the new emigrants arriving after the war, especially their political motivation for staying in the USA and their social aspirations to enter the middle class of American society. Together with the Americans, they often mocked their strange accent, a mixture of Polish and British English, as well as their manners, customs and, above all, the stubbornness with which they refused to assimilate into American culture, insisting on their Polish national identity.[12]

However, the friction between the old and new émigrés also had a deeper basis. The latter had a clearly outlined profile of action, which was to fight for the restoration of an independent Polish state, and thus to put Polish interests in the foreground. To this end, taking advantage of their elite character, new emigrants tried to impose their dominance on the old emigration in the form of taking over the leadership of the American Polish

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10 Juliusz L. Englert and Jerzy Witting, *W harcerskiej służbie. ZHP na obczyźnie 1946–1996* (London: Naczelnictwo ZHP poza granicami kraju, 1997).

11 Kukla and Miszczuk, *Dzieje harcerstwa*, 89–90.

12 Beata Pawlikowska, "Rozwój i działalność Związku Harcerstwa Polskiego – Okręg Stany Zjednoczone (w zarysie)," in *Światowe Harcerstwo. Związek Harcerstwa Polskiego na obczyźnie w latach 1918–2018. Studia, szkice i materiały,* edited by Marek Wierzbicki (Lublin–Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2018), 233–7.

community and setting its political goals in order to use its potential to exert pressure on the American authorities. Meanwhile, the Polish émigré circles, incumbent in the USA for decades, were already firmly assimilated into American culture and society and did not want to put the interests of the Polish state first. While nourishing sentiment and sympathy for enslaved Poland, and even providing tangible material aid to compatriots living there, they considered the interests of the United States paramount and did not intend to serve the Polish raison d'état.

Hence, at the end of the Second World War and immediately after its end, they did not support the anti-Soviet direction of the Polish post-war emigration policy. Besides, the old emigration (Polonia) of plebeian and peasant origin and character felt that they were American citizens loyally serving their new homeland, which enabled them a perceptible social and material advancement. Meanwhile, the representatives of the post-war new émigrés regarded the collapse of the Polish state as a catastrophe and their stay in the USA as bringing them social declassification. Despite initial misunderstandings and friction, these two emigration circles gradually grew closer over the following decades, especially when the American government, in the 1960s and 1970s, began to give stronger support to the anti-communist post-war emigration. Despite initial difficulties, scouting instructors were able to establish organizational structures covering the United States, which formed part of the aforementioned Polish Scouting and Guiding Association, which in the post-war period was active in more than a dozen countries on four continents of the world.[13]

On the East coast of the USA, scouting activities gained momentum after the ZHP authorities in Germany appointed Scoutmaster Ryszard Stańkowski as their contact instructor in the late 1940s. As a result, he was approached by male and female instructors looking for opportunities to serve in the United States, and smaller scouting circles – in addition to the larger ones established in major cities such as Chicago and Detroit – appeared in centers such as Albany, Buffalo and New York, New York, Bantam, Connecticut, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Jersey, New Jersey. In 1951, the Supreme Council of the Polish Scouting and Guiding Association (ZHPdzpgK) established a District of the Polish Scouting and Guiding Association (ZHP) in the USA, headed by Scoutmistress Wanda Kamieniecka-Grycko as a delegate of the Supreme Council, the President of the District Board, Scoutmistress Ewa Gierat, a delegate of the Girl Scout Headquarters and the first commander of the Girl Scout Troop, and Scoutmaster Jan Kanty Miska, a delegate of the Boy Scout Headquarters and at the same time the first commander of

13 Tadeusz Paleczny, *Ewolucja ideologii i przemiany tożsamości narodowej Polonii w Stanach Zjednoczonych w latach 1870–1970* (Warsaw–Kraków: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1989), 193–238.

the Boy Scout Troop. These appointments were confirmed by election by the instructors' circle at the first instructors' convention held in Detroit in 1952.[14]

The first scout troops on the West Coast were established in California, thanks to the efforts of Scoutmistress Wanda Kamieniecka-Grycko, who in February 1958 founded a troop of scouts and a troop of girl scouts at the Polish parish in Los Angeles. Although after seven years, in 1964, due to the parish's lack of interest in cooperating with the scouting movement, their work ceased, it was reactivated in 1974 thanks to the initiative of Scoutmaster Rev. Zbigniew Olbraś. It was then that troops were formed in San Francisco, which, together with the Los Angeles community, in 1976 formed the joint scout troops of girl scouts "Mazowsze" and boy scouts "Kraków." In 1986, Scoutmistress Małgorzata Szternal-Gołubiec organized a girl scout troop in Seattle, Washington among Polish immigrants settled in the USA after martial law was declared. After a few years, in 1993, a coeducational independent unit "Szczep Kaszuby" was established.[15]

Structures and Functioning of Organizations

In the second decade of the 21st century, ZHPdzpgK functioned in five locations. The "Podhale" Scout Troop and the "Warmia" Scout Troop operate on the East Coast. Their summer camps take place on rented land, notably at the Scouts' staging area "Bieszczady," owned by the "Warmia" Scout Troop, while scout camps were organized for many years on land owned by the ZNP in Palmer, Massachusetts, and at the Doylestown Shrine (American Czestochowa, Pennsylvania). The latter was home to 11 Circles of Friends of Scouting (Koło Przyjaciół Harcerstwa) in 2017, as well as the Connecticut Circuit, which administers the legal registration of the United States District of the Polish Scout Organization.[16]

In the central states, the Michigan division was based in Detroit, which included the Girl Scout Troop "Ziemia Rodzinna," the Boy Scout Troop "Kresy," the instructor troop "Iskry," as well as the Circle of Friends of Scouting. The "Białowieża" center belonged to the District, where all the bivouacs, camps and scout camps of the units from its area were held. In the same part of the USA, there was the Chicago division, associating the Scout Troop "Tatry," the Scout Troop "Warta," the instructors' troop "Pasieka," the instructors' troop "Siewcy," two Circles of the Friends of Scouting (one of them, i.e. KPH Chicago

14 Ewa Gierat, *Powojenna historia harcerstwa w Stanach Zjednoczonych, Historia ZHP w USA 1949–1989* (Detroit: Zarząd Okręgu ZHP, 1990), 11–2.

15 Kukla and Miszczuk, *Dzieje harcerstwa*, 90–1.

16 Pawlikowska, *Rozwój i działalność*, 248–50.

has a center – the Norwid Scout Camp in Crivitz, Wisconsin, three artistic groups: the only scout folk dance groups in the then ZHPdzpgK "Lechici" and "Orlęta," the scout artistic group "Wichry" and the last Circle of Senior Scouting in the USA (the first of the circles "Orły Kresowe" disbanded in 2016 due to the old age and poor health of its members).

On the West coast, scouting units functioned in the Girl Scout Troop "Kaszuby" (four units and the female instructor troop "Zdrój" in Washington State) and the Girl Scout Troop "Mazowsze" and Boy Scout Troop "Kraków," which operated in California, Arizona and Colorado (the boy troop also had units in Washington State). California was also the headquarters of two circles of friends of scouting (KPH). In 2016 the United States district had approximately 2,700 members, including 1,000 adults, and was the most numerous district of ZHPdzpgK.[17]

Throughout all decades of the post-war history of scouting in the USA, the theme of inadequate financial support from the "old" (pre-war) and "new" (post-war) émigrés has recurred in the reports of its authorities. In spite of this, some of their circles remembered the need to provide assistance to an organization that aimed to raise a group of young people who remembered their Ancestral Country. In the first thirty years of the District's existence, material support from veterans' associations was important, as they were willing to fund new scout flags, subsidize scout rallies, bivouacs, expeditions and camps, lend their own premises for meetings or take care of the activities of the troops and scouts. The structures of the Polish Combatants' Association in the United States (Stowarzyszenie Kombatantów Polskich w Stanach Zjednoczonych) were particularly significant in this field. However, in the 1990s, the ranks of this and other associations began to cull due to the passage of time and the dying out of this community. Importantly, in many cases, the disbanded veterans' associations handed over their last material resources to the scouts, in recognition of their patriotic activities. Since then, scouting on American soil has been forced to secure all financial resources on its own.[18]

Other important circumstances that often hindered scouting work were the long distances and transport costs, problems with cooperation in the emigration and Polish communities, and the difficulty of maintaining the Polish language in scouting communities. As far as the first issue is concerned, scouting activities were greatly hampered by the considerable distances not only between the various divisions, but also between the patrols in the troops, the headquarters of the troops and the places where the scouts lived, and finally to their camping or bivouac sites. Significant distances meant higher transport

17 Kukla and Miszczuk, *Dzieje harcerstwa*, 90–1.

18 Piotr Kardela, *Stowarzyszenie Polskich Kombatantów w Stanach Zjednoczonych w latach 1953–1990* (Olsztyn–Białystok: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2015).

costs, which made it much more difficult for scout units that were forced to raise funds for their activities on their own.[19]

On the other hand, the Polish émigré community at the time was a conglomerate of numerous associations, foundations, schools and other institutions, enriched by a vast network of parishes, in which scouting was sometimes regarded as competition for Polish Saturday schools or church formations. This also limited its possibilities for action. On top of this, there were issues of assimilation of children and young people into the culture of the country of settlement. The departure of part of the younger generation from the language of their ancestors in favor of English played an important role among them. ZHP as an organization consistently upheld the cultivation of the Polish language, especially during meetings, activities and scouting trips. This, in turn, deterred those who did not prioritize this issue. The scouting work was also not facilitated by the position of many American schools, which in many cases pressured Polish children and teenagers to attend extracurricular activities, often organized on Saturdays, i.e. on the day when classes in Polish schools and scout meetings were held.[20]

On the other hand, an essential factor which made it possible to operate under such complicated conditions was undoubtedly the commitment of the staff of instructors, who were responsible for the direction and shape of educational work in ZHP USA. As in other units of this type, female and male instructors worked on a voluntary basis without receiving any remuneration.

An insufficient number of female and male instructors was always the greatest barrier hampering the development of the organization in the United States. Its cause was firstly the failure of a considerable part of the instructional staff to join the scout and cub troops, which automatically overloaded all active instructors. They were overburdened with duties not only in the scouting field, but also with social work in Polish organizations, as they were often asked to contribute where there was no one willing to help. The difficulty of maintaining personal contacts in the vast areas of the United States also caused serious problems in forming cadres in the younger generation of scouting members. Therefore, in the 1980s, the average age of the cadre was relatively high, while the instructors themselves were overburdened with educational work in patrols and troops and with duties in non-scouting environments, such as helping to run classes in Polish Saturday schools and organizing various patriotic, religious and Polish community events.[21]

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19 See: Archive of the Head of the Polish Scout Association (hereafter: ANZHP), B.3.19.2., Report of the Head of the Scout Association [USA District] for the year 1970–1971, no pagination.

20 Pawlikowska, *Rozwój i działalność*, 249–50.

21 *Znicz. Wiadomości Harcerskie* (USA), no. 3 (1986): 6.

Idea, Method, Program of Scouting Work

ZHP USA pursued the ideological profile of its scouting organization, which combined loyalty to the countries of settlement with a strong aspiration to rebuild an independent, fully sovereign Polish state. Thus, the post-war scouting had a clear emigrant character, and not only a Polish one, as it participated in a political mission based on patriotism, which clearly distinguished it from the Polish organizations of the so-called "old Polonia" in the USA. And indeed, until 1956, the instructors of ZHP in the USA (as in other countries where the association was active) lived in anticipation of the outbreak of the Third World War, which would result in the reactivation of the Polish Armed Forces in the West under the command of General Władysław Anders, and their participation in the victorious war of the Western world against the Soviet Union. A war that was to bring the liberation of Poland from Soviet domination.

When it did not happen, the circles of post-war emigration had to switch to a "long march" in the form of many years of daily work aimed at maintaining the national identity of subsequent generations of Polish emigrants and their mobilization for the fight to rebuild an independent Poland. The instructional circles of the ZHP USA understood their role in a similar way. Still, the main goal of the exile, post-war scouting was to serve for the benefit of an independent Poland and to educate scouts to be righteous people and nationally conscious Poles. At the same time, the principle of loyalty to one's country of settlement and integration into its society, culture and institutions was not forgotten.[22]

The specificity of educational work in exile posed two significant challenges for post-war scouting abroad, namely assimilation tendencies visible particularly in the young generation of Polish emigrants and secularization processes resulting in the abandonment of religious faith or growing indifference to the religious practices of the Catholic Church. These were particularly evident in a country such as the USA, with its individualistic and materialistic culture, whose power of influence increased even more after the Second World War, when the USA gained the status of the world's greatest military and economic force. The rapidly rising standard of living of its citizens also facilitated the social advancement of immigrants from Poland, even though they occupied lower rungs in the American social hierarchy until the early 1970s.

