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HOPE

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A Debate

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George Frederic Watts, *Hope*, 1886, oil paint on canvas.
Location: Tate Britain
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Dilapidated old granary building in Worcester, England, to be rebuild by the Hope Church.
Photograph courtesy of Maciej Rajewski (2019).

FROM THE EDITORS

"TO GET ALL THE MUSIC POSSIBLE"
The Fragility and the Strength of Hope

"Hope sitting on a globe, with bandaged eyes playing on a lyre which has all the strings broken but one out of which poor little tinkle she is trying to get all the music possible, listening with all her might to the little sound…"[1] The description of his vision of 'hope' which George Frederic Watts included in his letter to Madeline Wyndham written in December 1888 seems to grasp the essence of a common-sense understanding of 'hope': the belief in the potential of little means, once they are coupled with what we call an eager and trusting heart.

Watts's painting of Hope, embodying the vision the artist described in such detail, manifests an additional quality, namely that of beauty, which he accomplished through his thorough application of color and light, as well as through the subtle brushstrokes he used. On the ideational level, though, the beauty of Hope lies in the fact that despite her blindness, despite her incapability of an insight other than the one her faint music might prompt or provide, she unceasingly strives to achieve her own vision, and seems decided, but also serene in her eternal perseverance. It is Hope's fragility contrasted with her willpower that we admire. What the painter grasped in his depiction of Hope—whether deliberately or not—is precisely the determined effort a human being continually makes in order to obtain an insight, one as deep as possible, or a proper cognitive judgment, in whatever situation might occur. This inherently human need to find the proper direction and orientation of thought, followed with the right decision whether to act or not to act, and, if so, what action to take, is accompanied by the unspoken conviction that one is bound to assume such an attitude by the power of one's nature. It is precisely the inner belief that an insight is possible and that the effort to obtain it is both a deeply cherished need and an existential duty that might be considered in terms of 'hope.' Hope appears then to bridge the gap between the opacity and the clar-

[1] Letter from George Frederic Watts to Madeline Wyndham, 8 December 1885, now in the Tate Archives. Quoted after Nicholas Tromans, *Hope: The Life and Times of a Victorian Icon* (Compton, Surrey: Watts Gallery, 2011), 70.

ity of vision. Perhaps, applying Humean categories, one might venture to say that—in some sense—hope constitutes the bridge between 'is' and 'ought,' or rather one between 'ought' and 'is.' Therefore—in binding one's longing for a vision with an actual vision and with its consequences—hope demonstrates, in itself, the potential of light. Like light, it is a catalyst for vision. In this sense hope is light.

John Paul II—a philosopher pope—begins his poem *The Roman Triptych* with an expression of wonderment at the unique status of the human being in the world:

> (Allow me to pause here;
> allow me to stop at a threshold,
> the threshold of simple wonder).
> The running stream cannot marvel,
> and silently the woods slope down,
> following the rhythm of the stream—
> but man can marvel!
> The threshold which the world crosses in him
> is the threshold of wonderment.
> (Once, this very wonder was called "Adam").
>
> He was alone in his wonder,
> among creatures incapable of wonder—
> for them it is enough to exist and go their way.
> Man went his way with them,
> filled with wonder!
> But being amazed, he always emerged
> from the tide that carried him,
> as if saying to everything around him:
> "Stop—in me is your harbor,"
> "in me is the place of meeting
> with the Primordial Word."
> "Stop, this passing has meaning...
> has meaning... has meaning."[2]

In the natural world, the uniqueness of the human being springs from the specifically human capability of wonderment, which in turn engenders—also specifically human—hope to find the meaning of things (the hope to understand the 'deep structure' of the 'wonder'). Indeed, the two concluding lines of the quoted extract ("Stop, this passing has meaning… / has meaning… has meaning") are not simply a matter-of-fact statement: they do not express a certainty or a mere acknowledgement of the 'state of things.' Rather, the

[2] John Paul II, *The Roman Triptych*, trans. Jerzy Peterkiewicz, "L'Osservatore Romano" (Weekly Edition in English), March 26, 2003: 4.

words "has meaning," followed by suspension points (which recur twice in these lines), suggest that man is intrigued by his own cognitive grasp of the surrounding world. The wonderment at the world he experiences engenders in him a hope of grasping the meaning of things: the meaning he has not been fully revealed and one he is incapable of conceptualizing by himself.

By introducing, in the part of his poem entitled "Conversation between father and son in the land of Moria," the figure of Abraham, John Paul II seems to point to the fact that the 'hope of understanding' is so deeply inscribed in human existence (or, in other words, in human experience) that it actually permeates its entirety, revealing itself most radically in situations with which one would tend to associate despair.

> So they walked and talked together on the third day.
> Here is the hill, where I shall offer a sacrifice to God—
>
> said the father, and the son was silent, dared not ask:
> Where is the lamb? We have fire, wood, a sacrificial knife,
> but where is the sacrifice?
> God alone will choose it—
> This he said, and dared not say aloud
> the words: the lamb, my son, will be you—
> so he was silent.
>
> With this silence he was falling again into a soundless hollow.
> He had heard the voice which led him.
> Now the voice was silent.
> He was left with nothing but his own name
> Abraham: He who believed against hope.
> In a moment he will build a sacrificial pile,
> make fire, bind Isaacs hands—
> and then—what? the pile will burst into flames....
> Already he sees himself as the father of a dead son,
> the son the Voice gave him and is now taking away?[3]

The question mark that concludes the above-quoted extract seems as meaningful as the recurring suspension points in the opening part of the poem: the reader gets the impression that the incredulity of the act apparently demanded of Abraham makes him hope against belief rather than—as we read in the poem—believe against hope. While he might have believed against hope when he was childless, and while he may believe against hope now: believe in his God and know that in a moment God will take away from him what he once gave him in a free gift, there is also another interpretation surfacing, the one

[3] Ibidem.

the question mark suggests: while Abraham believes in the power of God, his hope in the goodness of God is so strong that the entire existence of Abraham at this point becomes one of hope.[4]

Abraham's hope against belief, one can sense from John Paul II's rendition of the biblical story, may be contrasted with Abraham's belief deprived of hope that Søren Kierkegaard scrutinizes in the "Prelude" to his *Fear and Trembling*.[5] Already in its opening part the Danish philosopher describes Abraham as a man who was tempted by God and who "endured temptation, kept the faith, and a second time received again a son contrary to expectation."[6] Indeed, in none of Kierkegaard's readings of the story does Abraham hope: he is either focused on fulfilling God's will without understanding it ("It is better for him to believe that I am a monster, rather than that he should lose faith in Thee"[7]), or he is resigned ("They rode on in silence along the way, and Abraham's glance was fixed upon the ground.... From that time on Abraham became old, he could not forget that God had required this of him.... Abraham's eyes were darkened, and he knew joy no more"[8]), or he is haunted by guilt ("He prayed to God to forgive him his sin ... that the father had forgotten his duty toward the son.... He found no rest"[9]), or he must face the consequences of his blind obedience to God ("Isaac had lost his faith"[10]). Neither in the comments Kierkegaard offers his readers on Abraham's attitude do we find any reference to hope, as if hope turned out redundant in the face of absolute faith and belief in the promise once made; as if absolute faith and belief in the promise supplanted the sentiment of hope, or expectation, the need for the 'light' and, together with them, the

[4] Commenting on the significance of this scene in *The Roman Triptych*, Joseph Ratzinger wrote: "The immense arch, the true vision of the *Roman Triptych*, is clearly revealed in the third panel, the ascent by Abraham and Isaac of Mount Moria, the mountain of the sacrifice, of the self-gift without reservation. This ascent is the last and decisive stage in Abraham's journey, which began with his departure from his own land, Ur of the Chaldeans; it is the basic stage of the ascent toward the summit, against the current, to the source that is also the goal. In the inexhaustible dialogue between father and son, consisting of few words and of bearing together, in silence, the mystery of the words, all the questions of history, the suffering, fears and hopes are reflected. In the end it becomes clear that this dialogue between father and son, between Abraham and Isaac, is the dialogue in God himself, the dialogue between the eternal Father and his Son, the Word, and that this eternal dialogue represents at the same time the response to our unfinished human dialogue." Card. Joseph Ratzinger, "Presentation of the Holy Father's Poetry," *L'Osservatore Romano* (Weekly Edition in English), March 26, 2003: 4.

[5] See Søren Kierkegaard, *"Fear and Trembling" and "The Sickness Unto Death,"* trans. Walter Lawrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).

[6] Ibidem, 37.

[7] Ibidem, 40.

[8] Ibidem, 40–1.

[9] Ibidem, 41–2.

[10] Ibidem, 43.

urgent need to find out, to know. Kierkegaard's Abraham seems the reverse of Watts's Hope: there is neither need nor will in him to strive for a truthful vision. He does not aspire to understand. Rather, he replaces cognitive effort with the contents of the command of the authority he obeys.

> By faith Abraham went out from the land of his fathers and became a sojourner in the land of promise. He left one thing behind, took one thing with him: he left his earthly understanding behind and took faith with him...[11]

Deprived of hope for knowing the truth in the sense of recognizing it, Kierkegaard's Abraham shows a radically different face from the one John Paul II describes in his *Roman Triptych*. We might say that John Paul II's Abraham—due to the room he leaves for the light of hope—seems, so to speak, more 'human.'

A philosophical question which inevitably comes up in relation to the above reflections is whether hope, conceived of as light and a catalyst for vision, can—startlingly—become a yoke to the cognitive subject. Inherent in every cognitive act, hope for attaining a truthful vision may be confronted with one that apart from being truthful is also difficult to embrace. Tadeusz Styczeń analyzes the case of the 'Kowalski' of the 1980s in Poland. 'Kowalski' is a symbol of an average Polish person who lived a big part of his or her life under communism, and then joined the Solidarity movement because it brought hope for a change, for a change in political and social senses: a change Kowalski identified with the good. Yet soon the oppression of the regime became relentless and 'Kowalski' was arrested and given an alternative: 'Either you sign a declaration of loyalty in which you will state that the hopes and ideals of Solidarity are merely rowdy lawless anti-State excesses, and you will leave this place as a free person, or you will spend the years to come in prison and your family will be persecuted.' In the Poland of the 1980s, many of those blackmailed in such a way would finally sign a declaration of loyalty—doing so with a trembling hand—and later could never forget the price of the 'freedom' they gained by killing hope in themselves. Occasionally, though, 'Kowalski' would refuse to accept the freedom thus offered to him. Styczeń calls such a decision a "startling lesson in anthropology and ethics,"[12] a "tremendum et fascinosum mysterium hominis."[13]

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[11] Ibidem, 48.

[12] Tadeusz S t y c z e ń, "Wolność w prawdzie," in Tadeusz Styczeń, *Dzieła zebrane*, ed. Alfred M. Wierzbicki, vol. 4, *Wolność w prawdzie*, ed. Kazimierz Krajewski (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL and Instytut Jana Pawła II KUL, 2013), 25. All translations from Styczeń are my own.

[13] Ibidem.

> Kowalski breaks the atom of his own 'self.' He breaks into the depth of the mystery that he is, he breaks into the depth of his personal subjectivity. In a sudden illuminating vision, Kowalski sees that he must not ignore the truth he once recognized and found true, or he will ignore himself, more than that: he will question himself as a person. To save oneself is to save the freedom that is incomparably deeper and more important than the one offered to Kowalski by the authorities, provided he signs the declaration, thus backsliding from what he had found true [the substance of his hopes]. To save one's freedom, to save faithfulness to the truth once recognized, and to save oneself—they are one and the same thing! Kowalski grasps this inseparable *iunctim*. And the discovery he makes leaves no room for doubt: in the situation violence and oppression forced him to confront, he can remain truly free only when he stays in prison.[14]

Unlike Kierkegaard's Abraham, Kowalski does not remain passive towards hope. He is open to a new vision, involved in bringing it about, and he remains faithful to it because abandoning his hopes, acknowledging that they were merely "rowdy lawless anti-State excesses" would be tantamount to questioning his own dignity, to questioning himself as the subject he clearly is. No wonder Styczeń would frequently call the 'Kowalskis' of the 1980s in Poland—those faithfully striving to overcome the 'darkness' with the light of hope—the Socrateses of our times. Styczeń's 'Kowalski,' who freely chooses to stay in prison and remains faithful to what he has found true reminds one of Watts's Hope, serene in her perseverance despite her frail means.

*

The authors of the present volume discuss both the fragility and the strength of hope. Its various renditions and descriptions of the pathways on which it advances reflect the diversity of human experience. The papers we have collected address the essence and structure of hope, its rootedness in human nature, its relationship with religious faith, as well as its functioning in the most difficult areas of human life, such as those marked by suffering, death, or other liminal situations. Hope manifests itself also as a driving force of history. As a literary topos, it conveys beauty. Abuse of hope, in particular of social hope, results in totalitarian systems, which then destroy hope.

In this volume, we have also included an extensive section devoted to a discussion of the present condition of universities. In the wake of the recent reform of academic institutions in Poland, many universities (but also scholarly journals), in particular those dedicated to the humanities, are facing the prospect of non-existence. Considered as unnecessary and unprofitable, not

[14] Ibidem.

infrequently disdained as spurious, and made to remodel themselves so as to abandon their unique ethos and become bureaucratic cosmopolitan schools advancing a standard blueprint for education and research, they are perhaps most in need of hope.

The editors of *Ethos* would like to thank Adam Potkay, who inspired us to prepare the present volume.

Dorota Chabrajska

JOHN PAUL II
“HOPE WHICH IS OPEN TO ANYONE...”

Ethos 32, no. 4 (128) (2019): 15–17

JOHN PAUL II

"HOPE WHICH IS OPEN TO ANYONE..."*

The Holy Spirit, poured out 'without measure' by Jesus Christ, crucified and risen, is "the One who builds the kingdom of God within the course of history and prepares its full manifestation in Jesus Christ ... which will come at the end of time."[1] In this eschatological perspective believers are called, during this year dedicated to the Holy Spirit, to a renewed appreciation of the theological virtue of hope, which "on the one hand encourages the Christian not to lose sight of the final goal which gives meaning and value to life, and on the other, offers solid and profound reasons for a daily commitment to transform reality in order to make it correspond to God's plan."[2]

St. Paul underlines the intimate and deep bond which exists between the gift of the Holy Spirit and the virtue of hope. "Hope," he says in the Letter to the Romans, "does not disappoint us, because God's love has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us" (Rom 5:5). Yes, the very gift of the Holy Spirit, filling our hearts with God's love and making us children of the Father in Jesus Christ (cf. Gal 4:6), instils in us the sure hope that nothing "will be able to separate us from the love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord" (Rom 8:39). For this reason, the God revealed in the "fullness of time" in Jesus Christ is truly "the God of hope," who fills believers with joy and peace, so that "by the power of the Holy Spirit [they] may abound in hope" (Rom 15:13). Thus Christians are called to be witnesses to this joyful experience in the world, and to "always be prepared to make a defence to any one who calls [them] to account for the hope" that is in them (1 Pt 3:15).

---

* Address delivered during the General Audience in the Vatican on November 11, 1998. For the original text, see http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/audiences/1998/documents/hf_jp-ii_aud_11111998.html.

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[1] John Paul II, Apostolic Letter Tertio millennio adveniente, November 10, 1994, Section 45.

[2] Ibidem, Section 46.

Christian hope brings to fulfilment the hope inspired by God in the People of Israel, and finds its own origin and model in Abraham, who "believed against hope that he should become the father of many nations" (Rom 4:18). Ratified in the covenant made by the Lord with his people through Moses, the hope of Israel was constantly rekindled down the centuries by the preaching of the prophets. Lastly, it was centered on the promise of the eschatological outpouring of God's Spirit on the Messiah and on all his people (cf. Is 11:2; Ez 36:27; Jl 3:1–2). This promise was fulfilled in Jesus. He is not only the witness to the hope which is open to anyone who becomes his disciple. He himself, in his person and in his work of salvation, is "our hope" (1 Tm 1:1), since he proclaims and brings about God's kingdom. The Beatitudes are the 'Magna Charta' of this kingdom (cf. Mt 5:3–12). "The Beatitudes raise our hope toward heaven as the new Promised Land; they trace the path that leads through the trials that await the disciples of Jesus."[3]

Made Christ and Lord through the paschal mystery (cf. Acts 2:36), Jesus becomes "a life-giving spirit" (1 Cor 15:45), and believers, baptized in him with water and the Spirit (cf. Jn 3:5), are "born anew to a living hope" (1 Pt 1:3). Henceforth the gift of salvation, through the Holy Spirit, is the pledge and seal (cf. 2 Cor 1:21-22; Eph 1:13–14) of the full communion with God to which Christ leads us. The Holy Spirit, one reads in the Letter to Titus, was "poured out upon us richly, through Jesus Christ our Saviour, so that we might be justified by his grace and become heirs in hope of eternal life" (Ti 3:6–7).

Also according to the Fathers of the Church the Holy Spirit is "the gift which lavishes perfect hope upon us."[4] In fact, says St. Paul, it is the Spirit "bearing witness with our spirit that we are children of God, and if children, then heirs, heirs of God and fellow heirs with Christ" (Rom 8:16–17). Christian life grows and matures to its fullness from that 'already' of salvation which is the life of God's children in Christ, in which we are made to share by the Holy Spirit. From the experience of this gift, it longs with trusting perseverance for the 'not yet' and the 'yet more,' which God has promised us and will give us at the end of time. Indeed as St. Paul maintains, if one is really a son, then one is also heir to all that belongs to the Father with Christ, the "first-born among many brethren" (Rom 8:29). "All that the Father has is mine," says Jesus (Jn 16:15). For this reason, in communicating his Spirit to us, he makes us share in the inheritance of the Father and gives us the pledge and first fruits. This divine reality is the inexhaustible source of Christian hope.

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[3] *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, Section 1820

[4] St. Hilary of Poitiers, *De Trinitate*, II, 1, https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/3302.htm.

The Church's teaching sees hope as one of the three theological virtues, poured out by God into the heart of believers through the Holy Spirit. It is that virtue "by which we desire the kingdom of heaven and eternal life as our happiness, placing our trust in Christ's promises and relying not on our own strength, but on the help of the grace of the Holy Spirit."[5] To the gift of hope "special attention should be given ... especially in our day in which many people, including quite a few Christians, are floundering in the illusion and myth of an unlimited capacity for self-redemption and self-fulfillment and the temptation to pessimism from the experience of frequent disappointment and defeat."[6] Many dangers seem to loom over the future of humanity, many uncertainties weigh on man's personal destiny and he frequently feels incapable of dealing with them. In addition, the crisis of the meaning of life and the enigma of pain and death keep knocking relentlessly at the door of our contemporaries' hearts. The message of hope which comes from Jesus Christ brightens this horizon darkened by uncertainty and pessimism. Hope sustains and protects us in the good fight of faith (cf. Rom 12:12). It is nourished by prayer, and most particularly by the "Our Father," "the summary of everything that hope leads us to desire."[7]

Today it is not enough to reawaken hope in individual consciences; it is necessary *to cross the threshold of hope together*. Hope, in fact, essentially has—as we will have the opportunity to examine—a community as well as a social dimension, so that what the Apostle says in the proper and direct sense for the Church can in a broader sense be applied to the vocation of all humanity: "There is one body and one Spirit, just as you were called to the one hope that belongs to your call" (Eph 4:4).

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[5] *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, Section 1817.

[6] John Paul II, "General Audience," July 3, 1991, *L'Osservatore Romano*, English edition, July 8, 1991: 11.

[7] *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, Section 1820.

ON HOPE IN GOD

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"THERE MAY YET BE HOPE..." (Lam 3:29) Destruction, Suffering, and Hope in the Book of Lamentations

The picture provided by the editors of Lamentations leaves no doubt about the fact that the agent of destruction was the Lord himself, while the emotions of profound sadness, excruciating pain, anger, and burning rage, as well as despair, have been portrayed with an incomparable richness of color. And one must admit that the vivid description of the destruction renders the expression of the extreme emotions both comprehensible and justified. The God who allowed children to die must take into account the outcry of human beings!

In 598 or 597 BCE, Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon, invaded Judah and laid siege to its capital Jerusalem. After a short defense, the city was captured and pillaged, and a great number of its residents were taken into captivity. Those events caused a serious crisis, not only in terms of the political or social life of the period, but also in the aspect of its religious and theological tradition, by provoking dramatic questions: How was it possible that Jerusalem, which used to be "the city of the great King"[1] (Ps 48:2), had been defeated? Had the Lord abandoned his Temple, his city, and his people? Even though the first Babylonian invasion was a serious blow to the Kingdom of Judah, it seemed to have quickly recovered from the shock. Jerusalem was rebuilt after the wartime damage, the economy was revived, the anti-Babylonian party gained allies and waited for a favorable occasion to liberate the country from the occupation. At that time, there was still hope. However, the second invasion in 587 BCE and the fall of Jerusalem, preceded by a year-long siege, put an end to the Kingdom of Judah. The old questions returned and became even more urgent: Why did that happen? Why did God allow his Temple to be destroyed? Is he the true God? Is there still any hope?

Those dramatic questions have been expressed by means of *qinah*: the mourning rhythm of the Book of Lamentations. The editors of Lamentations wrestled with the inexplicability of the tragic human experience, while attempting to express the immense suffering of the crushed city and its inhabitants. In this article, I shall follow that poignant narrative of the successive stages of the destruction of the country and the city, as well as of the suffering of its

[1] Unless otherwise noted, the Biblical citations in this paper are from the *New Standard Version Bible*.

people. In the concluding part of the paper, I shall focus on some theological issues arising from the description provided by the editors of Lamentations. I shall try to join them in asking the question, "Is there still any hope?"

THE PICTURE OF DESTRUCTION

The Book of Lamentations presents the consecutive stages of the destruction caused by the Babylonian army and depicts the concentric circles of devastations caused by the war. Examining this picture, I shall study the destruction of the country, the city, and, finally, of the Temple.

DESTRUCTION OF THE COUNTRY (LAND)

I shall begin the discussion of the tragedy described in the Book of Lamentations, with the outermost circle of destruction depicted by the editor of the book. During the military campaign, the Babylonian army (in fact, neither the Babylonians nor their king Nebuchadnezzar have been openly mentioned in Lamentations[2]) gradually invaded the whole Kingdom of Judah, moving from its border towards its heart: the capital. The traces of that devastating process are reflected in the second song of Lamentations: "The Lord has destroyed without mercy all the dwellings of Jacob; in his wrath he has broken down the strongholds of daughter Judah; he has brought down to the ground in dishonor the kingdom and its rulers" (Lam 2:2).

The verse quoted above enumerates the targets hit by destruction: the dwellings of Jacob, the strongholds of daughter Judah, and lastly the kingdom and its rulers. It is worth noticing that God's anger does not (at least, not directly) focus on human beings. Only at the end of Lamentations 2:2 does the editor introduce "the rulers." "The dwellings of Jacob" (*nə'ôṯ ya'ăqōḇ*) are mentioned first. The noun *nāwe*^{h} indicates dwelling in a general sense (cf. Job 8:6; Ps 68:13; Prv 3:33; 21:20), the shepherd's dwelling (cf. Zep 2:6), the sheepfold, i.e., the place where the sheep are fed and protected at night, enclosed, sheltered, and safe (cf. Prv 24:15; Is 33:20). However, *nāwe*^{h}, can be also used to mean the pasture whereto the shepherd leads his flock (cf. Ez 34:14; Ps 23:2). Thus the term in question can indicate both a (fenced and safe) en-

[2] See Delbert R. H i l l e r s, "History and Poetry in Lamentations," *Currents in Theology and Missions* 10 (1983): 155.

closure and an open space (pasture).[3] This ambivalence appears particularly clear in the prophetic books of the Bible. On the one hand, *nə'ôṯ* is sometimes used to describe safe places ("peaceful folds"—*nə'ôṯ haššālôm*—cf. Is 32:18; Jer 25:37) or places that remain intact even after the destruction of the kingdom (cf. Is 27:10; Ez 25:5; Zep 2:6). On the other hand, however, such places also shared in the fate of the whole country. They were also touched by the flame of God's anger: dried out, abandoned, and destroyed (cf. Jer 10:25; 25:37; Am 1:2).

In Lamentations 2:2, the "dwellings of Jacob" may be used to mean, metaphorically, the inhabited territories (see the use of the term in question in the announcements of salvation in Jeremiah 50:19 and Ezekiel 34:14). The parallelism of the expressions: the "dwellings of Jacob" and the "strongholds of daughter Judah" in Lamentations 2b is also noteworthy. Obviously, those expressions are not synonymous, but together they describe the whole country: the cities and the pastures, i.e., the kingdom mentioned in verse 2c. As Iain W. Provan states, the "dwelling or pastures of Jacob" refers to the country in general, while the "strongholds of Judah" specifies the object of destruction.[4]

The "strongholds of daughter Judah" (*miḇṣərê ḇaṯ yəhûḏāʰ*) are listed as the second destroyed target. The noun *miḇṣār*, "stronghold," comes from the root *bṣr* which means: to cut, to make inaccessible, to fortify.[5] Using this term, the editor alludes to the fortified cities built to protect strategic places and to make access to the capital more difficult. Their names can be found in the second book of Chronicles (cf. 2 Chr 11:5-11) in the context of the description of King Roboam's construction activity. Prophet Jeremiah also mentions two of those cities (Lachish and Azekah) as the resistance points against the Babylonian army (cf. Jer 34:7), the information apparently confirmed by the text of the so-called Lachish ostraca.[6]

The expression "daughter Judah" (*ḇaṯ yəhûḏāʰ*) appears three times in the Book of Lamentations (cf. Lam 1:15; 2:2; 2:5), next to similar expressions, such as the "daughter of Zion," the "daughter of Jerusalem," the "daughter of Edom," and the "daughter of my people." The image of a state, a country, or a city personified as a female figure seems to be very useful. It offers

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[3] See Francis B r o w n, Samuel R. D r i v e r, and Charles A. B r i g g s, entry נָוֶה, in Brown, Driver, and Briggs, *The Brown–Driver–Briggs Hebrew and English Lexicon: With an Appendix Containing the Biblical Aramaic. Coded with the Numbering System from Strong's Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible*, (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 2003), 627.

[4] See Iain W. P r o v a n, *Lamentations* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1991), 60.

[5] See Francis B r o w n, Samuel R. D r i v e r, and Charles A. B r i g g s, entry בָּצַר, in Brown, Driver, and Briggs, *The Brown–Driver–Briggs Hebrew and English Lexicon*, 130–1.

[6] See "The Ostraca of Samaria," trans. William F. Albright, in *Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament*, ed. James B. Pritchard (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 322.

a great variety of possible representations capable of expressing the nuances and shades of meaning (such as, e.g., 'young woman,' 'daughter,' 'virgin,' 'bride,' 'spouse,' 'mother,' or 'widow'). This potential may be among the factors that explained the popularity of the female personification in the Hebrew Bible, as well as in the culture of ancient Near East. Importantly, the "daughter of Judah" seems to have a broader meaning than the "daughter of Zion" or the "daughter of Jerusalem." The latter two expressions designate the city of Jerusalem: the capital of the state, whereas the "daughter of Judah" represents the whole Kingdom of Judah. As mentioned above, it was not only Jerusalem that suffered the consequences of the war. The whole kingdom partook of the tragic fate of the capital[7] and that community of fate is emphasized by the use of verbs describing the process of destruction. The Lord appears to be the subject of the verbs "destroyed" (*billaʿ*) and "showed no mercy" (*lʾ ḥāmal*) [to all the dwellings of Jacob] (cf. 2:2); he has "broken down" (*hāras*) the strongholds of the daughter of Judah, "brought down to the ground" (*higgîaʿ*), and "dishonored" (*ḥillēl*) the rulers of Judah. Three out of these five verbs (*blʿ*, *lʾ ḥml*, and *hrs*) have also been used in the description of the destruction of Jerusalem (cf. Lam 2:16-17, 21). It is worth noting that all the verbs used by the editor in Lamentations 2:2 emphasize violence, impetuosity, haste—almost the fury of action. The picture of destruction becomes even more dramatic once the reader realizes that it was God who inflicted violence on Judah and that, in the Hebrew Bible, violence was attributed to God only thrice (cf. Ps 89:40; Is 47:6; Lam 2:2). The idea of the destruction of the kingdom reappears in Lamentations 2:3–5 where the editor moves from the descriptions of Jerusalem to the images presenting the suffering of the entire country. The geography of the destruction is specified by the use of the names: "Israel" (Lam 2:3.5), "Jacob" (Lam 2:3), and the "daughter of Judah" (Lam 2:5). The narrative is further dramatized with additional verbs referring to the devastation wrought by the Lord. He "has cut down (*gāḏaʿ*) in fierce anger" (Lam 2:3), he "has burnt (*wayyiḇʿar*) like a flaming fire" (Lam 2:3) which "consumes" (*ʾāḵlāʰ*) (cf. Lam 2:3), he has "poured out (*šāpaḵ*) his fury like fire" (Lam 2:4), he "laid in ruins" (*šiḥēṯ*) its strongholds, and multiplied (*wayyereḇ*) in daughter Judah mourning and lamentation" (Lam 2:5). Even though it is the Lord who has caused destruction and acted "like an enemy" (Lam 2:5), the Book of Lamentations mentions also the names of the nations which, in an active or a passive way, contributed to the destruction of the Kingdom of Judah. Among them, the book names the Chaldeans (cf. 2 Kgs 25; 2 Chr 36:19; Jer 37:52), the Ammonites (cf. Ez 25:3), and the inhabitants of Moab (cf. Ez 25:8), Edom (cf. Ez 25:12), and Tyre (cf. Ez 26:2). In this way, the reader is informed that certain neigh-

[7] See Johan R e n k e m a, *Lamentations* (Leuven: Peeters, 1998), 170.

boring countries took advantage of the Chaldean invasion of the Kingdom of Judah even though they had earlier allied against the Babylonians (cf. Lam 5:2; Jer 27:3), which appears even more painful when we remember that some of those countries (e.g., Edom) were considered as connected to Israel through family ties (cf. Lam 4:21–22).

DESTRUCTION OF THE CITY

The subsequent stage of destruction depicted in the Book of Lamentation is the fall of the city of Jerusalem. The capital of the Kingdom of Judah was captured by the Babylonian troops twice: for the first time, it happened on March 15–16, 597 BCE, when, during the military campaign of Nebuchadnezzar in Judah,[8] the Judean king Jehoiachin surrendered the city (cf. 2 Kgs 24:12; 2 Chr 36:10; Ez 17:12), thus saving it from complete ruin, and, for the second time, in the summer of 587 or 586, after a long siege.[9] Although both defeats led to the destruction of the city narrated in the Lamentations, it was the second capture of Jerusalem that had a decisive impact on the shape of the poetic images included in the book.

One of these images is included in Lamentations 2:8–9a: "The Lord determined to lay in ruins the wall of daughter Zion; he stretched the line; he did not withhold his hand from destroying; he caused rampart and wall to lament; they languish together. Her gates have sunk into the ground; he has ruined and broken her bars." In this extract, the city itself is called "daughter Zion." The editor of the book mentions four architectural elements of the city: the wall, the rampart, the gates, and the bars. During the siege, they were, strategically speaking, the most important strongpoints of the city. Their size itself could discourage or frighten potential enemy and so they were regarded as the guarantee of the safety of the residents. In addition, being the outermost and thus the most visible part of the city and a walkway leading into it, the walls, the ramparts, the gates, and the bars testified to the power, might, and wealth of Jerusalem. Indeed, they might be considered, *pars pro toto*, as the whole Jerusalem, since to capture them meant to defeat the entire city.[10]

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[8] See "The Conquest of Jerusalem," trans. A. Leo Oppenheim, in *Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament*, 564; Bustenay O d e d, "Judah and the Exile," in *Israelite and Judean History*, ed. John H. Hayes and J. Maxwell Miller (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1986), 471.

[9] For a discussion of the problems concerning the precise chronology see O d e d, "Judah and the Exile," 474–5.

[10] See R e n k e m a, *Lamentations*, 254.

First, the text mentions the wall of Jerusalem. The Hebrew Bible frequently refers to them in different contexts (cf. 1 Kgs 3:1; 9:15; Ps 48:14; Jer 1:15; 2 Kgs 25:4 mentions also the second wall or the double wall). This biblical data has been confirmed by archeological excavations. Kathleen Kenyon, Nahman Avigad, and Yigal Shilo have discovered fragments of the walls and gates, as well as of the towers. The excavations have also revealed that the wall in various parts of the city was three, five or even seven meters high.[11] The editor of Lamentations writes that the city wall was exposed to destruction (*ləhašḥît*). The stem *šḥṯ*, used in the conjugation *pi'el* (cf. Lam 2:5) to describe the destruction of the country, is now used in the *hiph'il* form. Such a choice of form stresses the fact that the destruction was premeditated, accomplished intentionally, with an unwavering determination. The tension in the narrative is intensified even more by the verb *ḥšḇ*, "to intend," "to determine," used with "the Lord" as the subject.[12] It was the Lord who actually intended the destruction, it was him who planned it!