In spite of these processes, scouting was one of the strongest educational institutions of the emigration, which with its influence slowed down the assimilation processes of the Polish diaspora, above all by popularizing the Polish language among Polish children and teenagers, which was a challenge for the natural abandonment of the Polish language in

22 See, for example, ANZHP, G/1/6, Reports of the Chief Scout Council for 1955–1960, without pagination of pages.

the second generation in the emigration environment; also by introducing young emigrants to the achievements of Polish national culture, familiarizing them with Polish history, deepening national consciousness, which strengthened the bond with Polishness in a situation of daily confrontation with a diversity of ethnic cultures on American soil. Scouting in the USA gave expression to its beliefs by participating in patriotic celebrations on 3 May, 11 November or Pulaski Days, as well as numerous services, pilgrimages and spiritual retreats. An important factor strengthening the scouting structures in the implementation of their patriotic educational programme turned out to be the next (third) wave of emigration from Poland, which in 1980–1997 brought about 300,000 Poles to the USA. Although there were many problems with the adaptation of the newly arrived emigrants to scouting work in the American reality, incomers significantly strengthened the potency of the Polish community, a large part of which was interested in maintaining ties with the native culture and the Polish-speaking environment.[23]

Scouting in the United States faced a number of difficulties in its daily educational work. Firstly, scouting activities outside the home country (i.e. in the conditions of emigration) took place in abnormal conditions, compared to life in Poland. It was made more difficult by the very necessity to carry it out in a foreign political and socio-cultural environment, which forced members to adapt to its administrative, economic, social and cultural requirements. On top of this, there was the need to conform to the situation, needs and requirements of the Polish community, which showed a varied level of assimilation, and thus also a non-uniform degree of interest in the culture and situation of Poland. In addition, the scouting movement had to face the extremely expansive American culture, which was open to immigrants. The strong focus of American society on material issues, together with the spread of an individualistic culture, did not encourage Polish immigrants to send their children to an organization that preached the primacy of spiritual values over material ones and taught sacrifice for others, especially for the then enslaved Poland. No wonder then that scouting in the United States (as in other countries) was elitist in character, and its numbers in George Washington's land never exceeded 3,000 members.[24]

The situation in this respect became even more complicated in the 1970s. Influenced by the cultural revolution associated with the 1968 student protests, modern, progressive cultural trends, leftist and liberal in nature, were gaining popularity in the USA at the time, standing in opposition to traditional culture based on Christianity. Their essence

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23 Lubomir Zyblikiewicz, *USA* (Warsaw: Trio, 2004), 215–82; Marek Wierzbicki, *Harcerz-Żołnierz-Obywatel. Zygmunt Lechosław Szadkowski 1912–1995* (Lublin: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2016), 88–104; Ewa Karpińska-Gierat, *Korzenie i owoce* (Colorado Springs: Language Bridges, 1998).

24 ANZHP, A.2.8.4., Hm. L. Kliszewicz, Polish elements in scouting work in exile, no date [probably 1958], card 95–100.

was a rejection of the hierarchical nature of society, authority. cultural taboos and moral values based on the Decalogue. Under these conditions, the desire to free the individual from the control of society, in order to allow unfettered individual development, began to dominate in university and school environments.[25]

These trends also reached scouting, calling into question the use of many educational tools such as discipline, organizational hierarchy, punishment or demands. The older generation of instructors often saw these trends as a threat to scouting in its traditional form, but the younger generation no longer did. This was accompanied by a decrease in the level of involvement of the instructional staff in educational work in the troops, entailing increasing methodological deficiencies, e.g. neglect of the deputation system and environmental studies (*puszczaństwo*), and less interest in Polish culture and history, and even a gradual likening of the idea, methodology and programme of Polish scouting to American scouting to the detriment of patriotic upbringing in the Polish spirit. These unfavorable tendencies were perceived by the most conscious and committed part of the instructors' corps, which, through discussions, persuasion, modification of the programme of scouting work and staff training, tried to improve the position of scouting on American soil.[26]

Added to this were problems with the understanding of the Polish national identity of scouts. In the second half of the 1970s and in the following decade, there were demands to revise the content of the Scout Promise in the context of the doubts of many younger instructors, who believed that their proper homeland was the United States, which they should primarily serve. On the other hand, the older generation of instructors – the founders of the ZHP USA – incidentally already in minority at the time, regarded such proposals as undermining the very essence of post-war scouting abroad. While the former felt more like Americans of Polish origin, the latter still regarded themselves as Poles, carrying out a mission on foreign, American soil to reactivate an independent Polish state. Nevertheless, the majority of representatives of both sides of the dispute considered a discussion on the subject necessary, which led to a consensus and leaving the most important ideological declarations unchanged.[27]

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25 On the moral revolution in the aftermath of the 1968 student protests see, for example, Anna von der Golz, ed., *"Talking 'Bout My Generation". Conflicts of Generation Building and Europe's 1968* (Gottingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2011).

26 ANZHP, B.3.18., Hm. Ryszard Miziołek, On scouting in the USA and the scouting method, 1971, k. 41–48; ANZHP, B.3.18., Report of the Chairman of the ZO USA for the period 29 X 1972 to 19 V 1973, k. 89–90; 91–98; ANZHP, B.3.18, Minutes of the Plenary Meeting of the U.S. District Board of the U.S.A., held on May 19, 1973, held in the Scouting common room at the 78th A[ssociation]W[etheran] A[rmy]P[olska] Outpost, k. 91–98.

27 *Znicz. Wiadomości Harcerskie* (USA), no. 2 (1986): 5–6.

In addition to ideological problems, the structures and units of the ZHP USA had to struggle with difficulties of a programme, methodological and purely human nature. The first of these was the issue of Senior Scouting (Starsze Harcerstwo), which was one of the four parts of ZHP abroad. According to the regulations in force, its mission was to transfer the values and customs of scouting, e.g. fraternity, solidarity, mutual help, selflessness, the ability to work together for the common good, to the area outside scouting, i.e. to the so-called adult society. In addition, the Senior Scout circles were not subordinate to the regiments in the individual districts, but directly to the ZHP Headquarters in London, where their leader was also located. As it soon turned out, in the day-to-day activities of the District units, the older scouts mostly did not show much activity. They did not have a clearly outlined program. Moreover, they did not get involved in the fields served by other scout units in the United States, closing themselves within the circle of their own issues and problems. Therefore, their passivity and isolation from the scouting community caused much irritation among female instructors and instructors involved in the day-to-day educational work in scout troops. On American soil, eight Senior Scouting circles were formed in the late 1940s, then, in the 1950s, only three were formed, which gradually reduced their activity due to the advanced age of their members. The younger members, on the other hand, did not appear. In 2016, one of the circles also ceased to operate.[28]

Some elements of the scouting methodology were functioning poorly, such as the patrol system, which consisted of – extremely educationally effective – work in small groups (*zastępy*), led by naturally selected patrol leaders (*zastępowi*). In the 1970s there was a noticeable decline in this method of working, with an emphasis almost exclusively on working in larger groups – troops (*drużyny*). However, this was somewhat natural in those times, when even the organization of a troop meeting posed many problems, given the necessity for parents to transport their children by car over distances sometimes reaching hundreds of kilometers, and only on Saturdays, when Polish Saturday Schools were in session.[29]

Activity

The basic aspect of scouting in the USA was everyday educational work, carried out in troops, circles, districts and regiments, similar to that which was carried out before the

28 See: Eugenia Maresch, "Kręgi Starszoharcerskie – ich początek i zmierzch," in *Światowe harcerstwo*, 147–59; ANZHP, A.2.6.2., United States District Board Report 1962, no pagination; ANZHP, A.2.2.13., United States District Board Report 1972, no pagination.

29 ANZHP, B.19.4., Report of the Girl Scout Troop Commander of the United States of America, 1977, no pagination.

war, during the wartime exile or in the first post-war years in Germany, Great Britain, India, Africa and the Middle East. It was based on the Scout Law and the Scout Promise, which contained the most important moral values and ideals that the scout movement wanted to instill in its participants. This was not an easy process due to numerous difficulties and obstacles that hampered scouting work, e.g. the great distances between the various circles, the reluctance of many young Polish emigrants to impose spiritual demands on themselves. Moreover, only 40% of the incoming instructors took an active part in educational work, while the rest explained their passivity by personal and family problems. In spite of this, the District authorities did not give up, but consistently worked on training the younger staff, creating new troops, cub packs and district units as well as supporting the already functioning ones, e.g. by providing professional methodical magazines and visiting scout centers.[30]

Due to their wide area of activity, every few years they organized District rallies to commemorate key historical events for the Polish people, to celebrate important anniversaries in the history of scouting and to integrate the staff of instructors, scouts and scoutmasters, who – due to the long distances involved – rarely met directly in a wider group of troops from the district and especially from the regiment. The first of these took place in 1955, followed by others in 1960, 1966, 1974, 1985, 1988, 2006, 2015.[31]

An important field of scouting activity were various patriotic and political actions, such as collecting funds for the National Treasury, providing Polish political emigration with at least a small amount of funding for independence activities; collections of food, clothing and medicine for compatriots in Poland, patriotic celebrations associated with anniversaries of important events, such as national uprisings, regaining independence, battles of the Second World War, etc. The celebrations of the 3rd of May Constitution Day, held by the Polish community since 1891, were among the most important, Independence Day (traditionally on 11 November), successive anniversaries of the Battle of Monte Cassino or the Katyn Massacre. Scouts performed all kinds of services, from honor guards at graves and monuments, participation in roll calls of remembrance, medical and orderly services to participation in holy masses. Visually appealing, the presence of uniformed scout units invariably received a positive response from the spectators or participants in these celebrations. It also brought together the circles of veterans of the Polish Armed Forces and scouting. For the veterans, former soldiers of the Polish armed

30 ANZHP, A.2.11.3., Report of the US District Board, 1954, k. 42–43.

31 ANZHP, B.3.19.5., Hm. J. K. Miska, Report of the ZHP USA District Rally, no date [probably September 1955], no pagination; Gierat, *Powojenna historia*, 59–62; ANZHP, E.2.5.137; *Biuletyn Informacyjny Naczelnictwa ZHP* (Londyn), no. 151 (1966): 878–9.

formations, it was the youth gathered in the ranks of the scouting movement that constituted their closest ideological environment.[32]

As the years passed and their own ranks dwindled, the veterans' organizations, led by the SPK (Stowarzyszenie Polskich Kombatantów), were concerned to find continuators of the struggle for the restoration of an independent Polish state. They chose scouting, because ZHP in exile emphasized the idea of independence most strongly in its declarations and deeds. For this reason, in August 1969, during the anniversary celebrations of the 25th anniversary of the Battle of Monte Cassino, they made a solemn handover of the banners of the PSZ units to the young generation of the independence emigration, which was represented mainly by the ZHP. On a day-to-day basis, the SPK tried to support scouting structures by providing material and moral support, e.g. by subsidizing activities, making premises available, and promoting scouting themes in veterans' magazines.[33]

Post-war scouting also took care to maintain cooperation with the émigré scouting organizations of nations enslaved by the Soviet Union, such as the Hungarians, Latvians, Estonians and Ukrainians, for example. To this end, it jointly founded the Associated International Scout and Guide Organisation (AISGO), a scouting federation that served as a reminder of the freedom aspirations of Central and Eastern European countries. Its international role was not very big, but nevertheless for scouts it was an opportunity to go beyond the exclusively Polish environment.[34]

In 1996, the 4th World Course – Training Camp "Cadre 2000" was held at the Hoover Center Scouts of the USA, Yorkville, Illinois, which was organized by the ZHP USA. It was attended by female and male instructors from Great Britain, Australia, Denmark, Sweden, France, Canada, Germany, the United States and Poland (a total of 125 candidates for the ranks of assistant scoutmaster/assistant scoutmistress (*podharcmistrz/podharcmistrzyni*) and scoutmaster/scoutmistress (*harcmistrz/harcmistrzyni*). In addition to the implementation of trials for the instructor ranks, the course program included classes in many different fields, including ideological education, scouting methodology, pedagogy, psychology, ethics, international relations, history and contemporary scouting. An important aim of the course was also to integrate the instructional staff of the ZHP from its various districts and centers and scout organizations.[35]

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32 Pawlikowska, *Rozwój i działalność*, 247.

33 Piotr Kardela, *Stanisław Gierat 1903–1977. Działalność społeczna i polityczna* (Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Promocyjne "Albatros", 2000), 466; Kardela, *Stowarzyszenie Polskich Kombatantów*, 301–2, 305–7.

34 Pawlikowska, *Rozwój i działalność*, 246.

35 Englert and Witting, *W harcerskiej służbie*, 304–6.

Conclusion

The phenomenon of scouting activities in the USA should be considered in several aspects, i.e. as a historical one, connected with events and processes of the most recent Polish history, a socio-cultural one, resulting from the evolution of the cultural profile and social needs of the Polish diaspora in the USA, and a political one, connected with the influence of the Polish state for the realization of its political and economic goals in the international arena and the idea of the struggle for Polish independence in the 20th century. Its strongest influence and reach was when Polish emigration in the United States pursued the mission of fighting for the realization of Poland's independent existence, and thus put its interests first, while the USA was treated as a foreign country, a place to earn money and only a temporary residence. This was the case during the years of the First World War and after the Second World War, when the national ideology of the "old" Polonia or the "new wave" of emigration from Poland put the interests of the Polish state in the foreground. At that time, its representatives most readily accepted the national ideals and values and political goals that were strongly emphasized by Polish scouting (*harcerstwo*). This, in turn, gave its activities a strong political and pro-independence character. In other periods, such as the interwar period, scouting had national autonomy but was more or less influenced by American scouting.

The key process which, in my opinion, determined the shape of the scouting movement in this country turned out to be the situation, structure, interests and values of the old and new emigration, as well as the evolution of its ideology and sense of national identity. In the second half of the 19th century, the emigrants from the Polish lands, peasants from the Russian and Austrian partitions, mostly had a poorly formed national consciousness. It was only in the first decade of the 20th century that a significant national revival took place among them, which brought a deepening of ties with Poland and a mass interest in the idea of its resurrection. During this period, the Polish community of the time referred to the Polish diaspora in the USA as the "fourth partition district." After the restoration of the independent Polish state, there was a change in the national ideology of the Polish American diaspora, towards the internalization of the values and interests of American society and culture. By the 1930s, most of its representatives already recognized themselves as Americans of Polish origin, loyal to the American state. The scout troops operating at the time promoted Polish culture, but treated it as an element of the identity of Polish emigrants, as members of an ethnic group forming part of the multicultural American society. They also succumbed, to a lesser or greater extent, to pressure from American scouting, which sought to bring scouting circles under its control.

The period of the Second World War deepened assimilation processes among the Polish community, and at the same time initiated the influx of a new wave of wartime and post-war emigration from Poland. As already mentioned, they put the interests of the Polish state first, treating their stay as temporary until the victory over the Soviet Union and the removal of the communist regime ruling Poland. The American structures of the Polish Scouting and Guiding Association (ZHP), established in the early 1950s, also operated in this spirit, carrying out the Polish independence mission and popularizing national culture among the émigré community. Their leadership, like the rest of the post-war Polish diaspora in the USA, recognized themselves as the political and ideological representation of the Polish state in the United States.

Scouting work was not easy, given the materialization of American society, the numerical superiority of the old émigrés, their considerable degree of assimilation into the American environment and the relatively rapid rate of Americanization of the second generation of wartime and post-war émigrés. For while the Poles born in Poland still remembered Poland and considered it natural to spread the independence mission in its interests, the next generation, i.e. the generation of their children born on American soil – generally speaking – no longer had such a conviction. For them, the United States was the first homeland to which they owed loyalty, all the more so because the status of citizen of the world's greatest superpower was extremely attractive. Thus, the process of assimilation of the representatives of the post-war emigration was also taking place, albeit without the transition of an ethnic group within American society.[36]

Hence, already in the 1970s, older instructors complained about the weak interest of their younger successors in the leadership of ZHP USA structures in the Polish patriotic programme. In turn, this younger cadre of instructors, living in the American environment on a daily basis, felt strongly attached to their American homeland and therefore sometimes expressed doubts about the advisability of putting the imaginary homeland – Poland – in the forefront of the scouts' everyday educational work. In the end, apparently under pressure from the older generation of instructors and the chief authorities of ZHP, who proposed a model of bicultural integration of the members of their organization, i.e. acceptance of both Polish culture and the country of settlement (similarly to the interests of Poland and the USA), there was no change to the wording of the Scout Promise, however, the problem of national and cultural self-identification of the members and educators of the scouting organization surfaced from time to time in the following decades of the functioning of scouting abroad. An important turning point in this respect was the restoration of a sovereign Polish state after the fall of communism in 1989, which automatically meant the end of the independence mission of political emigration, including

36 Paleczny, *Ewolucja ideologii*, 229–42.

ZHP operating outside Poland. The female and male instructors, themselves already integrated into American society and the old Polish community, were then looking for a new ideological and programmatic model, debating, among other things, the issue of the proportion of Polishness, i.e. Polish history and culture and scouting in educational programs, and especially the question of whether they should raise scouts to be American Poles or Americans of Polish origin.[37]

Undoubtedly, the activities of post-war scouting have left a lasting mark in the United States. Among other things, it contributed to slowing down the rate of assimilation of American Poles into the culture of their country of settlement and formed many outstanding social activists, such as leaders at various levels in the KPA structures. Nevertheless, despite its evident successes, the effects of these efforts were undermined by the relatively small size of the scouting organization compared to the number of children and adolescents whose families expressed interest in Polish culture and the relatively high average age of its members. Most importantly, the end of emigration from Poland to the USA at the end of the 1990s has resulted in a noticeable acceleration of assimilation processes in the local Polish community, including the scouting movement, in the 21st century, e.g. in terms of departing from the Polish language in everyday life.

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37 *Znicz. Wiadomości Harcerskie* (USA), no. 34 (1991): 8–9.

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A "Clash of Definitions"? Polish Émigré Scholars and the Cold War Discourse of Western Civilization

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Abstract: In the course of the twentieth century, the idea of "the West" as a community of shared cultural values acquired fundamental importance in international politics. What constitutes the identity of this community and how exactly its geographical scope should be defined has often been a matter of debate. This article examines how Polish scholars, who spent part of their academic careers in Cold War America and opposed the communist regime in their homeland, participated in such debates and how they imagined the relationship between Poland and "the West". Focusing on three individual cases representing different generations of the émigré community, the article shows to what extent Polish émigré scholars' ideas about the identity of "the West" were compatible with contemporary American discourse, how they were related to concepts of "modernization," and how they evolved in the context of generational change.

Keywords: Polish exile, Cold War, civilization discourse, modernization theory, postcolonialism

More than three decades after the end of the Cold War, the idea of "the West" as a distinct civilizational entity remains a central means of mentally mapping the political world – be it as an element of positive self-identification with "Western values" or, as in the case of the recent Russian concept of "the collective West,"[1] as an element of cultural othering. Historians of "the West" as a political concept have emphasized that this duality can be traced back to its origins: Already in the nineteenth century, the emergence of a French and German discourse that associated "the West" with liberalism and modernity was closely linked to the rise of a Russian self-image as "non-Western" in the context of the debate between Slavophiles and Westernizers.[2] A conceptual history of "the West" must therefore take into account the transnational dimension of Occidentalist discourses.[3]

1 This term has become widespread in Russian media since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Cf. Natalia Bogatyreva, "Enemies Inside and Out: How Russians Believe Conspiracy Theories," *Zeitschrift für Psychologie* 232, no. 1 (2024): 42.

2 Cf. Riccardo Bavaj, "'The West': A Conceptual Exploration," European History Online (EGO), November 21, 2011, accessed August 23, 2024, https://www.ieg-ego.eu/bavajr-2011-en.

3 Cf. also Jasper M. Trautsch, "'Der Westen': Theoretisch-methodische Überlegungen zu einer Begriffsgeschichte," *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte*, no. 60/61 (2018/2019), 434–40.

In analyzing such discourses historically, it is crucial to consider how ideas about the identity of "the West" have changed over time. In his influential critique of Samuel P. Huntington's concept of a "clash of civilizations,"[4] Edward W. Said has argued that instead of conceptualizing civilizations as homogeneous and antagonistic cultural entities, scholars should recognize that cultures had developed in constant exchange with one another and that they had always been pluralistic and dynamic in themselves. In particular, the question of what constituted the identity of "Western civilization" had been answered differently at different times, and it had often been the subject of debate. The real problem, therefore, was not a "clash of civilizations" but a conflict over how to define the identity of particular cultures – a "clash of definitions."[5]

This article examines how Polish émigré scholars in the United States became involved in Cold War debates about the identity of "the West," how they sought to shape American imaginaries of this civilizational entity, and how they conceptualized the relationship between their home country and "the West." The case of Polish attitudes toward "the West" is particularly interesting because of what can be described as a history of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion.[6] On the one hand, Poland has often been portrayed as a defender and disseminator of "Western values," be it Western Christianity, democracy and the rule of law, or the free market and property rights – especially in the context of its centuries-old geopolitical antagonism with Russia.[7] On the other hand, Poland has often found itself excluded from the community of "the West" – either physically, as during the Cold War, or discursively, as in times when "the West" was primarily associated with modernity and Poland was considered too "backward" to be "Western." With regard to the nineteenth century, historian Jerzy Jedlicki has shown that also within the Polish discourse, attitudes toward "the West" were closely linked to perspectives on modernity: While Polish liberals had conceptualized "the West" as a model of social development that could help Poland overcome its perceived "backwardness," conservative adherents of Romantic nationalism had constructed pre-partition Poland as the epitome

4 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

5 Edward W. Said, "The Clash of Definitions," in Said, *Reflections on Exile and Other Essays* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 569–90.

6 In this respect, the relationship between Poland and "the West" can be compared to that between "Eastern Europe" and "Europe." Cf. on the latter Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), 7.

7 Cf., for instance, Andrzej Sulima Kamiński, *Republic vs. Autocracy: Poland-Lithuania and Russia, 1686–1697* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); Andrzej Nowak, *Polska i Rosja: Sąsiedztwo wolności i despotyzmu X–XXI w.* (Kraków: Biały Kruk, 2022). For a historiographical analysis of this discourse cf. Andrew Kier Wise, "Russia as Poland's Civilizational 'Other'," in *The East–West Discourse: Symbolic Geography and its Consequences*, ed. Alexander Maxwell (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2011), 73–92.

of a "truly" Western culture, distinct from the allegedly degenerate industrial civilization of late nineteenth-century Western Europe.[8]

Focusing on three scholars representing different generations of the Cold War Polish émigré community – historians Oskar Halecki (1891–1973) and Piotr Wandycz (1923–2017), and Slavist Ewa Thompson (*1937) – I show how Polish imaginaries of "the West" have evolved since 1945 and how these imaginaries have been linked to shifting discourses of "modernity." While previous scholarship has told the story of changing imaginaries of "the West" among Polish émigrés as a story of idealization and disenchantment,[9] I argue that examining the ideas of scholars who sought to engage with debates in their host society reveals two paradigmatic shifts in Polish Occidentalist discourse: from an early Cold War anticommunist vision that still contained traces of interwar antimodernism, to a paradigm that associated "the West" with an affirmative understanding of "modernity," and finally to an increasingly critical perspective on "modernization" as an allegedly hegemonic concept in the context of postcolonial theories during the late Cold War and early post-Cold War period.

These paradigmatic shifts are characteristic of discourses in many Western countries and reflect the rise and fall of modernization theory during the Cold War.[10] However, as I will show below, the fact that Polish émigré scholars in the United States did not always make these shifts in synchrony with their host society did at times lead to "clashes of definition" regarding the conceptualization of "the West."

"The West" as a Community of Timeless Spiritual Values: Oskar Halecki

Oskar Halecki is commonly known as the originator of the concept of "East Central Europe" as a distinct historical region. Many aspects of his life and work have been thoroughly researched: we know that his multiethnic ancestry, which linked him to the history of two European empires that were crucial for the historical genesis of "East Central Europe" – the Habsburg Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth – as well as

8 Cf. Jerzy Jedlicki, "A Stereotype of the West in Postpartition Poland," *Social Research* 59, no. 2 (1992): 345–64; in more detail also: Jedlicki, *A Suburb of Europe: Nineteenth-Century Polish Approaches to Western Civilization* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999).

9 Cf. Łukasz Mikołajewski, *Disenchanted Europeans: Polish Émigré Writers from* Kultura *and the Postwar Reformulations of the West* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2018).

10 Cf. on the latter: Nils Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007).

his Catholic faith provided an important background for his historiographical work.[11] It has also been shown how, during the interwar period, Halecki developed a vision of a multiethnic, federalist Poland that would build on the tradition of the Jagiellonian dynasty in pursuing an alleged civilizing mission towards the East, and how, already at that time, he sought to promote internationally the idea that Poland had always had close ties with the Western world.[12] Finally, it is known that after emigrating to France in 1939 and then to the United States in 1940, Halecki played a crucial role in organizing the activities of Polish émigré scholars, and that he tried to popularize the idea that the region of "East Central Europe" constituted the "Borderlands of Western Civilization."[13] But what shaped Halecki's understanding of "Western civilization"?[14] How was it related to his perspective on "modernity," and how was it influenced by his own transcultural experience, especially his perception of American culture?

During Halecki's studies at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków, then part of the Habsburg Empire, one of his most influential lecturers was Wacław Sobieski. Sobieski advocated an "optimistic" view of Polish national history, according to which affirmative interpretations should strengthen the national consciousness of Poles and encourage them in their struggle for national independence.[15] In an obituary for his teacher, Halecki later emphasized that this patriotic approach to historiography did not amount to nationalistic parochialism: "Ardent patriotism never narrowed the horizons of this thoroughly national historian. On the contrary, he was one of those rare Polish historiographers who, even before the war, recognized the need to link Polish history organically to universal history [...]."[16] As evidence, Halecki cited, among other publications, an

11 Cf., for instance, Grzegorz Ryś, "Chrześcijaństwo jako klucz interpretacyjny historiozofii Oskara Haleckiego," in *Oskar Halecki i jego wizja Europy*, Vol. 1, ed. Małgorzata Dąbrowska (Warsaw, Łódź: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2012), 9–15; Christoph Augustynowicz, "Wiedeńska genealogia Oskara Haleckiego," in *Oskar Halecki i jego wizja Europy*, Vol. 2, ed. Małgorzata Dąbrowska (Warsaw, Łódź: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2014), 15–20.

12 Cf., among other publications, Krzysztof Baczkowski, "Oskara Haleckiego jagiellońska wizja dziejów," in *Oskar Halecki*, Vol. 1, 56–77; Marek Kornat, "Profesor Oskar Halecki w życiu politycznym Polski i na forum międzynarodowym," in *Oskar Halecki i jego wizja Europy*, Vol. 3, ed. Małgorzata Dąbrowska (Warsaw, Łódź: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2014), 232–88.

13 Cf. Oskar Halecki, *Borderlands of Western Civilization: A History of East Central Europe* (New York: Ronald Press, 1952). For an overview of Halecki's scholarly activities in the United States cf.: Rafał Stobiecki, *Klio za wielką wodą: Polscy historycy w Stanach Zjednoczonych po 1945 r.* (Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej, 2017), 135–169.

14 A first step towards answering this question was made by Rafał Stobiecki, "Oskar Halecki jako historyk cywilizacji?," in *Oskar Halecki*, Vol. 2, 124–44.