The theme of the wall is resumed in Lam 2:8c, where it is combined with that of the rampart, or bulwark. The verbs used here (*'ḇl* and *'ml*) emphasize the picture of ruins and total damage. As Arnulf Baumann notes, the verb *'ḇl* means "to observe customs of mourning." Due to the destructive intervention of God, the ruins of the wall and of the rampart become a sign of mourning.[13] In Johan Renkema's view, however, that sign might have been an effect of the enemy's efforts to destroy the wall during the siege.[14]

Verse 8 says that the Lord "stretched the line" (*nāṭāʰ qāw*). This is an expression suggestive of a positive enterprise: God's creative work, but also a carpenter's work or the reconstruction of Jerusalem (cf. Is 44:13; Jb 38:5; Jer 31:38; Zec 1:6). In this context, however, the meaning of the phrase resembles that in 2 Kings 21:13, where the biblical author characterized the destruction of the city as "well prepared," "measured," as well as consistently and dispassionately realized. By describing the Lord as the one who did "not withhold his hand from destroying," the author recalls God's saving intervention in 2 Samuel 24:16, when the Lord had stopped the hand of the angel bringing destruction. Now the hand of the destroyer was not restrained!

The final part of the discussed text mentions the city gates and bars. The gates served as the main points of resistance during the siege. Their dimen-

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[11] See Yigal S h i l o h, "Jerusalem: The Early Periods and the First Temple Period," in *The New Encyclopedia of Archeological Excavations in the Holy Land*, vol. 2, ed. Ephraim Stern (Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society and Carta, 1993), 706.

[12] See R e n k e m a, *Lamentations*, 251.

[13] See Arnulf B a u m a n, entry אבל, in *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Alten Testament*, vol. 1, ed. Gerhard J. Botterweck and Helmer Ringgren (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1973), 46.

[14] See R e n k e m a, *Lamentations*, 254; Cf. 2 Sam 20:15; 2 Kings 25:10.

sions and security usually exceeded those of the regular wall.[15] Now, when the anger of the Lord struck the city, the gates "sank into the ground," and the bars were "ruined and broken" (Lam 2:9). As Renkema notes, when the verb *'bd* refers to a material object, it is often connected with the cult of idols.[16] This seems surprising in the context of Jerusalem, the Holy City. However, the use of the verb in question may also indicate the true source and the cause of God's wrath, i.e., the idolatrous confidence placed in the Holy City by the people of Judah.

It is worth noting that the sequence of verbs itself indicates the continuous progress of destruction. In this way, the editor depicts—reconstructing the order of events almost exactly as they happened—the agony of Jerusalem. The image again emphasizes the personification of the city (which we have addressed, while discussing the expression "the daughter of Zion"). The editor of the book enhances the personification even more by showing a resemblance of the 'actions' of the city to those of the people. Inanimate objects in the city are described as 'acting' as if they were its residents: the wall and the ramparts mourn and bend to the ground—exactly as do the elders of the city in Lamentations 2:10. Such a description, on the one hand, testifies to the common destiny of the city and its inhabitants. On the other hand, it also indicates that the whole truth about the destruction of Jerusalem can be expressed only by means of images and metaphors normally used to describe human suffering. Such a choice of images and metaphors is evident from the very beginning of the book. In Lamentations 1:1, the unpopulated city is compared to a widow who lost not only her husband, but also her children; in other words, she was deprived of any support and care. This picture seems to aptly express the situation of the city after the siege: its residents died in battle (cf. Lam 3:21-22) or were taken captive (cf. Lam 1:5). The city of Jerusalem, destroyed during the war, was deprived of any protection and lay in ruin (cf. Neh 1:3; 3:11-14.17).

In Lamentations 1:8, the editor speaks of the "nakedness"[17] of Jerusalem. In the Hebrew Bible, "nakedness" has an extremely wide semantic field. Very often, the meaning of the word focuses on the concepts of shame and misfortune. Stripping of clothes was used as a punishment inflicted on adulterous women. Now Jerusalem was stripped of its garments, i.e., of the walls, the ramparts, and the city gates (cf. Ez 16:39; 23:29). The unfaithful city, deprived of its garments, was exposed to dangerous attacks and covered in shame, remaining without any defense.[18]

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[15] See S h i l o h, "Jerusalem: The Early Periods and the First Temple Period," 706.

[16] See R e n k e m a, *Lamentations*, 256.

[17] Quoted after *The Revised Standard Version.*

[18] See R e n k e m a, *Lamentations*, 134–5.

In Lamentations 1:13, we can read that the city was destroyed by the fire sent by the Lord from heaven. The fire emphasizes the intensity of God's wrath against Jerusalem (cf. also Lam 1:12; 2:4) and is reminiscent of the story of Sodom and Gomorrah (cf. Gn 18–19), the two cities destroyed by the fire falling from the sky (cf. Gn 19:24–25). Destruction by means of fire is also characteristic of the siege tactics known from ancient sources. The excavations conducted by Nahman Avigad in Jerusalem confirmed that the city had been destroyed precisely in that way.[19] As the Book of Lamentations states, the fire of divine wrath devoured the bones of the daughter of Zion. This picture shows the fire that penetrates the body and touches its entrails. The meaning of this metaphor is revealed in the light of Lamentations 4:11, where the ardent wrath of the Lord kindles the fire which devours the foundations of Zion. It would be difficult to imagine the fire destroying even the stone foundations of the city, but by claiming it had actually been the case, the editor of the book emphasizes the immense scale of destruction.

It is worth noting that the immensity of the catastrophe is underlined by the contrast between the vision of Jerusalem in ruins and that of the city prior to the siege: "full of people" (Lam 1:1), and "the perfection of beauty, the joy of all the earth" (Lam 2:15). After the war, those phrases were used only by the enemy to openly mock and deride Jerusalem.

DESTRUCTION OF THE TEMPLE

The capture of the Temple is given a special place in the description the fall of Jerusalem. A direct reference to this event can be found in Lamentations 1:10 and 2:6–7. Paradoxically, the text of Lamentations 1:10 does not focus on the material aspect of destruction, but on the fact of the Babylonian troops entering the Temple. Although the invasion of the Temple was certainly accompanied by pillage and material destruction (cf. 2 Kgs 25:9; Ps 74:3), the first issue observed by the author is the transgression of the divine prohibition by the "pagans," *gôyim*.[20] The source of the prohibition is Deuteronomy 23:3–4, which mentions the Ammonites and the Moabites. In the Hebrew Bible, there are also texts that generally refer to foreigners (*ben-nēḵār*), prohibiting their participation in the liturgy or their presence in the Temple (cf. Ex12:43; Lv 22:25; Ez 44:9). The presence of a foreigner in the Temple during the liturgy, let alone his participation in it, was considered (with rare exceptions:

[19] See S h i l o h, "Jerusalem: The Early Periods and the First Temple Period," 709.

[20] See Francis B r o w n, Samuel R. D r i v e r, and Charles A. B r i g g s, entry גָּוִי, in Brown, Driver, and Briggs, *The Brown–Driver–Briggs Hebrew and English Lexicon*, 156.

cf. 1 Kgs 8:43; 1 Chr 6:32–33) as profanation (*ḥll*) of the liturgy or of the sanctuary. Now, the Babylonian invasion and the entrance of the troops to the Temple amazed the editor of the Book of Lamentations and made him question his (sometimes almost magical: cf. Jer 7:12–14) faith in God's protection of the holy place.[21] First and foremost, it was incomprehensible to him that a pagan army might have been an instrument of God's punishment, the scourge in God's hands.

In the second extract focused on the Temple (Lam 2:6–7), the motifs of profanation ('spiritual' destruction) are mixed with those of material destruction. The issue of pagan presence in the sanctuary, mentioned earlier in Lamentations 1:10, reappears. The editor of the text adds yet another element of the 'spiritual' destruction: the Lord has caused to be forgotten (*šikkaḥ*) "appointed feast and sabbath"[22] (Lam 2:6), He "has scorned (*zānaḥ*) His altar," and "disowned (*ni'ēr*) His sanctuary" (Lam 2:7). The syntax of Lam 2:6-7 places the terms *znḥ* and *n'r* in verse 7 in parallel with *ḥms* and *šḥt* in verse 6. In this sense, the desecration of the Temple becomes visible in its physical destruction.[23] The physical destruction of the Temple also highlights the problem of God's silence. On the one hand, the destruction is seen as caused by God's silence.[24] On the other hand, the destroyed Temple is the clearest sign of that silence.

It is worth considering how the precise object of the destruction has been specified. In Lamentations 2:6, the editor writes about the "tabernacle" (*śoḵ* —"hut," "enclosure"[25]), the appointed place of celebration (*môʿēd*). In 2:7, he also adds the altar (already mentioned in Lamentations 1:10), the sanctuary, the walls of the citadel [of the Temple], and finally the house of the Lord (probably alluded to already in Lamentations 2:1).[26] In this way, he brings to the reader's mind not only the particular edifice of the Temple, but also the whole complex of buildings connected with it, and points to the fact that (as in the case of the city) their fate and that of the human beings are intertwined. And it is exactly the fate of the inhabitants of Jerusalem that I shall analyze in the next section of this paper.

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[21] See Jacob L. H e l b e r g, "The Incomparable Sorrow of Zion in the Book of Lamentations," *Ou Testamentiese Werkgemeenskap in Suid-Afrika* 15–16 (1972–1973), 33.

[22] Quoted after *The Revised Standard Version*.

[23] See R e n k e m a, *Lamentations*, 246.

[24] See F. W. D o b b s - A l l s o p p, *Lamentations* (Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 2002), 87.

[25] See R e n k e m a, *Lamentations*, 240; cf. Pss 27:5; 42:5; 76:3. See also P r o v a n, *Lamentations*, 63.

[26] See D o b b s - A l l s o p p, *Lamentations*, 83.

THE SUFFERING OF THE PEOPLE

In my analysis of the picture of the destruction of Jerusalem, I have progressed from its outermost circles (destruction of the land) towards the central point of the city (the Temple). I shall try to follow the same pattern in my analysis of the suffering of the people. According to some exegetes, the latter actually provides the profound structure of the Book of Lamentations.[27] However, at this point the order of my analysis becomes more subjective. In my view, the outermost circle consisted of common people, represented especially by women. The next circle encompassed the elite: the nobility, the priests, the prophets, and the elders, as well as the king, while the innermost circle was that of young ones and children. Not only were they the most precious treasure of the chosen people, but they also represented its future and hope.

THE WOMEN

Women, who normally did not take active part in military operations, frequently became the first victims of war, and endured great suffering due to physical violence inflicted on them by the victors and their ruthless ferocity. Those acts of violence were recorded in the Book of Lamentations and can easily be traced.

Lamentations 5:11 mentions "women raped in Zion and virgins in the towns of Judah." Interestingly, the married women and the virgins open the list of those who suffered because of the war. The editor writes about the women being raped by the invaders. The verb *ʿnh* can mean "to be afflicted, humiliated, to bend down," but it can also be used to describe sexual violence (cf. Gn 34:2; Dt 22:24, 29; 2 Sm 13:12, 14; Ez 22:10–11). The fact that soldiers, expected to obtain their equipment and care for its maintenance during the war, and frequently also to serve without pay, considered the women as part of their loot, helps explain the meaning of Lamentations 1:10. According to some exegetes, the phrase "all her precious things" may refer to the women. After the fall of the city, the women, together with the material goods, became property of the looters (cf. Ez 24:16).[28] In addition, the fact that the women suffered from violence points to another aspect of their experience of the war: they no longer had defenders, as their husbands, brothers, and sons were probably all dead.[29]

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[27] See Michael M. M o o r e, "Human Suffering in Lamentations," *Revue Biblique* 90(1983), 549.

[28] See R e n k e m a, *Lamentations*, 143.

[29] See Alan M i n t z, "The Rhetoric of Lamentations and the Representation of Catastrophe," *Prooftexts* 2(1982): 3.

Several other verses inform the reader about the fate of Jerusalem. In Lamentations 1:4, the young women are described with the *nip'al* form of the verb *ygh*, "to grieve."[30] This root is used nine times in the Hebrew Bible and, out of it, five times in Lamentations. In four of the five cases, the Lord is directly mentioned as the agent of the affliction of Jerusalem (cf. Lam 1:5.12; 3:32.33; cf. also Lam 1:4). Renkema believes that the young women in question were connected with the Temple (as dancers and singers).[31] To locate their grief against the historical background, yet describe it in theological terms (as sadness caused by the Lord), one might point to the cessation of worship and liturgy in the Temple or to the destruction of the Temple itself.

The fate of women is presented in Lamentations not only as tied to that of the city and the Temple, but also as related to the suffering of other social groups: Lamentations 1:4 reads that women experienced sorrow together with the priests; Lamentations 2:10 shows women united with the elders of the daughter of Zion in their gestures of mourning, while Lamentations 1:18 speaks about young women going to exile with young men (cf. 2 Kgs 25:11; Lam 1:5). Sometimes, the women felt exiled even though they had remained in the war-ravaged homeland (cf. Lam 1:1c.3c.4c.9bc.15b.18b.22ab).[32] Lamentations 2:21 records that both young and old women, just like the men (described here as boys) and the elders, were killed by sword. And finally, the women partook of the horror of hunger (mentioned throughout the book and affecting all the social groups).

We shall conclude the analysis of the suffering of women as described in the Book of Lamentations by pointing to another horrible experience: a specifically feminine one, related to motherhood. The women described in Lamentations witnessed the death of their children. They saw their children being killed by the enemy on the walls, as well as in the streets and squares of the city (Lam 1:15; 2:21; 4:1-2) and, which was much worse, watched their small children dying of hunger in their arms (cf. Lam 2:12; 4:3-4). However, the human suffering depicted in Lamentations reaches its apex when the women, forced by the circumstances of the war, sell, cook, and eat their children (cf. Lam 1:11; 2: 20; 4:10). Those scenes make the desperate cry (recorded in Lamentations 1:12) of the daughter of Zion profoundly authentic: "Look and see if there is any sorrow like my sorrow..."

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[30] See Francis B r o w n, Samuel R. D r i v e r, and Charles A. B r i g g s, entry עָנָה, in Brown, Driver, and Briggs, *The Brown–Driver–Briggs Hebrew and English Lexicon*, 387.

[31] See R e n k e m a, *Lamentations*, 116.

[32] See D o b b s - A l l s o p p, *Lamentations*, 76–7.

THE NOBLES, THE PROPHETS, THE PRIESTS, THE ELDERS, AND THE KING

As a group, the women may be considered as representing the fate of 'average' individuals during a siege. Proceeding to the second group, however, we must keep in mind that our analysis will address higher circles in the social hierarchy in which the king enjoyed the highest status. On the one hand, it might be expected that the position of the members of that group would guarantee them greater safety during the time of siege (e.g., special protection). On the other hand, they were those who would bear the most serious consequences of the fall the city. The latter assumption seems confirmed by the fact that the editor of the Lamentations would frequently focus his attention precisely on that group.

The word *śārîm*, "princes," is mentioned in the Lamentations four times. The noun *śār* can designate various functions and offices.[33] In the Bible, it is used to refer to princes and heads of the state, but also to heads of the army, those responsible for stopovers during the march through the desert, and superiors of the priests or the Levites (cf. 2 Chr 35:9; 36:14, 18; Jer 51:59; 52:10, 25). Whenever they are mentioned in Lamentations, it is to describe an affliction they suffered, and each time it is a different one. Lamentations 2:2 depicts them as sharing, with the entire kingdom, the experience of profanation (*ḥll*). Lamentations 1:6 mentions their hasty escape (cf. 2 Kgs 25:4–5). Held responsible for the pro-Egyptian politics and for the outbreak of the anti-Babylonian rebellion, they found themselves in danger after the victory of the Babylonian troops. Their escape and the chase after them are presented in terms of a hunt where the princes are compared to deer which, having taken a narrow escape, could not find pasture and lost their strength. When captured, some of them were killed (cf. Lam 5:12; cf. also 2 Kgs 25:19-21; Jer 39:6; 52:10, 25-27), while others were forced into exile (cf. Lam 2:9; cf. also 2 Kgs 25:21; Jer 52:27-30). Since a person's position in the social structure was inseparable from their living standard, one can recognize the predicament of the social class in question also in Lamentations 4:5[34]: those accustomed to excellent food (cf. Gn 49:20) and brought up in purple were found languishing (from hunger) in the streets and clinging to ash heaps.[35]

In Lamentations 5:12, the princes are mentioned together with the elders (*zəqēnîm*). The latter term has been used five times in the book to designate those

[33] See Francis B r o w n, Samuel R. D r i v e r, and Charles A. B r i g g s, entry שַׂר, in Brown, Driver, and Briggs, *The Brown–Driver–Briggs Hebrew and English Lexicon*, 978.

[34] See Adele B e r l i n, *Lamentations: A Commentary* (London and Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press), 2002, 505–6.

[35] See ibidem, 107.

who played an important role in the public life of the city (with the exception of Lamentations 2:21, where the term describes simply the age group). Because of the war, they were forced to abandon their duties (e.g., passing judgment at the city gates) (cf. Lam 5:14; cf. also Dt 21:19; Jo 20:4; Ru 4:1-12), they were no longer given honors and respect due to their age and social position (cf. Lam 4:16; 5:12), and had to perform the rites of mourning and penance (cf. Lam 2:10). Finally, they suffered and died from the horrors of hunger (cf. Lam 1:19).

In this context, the Book of Lamentations mentions also the Temple in the sense of the religious aristocracy represented by the priests and the prophets. The priests went into mourning because all worship had ceased in the destroyed Temple (cf. Lam 1:4). As in the case of the elders, the priests were no longer respected by the society (cf. Lam 4:16). They experienced the failure of the Law, which had been the basis of religious and social life (cf. Lam 2:9). Together with other inhabitants of the besieged city, the priests suffered hunger and died from it (cf. Lam 1:19). As they had the right to eat from the offerings made in the Temple, their case appears as particularly tragic. The prophets were no longer sent visions by the Lord, and so became useless to the society (cf. Lam 2:9). The horrible fate of the priests and the prophets is described by the editor of the second song of Lamentations: they were killed by the enemy in the Temple of the Lord (cf. Lam 2:20). Both priests and prophets were also accused of being the immediate cause of God's wrath that destroyed the city, because they "shed the blood of the righteous" (Lam 4:13) in the midst of Jerusalem, which may symbolize also idolatry.[36] In Lamentations 2:6, the editor speaks of the rejection of the priests by God and of his ardent wrath against them. Such a rejection was also experienced by the person at the top of the social hierarchy: the king.

Apart from verse 2:6, we find a mention of the king in Lamentations 4:19–20 and 2:9. Chronologically, one should first read Lamentations 4:19–20, which describe the escape attempted by the king (cf. 2 Kgs 25:3– 7; Jer 52:7–11). The events depicted in those verses took place outside the city, in the desert near Jericho, where the king was captured by the Babylonians. The tragic conclusion of those verses is that neither the city, with its walls, streets, and squares, nor the desert and the mountains could provide the king and his nobles with a place to hide.[37] Brought to Riblah, the king, after watching the death of his sons, was blinded and sent to Babylon (cf. 2 Kgs 25:6–7). An allusion to the Babylonian exile can also be found in Lamentations 2:9, which alludes to the king and his nobles being made to stay among pagan peoples. Two features of the verses in question (Lam 4:19–20 and Lam 2:9) deserve special attention. Firstly, the enemy's determination is expressed by means of an image of

[36] See ibidem, 104.

[37] See P r o v a n, *Lamentations*, 122.

eagles preying on the king (cf. 2 Sam 1:23; Jer 48:30; 49:22). The verb *dlq* used here expresses the idea of furious and ardent pursuit. Secondly, the king is presented as "the anointed of the Lord" and "the breath of our life," as well as metaphorically: by means of an image of a tree ("under his shadow we shall live among the nations"—Lam 4:20). This characteristic makes evident not only the psychological aspect of kingship (the sense of security and protection), but also—and perhaps above all—its theological aspect: the Davidic king as a sign and partner of God's covenant with His people. The king is also mentioned in Lam 2:9, in the context of the exile into which he and his princes were driven (cf. Lam 4:14.17).[38]

THE YOUNG PEOPLE AND THE CHILDREN

At the end of this section of the paper, I shall focus on the situation of the young people and the children. They are the group that played almost no active role in the military, political, or social life, but it is them—in our view—who actually turn the scales against Judah in the story reported in the Book of Lamentations. Such a claim might appear odd, particularly given the fact that the analysis of the material concerning the young people and the children has not revealed anything new or extraordinary. Their suffering might seem to have been already addressed in the descriptions of the experience of the other groups. Although the group in question was the weakest part of the society, during the war, they were shown mercy neither by the enemy nor by the neighbors. Those who, due to their weakness and lack of autonomy, relied on love, solidarity, and compassion in time of peace were made to partake of the suffering inflicted upon the whole population by the war. The Book of Lamentations describes the double threat that hunger posed to the children (cf. Lam 2:11–12). They were dying of hunger like all the others but, in addition, they were exposed to another unexpected and fatal danger. The book reports— as has been mentioned in the discussion of the fate of the women—the appalling practices of cannibalism and trade in children (cf. Lam 1:11; 2:20; 4:10).[39] The editor describes the horrible common fate of the boys and the elders (cf. Lam 2:21), and writes that the virgins and the young were killed by sword as if they were soldiers, men of war (Lam 2:21). The virgins are shown to have been subjected to the same sufferings as the mature women (cf. Lam 5:11), also partaking of the fate of the elders

[38] See B e r l i n, *Lamentations: A Commentary*, 113.

[39] See Delbert R. H i l l e r s, *Lamentations*: *A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (New York, London, Toronto, Sydney and Auckland: Doubleday 1992), 148. See also Delbert R. H i l l e r s, "History and Poetry in Lamentations": 157–60.

(cf. Lam 2:10). The young are destroyed or driven into exile (cf. Lam 1:18). A particular drama experienced by that group, as the fifth song of Lamentations suggests, consisted in that they had to mature too soon because there was no time for them to be young (cf. Lam 5:14) and, even after the war and the fall of Jerusalem, were forced to labor beyond their strength (cf. Lam 5:13).

Having recognized the solidarity of fate and suffering between the youngest and the oldest generations, is it possible to justify the statement that the children and the young people are given a particularly important place in the Book of Lamentations? It seems to be the case for two reasons. Firstly, the fate of the children raises the question of the suffering of the innocent, which cannot be easily explained: pointing to suffering as a penalty for sin amounts to oversimplification. The editor of the book perceives the suffering of the innocent as a fact undermining the traditional rules of retaliation and retribution. In our view, the problem in question becomes one of the main issues with which the editor strives to cope, at the same time inviting the reader to confront it mentally. Secondly, the motif of the suffering of the children and the young gives more breadth and depth to the picture of the disaster. Not only do such suffering and death show the true extent of the tragedy, but they also appear to overshadow the future of the nation, the city, and the whole country. Is it possible for Jerusalem, with part of her future already dead, to keep her hope alive? Is there a place for hope in the Book of Lamentations? We shall address this issue in the final section of the paper.

THEOLOGY AND HOPE IN THE BOOK OF LAMENTATIONS

It is difficult to discuss the theology of Lamentations as if there were a consistent, clearly identifiable theological system presupposed in the book. The diversity of opinions among modern exegetes demonstrates that it would be virtually impossible to find such a system in the Book of Lamentations. In the third section of the paper, I shall present some theological ideas emerging from the descriptions of suffering included in the analyzed text. I shall also try to identify traces of hope hidden among the mourning and lament over the destroyed city and the suffering of its people.

"WE HAVE TRANSGRESSED AND REBELLED, AND YOU HAVE NOT FORGIVEN" (Lam 3:42)

The Book of Lamentations shares a belief, common in the ancient Near East, that catastrophes, on both social and individual levels, are consequences

of sin or transgression of the law.[40] Such a belief is expressed throughout the book (cf. Lam 1:5, 8, 14, 18, 20, 22; 2:14; 3:39, 42; 5:7, 16). On this evidence, one might hypothesize that the roots of Lamentations are to be found in the Deuteronomistic theology, in which reward and punishment were perceived as immediate consequences of human behavior. Such a clear dependence seemed obvious to the editors of Deuteronomy, even though it might not be apparent what sin or transgression had caused the punishment.[41] Some biblical scholars claim that "the very admission of personal guilt becomes the turning point towards hope in the future."[42] However, even if the traces of this traditional concept can be found in Lamentations, it seems that we can also see in it a clear break from the well-established theological view. It is interesting to observe that in Lamentations sin is attributed to different subjects, such as Zion, Jerusalem, "the daughters of my people," or the ancestors. All of them seem rather abstract: perhaps not unreal, but certainly not specific. This impression is strengthened by Lamentations 3:39, where the editor mentions "a man,"[43] or "a living man,"[44] as the subject of sin, as if the sin (and the punishment for it) could be attributed to any living being. Although the book contains also confessions made in the first person ("we have transgressed and rebelled"—Lam 3:42; "we have sinned"[45]—Lam 5:16), the individual songs express a certain tension, suggesting that, seen in the context of the disaster the Lamentations describes, the traditional view of Deuteronomistic theology was not without flaw.[46]

This hypothesis also appears to be supported by the fact that, in the Book of Lamentations, it is difficult to find any specific characterization of the sin which had caused the disaster. The reader is provided only with general information on the issue: Lamentations 1:18 declares that Jerusalem rebelled against the words of the Lord, while Lamentations 4:13 mentions the sin of the priests. Apart from the allusions included in these verses, the nature of transgression to which the text refers finds no explanation; such details are absent even from the verses where the fault is confessed in the first person ("we have sinned"),

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[40] See D o b b s - A l l s o p p, *Lamentations*, 29.

[41] See Jannie H u n t e r, *Faces of a Lamenting City: The Development and Coherence of the Book of Lamentations* (Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Bern, New York, Paris and Wien: Peter Lang Publishing, 1996), 73.

[42] Jože K r a š o v e c, "The Source of Hope in the Book of Lamentations," *Vetus Testamentum* 42, no. 2 (1992): 227.

[43] Quoted after *The Revised Standard Version.*

[44] Quoted after *The Revised Standard Version.*

[45] Quoted after *The Revised Standard Version.*

[46] See Kathleen M. O' C o n n o r, *Lamentations and the Tears of the World* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2002), 121.

or from Lamentations 4:6, which suggests that the sin of the "daughter of my people"[47] was greater than that of Sodom.

The reader's uncertainty about the reasons which might explain the catastrophe is, perhaps, a reflection of the doubt cherished by the editors of the Book of Lamentations. On the one hand, they remembered the religious tradition expressed, e.g., in Deuteronomy 28[48] or in the teaching of the prophets who announced inevitable punishment of sin. On the other hand, the editors of Lamentations remembered also the theology of Zion, expressed, e.g., in the Psalms (Pss 46, 48, 87), which affirmed the inviolability of the Temple as the place chosen by the Lord. It is probably with that uncertainty that the evolution in the attitude of the editors began, their fearful doubt, gradually changing into detached observation of the facts, and finally into the open accusation: 'The Lord has exceeded ... The Lord has abandoned himself to anger....'

"THE LORD HAS DESTROYED WITHOUT MERCY" (Lam 2:2)

In the preceding section, we mentioned the change of heart experienced by the editors of Lamentations. They struggled with doubts and questions—and they struggled intensely. They faced a disaster never seen before. Their traditional theology was prompting them that the destruction they witnessed had been caused by sin, so they recognized that the Lord had punished them rightly.[49] But when they considered the scale of the tragedy, the effects of the Lord's wrath, they were unable to suffer in silence any more. And so, at the beginning of three out the of five songs the book comprises (cf. Lam 1, 2, and 4), we can hear a cry rising to God from the ruins of the Holy City: it is a voice resembling an inarticulate sound, *'êḵāh*, a cry of pain, suffering, or despair, a cry of grief for the death of the city, for the death of the husband, wife, or children, for the 'death' of the Temple, and for the death of the human heart. But that initially inarticulate cry, coming from the wounded hearts of the witnesses to the tragic events, immediately changes into eloquent images of the fall, of the suffering of the people, and of the emotions it had engendered. As shown in the previous section of the paper, the image of destruction which has emerged from Lamentations 1–2 is expressive of the destructive force, violence, and cruelty unparalleled anywhere in the Hebrew Bible. The picture provided by the editors of Lamentations leaves no doubt about the fact that the

[47] Quoted after *The Revised Standard Version.*

[48] See H u n t e r, *Faces of a Lamenting City*, 77.

[49] See M i n t z, "The Rhetoric of Lamentations and the Representation of Catastrophe": 11.

agent of destruction was the Lord himself, while the emotions of profound sadness, excruciating pain, anger, and burning rage, as well as despair, have been portrayed with an incomparable richness of color. And one must admit that the vivid description of the destruction renders the expression of the extreme emotions both comprehensible and justified. The God who allowed children to die must take into account the outcry of human beings!

"AND THEREFORE I HAVE HOPE" (Lam 3:21)
"DO NOT FEAR!" (Lam 3:57)[50]

It would be a mistake to think that the Book of Lamentations is focused merely on the past historical events and on the resulting tragic situation of Judah. The mental world of the editors of the book cannot be exhausted by mere memory of the disaster, not even by their lament over the hardships caused by the destruction. Lamentations also speaks about the future. This fact inspires the first ray of hope, which seemed to have died together with the children of Jerusalem: "I say, 'Gone is my glory, and all that I had hoped for from the Lord'" (Lam 3:18). As a matter of fact, the vocabulary of hope, absent from every other chapter of the book, appears in surprising abundance in Lamentations 3 (cf. Lam 3:18.21.24.26.29).[51] Derived from the realization, 'We have survived,' hope takes here a concrete form and immediately engenders the questions: 'What then will be? Have you utterly rejected us? Are you angry with us beyond measure?' (cf. Lam 5:22). Those questions testify to the fact that the human beings who have suffered begin to search for God; they do it by following the well-known path: "Let us test and examine our ways, and return to the Lord" (Lam 3:40; cf. Jer 18:11; 35:15; 14:3). However, the protagonists of Lamentations do not share the optimism of the past generation. Rather, they know that despite their great desire to return to the Lord, they are unable to do so by their own efforts, but desperately need the Lord's help. "Restore us to yourself, O Lord, that we may be restored; renew our days as of old" (Lam 5:21). In this way, by awaiting God's help, the survivors take their first step: they decide to hope. It is not an easy hope, but a hope in tears; a hope expressed as an act of volition rather than as a conviction that 'all will be well.' In Lamentations, the human beings *decide* to hope: 'I will have hope' /

[50] See Bo J o h n s o n, "Form and Message in Lamentations," *Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft* 97 (1985): 60.

[51] See Miriam J. B i e r, *'Perhaps There is Hope'*: *Reading Lamentations as a Polyphony of Pain, Penitence, and Protest* (London, Oxford, New York, New Delhi and Sydney: Bloomsbury, 2016), 113.

'I will persevere, persist' (*'ôḥîl*—cf. Lam 3:21).[52] It seems that the destruction, the suffering, and the pain have become, paradoxically, evidence of God's faithful and unfailing love.[53] And although that love assumes the painful shape of judgment, it also leads to the discovery that "the steadfast love of the Lord never ceases, his mercies never come to an end" (Lam 3:22). Thus the hope declared in Lamentations 3:21, and expressed again in Lamentations 3:24, is not naive hope, nourished only by the memory of the miraculous exit from Egypt or glorious conquest of the Promised Land.[54] In the presence of God stands the new human being: changed by pain and formed out of the suffering of the earth (cf. Gn 2:7), courageous enough to raise not only his or her cry, but also his or her fists toward the sky. The destroyed city and the murdered people provide a silent background to that dramatic protest. And now, against this background, the human being makes his or her decision: 'I will have hope, I will persevere' (cf. Lam 3:21), and immediately adds in a whisper: 'Please, O Lord, do not let me down....'

To such a decision, God responds by entering into dialogue with the human being transformed by suffering. The same God who raised the cry of his anger, now speaks through silence,[55] broken by just two Hebrew words which resound in Lamentations 3:57, *'al-tîrā'*—"Do not fear!"[56]

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At the beginning of this analysis of the Book of Lamentations, it seemed important to concentrate on the historicity of the described events, so as to seek their confirmation in other books of the Hebrew Bible, or in other historical sources.[57] I have always been convinced that there is more to the story

[52] See Ulrich B e r g e s, *Klagelieder* (Freiburg, Basel and Wien: Herder, 2002), 197. Sometimes this "man's hopeful transition" is identified as starting only in Lamentations 3:22. See Mark P. S t o n e, "Vindicating Yahweh: A Close Reading of Lamentations 3.21-42," "Journal for the Study of the Old Testament" 43, no. 1 (2018): 90–1. Stone reads the Hebrew verb *yḥl* in Lamentations 3:21 in its basic meaning of 'to wait.'

[53] See Paul R. H o u s e, "Lamentations," in *Song of Songs. Lamentations*, ed. Duane Garrett and Paul R. House (Dallas, TX: Thomas Nelson Inc., 2004), 415.

[54] See Paul W. F e r r i s Jr., *The Genre of Communal Lament in the Bible and the Ancient Near East* (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1992), 145.