15 Cf. Hans-Jürgen Bömelburg, "Zwischen imperialer Geschichte und Ostmitteleuropa als Geschichtsregion: Oskar Halecki und die polnische 'jagiellonische Idee'," in *Vergangene Größe und Ohnmacht in Ostmitteleuropa: Repräsentationen imperialer Erfahrung in der Historiographie seit 1918*, eds. Frank Hadler and Mathias Mesenhöller (Leipzig: Akademische Verlagsanstalt, 2007), 104.

16 Oskar Halecki, "Wacław Sobieski," *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, no. 49 (1935): 483.

essay on the role of Tadeusz Kościuszko and Kazimierz Pułaski in the American War of Independence, subtitled "Uniting the Ideals of Poland and America," which Sobieski had published in 1918 – the year in which Woodrow Wilson outlined his Fourteen Points, which included the restoration of an independent Polish state.[17] In this essay, Sobieski argued that there were broad similarities between the political systems of the early United States and the late Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: both were based on the principles of federalism and the decentralization of power, and just as the Americans had defended these principles against the British king, the Poles had attempted to do so against the absolutist monarchs of Russia and Prussia. Their defeat and the partitions of Poland had marked the moment when Europe had taken a different historical path than America.[18]

This positive view of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as a fundamentally Western system became a cornerstone of Halecki's thinking during the interwar period, and he soon advocated the idea that the Second Polish Republic should follow in its footsteps. In 1920, at the height of the Polish-Soviet War, he argued that Poland's eastern border of 1772 should be restored because "to renounce the land for which our ancestors died in countless wars and uprisings would offend our most sacred national feelings."[19] In Halecki's eyes, the creation of a federation encompassing the territories inhabited by Poles, Lithuanians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians would not only satisfy Poland's "historical rights," but would also be the best way to implement Wilson's principle of national self-determination. A federal state structure would be useful in winning the support of the Western Allies.[20]

The outcome of the Polish-Soviet War left no room for the realization of federalist ideas. While Halecki did not openly criticize the drawing of Poland's new eastern border and the policies toward national minorities in the Second Polish Republic, he remained loyal to his "Jagiellonian Idea" as an abstract ideal of Polish statehood: he continued to believe that the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had acted as a bulwark against the "Muscovite-Tatar-Turkish East" and that it had "extraordinarily extended the reach of the Latin civilization of the West."[21] As can be seen from these quotes, Halecki's interwar understanding of "Western civilization" was not tied to a vision of "modernization" but

17 Cf. ibid., 486.

18 Cf. Wacław Sobieski, "Kościuszko i Pułaski w Ameryce. (Zjednoczenie ideałów Polski i Ameryki)," in *Polska w kulturze powszechnej. Część I: Ogólna*, ed. Feliks Koneczny (Kraków: Krakowska Ekspozytura Biura Patronatu dla Spółek Oszczędności i Pożyczek, 1918), 92.

19 Oskar Halecki, "Granica z r. 1772 a nasz program obecny," *Wschód Polski* 1, no. 4 (1920): 2.

20 Cf. ibid., 9. For two opinions of Ukrainian historians on Halecki's federalist ideas cf. Oleksandr Avramchuk, "Między ideą jagiellońską a Międzymorzem: Ewolucja kwestii ukraińskiej w poglądach politycznych Oskara Haleckiego (1891–1973)," *Klio Polska* 9, (2017): 57–79; Gennadii Korolov, "'Dwie Europy Środkowe' Oskara Haleckiego w 'cieniu imperializmów'," *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 124, no. 4 (2017): 677–98.

21 Oskar Halecki, "Idea jagiellońska," *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 51, (1937): 509.

referred to a pre-modern state of European culture that should serve as a model for the present. He also explicitly subscribed to an anti-modernist discourse that was prevalent in many European countries at the time, although he did not identify with its radical political manifestations: reviewing a book by the Swiss traditionalist thinker Gonzague de Reynold for the daily *Kurjer Warszawski* in May 1934, Halecki agreed with Reynold's interpretation of modern European history as a history of decline and argued that the "anthropocentrism" of the "so-called modern world" should be replaced by a revival of medieval "theocentrism." Unlike Reynold, however, Halecki did not claim that movements such as Italian Fascism or German Nazism could be useful in achieving this goal.[22]

After emigrating to the United States during World War II, Halecki was not one of those émigrés who believed that Polish intellectual traditions should be substantially reassessed in light of the global political changes of the war and early postwar period. He remained faithful to his "optimistic" view of the history of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and insisted that the ethnically mixed eastern borderlands annexed by the Soviet Union should be returned to Poland.[23] He also adhered to an understanding of "Western civilization" that emphasized long historical continuities, as can be seen in his influential book *The Limits and Divisions of European History*.[24] An important point of reference for him was the approach of Arnold J. Toynbee, who had achieved international fame as the author of the twelve-volume *A Study of History* – especially in the United States, where he was generally regarded as the greatest living historian.[25] Halecki and Toynbee had known each other since the interwar period and kept in touch after the former's emigration to America.[26] They agreed that nation-states were an inadequate framework for historiography because they were part of larger cultural entities – civilizations, which Toynbee conceived as an "intelligible field of study."[27] But while Toynbee had studied the emergence, growth, and collapse of civilizations in a comparative way, Halecki favored the study of individual cases and focused on Europe, which he portrayed as exceptional because of its high cultural diversity in a small territory.[28]

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22 Cf. idem, "U podstaw kryzysu," *Kurjer Warszawski*, 27 May 1934, 8–10.

23 Cf. for instance Oskar Halecki, "Mit linii Curzona," *Instytut Józefa Piłsudskiego w Ameryce: Biuletyn* 16, no. 2 (1959). Cf. also Avramchuk, "Między ideą jagiellońską a Międzymorzem," 77.

24 Oskar Halecki, *The Limits and Divisions of European History* (London, New York: Sheed & Ward, 1950).

25 Cf. Jürgen Osterhammel, "Arnold Toynbee and the Problems of Today," *Bulletin of the German Historical Institute Washington* 60, (2017): 70.

26 Cf. the correspondence between Halecki and Toynbee in the PIASA Archives, Fonds No. 17: Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences of America, f. 146.

27 Cf. on this aspect Paul Costello, *World Historians and Their Goals: Twentieth-Century Answers to Modernism* (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1993), 78.

28 "Whatever is colossal and uniform is definitely un-European, and that is the secret of all the refinement and distinction of European civilization." Halecki, *The Limits and Divisions*, 12.

Halecki also argued that Europe should not simply be equated with "the West," as this would imply a conceptual marginalization of the eastern half of the continent. Instead, he offered a historical framework according to which a Mediterranean (Greco-Roman), a European and an Atlantic civilization were "affiliated" to each other – a term that he borrowed from Toynbee.[29] Rejecting the traditional periodization of ancient, medieval, and modern history, Halecki argued that the Mediterranean civilization had not collapsed in 476, but had been replaced by the European civilization around the year 1000, when most of Northern and Eastern Europe had been Christianized. For him, it was legitimate to regard European civilization as essentially Christian. The thirteenth century, with its supposed harmony between Christian and humanist traditions, had been the greatest epoch in European history, while the process of secularization had meant the decline of European civilization. In the first half of the twentieth century, the "European age" had finally come to an end.[30]

Despite this critical perspective on European modernity, Halecki did not indulge in the cultural pessimism that Oswald Spengler had expressed three decades earlier in *The Decline of the West*.[31] Instead, he expressed hope that the emerging Atlantic civilization would be even more closely "affiliated" to the European civilization than the latter had been to the ancient Mediterranean civilization, and that the heritage of European culture would survive in the New World.[32] In line with what Sobieski had written earlier, Halecki described America as a continuation of European civilization:

> It is no exaggeration to call the Western hemisphere, as a whole, a New Europe [...]. For the entire heritage of European culture, which included its well-preserved heritage of Mediterranean, Greco-Roman civilization and the whole Christian tradition in the form of all the different denominations, was brought to the other side of the Atlantic.[33]

Since the new Atlantic community was based on the same – Christian – values as the older European one, the countries of East Central Europe would continue to act as a "bulwark" of Western civilization if they were liberated from Soviet rule.[34]

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29 Cf. Stobiecki, "Oskar Halecki jako historyk cywilizacji?," 134.

30 Cf. Halecki, *The Limits and Divisions*, 45–61; Stobiecki, "Oskar Halecki jako historyk cywilizacji?," 136.

31 Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, 2 Vols. (New York: Knopf, 1947). For the original edition cf. idem, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes: Umrisse einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte*. 2 Vols. (Vienna: Braumüller, 1918–1922).

32 Cf. also Małgorzata Morawiec, "Oskar Halecki (1891–1973)," in *Europa-Historiker: Ein biographisches Handbuch*, Vol. 1, eds. Heinz Duchhardt et al. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), 236.

33 Halecki, *The Limits and Divisions*, 55.

34 In his 1952 book *Borderlands of Western Civilization*, Halecki stated explicitly that the countries of East Central Europe were "more eager than ever before to join that world [the Western world, K.J.W.] in the

This conceptualization of "the West" was not entirely foreign to the contemporary American environment. Early American notions of an Atlantic community often drew on shared Christian values as a unifying principle.[35] However, Halecki had to acknowledge that influential participants in the American discourse on the identity of "the West" expressed ideas that differed from his own. A leading proponent of such a different conceptualization of "the West" was the historian William H. McNeill. In 1963, McNeill published *The Rise of the West*, which quickly became a best-seller in the United States as an optimistic counterpoint to Spengler's *The Decline of the West*.[36] While he also referred to Toynbee's idea of civilizations, he rejected its metaphysical implications[37] and shifted his methodological focus from historical comparison to the analysis of the diffusion of techniques and ideas across civilizations. In his view, the rise of "the West" had begun around 1500, when Europeans began discovering distant regions of the world and adopting technological innovations from other civilizations. He argued that the ability to transform itself had become a cornerstone of "the West's" superiority, and that "an accelerating pace of technical and social change bids fair to remain a persistent feature of Western civilization."[38]

This emphasis on change and innovation was hardly compatible with Halecki's belief in timeless Christian values, and McNeill's interest in the exchanges between civilizations contrasted with the former's rhetoric of "bulwark." When McNeill turned his attention to what Halecki had called "East Central Europe," the clash of definitions became clear: in his 1964 book, *Europe's Steppe Frontier*, McNeill explored how the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires had managed, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, to establish hegemony over the territory between them. He argued that these empires had been able to organize power more efficiently than their local competitors, especially Poland and Hungary with their self-assertive nobility. Disappointed that a prominent

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spirit of their own democratic tradition and cultural heritage" and "could be a stronghold of peace at the very frontier of Western civilization." Cf. idem, *Borderlands of Western Civilization*, 474, 515.

35 Cf. Emiliano Alessandri, "The Atlantic Community as Christendom: Some Reflections on Christian Atlanticism in America, circa 1900–1950," in *Defining the Atlantic Community: Culture, Intellectuals, and Policies in the Mid-Twentieth Century*, ed. Marco Mariano (New York, London: Routledge, 2010), 47–70; Giuliana Chamedes, "Transatlantic Catholicism and the Making of the 'Christian West'," in *The TransAtlantic Reconsidered: The Atlantic World in Crisis*, eds. Charlotte A. Lerg, Susanne Lachenicht, and Michael Kimmage (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2018), 139–55.

36 McNeill had read Spengler's book in 1936. Cf. Costello, *World Historians*, 189.

37 In 1961, McNeill wrote that he was "disturbed by some of Toynbee's mythological and theological language." William H. McNeill, "Some Basic Assumptions of Toynbee's *A Study of History*," in *The Intent of Toynbee's History: A Cooperative Appraisal*, ed. Edward T. Gargan (Chicago, IL: Loyola University Press, 1961), 45.

38 William H. McNeill, *The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community. With a Retrospective Essay* (Chicago, IL, London: University of Chicago Press, 1991) [first edition: 1963], 567.

American historian had interpreted as a "victory of bureaucratic empire"[39] what appeared to him to be a victory of despotism over freedom, Halecki reviewed the book for the émigré weekly *Wiadomości*, noting that "one may doubt whether such interpretations, even when they appear under the pen of distinguished American historians, are in keeping with the liberal traditions of Washington's and Wilson's United States."[40]

By the 1960s, Halecki had to acknowledge that postwar American culture was gradually distancing itself from the European spiritual heritage that he regarded as the foundation of the Atlantic community and that he wanted to be preserved. As he expressed in his 1963 book *The Millennium of Europe*, he saw "materialism" as a major threat to the Western world:

> It is particularly instructive to observe that the frequent criticisms of the Orientals, who blame the West for the materialistic features of its culture, is directed against Europeans no less than against the Americans. This is for both of them a serious warning to revitalize the spiritual elements of their heritage, if they want it to survive and not to be submerged by the machine age.[41]

But this perspective found little support in an intellectual environment that saw social change and technological innovation as essential features of "the West's".

"The West" as Center of Political, Social and Cultural Innovations: Piotr Wandycz

While the first generation of Polish émigré scholars, members of the intellectual elite of the Second Polish Republic, often saw it as their duty to preserve the scholarly heritage of the interwar period, a younger generation was more willing to acculturate into their host society. Historian Piotr Wandycz can be considered a typical representative of this second generation.[42] Born in Kraków and educated in Lwów, he emigrated with his parents at the outbreak of World War II (via Romania) to France, where he began studying history at the University of Grenoble before joining the Polish Armed Forces in"the West's" in 1942. After the war, he continued his studies at the University of Cambridge and the London School of Economics and Political Science. Focusing on the history of international relations and political ideas, Wandycz adopted the stance of

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39 Cf. idem, *Europe's Steppe Frontier, 1500–1800* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 125–80.