[55] See M i n t z, "The Rhetoric of Lamentations and the Representation of Catastrophe": 16.

[56] See Shaye J. D. C o h e n, "The Destruction: From Scripture to Midrash," *Prooftexts* 2, no. 1 (1982): 20.

[57] See H i l l e r s, "History and Poetry": 155–61; Daniel L. S m i t h - C h r i s t o p h e r, "Reassessing the Historical and Sociological Impact of the Babylonian Exile (597/587–539 BCE)," in *Exile: Old Testament, Jewish, and Christian Conceptions*, ed. James M. Scott (Leiden, New York and Köln: Brill, 1997), 7–36; Hans M. B a r s t a d, *The Myth of the Empty Land: A Study in the*

told in Lamentations than the poetic imagination of the authors and editors of the book. While 'walking' with them through the squares and streets of the destroyed city and 'meeting' the suffering people, I have discovered that the power of Lamentations does not consist in a more or less faithful account of the dramatic events in the history of Israel. Rather, I realized that the power of the book lies in that it is an expression of the universal experience of human suffering.[58] As such, Lamentations is addressed not only to its human listeners, or readers, but also to God and—I am certain of it—contains vestiges of the divine response.

Still, suffering and its expression, though overwhelming, does not exhaust the contents of the Book of Lamentations and its careful reading unveils the theological themes apparently unique to the Hebrew Bible, such as human guilt and responsibility, the role of God in the destruction of the land, the city, and the Temple, as well as in the terrible suffering experienced by the inhabitants of the desolate—'murdered'—city. Against such a background the issue of hope emerges as particularly telling and significant. The hope which can be found in Lamentations sprouts up from among the ruins and debris and is rooted in the conviction that "The steadfast love of the Lord never ceases, his mercies never come to an end" (Lam 3:22); however, it is also a hope born in the hearts of those who, having suffered, decided to give God a chance, to trust him one more time.

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[58] See Iain W. P r o v a n, "Reading Texts Against an Historical Background: The Case of Lamentations 1," *Scandinavian Journal of the Old Testament* 4, no. 1 (1990): 141.

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ABSTRACT / ABSTRAKT

Krzysztof NAPORA, "There May Yet Be Hope..." (Lam 3:29): Destruction, Suffering, and Hope in The Book of Lamentations

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In this article, the author analyzes the images of the destruction of the Kingdom of Judah and the suffering of its inhabitants during the Babylonian invasions of the 6th century BCE as they have been described by the editors of the Book of Lamentations. The author discusses the successive stages of the destruction (land—city—Temple) and of the suffering (ordinary people—nobles—children). In the concluding section, some theological reflections inspired by the book are presented. Among them, a prominent place belongs to the issue of hope that sprouts up in the ruins of the desolated city.

Keywords: Book of Lamentations, hope, Babylonian captivity, Jerusalem

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Krzysztof NAPORA, „A może jest jeszcze nadzieja...” (Lam 3:29). Zniszczenie, cierpienie i nadzieja w Księdze Lamentacji

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Wśród ksiąg Starego Testamentu, ukryta nieco w cieniu Proroctwa Jeremiasza, Księga Lamentacji jawi się jako utwór zupełnie wyjątkowy. W żadnej innej spośród ksiąg biblijnych obraz zniszczenia kraju i miasta oraz portret ludzkiego cierpienia nie splatają się ze sobą w sposób bardziej sugestywny. Ruiny i ból tworzą przejmujący pejzaż odmalowany kunsztownym rytmem hebrajskiej poezji żałobnej (*qinah*) i wyśpiewany głosami pięciu pieśni tworzących księgę. Wyjątkowość księgi nie polega jednak wyłącznie na plastycznym opisie cierpienia i zniszczeń. Opis ten staje się tłem, na którym redaktor Lamentacji szkicuje niezwykły traktat, próbując na nowo stawiać tradycyjne pytania dotyczące Boga, człowieka, sensu cierpienia i źródeł nadziei. Autor niniejszego opracowania analizuje kolejno obrazy zniszczenia i cierpienia ludzi dotkniętych dramatem wojny zawarte w wybranych fragmentach Księgi Lamentacji oraz stara się zidentyfikować elementy teologicznej refleksji redaktora księgi. W kontekście opisanego dramatu jednym z najważniejszych motywów tej refleksji wydaje się motyw nadziei.

Słowa kluczowe: Księga Lamentacji, nadzieja, Niewola Babilońska, Jerozolima

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Agnieszka DUDEK-KOWALSKA

MERCY AS FRUIT OF THE PASCHAL MYSTERY IN THE THEOLOGY OF JOHN PAUL II: THE SOURCE OF CHRISTIAN HOPE

"Death has justice done to it at the price of the death of the one who was without sin..." Christ did die. He died as a human being and therefore he stood in solidarity with man even more firmly than he did before his death. He accepted the contingency which marks a human existence and experienced it in a most painful way. He conquered death not the way a glorious and omnipotent God might do, but, as it were, 'modestly,' as one of us, by having accepted the burden that transcended the capacities of a human life.

> In His resurrection Christ has revealed the God of merciful love, precisely because He accepted the cross as the way to the resurrection. And it is for this reason that—when we recall the cross of Christ, His passion and death—our faith and hope are centered on the Risen One.
>
> John Paul II, *Dives in Misericordia*

> Man's great, true hope which holds firm in spite of all disappointments can only be God—God who has loved us and who continues to love us "to the end," until all "is accomplished."
>
> Benedict XVI, *Spe Salvi*

From the beginning of John Paul II's pontificate, his message to all mankind set the paths of hope and spiritual strengthening. His teaching was an invitation to abandon disbelief and agnosticism and enter into a relationship with God acting in the person of Jesus Christ. The Pope's first words in St. Peter's Square, "Be not afraid," were deeply rooted in his trust and faith, in his personal experience and in his deepest beliefs.[1]

One of the major fruits of the pontificate of John Paul II, in particular of the theology he advanced, was the development of the doctrine of the Divine Mercy. The significance of Sister Faustina Kowalska's revelations regarding

[1] "Because *the Pope* is a witness of Christ and a minister of the Good News, he is a man of joy and a man of hope, *a man of the fundamental affirmation of the value of existence, the value of creation and of hope in the future life*." J o h n P a u l II, *Crossing the Threshold of Hope*, ed. Vittorio Messori (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005), 22.

the spiritual condition of today's world and its people contributed to the fact that preaching the Merciful Father became of prime importance among the tasks the Pope wished to accomplish through his teaching.

The path taken by the Church forty years later shows that the major intuitions and emphases of John Paul II are far from obsolete. On the contrary, the pontificate of Pope Francis focuses on the attitude of mercy conceived as the principal mission of the Church. The current moment in history—the fortieth anniversary of the Polish Pope's first pilgrimage to his homeland, followed with the fortieth anniversary of the promulgation of his first encyclical letter, as well as the upcoming centenary of his birthday and the fifteenth anniversary of the Pope's death—is conducive to a reconstruction of the concept of the Divine Mercy as it is expounded in the teaching of John Paul II.

The central focus of the theology of the Divine Mercy as worked out by John Paul II is undoubtedly the salvific events of the Paschal Mystery. "Redemption involves the revelation of mercy in its fullness. The Paschal Mystery is the culmination of this revealing and effecting of mercy,"[2] says the Pope, pointing out that the events of the Paschal Mystery are an inexhaustible source of Christian hope. Developing this insight, Benedict XVI—the immediate successor of John Paul II—wrote as follows: "According to the Christian faith, 'redemption'—salvation—is not simply a given. Redemption is offered to us in the sense that we have been given hope, trustworthy hope, by virtue of which we can face our present…"[3]

John Paul II stressed that the Divine Mercy, which is the fundamental source of hope to the world and which manifested itself above all in the passion, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, reached its climax in the spiritual fruits of the passion, namely, in redemption, justification, and salvation. If it was not for them, it would be impossible to speak of the real significance of the Paschal Mystery. Without the Paschal Mystery, the mercy revealed by Jesus Christ through the words he preached and through his salvific acts would be reduced to universal solidarity and to fidelity to the moral principles laid out in the Good News. Thus, if it was not for the Paschal mystery, the major criterion for discerning the genuineness of the mission of Jesus would be missing. Without the Paschal Mystery, the hope that endures and overcomes the constraints death imposes on human beings would not be possible.

Thus the soteriological dimension of *mysterium paschale* is of critical importance in the theology of the Divine Mercy. Owing to the spiritual fruits of

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[2] John Paul II, Encyclical Letter *Dives in Misericordia*, November 30, 1980 (Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1980), Section 7.

[3] Benedict XVI, Encyclical Letter *Spe Salvi*, November 30, 2007 (Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2007), Section 1.

the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, the Divine Mercy is the true source of the spiritual life of man. It was through the passion of Christ, followed by his glorious resurrection and ascension, that God made the ultimate salvific gift of himself to man. In the events that contributed to the Paschal Mystery, God showed that the tragic aspects of human life can be overcome.

While considering the Divine Mercy as a source of hope for mankind, we need to focus on its particular dimensions, each of which reveals a whole specific category of its results for man (or fruits of God's mercy), designated by a specific collective name from the glossary of theological terms. In the light of the theology worked out by John Paul II, it is redemption, justification, and salvation that come to the fore as the most profound consequences of God's greatest gift to man.

THE MERCY OF REDEMPTION

Conceived of as a collective category comprising the salvific work done by Jesus Christ, 'redemption' encompasses its particular consequences, among them justification and salvation.[4] In the strict sense, however, the term 'redemption' denotes 'nullification of sin.' It designates liberation from the slavery of sin, which was accomplished through the expiatory sacrifice of Jesus Christ and his 'purchasing' the redeemed for God. "The redemptive power of suffering is in love."[5] Everything that follows—justification, entering into the New Covenant, the gift of new life and new dignity—is only successive consequences of the fundamental grace granted to the humanity through the sacrifice of Jesus and his 'gift' of the cross, which was tantamount to liberating man from the slavery of sin. All these consequences of the sacrifice of Christ are a source of a new hope for humanity. "Could not one find here the answer which humanity awaits today? It can be received only from Christ crucified, the holy one who suffers. He can penetrate the heart of the most painful human problems, because he already stands beside all who suffer and who ask him for an awakening of new hope."[6]

In the succeeding part of the article, three aspects and meanings of the issue of redemption will be analyzed, the main focus being its sense of victory over

[4] See J o h n P a u l II, Encyclical Letter *Redemptor Hominis*, March 4, 1979 (Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1979), Sections 7, 8, and 9.

[5] J o h n P a u l II, "The Meaning of Suffering in the Light of Christ's Passion" (General Audience, Vatican, Wednesday, November 9, 1988), Section 2, http://www.totus2us.com/teaching/jpii-catechesis-on-jesus-christ/the-meaning-of-suffering-in-the-light-of-christs-passion.

[6] Ibidem, Section 8.

sin and death, as well as reconciliation with the Father, or reestablishment of the bond destroyed by sin.

MERCY IS LOVE WHICH CONQUERS SIN

The *Catechism of the Catholic Church* teaches that the obedience of Jesus to his Father, manifested in his acceptance of the work of redemption, was his response to the Father's redemptive love for his people. Thus the formulation we find in the *Catechism...* prompts the conclusion that it was God the Father who initiated the work of redemption and that God's design took the shape of redemptive love.[7] This "merciful love"[8]—as John Paul II described it—is revealed by the Son of God. "Indeed this Redemption is the ultimate and definitive revelation of the holiness of God, who is the absolute fullness of perfection: fullness of justice and of love, since justice is based on love, flows from it and tends towards it,"[9] we read in *Dives in Misericordia*. A deeper insight into the holiness of God will enable a discovery of the fundamental implication of redemption.

According to *Dives in Misericordia*, the holiness of God is manifested in that man can 'partake' of God. It is manifested in God's being 'for' man. A grave obstruction, however, in man's relationship with God is sin. Therefore, redemption above all shows man the essence and nature of sin. The encyclical on the Divine Mercy defines sin negatively, namely, by describing what sin is not, as well as points to ways to overcome it. Among other things, we read that sin undermines the "creative power in man."[10] Redemption restores this power and retrieves man's access to the fullness of life, making the holiness that comes from God again available to man. In the entire history of salvation, it is sin that has been the root of all evil and the cause of death.[11] Sin manifests man's rejection of God's fatherly love and denotes a breach of God's covenant with man.[12] It is due to sin that God's love cannot be revealed in any way other than mercy which removes all imperfection and misery.[13]

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[7] See *Catechism of the Catholic Church* (Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2003, Sections 604–609 (https://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_INDEX.HTM).

[8] J o h n P a u l II, *Dives in Misericordia*, Section 3.

[9] Ibidem, Section 7.

[10] Ibidem.

[11] Ibidem, Section 8.

[12] See J o h n P a u l II, *Redemptor Hominis*, Section 9.

[13] See Antoni S ł o m k o w s k i, "Miłosierdzie Boże w paschalnym misterium," in *"Bo na wieki Jego miłosierdzie" (Ps 135): Ks. Michał Sopoćko o miłosierdziu Bożym*, ed. Tomasz Bielski, vol. 2, *Powołanie człowieka* (Poznań and Warszawa: Pallottinum, 1972), 167. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.

> Mercy in itself, as a perfection of the infinite God, is also infinite. Also infinite therefore and inexhaustible is the Father's readiness to receive the prodigal children who return to His home. Infinite are the readiness and power of forgiveness which flow continually from the marvelous value of the sacrifice of the Son. No human sin can prevail over this power or even limit it. On the part of man only a lack of good will can limit it, a lack of readiness to be converted and to repent, in other words persistence in obstinacy, opposing grace and truth, especially in the face of the witness of the cross and resurrection of Christ.[14]

Thus John Paul II emphasizes that the sacrifice of Christ was so powerful that no sin can ever prevail over it. On the other hand, it by no means violated the freedom of man. Sin is ultimately *felix culpa*, 'happy fault': the fault which has been obliterated by the 'glorious Redeemer.'

Jesus Christ, the Son of God, himself without sin and partaking of the Divine fullness of perfection and love, took upon himself the sins of man. The Pope explains: "If he 'made to be sin' him who was without any sin whatever, it was to reveal the love that is always greater than the whole of creation, the love that is he himself, since 'God is love.'"[15] God's love exposes the nullity of sin, simultaneously demonstrating that sin is incompatible with the intended nature of all creation. God's mercy, which obliterates sin and evil, reveals goodness as the mark of the original nature of the creation.

In consequence of the redemptive work of Jesus Christ man receives forgiveness of his sins: the body of his sins is destroyed. "Overcoming evil: this is the meaning of the Redemption"[16]. However, the redemptive effect of the Paschal Mystery is broader than destruction of sin: evil, which is lack of love, is compensated by the 'surplus' of God's love.

MERCY IS VICTORY OVER DEATH

Christ's victory over death is directly related to his victory over sin. The theological conception of sin as the cause of death which the encyclical elaborates corresponds to the description of the nature of sin we can find in the

[14] John Paul II, *Dives in Misericordia*, Section 13. For a definition of sin stating what sin is, see John Paul II, Apostolic Exhortation *Reconciliatio et Paenitentia*, December 2, 1984 (Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1984), Section 14. The Pope writes that sin is primarily an exclusion of God, rupture with God, and disobedience to God. See ibidem.

[15] John Paul II, *Redemptor Hominis*, Section 9.

[16] John Paul II, Apostolic Letter *Tertio Millennio Adveniente*, November 10, 1994 (Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1994), Section 7. See also Janusz Lekan, "Przebaczenie w optyce miłosierdzia," *Teologia w Polsce* 10, no. 2 (2016): 64–77.

Catechism of the Catholic Church.[17] In doing justice to sin, Christ—through his death—did justice also to death.[18] Himself without sin and not subjected to death, Christ embraced the burden of guilt and contingence of human existence. "Because of his innocence and holiness … he could take upon himself that which is the effect of sin, namely, suffering and death, giving to the sacrifice of his life a real value and a perfect redemptive meaning."[19] This paradox proved to be pregnant with consequences of spiritual significance. The efficacy of the sacrifice of Christ with respect to victory over death can be fully seen in his glorious resurrection. In the act of raising Jesus, God's inclination toward his creation manifested itself as mercy liberating the creation from the constraints imposed by death. As John Paul II emphasized, the resurrection of Jesus Christ revealed merciful love in that it followed the sacrifice of the cross.[20]

The soteriological perspective of Christ's victory over death is an issue of particular theological significance. The context of the entire teaching on the salvific fruits of the Paschal Mystery shows that its meaning is by no means exhausted in the abolishment of death. "Death has justice done to it at the price of the death of the one who was without sin..."[21] Christ did die. He died as a human being and therefore he stood in solidarity with man even more firmly than he did before his death. He accepted the contingency which marks a human existence and experienced it in a most painful way.[22] He conquered death not the way a glorious and omnipotent God might do, but, as it were, 'modestly,' as one of us, by having accepted the burden that transcended the capacities of a human life.[23] His victory, confirmed by his rising, demonstrated that death was no longer the ultimate end of a human life. The rising of Jesus, the manifestation of God's mercy experienced by his only begotten Son, gave death a new and true meaning and showed that its nature is transitional and that it by no means marks the end of life.

Thanks to the sacrifice of Christ, death is no longer the final goal, or the destiny, of the creation.[24] Death turned out to be merely a transition, an actual

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[17] See *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, Section 602.

[18] See J o h n P a u l II, *Dives in Misericordia*, Section 8.

[19] J o h n P a u l II, "The Redemptive Value of Christ's Sacrifice" (General Audience, Vatican, Wednesday, October 26, 1988), Section 3, http://www.totus2us.com/teaching/jpii-catechesis-on-jesus-christ/the-redemptive-value-of-christs-sacrifice/.

[20] See J o h n P a u l II, *Dives in Misericordia*, Section 8.

[21] Ibidem.

[22] See Zofia J. Z d y b i c k a, "Konanie i śmierć Chrystusa radykalnym objawieniem miłosierdzia," in *Jan Paweł II. "Dives in misericordia": Tekst i komentarze*, ed. Stanisław Nagy (Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1983), 141–51.

[23] See ibidem, 148.

[24] See J o h n P a u l II, *Dives in Misericordia*, Section 8. See also J o h n P a u l II, "The Redemptive Value of Christ's Sacrifice," Section 3; Kazimierz H o ł a, "Teologiczno-dogmatyczne

Passover.[25] Christ's sacrifice became the highest revelation of the Divine Mercy, since it rid man of the most dreadful prospect, namely, that of annihilation. As a result, after the spearhead of the blade of death was broken, it became a gateway to the new life forecasting the second birth and the encounter with the Father. "With his death Jesus reveals that at the end of life man is not doomed to immersion in obscurity, in the existential void, in the abyss of nothingness. But man is invited to meet the Father toward whom he moved in the journey of faith and love during life, and into whose arms he threw himself with holy abandonment at the hour of death."[26]

The Divine Mercy revealed in the resurrection of Jesus Christ is also a sign pointing to the existence of a transcendent reality to which the phenomenon of death does not apply. In the eschatological state in which 'the first things are gone,' mankind is to achieve the intended reconciliation with God. "The new life granted to believers by virtue of Christ's resurrection consists in victory over the death caused by sin, and a sharing in the divine life of grace.... The definitive victory over death, already won by Christ, is shared by him with humanity in the measure in which it receives the fruits of redemption. It is a process of admission to the new life, to the eternal life which will last until the end of time."[27]

MERCY IS RECONCILIATION WITH THE FATHER

Conceived as a fruit of redemption, man's reconciliation with God is the theme of the apostolic exhortation *Reconciliatio et Paenitentia*. The Divine Mercy is described here in terms of God's initiative to reconcile with man.[28] To illustrate his teaching, John Paul II made use of the parable of the prodigal son, which explains the nature of reconciliation.[29]

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aspekty encykliki 'Dives in misericordia,'" in *Encyklika Ojca Świętego Jana Pawła II O Bożym Miłosierdziu "Dives in misericordia": Tekst i komentarz*, ed. Stanisław Grzybek and Marian Jaworski (Kraków: Polskie Towarzystwo Teologiczne w Krakowie, 1981), 146–7.

[25] See J o h n P a u l II, "Christ's Last Words on the Cross" (General Audience, Vatican, Wednesday, Dec. 7, 1988), Section 5, http://www.totus2us.com/teaching/jpii-catechesis-on-jesus-christ/christs-last-words-on-the-cross/.

[26] Ibidem, Section 6.

[27] J o h n P a u l II, "The Saving Power of the Resurrection" (General Audience, Vatican, Wednesday, 15 March 1989), Sections 2–4, http://www.totus2us.com/teaching/jpii-catechesis-on-jesus-christ/the-saving-power-of-the-resurrection/.

[28] See, e.g., J o h n P a u l II, *Reconciliatio et Paenitentia*, Sections 10 and 20.

[29] See ibidem, Section 6.

The Pope notes that the initiative of reconciliation always comes from God and is a manifestation of his merciful love.[30] "This initiative on God's part is made concrete and manifest in the redemptive act of Christ,"[31] says the Pope. The form of this reconciliation, which assumed the shape of a shocking sacrifice motivated by love, transcends human cognitive capacities. If it was not for *mysterium pietatis* revealed through Christ, sin would claim victory in the history of mankind, bringing destruction and rendering the implementation of God's redemptive plan impossible. *Mysterium pietatis* embraces the mystery of God's infinite mercy, which can heal human iniquity at its core.[32] John Paul II clearly states: "The mystery of pietas, on God's part, is that mercy in which our Lord and Father—I repeat it again—is infinitely rich.... We exclaim in gratitude: 'Yes, the Lord is rich in mercy' and even: 'The Lord is mercy.' The mystery of pietas is the path opened by divine mercy to a reconciled life."[33] However, the reconciliation earned through the sacrifice of Christ is characterized by an objective aspect. A subjective, personal reconciliation with God calls for a cooperation from the side of man, in particular for his acceptance of the gift of God's forgiveness.[34]

The fundamental condition of man's reconciliation with God—but also with other human beings and with the entire creation[35]—is liberation from sin. It is sin that causes rupture within a human being, or introduces a lack of harmony in it, and, last but not least, results in man's separation from God. Reconciliation with God is the step that follows remission of sins and forgiveness, and yet its root is the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.

Since the beginning of Christianity, the death of Christ has been perceived as the source of unity for "the dispersed children of God" (Jn 11:52). John Paul II repeats after St. Paul that in Christ the Father himself reconciled with him all creatures.[36] Any reconciliation with others, or healing of broken relationships, always comes after reconciliation with God. The 'vertical' reconciliation has a priority over a 'horizontal' one.

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[30] "Having thus established him [Jesus] in solidarity with us sinners, God 'did not spare his own Son but gave him up for us all' (Rom 8:32), so that we might be 'reconciled to God by the death of his Son' (Rom 5:10)." *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, Section 603.

[31] J o h n P a u l II, *Reconciliatio et Paenitentia*, Section 10. See also J o h n P a u l II, "Offer Forgiveness and Receive Peace." Message for the Celebration of the 30th World Day of Peace (Vatican, December 8, 1996), Section 6, http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/messages/peace/documents/hf_jp-ii_mes_08121996_xxx-world-day-for-peace.html.

[32] See J o h n P a u l II, *Reconciliatio et Paenitentia*, Sections 19 and 20.

[33] Ibidem, Section 22.

[34] See ibidem, Section 13.

[35] See ibidem, Section 8.

[36] See Alfons N o s s o l, "Chrystologia encykliki 'Redemptor hominis,'" in *Jan Paweł II, "Redemptor hominis": Tekst i komentarz* (Kraków: Polskie Towarzystwo Teologiczne w Krakowie, 1980), 94–103.

THE MERCY OF JUSTIFICATION

Man's condition resulting from sin—the state of being separated from God, who is the Source and Giver of all temporal and eternal life—goes against the plan of the Creator. According to a popular Christian insight, sin has not only 'flawed' the creation, but has also harmed the One who embodies the highest holiness and justice. Aware of their faults, human beings believed that reestablishment of the original condition of grace intended by God for all creation, as well as gaining salvation, was possible only by way of atonement which was to satisfy the wronged and humiliated God and his justice. In history, thinking along those lines was reflected in sacrificial cults.

However, God conceived a fully efficient way to re-establish the distorted justice. As the Guardian of order, he resolved the impasse caused by the apparent conflict between love and justice. God revealed the meaning of perfect justice, which is closer to holiness and love rather than to justice conceived in purely human terms, and proved that he can restore justice without inflicting revenge or punishment on creation. The way God used was justification. He gave his own Son so that the greatest injustice possible, that of deicide, might be transformed in him and by him.

MERCY VERSUS JUSTICE

While analyzing the issue of the simultaneous interdependence and distinctiveness of God's attributes, it stands to reason to evoke a valid view that in God there is no difference between his nature and his attributes. Reference to his attributes is a way of describing the perfection that exists in God.[37]

'Mercy' and 'justice,' in particular when understood in human terms, might seem contradictory notions, yet this contradiction is merely apparent. Mercy is usually defined as compassion shown to someone in an active way. Justice, on the other hand, is generally understood in the sense of social or distributive justice, that is granting someone something they are rightfully entitled to due to their merit or work done. In order to grasp the nature of the Divine Mercy, the author of the encyclical *Dives in Misericordia* refers—in the above quoted extracts—to biblical definitions that embrace human, but already theological apparatus of notions. According to the terminology used in the Bible, mercy shown to man by God, in particular the Divine Mercy expressed in the Paschal

[37] See Wincenty G r a n a t, *Teodycea* (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1968), 381–4. See also Wincenty G r a n a t, "Miłosierdzie jako przymiot Boga," in *Ewangelia miłosierdzia*, ed. Wincenty Granat (Poznań and Warszawa: Pallottinum, 1970), 9–49.

Mystery, comprises the fullness of Divinity, but simultaneously the fullness of justice, perfection and holiness.

Justice done by God to sinful creation addresses sin itself; it is sin that justice is done to. As a result of God's intervention, man is not harmed. He is saved. What is more, his creative love is restored.[38] God's justice, the only and full one, is superabundant, since it compensates for human sins. This justice "springs completely from love: from the love of the Father and of the Son, and completely bears fruit in love."[39] For God, restoration of justice disrupted by sin means restoration of the salvific order. Punishment for the creation is out of question. The death of the Son of God shows that God's justice does not call for propitiation; rather, it is ready to give itself away in order to save the creation.

Thus, according to the theology advanced by John Paul II, the notions of justice and mercy are not contradictory.[40] The nature of the justice of God, which is an attribute of his, is tantamount to mercy, which transcends all human understanding[41] and was clearly manifested by the act of the cross and by the resurrection of Jesus. The Divine Mercy is, in its essence, the justice shown by infinitely good God the Father, who 'compensated' for human sins with the sacrifice of his Son.[42] Therefore, we may say that God's will embraces both mercy and justice, as well as salvation.

The order of the relation obtaining between mercy and justice has been described by John Paul II in the following way: "Demonstrating from the very start what the 'human heart' is capable of ('to be merciful'), do not these words from the Sermon on the Mount reveal in the same perspective the deep mystery of God: that inscrutable unity of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, in which love, containing justice, sets in motion mercy, which in its turn reveals the perfection of justice?"[43]

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[38] See J o h n P a u l II, *Dives in Misericordia*, Section 7.

[39] Ibidem.

[40] This teaching has been repeated by Pope Francis. See F r a n c i s, *Misericordiae vultus*: Bull of Indiction of the Extraordinary Jubilee of Mercy, Vatican, April 11, 2015 (Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2015), Sections 20 and 21. See also Józef W a r z e s z a k, "Papież Franciszek świadkiem Bożego miłosierdzia," *Warszawskie Studia Teologiczne* 29, no. 4 (2016): 45–6.

[41] See Agnieszka D u d e k, "Reinterpretacja relacji miłosierdzie–sprawiedliwość w posoborowych dokumentach Kościoła," Master and Licentiate Thesis presented to the Chair of Christology at the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin in 2001 (unpublished).

[42] See Anastazy B ł a w a t, "Kontemplacja miłosierdzia Bożego w Mysterium Paschale," *Communio* 1, nos. 1–2 (1981): 98; Stanisław N a g y, "Wynagrodzenie w tajemnicy Bożego miłosierdzia," in *Jan Paweł II. "Dives in misericordia": Tekst i komentarze*, 160.

[43] J o h n P a u l II, *Dives in Misericordia*, Section 8. See Roman K a r w a c k i, "Soteriologia," in *Dogmatyka w perspektywie Bożego miłosierdzia*, ed. Krzysztof Góźdź and Krzysztof Guzowski (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2010), 122–3.

THE ESSENCE OF JUSTIFICATION

In theology, justification is understood as the act in which God, through his act of love, guides man towards the relationship with him, which he, the Holy God, requires of man and which he, the Merciful God, is ready to offer to him. God puts his plan into practice by making man partake of his Divine nature, which happens once the Holy Spirit divinizes man, having dwelled in his being.[44]

In his definition of justification, John Paul II emphasized that God offered man his own justice in the mystery of the cross of Jesus Christ.[45] The encyclical *Redemptor Hominis* teaches that justification is the deepest core of redemption.[46] In the encyclical *Dives in Misericordia*, in turn, John Paul II writes about "mercy, which is able to justify man, to restore justice in the sense of that salvific order which God willed from the beginning in man and, through man, in the world."[47] The act of justification consists in that the abundance of justice in God makes him ready to sacrifice himself in the person of his Son and thus nullify the 'difference' in the measure of justice used by himself and by the creation respectively. Thus the abyss of sin gets 'filled up.' By justifying mankind, God does justice to his own justice, annihilating humiliation he endured from sinful mankind.[48]

The source of justification accomplished in the Paschal Mystery of Jesus Christ is God's love and the Divine Mercy. It is Divine Love that urges God to reach out to man with the initiative of justification: "His is a love that does not draw back before anything that justice requires in him."[49]

Mercy "reveals the perfection of justice"[50]: it shows that justice is not self-sufficient, stagnant, or self-oriented. On the contrary, in God, man can partake

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[44] See Karl R a h n e r and Herbert V o r g r i m l e r, *Theological Dictionary*, transl. by Richard Strachan (New York: Herder & Herder, 1965). See also Karl R a h n e r and Herbert V o r g r i m l e r, "Usprawiedliwienie" [Justification], in *Mały słownik teologiczny*, trans. Tadeusz Mieszkowski and Paweł Pachciarek (Warszawa: Instytut Wydawniczy Pax, 1996), col. 611–2.

[45] See J o h n P a u l II, "The Moral Law Is Identified with the Will of God" (General Audience, Vatican, Wednesday, December 18, 1985), Section 4, http://www.totus2us.com/teaching/jpii-catechesis-on-god-father-creator/the-moral-law-is-identified-with-the-will-of-god/.

[46] See J o h n P a u l II, *Redemptor Hominis*, Section 9.

[47] J o h n P a u l II, *Dives in Misericordia*, Section 7.

[48] See B ł a w a t, "Kontemplacja miłosierdzia Bożego w Mysterium Paschale," 98. See also *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, Section 602; Wacław H r y n i e w i c z, "W głąb tajemnicy odkupienia: Doniosłość soteriologicznej nauki Jana Pawła II," in *Jan Paweł II. "Redemptor hominis": Tekst i komentarze*, ed. Zofia J. Zdybicka (Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1982), 179; Bogdan F e r d e k, "Miłosierdzie Boże jako źródło usprawiedliwienia grzesznika," *Perspectiva: Legnickie Studia Teologiczno-Historyczne* 2, no. 1 (2003): 184–96.

[49] J o h n P a u l II, *Redemptor Hominis*, Section 9.

[50] J o h n P a u l II, *Dives in Misericordia*, Section 8.

of justice: he can learn justification and learn that it is being active that is the nature of justice. If we can say that God justifies man, the meaning is that God makes man righteous—and thus God's friend.[51]

SATISFACTION OF THE LOVE OF THE FATHER

The notion of satisfaction, or rather doing justice, was used by John Paul II in his encyclicals *Redemptor Hominis* and *Dives in Misericordia*.[52] Although the concepts in questions might be related to a demand of sacrifice from the sinner, they should be interpreted in the same context as those concerning the sacrificial death of Christ, which was the gift of God to man. With his death, Jesus Christ did justice to God's love and faithfulness to man. Jesus became the reconciliation of humanity with the Father. The death of Jesus on the cross did justice to God in the sense that it once again opened God's fatherhood up to man so that God could approach mankind.[53]

The concept of satisfaction was to a certain extent reinterpreted in the context of the Trinitarian and personalistic theology developed by John Paul II. The concept in question is no longer understood narrowly, as justice in its distributive, stagnant and subjective sense; rather, its interpretation refers to love, mercy and God's faithfulness to himself. If justice revealed on the cross is adequate to God and, as such, born out of love and bearing fruit in love, it does not require compensation in the sense of punishment offered through the blood of the Son. The mystery of the cross comprised "the overwhelming encounter of divine transcendent justice with love: that 'kiss' given by mercy to justice."[54]

Satisfaction is seen in the quoted encyclicals as an opportunity to reveal God's fatherhood towards creation. Satisfaction has nothing to do with atonement, propitiation or compensation in the sense of retributive justice. Justice has already been done ultimately to sin and death. John Paul II emphasizes: "The cross of Christ, on which the Son, consubstantial with the Father, renders full justice to God, is also a radical revelation of mercy, or rather of the love that goes against what constitutes the very root of evil in the history of man: against sin and death."[55]

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[51] See Bogdan S i k o r s k i, "Odkupienie jako nowe stworzenie," in *Jan Paweł II. "Redemptor hominis": Tekst i komentarz*, 112.

[52] See ibidem. See also J o h n P a u l II, *Dives in Misericordia*, Section 7.

[53] See J o h n P a u l II, *Redemptor Hominis*, Section 9. See also H r y n i e w i c z, "W głąb tajemnicy odkupienia: Doniosłość soteriologicznej nauki Jana Pawła II," 179.

[54] J o h n P a u l II, *Dives in Misericordia*, Section 9.

[55] J o h n P a u l II, ibidem, Section 8. See also H r y n i e w i c z, "W głąb tajemnicy odkupienia: Doniosłość soteriologicznej nauki Jana Pawła II," 179.

In John Paul II's catecheses, one can find certain references to the traditional terminology that defines the sacrifice of Christ as the price and compensation for the liberation of man from the slavery of sin. However, the Pope does not say that Jesus offered his sacrifice to God the Father; on the contrary, John Paul II points out that Christ completed his salvific mission on the cross out of love. The Pope emphasizes "the sacrifice of the Man-God"[56] and writes that Christ "satisfied the Father's eternal love".[57] It is not said, however, to whom "the sacrifice" was made. The phrases in question refer to sin since Jesus Christ made his sacrifice for all the human beings and on their behalf. His passion expressed "the superabundance of love which overcomes every deficiency and insufficiency of human love, every negation and contrariety linked with human sin in every dimension—interior and historical—in which this sin has weighed on the relationship of man with God."[58] Moreover, it would be wrong to assume that Christ was to offer his atoning sacrifice to the Father, since Christ was sent by the Father for the sake of the salvation of the world so that the world would be liberated from the slavery of sin. John Paul II points out that the Father and the Son always act 'in unison.'[59]

THE MERCY OF SALVATION

In the theological sense, the salvation accomplished by God is most frequently defined as the liberation of man from the slavery of sin which might entail eternal damnation, and as offering man a share in the eternal happiness of God. Salvation denotes, on the one hand, the transformation of the entire mankind into the Kingdom of God (*basileia*) and, on the other, the gift God gave mankind in Jesus Christ by making every human being capable of partaking of his nature. As such, salvation is the contents of Divine promise and the object of human hope.[60]

According to the teaching of John Paul II, salvation—in all the abundance of its meaning—is the greatest gift of the Divine Mercy.[61] While the gift of salvation is rooted in the Paschal Mystery,[62] it will be revealed fully only in the life to come. Inspired by the Holy Spirit and by the power of her faith, the

[56] John Paul II, *Dives in Misericordia*, Section 7.

[57] Ibidem, Section 9.

[58] John Paul II, "The Redemptive Value of Christ's Sacrifice," Section 4. See also *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, Sections 609 and 615.

[59] See John Paul II, "Jesus Christ, the Son Sent by the Father" (General Audience, Vatican, Wednesday, June 24, 1987), Section 8, http://www.totus2us.com/teaching/jpii-catechesis-on-jesus-christ/jesus-christ-the-son-sent-by-the-father.

[60] See "Zbawienie" [Salvation], in *Mały słownik teologiczny*, col. 665.

[61] See Marek Pyc, "Chrystologia," in *Dogmatyka w perspektywie Bożego miłosierdzia*, 103–16.

[62] See John Paul II, *Dives in Misericordia*, Section 8.

Church can nevertheless discern the meaning of the salvation offered by God, and in particular the meaning of God's gift of the new life, which she wishes to enter already in her earthly existence.

THE COVENANT WITH THE WHOLE OF MANKIND

The Paschal Mystery of the cross and the resurrection of Jesus Christ began a new covenant between God and mankind.[63] The New Covenant—a new and eternal one—was made in the blood of Christ and completed by the Pentecost after his ascension.[64] "By virtue of this sacrifice, the 'new Counselor' (*Paraklletos*) (cf. Jn 14:16), the Holy Spirit, is given to those who are 'sanctified in Christ Jesus, called to be saints' (1 Cor 1:2)."[65]

The covenant God made with mankind in Christ is eternal and it goes back to earlier stages of history, when it was announced.[66] The all-encompassing covenant, which does not exclude anyone, be it a group of people or a nation, is symbolized, in parables told by Jesus, by the concept of 'feast.' This New Covenant is a work of the Divine Mercy, in which God confirms, in love, his eternal faithfulness to man.[67] God's invitation to the covenant is universal and whether a person will partake of it is contingent solely on her response.[68] "Through the covenant, especially that full and definitive covenant in Jesus Christ, God becomes in a certain way immanent in regard to the world. Yet he completely preserves his own transcendence. The incarnate God, and still more the crucified God, remains an incomprehensible and ineffable God. But

[63] See 1 Cor 11:25. See also *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, Section 613.

[64] See J o h n P a u l II, "Pentecost is the Fulfillment of the New Covenant" (General Audience, Vatican, Wednesday, August 2, 1989), Section 1, http://www.totus2us.com/teaching/jpii-catechesis-on-god-the-holy-spirit/pentecost-is-the-fulfillment-of-the-new-covenant/; J o h n P a u l II, "People of God, a Holy People" (General Audience, Wednesday, Vatican, August 16, 1989), Section 1, http://www.totus2us.com/teaching/jpii-catechesis-on-god-the-holy-spirit/pentecost-people-of-god-a-holy-people/; J o h n P a u l II "Pentecost: The Birth of the Church" (General Audience, Vatican, Wednesday, August 30, 1989), Section 1, http://www.totus2us.com/teaching/jpii-catechesis-on-god-the-holy-spirit/the-birth-of-the-church/.

[65] J o h n P a u l II, "People of God, a Holy People," Section 5.

[66] See J o h n P a u l II, "The God of the Covenant" (General Audience, Vatican, Wednesday, September 25, 1985), Sections 2–4, http://www.totus2us.com/teaching/jpii-catechesis-on-god-father-creator/the-god-of-the-covenant.

[67] See B ł a w a t, "Kontemplacja miłosierdzia Bożego w Mysterium Paschale," 101.

[68] See J o h n P a u l II, "The Church is Revealed in Parables" (General Audience, Vatican, Wednesday, September 18, 1991), Section 4, http://www.totus2us.com/vocation/jpii-catechesis-on-the-church/the-church-is-revealed-in-parables.

he becomes for us still more incomprehensible and ineffable precisely in so far as he is manifested as a God of an infinite, inscrutable love."[69]

In the Passover of the New Covenant—in the passion and resurrection of Jesus Christ—the world is once again given to God.[70] Owing to the New Covenant, the eternal plan God had in store for his creation can be implemented. It marks the transition of creation from the state it was in after breaking the initial covenant with God to the new one, which was made in the eschatological perspective.[71] In the eschatological fulfillment, in the world devoid of imperfection, where there will be no pain or tears, the Divine Mercy will be ultimately revealed as love.[72]

THE GIFT OF THE NEW CREATION

The focus of *Redemptor Hominis* and *Dives in Misericordia*, despite their dogmatic significance, is theological anthropology. Indeed, John Paul II believed that the issues regarded as the deposit of faith have a potential of inspiring a spiritual and moral revitalization of humanity.

While the encyclical *Redemptor Hominis* brings an in-depth analysis of the reality of the late 1970s, one cannot help the observation that the problems the encyclical addresses are pressing issues even today. Among them are alienation and man's fear of what he produces with his hands and with his intellect, uncontrollable consumerism, and threats to human freedom.[73] *Dives in Misericordia* repeats these diagnoses and adds to them remarks on the uneasiness caused in the contemporary world by the rising globalization, increased arms race, and violation of the human rights.[74]

John Paull II repeatedly emphasizes that the mystery of redemption, in which man finds a confirmation of his greatness and dignity, is an inexhaustible source of renewal both in the individual and in the global sense. It was in the Paschal events that the salvific order willed by God from the beginning was restored.[75] In the Paschal Mystery, man is once again 'expressed,' revealed to

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[69] John Paul II, "The God of the Covenant," Section 7.

[70] See The Second Vatican Council, Dogmatic Constitution on the Church *Lumen Gentium*, November 21, 1964, Section 3, https://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19641121_lumen-gentium_en.html.

[71] See John Paul II, "The Church in the Old Testament" (General Audience, Vatican, Wednesday, August 7, 1991), Section 5, http://www.totus2us.com/vocation/jpii-catechesis-on-the-church/the-church-in-the-old-testament/.

[72] John Paul II, *Dives in Misericordia*, Section 8.

[73] See ibidem, Sections 8, 15, and 16.

[74] See John Paul II, *Dives in Misericordia*, Section 11.

[75] See ibidem, Section 7.

himself, and, in a way, newly created.[76] This 'new creation' is described in the opening part of *Redemptor Hominis*.

> This act of redemption [the Incarnation] marked the high point of the history of man within God's loving plan. God entered the history of humanity and, as a man, became an actor in that history, one of the thousands of millions of human beings but at the same time Unique! Through the Incarnation God gave human life the dimension that he intended man to have from his first beginning; he has granted that dimension definitively—in the way that is peculiar to him alone, in keeping with his eternal love and mercy."[77]

By being united with each man, Christ restored God's image and likeness in him. "From the mystery is born 'the new man,' called to become a partaker of God's life, and newly created in Christ for the fullness of grace and truth."[78]

The 'new creation' of man was possible thanks to Christ the Redeemer, who restored the initial relationship of the humankind with God.[79] The God of redemption is at the same time the God of creation. By saving the world, he, as it were, newly creates it.[80]

In the individual dimension, the sacrifice of Jesus Christ should be understood in the sense of making a sinner partake of the perfection of God, which is accomplished in a transformation the human heart undergoes once it is immersed in the fruits of the Paschal Mystery.[81] In *Dives in Misericordia* John Paul II writes that the 'new' creation is manifested already in the restoration of love as the creative power in man,[82] which inspires him to live in a relationship with God and to partake of God's life.[83]

Through the mystery of redemption, as a result of salvation, man's Divine filiation is restored. The mystery of the cross reveals God's eternal plan to adopt man and make him the heir to the kingdom. Because of sin, man had rejected God's plan and his privilege was revoked. However, the New Covenant between God and mankind—the new 'spiritual adoption'—nullified the previous condition of the humankind. God's adoption of man, which restored man's dignity, has shown

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[76] See J o h n P a u l II, *Redemptor Hominis*, Section 10.

[77] Ibidem, Section 1.

[78] Ibidem, section 18. See also *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, Section 654, and L e k a n, "Przebaczenie w optyce miłosierdzia": 64–5.

[79] See J o h n P a u l II, *Redemptor Hominis*, Section 9.

[80] See S i k o r s k i, "Odkupienie jako nowe stworzenie," 103–18. See also Stanisław W ł o d a r c z y k, "Odkupiciel człowieka Jezus Chrystus jest ośrodkiem wszechświata i historii," in *Jan Paweł II. "Redemptor hominis": Tekst i komentarz*, 119–22.

[81] See B ł a w a t, "Kontemplacja miłosierdzia Bożego w Mysterium Paschale": 98.

[82] See J o h n P a u l II, *Dives in Misericordia*, Section 7.

[83] See ibidem. See also B ł a w a t, "Kontemplacja miłosierdzia Bożego w Mysterium Paschale": 98.

that the relationship obtaining between God and man is that of merciful fatherhood. God does not reject creation, but seeks to regain it. "Believing in the crucified Son means 'seeing the Father,' means believing that love is present in the world and that this love is more powerful than any kind of evil in which individuals, humanity, or the world are involved."[84] The gift of a new life and a new dignity of the humankind, which follows the Paschal Mystery, is manifested also in that, having experienced mercy, man is simultaneously called to show mercy towards God.[85]

The salvific gift of a new life is fully revealed by Paschal Christ. The day of the resurrection of Jesus may be compared to the seventh day of creation, on which God rested after his work. The act of creation was undoubtedly a work of mercy and the act of raising Jesus had the same nature.[86] Risen Christ is also a sign of the glorious condition to which creation is advancing.[87] Christ is the New Adam, the 'heavenly man,' perfect in body and spirit, free from death and the limitations of physicality, and called to the eternal life in God and with God.[88] It was the resurrection of Christ that revealed the reality eternally shared by the Son of Man. In the transformed and glorified humanity, this mystery has become available to human cognition.

THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF "A NEW HEAVEN AND A NEW EARTH" (Rev 21:1)

To the people of the New Covenant, the salvific reality initiated in the Paschal Mystery of Jesus Christ has a symbolic significance and is a sign of hope rather than an object of actual experience.[89]

The cross and the empty tomb of Jesus are the fundamental signs of the the Paschal Mystery. Both are eschatological symbols which anticipate the ultimate fulfilment and renewal of the world in love that will win its victory conquering the deepest sources of evil.[90] Thus the full revelation of the Divine Mercy already present in the fruits of the Paschal Mystery will only be accomplished at the end of time, in "the Kingdom of life and holiness."[91] The fulfilment and revelation of

[84] J o h n P a u l II, *Dives in Misericordia*, Section 7.

[85] Ibidem, Section 8.

[86] See B ł a w a t, "Kontemplacja miłosierdzia Bożego w Mysterium Paschale": 108.

[87] See 2 Cor 5:17; Gal 6:15; 1 Cor 15:23; Col 1:18.

[88] See S i k o r s k i, "Odkupienie jako nowe stworzenie," 112–3.

[89] See *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, Section 670.

[90] See J o h n P a u l II, *Dives in Misericordia*, Section 8.

[91] Ibidem. See J o h n P a u l II, "The Church Witnesses to Gospel Hope" (General Audience, Vatican, Wednesday, May 27, 1992), Section 4, http://www.totus2us.com/vocation/jpii-catechesis-on-the-church/the-church-witnesses-to-gospel-hope. See also J o h n P a u l II, "Peace with God the Creator, Peace with All the Creation." Message for the celebration of the World Day of Peace, Vatican, December 8,

the Divine Mercy have their foundation already in the salvific events: in the 'hour' of Christ. However, the full meaning of that 'hour' still remains covered.

In *Dives in Misericordia*, John Paul II elaborates on the teaching that the resurrection of Christ is the ultimate sign of the revelation of merciful love in the world: it is the sign that anticipates the reality in which creation will be saved from death, all shortcomings will be compensated, and mercy will no longer function in the context of the misery of sin, but will be fulfilled in guiding creation to the state of perfection based on the principle of love.

The Divine Mercy, which reveals the reality of salvation to the people of the New Covenant as the ultimate goal and hope, is simultaneously a program that calls for daily implementation. Thus the ultimate revelation of the Divine Mercy brings the duty to accept this program as the rule of life and carry it out based on the gifts of the Spirit, in particular by practicing mercy, in line with the conviction that the reality of salvation is revealed most of all in the hearts of people united with God.[92]

The gift of salvation is revealed also by the birth of hope for a new earth and a new heaven in human hearts: the hope for a reality where creation will experience its ultimate fulfilment.[93]

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The Divine Mercy revealed by Jesus in the Paschal events falls within the category of mystery. Redemption, justification, and salvation are manifestations of the reality which can be recognized only in faith.

The sacrifice of Jesus reveals the spiritual dimension of mercy and hence the eschatological reality. *Mysterium paschale* unveils the fact that God's merciful plan is not limited to the world of temporal goods, but through them refers human persons to the goods to come. The mercy revealed in the Paschal Mystery anticipates the life and the gifts mankind will receive in the world of fulfilled hope. The mercy of the cross and the resurrection anticipate the revelation of the perfect nature of God, which is love.

1989 (Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1989), Section 4, http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/messages/peace/documents/hf_jp-ii_mes_19891208_xxiii-world-day-for-peace.html.

[92] See J o h n P a u l II, "Love is the Most Powerful Force in Society." Message for World Migrant Day 1991, Vatican, August 21, 1991, Section 4, *L'Osservatore Romano*, English Edition, September 16, 1991: 1–2.

[93] See J o h n P a u l II, "Message of the Holy Father for the Sixth World Day of the Sick, February 11, 1998," Vatican, June 29, 1997, Section 5, http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/messages/sick/documents/hf_jp-ii_mes_29061997_world-day-of-the-sick-1998.html.

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ABSTRACT / ABSTRAKT

Agnieszka DUDEK-KOWALSKA, Mercy as Fruit of the Paschal Mystery in the Theology of Pope John Paul II: The Source of Christian Hope

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The purpose of this paper is to explain the soteriology of the Paschal events in the context of the Divine Mercy. This interpretation, proposed by John Paul II, is a new input in the field of dogmatic theology in Catholicism. A creative comparison of the attribute of mercy with the mysteries of the salvific events of the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ has contributed to the development of major soteriological categories, understood as the fruits of the Paschal Mystery.

Within the framework of traditional notions of redemption, justification, and salvation, the author analyzes chosen issues of the theology advanced by John Paul II. When it comes to the category of redemption, they include: mercy as love conquering sin, mercy as victory over death, and mercy as reconciliation with the Father. As far as the category of justification is concerned, the following notions have been analyzed: love versus justice, the merit of justification, doing justice to the love of the Father. With respect to the mercy of salvation, the following issues have been reviewed: the covenant with the whole of mankind, the gift of a new creation, and anticipation of "a new heaven and a new earth."

Keywords: mercy, Christian hope, justice, Paschal Mystery, redemption, justification, salvation, resurrection, John Paul II

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Agnieszka DUDEK-KOWALSKA, Miłosierdzie jako owoc misterium paschalnego w teologii Jana Pawła II. Źródło chrześcijańskiej nadziei

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Celem artykułu jest ukazanie soteriologii wydarzeń paschalnych w kontekście Bożego miłosierdzia. Ujęcie to, którego dokonał Jan Paweł II, stanowi ważny wkład w dziedzinę teologii dogmatycznej. Twórcze zestawienie miłosierdzia jako przymiotu Boga z tajemnicą wydarzeń zbawczych śmierci i zmartwychwstania Jezusa Chrystusa w ich ujęciu przez Jana Pawła II pozwoliło na analizę podstawowych kategorii soteriologicznych: odkupienia, usprawiedliwienia i zbawienia, rozumianych jako owoce misterium paschalnego. W przypadku kategorii odkupienia podjęto problem miłosierdzia jako miłości zwyciężającej grzech, miłosierdzia jako zwycięstwa nad śmiercią i miłosierdzia jako pojednania z Ojcem. W analizie kategorii usprawiedliwienia rozróżniono miłość i sprawiedliwość oraz przedstawiono istotę usprawiedliwienia i zadośćuczynienia miłości Ojca. W ramach analizy kategorii miłosierdzia zbawienia wskazano na znaczenie pojęć przymierza z całą ludzkością, daru nowego stworzenia i zapowiedzi „nowego nieba i nowej ziemi".

Słowa kluczowe: miłosierdzie, chrześcijańska nadzieja, sprawiedliwość, misterium paschalne, odkupienie, usprawiedliwienie, zbawienie, zmartwychwstanie, Jan Paweł II

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TOWARDS CONCEPTUALIZING HOPE

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Eleonore STUMP

SUFFERING AND FLOURISHING*

How many people who live an upper-class life without much serious suffering, without much of any impairment in mind or body, count as having great personal thriving? How many people in a life of ease, with little tribulation in it, seem to be an example of human flourishing that others would love to be like? On the contrary, greatness of personal thriving seems to be found largely if not exclusively among those who suffer greatly too.

Although we sometimes praise a person who suffers for not sinking under his suffering, we still suppose that the sufferer is to be ranked more among life's losers than among life's winners. Even if we think of a person who stands under his suffering as heroic, we tend to think of whatever is good in his life as happening in spite of the suffering. And, in general, we are inclined to find perverse anything that values the suffering itself. On the contrary, anything that undermines physical or mental thriving strikes us as lamentable.

The current disability rights movement is an exception to this general attitude. Like the gay pride movement, the disability rights movement wants to celebrate what others have generally pitied—or disrespected—as the suffering of misfortune. It wants others to see that those with disabilities are not among life's losers, or even among life's heroic overcomers of the tragic. Instead, the disability rights movement holds disability pride parades. Here is an excerpt from a text by Sarah Triano, the founder of the Chicago Disability Pride parade:

> The sad sack, the brave overcomer, and the incapable are worn-out stereotypes the parade refutes by giving us a time and space to celebrate ourselves as we are. First, we want to show the world the incredible joy that exists in our lives. We are part of the richness and diversity of this country and the world. The Parade is an international celebration of our continued and continuing survival. We also, by marching in this parade, are giving the world a chance to express pride in us, too![1]

From the Patristic period onward, the Christian tradition has held a roughly analogous position not as regards disability but rather as regards suffering in

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* The present article is a revised version of an extract from Chapter 9 of the author's book on atonement. See Eleonore S t u m p, *Atonement* (Oxford: Oxford University, Press, 2018).

[1] Quoted after Elizabeth B a r n e s, *The Minority Body: A Theory of Disability* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 185.

general. It has supposed that those who endure serious suffering are not the pitiable losers of life or even the heroic overcomers of tragedy but rather are those specially loved by God. That is because, on this view, suffering is not only medicinal for the human condition but is also a gift of God's to those who are nearer to God. John Chrysostom says of people who are scandalized at the sight of human suffering, "They do not know that to have these sufferings is the privilege of those especially dear to God."[2]

Clearly, there is something right about the contemporary unreflective rejection of suffering as bad. Someone who valued suffering as an intrinsic good would be mentally disturbed at best and evil at worst. But there is nonetheless something worth exploring in the Christian attitude towards suffering as a gift. In this lecture, I want to look closely at the relevant Christian doctrines to see what can be said to explain this attitude towards suffering and to distinguish it from the neighboring perverse attitude seeing suffering as an intrinsic good.

THE CONNECTION OF SUFFERING AND PERSEVERANCE: CONSOLATION, SANCTIFICATION LEADING TO GLORY, AND CHRIST'S ATONEMENT

There is a biblical text in 2 Corinthians that expresses the relevant Christian attitude in a paradigmatic way, and it will be helpful to approach the examination of suffering through the claims in that text.

In 2 Corinthians 1:5, Paul, generally taken to be the writer of the Epistle, makes this claim: "As the sufferings of Christ abound in us, so also our consolations abound through Christ." This is not a claim about what justifies God's allowing the suffering of a person in grace or what defeats that suffering for her. The issue here is definitely not theodicy. Rather, the claim in the Pauline epistle is only about a connection between suffering and consolation. According to this claim, for a suffering person in grace in this life, her suffering is somehow correlated with the consolation she has in or with Christ. The comfort and help a sufferer has from Christ can intensify as her suffering increases.[3]

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[2] John Chrysostom, "Commentary on Saint John the Apostle and Evangelist: Homilies 48–88," in *The Fathers of the Church*, vol. 41, trans. Sister Thomas Aquinas Goggin (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1960), 165.

[3] I say "*can* intensify" because a sufferer is not compelled to accept the consolation that loving presence is able to provide. She can reject it if she chooses to, just as she can reject any offer of love she does not want.

Later in the same Epistle, Paul concludes a complicated analogy between the Israelites at the time of the giving of the Law, on the one hand, and people in the process of sanctification, on the other, by saying of people in sanctification, "Beholding as in a mirror the glory of the Lord, we are all changed into the same image from glory into glory through the Spirit, the Lord" (2 Cor 3:18). The details of Paul's analogy are elaborate, and this concluding claim is also intricate; but the basic idea is that a person in grace comes to have (even in this life) the glory of the loveliness of God (to some, no doubt, small degree) in virtue of being united with God (to one degree or another). And Paul goes on to connect the glory of that union with suffering, in this way: "Our light afflictions, which last only for the moment, bring about for us a far greater eternal weight of glory" (2 Cor 4:17). In other words, according to Paul in this Epistle, the suffering endured by a person in grace is one source of that person's glory or spiritual loveliness. Finally, Paul explains that the role of suffering in bringing about glory has an intrinsic connection to the atonement of Christ. He concludes his exposition of that idea this way: "For us, God made Christ, who knew no sin, [to be] sin, so that in Christ we might be made the righteousness of God" (2 Cor 5:21).

The thought of all these lines of Paul's in 2 Corinthians then is roughly this. A person in grace Paula will experience suffering of one kind and degree or another in this life. But that suffering will help to bring about for Paula, eventually, the greater good of glory, where glory is a matter of a union between God and Paula in which Paula has in herself something of the righteousness, and something of the beauty, of God. And through the suffering which Paula endures and which results in her growing in her own beauty of holiness in union with God, she will also have consolation that grows as her suffering intensifies. In a paradoxical way, then, according to the Epistle, her suffering conduces to her joy. And all of this will be somehow tied to the atoning work of Christ, in which Christ bears—in fact, becomes—human sin so that human beings can become the righteousness of God.

To begin to understand Paul's thought about suffering, glory, consolation, and the atoning work of Christ, it is necessary to work slowly through its elements, beginning with the nature and effects of suffering. When it is properly unpacked, what Paul's thought in the Epistle shows is the way in which the suffering of a person in grace is connected to the suffering of Christ and contributes to her perseverance in the process of sanctification, to help her complete the process instead of abandoning it. Furthermore, in completing the process of sanctification, a person in grace does not stay in the same state she was in when she began the process. Rather, on Paul's thought, a person who perseveres in sanctification through suffering continues to grow in closeness to God until she has as much joy and union with God, and as much loveliness in that union, as she is willing to have.

THE MODES OF HUMAN FLOURISHING

The complicated thought of 2 Corinthians gives suffering a place in flourishing. That is, on Paul's thought in that Epistle, something about suffering, which seems to deprive a person of flourishing, actually enables or enhances the flourishing of the sufferer.

Although discussions of human flourishing are by now something of a cottage industry, for my purposes here a person's flourishing can be thought of as his thriving.[4] So understood, the opposite of thriving is not being sick but rather something like being dysfunctional. The failure to thrive is a broad category that encompasses any kind of impairment or impediment[5] to the proper functioning of some part of a person or even of the whole person himself.[6] It may be that this usage is not the everyday meaning of the term 'thriving,' but it is one sense of the term; and it is helpful to have some term by which to refer to the phenomenon in question. At any rate, a flourishing human life is a life that is an excellent one for a human being, and 'thriving' is a reasonable way to refer to the excellent condition of something living.

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[4] I am trying to use terminology that does not in effect associate me in a misleading way with one or another side in the disputes over disabilities. In my view, the best current philosophical discussion of disability can be found in Elizabeth Barnes's book *The Minority Body*; and her general view of disability as what she calls 'mere difference' rather than 'bad difference' seems to me entirely right. Her own care to disambiguate her position from other similar-sounding views in the near neighborhood has persuaded me to try expressing my position here with terminology not in regular use in the disability literature as she engages with it. In addition, I am using the terminology of 'flourishing' and 'well-being' in ways that are somewhat out of line with their use in the contemporary literature on well-being and happiness. Because I want terms that correlate with the account of suffering I have given and the connection between suffering and union with God at issue for my interpretation of the doctrine of the atonement, I will use the relevant terms in the way explained here, even if they have somewhat different uses in other areas of philosophy.

[5] When the proper functioning of some organ or activity within a system is diminished or prevented by something else within that system, then there is an impediment to the organ or activity in question. When the proper functioning is diminished or prevented by the something internal to the organ or activity, then there is an impairment. I mean 'impediment' and 'impairment' to be generic enough to cover all the varieties of loss or lack of typical structure and/or function in any part of a person, whether that part has to do with an organ or an activity. For more narrowly defined terms and careful distinction among them, see Sheena L. C a r t e r, "Impairment, Disability and Handicap," Emory School of Medicine, www.pediatrics.emory.edu/divisions/neonatology/dpc/Impairment%20MX.html. I am grateful to Kevin Timpe for calling my attention to this useful site.

[6] It is not my intention to participate in the burgeoning and insightful literature on disability; but there is some overlap between that literature and the issues central for me here. I have learned and benefitted from Elizabeth Barnes's work on disability, but my focus here is not on disability per se. In addition to her book cited above, see also Elizabeth B a r n e s, "Valuing Disability, Causing Disability," *Ethics* 125, no. 1 (2014): 88–113; Elizabeth B a r n e s, "Disability and Adaptive Preference," *Philosophical Perspectives* 23 (2009): 1–22; and Elizabeth B a r n e s, "Disability, Minority and Difference," *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 26, no. 4 (2009): 337–55.

It is worth noting in this connection that even an impediment to the proper functioning of a human body and a consequent loss of some kind of physical thriving is not a disability. Striving for a workable account just of physical disability, Elizabeth Barnes says affirmingly,

> The disability rights movement tends to count a physical condition as a disability (and therefore as something they're working to promote justice for) if it has some sufficient number of features such as: being subject to social stigma and prejudice; being viewed as unusual or atypical; making ordinary daily tasks difficult or complicated; causing chronic pain; causing barriers to access of public spaces; causing barriers to employment; causing shame; requiring use of mobility aids or assistive technology; requiring medical care; and so on. As with most cluster concepts, there will no doubt be vagueness and borderline cases.[7]

Barnes seems to me right in this characterization. By itself, then, an impediment to thriving does not count as a disability, whatever the nature and severity of the impediment, if for no other reason than that a disability is at least in part a function of the society in which a person who has the impediment lives. What is at issue in what follows is therefore not disability, but the lower-level notion of an impairment or impediment[8] and the correlated contrary, thriving.

It is evident that thriving comes in different modes. To begin with, we can distinguish the thriving a person has when he suffers no impediments as regards his body from the thriving he has when he suffers no impediments as regards his mind. We can think of thriving, that is, either as bodily thriving or as thriving of the mind[9]; and it is possible to have one of these modes of thriving without the other. So, for example, there are people who are in excellent

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[7] B a r n e s, *The Minority Body*, 45.

[8] Because it is awkward to write 'impediments or impairments' repeatedly, in what follows I will simply write 'impediments' as shorthand for the longer phrase.

[9] For a good discussion of these kinds of health and their connection to human flourishing, see, for example, Richard K r a u t, *What is Good and Why: The Ethics of Well-Being* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), and especially the discussion beginning on page 133. Nonetheless, it should be said that this distinction between kinds of health is coarse-grained and imprecise. It is imprecise because human beings are embodied minds and so what affects the body affects the mind and vice versa, if one can even speak this way. To distinguish between health of body and health of mind is therefore only a rough approximation to the correct distinction. And this rough distinction is also coarse-grained because it is based on only a large-scale distinction among parts of human beings. Those parts have parts too, and impairments in the varying smaller-scale parts make correspondingly different impairments for a person suffering from them. Some of these impairments will make life harder for the sufferer than others. For an excellent discussion of even the most philosophically complicated of such issues, namely, the connection between disability and executive function, for example, see Kevin T i m p e, "Executive Function, Disability, and Agency," *Res Philosophica* 93, no. 4 (2016): 767–96. Even with the caveats in this note, however, the imprecise and coarse-grained distinction between health of body and health of mind is useful for showing the theological claim at issue in this paper, and so I will adopt it in what follows.

bodily condition but who suffer from mental illness or some other impediment of mind. Buzz Aldrin was in peak athletic condition when he flew to the moon in 1969, but he later acknowledged that he also suffered from serious depression.

An obstacle to thriving in mind can come not only from some disease of the mind or some damage to the brain; it can come also from heartbreak. A heartbroken person also lacks thriving in mind, in the sense of 'thriving' at issue here. Thriving in mind seems to require energy, confidence, groundedness in oneself, an ability to concern oneself with others, and things of this sort. Heartbreak is like being hit by a truck in one's psyche; it focuses a person intensely on himself. It may produce the energy of rage, but no one would mistake that energy for the constructive energy of thriving in mind.

It is also worth noticing that heartbreak can come from the suffering of another person too. A mother's heart's desire can be that her child thrive; and if that child struggles with a chronic and irremediable sickness, the mother may suffer heartbreak over her child's suffering.[10] That heartbreak will be an impediment to her own thriving in mind too.

It is possible to have great bodily impediments but to be thriving in mind. In her *New York Times Magazine* article chronicling her extended arguments with Peter Singer, Harriet McBryde Johnson, who was a disability rights lawyer, describes herself this way:

> I'm Karen Carpenter—thin, flesh mostly vanished, a jumble of bones in a floppy bag of skin.… My right side is two deep canyons. To keep myself upright, I lean forward, rest my rib cage on my lap, plant my elbows beside my knees… I am the first generation to survive to such decrepitude.[11]

By her own description, Johnson suffers from significant impediments as regards bodily thriving. On the other hand, however, her meaningful work and her excellence at it, her very ability to handle exchanges with such opponents of the disability rights movement as Peter Singer with intelligence and courtesy and wit, all testify to her thriving in mind.