40 Oskar Halecki, "Amerykańska interpretacja europejskich 'dzikich pól'," *Wiadomości*, May 16, 1965, 3.

41 Halecki, *The Millennium of Europe* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1963), 382.

42 Cf. Andrzej Nowak, "Emigracja 'drugiego pokolenia': Refleksje i pytania na marginesie biografii Piotra Wandycza i Leopolda Łabędzia," *Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej* 50, no. 1 (2015): 103–17.

a sober empiricist, skeptical of grand narratives and historical determinism.[43] Politically, he identified with British liberalism.[44] In 1951 he received his doctorate with a thesis on "Liberal Internationalism: The Contribution of British and French Liberal Thought to the Theory of International Relations" and moved to the United States, where his father had lived since 1944.[45]

Upon his arrival in New York, Wandycz soon became acquainted with Halecki. Their relationship was cordial, but not entirely free of disagreements. On the one hand, Wandycz appreciated Halecki's efforts to popularize the concept of East-Central Europe in American scholarship. He himself was active in Polish émigré organizations that promoted a federalist organization of the region, such as the movement "Independence and Democracy" (*Niepodległość i Demokracja*, *NiD*)[46] and the Union of Polish Federalists (*Związek Polskich Federalistów*). Halecki was the patron of the latter.[47] In his scholarly work, Wandycz soon adopted Halecki's concept of East-Central Europe, criticizing the region's marginal role in American scholarship and historical education.[48]

On the other hand, Wandycz was well aware that Halecki's historical thinking was out of touch with contemporary American debates. In a 1975 obituary, he wrote that Halecki had "not adapted to the style of American scholars" and had "not been particularly popular in the American historical world."[49] In his correspondence with Jerzy Giedroyc, the editor of the émigré magazine *Kultura*, Wandycz explicitly wrote that Halecki's highly affirmative perspective on Polish history had been the main reason for his limited impact on American scholarship: Halecki and other émigrés of the older generation were "considered Polish propagandists in the (Anglo-Saxon) West, and from our point of view they gloss over significant errors of the past."[50]

While Wandycz remained loyal to Halecki's attempts to introduce a Polish perspective into American historical research, his socialization in British and American academia

43 Cf. Stobiecki, *Klio za wielką wodą*, 246–7.

44 Cf. Piotr S. Wandycz, *O federalizmie i emigracji: Reminiscencje o rzeczach istotnych i błahych. Rozmowy przeprowadził Sławomir Łukasiewicz* (Lublin: Towarzystwo Instytutu Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, 2003), 24.

45 On Wandycz's biography cf., among other publications, Antony Polonsky, "Piotr Wandycz: An Appreciation," in *Ideology, Politics and Diplomacy in East Central Europe*, ed. M.B.B. Biskupski (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2003), xiii–xix; and, more extensively, Stobiecki, *Klio za wielką wodą* (as cited in note 13), 233–67.

46 Cf. on Wandycz's ties with this organization: Wandycz, *O federalizmie i emigracji*, 24–41 and *passim*.

47 Cf. Piotr Wandycz, "Garść wspomnień po latach," in *Oskar Halecki*, Vol. 2, 10.

48 Cf. Wandycz, "The Treatment of East Central Europe in History Textbooks," *The American Slavic and East European Review* 16, no. 4 (1957): 515–23.

49 Wandycz, "O dwóch historykach," *Zeszyty Historyczne* 32, (1975): 63.

50 Letter from Piotr Wandycz to Jerzy Giedroyc, 24 May 1967, in: Archive of the Instytut Literacki "Kultura," correspondence between Jerzy Giedroyc and Piotr Wandycz, f. 1, p. 134.

allowed him to view Polish history with greater analytical distance.[51] This had an impact on the way he portrayed Poland's historical ties with Western, and especially American, culture, as can be seen in his 1980 book *The United States and Poland*. Instead of arguing that the federal democratic system of the United States had much in common with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Wandycz analyzed how the political actors of the late eighteenth century had perceived each other. He found that American leaders such as Thomas Jefferson, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison had viewed Poland as an example of how a democratic federation should not be organized, because it lacked political efficiency and defensibility, and that they had taken little notice of contemporary Polish reform efforts.[52] On the other hand, Polish reformers and conservatives alike had invoked the example of the United States in their debates about the future political organization of their country, which resulted in the Constitution of May 3, 1791.[53] In Wandycz's account, it was political innovation, as exemplified by this enlightened constitutionalism, rather than a timeless spiritual heritage, that bound Poland to the Western world.

This shift in understanding of what constitutes the identity of "the West" also had implications for Wandycz's conceptualization of East-Central Europe. As he noted in his 1992 book *The Price of Freedom*, which he dedicated to Halecki and the British historian Hugh Seton-Watson, the term "Western Europe" is usually associated not with the continent's western fringes – Iceland, Ireland, or Portugal – but with centers of political, social, and cultural innovation, such as Great Britain and France. Finding a purely geographical and cultural terminology inadequate, Wandycz adopted the vocabulary of Immanuel Wallerstein's world-systems theory, which distinguishes a dominant core, a dependent periphery, and an intermediate semi-periphery. He argued that East-Central Europe, along with a few countries geographically located in Western Europe, such as Spain and Portugal, constituted the continent's semi-periphery.[54] He noted that the region had suffered from relative economic backwardness compared to Western Europe. However, he also emphasized that "it would be a mistake to see the Czecho-Polish-Hungarian area

51 The epistemic benefits that Wandycz drew from his position between two cultures are also emphasized by Stobiecki, *Klio za wielką wodą*, 251.

52 Cf. Piotr S. Wandycz, *The United States and Poland* (Cambridge, MA, London: Harvard University Press, 1980), 34–5.

53 Ibid., 43, 46.

54 Cf. Piotr S. Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom: A History of East Central Europe from the Middle Ages to the Present* (London, New York: Routledge, 1992), 3–4; It is noteworthy that Wandycz did not refer directly to Wallerstein at this point, but to a variant of his model developed by Hungarian scholars. Cf. also: Rafał Stobiecki, "Europa Środkowo-Wschodnia w myśli historycznej Piotra Wandycza," in *Piotr Wandycz. Historyk, emigrant, intelektualista*, eds. Marek Kornat, Sławomir M. Nowinowski, and Rafał Stobiecki (Bydgoszcz: Oficyna Wydawnicza Epigram, 2014), 23.

as a passive member of the European community, always a taker, never a giver."[55] On the contrary, significant innovations in the spiritual and political fields had originated in the region, and East-Central Europe had at times resembled "a laboratory in which various systems are being tested."[56] From this perspective, the fact that Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia (or Bohemia, in earlier times) had participated in all the major upheavals of European history – such as the Renaissance, the Reformation, or the Industrial Revolution – made them an integral part of "the West." At the same time, Wandycz acknowledged the existence of "orientalizing" elements that at certain times had made the countries of East-Central Europe resistant to innovations from "the West's", such as Polish "Sarmatism" – the political ideology of seventeenth-century Polish nobles who traced their origins to the ancient Iranian people of the Sarmatians, regarded the system of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as perfect, and opposed any attempts at political reform. Wandycz left no doubt as to how he judged these elements. He wrote that "Sarmatian xenophobia combined with parochialism and opposition to change" and that by the early eighteenth century the Polish nobility "was not only losing civic virtues, but [...] was growing ever more bigoted and intolerant."[57] As an émigré who had successfully assimilated into the culture of his Western host society, Wandycz had developed a skeptical attitude toward those forces in his homeland that had staunchly resisted processes of modernization – which, from this point of view, also implied "Westernization."

Not surprisingly, Wandycz's impact on the American discourse surpassed that of Halecki. While Halecki was most popular among fellow émigrés and circles of Catholic intellectuals, Wandycz soon joined the elite of American academia, becoming a full professor at Yale University in 1968. Nevertheless, he formulated his conception of East-Central Europe as part of the liberal, innovative West at a time when such an understanding of "Western civilization," which would have been fully compatible with McNeill's ideas of the 1960s, had already passed its zenith. Meanwhile, a heightened awareness of ecological issues was challenging the affirmative concept of progress; critical engagement with racism and colonialism was undermining the belief in Western moral superiority; and the rise of social constructivism was challenging traditional modes of historical inquiry. Wandycz did not participate in these shifts and tended to see them as limiting the attempts of Polish émigrés to influence American debates. In his preface to the second edition of *The Price of Freedom*, published in 2001, Wandycz expressed skepticism about "the tendency to treat all these terms [such as the term East-Central Europe, K.J.W.] as artificial concepts which exist only in the minds of those who apply them." He explicitly

55 Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom*, 5.
56 Ibid., 10.
57 Ibid., 89, 113.

referred to Benedict Anderson's conceptualization of nations as "imagined communities" and Larry Wolff's study of how Eastern Europe had been "invented" in the Age of Enlightenment.[58] Wandycz remarked: "All these discussions, however intellectually stimulating they are, have not altered the basic approach adopted in this book."[59] One might conclude that his role at the end of his career was not so different from the one Halecki had played several decades earlier – while the latter had sought to defend an understanding of Western civilization derived from late medieval Christian faith against the challenge of twentieth-century modernity, Wandycz, at the dawn of a postmodern era, adhered to an affirmative imagination of Western modernity.

"The West" as Poland's "Surrogate Hegemon": Ewa Thompson

While Wandycz remained skeptical of postmodernism and continued to associate the identity of "the West" with liberal ideas of progress, another Polish-American scholar developed a decidedly conservative understanding of cultural identity by selectively drawing on specific elements of postmodernist thought.[60] Slavist Ewa Thompson, who was initially educated in the People's Republic of Poland and became part of the Cold War émigré community after moving to the United States in the late 1960s, is best known today for interpreting Polish culture from a postcolonial perspective. Her main thesis, as elaborated in the monograph *Imperial Knowledge*[61] and numerous articles,[62] is that various historical forms of Russian domination over Poland, including Soviet domination over the People's Republic of Poland, can be characterized as colonial. Thompson acknowledges that there are differences between the case of Polish subordination to Russia and the maritime colonialism of Western European imperial powers; for example, the Polish territories of the Tsarist Empire were economically more developed than the Russian imperial core, which contradicts the idea of a colonial "civilizing mission," and the

58 Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983); Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe*, 7.

59 Piotr S. Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom: A History of East Central Europe from the Middle Ages to the Present* (London, New York: Routledge, 2001), xii.

60 While Thompson embraces postcolonial theory, she nonetheless rejects other elements of postmodernism, in particular anti-essentialism. Cf. Ewa M. Thompson, "Ways Out of the Postmodern Discourse," *Modern Age* 45, no. 3 (2003): 195–207.

61 Thompson, *Imperial Knowledge: Russian Literature and Colonialism* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000).

62 Cf., for instance, Thompson, "It Is Colonialism after All: Some Epistemological Remarks," *Teksty Drugie, Special Issue – English Edition*, no. 1 (2014): 67–81.

People's Republic of Poland was formally an independent state governed by Polish authorities, not Soviet colonial masters. However, Thompson defends the use of the term "colonialism" because it signified "the subjugation of both territory and people whose national consciousness is either already developed or is still developing under colonial domination, political and economic exploitation of a given territory, as well as hindering or even halting development"[63] – criteria that she believes were met in the Polish case.

For Thompson, this postcolonial interpretation of Polish culture has implications not only for understanding Poland's history, but also for its present. She describes the elites of post-communist Poland as suffering from a "colonial mentality"[64]: accustomed to a culturally subordinate status, they tried to imitate Western models and constantly sought the approval of Western opinion leaders. "The West" had thus replaced the Soviet Union as Poland's source of cultural models – it had acquired the status of a "surrogate hegemon" (*hegemon zastępczy*).[65] To overcome their desire for subordination, Polish elites should instead try to cultivate their native cultural traditions. According to Thompson, the "Sarmatism" of early modern Polish nobles, who proudly celebrated their own way of life rather than seeing Western cultural habits as superior, could serve as an inspiration for the present.[66]

Many critics have pointed out inconsistencies in Thompson's application of postcolonial theory to the Polish case.[67] Perhaps most persuasively, Stanley Bill has argued that Thompson's explicitly essentialist vision of an "authentic" Polish culture is based on false premises – since virtually all cultures have developed in exchange with the outside world, cultural hybridity should be considered the rule rather than the exception. In particular, the culture of the late Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which Thompson regards as the epitome of Polish cultural authenticity, was – despite its partial self-orientalization in

63 Ibid., 69.

64 Ewa M. Thompson, "W kolejce po aprobatę: Kolonialna mentalność polskich elit," November 5, 2007, accessed August 21, 2024, https://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/wydarzenia/artykuly/59821,w-kolejce-po-aprobate.html.

65 Cf. Thompson, "Postkolonialne refleksje: Na marginesie pracy zbiorowej 'From Sovietology to Postcoloniality: Poland and Ukraine from a Postcolonial Perspective' pod redakcją Janusza Korka," *Porównania* 5, (2008): 113–25.

66 Cf. Thompson, "Sarmatism, or the Secrets of Polish Essentialism," in *Being Poland: A New History of Polish Literature and Culture since 1918*, eds. Tamara Trojanowska, Joanna Niżyńska, and Przemysław Czapliński (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2018), 3–29. Thompson also served as longtime editor of the Texas-based journal *The Sarmatian Review*.

67 Cf., for instance, Dorota Kołodziejczyk, "Postkolonialny transfer na Europę Środkowo-Wschodnią," *Teksty Drugie*, no. 5 (2010): 22–39; Grażyna Borkowska, "Perspektywa postkolonialna na gruncie polskim – pytania sceptyka," *Teksty Drugie*, no. 5 (2010): 40–52; Tomasz Zarycki, *Ideologies of Eastness in Central and Eastern Europe* (London, New York: Routledge, 2014), 93–100; Marta Cobel-Tokarska, "Problems and Contradictions in Polish Postcolonial Thought in Relation to Central and Eastern Europe," *Postcolonial Studies* 24, no. 1 (2021): 139–58.

the context of "Sarmatism" – highly receptive to influences from Western Europe, such as German law, French poetry, and Italian architecture.[68] Notwithstanding these criticisms, the fact that Thompson's perspective on Polish culture has met with a lively response in Polish intellectual circles indicates a remarkable shift in Polish attitudes toward "the West," especially when compared to earlier interpretations such as those of Halecki and Wandycz. While the latter sought to persuade their American contemporaries that Poland should be considered an integral part of "Western civilization," either defined as an essentially Christian community or as a group of highly dynamic and innovative "modern" nations, Thompson has questioned the universality of Western cultural models. Unlike Wandycz, who criticized Polish deviations from the Western path of historical development, such as early modern "Sarmatism," as instances of bigotry and intolerance, perhaps even as a cause of "backwardness," Thompson argues that contemporary Poland should stop trying to imitate Western models in order to restore its supposedly authentic cultural self. It is noteworthy that these different conceptualizations of Poland's relationship with "the West" were all formulated by Polish émigré scholars in the United States, for whom the need to assimilate to a "Western" culture was not an abstraction but an everyday biographical experience.

Conclusion

As can be seen from the examples of Halecki, Wandycz and Thompson, Polish intellectual imaginations of "the West" underwent two significant paradigmatic shifts in the twentieth century. An early twentieth-century discourse that identified "the West" with timeless Christian values and considered the history of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as evidence of the "Western" character of Polish culture was initially maintained by anticommunist émigré scholars like Halecki. In the 1960s, it lost its plausibility because it proved incompatible with the American discourse that linked "Western" identity to concepts of "modernization." Émigré scholars who, like Wandycz, belonged to a younger generation adopted this affirmative perspective on "Western" modernity: while continuing to argue that Poland was an integral part of "Western civilization" by emphasizing "innovative" phases such as enlightened constitutionalism, they developed a critical attitude towards historical periods when Poland seemed to deviate from the

68 Cf. Stanley Bill, "Seeking the Authentic: Polish Culture and the Nature of Postcolonial Theory," August 12, 2014, accessed August 21, 2024, https://nonsite.org/seeking-the-authentic-polish-culture-and-the-nature-of-postcolonial-theory/.

Western path of modernization. In contrast, Ewa Thompson, who can be considered a member of the third generation of Polish émigrés, has used arguments from postcolonial theory to challenge the idea that Western paths of development can be considered universal. However, Thompson's explicitly essentialist rejection of Polish attempts to "imitate" "the West's" has remained controversial both in Poland and internationally. Taken together, these three cases demonstrate that the highly ambiguous development of Polish conceptualizations of "the West" in the twentieth century cannot be reduced to a linear path from idealization to disenchantment, and that "clashes of definitions" are likely to persist both between and within particular "Western" societies.

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Care for Civilian and Military Refugees in the South of France 1939–1940. Cooperation between the Polish Consulate in Marseille and the Polish Red Cross – Case Study

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Abstract: The aim of this article is to present the care of civilian and military refugees in the years 1939–1940 with the cooperation of the Polish Consulate in Marseille and the Polish Red Cross (PCK). Providing assistance to refugees was one of the key elements of the work carried out by both the Consulate and the PCK. It required considerable flexibility and action on many levels. Until June 1940, most of the care work was carried out by the Consulate. It was only after the defeat of France and the establishment of the PCK delegation in Marseille that responsibilities were divided. The main concern was to raise funds, set up shelters and provide medical care. It would not have been possible to obtain shelters for refugees if it had not been for the cooperation of the Consulate and the PCK with the local authorities. Until June 1940, the attitude of the French authorities towards Polish refugees was more favorable than after the defeat of France. As of September 1940, the Consulate ceased to function and was replaced by the Polish Office (Biuro Polskie), which began cooperating with the PCK delegation in Marseille.

Keywords: Second World War, France, Government in Exile, refugees, Polish Army in France, Poles, Marseille, PCK, Polish Consular Service in France

Introduction

The defeat of Poland in September caused internal chaos not only among the political elite but also among the civilian population. The immediate evacuation of the Polish Government, which was interned in Romania, could not continue its work in France. In view of the situation, a new Government headed by Władysław Sikorski was formed. France, by receiving and providing security for the constituted Polish Government on September 30, 1939, became a place of refuge for Polish citizens.[1] It is worth mentioning

[1] Henryk Batowski, *Polska dyplomacja na obczyźnie 1939–1941* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1991), 55–8; Stanisław Zabiełło, *O rząd i granice. Walka dyplomatyczna o sprawę polską w II wojnie światowej*

that on September 7, 1939, Minister of Foreign Affairs Georges-Étienne Bonnet and Ambassador Juliusz Łukasiewicz signed a financial agreement, which was approved by a decree of September 9, by President of France Albert Lebrun. With this document, Poland was granted funds to cover the costs of running its Embassy and Consulates in France for the duration of the war. By June 30, 1940, Poland received the sum of 20,511,956 French francs.[2]

The French side supported the action of accepting refugees, expecting tangible benefits from the fact that people experienced in the 1939 campaign, as well as specialist cadres, would arrive on their territory. The French Government also envisaged the evacuation of individuals useful to French agriculture and industry, which also resulted in the later impossibility of including a certain group of Poles in the service of the Polish Army.[3]

The Polish Embassy, headed by Feliks Frankowski as chargé d'affaires (he took the place of Ambassador Juliusz Łukasiewicz), cooperated not only with the Consulates, but also with the Prefectures. At that time, the local authorities emphasized their willingness to help Poles. Subsequently, the Ministry of Social Welfare (MOS) provided financial assistance to refugees arriving from the country, as well as to members of military families, until the defeat of France in June 1940. The distribution of funds was regulated at a meeting of the Council of Ministers on March 1, 1940 in the form of regulations specifying the scope of activities and cooperation between the MOS and Government delegates for the care of refugees and representatives of consular authorities.[4]

(Warsaw: PAX, 1986), 32–9; Tadeusz Wyrwa, *Bezdroża dziejów Polski. Kraj i emigracja po 1 września 1939 r.* (Lublin: Norbertinum, 2000), 13–25; Anna Ambrochowicz-Gajownik, *W cieniu Lazurowego Wybrzeża. Konsulat polski w Marsylii 1919–1940* (Warsaw: Neriton, 2019), 168; Małgorzata Gmurczyk-Wrońska, *Polska – niepotrzebny aliant Francji? (Francja wobec Polski w latach 1938–1944)* (Warsaw: Neriton, Instytut Historii PAN, 2003), 186–90; Waldemar Michowicz, "Organizacja polskiego aparatu dyplomatycznego w latach 1918–1939," in *Historia dyplomacji polskiej*, vol. 4, *1918–1939*, ed. Piotr Łossowski (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1995), 27; Anna Pachowicz, *Towarzystwo Opieki nad Polakami we Francji 1941–1944* (Toruń: Oficyna Wydawnicza Kucharski, 2013), 22; Władysław Pobóg-Malinowski, *Z mojego okienka. Fakty i wrażenia z lat 1939–1945*, vol. 1, *1939–1940*, ed. Przemysław Marcin Żukowski (Łomianki: LTW, 2013).

2 Anna Ambrochowicz-Gajownik, "Ośrodki miejskie południowej Francji – miejscem schronienia dla polskich uchodźców w latach 1939–1940," in *Oblicza wojny. Miasto i wojna*, vol. 3, eds. Witold Jarno and Jarosław Kita (Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 2021), 195–208.

3 Gmurczyk-Wrońska, *Polska – niepotrzebny aliant Francji?*, 186–90.

4 Archiwum Akt Nowych (*The Central Archives of Modern Records)* [hereafter: AAN], Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Marseille (hereafter: KRPM), 464/834, KRPM to Ministry of Social Welfare in Angers, Marseille, February 1940, p. 81; Biblioteka Polska w Paryżu (Polish Library in Paris) [hereafter: BPP], Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Toulouse (hereafter: KRPT), 41, Polish Embassy in Paris to Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Toulouse on sending the regulations on the organisation of authorities and bodies for the care of refugees adopted by the Council of Ministers on 1 March 1940, Paris 10 April 1940; *Protokoły z posiedzeń Rady Ministrów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, vol. 1, *październik 1939 – czerwiec 1940*, ed. Wojciech Rojek in cooperate with Andrzej Suchcitz (Kraków: Secesja, 1994), doc. 20a [Proposal of the Ministry of

The defeat of France in June 1940 caused chaos among members of the Polish Government in Exile.[5] It was then that President Władysław Raczkiewicz, at a meeting of the Council of Ministers, took the decision to evacuate the Polish authorities to the British Isles, in effect obtaining an official *droit de résidence* from the British Government.[6] The high Polish authorities arrived in London on June 21, 1940, welcomed by Edward Raczyński, then Polish Ambassador to London, together with King George VI.[7] The evacuation of the Government did not mean the departure of all diplomatic representatives. It was directly related to the need to organize care for the civilian and military population remaining on French soil, and to take steps to evacuate them. Raczkiewicz entrusted this work to Stanisław Kot and General Marian Kukiel.[8] The former was to take charge of the evacuation of civilians, while the latter of the military. The formal provision of care for the refugees was intended to calm the mood among the refugees, where the successes of the German army were causing feelings of anxiety, uncertainty or even panic. Furthermore, those in the Northern departments of France occupied by Germany found themselves in a tragic situation.

As soon as the evacuation of the Government to the British Isles began, the most urgent matter was to take care of the pre-war emigration residing in the occupied and non-occupied zone (Vichy states), as well as the civilian refugees and soldiers who were arriving constantly. Following the occupation of Paris by the Germans and the signing of the Armistice on June 22, 1940, and the acceptance of German terms, it was only a matter of time before the Polish Consulates in France, which operated in the unoccupied zone, were closed down.[9] Before this event took place, however, a meeting of the Council of Ministers on June 17, 1940 decided to define the principles and nature of assistance to Polish citizens who were in France.[10] The authorization to organize the relief effort was given to Feliks Chiczewski by Prime Minister Sikorski, after consultation with Marshal

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Social Welfare, in coordination with the Minister of the Treasury, at a meeting of the Council of Ministers on the principles of care and assistance for Polish refugees in France], 220; *Protokoły z posiedzeń Rady Ministrów*, doc. 20b [Principles of assistance and care for Polish war refugees in France], 220–2; Pachowicz, *Towarzystwo Opieki nad Polakami*, 22.

5 Gmurczyk-Wrońska, *Polska – niepotrzebny aliant Francji?*.

6 Maria Pestkowska, *Za kulisami rządu polskiego na emigracji* (Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza Rytm, 2000), 43.

7 Krzysztof Kania, *Edward Bernard Raczyński 1891 – 1993 dyplomata i polityk* (Warsaw: Neriton, 2014), 194; Tadeusz Wyrwa, "Władze RP we Francji. Odbudowa władz Rzeczypospolitej w Paryżu i Angers wrzesień 1939–czerwiec 1940," in *Władze RP na Obczyźnie podczas II wojny światowej 1939–1945*, ed. Zbigniew Błażyński (London: Polskie Towarzystwo Naukowe na Obczyźnie, 1994), 71.

8 Tadeusz Paweł Rutkowski, *Stanisław Kot 1885–1975. Biografia polityczna* (Warsaw: DiG, 2000), 163.

9 Aleksander Hall, *Naród i państwo w myśli politycznej Charles'a de Gaulle'a* (Warsaw: Neriton, Rzeszów: Wyższa Szkoła Informatyki i Zarządzania, 2005), 113; Richard Vinen, *France 1934–1970* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 33–5.

10 Pachowicz, *Towarzystwo Opieki nad Polakami*, 25.

Philippe Petain and Ambassador Howard Kennard. When France broke off diplomatic relations with the Polish Government, consular posts ceased to function, and on September 23, 1940, Polish Offices (Biura Polskie) were established in their place. The Polish Offices were headed by Stanisław Zabiełło, the Government Delegate for France.

Providing Assistance to Civilian and Military Refugees

From September 1939, a campaign to organize shelters began in the south of France, with the cooperation of representatives of the Polish Government, the Polish Red Cross and the French local authorities. At the time, the French were favorably disposed towards helping Poles, although they suggested that the majority of refugees should be placed in urban centers with a wide range of hotels or guesthouses closer to the Côte d'Azur, mainly around Nice or Monaco.[11]

The evacuation action took two routes: by sea and by land. At that time, ships with Polish refugees from Yugoslavia, Athens, Beirut, Oran, Romania, Hungary, Greece and Dakar called at the port of Marseille. On the other hand, Poles were arriving by land via Italy to Modena. It was recorded that between October 1939 and April 1940, 31,727 people passed through the border points. By May 1940, 33,120 people had been evacuated.[12]

Meanwhile, the work of the consular post was extremely busy and demanding. The situation at the time required the Consulate to coordinate its activities on many levels. Moreover, the Polish Red Cross (PCK), which was being established in France at the end of 1939, started to cooperate with the Polish Government and its various bodies, thanks to the permission of the French Red Cross and the legal approval of the Minister of Military Affairs. At that time, the board of the PCK was housed in a house belonging to the foundation of Count Jakub Potocki, donated by the MOS.[13] The chairman at the time, Aleksander Osiński, sent a letter to the Polish Embassy to encourage consular posts to make contributions to the PCK.[14] The Consulate in Marseille contributed to the organization, while the staff of the consular post in Lille reacted negatively to President Osiński's request.[15]

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11 Ambrochowicz-Gajownik, *W cieniu Lazurowego Wybrzeża*, 168.