Impediments to either bodily thriving or thriving in mind are generally a suffering for the person who has them. But there is a general consensus that, other things being equal, thriving in mind outranks bodily thriving. For comparable impediments, however roughly such comparison might have to be made, an incapacity in mind is a greater obstacle to human flourishing than

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[10] I am grateful to Claire Crisp for calling my attention to the need to make this point explicit.

[11] Harriet M c B r y d e J o h n s o n, "Unspeakable Conversations," *New York Times Magazine*, February 16, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/16/magazine/unspeakable-conversations.html.

a bodily incapacity. Few people would be willing to trade diminished bodily thriving for comparable diminishments of thriving in mind.[12] And this common attitude seems right. On the scale of value commonly found in the Christian tradition and much contemporary thought, the best thing for human beings is a matter of relationships; and if they are serious enough, impediments with regard to thriving in mind are more of a barrier to relationships than roughly comparable impediments to bodily thriving, ceteris paribus.[13]

And yet even for human beings with serious cognitive impairments, meaningful and fulfilling relationships of love are possible. Eva Kittay makes this point in a moving passage, worth quoting at length. She says,

> Philosophers have made much of the importance of rational capacities for the exercise of moral judgments and moral actions, but many … have seriously understated the critical role other capacities play in our moral life…, such as giving care and responding appropriately to care, empathy and fellow feeling, a sense of what is harmonious and loving, and a willingness to reciprocate giving and receiving kindness and love.… [Consider in this connection] a young woman, whose rational capacities are difficult to determine because she lacks speech among other skills, but her capacity to enjoy life, to share joy through smiles and laughter, to embrace those who love and care for her, and to bring joy to all whose lives she touches—an individual who, through her warmth, her serene and harmonious spirit, and her infectious love of life enriches the lives of others.… Whether or not she would know what it means to determine her own good may be in doubt, but the good she brings into the world is not.[14]

Furthermore, on the traditional Christian scale of value, the greatest human relationship is with God, and so the greatest thriving for a human person is in that relationship. And even serious impediments to thriving in mind are not a bar to a human person's relationship with God. Consider, for example, this

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[12] In arguing for the rationality of those people who say that their disability is not a disadvantage to them, Barnes excepts those who are severely mentally ill. For example, she says, "Ceteris paribus, for any person x, x is a good source of evidence about x's own wellbeing. This is a fairly weak principle, and one that most people would readily agree to.… And the claim is ceteris paribus—[people] are not a good source of evidence if they are crazy…" B a r n e s, "Disability and Adaptive Preference": 9. I disagree with Barnes in the last claim in this quotation. I think that even a person Jerome who is seriously mentally ill can have personal flourishing; and so in that case Jerome's testimony that he is flourishing will be a good source of evidence that he is flourishing, even with mental illness or other mental impairments.

[13] At some point, of course, the two modes of diminishment will converge, in so far as the mind is correlated (in some way or other, depending on one's theory of mind) with the brain. But, clearly, at least in many cases, it is possible to have impediments to bodily thriving without having any impediments to thriving of mind.

[14] Eva K i t t a y, "Deadly Medicine: Project T4, Mental Disability, and Racism," *Res Philosophica* 93, no. 4 (2016): 734.

report of religious experience on the part of someone suffering from significant mental illness:

> At one time, I reached utter despair and wept and prayed to God for mercy instinctively and without faith in reply. That night I stood with other patients in the grounds waiting to be let in to our ward…. Suddenly someone stood beside me … and a voice said, 'Mad or sane, you are one of My sheep'. I never spoke to anyone of this but ever since, twenty years, it has been the pivot of my life.[15]

Even among those with both bodily thriving and thriving in mind, few people have such powerful religious experiences. The religious experience this patient reports was so great as to center his life, for a long time, on his telling of the story, and to bring him consolation throughout that whole period; the closeness to God of the original experience and the on-going relationship with God it provoked were great enough to endure through many years of the patient's life.

One can see, then, that although, other things being equal, serious impediments to thriving in mind are more likely to undermine a person's flourishing than comparable impediments to bodily thriving are, flourishing in loving personal relationship is nonetheless possible even with significant impediments to thriving in mind.[16] Furthermore, as the example of the patient's religious experience illustrates, when God is one of the *relata* in the relationship, then even those things that might obstruct relationship between two human beings, such as major mental illness, are not a bar to relationship. Manifestly, an omnipotent, omnipresent God could make relational contact with a human person challenged by a serious impediment to thriving in mind if only that person did not resist God's love and grace.

What such considerations should help us recognize is that bodily thriving and thriving in mind do not exhaust the modes of thriving for human beings. A human person can have impediments to thriving of both body and mind—because, for example, of the ill-treatment of others and the lasting bodily and

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[15] Quoted in William Alston, *Perceiving God* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 18–9.

[16] It is an open question, which I cannot deal with in passing here, whether flourishing in loving personal relationships is compatible with every kind of impediment to thriving of mind. Nonetheless, as Kevin Timpe has called to my attention, Jean Vanier's work with persons suffering from severe impediments to thriving of mind is suggestive in this regard. For a detailed description of a particular case, see Henri Nouwen, *Adam: God's Beloved* (Maryknoll, NY: 2000). For Jean Vanier's own views on the subject, see Jean Vanier, *Becoming Human* (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1998). For a brief discussion of some of Vanier's work in connection with the problem of suffering, see Eleonore Stump, *Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), Chapter 14, "What We Care about: The Desires of the Heart," 418–50.

psychological damage of that ill-treatment—and yet that person can have thriving as a human person.[17] There is thus a third mode of thriving.

THE THIRD MODE OF THRIVING

Harriet Tubman seems to me a good example of this third mode of thriving. She was born a slave, and from early childhood she was recurrently separated from her family. When she was 6 or 7, for example, she was farmed out to a different household as a house slave and nanny. In that job, child though she was, she endured severe beatings; and she was often deprived of sufficient food and adequate clothing. Later in life, as a result of the abuse of one slave master, she suffered a serious head wound, which left her with lasting neurological problems. Throughout the rest of her life, she seems to have suffered from narcolepsy and other manifestations of brain damage as a result of that injury.[18] It is difficult to believe that, in addition to the neurological problems she suffered, she did not also have lasting psychological damage from the trauma of the abuse she endured as a child. And this is only the beginning. The story of the suffering of her life is too great to be summarized adequately in short space here, and it is hard to read even in abbreviated form because the cruelty inflicted on her is heart-breaking.

When she was a young woman, Tubman succeeded in escaping from slavery; and she spent all the rest of her long life rescuing other slaves and working for the abolition of slavery, often in perilous circumstances. When a biography of her was being prepared during her lifetime, she asked Fredrick Douglas to write a recommendation for the cover of the book; and this is what he, so worthy of honor himself, wrote to her:

> You ask for what you do not need when you call upon me for a word of commendation. I need such words from you far more than you can need them from me, especially where your superior labors and devotion to the cause of the lately enslaved of our land are known as I know them. The difference between us is very marked. Most that I have done and suffered in the service of our cause has been in public, and I have

[17] In a helpful paper commenting on the controversy generated by the claim that disability is a not a bad difference, Ian Stoner argues for a distinction in kinds of wellbeing and in ways of being worse off. The distinction he makes has at least a family resemblance to the one I make here, although without the metaphysics I depend on here. See Ian Stoner, "Ways to be Worse Off," *Res Philosophica* 93, no. 4 (2016): 921–49.

[18] For two differing biographies of Harriet Tubman, from which I am taking these details of her life, see Sarah Hopkins Bradford, *Harriet, the Moses of Her People* (New York: Corinth Books, 1961 [originally published in 1886]); and Catharine Clinton, *Harriet Tubman: The Road to Freedom* (New York: Back Bay Books, 2004).

> received much encouragement at every step of the way. You, on the other hand, have labored in a private way. I have wrought in the day—you in the night.... The midnight sky and the silent stars have been the witnesses of your devotion to freedom and of your heroism. Excepting John Brown—of sacred memory—I know of no one who has willingly encountered more perils and hardships to serve our enslaved people than you have.[19]

The great honor in which Harriet Tubman was and is so rightly held by so many people, me included, bears witness to her thriving as a human being. She is not a bent or broken or otherwise failing specimen of the human species. On the contrary, she is a shining example of humanity. And we do not honor her out of compassion, as someone who heroically overcame the tragic circumstances of her life. Rather, anyone with integrity has to acknowledge that she sets a standard for human greatness and so also for thriving as a human being. But she had that thriving with serious impediments to thriving of body and of mind.

It is hard to know exactly what to call this third mode of thriving; but because it seems somehow to be the thriving of the whole person, rather than the thriving of a part of a person, as thriving of body or of mind is, I will call it 'personal thriving', for lack of a better term.

PERSONAL THRIVING AND FLOURISHING

On orthodox Christian theology, the best state for a human person requires willing what God wills; and the sanctification of a person Paula has as its ultimate aim the complete integration of Paula's will around the good, so that Paula wills always and only what God wills.[20] But Paula could be significantly fragmented in will and still count as willing what God wills, provided that Paula has and retains a second-order willing for a will that wills what God wills.[21] As Aquinas understands Christ's will in the garden of Gethsemane, when Christ desired not to die, Christ had a will for something that God did not will; and, nonetheless, Christ was willing what God wills in virtue of having a second-order will to have a will that wills what God wills. On Aquinas's view, then, in this life a person Paula can count as being in grace, even as being Christ-like,

[19] Quoted in B r a d f o r d, *Harriet Tubman*, 134–5.

[20] For further discussion of this claim, see S t u m p, *Atonement*, Chapters 6 and 7. See also in this connection Kevin T i m p e, "Cooperative Grace, Cooperative Agency," *European Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 7, no. 3 (2015): 225–47.

[21] For detailed discussion of this view, see S t u m p, *Atonement*, Chapter 7.

when there is still significant fragmentation and brokenness in her will.[22] But if, on this view, a person can count as being in the best state for human beings in this life even with significant brokenness in the will, then it should not be surprising that, on this same view, someone's having impediments in other parts of a human person is also compatible with her personal thriving.

So thriving of body and thriving of mind are neither individually necessary nor jointly sufficient for personal thriving, as the cases canvassed here illustrate. And because it is the thriving of the whole person, personal thriving outranks thriving of either of the other two modes of thriving or both of them combined (ceteris paribus).[23] So, for example, a person who has significant impediments as regards the body might have greater personal thriving than someone who lacks those impediments (ceteris paribus). In my view, Harriet McBryde Johnson illustrates this point. She is greatly admirable for the thriving of her life, even with serious impediments to thriving of body. Similarly, a person can have personal thriving even with serious impediments to thriving of mind as well as body. The story of Tubman's life shines through the many years since her death as an example of the power and beauty of the human spirit. Her great-heartedness, the indomitable power of her will, the generosity of her work, the accomplishments of her life, are magnificent. Even with the impediments as regards both mind and body from which she suffered, the personal thriving exemplified in her life sets a standard for others.

Furthermore, insofar as personal thriving includes those things characteristic of a life marked not by defeat but by joy, then personal thriving, the thriving of the whole person, seems clearly also to be the flourishing of that person. Human flourishing, then, is not just a matter of thriving in body or in mind or both. It is a matter of thriving as a whole person, and this thriving can occur even when a person suffers from significant impediments as regards both mind and body. As the example of Harriet Tubman illustrates, the depredations of other human beings, the consequences of severe poverty, the misfortunes of nature, and other similar afflictions cannot take away from a sufferer the possibility of flourishing. For even resplendent human flourishing, it is not necessary that the impediments to thriving of mind or body be prevented or removed.

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[22] In this connection, see the section on exclusivism in S t u m p, *Atonement*, Chapter 8. By parity of reasoning with the arguments in that chapter, on this Christian view of thriving, personal thriving is not limited to those who identify themselves as Christians.

[23] Underlying these claims is a rejection of a certain kind of reductionism; on these claims, the whole is not just the sum of its parts. That is why there can be thriving of the whole even when the parts of the whole have some impediments to thriving. For further discussion of the metaphysical position at issue here, see Eleonore S t u m p, "Emergence, Causal Powers, and Aristotelianism in Metaphysics," in *Powers and Capacities in Philosophy: The New Aristotelianism*, ed. Ruth Groff and John Greco (New York and London: Routledge, 2012).

I recognize, of course, the troublesome appearance of this claim and the dreadful misuses to which it can be put. But think of the matter this way. If this claim were not true, then human flourishing would be another monopoly of the wealthy Western industrialized countries, or at least the upper classes in them. Wealth can go a long way towards the prevention and amelioration of impediments to the thriving of mind and body through the nutrition, medical care, and education that wealth makes possible. But wealth is neither necessary nor sufficient for human flourishing, and consequently neither is the thriving of body or thriving of mind that wealth helps to produce. I want to add hastily that this claim should be no consolation for those people who cause suffering to others, or whose indifference contributes to it, or who fail to remedy it when they can readily do so. That flourishing is compatible with suffering does not imply that such people are not execrable in their conduct.[24]

THE FURTHER CLAIM
SUFFERING AND FLOURISHING

It is hard not to notice that, as the Patristic thinkers regarded suffering, some diminishments in thriving of body or mind can in fact be woven into personal thriving. That is, the bodily or mental diminishments in thriving can in fact contribute to personal thriving not because they constitute challenges that a person surmounts, but because those very diminishments are themselves ingredient in that person's thriving. The diminishments are integral to the personal thriving, in the sense that their removal would constitute the removal (or at least the lessening) of the personal thriving.[25]

For example, it is hard not to suppose that Harriet McBryde Johnson is as superlatively courteous and generous to her enemies as she is because of her life with impairments of body. And Harriet Tubman's suffering from the depredations of the slave society around her and her consequent impairments in both

[24] For detailed defense of this claim, see S t u m p, *Wandering in Darkness*, Chapter 13, "Theodicy in Another World," 451–81.

[25] There might, of course, be flourishing of some different sort if the impediments to thriving of body and of mind were removed. The point is only that for the flourishing under discussion, the impediments to thriving are woven into the fabric of the flourishing which a person actually has and are not related to that flourishing in any merely accidental or instrumental way. Furthermore, nothing about the removing of one kind of impediment to thriving, as, for example, the miraculous removal of blindness when Jesus restores the sight of a man born blind, prevents there from being other impediments to thriving of mind or of body in the same person which lead to flourishing of a different sort. Short of perfection in heaven, human beings in this life will not be entirely without some impediments to thriving in mind or body.

mind and body seem to be part of the fabric of her character, marked by her charismatic leadership in her society and her self-sacrificial care for others.

Or think of the same point the other way around. How many people who live an upper-class life without much serious suffering, without much of any impairment in mind or body, count as having great personal thriving? How many people in a life of ease, with little tribulation in it, seem to be an example of human flourishing that others would love to be like? On the contrary, greatness of personal thriving seems to be found largely if not exclusively among those who suffer greatly too.[26] It is difficult to think of anyone who lacks such suffering and yet excites powerful admiration for the personal thriving of his life.

That suffering can lead to great personal thriving seems to me overwhelmingly confirmed by evidence of all kinds, including historical reflection, psychological studies, and plausible fictional narratives.[27] But *why* it should be so is harder to see.

On the scale of value for flourishing which is maintained in orthodox Christian theology, and which is widely held even by those who do not accept that theology, human flourishing has relationships of love at its heart. But the post-Fall human condition is characterized by a tendency to turn away from such relationships into willed loneliness and isolation[28]; and so the post-Fall human condition inclines a person in a direction that undermines flourishing, when flourishing is understood as a matter of relationships of love.

Suffering can make a difference to this condition in varying ways.

In the first place, because suffering is generally aversive, it can drive a person to seek amelioration from the suffering,[29] and it will have to be sought at least in part in the remedies other people can provide. Or, if all remedies fail, then suffering can incline a person to seek just the consolation that other people can give by their presence and compassion. Even when suffering cannot be taken away or diminished, it can somehow be made more bearable by the consolation of the presence of loving others. That is one reason why women in labor find it good to have a caring labor coach with them. The presence of the labor coach cannot diminish the physical pain of childbirth. How could it? But nonetheless the presence of a kind person personally engaged and responsive to

[26] I do not mean to say that suffering is sufficient for personal thriving or that everyone who suffers has personal thriving in virtue of suffering. For some people, suffering is destructive rather than productive of thriving. For further discussion of this point, see S t u m p, *Wandering in Darkness*, Chapter 13.

[27] For some attempt to describe the evidence and argue for the claim, see ibidem, Chapters 13–15, p. 371–481.

[28] See ibidem, Chapters 5–7, p. 85–150.

[29] For more discussion of this claim, see S t u m p, *Atonement*, Chapter 6.

a woman in labor will make the pains of the labor more tolerable if the woman in labor will accept the care and compassion which that person offers.

Secondly, it has to be said that, for those who suffer involuntarily[30] and whose wills are therefore set against the suffering, suffering can be an affront to the ego. In saying this, I do not mean to imply that this reaction is blameworthy. On the contrary, there can be something pathological about passivity in the face of suffering.[31] When, to the great scandal of the Comforters in the story, Job unleashes his furious protests to God for God's allowing his suffering, God himself says at the end of the story that only Job—not the pious Comforters but Job—has said what was right.[32] So I do not mean to imply any negative assessment by saying that the mere fact of suffering can be an affront to the ego of the sufferer. I mean only to call attention to the fact that, when a person cannot ward off from himself what his will is set against, he is driven to acknowledge that he is not sufficient for himself. In this spirit, he will also be more likely to be willing to seek help, human help or God's help.

For one reason or another, then, suffering can break in on a person's inwardness and isolation.[33] The aversiveness of suffering can fuel a person's willingness to seek connection with others. A suffering person may turn to other human beings, but it is also widely recognized that in suffering a person is likely to turn to God, even if this turning comes with anger or remonstrance, as it does in Job's case.[34] It is common to find religious belief and religious experience among those in deep distress. It is less common to find true religiosity among those at ease.

For Tubman, God was always present to her and engaged with her. One of her biographers describes an experience that was typical for her; it occurred at the time in her life when she was first contemplating returning to slave territory to rescue other slaves:

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[30] Even those suffering only involuntarily *secundum quid.*

[31] For a defense of this claim, see the discussion of Eckhart's views in S t u m p, *Atonement*, Chapter 6.

[32] For a discussion of this case, see S t u m p, *Wandering in Darkness*, Chapter 9, "The Story of Job: Suffering and the Second-Personal," 177–226.

[33] It is certainly true, as some readers will be quick to point out, that suffering can also cement a person into angry or despairing isolation. Insofar as a person's surrender to love, or even just to the compassion and care of others, is always in the control of that person, nothing can guarantee that a person will incline to such surrender.

[34] Some people suppose that there are special cases in which a person suffers from a trauma associated with a religious context, so that the one thing such a person is unlikely to do is turn to God in suffering. For discussion of such cases, see Michael R e a, "*Though the Darkness Hide Thee": Seeking the Face of the Invisible God* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018). If in fact there are such cases, then I will omit them from the claims made here.

> She had great fears about her future course, and confided, 'The Lord told me to do this. I said, "Oh Lord, I can't—don't ask me—take somebody else."' But Tubman also reported that God spoke directly to her: 'It's you I want, Harriet Tubman.'[35]

As this and other anecdotes from Tubman's life illustrate, suffering is part of an on-going process in a person's life in which flourishing can develop and increase. The correlation between suffering and flourishing depends on second-personal relationships of love; and such relationships are dynamic, not static, even where God is concerned. It is part of traditional Christian theology that God will give grace to anyone who does not refuse it,[36] but, clearly, a process of this sort will expand rapidly if it is continued. That is because the grace given enables a person to ameliorate her own inner fragmentation and so to be more willing to be open to love and goodness—and this increased openness on her part will be met with more grace that grows her in goodness, thereby resulting in more grace given, and so on. Seeing the relationship between God and a person in grace in this way explains the line in the Gospels (see, e.g., Mt 25:29) that to him who has, more will be given. This is an odd distribution principle if one is thinking of goods that diminish when they are distributed, such as money or human honor; but it makes sense if one is thinking of grace and love. Love grows in consequence of being accepted and shared. Insofar as suffering opens a person to love and deepens her in closeness to God and others, it is an element in this growth. What makes Tubman exemplary for us increased in her throughout her life.[37]

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So here is what I want to say in conclusion.

I have no wish to support anything that would seem in any way to make light of Tubman's suffering. The suffering inflicted on her by the people promoting and maintaining slavery highlight the terribleness of the human post-Fall disorder, for which no words seem negative enough. Nonetheless, with diffidence, I want to suggest that Tubman's life also illustrates well the complicated thought in 2 Corinthians set out above and the traditional Christian attitude towards suffering represented by the quotation from Chrysostom I gave at the outset of this paper.

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[35] C l i n t o n, *Harriet Tubman*, 83.

[36] For more explanation of this claim, see S t u m p, *Atonement*, Chapter 2.

[37] It would be a mistake to suppose that her suffering increased simultaneously and correlatively. Nothing about the role of suffering in flourishing implies that the suffering and the flourishing are simultaneous.

On the complex thought in the Pauline Epistle, in virtue of suffering, a person can grow in flourishing, even with irremediable and significant impediments to thriving of body or mind, until there is in her life such flourishing that it is right to think of it as glory. And—to take the next part of the Epistle's thought—the affliction that a person suffers in this process will have a correlated consolation in the presence of God with her.

Tubman's flourishing came to her in virtue of her suffering, and the result is that her life is an example of the best a human life can be. The connection that the Epistle makes between suffering and glory is illustrated in her life. And so is the Epistle's claim that consolation increases with affliction. That Harriet Tubman is as exceptional in her on-going religious experience as in her great-heartedness and her suffering is evident not only from her own testimony but also that of others who knew her. Her contemporary biographer summed the matter up this way:

> [Harriet] spoke of 'consulting with God,' and trusted that He would keep her safe. Thomas Garrett once said of her, 'I never met with any person of any color who had more confidence in the voice of God, as spoken direct to her soul.'[38]

Thomas Garrett's evaluation of Harriet Tubman's religious life is surely right. At any rate, it is highly doubtful whether any of those in the relatively well-to-do slaveholding communities around her lived in the kind of on-going powerful religious experience she had. And so the Epistle's correlation of glory and of consolation with suffering seems well illustrated in her life. On this way of thinking of suffering, it is not hard to see why Chrysostom would think that those who suffer more are also especially dear to God.

And here it is important to me to reiterate caveats I have made elsewhere also.

I am not claiming that the good of human flourishing justifies any human being in causing or permitting or failing to remedy suffering of the sort Tubman endured. To say that a person flourishes as she does at least in part in virtue of her suffering does not imply that it would be acceptable for another human being to permit it, or to cause it, or to refuse to remedy it if he could readily do so. It is one thing to claim that some suffering can lead to the flourishing of the sufferer and another thing entirely to claim that a person is justified in causing or allowing such suffering on the part of another for the sake of that flourishing.[39]

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[38] C l i n t o n, *Harriet Tubman*, 91.

[39] For discussion and defense of this claim, see S t u m p, *Wandering in Darkness*, Chapter 13. From the fact that an impediment of one part of a person can exist together with great thriving of the whole person, it does not follow that any such impediment itself is a good thing. It means only that an impediment with regard to one part of a human person can be completely eclipsed or defe-

Furthermore, nothing about suffering guarantees that a sufferer will grow in closeness to God; human free will rules out such guarantees.

In addition, the consolation that increases with affliction, as the Epistle describes it, may not come at the same time as the affliction; it may come only later. Even those who seem to lack all consolation because they are burdened by depression or something else that leaves them destitute of ordinary human peace may yet find that their suffering enables them to flourish later with greater peace and greater joy than others who have not experienced such desolation.

Finally, someone may suppose that, for every one person such as Harriet McBryde Johnson or Harriet Tubman, there are countless others who do not flourish in their suffering. But such a claim about the relative proportion of people who suffer without ever flourishing in consequence seems to me unsupported by any good evidence. Suffering is not always transparent even to the sufferer, let alone to those around the sufferer;[40] and flourishing is similarly not transparent either. In this respect, consider Sophie Scholl, who was executed by the Nazis after a speedy show trial and buried in an outcast's grave at what was then the edge of Munich. Hardly anyone around the world then knew who she was, or cared to know either. But now she is honored the world over for the flourishing of her life, and her grave is never without fresh flowers. So it is possible for a person both to suffer and to flourish in ways invisible to others, at least for a time, at least in this life. Consequently, the claim that most sufferers

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ated by the thriving of the whole person. In a related point regarding disability, Elizabeth Barnes has argued in various works that this claim: (1) disability by itself does not make a life worse than it otherwise would be, does not entail this claim: (2) it is morally permissible to cause disability or to fail to remedy disability. See, e.g., B a r n e s, "Disability, Minority and Difference," 339. Her position seems to me entirely correct. One can think of the point this way. An impediment to the flourishing of a part of a person Paula is something bad for that part; and insofar as it is bad for that part, it ought to be prevented or remedied if it can be so ceteris paribus. But it is also possible for Paula to thrive as a person in virtue of the impediment of one of her parts. In that case, Paula's personal thriving defeats the badness of the impediment to the flourishing of a part of Paula. When the badness of the impediment is defeated by the thriving of the whole person, then it may well be the case that the conditions in the ceteris paribus clause are not met. Consequently, in a case of that sort, Paula might well prefer to keep the impediment and to be glad of it (as, in an analogous case, the disability rights movement argues with respect to disability). But in cases where the prevention or the remedy of some impediment to the flourishing of a part of Paula would not diminish or destroy Paula's personal thriving, the prevention or remedy of the impediment ought to be sought. Since the impediment itself is some defect in a part of Paula, and since human beings are rarely in a position to know whether keeping or causing such a defect will enhance the personal thriving of a person who has that defect, then if a person Jerome caused or kept such a defect in Paula when he could readily prevent or repair it, Jerome's actions are not rendered morally permissible by any good effects that might follow for Paula.

[40] For further explication and defense of this claim, see S t u m p, *Wandering in Darkness*, Chapter 1, "Suffering: Theodicy and Defense," 3–22.

find no flourishing in their suffering is not only unsupported but in fact is such that empirical support for it is in principle hard to come by.

With these caveats underlined, it seems to me right to acknowledge that there is a connection between the flourishing of Tubman's life and the suffering she endured. It seems to me true to say, with the thought of the Epistle, that she flourished in virtue of her suffering. If there is something heart-breakingly shaming about the human species in consequence of its part in such horrors as the slavery of the ante-bellum South, then the gloriousness of Tubman's life is highlighted by contrast. With all the impediments as regards mind and body which were a suffering for her, who would not grant that the flourishing of her life greatly outranked that of the slaveholders whose lives had vastly less suffering than hers or even that of the Northerners who lived at ease and were content not to mingle themselves into the troubles of others? Who would pick one of those Southern slaveholders or those indifferent Northerners as exemplary of human flourishing? By contrast with the life of Harriet Tubman, their lives look sad or shaming for our species. And if, like the slaveholding Southerners or the uninterested Northerners, Tubman had just lived a life of relative wealth and comfort, it seems unlikely that she would have become the woman we now are honored to honor.

And so there is something deeply right in the traditional Christian attitude about suffering, as there is also something supremely right in the disability pride movement. A person is more than the sum of her mind and body, and there can be a magnificent flourishing of the whole person not in spite of but because of the suffering she endures.

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ABSTRACT /ABSTRAKT

Eleonore STUMP, Suffering and Flourishing
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Although we sometimes praise a person who suffers for not sinking under his suffering, we still suppose that the sufferer is to be ranked more among life's losers than among life's winners. And, in general, we are inclined to find perverse anything that values suffering itself. On the contrary, anything that undermines physical or mental thriving strikes us as lamentable. The current disability rights movement is an exception to this general attitude. It wants others to see that those with disabilities are not among life's losers, or even among life's heroic overcomers of the tragic, but are instead people to celebrate. From

the Patristic period onward, the Christian tradition has held a roughly analogous position not as regards disability but rather as regards suffering in general. It has supposed that those who endure serious suffering are not the pitiable losers of life or even the heroic overcomers of tragedy but rather are those specially loved by God. In this paper, I want to look closely at the relevant Christian doctrines to see what can be said to explain this attitude towards suffering and to distinguish it from the neighboring perverse attitude that sees suffering as an intrinsic good.

Keywords: suffering and flourishing of a human person, disability, disability rights movement, the Christian approach to suffering

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Eleonore STUMP, Cierpienie a rozkwit człowieczeństwa

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Mimo że niekiedy zdarza się nam wychwalać człowieka, który nie ugina się pod ciężarem cierpienia, pozostajemy w przekonaniu, że cierpiących należy postrzegać jako przegranych, nie zaś jako tych, którym się w życiu powiodło. We wszelkich próbach pozytywnego wartościowania cierpienia dostrzegamy ponadto pewną przewrotność. I przeciwnie, wszystko to, co zagraża ludzkiemu rozwojowi czy sukcesowi, natychmiast uznajemy za godne współczucia. Na tle takiego właśnie generalnego postrzegania cierpienia jako wyjątek jawi się ruch na rzecz praw osób niepełnosprawnych. Zmierza on do tego, by dostrzeżono, że osób dotkniętych niepełnosprawnością nie należy z góry zaliczać do ludzi przegranych w życiu, ani też widzieć w nich jednostek heroicznie przezwyciężających swój tragiczny los. Przeciwnie, należy upatrywać w nich osoby, których obecność trzeba uroczyście afirmować. Tradycja chrześcijańska już od okresu patrystycznego utrzymuje zasadniczo podobne stanowisko w kwestii cierpienia jako takiego. Zakłada ona, że ludzie dotknięci poważnym cierpieniem nie są przegranymi, którzy zasługują na współczucie, ani też osobami, które starają się w heroiczny sposób przeciwstawiać tragedii; zostali oni raczej w szczególny sposób umiłowani przez Boga. W obecnym tekście pragnę bliżej przyjrzeć się odnośnym doktrynom chrześcijańskim, aby wskazać na możliwy sposób uzasadnienia takiego właśnie pojmowania cierpienia i wyraźnie odróżnić to stanowisko od zbliżonego doń poglądu, który nakazuje dostrzegać w cierpieniu wewnętrzne dobro.

Słowa kluczowe: cierpienie i rozkwit osoby ludzkiej, niepełnosprawność, ruch na rzecz praw osób niepełnosprawnych, chrześcijańska interpretacja cierpienia

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BETWEEN HOPE AND DESPAIR
The Experience of Eternity

In spite of the cataclysms that marked the 20th century, numerous philosophers of the period, such as Gabriel Marcel, Paul Ricoeur, or Józef Tischner, emphasized the significance of hope. Pope John Paul II, in turn, went as far as to make the motif of 'hope' an essential element of his teaching. The attempts to reinstitute hope after the war show that it is among the most powerful dimensions of human nature and needs to be seen as a necessary condition for a human life, or even as a synonym for a human life: To live is to hope.

TIME AND ETERNITY
Introductory Remarks

One of the most significant problems discussed in European philosophy over the years has been whether the essence of being is eternity or time. To put it simply, one can distinguish two dominant standpoints on the issue. According to the first one (of which Parmenides is the symbolic patron), the One Being is that which is eternal and immutable, and thus all changes belong to the world of illusion. According to the second one (of which Heraclitus is the symbolic patron), nothing in the world is stable, only change is real. Parmenides used to be considered right more often than Heraclitus, which is expressed not only in the various forms of Platonism, but also in the Christian understanding of God as the eternal and immutable being. The latter view is an expression of the distrust of time, which is conceived as degrading being. Existence in time is fragile, almost unreal, since—from the perspective of eternal immutability—to change is either to cease to be, or not to be at all. In a universe characterized by ever-present change, there is no room for absolute existence (which might be otherwise attributed to being, truth, or duty) and even enduring in existence turns out to be merely illusory. Thus time and eternity are mutually exclusive forms of existence. Since time involves not only change, but also destruction, it is perceived as evil, as illustrated by the Greek myth about Kronos, who begets his children only to devour them.[1] Thus, if being is tantamount to eternity and

[1] I discussed the myth about Kronos in a separate article. See Ireneusz Z i e m i ń s k i, "Logos czasu: Na marginesie greckiego podania o Kronosie," *Sztuka i Filozofia*, nos. 22–23 (2003): 149–62.

immutability, time appears as an ontological horror and, as such, needs to be overcome.

In contemporary philosophy, the predominant standpoint in the controversy over the essence of being is that of temporality: being is considered as tantamount to time and change (this approach is particularly common for the philosophy and theology of process). Despite this general orientation, philosophers tend to seek a durable element capable of resisting the destructive power of the passage of time. Ironically, one of these durable forms is time itself: even though everything that exists in time must die, time itself does not cease to exist. This, however, would suggest that the primary mark of being is enduring in existence rather than mutability. Such a view is supported by the theory of substantialism, frequently recurring in the European philosophy since the times of Aristotle and claiming that there is an immutable entity (substance) at the base of all change. Thus, change and time appear to be ontically preceded by immutability and eternity. This, however, does not justify the claim that time is ontically inferior to eternity; rather, it points to the ultimate beginning of time which makes its existence possible and from which it derives its meaning. Therefore, according to substantialism, time and eternity do not need to be juxtaposed: they complement each other (or may even be seen as two sides of the same reality).