12 Instytut Polski i Muzeum im. Generała Władysława Sikorskiego w Londynie (Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum in London) [hereafter: IPMS], Armia Polska we Francji (Polish Army in France) [hereafter: APF], A.IV.4/1/37, Movement of evacuees through border points, p. 90.

13 Polski Czerwony Krzyż we Francji [The Polish Red Cross in France] 1940, no. 1–2.

14 AAN, KRPM, 464/914, APP to KRPM about PCK, Paris 31 January 1940, p. 3; AAN, KRPM, 464/914, Aleksander Osiński to APP, Paris 17 January 1940, p. 4.

15 AAN, KRPM, 464/914, Consulate of the Republic of Poland in Lille (hereafter: KGRPL) to APP, 29 February 1940, p. 10.

In November 1939, the Consulate organized in Marseilles and Toulon, French Committees of Assistance for Refugees from Poland. The presidium consisted of the French local authorities: the Prefect, the Commander of the 15th military district, the Bishop, the Mayor of the city, the President of the Chamber of Commerce and the Presidents of local associations. The aim behind these activities was to acquire buildings from the French authorities for the creation of shelters for refugees. The French authorities then put a military hospital at their disposal and provided free medical care.[16] In addition, French representatives contributed funds to the budget of the Polish Central Committee for War Victim Relief.

There were two shelters for women and children in Marseille, organized by the nuns of the Company of the Daughters of Charity of St Vincent de Paul and the Franciscan nuns.[17] In November 1939, the Consulate placed two female doctors (Krystyna Munk, Aleksandra Pizło) and two nurses (Eugenia Mierzejewska, Eugenia Hankiewicz) in a shelter with the Daughters of Charity. The women told the Consul that they really wanted to help those in need, as they had all the qualifications for their profession. The doctors were specialized as surgeons and had worked in hospitals in the Lviv and Kraków districts before being sent to France. In the case of the nurses, the Consulate learned that both ladies had worked at the Garrison Hospital in Radom. The Consulate placed the information at the disposal of the Polish Red Cross so that the organization could issue directives for the employment of these women.[18] In the meantime, Krystyna Munk was assigned to sanitary work on the ship "Warszawa," with the prior consent of the local authorities.[19]

The Consulate bore the costs associated with people staying with the nuns. It is worth mentioning that the daily stay amounted to 12 francs per person, including food. It should also be added that the Consulate staff received numerous complaints from the nuns about the reprehensible behavior of women.[20] The nuns often ran away from helping their compatriots because their social status was too high for them to take up work in the factories.[21]

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16 AAN, KRPM, 464/572, KGRPM to Central *Polish Committee* for the Relief of War Victims, Marseille, 18 December 1939, p. 6–7. At the time, the prefecture provided three hotels. It is worth mentioning that the consulate was also supported by committees „Les Amis de la Pologne". For more information, see: Małgorzata Nossowska, *O Francuzce, która pokochała Polskę. Rosa Bailly i stowarzyszenie Les Amis de la Pologne* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo UMCS, 2012).

17 The full name of the Franciscan nuns does not appear in the archival documentation and, at this point, it is difficult for the author to identify from which congregation they belonged.

18 AAN, KRPM, 464/914, KGRPM to PCK, Marseille, November 1939, p. 72.

19 AAN, KRPM, 464/914, KGRPM to cpt. Jan Ćwikliński, Marseille 18 December 1939, p. 75–8.

20 AAN, KRPM, 464/834, Anna Zajączkowska to Consul General in Marseille dr Adam Lisiewicz, Marseille 20 May 1940, p. 90–1.

21 AAN, KRPM, 464/834, KGRPM to Delegate of the Polish Government for Polish Exile in France, Marseille, 20 May 1940, p. 93; AAN, KRPM, 464/835, Delegation of the Republic of Poland for Polish Exile in France to KRPM, Paris, 5 June 1940, p. 2.

The most important concentrations were in and around Marseille, including the military camp at Carpiagne, and in the departments of Gard and Vaulcuse, which were home to pre-war Polish emigrants or those evacuated from the North of France. The departments of Gard and Bouches-du-Rhône had the largest number of emigrants (1,427) and refugees (2,270).[22] In another location, Buis-les-Baronnies (dep. Drôme), the Marseilles Consulate noted that it had managed to place 15 people at the Hotel Luxembourg. In later months, more and more Poles arrived at the hotel. The daily expenses for the refugees and soldiers were covered by the Consulate. They amounted to 7,000 French francs.[23] The Consul sought from the prefecture that Zdzisław Drohocki should start working in the local hotel as administrator and doctor of the center.[24] In June 1940, the French authorities specified that the departments of Drôme and Allier were to become the main centers of refuges for civilian refugees.[25]

The conditions in the shelters and hospitals where the refugees were housed were also monitored by PCK delegates. In the spring of 1940, delegate Wanda Ładzina[26] visited the military hospital "Centre de Dermato-Venereologie de la XV Region" in Marseille, where there were about 100 sick Poles, with two Polish nurses on duty. Ładzina was also interested in Polish soldiers placed in military hospitals, especially French ones. She reported that the soldiers asked for a Polish nurse with French language skills to be employed. Their main concern was that she should assist with medical appointments and deal with formal hospital documentation. In addition, they asked the delegate to supply them with newspapers and cigarettes.[27] The case was dealt with by the Ministry of Military Affairs, which entrusted the care of the sick to the health personnel of the assembly station in Carpiagne.[28] The above-mentioned situations were also of interest to the consular post, so thanks to correspondence with the station commander there, the Consul knew that soldiers sent to the hospital in Marseilles were given an allowance of 30 francs and basic necessities.[29]

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22 Ambrochowicz-Gajownik, *W cieniu Lazurowego Wybrzeża*, 169–71; Mieczysław Zygfryd Słowikowski, *W tajnej służbie. Jak polski wywiad dał aliantom zwycięstwo w Afryce Północnej* (Poznań: Rebis, 2011), 47–64.

23 AAN, KRPM, 464/835, Consul General dr Adam Lisiewicz to Polish Embassy RP in Vichy, Marseille, 24 July 1940, p. 63.

24 AAN, KRPM, 464/914, KGRPM to Prefect of the department of Drôme, Marseille, 12 August 1940, p. 49.

25 AAN, KRPM, 464/914, Ministry of Social Welfare to directors of all the shelters of the Ministry of Social Welfare in France, Vichy 8 June 1940, p. 18.

26 For more information, see: Anna Pachowicz, "Posłanka Wanda Ładzina (1880–1966) i jej działalność w Polsce i we Francji," *Przegląd Sejmowy*, no. 3 (2023): 87–105.

27 AAN, KRPM, 464/914, KGRPM to General Board of the PCK in Paris, Marseille, 1 April 1940, p. 14.

28 AAN, KRPM, 464/914, Minister of Military Affairs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 23 April 1940, p. 17.

29 AAN, KRPM, 464/912, The Commander of the assembly camp station in Carpiagne to KGRPM, Carpiagne, 28 March 1940, p. 35.

Meanwhile, after the defeat of France on June 19, 1940, an organization was set up to take comprehensive care of Polish citizens residing in France, immediately after the departure of the Government. At a conference at the office of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers in Libourne, chaired by Minister Stanisław Kot, it was decided to set up the Committee to Aid Poles in France (*Komitet Pomocy Polakom we Francji*). Minister Kot then proposed that the Committee's responsibilities should include providing assistance to both ex-military and civilians. The premises of the Consulate in Toulouse were chosen as the Committee's headquarters for nearly two months.[30] It was to operate on a larger scale than the Consulates still in operation in the south of France, given that consular activity was already being curtailed, as was to be demonstrated by the announced general evacuation of diplomatic and consular officials.[31]

On June 28, 1940, in Toulouse, the executive board of the Polish Red Cross Committee in France was constituted, with Feliks Chiczewski as President, and the Vice-presidents becoming: Anna de Gontaut-Biron and Józef Szymanowski, Stanisław Zabiełło as Treasurer and Gustaw Zieliński as Secretary. Elected as members of the Presidium were: Jan Chądzyński, Rev. Zygmunt Kaczyński, Piotr Kalinowski, Wacław Bitner. Due to the range of tasks facing the PCK, field District Delegations were established in Lyon, Toulouse, Marseille and Nice.[32] It is worth mentioning that on July 18, at the request of Marshal Philippe Petain, Feliks Frankowski took over as chargé d'affaires at the Polish Embassy, while Aleksander Kawałkowski acted as the embassy's Counsellor in Exile and received a mandate from Frankowski to liaise with the PCK, with the right to participate in meetings of the Presidium.[33]

People with a wide range of experience were elected as individual PCK delegates.[34] Thus, in Marseille, Witold Obrębski, a long-standing Consul at the consular post in this city, became the Delegate. Obrębski was familiar with the local realities, and made use of his acquaintance with the local authorities to start his work quickly. As a result, the Delegate was able to obtain from French officials a fully equipped English Hospital, with Dr. Nawrotny as its manager.

As soon as the General Board of the Polish Red Cross was constituted, work was divided among the individual members. The Division for Emigration and the Occupied Territories took care of refugees, maintaining contact with demobilized soldiers and

30 Ibid., 26.

31 Rutkowski, *Stanisław Kot 1885–1975*, 169.

32 IPMS, Polski Czerwony Krzyż we Francji [dalej: PCK], PRM-K/6, PCK to the General Board of the PCK in London, Vichy, 18 September 1940, p. 22–35; Pachowicz, *Towarzystwo Opieki nad Polakami*, 27.

33 Ibid., 124–6.

34 Stanisław Zabiełło, *Na posterunku we Francji* (Warsaw: PAX, 1967), 113.

establishing relations with Polish communities in the occupied territories and Polish prisoners of war, taking care of schooling and teachers.[35]

Providing care for the refugees was not an easy matter due to the financial problems piling up. Frankowski was careful to use funds sparingly. In addition, he sought a closer relationship between the PCK delegation and the Consulate in Marseille in order to coordinate care activities.[36] In his letter, he made it clear that the Consulates were to continue to care for Polish citizens according to the guidelines and instructions coming from the Polish Embassy in Vichy. He stipulated, however, that pensions and allowances paid regularly up to June 23, 1940 by Consulates should be discontinued, as well as the provision of individual short-term aid in the form of allowances to war refugees from Poland, to families of persons residing outside the country, with the exception of special cases such as allowances for travel abroad or for travel to PCK shelters. He pointed out that the only form of material aid was collective care organized by the PCK, providing food and accommodation in shelters. This aid flowed mainly to those who were destitute, jobless and with health problems. Refugees arriving at field delegations had to receive a certificate from the Consulate beforehand that it was placing them under the care of the PCK. It is worth noting, nevertheless, that this certificate was not binding for the PCK.[37] The Consulates were to provide assistance to people from the old émigrés, but in a very sparing manner and rather direct them to the board of the Union of Poles in France (*Związek Polaków we Francji*). Then, from August onwards, the Consulates were to provide assistance to the military.[38] From September 1, 1940, though, soldiers of the Polish Army in France came under the care of the Polish Red Cross. Its scope included material aid, cultural and educational activities in the working parties, as well as individual care. For this reason, the Embassy asked for coordination between the PCK and the consular posts.[39] Nevertheless, the decisive voice in providing support to refugees was on the side of the PCK.[40]

However, before there was any real cooperation between the PCK delegation and the Consulate in Marseille, the latter provided care for refugees on its own. At the time, its budget was very modest, amounting to around 100,000 francs. Consul Adam Lisiewicz

35 Pachowicz, *Towarzystwo Opieki nad Polakami*, 28.

36 IPMS, PCK, PRM-K/6, Letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, London, 13 September 1940, p. 9; AAN, KRPM, 464/916, PCK to Polish Consulate in Marseille, Toulouse, 15 August 1940, p. 30; BPP, Archive of the PCK in France from the collection of Jozef Jakubowski [hereafter: PCK SJJ], 22, Polish Embassy to the Consuls General of the Republic of Poland in Marseille, Toulouse, Nice, Lyon, Vichy, 8 August 1940, p. 41–2.

37 BPP, PCK SJJ, 22, Division of competences between the consulates and the PCK, p. 46–50.

38 BPP, PCK SJJ, 22, Feliks Chiczewski to Witold Obrębski, PCK delegate, Toulouse, 8 August 1940, p. 67.

39 AAN, KRPM, 464/914, APP to KGRPM, Vichy, 31 August 1940, p. 25.

40 AAN, KRPM, 464/835, PCK in Toulouse to PCK in Marseille, Toulouse 15 August 1940, p. 39.

reported that the board of the Polish Red Cross did not yet have any organized shelters and there was no possibility of paying aid to the most needy. The actual activity of the Polish Red Cross did not begin until August 1, 1940.[41] Meanwhile, the Marseille post took on the main burden of organizing aid for the refugees, by providing accommodation and issuing food vouchers. From the French side, aid was flowing in the form of donating various kinds of places in hotels, schools, boarding houses and hostels. The Polish side was less able to count on financial assistance. Nevertheless, the Consulate sent a letter to the French director of transport in Marseille, asking for vouchers for 200 liters of petrol to be issued for use by the management of the Accommodation Centre for Polish refugees in La Calade, needed for the trucks made available to the Polish Red Cross delegation in Marseille.[42] It then worked with the hospital management in Marseille to enable it to supply the PCK's infirmary, located in the English Hospital, with the necessary supplies and pharmaceutical products.[43] The site became a center of accommodation for those in need of permanent medical care and was taken over by the PCK delegation in Marseille. Nevertheless, the consular post, in correspondence with the Marseille Prefecture, sought to assign Jakub Polakow to this outpost.[44]

From August 1940, the activities of the PCK delegation in Marseille began to gain real relief dimensions. At that time, the management of the Polish Red Cross allocated 600,000 francs to the Marseilles Consulate.[45] As a result of the transfer of these funds, an immediate relief operation was launched, which translated into approximately 1,000 people being assisted in the Consulate's district. It was possible to organize temporary accommodation and kitchens where free or low-priced lunches (of 4–6 francs) were served.