The controversy I have outlined is not merely over the nature of being as such, but it also concerns human nature and the meaning of life. The question we need to address is then whether a human being is merely a passing phenomenon, facing an ultimate and irreversible destruction in death, or whether there is an enduring and indestructible element in a human life. The key to the answer can be found in our daily experience of time.

THE EXPERIENCE OF TIME

While discussing the problem of the human experience of time, I shall disregard its physics related theories, as well as the issues they raise by understanding time as an indelible component of the human image of the world. Neither am I interested in the ontological argument over the reality of time, or its nature. Therefore I shall not delve into the issue of what or how time is: whether it is an objective aspect of reality (as Newton held) or simply a subjective form of intuition (as Kant understood it). Neither shall I consider the issue of whether time needs to be interpreted as an absolute and substantial structure which is the condition for the existence of objects (as is assumed in Newtonian physics), or rather as their secondary quality, resulting from the changeability of objects and from the relations obtaining between them (as held, for example,

by Aristotle or Leibniz). Last but not least, I shall not consider issues regarding the inner structure of time epitomized by the question of whether time is a monotonous, mathematical continuum of succeeding instants (which was the basis of Zeno's paradoxes), or whether time should be conceived in terms of real duration and lived consciousness (as Henri Bergson understood it). I disregard these questions because a human experience of time is subjective and largely independent of the ontic structure of time.

By limiting the scope of the inquiry to the anthropological dimension, I shall omit a majority of issues related to the culturally determined perception of time in particular historical epochs, civilizations,[2] and areas of social life.[3] I believe that, regardless of such determinants, human beings understand time in a specific way linked to their (species determined) physiological, bodily structure and their specific experiences, as well as to the specific course of the life of each of them. What I mean, however, is not the universally acknowledged fact that time is perceived as subjective due to the changing intensity of various experiences, acutely manifested in the fact that we tend to consider negative circumstances as long-lasting (a few minutes long toothache, for instance, might seem an eternity), and find pleasant moments passing too fast (a walk in the company of a loved person might seem very short, while in fact it has taken a few hours). Instead, my objective is to demonstrate the aspects of the human experience which point to our existence in both time and eternity.[4]

Without undermining the importance of space as the 'place' filled with our lives and the activities we pursue, it is important to note that it is its temporality that constitutes the fundamental mode of any human experience; thus, it is justified to say that we not only exist, but that we also exist in time. Therefore, one may agree with Edmund Husserl that our primary awareness is that of time, and our awareness of space is only secondary.[5] The primacy of time-consciousness is evident also on the level of our fundamental existential aspirations, which has been succinctly grasped by Abraham Joshua Heschel in his observation that humans must first and foremost master time and only secondarily do so about space.[6] But how to master time? It seems only obvious

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[2] Interesting remarks on this issue can be found in Frederick Charles Copleston's book *Philosophies and Cultures*. See Frederic Charles C o p l e s t o n, *Philosophies and Cultures* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).

[3] Obviously, a monk in a monastery experiences time differently than a stockbroker.

[4] For an explanation of the metaphysical meaning of ordinary human time, see Jean G u i t t o n, *Justification du temps* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966).

[5] According to Husserl, consciousness constitutes itself as internal time-consciousness. See Edmund H u s s e r l, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, trans. James Churchill (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964).

[6] See Abraham Joshua H e s c h e l, *The Sabbath: Its Meaning for Modern Man* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux and The Noonday Press, 1998), 3–7.

that the limits of time are more difficult to escape than those of space. Time not only affects us externally, but also determines the internal structure of our lives, and thus it is not at our disposal. Contrary to appearances, it is not us having power over time, but time having power over us. Leszek Kołakowski once said that a human life is like a house with four cornerstones provided by reason, God, love, and death, all of them bound together by time and simultaneously serving as ways to master time and its destructive power.[7]

Our experience of time is ambiguous. On the one hand, time is given us as a natural form of existence, but on the other, it is a power which destroys us.[8] The dubious nature of time results in its two opposite understandings: as a continuity and durability, or as fading and destruction. In everyday life we tend to perceive time in terms of fading, or we even see an irresistible momentum in it. This particular aspect was stressed by St. Augustine, who argued that time cannot be considered as 'being'; rather, it should be conceived as 'nothingness,' since the past no longer exists and will never recur (the course of events is final and unidirectional), the future does not exist yet, and there is no certainty that it will ever happen (neither the past nor the present time imply the existence of any antecedent moment), while the present time, delineating the border between the past and the future is devoid of duration and impossible to grasp by the intellect. The above description points to the fact that, by existing in time, a human being does not partake of enduring (or true) being: only eternity is truly real. Although our lives could be considered as following the path which ends with eternity, they cannot be deemed real as long as this destination has not been reached. A similar description of time, much as it is set in a different philosophical context, can be found in the work of Hegel, who claimed that temporal existence disappears in the act by which it is. Thus, it is their existence in time that decides about the fundamental finiteness of things, which, therefore, can hardly be called entirely real.[9]

The negative experience of time, rooted in the contrast between our existence, which fades as time passes, and the eternity and durability of the abso-

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[7] See Leszek K o ł a k o w s k i, *Kompletna i krótka metafizyka: Innej nie będzie. Innej nie będzie*, in Leszek Kołakowski, *Czy Pan Bóg jest szczęśliwy i inne pytania*, ed. Zbigniew Mentzel (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak, 2009), 297. At first glance, it might seem that death is not a triumph over time; rather, it provides most clear evidence of the power time has over us. However, death can mean either an eternity of non-existence or a transition to a different form of being and in both cases it signifies a triumph over time.

[8] See ibidem.

[9] See Bernard B o u r g e o i s, "Time and Eternity," *The Philosophical Forum* 31, nos. 3–4 (2000): 380–5. According to Hegel, the essence of time is that it emerges from nothingness and, having come to existence, immediately fades into nothingness; therefore, one could say that time both is and is not. To be precise, things do not emerge or die in time, time itself being both emergence and death.

lute, is, however, not the only possible approach to time. Once we disregard the initial negativity of transience and focus on the subjective experience of the successive moments of life, also positive aspects of the passing of time will come to the fore. While time helps us forget pain and makes the old wounds heal, some experiences—both negative and positive—are so intense that the passing of time will never erase them. They are enduring to the point that we keep reliving them as if they had just happened. In such cases, we observe that time is not related merely to fading, but also to a continuous endurance of one state: a specific event or experience appears continuously present, making a stamp on the person's entire life. Such occurrences point to the existence of a significant dimension of the self which persists while simultaneously fading away. Simultaneously with temporality, we experience eternity.

THE EXPERIENCE OF ETERNITY

There are two major ways of approaching eternity: we can conceive of it either as infinite time or as timelessness, that is as an 'eternal now' in which the passage of time does not exist. Both descriptions can be referred both to earthly life and to the potential existence after death, and therefore we can speak of four meanings of eternity, related to, respectively, (1) a temporally infinite earthly life, (2) a temporally infinite life after death, (3) a timeless earthly life, and (4) a timeless life after death.

A temporally infinite earthly life can be an object of our experience insofar as our consciousness, at any moment, remains open to the future. Since we do not experience any conscious moment as the final one, our lives appear potentially infinite at least in the subjective sense. However, were such an eventuality to become fact, death would have to be eliminated, which—at least at the current stage of the advancement of medical science—is out of the question. Thus, in our considerations, we may disregard the concept of eternity as a temporally infinite earthly life.

A temporally infinite existence after death, in turn, poses a problem not only because we lack conclusive (or at least uncontroversial or generally accepted) arguments for it, but also due to the fact that it would exclude the possibility of ever reaching the fullness of life and would be tantamount to endless and aimless being.[10] Moreover, from the perspective of earthly exist-

[10] See Bernard W i l l i a m s, *The Macropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality*, in: Bernard Williams, *Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers 1956–1972* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 82–100. One could interpret the model proposed by Kant in a similar way; although he believed that life after death is an essential condition for accomplishing the highest good (conceived as the effect of the fulfillment of our moral duties which makes us deserve happiness),

ence, it is rather difficult to grasp in what an endlessly enduring existence after death might actually consist. Therefore, in the present considerations, we shall disregard also this way of approaching eternity.

The third option, that of eternity conceived in terms of a timeless earthly life, would imply that, in our lives, we actually experience certain moments without a simultaneous experience of the passage of time. Owing to such moments, we partake of eternity even before we die. On the other hand, eternity understood as a timeless life after death would imply a self-contained existence, resembling that of God.[11] The only basis for envisioning such a condition is the experience of moments marked by timelessness already in earthly life.

It is clear then that the only sufficiently justified eternity, as well as the only available one in our earthly experience, is that related to a timeless earthly life. Thus we must not conceive of eternal life as the negation of time; rather, we need to see in it a particular form of existence manifested in time and through time,[12] and consisting in a subjective experience of the absence of a passage of time, which marks such realities as love, boredom, or pain we tend to perceive as enduring. Strictly speaking, though, one can hardly associate them with an experience of 'eternal presence,' since they presuppose the knowledge that they may be terminated. Therefore, they do not fully partake of eternity; rather, we may see in them the 'crumbs of eternity' experienced in time. Yet, while being experienced, they appear permanent and unchangeable to the extent that the subject finds it impossible even to envision that they might ever end; it is precisely at such moments that a human being experiences eternity, and much as temporary or subjective such an experience is, it is nevertheless real.

It is also possible to experience time itself as eternity, and it would imply not only a deep intensity of certain experiences (in the sense of the content

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one might nevertheless wonder whether such a goal can ever be reached. If so, life after death would amount to an endless pursuit of the final goal (the synthesis of duty and happiness) which is never ultimately accomplished.

[11] This is how eternity has been understood by numerous philosophers and Christian theologians.

[12] See Jacques Durandeaux, *L'Éternité dans la vie quotidienne: Essai sur les sources et la structure du concept d'éternité* (Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1964), 170, 225–7. See also Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, *The Idea of Immortality* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1922), 135. One might certainly point to alternative models of timelessness, for instance, to that which identifies it with a total absence of time (even of the present time). In the present considerations, however, I disregard this option, since what I am interested in above all is the experience of eternity in time, while an absolutely timeless existence, devoid not only of the past and the future, but also of the present time, would not pertain to time in any way. Therefore, an eternal timeless existence in the sense of an absence of time would denote a form of eternity radically different from what we can experience in everyday life; it is not excluded, though, that the latter possibility relates to the essence of the life we might experience after death. It would then denote a radically new form of being impossible to grasp mentally from the vantage point of earthly existence.

filling up time), but also a durability of time as such (i.e., present, as well as continuous existence of the past and of the future). In both cases, the experience of eternity involves a subjective sense of an unchangeable duration devoid of any awareness of the passage of time. The experience in question may be either positive and involve pleasure, or negative, when it embraces suffering; it may also be rather neutral, almost bordering indifference, but it always consists in the subject's attention being focused on the present, which makes it possible for the consciousness not to realize the passage of time. The most important sources of this particular sense of eternity are memories, aesthetic and religious experiences, love, happiness and ecstasy, hope, fear, pain, suffering, despair, unremovable guilt, and boredom.[13] Below, I shall consider experiences related to hope as broadly understood (i.e., involving the expectation of something good), as well as fear that the good in question will not be accomplished, or that, once accomplished, it will be lost. Should the latter turn out to be the case, we experience anguish or even fall into despair.

HOPE

As confirmed by empirical data, hope is counted among the most important values. Władysław Tatarkiewicz, a 20th century Polish philosopher, refers to a survey done among German youth which showed that they considered 'hope' as the most beautiful word.[14] Although Tatarkiewicz does not provide the exact year of the study in question, it was apparently conducted soon after the Second World War, which proves that human beings crave hope even in the most tragic circumstances. In spite of the cataclysms that marked the 20th century, numerous philosophers of the period, such as Gabriel Marcel, Paul Ricoeur, or Józef Tischner, emphasized the significance of hope. Pope John Paul II, in turn, went as far as to make the motif of 'hope' an essential element of his teaching. The attempts to reinstitute hope after the war show that it is among the most powerful dimensions of human nature and needs to be seen as a necessary condition for a human life, or even as a synonym for a human life: To live is to hope.

In the present considerations, we shall disregard various attempts to define hope; rather, we shall focus on a description of the experience of hope in daily life. Hope certainly involves a subject who cherishes it, as well as its object,

[13] For a detailed discussion of the 'crumbs of eternity' offered us in earthly existence, see Ireneusz Ziemiński, *Życie wieczne: Przyczynek do eschatologii filozoficznej* (Poznań and Kraków: Dominikańskie Studium Filozofii i Teologii, Wydawnictwo Polskiej Prowincji Dominikanów W Drodze and Kolegium Filozoficzno-Teologiczne Polskiej Prowincji Dominikanów, 2013).

[14] See Władysław T a t a r k i e w i c z, *O szczęściu* (Warszawa: PWN, 1985), 249n6.

and it consists in trust in that a certain good will endure or some evil will be removed. Hope by no means refers to specific situations only: it may equally be a stable attitude in life which makes it possible for a human being to overcome adversities and handle difficult situations. However, hope must not be mistaken for naïve optimism, blindness to evil, or an escape from an unbearable situation into dreams of a better tomorrow. What hope embraces is rather readiness for the new and the unexpected, although it lacks certainty that what we desire will actually come true. Therefore, hope must not be interpreted as anticipation of something already settled or determined; rather, hope expresses trust that there is always a possibility that we will go on living. Hope is open to the future, including the future after death.

According to Gabriel Marcel, hope is invariably eschatological in its nature, its scope never limited to our earthly existence and always going beyond death, towards the fullness of life.[15] Polish poet Jan Twardowski called hope a time without goodbyes,[16] while German philosopher Paul-Louis Landsberg believed that hope is capable of defeating death.[17] Likewise, Josef Pieper argued that hope means trust in the possibility of attaining life in God, the proper object of hope being salvation.[18] To a Christian, it is Jesus Christ who is the fulfilment of hope, which becomes clear in death: while from the vantage point of earthly existence, death signifies the final defeat, from the perspective of faith, it is the moment of greatest hope. It means that the full meaning of hope is revealed in situations when a human being, pushed into nothingness, loses everything. Paradoxically then, death brings the culmination of hope, as shown by Jan Twardowski in his poem *Na ręce* [In My Hands].[19] This certainly does not mean that death is good or that it is the ultimate goal of life. Conversely, it is the moment of greatest hope possible, because, helpless in the face of fate, in death, we reach the absolute end. In death, nothing awaits us any more; in death, we lose everything, and we lose it forever. However, while posing a dire threat to our existence, death is simultaneously the moment of absolute hope for salvation from evil, including the evil of death itself.

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[15] See Gabriel Marcel, *Being and Having*, trans. Katharine Farrer (Westminster: Dacre Press, 1949), 77–9, 93–4. See also Gabriel Marcel, *The Mystery of Being*, trans. George Sutherland Fraser (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1950), 216–9.

[16] See Jan Twardowski, "Ostatnia" [The Last One] in Jan Twardowski, *Nadzieja, miłość, spisane pacierze: Wiersze wybrane* (Białystok: Dom Wydawniczy Benkowski, 2007), 118.

[17] See Paul-Louis Landsberg, *Essai sur l'expérience de la mort et Le problème moral du suicide* (Paris: Éditions Points, 1993). See also Paul-Louis Landsberg, *O sprawach ostatecznych*, transl. by Barbara Kazimierczyk (Warszawa: Instytut Wydawniczy Pax, 1967), 35–7.

[18] See Josef Pieper, *Faith, Hope, Love*, trans. Richard and Clara Winston, and Frances McCarthy (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997), 106–8, 111–4.

[19] See Jan Twardowski, "Na ręce," in Twardowski, *Nadzieja, miłość, spisane pacierze*, 86.

Hope is not only open to the future, but also embodies it by turning some future good into a present one: our trust in receiving a good annihilates the temporal distance which separates us from it.[20] One might go as far as to say that hope in a way materializes what only the future holds for us. And this does not hold true about earthly goods exclusively, but also about life after death, since eschatological hope makes it possible for us to experience its presence already now. This is something already St. Paul emphasized by saying that "in hope we were saved" (Rom 8:24). Gabriel Marcel held, in turn, that hope makes a human being capable of overcoming the passage of time, thus confirming his or her eternal existence.[21]

However, there are certainly numerous individuals who do not cherish eschatological hope; indeed, some of them would rather avoid life after death at all costs. One might say, though, that what they hope for is death which will put an ultimate end to their earthly agony. Likewise, a person committing suicide, unable to cope with utter despair, has at least a glimmer of hope that their fate will change once death puts an end to the suffering. There is no doubt that those who continue their lives by taking up new projects on a daily basis are hopeful, since a human being absolutely devoid of hope would not be able to act at all. If absolute despair, a total absence of hope (whether for life or for death), is possible, a human being who has experienced it has simultaneously experienced the eternity of hell.

Certainly not all hope is rational. Not infrequently do we hope in spite of what surrounds us. One might even go as far as to claim that hope, by making it impossible to see life as it really is, engenders dangerous illusions. On the other hand, though, this is precisely the reason why hope makes it possible for us to handle even most difficult situations in which we would otherwise tend to experience life as an endless agony and, as such, having no meaning at all. The fact that at times we can break in the face of a minor failure, while on other occasions even a major tragedy exerts no power over us, can be explained by pointing to the difference between the nature of hope for accomplishing a specific good (or, for avoiding a specific evil) and that of hope as a permanent attitude adopted in life, the latter justifying the acceptance of even enduring agony. Hope for a specific good not infrequently ends up in disappointment, yet it does not destroy the attitude of trust in the world as such, regardless of the many disappointments and failures one might have experienced. Both types, though, coincide in eschatological hope, which is, on the one hand, hope for a specific good (i.e., life after death) and, on the other, a stable attitude

[20] See G u i t t o n, *Justification du temps*, 21–8.

[21] See Gabriel M a r c e l, *Homo Viator: Introduction to the Metaphysics of Hope*, trans. Emma Craufurd and Paul Seaton (South Bend: St. Augustine's Press, 2010), 24–5.

a person shows while handling most difficult moments in his or her life. Should eschatological hope turn out merely an illusion, we shall not experience life after death, but neither shall we experience disappointment: having ceased to exist, we shall not be in the position to realize that it was actually an illusion we entertained as hope. Thus anyone who preserves a hope for life after death, and does so till the end of their lives, will not experience their death as the ultimate end of life, and so, as long as such a person is alive, he or she enjoys eternal life.

One might argue, though, that hope—in particular eschatological hope—is actually tantamount to pride, which consists not only in a greed for life, but also in the belief that salvation can be taken for granted. The reason is that eschatological hope is not experienced as a risk or an uncertainty, rather, it is identified by the hoping subject with his or her actual possession of the 'goods' hope is merely to portend. Since no certitude is possible as far as the future, in particular the potential future awaiting human beings after death, is concerned, a person who believes he or she has already been saved not only entertains an illusion, but also manifests pride.

Contrary to the just described interpretation, it is important to note that no one actually experiences hope as reassurance that the desired goods will be ultimately granted; instead, the role of hope is to create useful illusions which help human beings live on. Thus the suggestion that hope for salvation is tantamount to pride is utterly senseless: what hope for salvation expresses is rather faith in the existence and goodness of God, combined with an unshakeable trust that God will never leave us. Of all these, we cannot be certain, though, since certainty is a mark of expectation rather than of hope.

EXPECTATION

Expectation is an axiologically and emotionally neutral state, devoid of hope as much as of fear, and relating to a predetermined future. Expectation is accompanied by the certainty that a particular good, or a particular evil, will affect us as soon as the temporal distance that separates us from it disappears. A good example of a person cherishing an expectation is that of a writer who has just been awarded the Nobel Prize: the prize might not have been handed to him yet, but the decision that he will receive it has already been taken, so the writer is expecting the prize.[22]

[22] The writer might certainly die before receiving the award or the circumstances might preclude the ceremony, still, once we disregard arguments of this kind, at least some future facts can be already taken for granted.

Thus expectation is not an 'empty' experience of time, but it is focused on a specific fact which is certain to occur. In expectation, there is no room for surprise, or for novelty, since the contents of expectation have already been set. Expectation does not open up the human being to a new future, because, paradoxically, one can expect only what is already known, more than that: what is already certain.[23] In daily life, expectation is based on the repetitiveness of things: we expect things that usually happen and we expect things which we have repeatedly experienced to continue. We expect certain situations or specific events to take place and we consider them as daily routines, as things that will definitely happen and will do so precisely the way everything we have expected so far happened. However, expectation is by no means a result of routine or a matter of habit; rather, it manifests our sense of the reality which makes us expect the predetermined to come (and consider all other things as uncertain). It is here that the main difference between expectation and hope lies: hoping involves no certainty, while expectation embraces things already set to happen and relates to them as if they have happened already.[24] One can expect life after death, as confirmed by the Apostles' Creed; yet should one believe in resurrection, one will not only hope for it, but be certain resurrection will be the case.

If the above description is apt, the element of the future is even more deeply present when we expect things than when we hope for them. In the case of expectation, future things are present already now as ones to come. Expectation is then analogous to memory: while it is thanks to memory that things gone by become present, expectation does so about future things. Thus both memory and expectation make it possible for us to experience time that does not pass.

And yet this optimistic thesis may be put into question once we argue that what we expect does not exist yet, since it belongs to the future which is only to come. Thus the expectation of a thing is not tantamount to the actual possession of it. Rather, it should be seen in terms of lacking this thing continuously and, since the future is unpredictable, the fact we expect to take place may actually never happen. This argument turns out paramount once we consider the case of life after death.

A counterargument, though, points out that, in the case of inevitable events, we may say that they are present already now and the fact that they actually have not taken place yet is insignificant. For instance, if a marathon runner is a kilometer ahead of the other competitors and a hundred meters away from the finish line, we may safely assume that no one is going to overtake them and we consider them the winner. Likewise, we consider the promises made by a loyal

[23] See Adam H e r n a s, "O codzienności," *Kwartalnik Filozoficzny* 25, no. 2 (1997), 107.
[24] See ibidem, 108.

friend as fulfilled in advance: if a friend has promised us something and we have no reason to doubt their words, we expect that they will keep their promise and we consider it as fulfilled in advance. Although, in the objective sense, there is always the eventuality that the friend will let us down or that they will be unable to keep their promise due to unexpected adverse circumstances, we subjectively tend to consider the promise as fulfilled. In the same vein, the expectation of life after death is based on the faith in the promise made by God. If one believes that God is faithful, one can consider his promises as already fulfilled, even though their actual fulfillment will be verified only in the future. Thus one who expects eternal life partakes of it already.

Yet expectation may be also described in a negative sense, as a continuing absence of the desired object. Even though the occurrence of a certain good has been predetermined, the temporal distance from it might appear endless, as if time stood still. This is the case, for instance, when we anxiously await being handed the prize we have been awarded, or when we are waiting for the arrival of a loved person, knowing that they are already on the way. The feeling of missing them deeply may cause the impression that time is standing still and we find ourselves confined to the torture of endless waiting. "It is a torture to wait impatiently and to be unable to live to see what is to come."[25] The expected good, even though close and certain, remains continuously absent. Thus expectation may embrace not only the presence of some future goods, but also their continuous absence, and it is justified to say that expectation provides an opportunity to experience eternity both positively and negatively. Yet in both cases we are dealing with true eternity.

One might argue, though, that the future is inherently uncertain and no event we expect is certain to become the case. Thus no event can be described as inevitable, which suggests that future values cannot be experienced as actually present now.

And yet, in response, we need to point that expectation is a subjective experience and even should no future events be inevitable, a human being may well find them certain and actually present already now. If a runner is convinced of his victory beforehand, he or she may feel the winner even before reaching the finish line. Even should they lose, no one can take away from them the feeling of triumph they experienced seeing how far ahead of other competitors they were. It means that during the time when the runner considered themselves the winner they already delighted in a future good and that the moment in question was, to them, an experience of eternity in time.

We need to add that, in the case of each person, at least one future event is inevitable, namely, the person's death. Much as our consciousness might deny

[25] See T a t a r k i e w i c z, *O szczęściu*, 145.

it, we know that death is something we cannot avoid. In this sense, we can say that death is present already now: although it is part of the future, it continually accompanies us as our inevitable destiny.

It is occasionally suggested that expectation ruins the course of our lives. If we continually expect something new, it makes our lives become oriented exclusively towards the future and prevents us from enjoying the present moment or the past. In such instances, it is chaos that enters our lives and we tend to live without a set goal to reach. Thus we do not experience eternity; rather, we are immersed in the passing of time.

Responding to this argument, one might observe that (unlike hope) expectation is not a permanent stance in life. Rather, it has a particular object and addresses a specific future event. Should we persist in seeking a permanent attitude in it, it would be in regard to our ultimate destiny rather than the momentary and contingent goods. After all, even an insatiable pursuit of novelty can be a manifestation of the pursuit of an eternity which transcends time. A good example of such an attitude is offered by the character of Don Juan with his pursuit of absolute ecstasy bringing an ultimate satisfaction of all his desires. An orientation towards novelty does not need to be tantamount to a chaotic life. Rather, it signifies a pursuit to base life on an unshakeable foundation. In view of the above, expectation can be considered as an experience of eternity or, at least, as a pursuit of it.

FEAR

Hope and expectation are generally positive sentiments, addressing a good to come which does not seem distant in the temporal sense. Yet experience teaches us that not all hopes or expectations are fulfilled and that some of them will forever remain what they are: a hope or an expectation. For this reason, another attitude towards the future one might find justified is that of anxiety, or fear: the awareness that the expected good may not come and that, instead of it, some evil we would rather avoid will occur.

Typically, two types of fear are distinguished, one of them being fright, an acute emotional sensation caused by a particular situation. Fright is normally short-lived and it passes once the imminent danger disappears or once we have dealt with a particular threat: having faced it, we are no longer afraid of it. The other type of fear has been described by the existentialists as an indefinite terror surfacing throughout one's lifetime in the shape of a fear of death conceived as nothingness. The latter rarely breaks through to become the main focus of the consciousness, rather, it permanently 'hangs' about a human existence in the shape of an anxiety. It does not make a human being dread a particular

danger, such as an illness, a famine, or an avalanche, so in principle it is not transformed into fright[26]; nevertheless the terror of death pervades even moments of greatest joy possible and empoisons life with the consciousness of the inevitable end. Terror gives rise to other fears: was it not for the threat of losing existence, we would not be afraid of other dangers. Indeed, they horrify us, because we are mortal and may die at any moment.

Regardless of the type of fear or its intensity, it plays a positive role, for instance, by protecting humans from taking excessive risks. Nevertheless, fear may also have negative consequences, in particular when it assumes power over our consciousness, thus eliminating other sensations and feelings. Fear is also a factor negatively affecting our rational appraisal of particular situations and paralyzing our respective actions: there are those suffering from agoraphobia or from a fear of night. Oftentimes, we find ourselves gripped by the fear of a particular danger, but occasionally terror may have the same effect: in such cases, our fear of nothingness becomes the only (or the main) content of our lives.

Regardless of the function a particular fear performs, or its rational or irrational nature, it is congeneric with hope. Just as hope, fear appears in a situation of uncertainty, potential loss, or evil. And just as hope does, fear makes its object actually present at a given moment, thus enabling us to transcend time, which is particularly observable in the case of an intense fear of which are unable to take control. On such occasions, we panic as if there was a misfortune pending and we approach it as if it were inevitable, or even as if it has actually affected us already. Thus fear removes the distance between an uncertain future and the present moment, conceiving of a potential evil as already actual.

Moreover, fear not only removes the temporal distance between the present moment and potential future misfortunes, but—the moment it is being experienced—exemplifies a subjective experience of time having stood still. Thus, in the case of fear, we experience an 'eternal now' which continues endlessly, resembling the confinement of a prison from which all routes of escape have been blocked off. In this way, fear turns out an actual experience of the eternity of hell.

However, the above conclusion might be confronted with objections similar to those which were raised in reference to hope and expectation. The object of fear is not present here or now, so the misfortune of which we are afraid might actually happen, but is not inevitable. The future might positively surprise us

[26] Occasionally, such a phenomenon may be grounded in biology. For instance, a person suffering from malignant cancer which has not been diagnosed yet might find themselves worrying about their lives, as if they were having a premonition of death. See Antoni K ę p i ń s k i, *Rytm życia* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1978), 172.

by being different from what we have portended and for this reason a fear of the future might appear irrational, which has been observed by numerous philosophers, among them by the stoics, who believed that one should not visualize future misfortunes. Should they actually happen, we will have suffered twice on their grounds: both now and in the future, but were they to be avoided, we would poison our lives by living them through as if they actually happened.

Addressing this difficulty, we need to note that fear is not will-dependent and neither does it yield to rational persuasion. Much as an external observer might not see a reason for the fear gripping another person, the person in question is incapable of defeating it, even though they might understand the arguments presented to them. Since a human being can neither control the occurrence of a fear nor is in power to overcome it, the condition the person who fears something experiences must not be interpreted in terms of fault, error, or irrationality.

It also seems that fear can 'immunize' us against future misfortunes by making us capable of surviving them once they happen. Not infrequently does fear make us imagine a future evil more tragic than it turns out once it actually affects us. The reason is not our erroneous image of the evil in question; rather, by being afraid of it, we get prepared to face the evil. Consequently, one might say that a fear of an evil prior to the evil in question may weaken our sensibility to it and make us better prepared for handling it once it becomes real. However, regardless of the function a given fear performs, it is undoubtedly an experience of eternity, since the moment we experience it we do not see a possibility to change the course of events. Fear is a totalizing experience and, as such, it precludes the sense of time, sharing these characteristics with other human experiences, such as those of pain, suffering, and despair.

PAIN AND SUFFERING

Suffering is related to pain and it is difficult to distinguish them. Nevertheless, suffering is considered as a separate phenomenon: while pain is a purely physical condition, suffering may be purely psychological. Therefore, even if each and every pain is suffering, not each and every suffering is pain. For instance, the sadness we experience after a loved person has passed away, may not be accompanied by any physical ailment. The concept of suffering may be still narrowed down by pointing out that not every physical pain is simultaneously suffering. Thus an analysis of suffering suggests that it has an additional quality to it, which is absent from pain: one related to the fear for one's life or to the uncertainty of the causes of the pain one experiences, or to the impossibility of killing the pain in question. In view of the above suggestion, even an

acute pain (for instance, a toothache) which, however, is not accompanied by an existential concern is not to be considered as suffering. Pain is a particular condition of a living body and it may be relieved. Suffering, in turn, is like an abscess which cannot be healed and which makes it impossible for us to forget it. Thus suffering gives a specific aura to our experiences and affects their nature as such.

Just as joy, delight, and fear, also pain and suffering have totalizing tendencies. "The sufferings we experience get extrapolated in our consciousness, resembling the ripple on the water into which a stone has been thrown."[27] While suffering may not eliminate other experiences, it may affect them, thus suppressing the person's ability to feel happiness or joy. Numerous philosophers (e.g., Voltaire or Schopenhauer) believed suffering to be natural and inherent in the human condition, and they defined man as a being who suffers. According to Schopenhauer, each of us has a measure of suffering to take, proper for him or her, which will not be exceeded, yet taken fully. This means to say that a human being always suffers accordingly, neither more nor less, and once a suffering is gone, it is instantly replaced by another of the same (or even stronger) intensity.

While pain cuts us off from both the past and the future, having confined us to an 'eternal now,' suffering, in particular the purely psychological one, seems to break the confines of the present moment, especially whenever we suffer not only due to the evil that affects us now, but also on account of the evil we have already experienced or the one that is only to come. This suggests that suffering colors the entire life and therefore we cannot recall a time when it was absent from our existence. And so, just as we love since forever, we also suffer since forever, the difference being that in the case of love we have faith that we will love forever, and in the case of suffering we are overwhelmed by the sense that there is no hope for our anguish to end. Thus suffering is also an experience of eternity.

The above description of suffering may be questioned if we point out that in fact suffering does not involve extrapolating the present moment into the future. On the contrary, we suffer by contrasting the present moment with the past, which was free from anguish and which we remember as a time of paradisiacal happiness. We must not forget that there are also cases of groundless, or even fictitious suffering. Since phantom pains (e.g., in the limb that is no longer there) can be the case, one can certainly experience also imaginary suffering, related to a false evaluation of the situation. And there are those who suffer only because they wrongly suspect others of hostility towards them, and in such cases we may speak about an illusion of suffering.

[27] T a t a r k i e w i c z, *O szczęściu*, 146. Translated by Agnieszka Ziemińska.

In response to the above arguments, one needs to observe that even should suffering not involve an extrapolation of the disagreeable condition into the future, it is itself extrapolated into the future, since we consider it as the present condition, excluding the possibility that the course of events will change. And certainly there are no fictitious sufferings as each of them is experienced as an actual state. While, in the objective sense, there may be no reason for suffering (or a given suffering may appear disproportional to its causes), the very experience of suffering is real to the person who is its subject. Even though the cause of the suffering may be illusory, the suffering itself is real.

DESPAIR

Much as they appear endless or interminable when actually experienced, and regardless of their former intensity or duration, pain and suffering may stop, but they may well result in a complete and lasting despair.

Centuries ago, despair was considered as melancholy, or even as sin.[28] After Peter Lombard wrote his *Sentences*, despair was defined as a sin against the Holy Spirit, consisting in unbelief in salvation and one, of which one cannot be absolved. Despair was taken to be a state of mind which a person deliberately adopts and thus an act of refusal to receive God's grace, rather than merely a mood. In the present considerations, we shall disregard such an approach to despair, though. Instead, we shall see it as a psychological condition which one develops without willfully adopting it and which, not infrequently, manifests itself as a depression. Regardless of its physiological background, despair does not involve public acts, like tearing one's clothes or wailing, but it is characterized, above all, by falling into an extremely gloomy mood. Despair destroys a human being inwardly, occasionally resulting in a suicide attempt on the part of the person suffering from it. Despair epitomizes the condition of absolute unhappiness[29] and is the quintessence of the negative.

Despair is sometimes perceived as an opportunity for showing heroism or developing a deeper understanding of the human condition. A person who has experienced despair is considered to be free from illusions and to have touched the absurdity of being, which might suggest that despair is a metaphysical attitude and a response to the cruelty life brings.[30] However, it actually manifests an abject existential experience in the case of which a human being sees no

[28] For an exquisite description of the various forms of despair, see Marek B i e ń c z y k, *Melancholia: O tych, co nigdy nie odnajdą straty* (Warszawa: Świat Książki, 2014).

[29] See T a t a r k i e w i c z, *O szczęściu*, 159.

[30] See Emil M. C i o r a n, *On the Heights of Despair*, transl. by Ilinca Zarifopol-Johnston (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1990). See also Emil C i o r a n, *The Fall*

possibility of rescue and loses all hope. Despair is marked by absolute helplessness and a lack of faith in any future.[31] Those immersed in despair experience the 'eternal now' of an extreme unhappiness which will never end. Precisely for that reason, St. Augustine held that despair kills the soul and in this sense is dehumanizing, while Isidore of Seville warned that despair resembles eternal damnation and that to despair is to descend into hell.

Contrary to such gloomy descriptions, one might argue that despair is not, or at least does not have to be, a permanent condition, and that due to the temporal nature of human consciousness and the fact that a human being continuously experiences new stimuli it can be overcome. One might also add that human nature exhibits an inherent will to live which is capable of handling all adversities. Thus human beings must be conceived as beings that hope and are always in the position to find a will to live in spite of the tragedies that mark their existence.[32]

The above argument is certainly wrong, since cases of utter despair which is impossible to overcome actually happen. The volitive faculty of a human being has no power over despair, just as it turns out powerless in the case of pain or suffering, and therefore one who has fallen into despair turns out absolutely helpless in the face of his or her condition. This is precisely the essence of despair: one cannot see even a ray of hope for better, all the defense mechanisms have failed and only death remains, but does not come. Thus Søren Kierkegaard calls despair 'sickness unto death,' yet one in the case of which death is impossible.[33] Neither is suicide possible, since it requires at least a vestigial will to act, enabling one to take the respective decision and carry it out, of which a human being experiencing despair is devoid. Therefore despair is an eternal hell from which there is no route of escape.

HOPE FACING DEATH
A Conclusion

While despair might seem the antithesis of hope, the two sentiments need not be mutually exclusive. Although, immersed in despair, a human being can hardly cherish the illusion that the fortune will ever change, there still remains

into Time, trans. Richard Howard (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), and Emil M. C i o r a n, *The Trouble with Being Born*, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Seaver Books, 1976).

[31] See C i o r a n, *The Trouble with Being Born*, 3–5.

[32] See T a t a r k i e w i c z, *O szczęściu*, 159.

[33] See Søren K i e r k e g a a r d, *The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation on the Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin*, trans. Reidar Thomte and Albert B. Anderson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). See also Søren K i e r k e g a a r d, *The Sickness Unto Death*, trans. Walter Lowrie (Belmont, NC: Wiseblood Books, 2013).

the certainty that, at some point, death will come. And if we can hope for death to be the ultimate annihilation of consciousness, we can also hope that death will terminate despair. Another relation between hope and despair is revealed if we consider the fact that despair frequently occurs as a result of hopes which have failed. Hope may be a positive force, capable of sustaining life, but we cannot be certain hope will last forever and therefore there is a smoldering possibility of despair already at the very heart of hope. Even a hopeful person is ultimately aware that no good is granted us forever and one of the reasons is the inevitability of death: even if there is an afterlife of some form, one can hardly yield to the illusion that it will embrace earthly goods. Regardless of how the hopeful and the despairing live their lives, death as the ultimate hope (for the absolute end of life or for its continuation) is the point of reference for both groups.

Translated by *Agnieszka Ziemińska*

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ABSTRACT / ABSTRAKT

Ireneusz ZIEMIŃSKI, Between Hope and Despair: The Experience of Eternity
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There are two basic approaches to the experience of time. It is conceived either as a power which gradually destroys a human life or as duration which resists change and death. The focus of the article is the latter model, which allows experiencing moments of eternity within the experience of a sustained continuation of one's own being. While hoping for a particular good (or expecting it), the human being already possesses it in some form and, in this way, hope (or expectation) turns out to be an actuation of the future, which, although is yet to come, is already experienced as real and actually present. Among other moments of eternity in an earthly life, despite their negative nature, are those of physical pain, psychological suffering, and despair. Experiencing them, a human being feels that time is standing still and life has changed into an eternal hell which is impossible to overcome. The model moments of eternity which have been described in the article are manifestations of the only form of eternal life accessible to a human being in earthly life. However, they may also become starting points for constructing either philosophical or theological models of eternal life after death.

Keywords: time, eternity, hope, despair, pain, boredom, suffering

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Ireneusz ZIEMIŃSKI, Między nadzieją a rozpaczą. Doświadczenie wieczności
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Istnieją dwa główne sposoby doświadczenia czasu – jako siły niszczącej ludzkie życie i jako trwania, które opiera się zmianie i śmierci. W artykule opisuję ten drugi model, w ramach którego możliwe jest doświadczenie chwil wieczności, polegających na doznaniu niezmiennego trwania własnego bytu. Mając wszak nadzieję na określone dobro (lub oczekując go), człowiek w jakiejś mierze już je posiada; w ten sposób nadzieja (i oczekiwanie) okazują się uobecnieniem przyszłości, która – mając dopiero nadejść – już jest doświadczana jako realna i aktualnie obecna. Podobnymi chwilami wieczności, tyle że negatywnymi, są takie doświadczenia, jak fizyczny ból, psychiczne cierpienie czy rozpacz. W przypadkach takich człowiek ma poczucie, że czas się zatrzymał, wobec czego życie zamienia się w niemożliwe do pokonania, wieczne piekło. Opisane przykładowo chwile wieczności są jedyną formą życia wiecznego dostępną człowiekowi na ziemi; mogą one jednak również stanowić punkt wyjścia do

konstruowania (filozoficznych czy religijnych) modeli życia wiecznego po śmierci.

Słowa kluczowe: czas, wieczność, nadzieja, rozpacz, ból, nuda, cierpienie

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CHRISTIAN HOPE IN THE POSTMODERN WORLD
On the Essence and Decline of Hope, and on the Prospects for Its Restoration, as seen from the Perspective of the Philosophy of Culture

It is not Christian hope that postmodern culture takes away from the human being; rather it deprives the human being of the dignity belonging to him or her as a person. And it is precisely this dignity which is an indispensable condition for hope. It is only as a result of the decline of hope that the subject's relationship with the Absolute begins to wane and becomes marginal, vulnerable, vacillating, and ultimately illusory.

The present considerations are focused on the issue of Christian hope, its absence from the reality of the contemporary society, and the potential conditions for its restoration. A major part of the paper addresses the phenomenon of the absence of hope characteristic of the current phase of the development of Western culture. Hope is essentially a sentiment cherished by individual rather than collective subjects, and since it is founded on one's personal faith, its object is individual, intimate, and unique. The individual experience hope embraces is, in its core, incommunicable and unimpartable. Thus the realm of hope is that of fundamentally autonomous and individual human personal existence. The characteristics of hope which will be discussed in the paper can be also referred to the domain of human spirituality as such.

A scholarly insight cannot fully probe into the depth of personal experience, which can be grasped only indirectly, by way of interpretation of the spiritual evidence and ego-documents available. The present considerations, which will follow the latter path, are intended to address the general traits of hope which are manifested in and constitutive of any of its Christian renditions.

However, the paper will not focus merely on the definition and theory of hope adopted for the above-formulated purpose, but it will address the condition and situation of hope in modern culture, in particular such phenomena as the current transformations of hope accompanied by its decline. The main goal is to probe the pathways on which hope becomes absent from modern culture and to address the resulting question of how to restore Christian hope in today's world. In this respect, an analysis of modern culture as such is of importance, since culture provides the middle area between the core of Christianity, its *depositum fidei*, and the human subject, to whom hope is a way to experience transcendence and tackle mystery, as much as it is part of his or her existential

condition. Thus the focal point of the present analysis is the human being seen from the perspective of metaphysics. Only such an approach can guarantee a highest quality anthropological analysis postulated by a classical reading of the core of the Christian message. Disregarding the metaphysical background of the problem would undermine the essence of the concept of hope based on the Christian *depositum fidei.* It is impossible to discuss hope as a Gospel virtue (or a heroic one) outside the metaphysical and theological context of the human person.[1] The metaphysical approach is a model one and it is crucial to the theological explanation of the meaning of the category of hope.

However, our considerations will not be confined to the realm of theology, since they will involve a much broader context designated by various disciplines employed in culture studies. Thus, while taking into consideration metaphysical and theological issues, we will concentrate on the status of hope[2] in modernity or, to be more precise, in the postmodern era. A significant issue is that of the multifold nature of hope in contemporary culture. While the teaching on hope provided by the Church in the field of theology is precise and exact, and the concept in question remains stable, the main characteristic of the postmodern era is continuous fluctuation of cultural factors, which triggers also transformations of the meaning of hope, which in turn generates the pressure to adapt one's thinking to the currently 'valid' understanding of the concept. Thus there is, on the one hand, hope as defined in the teaching of the Catholic Church (and addressed, in particular, by Benedict XVI in his encyclical *Spe salvi*[3]) and, on the other, the actual experience of a human individual. The mental space between the two is filled by culture with its various factors affecting the contents of the original concept by modifying, reducing, or even questioning them either in their entirety or in some aspects. The present considerations will address precisely the changeability of hope experienced by modern man.[4]

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[1] Metaphysical personalism developed within Thomism is a theory of man which expounds the issue of Christian hope and provides intellectual tools helpful in culture analysis (which, in our case, will be reflection on postmodern culture).

[2] The terms "hope" and "Christian hope" are used interchangeably throughout the paper. The text generally addresses Christian hope conceived as a heroic virtue attained owing to God's grace and resulting in an act of will aimed at being granted salvation, which is the highest good, and which consists in loving and knowing God in eternity. Thus, in the present paper, 'hope' is tantamount to 'Christian hope.'

[3] See B e n e d i c t XVI, Encyclical Letter *Spe Salvi*, November 30, 2007 (Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2007).

[4] The article makes use of a broad concept of culture and disregards its narrowing specifications provided by various disciplines. The general understanding of culture in question embraces the human activity as such and its effects (artefacts, actions, attitudes, behavioral patterns and dispositions, norms and principles, appraisals and evaluations, and even the sphere of the unconscious) established and transmitted in the society in both the synchronic and the diachronic senses. Exploration of culture cannot be narrowly perceived as the research object of an individual field of study, but it

It is important to note that the contingency of the contents of hope is by no means a secondary issue: Neither in an individual life nor in the social reality can the pressure from cultural factors be avoided. The moment our thinking goes beyond the accepted Christian ethos (the truths of faith and the creed) the significance of the impact of culture begins to surface. A human being, who lives in the society in a particular time, cannot function outside culture, cannot develop his or her subjectivity other than in the given cultural context, and simply cannot continue his or her existence outside it. Culture continually forms us, pervades our spirituality, sets our standards, 'molds' us according to the socially dominant image of what a human life should be like. We must not forget that culture embraces the domain of the human spirit and therefore its impact on man cannot be simply disregarded. This cultural 'determinism,' which can be only partly and only sporadically controlled by an individual, interposes itself between Christian hope, which addresses the transcendent reality, and the unique personal subject. The result is multifarious configurations and variants of hope, a taxonomy of hope we shall address.

WHAT IS HOPE?

The key issue is that of what hope is. Answers to this question can be found in various studies representing such domains as, for instance, pedagogy, homiletics or eschatology. The proposed solutions are justified insofar as they draw on the 'core' concept of Christian hope, which they all share and which is rudimentary to all of them. This 'original' meaning of hope can be occasionally found in compendia of philosophy or theology. A possibly most comprehensive teaching on Christian hope has been put forward in Benedict XVI's *Spe Salvi*, which is an encyclical fully devoted to this topic.

First of all, we shall focus on the basic elements of the structure of hope, most obvious among them being its object. Christian hope is not tantamount to 'expectation,' or waiting for the ultimate goal in life to be accomplished. It is not only about what is going to happen, but about what already 'is.' Benedict XVI emphasizes that while subjective attitudes are grounded merely in the 'conviction' about what might come, true Christian hope has its roots in objective faith and applies to what already is, what is objectively given us in faith. "Faith is not merely a personal reaching out towards things to come that are still totally absent: it gives us something. It gives us even now something of

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needs to be continued by multiple disciplines (such as the anthropology of culture, the sociology of culture, the psychology of culture, or the history of culture). Analyses of culture as a factor affecting Christian hope are provided in particular by the philosophy of culture and the theology of culture, as well as by philosophical and theological anthropology.

the reality we are waiting for, and this present reality constitutes for us a 'proof' of the things that are still unseen."[5] The objective nature and the oneness of the object of the experience of hope and the expectation it embraces lie in that "Christian hope is the source of the certainty inherent in the trust that what we experience now is going to have its continuation and its ultimate fulfilment."[6] The objective nature of hope is given neither empirically, nor in the inner cognitive experience of the subject. Rather, it springs from what is given in faith. Faith has the status of a declaration based on specific spiritual experience. The object of hope given in faith remains the same in the ontological sense both at the start of the Christian path and in its ultimate fulfillment. Departure from acknowledging this unity, which is a mark of the postmodern world, results in a degradation of hope or in rejecting it out of hand.

The second constitutive element in the structure of hope is its subject. One might say that the human subject, the person whose life in the objective world is a passage from each present moment towards the ultimate one, has been given the status of a wanderer, or a pilgrim. And it is hope that defines the pathway of the *homo viator* heading towards his or her ultimate destination, which can be perceived either in terms of the *finale* or as an endless pursuit, since God himself is infinite and impenetrable, as Blaise Pascal observed.[7]

Another constitutive element of hope is the effort and the focus of the human will which has discovered the foundation of hope in faith. Therefore hope involves purposeful volition marked by human rationality (which is in fact frequently considered as the *definiens* of hope).

Last but not least, an important element in the structure of hope is its context. While hope certainly needs to be perceived as a sentiment cherished by individual persons rather than by collective subjects, it is in the community of the Church that it flourishes. Hope needs the world, it needs its context and its background, which Thomas Merton, drawing on a meditation by John Donne, aptly expressed in the title of his book *No Man Is An Island*.[8] It is in the company of others, together with the community of the faithful, that a human

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[5] B e n e d i c t XVI, *Spe Salvi*, Section 7.

[6] Stanisław C h r o b a k, *Podstawy pedagogiki nadziei: Współczesne konteksty w inspiracji personalistyczno-chrześcijańskiej* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo UKSW, 2009), 293. See also ibidem, 325–40. Chrobak extensively refers to the philosophy of religion advanced by Zofia J. Zdybicka. See J. Z d y b i c k a, *Człowiek i religia* (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, 1993). Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.

[7] See Blaise P a s c a l, *Pensées*, 427, trans. W. F. Trotter (Woodstock, Ontario: Devoted Publishing, 2018), vol. 2, 74. See also Jadwiga S o k o ł o w s k a, *Dwie nieskończoności: Szkice o literaturze barokowej Europy* (Warszawa: PIW, 1978), 15.

[8] See Thomas M e r t o n, *No Man Is An Island* (San Diego, New York, and London: Harcourt, 2003).

subject, a *homo viator*, follows his or her path in the world. And much depends on the world, which can play either a positive or a negative role.

Having pointed to the most essential elements in the structure of Christian hope, we shall now proceed to the main part of these considerations, namely, to a characterization of the cultural factors which undermine the functioning of hope's structure. The factors in question may affect either its single element or all of them simultaneously.

THE OBJECT OF CHRISTIAN HOPE

The object of our analysis will comprise two elements: (1) the 'here and now,' or the foundation of hope (p_1) and (2) the state it addresses, or the object of hope (p_2). In the case of Christian hope, their contents are the same and embrace God (the presence of Jesus Christ in the Church and in his transcendence, which is symbolically rendered, e.g., in the Parable of the Mustard Seed). However, the contents of elements p_1 and p_2 are identical only in the case of the 'core' Christian interpretation. In the wake of the processes of degradation of hope in postmodern culture, elements p_1 and p_2 are disjunctive, occasionally juxtaposed, or either one or both of them have become devoid of their marks of Christianity. In our analysis, the latter fact will be reflected in the notation we have adopted: what conforms to Christian faith will be indexed as *1*, while the reality which does not embrace living faith will be indexed as *0*.

The objective state, defined above, can be rendered by means of the following formula: $p_1 = 1, p_2 = 1$, where the same value (*1*), present in the case of either element, is the evidence of the presence of Christian hope both at its root and in its ultimate reference. Now, we shall focus on a series of departures from the objective state and, consequently, from Christian hope. According to the matrix we have received, the system of p_1 and p_2 generates three other possible configurations: $p_1 = 0, p_2 = 0$; $p_1 = 0, p_2 = 1$; $p_1 = 1, p_2 = 0$.

The least complex option is that in which, due to the absence of faith 'here and now,' on the one hand, and a lack of faith in the Ultimate Reality about to come, on the other, hope is absolutely impossible. This situation can be rendered by means of the following formula: $p_1 = 0, p_2 = 0$.

However complicated the two remaining options are, they are also crucial in a diagnosis of the condition of hope in the contemporary world.

FAILURES OF HOPE

In the case of the subjective attitude, hope identified with 'expectation' does not draw on p_1, and focuses on p_2 exclusively, which can be illustrated

by means of the following formula: $p_1 = 0, p_2 = 1$. Ignorance of the effort and the sensibleness of the Christian basis of the 'here and now' results in an unrestrained development of visions regarding the eschatological future of the subject. In most cases apophatic visions of God are put forward, in which the Absolute is described as infinite, unbounded, inconceivable, or unnamed. Such an attitude to God is not uncommon among the approaches accepted by modern day Christianity. Also today's philosophers and theologians frequently fall prey to such concepts, which—we need to remember—have been present in culture since the time of antiquity.[9] The goal of the theories in question is to make human thought free from metaphysics, which is considered to be 'parasitic.' A systemic positive image of God is, according to the followers of such views, all too anthropomorphic and the faith grounded in it approaches 'idolatry.' Therefore the goal of the 'new hope' thus postulated is to go beyond the borders of Western metaphysics and do so on the basis of the assumption that transgression will open us to better and more fulfilling encounters with God.

Yet proclamations of this kind are problematic. Obtaining knowledge of God through negating concepts that might be applied to him clearly goes against the Christian faith.[10] However, the standpoints to which we are referring are not related to the formally developed negative theology; rather, they are those that seek a transformation of negative theology by means of the Heideggerian concept of 'being.' In the sense adopted by Heidegger, 'being' is the absolutely original condition and 'structure' of any already constituted entity, including God as conceived in religious thinking. 'Being' is then the ultimate foundation of all things, although it does not itself have a foundation. Being is "a potential horizon which provides the grounding for all things, for the universe as such. One is tempted to say that 'being' in a way fulfills the functions of the Christian God, although Heidegger himself did not allow such interpretational hypotheses."[11]

The fact is that postmodern culture largely shares in Heideggerian existentialism and one may go as far as to say that Heidegger's philosophy is not only a point of reference in today's debates, but that it actually prevails in them,

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[9] See Tomáš H a l í k, *Wzywany czy niewzywany, Bóg się tutaj zjawi: Europejskie wykłady z filozofii i socjologii dziejów chrześcijaństwa* (Kraków: WAM, 2006), 121–2.

[10] Asked by his disciple Philip, "Master, show us the Father," Jesus responds, "Whoever has seen me has seen the Father.... Do you not believe that I am in the Father and the Father is in me?" (Jn 14:8–10). The Biblical text ultimately points to the personal existence of God. (The fact that in the present considerations we have accepted the vantage point of the philosophy of culture justifies non-analytic references to the Biblical text and omission of its critical exegesis.)

[11] Jan S o c h o ń, *Spór o rozumienie świata. Monizujące ujęcie rzeczywistości w filozofii europejskiej: Studium historyczno-hermeneutyczne* (Warszawa: Instytut Wydawniczy Pax, 1998), 421.

which results in postulates of the existence of a transcendent Being of 'beyond personal' a nature. So conceived, a transcendent Being has hardly anything to do with the Christian God or with the 'God of the faithful.' Occasionally, the intention is to 'make up' a God better than the One the Church preaches, and the principle the enthusiasts of such an option follow is, '"Yes" for God; "no" for the Church.' As a result, postmodern culture is marked by various transformations of God, by individual 'clouds' of expectations of God, and by various aspirations in designing God according to one's imagination and sensibility. Against such a background, true hope abandons its foundation in the Christian creed, in "confessional' Christianity,"[12] and—in this 'detached' state—aspires after Transcendence.

In the wake of such tendencies, the Christianity of the 'end time,' or of the 'return to the house of the Father,' becomes a multi-faced religion, a conglomerate of 'private' faiths, and looks for support precisely in 'apophatic' attitudes, which resort to simplification and make the end time the only object of hope. What one hopes for is then universal salvation which will come regardless of one's involvement or commitment to values. The attitude in question resembles to an extent apocatastasis conceived as the final restitution of the spiritual entities to their original condition, accomplished in a universal and irrevocable salvation. The theory of apocatastasis and the related apophatic theology have been discussed by Jean Clair in his book *De Immundo*.[13] The degeneration of culture and spirituality the author describes transforms the image of hope, which in a way loses its significance, having embraced the certitude that naive expectations (held by self-proclaimed intellectual leaders) are going to be satisfied. The core message they convey is that life does nor involve any duties and that its unavoidable toil will be compensated by God's absolute and irrevocable goodness, which will nullify any complications resulting from the differences of religion, denomination, or morality.[14]

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[12] 'Confessional Christianity' is a term used to distinguish creed-based Christianity from supra-confessional Christian faiths. In his research of the 17th century religion, Polish philosopher Leszek Kołakowski used also the phrase "non-confessional Christianity." See Leszek K o ł a k o w s k i, *Świadomość religijna i więź kościelna: Studia nad chrześcijaństwem bezwyznaniowym* (Warszawa: PWN, 1987). We need to add, however, that the term 'confessional Christianity' by no means puts Catholicism above any other form of the Christian religion. Rather, we should perceive Catholicism and the Catholic Church as the expression of the essence of Christianity. Regardless of its history and schisms, the original deposit of Christian faith rests with the Roman Catholic Church.

[13] See Jean C l a i r, *De Immundo* (Paris: Galilée, 2004).

[14] Tadeusz Kornaś gives an instance of such views by pointing to public statements of Polish theatre director and stage designer Krystian Lupa. "Lupa questions the Christian vision of the world, which due to its binary character wants us to perceive the reality either as good or as evil and to divide the humanity into the saved and the damned." Tadeusz K o r n a ś, *Aniołom i światu widowisko: Szkice i rozmowy o teatrze* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Homini, 2009), 254–5.

Such beliefs are supported by philosophical conceptions focused on idealistically understood Love and the Good. Those who advance them follow Plato in this respect and believe these ideas are as if 'above' being conceived as the research object of metaphysics. The Christian followers of this trend seem to forget that the aim is not to find the ultimate and the most clear description of God, but to comprehend the good in the context of the entire reality of the Absolute. Jesus says, "No one is good but God alone" (Mk 10:18), and his statement describes the goodness of the Person of God the Father. Indeed, it is his personal status that soon surfaces as the most important quality of the transcendent God. It remains so even should we be under the impression that his highest attributes appear to prevail over his personal nature.[15] Christian thinkers are certain of the absolute significance of the personal status of God and their opinion is generally shared even by those who, having recognized God as Person, still tend to adopt Heideggerian philosophy. A good example is the theology of Paul Tillich, who holds that the Unconditional embraces qualities specific for 'being,' but simultaneously those characteristic of 'person.'[16]

According to the Christian doctrine, one should seek the supreme being in the mystery of personal God: that of the infinite being embracing subjects which transcend it. The divine Persons are infinite and each of them embodies this infinity individually. St. Paul describes the mystery of the Triune God in the following way: "For the Spirit scrutinizes everything, even the depths of God.... No one knows what pertains to God except the Spirit of God" (1 Cor 2:10–11). Thus, despite it being a theological inspiration, we cannot refute the conclusion that the mystery of the divine Persons which has been revealed to man (the mystery of the Triune God) manifests 'more ultimate' possibilities than those inherent in the mere concept of 'being.' This observation needs to be made in

[15] Some postmodern thinkers believe that the person is a radically non-final being, personal status as such being reductive and limiting. The case is clearly observable once we attribute personal status to the Ultimate Reality. For this reason, Georges Bataille claims the Supreme Being must not be considered as 'person.' See Georges B a t a i l l e, *Theory of Religion* (New York: Zone Books, 1989), 33–4.

[16] Tillich undertakes the hopeless task of trying to reconcile the understanding of 'the ultimate' as bearing qualities of both 'person' and 'being' as such. He writes: "Wenn man vom 'Unbedingten' spricht, so meint man das, wovon man spricht, im eigentlichen Sinne. Man könnte es mit den Scholastikern das Sein-Selbst (*esse qua, esse ipsum*) nennen. Eine solche Aussage ist nicht-symbolisch. Aber in unserer Beziehung zum Unbedingten müssen wir symbolisch reden. Wir könnten nie in Kommunikation mit Gott treten, wenn er *nur* das 'Sein-Selbst' wäre. In unserer Beziehung zu ihm begegnen wir ihm in der höchsten Stufe unseres Seins: als Person. Es wird also in der symbolischen Redeweise über Gott zweierlei ausgesagt: Er ist das, was unsere Erfahrung des Person-Seins unendlich transzendiert, und zugleich das, was unserm Person-Sein so adäguat ist, daß wir 'DU' zu ihm sagen und zu ihm beten können." Paul T i l l i c h, *Die Frage nach dem Unbedingten*, in Paul Tillich, *Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 5, ed. Renate Albrecht (Stuttgart: Evangelische Verlagswerk, 1978), 218–9.

view of the fact that postmodern philosophy hardly accepts the category of 'person.'

A CLASH OF PHILOSOPHICAL OUTLOOKS

We shall now analyze the impact of the controversy between the idealistic philosophies and the realistic ones on the way in which Christian hope is perceived. Idealistic philosophers readily conceive of God in terms of the Good or Love, juxtaposing them with 'being' as such. Yet we must remember that accepting the personal status of God is tantamount to the recognition of his status of a being. According to the classical understanding, a person is necessarily a being.[17] If the personal status of God is questioned, it is mainly due to the ways of its theoretical and systemic elaboration. However, the elaboration in question is merely secondary, since, in any case, it is the aspect of existence that is of primary importance. Axiology based philosophies tend to disregard it in their insight into God and man,[18] although there is undoubtedly a strong relationship between the emphasis on being (in the sense of existing) and the recognition of specific values. Postmodern philosophy in general (also its part growing out of Augustinian roots) tends to claim that the supreme Being is to be conceived as Love or the Good, but we need to remember that such a being cannot but be simultaneously real (in the sense of actually existing): colloquially speaking, we might say it must bear marks of life. Since the supreme Love manifests itself by offering its life (to be precise: its existence) for another (others), the value of any being is manifested in the personal love it exhibits. Even in the case of the Triune God, love, which decides about his unity and his being the only God, cannot come into being other than by means of its particular manifestations. This, however, could not be the case, were it not for the divine Persons' offering themselves for each other up to the point of the highest sacrifice. It is here that we find the link between the existence of the divine Persons and the highest values embodied by them.

[17] I refer to an objectively existing being rather than to a product of reflection (which, in any case, is likely to have an anthropomorphic character). According to Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, God can be known as a being, and the 'negative way' (*via negationis*), as well as the 'way of excellence' (*via excellentiae*), is merely a modification of the only possible 'way' of being, which is the one conceived in the existential sense. See Piotr M o s k a l "Teologia negatywna" [Negative Theology], in *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, vol. 9, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2008), 423.

[18] For a detailed discussion of this question and, in particular, of Józef Tischner's view of Thomistic metaphysics, see Igor S t r a p k o, *Apologia nadziei w filozofii i pedagogice Józefa Tischnera* (Kraków: Nomos, 2004), 101–38.

However, problems even deeper than those entailed by idealistic philosophies appear once we analyze the postmodern thought in which existence (in the sense of actual being) is considered as indeterminate and indefinite, seen as if in the 'negative way,' and given the enigmatic description of 'non-being.' Postmodern culture is certainly incapable of faith, or of objective hope aimed at Transcendence.

SUPERFICIAL HOPE

Now we shall consider the second option, namely, the one described by means of the formula $p_1 = 1, p_2 = 0$. Also this configuration fails to produce Christian hope. However, we are dealing here with the reversal of the case we have just discussed. The focal point is the 'here and now,' faith and trust in God considered as a merely temporal, worldly situation of the Christian person. In such cases, not infrequently can we encounter attitudes of honest commitment manifesting a genuinely Christian life. And yet in such cases faith does not go beyond the sphere of the temporal or that of a mere wish to accomplish ultimate fulfillment in an encounter with God. The main obstacles on the pathway of faith are then, on the one hand, its rootedness in skepticism entailing secular life and its distance from the norms guiding one towards eternity, on the other.[19] As a result, believers become deprived of true hope and no longer seek in their experience of faith the 'evidence,' or the guarantee, that their existence will be ultimately fulfilled in transcendence. Such attitudes surface in statistics. In a survey conducted in 2015 by the Center for Public Opinion Research (CBOS) in Poland, only 36% participants declared their beliefs in the 'last things.' 31% of them stated that although they believed that death was not the end of existence, they did not know what would follow afterwards.[20] In a survey conducted by the Center for Public Opinion Research in 2009, in turn, 70%

[19] "Johann Baptist Metz once said that the formula today is: No to God, Yes to religion. People want to have some kind of religion, esoteric or whatever it may be. But a personal God, who speaks to me, who knows me personally, who has said something quite specific and who has met me with a specific demand, and who will also judge me—people don't want him." Joseph R a t z i n g e r, *God and the World: A Conversation with Peter Seewald* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2002), 69. According to this attitude, religion is considered as a value useful in daily life, but it must not place eschatological responsibility on the subject.

[20] The survey, no. 297 in the series "Aktualne problemy i wydarzenia" [Current Problems and Events], was conducted on February, 5–11, 2015, on a simple random sample of 1003 adult residents of Poland. See CBOS, "Kanon wiary Polaków" [The Standard of Religious Faith among the Poles], ed. Rafał Boguszewski, in *Komunikat z badań CBOS*, no. 29 (2015), www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2015/K_029_15.PDF. The survey disregarded the issue of the correlation between the participants' eschatological views, their attitudes to religion, and their denominations (or the lack of one).

of the participants declared that they believed in 'heaven' (although only 38% of them stated that they 'definitely' believed in its existence) and 66% of the participants declared that they believed in 'personal resurrection' (although, again, only 38% stated that their beliefs were 'definite').[21] The research results reported in both surveys show that a large percentage of those who consider themselves as Christians do not believe in a conceivable eternal life. Therefore, one can say that Christian hope is not fully lived through by them.

The attitude in question has had a deeper theoretical background in the so-called radical theologies developed in the 1960s and 1970s (at an early stage of postmodernist culture) and discussed extensively by Langdon Gilkey[22] already decades ago. The doctrines in question have been variously developed until our times as part of either secular or postsecular thought. The tendency such theologies commonly exhibit is one to exclude key aspects of the Christian image of God as a being. Much as forerunners of radical theology (e.g., Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Friedrich Gogarten, Gustave Thils, Harvey Cox, or Gabriel Vahanian) and the successive proponents of the theory of 'God's death' do not openly question the real existence of the transcendent God, they certainly consider such a possibility increasingly problematic. Their hypotheses prove sufficient to validate adherence to the doctrine in the daily life, but they fail to provide a solid ground for personal eschatological beliefs to become the source of the person's stable existence or her perception of the meaning of life.[23] Once the existence of God is put into question, which goes as far as creating mythologies about God's self-abandonment of his divinity,[24] the eschatological future becomes illusory and the hope in the transcendent reality no longer has any support. This 'limitation' of religion and of the potential of its being an object of trust is accompanied by man's growing belief in his own maturity and independence of any transcendent being (or its superior nature determining the presence of religious structures in social life). What we are talking about is by no means complete abandonment of the deposit of faith, but its free interpretations. It is against such a background that the objective nature of faith is questioned for the sake of a subjective attitude to transcendence. Faith is respected as objective merely 'here and now,' but it turns out absent

[21] The survey, no. 225 in the series "Aktualne problemy i wydarzenia," was conducted on February 5–11, 2009, on a simple random sample of 1048 adult residents of Poland. See CBOS, "Wiara i religijność Polaków dwadzieścia lat po rozpoczęciu przemian ustrojowych. Komunikat z badań" [Religious Faith and the Religiousness of the Poles Twenty Years after the Change of the Political System], ed. Rafał Boguszewski (CBOS: Warszawa: 2009), https://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2009/K_034_09.PDF.