It is worth adding that, at that time, the actions of the Polish authorities catered for over 5,000 refugees from Poland, as well as demobilized soldiers, whose number was estimated at around 12,000. Support was also extended to engineers (300 in number) who were destitute at that time and who were brought in specially from Romania and Hungary to

41 *Dokumenty Rządu RP na Obczyźnie. Suplementy do tomów I–VIII Protokołów posiedzeń Rady Ministrów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej: październik 1939–sierpień 1945*, ed. Wojciech Rojek in cooperation with Andrzej Suchcitz (Kraków: Secesja, 2010), doc. 41B: [Report on the activities of the Polish Red Cross in France at the time of the evacuation of the Polish army to Great Britain], 45–50.

42 AAN, KRPM, 464/914, KGRPM to director of transport in Marseille, Marseille, 6 September 1940, p. 26.

43 AAN, KRPM, 464/914, KGRPM to Monsieur le Directeur de la Santé Hôpital Lévy, Marseille, Marseille, 6 September 1940, p. 27.

44 AAN, KRPM, 464/914, KGRPM to the Prefect of the Department of Bouches-du-Rhône, Marseille, 12 September 1940, p. 52–3. Polakow (born 22 October 1894 in Łódź) held a medical diploma issued on December 15, 1923 by the Faculty of Medicine of the University of Warsaw, and in accordance with the law in force in Poland, he had been practising as a specialist in internal diseases (in particular infectious diseases) and children's diseases since 1923.

45 BPP, PCK SJJ, 22, PCK to Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Vichy, Toulouse, 8 August 1940, p. 53.

be employed in the war industry.[46] The Consulate in Marseille also attended to specialists dismissed from the war industry, in particular from the aviation industry. Their registration was carried out by the PCK delegate in Toulouse.[47] These people could not hope for any employment in France. As a result, the Consul began to hold talks with staff at the Portuguese and Spanish Consulates. He asked for short-term exit visas to be issued, with the assurance that their departure would be financed by the Polish authorities.[48] The response coming from these outposts, although sympathetic, was nonetheless negative. At that point, a group of war industry workers began to urgently seek travel to the United States, thus asking the Consulate to intervene in their case. Unfortunately, here too, the Marseille post encountered resistance from the American Consulate.[49] In mid-August 1940, it was estimated that eight million francs were required to be spent on relief operations for refugees, permanent emigrants, demobilized soldiers, white-collar workers and families.[50]

It should be mentioned that from June 1940, the French local authorities began to take a negative attitude towards Polish refugees. The Vichy authorities issued a new circular stating that those Poles who "displeased" a French administration official could be locked up in a camp.[51] At the time, the aim of the French was to make it difficult to stay on their territory. They hid behind top-down decisions coming from the German authorities. Moreover, it was not always easy for refugees to obtain exit visas, and permission to stay in the South of France was issued for a short period. Polish consular officials believed that the French local administration was treating Poles much worse than other foreigners, and they urged Feliks Frankowski to get the embassy and the PCK to start negotiations with the Vichy authorities.[52] The interaction between the Consulates and the PCK was important insofar as when the consular posts did not have sufficient knowledge of refugees or old emigrants, then the information would come from the delegation.[53] Meanwhile, the Third Reich pressured the French side to break diplomatic-consular relations with the emigration authorities. It also argued in favor of placing the demobilized in labor camps without issuing visas to leave France.[54]

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46 IPMS, PCK, PRM-K/6, Polish Embassy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in London, Vichy, 15 August 1940, p. 10–2.

47 AAN, KRPM, 464/916, PCK in Toulouse to KGRPM, Toulouse, 30 July 1940, p. 190.

48 AAN, KRPM, 464/357, KGRPM to the Portuguese and Spanish Consulate in Marseille, Marseille, 18 July 1940, p. 9–10.

49 AAN, KRPM, 464/357, KGRPM to the Group of former war industry workers, Marseille, 6 August 1940, p. 24.

50 BPP, PCK SJJ, 22, PCK to Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Vichy, Toulouse, 8 August 1940, p. 53.

51 Ambrochowicz-Gajownik, *W cieniu Lazurowego Wybrzeża*, 252–3.

52 BPP, PCK SJJ, 6, KRPM to the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Vichy, Marseille, 10 September 1940, p. 32–3.

53 Ambrochowicz-Gajownik, *Ośrodki miejskie*, 195–208.

54 Gmurczyk-Wrońska, *Polska – niepotrzebny aliant Francji?*, 401.

After June 1940, the situation of Polish soldiers was extremely difficult. There were 3,000 Polish soldiers in France, and between 1,000 and 1,500 officers. The majority of officers and non-commissioned officers (about 1,000 people) were in Camp de Carpiagne. This camp was moved to Garricues near Nimes in October 1940.[55] At the time, the process of demobilizing Polish soldiers was unclear, and the local authorities had no clearly defined guidelines on the matter. It was not until July 19, 1940 that General Henri Caillault defined the principles of demobilization. The action was handled by the French military authorities in the presence of an employee of the consular posts operating in the South of France (Lyon, Marseille and Toulouse).[56] Therefore, soldiers fearing to be sent to the camps reported to the Consulate for assistance. The post, in cooperation with the Consulate in Toulouse, signaled to the top-down authorities that soldiers had made their way to North Africa or the United States. The Consulate then also cooperated with an evacuation post headed by Major Mieczysław Zygfryd Słowikowski, alias "Rygor." He acted on the orders of General Juliusz Kleeberg. In the meantime, it was agreed that a Central Directorate would be established in Marseille, which was also to deal with the evacuation by sea. At the end of September, the transfer of soldiers was hampered by the Portuguese and Spanish borders, so it was decided that Słowikowski would take care of the transfer of soldiers by sea to North Africa.[57] It is worth mentioning that from September the PCK took over the care of war refugees, demobilized soldiers.[58]

Conclusion

The provision of aid to civilian and military refugees by the Polish Consulate in Marseille as well as by the Polish Red Cross was the most urgent matter, yet extremely difficult. The financial resources were disproportionate to the scale of the problem the Polish

55 Ambrochowicz-Gajownik, *W cieniu Lazurowego Wybrzeża*, 252.

56 Archives départementales des Bouches-du-Rhône w Marsylii (hereafter: AdBdR), Préparation militaire et recrutement de l'armée. Préfecture, 1800–1940, 1 R 885, Le Général Voisin, a Monsieur le Préfet des Bouches-du-Rhône, 11 November 1940.

57 IPMS, SNW and Ministry of Military Affairs/Ministry of Defence, A.XII.4/125, Report on the activities of the evacuation desk for the month of September 1940; Ambrochowicz-Gajownik, *W cieniu Lazurowego Wybrzeża*, 253–4; Słowikowski, *W tajnej służbie*, 47–51; Anna Ambrochowicz-Gajownik, "Diplomatic Tools and Tools of War: Activities of the Polish Office in Casablanca During Second World War – A Case Study," in *Oblicza wojny. Narzędzia*, vol. 10, ed. Magdalena Pogońska-Pol (Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 2023), 223–36.

58 BPP, PCK SJJ, 5, PCK to Presidency of the Council of Ministers in London, Toulouse, 3 September 1940, p. 127–8.

state had to face. In addition, the dependence on French authorities meant that all the actions of the Polish authorities were under control, which was particularly evident after June 1940. Cooperation between the Consulate and the Polish Red Cross was important and vital, although in the initial phase, the balance of assistance tipped in favor of the consular post. It was only after August 1940 that it was possible to speak of real support from the PCK delegation in Marseille, which relieved much of the work of the Consulate. It is worth emphasizing that providing assistance to civilian refugees and soldiers was a challenging and extremely difficult task, all the more so as the operations were carried out under difficult wartime conditions. It was a great help for the Consulate and the Polish Red Cross to obtain numerous places of refuge and to be able to create new ones, thanks to French support.

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In Memoriam

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Antoni Herkulan Wróbel OFM (1934–2023)

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On December 27, 2023, Antoni Herkulan Wróbel OFM passed away in Argentina. With his death, polish historiography lost an important researcher of Polish settlement history and Polish pastoral care in Argentina, and the Polish community in Argentina lost a deserving priest.

Antoni (his secular name) Wróbel was born on March 8, 1934, in Wierzchowiska, near Janów Lubelski, Poland. His family (parents Zofia and Jan and seven children) was very poor. His mother raised the children, while his father worked as a carter in a landowner's estate. The family's material situation worsened with the onset of the German occupation in 1939. The Wróbel family's condition improved somewhat after the war ended, thanks to the agrarian reform.

At the age of 7, Antoni began his education in primary school in September 1941. He completed it in 1948, and the thought of entering a seminary became increasingly present in his mind. To realize this dream, he began studying at a Small Franciscan Seminary in Wrocław in the fall of 1949 (the school was located in Nysa from 1950–1951).

In 1951, Antoni entered the novitiate of the Bernardine Fathers in Leżajsk. He took his first vows on August 31, 1952. From 1952 to 1956, he studied at the Seminary of the Bernardine Fathers in Kalwaria Zebrzydowska. On February 6, 1952, he took perpetual vows and adopted the religious name Herkulan. In the following years, until 1959, he continued his studies in Kalwaria Zebrzydowska, where he was also ordained a priest on June 26, 1960.

Later, besides a year of study at the Pastoral Institute in Kraków, Herkulan served as a priest and taught religion in primary school. In 1961, Providence connected him with history – he was not accepted at the Faculty of Earth Sciences at Jagiellonian University, which led him to pursue historical studies at the Catholic University of Lublin. He completed his studies in Lublin in 1964, but without taking the master's exam.

Herkulan Wróbel positively responded to an invitation to go on a mission to Argentina, where a Polish community had existed since the late 19th century. Polish parishes and individual clergymen played an extremely important role in the integration and nurturing of the Catholic religion and Polish identity. After difficulties in obtaining a passport, he arrived in Argentina by sea on December 2, 1966, accompanied by Friar Jerzy Łakomiak. Upon arrival, the clergymen were welcomed by Father Łucjan Łuszczki, rector of the Polish Catholic Mission in Argentina. Herkulan Wróbel began his priestly ministry at the Polish Catholic Center in Martin Coronado. The time after his arrival was also devoted to intensive study of the Spanish language. Having dealt with scouting during his school years, he worked as a chaplain and lecturer at camps for the Polish scouting movement.

In 1971, Herkulan was transferred to Rosario, where, in addition to his priestly work, he taught children (from Polish and mixed families) the Polish language. He became socially active in the Frederick Chopin Society and the "Dom Polski" Society in Rosario. Already in Rosario, he became engaged in historical and journalistic work, writing numerous articles about Polish pastoral care in Argentina. By 1978, he had published 90 articles on this topic, as well as on contemporary issues. His works appeared in periodicals such as *Miesięcznik Franciszkański*, *Głos Polski*, and *Bóg i Ojczyzna*.

The next pastoral location in Father Herkulan's life was Saladillo, where he also served pastoral care to Argentinians. In 1980, he returned to Martin Coronado. In 1983, he became the superior of the local monastery. During this time, he also served in San José and Llavallol. In San José, with the help of the faithful and civil authorities, he built a new church dedicated to St. Maximilian Kolbe. He continuously prepared historical and journalistic works.

In January 1994, Herkulan Wróbel passed the master's exam at the Catholic University of Lublin. A colleague from his student days, Father Professor Józef Swatek, also encouraged him to write a doctoral dissertation. After returning to Argentina, the historian began preparing his thesis, constantly conducting research in Polish and Argentine archives. On March 1, 1999, at the Pontifical Faculty of Theology, Herkulan Wróbel defended his doctoral thesis titled "The History of Polish Pastoral Care in Argentina from 1897 to 1997," earning a doctorate in theology with a specialization in the history of the Church.

Earlier, in 1996, Wróbel received a nomination to the important and responsible position of rector of the Polish Catholic Mission in Argentina, organizing numerous church and Polish community events. In 2001, he was again appointed rector of the PMK (a position he held until 2006).

Throughout his life, the Franciscan published over 300 works (including several books) of popular-scientific, academic, and journalistic nature on the history of Polish

settlement in Argentina and the local Polish pastoral care. He also gathered new materials on these topics, which became the basis for establishing an archive in Martin Coronado. The knowledge he gained was presented at numerous conferences and scientific symposia in Poland and abroad. He collaborated with Polish scientific societies and was a member of Argentine scientific institutions, including the Junta de Historia Eclesiastica Argentina and the Centro de Estudios Migratorios Latinoamericanos.

For his contributions to pastoral and social work, he was awarded the Officer's Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta (1997) and the Commander's Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta (2002).

He passed away on December 27, 2023, and the funeral ceremonies took place on December 30 in Martin Coronado.

Requiescat in pace.