[22] See, e.g., Langdon G i l k e y, *Gilkey on Tillich* (New York: Crossroad Publishing, 1990).

[23] One might say that what such theologies propose is a kind of inertia.

[24] See Mieszko C i e s i e l s k i, *O Bogu, który był: Nowa interpretacja Jezusa nauki o Bogu* (Warszawa: Scholar, 2016).

when considered in relation to the eschatological domain. A decline of hope for eternal life begins.

THE SUBJECT OF HOPE

Having acknowledged the postmodern subject's inability to perform an act of faith (rather than his or her loss of faith, or of what is given in faith), we need to make a step backwards in our analysis and ask what makes the postmodern subject incapable of believing and why the subject has become rid of 'evidence' of what is to come, as well as of the certainty that faith offers an ultimate fulfillment in transcendence. In order to answer this question we need to make an insight in the ontic structure of the human person. While the latter issue has been scrutinized by philosophy in its theoretical discourse, it significantly comes to light also in various practical situations in life, in particular those involving reflection on the human condition. The metaphysical conception of the human being adopted in these considerations points to certain attributes which are constitutive for a human person as an existing entity and verifiable in an analysis of actual human acts which involve the person's own understanding of her existential status. The specifically human attributes in question are self-awareness, love, freedom, dignity, subjectivity, being a subject rather an object of law, and existential completeness.[25] Each of these dimensions of a human being manifest such a deep presence of the Absolute that their transcendent source is evident to the person in her self-understanding. Insofar as she confronts her status of 'person' and consciously lives it through, she retains her ability to perform acts of faith and hope. In this sense, the theoretical metaphysical analysis is in unison with her experience of her condition. However, we must note that the Absolute merely renders the presence of the specifically human attributes in question free of contradiction.

Thus the fullness of faith and hope is possible once the subject enters a personal relationship with the Absolute, which—according to the Christian tradition—is the only proper relationship with God. Once the subject can see God as 'person,' God becomes a 'neighbor,' a 'you,' or the transcendent 'Thou.' A relationship with God in whom one believes and by whom one has been called (which is a relationship between persons by nature) is often manifested by the actions the person chooses to perform, acting as such

[25] See Mieczysław A. K r ą p i e c, *Ja – człowiek: Zarys antropologii filozoficznej* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 1979), 380–88. See also Mieczysław A. K r ą p i e c, *I—Man: An Outline of Philosophical Anthropology* (New Britain, CT: Mariel Publications, 1983).

being a specific trait that signifies the personal mode of existence.[26] A relationship with God may also be perceived in terms of the pathway a *homo viator* follows: it is the pathway at the end of which there is transcendent reality: an encounter with God.[27] In the case of hope, it is precisely the freedom of pursuing God, combined with getting to know him and love for him, that plays the crucial role. The highest act of love may be manifested by means of an offering of self, a sacrifice (which we have already discussed), or through self-denial by means of which, at the moment of one's death, one entrusts oneself to the Absolute, who is a person. In such cases dying is conceived as an act[28] and Christian hope may anticipate such highest acts of love. Regardless of the anthropology we accept, though, the human person cannot be fully understood without reference to the Absolute.[29]

Based on the above considerations, one might ask about the factors which make a human subject actually lose hope. A major one among them is by no means lack of a personal relationship with God (the Absolute), but abandoning the belief that he validates the personal status of the human being. This fact must be emphasized, since it is not Christian hope that postmodern culture takes away from the human being; rather it deprives the human being of the dignity belonging to him or her as a person. And it is precisely this dignity which is an indispensable condition for hope. It is only as a result of the decline of hope that the subject's relationship with the Absolute begins to wane and becomes marginal, vulnerable, vacillating, and ultimately illusory.

In postmodern culture, the human being, deprived of the attributes of a person, becomes equal to the material or biological objects present in the world.

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[26] Karol Wojtyła discusses the human act as the most important manifestation of a human person. See Karol W o j t y ł a, *The Acting Person*, trans. Andrzej Potocki (Dordrecht, Holland; Boston, USA; London, England: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979).

[27] See, e.g., Gabriel M a r c e l, *Homo Viator: Introduction to the Metaphysic of Hope* (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine Press, 2010).

[28] See K r ą p i e c, *Ja – człowiek: Zarys antropologii filozoficznej*, 383.

[29] See, e.g., the theories of man proposed by, respectively, Maurice Blondel, Gabriel Marcel, Romano Guardini, Jacques Maritain, Maurice Nédoncelle, Karol Wojtyła, Emmanuel Mounier, Hans Urs von Balthasar, and Robert Spaemann. Omitting reference to the Absolute in the definition of man, or in the metaphysical conception of the human being, precludes giving justice to who a human person is. This is particularly obvious in the case of attempts to justify the existence of human dignity. Such attempts inevitably need to resort to a transcendent and absolute realm providing the ground which will make it impossible to reduce a human person to a worldly reality or to degrade her in any other way. Recourse to a reality that goes beyond this world, however vague it might be, is also indispensable in the case of attempts to defend human dignity on grounds other than purely religious. See Francis F u k u y a m a, *Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002). Being a subject of law is, in turn, the reason why a human person must be perceived in reference to the common good, which (in the objective sense) is tantamount to the Absolute.

In the first case, his identity is reduced to that of a subject of culture, i.e., the subject of acts of speech or narration and a correlate of virtual fictional or gaming worlds. Although the human being becomes the organizing principle of intellectual discourses and participates in the interactions and games characteristic of the reality in which he lives, he remains a merely linguistic creation. In the second case, the human being is perceived only in biological terms, as is the case in various instinctivist conceptions, in ethology and in sociobiology, among others.

THE HUMAN SUBJECT IN THE POSTMODERN CULTURE

A further exploration of the condition described above will make it possible for us to probe into the mechanisms responsible for the reduced image of the human being in postmodern culture. The deep structure of those mechanisms embraces the reversal of the relationship between being and values. According to the classical conception, it is personhood that determines the existential status of the human beings, while the relationships obtaining among them provide the basis for the society, which is a relational entity with its own attributes implicating its functions and significance.[30] In postmodernism, ideas are said to precede the shape of the society as such, and the existential status of its members is granted only secondary importance. The various 'ideas' or conceptions of the society fostered by postmodern thought involve social engineering and, in consequence of this process, the society is deprived of its attributes, which—in the classical conception—are manifested by actual social roles and statuses, and by the functioning of social groups and institutions which have developed as a result of the interpersonal relations in question, such as, e.g., the family, the nation, the Church, the educational system, or the humanized economy. In the (global) society molded on this principle, not only social 'realities,' but also the human person[31] are subject to radical reinterpretation, which substantially changes, among others, the meaning of the human rights

[30] Krąpiec emphasizes that from the vantage point of philosophy (metaphysics) a community is certainly an entity, a being. Although the relationships which obtain among particular people do not constitute a substance in the philosophical sense, they nevertheless constitute a social, i.e., relational being. See K r ą p i e c, *Ja – człowiek: Zarys antropologii filozoficznej*, 291.

[31] Defining the human being by reference to social determinants results in putting the status of a person as member of the society above her personhood. Krąpiec notes that both Maritain and Mounier held that the person is entirely distinct from the political individual. While the person is dependent on the society in the respect of her being its member, she transcends the society, which is supposed to serve her welfare. See ibidem, 278. The reinterpretation of the social reality by postmodern ideology results in the degradation of both this entity and the human being as its member.

(or the rights of the human person), such as social freedom, democracy, and, above all, human dignity. The postmodern subject yielded by these processes is deprived of numerous attributes of personhood. The subject's new condition is determined merely by the categories formed on the grounds of cultural awareness conceived in the diachronic sense. Consequently, the affirmation of persons by one another is replaced by tolerance, which is tantamount to promotion of moral egocentrism and to disregarding the value of the common good. Rather than cultural identity, variety, multiculturalism, equal value, and critique of the so-called neocolonialism (postcolonialism) are promoted. The latter phenomenon, however, does not relate to the continuation of colonialism in today's world. Instead, it is an expression of a normative attitude critical of Western (Judeo-Christian) civilization and its philosophical foundations as such. In consequence of this transformation, interpersonal relationships tend to be replaced by new tribalism, and religions addressing a transcendent reality and confessed on the basis of personal belief tend to be substituted by primitive social ritualism, which manifests cultural regression. Among the prevailing marks of postmodern times are: individualism, transvaluation of values, as well as social and cultural uprootedness, all these phenomena and processes being accelerated by the theory and practice of globalism.[32]

SUBJECTIVITY AND PERSONHOOD

The reversal of the relationship between being and values in the postmodernist times affects the world as much as it affects the human being, who needs to individually confront the image of God as Person (the divine 'Thou') with that of God conceived as 'Ultimate Reference,' a cultural product of transgression. In the case of such a collision, no compromise is possible. The same problem appears in the realm self-experience. Krąpiec observes, though, that a human person is always aware that her acts are hers: her subjectivity (her being a 'self') is unavoidably given her in her cognitive experiences. Owing to this givenness, which is perceived in an existential sense, the person knows that she exists: she is aware of her existence as a subject who accomplishes her own acts.[33] The experience of being an existing entity is inalienable from

[32] In the case of postmodern thought, the method which has allegedly made it possible to go beyond the unchangeable metaphysical categories has been deconstruction embracing any element rooted in the cultural tradition and explained by modern and, in particular, realistic philosophies representing the classical current. Deconstruction manifests hope for the ultimate welfare of humanity. Such a postmetaphysical, postpersonalist, and utopian vision of the world can be found, e.g., in various currents of transhumanism.

[33] See K r ą p i e c, *Ja – człowiek: Zarys antropologii filozoficznej*, 373–4.

the subject's experience of being a person and embraces any act the subject performs, among them those rooted in faith and in Christian hope. As opposed to the metaphysical interpretation, the reductionist concept of the human experience characteristic of postmodernism deprives the subject of his personal and existential constitution. As a result, the subject is 'free' to adopt a new identity prompted by the intellect (by way of 'reflection') even though such an identity may disagree with the subject's experience of his own being. Again, we need to emphasize that abandonment of faith and decline of hope do not result from breaking the bond with God conceived as Person, but in consequence of distancing oneself from one's own personal status. Human beings are merely individuals functioning in a global situation: they are inevitably part of the universal cultural process and identify themselves with the position they occupy in it. The environment in which they live suppresses their existential self-determination.

Although his being an actually existing entity is certainly undeniable, the human subject finds it difficult to develop his personhood. Since important aspects of the subject's self are disregarded, identities of provenance other than personal (or even ones undermining his personhood) are being constantly shaped in him.[34] The postmodern subject seems unbound since he is free from moral duties or obligations towards the community (including the religious ones) and he does not pursue the Gospel virtues, which would amount to taking on the 'yoke' of Christ (cf. Mt 11:25–30). The postmodern subject does not truly live in the presence of God. In postmodern thought, God assumes the shape of a vague transcendence.

The human being in postmodernist culture is subject to continuous cognitive and ideological pressure which goes against his own experience of existing as 'person' not only in the sense of spiritual life or relations with others, but of all the remaining aspects of life as well. The pressure in question affects, among others, the understanding of the natural functions of the human body, which, in today's world, are subject to manipulation. Genetic engineering is increasingly introduced as a response to the visions of a 'posthuman' future or cultural gender transformations. Postmodern visions of man, conveying an understanding of the human body that goes against the human experience, question not only the ontological status of the human person, but also the validity of the contents of the Christian creed, which sets the pathway of hope for each human person.

[34] In this context, there appears the tendency to reduce personhood as such to secondary characteristics of identity. Thus we witness a paradox: the status of the human being as 'person' is rejected, which is accompanied by a fervent pursuit of its equivalent. Representatives of cultural or biological reductionism go even further and openly question the ontic structure of the human being as 'person.'

THE FOCUS OF WILL ON THE GOSPEL VIRTUE OF HOPE

According to a philosophical definition, Christian hope is "a virtue instilled (granted) by God, and its function consists in sustaining the focus and effort of the human will in order to accomplish the highest good to which the human being has been destined, namely, salvation, tantamount to knowing and loving God in eternity."[35]

The focus of the will being a significant condition for Christian hope, postmodern culture is marked by a decline of this kind of volition; rather, it encourages passiveness, despondency, and only partial involvement in the pursuit of temporal goals. Zygmunt Bauman offers the following diagnosis: "Immortality is no longer the transcendence of mortality. It is as fickle and erasable as life itself; as irreal as the death transformed into the disappearing act has become: both are amenable to endless resurrection, but none to finality."[36]

Another characteristic trait of contemporary culture is disappearance of the commitment to serious causes which might serve others. Instead, the prevailing attitude is that of *homo ludicus*, who pursues pleasure, is fond of appearances or virtual creations, and lives his life as a narration. The same despondency that engenders indifference can also inspire visions of an unconstructive agonic life which ultimately turns against others. What appears truly interesting in the postmodern outlook is not the lowering of the aspirations of the humankind, though, but the transformation of the human subject. The continuing crisis and paradoxes of the identity of the postmodern man are manifestations of the incompleteness of his existence, which is devoid of goals that would match his rank of an autonomous being. Despite the demand for a strong identity of the human subject the need to resort to religion disappears in contemporary culture due to its persistent efforts to make the human being existentially self-sufficient.[37] Christian hope is now devoid of a very important factor: the subject's focus on the deposit of faith and its fulfillment in the eschatological realm. Deconstruction of hope is observable on every level of faith, even in its most elementary manifestations.

THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNITY OF THE CHURCH

The path of hope must be accomplished in the community of the Church, where the faithful can experience each other's presence. "Part of the essence

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[35] Zbigniew P a ń p u c h, "Nadzieja," in *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, vol. 7, 472.

[36] Zygmunt B a u m a n, *Postmodernity and Its Discontents* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 163.

[37] See Leszek K o ł a k o w s k i, *Modernity on Endless Trial* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1990).

of Christianity—and this is included in the concept of the Church—is that our relationship to God is not just an inner one, one made up of my 'I' and his 'Thou,' but is also a matter of being spoken to, of being led.... As human beings we are there so that God can come to people by way of other people. He always comes to people through people. So we, too, always come to him through other people ... in whom he himself meets us and opens us up to him."[38] Faith, which 'reveals' the object of Christian hope is both initiated and sustained in interpersonal relations within the community of the Church. Each 'you' making up this community is a member of the Church and a sign of Transcendence. Each 'you' is a manifestation of *Ekklesia*, those belonging to the Lord. "*Ekklesia* means *called out*, those who are called out. The word in its technical sense refers to the 'assembly'.... to 'those called together by God,' those who have gathered together with him, who belong to God and who know that he is in their midst."[39]

However, in postmodern societies, both the Church as an institution and the community of the faithful tend to depart from the concepts of "royal priesthood" or "holy nation," and turn into a dispersed collectivity of individuals, occasionally forming short-term coalitions or loose alliances which do not serve accomplishing long-term goals and might be considered in terms of new tribalism. Although they have the shape of small communities, they do not generate a lasting foundation for Christian hope, which was characteristic of the Church. In the case of new tribalism, acts of faith are limited to immanent and changeable religiosity exhibiting vague reference to the transcendence. Unlike the communities participating in the mission of the Church, which transcend their temporal existence in the mystical reality of the Body of Christ, tribal collectivities do not make a lasting or systematic effort to follow the 'path' which has been set for them and neither do they focus on the eschatological dimension of existence.[40] Their key problem is not a lack of inner cohesion, but the cause of this condition, that is, the transformation of the personal subject into a postmodern identity affected by global determinants. Individualism, praised as the ideal by the postmodern society, has been—paradoxically—subsumed by globalism.[41] Even the numerous eschatologies proposed today are derivative

[38] R a t z i n g e r, *God and the World: A Conversation with Peter Seewald*, 70.

[39] Ibidem, 63–4.

[40] One needs to distinguish small communities active in the Church from the 'new tribalism' characteristic of the postmodern reality which does not participate in the mission of the Church. For an analysis of the 'new tribalism,' see Michel M a f f e s o l i, *The Time of the Tribes: The Decline of Individualism in Mass Society* (London: Sage Publications, 1996).

[41] For a broader explanation of this thesis, see Jolanta K o c i u b a, "Indywidualistyczna i personalistyczna koncepcja jednostki a tożsamość," in *Kim jestem? Kim jesteśmy? Antropologiczne i socjologiczne konteksty współczesnej tożsamości*, ed. Dorota Czakon and Mirosław Boruta (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Pedagogicznego, 2012), 54–69.

of the global trends. No wonder the attitude of Christian hope no longer appeals to modern man. Although egocentric individualism and new tribalism, which obliterates subjectivity, might seem disjunctive standpoints, neither of them encourages building relationships among human beings. As a result, eschatology, which needs a real community of the Church, is impossible, which, in turn, makes adopting the attitude of hope impossible. This is true about any type of religion founded on the postmodern concept of subjectivity. The transcendent reality Christianity affirms is radically different from purely conceptual forms of religion, which—in postmodernist culture—manifest a regression to primitive behaviors rooted in the human psyche: expecting 'a future' after death turns out a false substitute of Christian hope.

RESTORING CHRISTIAN HOPE

Decline of hope is a serious problem in modern day societies. An academic scrutiny of the elements of the structure of hope (including the threats it faces) is by no means tantamount to the restoration of hope. Yet one can point at least to certain conditions for accomplishing such an objective. In determining them, we shall refer to the analysis of the process of the degradation of hope. In all the three variants of incomplete hope we have discussed ($p_1 = 0, p_2 = 0$; $p_1 = 0, p_2 = 1$; $p_1 = 1, p_2 = 0$), faith and its object are in some way deformed. The first case, which is most serious, involves a lack of faith in God existing simultaneously in temporality and in eschatological transcendence. In the other cases, faith is either present 'here and now,' but does not entail a prospect of transcendence, or it is not present 'here and now,' but comes to the fore once the subject faces the prospect of transcendence.

As we can see, in each case we are dealing with the problem of the loss of faith and the need for its restoration. Already St. Augustine said, "But the Lord Himself says openly ... : 'This is the work of God, that ye believe on Him whom He has sent.' 'That ye believe on Him,' not, that ye believe Him. But if ye believe on Him, ye believe Him; yet he that believes Him does not necessarily believe on Him. For even the devils believed Him, but they did not believe on Him."[42]

According to the above explanation, overcoming postmodernism would first involve rational belief "on God," retrieving the human rights and respect

[42] St. A u g u s t i n, "Tractate 29," 6, in St. Augustin, *Lectures or Tractates on the Gospel according to St. John*, transl. by John Gibb and James Innes, http://www.documentacatholicaomnia.eu/03d/0354-0430,_Augustinus,_In_Evangelium_Joannis_Tractatus_CXXIV_[Schaff],_EN.pdf, 266. For a broader spectrum of this insight into the essence of faith, see Étienne G i l s o n, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Augustine* (New York: Random House, 1960).

for human dignity, as well as restoring the common good. Only then can faith in God become possible and follow genuine Christian hope, as well as the pathway to the participation in the life of God.

Another condition for restoring hope is a return to the conception of the human being as 'person.' Only a person, due to her ontic structure and participation in the realm of morality, is capable of making the existential and moral effort characteristic of the *homo viator*. The return to the concept of person will affect not only the social domain, but the law, as well as the political and moral life, that is, all the aspects of human existence which are instrumental in the person's self-fulfillment in the face of transcendence. Restoration of the humanity to its 'personal' dimension needs to compensate for its deconstruction brought about by the social transformations and genetic engineering aimed at the creation of virtual, or posthuman, beings. One can say that transhumanists have reached out for the fruit of the tree of life. Their desires express man's need to be at his own disposal and derive transcendence from his immanence. Yet abandonment of God is inseparable from the abandonment of part of one's own being. And it is only by restoring this part of human existence that man can restore his genuine and transcendent hope.[43]

For the purpose of restoring hope, the focus of the human will needs to be real matters rather than irrational alliances made to establish arbitrary rules regarding 'big' ideas, such as, e.g., globalization. The 'unreal' matters on which the world is focused today relate to its virtualization and simulacralization, as well as to the popularity of *homo ludicus*. Thus real human problems are projected onto the realm of life which, rather than implying duties, manifests the so-called 'lightness of being' and is not actually real.

For hope to be restored means to come to life in a community of the faithful. Therefore the structural organization of Christian life is of importance and needs to involve parishes, assemblies, movements, fraternities, formations or 'paths' which make it possible for hope to flourish in interpersonal relations. Christian communities not only support individual hope, but occupy a part of the social space dedicated to communication, public debate, and value systems, thus competing with the collectivities formed against the secular or postsecular background.

[43] For a discussion of the weakening of the perception of the real world in today's culture, the universal turn towards *homo ludicus*, and transhumanist tendencies, see Ryszard S t r z e l e c k i, *Homo ludens kultury współczesnej* (Bydgoszcz: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Kazimierza Wielkiego, 2019).

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ABSTRACT / ABSTRAKT

Ryszard STRZELECKI, Christian Hope in the Postmodern World: On the Essence and Decline of Hope, and on the Prospects for Its Restoration, as seen from the Perspective of the Philosophy of Culture

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The focus of the article is Christian hope, its decline in postmodern culture, and the prospects for its restoration. The analysis in question is conducted with reference to Benedict XVI's encyclical *Spe Salvi.* The object of Christian hope is the deposit of faith, including the 'four last things.' Therefore hope in this sense involves a recognition of the objective nature of both the temporal and

the eschatological realities. The subject of hope is the human being conceived as a *homo viator* pursuing the Transcendence, while the remaining elements of the structure of hope include the focus of the subject's will and the subject's participation in the community. Deconstruction of hope may either affect its single element or destroy all of them. The article discusses various manifestations of the phenomenon of the deconstruction of hope in postmodern culture. The concluding part of the paper focuses on the issue of the possible restoration of hope, which can be accomplished if advise from St. Augustine be followed: in order to believe in God, one needs to believe God, which is tantamount to working for the sake of the common good and respecting the dignity of a human being as person as well the value of human life.

Keywords: Christian hope, person, God, postmodernity, apophatic theology, secularism, postsecularism, volition, eschatology, faith, community, personalism

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Ryszard STRZELECKI, Nadzieja chrześcijańska w świecie ponowoczesnym. Istota – utrata – przywracanie. Refleksja kulturoznawcza

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Problematyka artykułu dotyczy nadziei chrześcijańskiej, jej utraty oraz warunków przywracania. Podstawą rozważań jest źródłowe rozumienie nadziei obecne w encyklice Benedykta XVI *Spe salvi.* Przedmiotem nadziei chrześcijańskiej jest depozyt wiary, w tym kwestia rzeczy ostatecznych. Nadzieja wymaga zatem uznania obiektywności rzeczywistości doczesnej i eschatologicznej. Podmiotem nadziei jest zwrócony ku Transcendencji homo viator, a elementy ją współtworzące to ukierunkowanie woli przez podmiot oraz jego udział we wspólnocie. Czynniki dekonstrukcji mogą dotyczyć jednego lub wszystkich elementów struktury nadziei. W artykule omówione zostało zjawisko dekonstrukcji nadziei w różnych wymiarach kultury współczesnej. Refleksja końcowa dotyczy kwestii przywracania nadziei, które dokonać się może na drodze przeciwnej wobec dekonstrukcji, a zatem poprzez odzyskanie wiary. Podstawą takiego zwrotu może stać się wskazanie św. Augustyna: aby wierzyć w Boga, trzeba wpierw wierzyć Bogu, czyli realizować dobro wspólne, uznawać osobową godność człowieka i transcendentną wartość ludzkiego życia.

Słowa kluczowe: nadzieja chrześcijańska, osoba, Bóg, ponowoczesność, teologia apofatyczna, sekularyzm, postsekularyzm, wola, eschatologia, wiara, wspólnota, personalizm

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ON HOPING FOR HOPE
The Search for *homo esperans*[1]

It is important to realize what hope is not. Roger Scruton, in the context of misunderstood hope, draws attention to a false, optimistic mentality that uses cognitive stereotypes, serving as 'anesthesia' for the uncertainty of the future. Kozielecki describes such attitudes in terms of passive hope: they express a belief that after a period of passive waiting one will reach the expected goal. This type of hope is built on the foundation of established cognitive schemes and trust in their reliability. It does not open up to something unknown in the future; rather, it makes one adopt the belief that 'things will somehow work out in the end.'

In *Zaufanie: Fundament społeczeństwa* [Trust: The Foundation of Society][2] Piotr Sztompka confirms the view of Jack M. Barbalet[3] that the inevitability of the unknown, of areas beyond control, is inscribed in the ontological condition of the human being and of the whole of humanity. We have developed three ways of dealing with uncertainty: hope, belief, and trust. Hope is a "passive and indefinite emotion, impossible to explain rationally, that things will go our way,"[4] belief combines the feeling of hope with that of certainty, whereas trust is a bet taken on the course of uncertain future events.[5] While his main purpose of introducing the distinction in question is finding the *differentia specifica* of trust, Sztompka's analysis is based on a rather clichéd understanding of hope: he takes its relation to the sphere of the emotional for granted and believes that hope embraces only the moment when the anticipatory desire is accompanied by an attitude of involvement. Thus Sztompka's interpretation of hope prompts certain questions: What is the nature of the process that leads a human being

[1] The title of my article addresses a debate "On Hoping for Hope" held by prominent contemporary Polish philosophers Karol Tarnowski, Robert Piłat, Jacek Filek, Barbara Chyrowicz, Łukasz Tischner, and Wojciech Bonowicz. See Karol T a r n o w s k i, Robert P i ł a t, Jacek F i l e k, Barbara C h y r o w i c z, Łukasz T i s c h n e r, and Wojciech B o n o w i c z, "Nadzieja na nadzieję," *Znak*, no. 12 (703) (2013), http://www.miesiecznik.znak.com.pl/7032013debata-13-dni-tischnerowskich-filozofia-i-nadziejanadzieja-na-nadzieje/.

[2] See Piotr S z t o m p k a, *Zaufanie: Fundament społeczeństwa*, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak, 2007.

[3] See Jack M. B a r b a l e t, "Social Emotions: Confidence, Trust, and Loyalty," *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy* 16, nos. 9–10: 75–96.

[4] S z t o m p k a, *Zaufanie: Fundament społeczeństwa*, 67. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.

[5] See ibidem, 67–70.

to believe that the certainty of the desired course of events is high enough to valorize positively the chance of its actual occurrence? When do we make a bet on uncertain future events? When do we begin to 'trust the future'? When is hope born?

In this article I will refer to the general line of argument on uncertainty put forward by Sztompka, introducing, however, new references and a system of new meanings helpful in a better understanding of the conditions necessary for a human person to enter the realm of hope.

One might ask why the problem of hope should be considered as important from the perspective of our present-day rootedness in the world. The question is by no means rhetorical. Hannah Arendt suggests that we should reconsider our human condition "from the vantage point of our newest experiences and our most recent fears,"[6] and adds, "This, obviously, is a matter of thought, and thoughtlessness—the heedless recklessness or hopeless confusion or complacent repetition of 'truths' which have become trivial and empty—seems to me among the outstanding characteristic of our time. What I propose, therefore, is very simple: it is nothing more than to think what we are doing."[7] Arendt's suggestion, and a simultaneous invitation to act on it, was made in 1958 and expressed an anxiety whether, as the human race, we were actually focused on the issue of our condition, whether we had sufficiently analyzed the effects of our actions, and, if so, whether we put our thoughts into practice. A Report to the Club of Rome entitled *Come On! Capitalism, Short-termism, Population and the Destruction of the Planet*, by Ernest Ulrich von Weizsäcker and Anders Wijkman,[8] is, however, a clear diagnosis of the humanity's lack of commitment to the reflection on our condition. Yuval Noah Harari, in turn, in his *Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow*, points to a paradox: "Today our knowledge is increasing at breakneck speed, and theoretically we should understand the world better and better. But the very opposite is happening. Our new-found knowledge leads to faster economic, social and political changes; in an attempt to understand what is happening, we accelerate the accumulation of knowledge, which leads only to faster and greater upheavals. Consequently we are less and less able to make sense of the present or forecast the future."[9] Therefore—he believes—we must try again to answer several questions the future 'poses' to us, namely, "What are today's greatest challenges and choices? What should

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[6] Hannah A r e n d t, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 5.

[7] Ibidem.

[8] See Ernest Ulrich v o n W e i z s ä c k e r and Anders W i j k m a n, *Come On! Capitalism, Short-termism, Population and the Destruction of the Planet: A Report to the Club of Rome* (New York: Springer Science+Business Media, 2018).

[9] Yuval Noah H a r a r i, *Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow* (Sydney, Toronto, Auckland, London, and New York: HarperCollins Publisher, 2017), 68.

we pay attention to? What should we teach our kids?"[10] In a similar vein, Steven Pinker calls for a new enlightenment accomplished "in the language and concepts of the 21st century."[11] However, the current trends of thought and intellectual attitudes, in a vast majority, are hardly a response to the postulates of the cited authors. A possible explanation of this fact is suggested by Ewa Bińczyk in the title of her book *Epoka człowieka: Retoryka i marazm antropocenu* [The Age of Man: On the Rhetoric and Marasmus of Anthropocene].[12] *Marazm* (marasmus) is a lack of action and unwillingness to look for solutions, largely resulting from helplessness towards *superwicked* problems we have to face,[13] which, according to Gregg Braden, result from a convergence of critical topics, such as those regarding the climate, population, energy, and economic extremes.[14] Referring to Kari Marie Norgaard's book *Living in Denial: Climate Change, Emotions and Everyday Life*,[15] Bińczyk diagnoses 'gaps' in our cultural 'toolbox' which make it impossible to handle the burning issues of today: "People need to feel the effectiveness of their own actions: the absence of such effectiveness and the feeling of not being in control evoke strong negative emotions."[16] Needless to say, such emotions undermine hopes for the future as such, as well as trust in it. The attitude of denial, as described by Norgaard, can be seen—holds Bińczyk—as a refusal to arouse hope in oneself, which makes it impossible to 'bridge' the 'gaps' in our cultural 'toolbox' and thus to address the problems our reality poses.

Regaining control of our world involves a 'vision' of the direction in which we want to go and such a vision provides hope for the future. In this context, it seems justified to say that "hope is fundamental for understanding human flourishing."[17] As such, hope is an indispensable 'condition' for looking ahead and for designing activities. Therefore a better understanding of the nature of hope is an imperative for our culture. In his foreword to *The Oxford Handbook*

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[10] Yuval Noah Harari, *21 Lessons for the 21st Century* (London: Jonathan Cape, 2018), ix–x.

[11] Steven Pinker, *Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress* (New York: Penguin Books, 2018), 5.

[12] See Ewa Bińczyk, *Epoka człowieka: Retoryka i marazm antropocenu*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2018.

[13] See ibidem, 56.

[14] See Gregg Braden, *The Turning Point: Creating Resilience in a Time of Extremes* (Carlsbad, New York and London: Hay House, 2014), 1–38.

[15] See Kari Marie Norgaard, *Living in Denial: Climate Change, Emotions and Everyday Life* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2011).

[16] Bińczyk, *Epoka człowieka: Retoryka i marazm antropocenu*, 56.

[17] Kristina Schmid Callina, Nancy Snow, and Ellie D. Murray, "The History of Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives on Hope: Toward Defining Hope for the Science of Positive Human Development," in *The Oxford Handbook of Hope*, ed. Matthew W. Gallagher and Shane J. Lopez (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 9.

of Hope, Todd B. Kashdan states that "hope should be receiving significantly more attention from scientists, practitioners, and policymakers."[18] A Polish philosopher Krzysztof Wieczorek is of a similar opinion and emphasizes the fact that "it is necessary to gain the courage to believe that hope is capable of overcoming the internal spiritual paralysis into which our fears drive us, the most acute of those fears being that of wasting an opportunity history has given us."[19]

Since the problem of hope is of particular significance to modern culture, it needs a study which goes beyond the limits of a single discipline. Rather, it calls for an interdisciplinary—or transdisciplinary—approach and therefore the present paper extensively draws on psychological analyses, among others. The point is to provide a thorough interpretation of human experiences which are considered as hope-related. Yet the psychological insights into the realm of hope will be analyzed against the background provided by modern philosophy,[20] in particular by Chantal Delsol and Vilém Flusser, as well as by Polish philosophers, psychologists, and sociologists.

The present considerations are not meant as a review of the existing research on the concept of hope. The author's goal is rather to focus on the processual characteristics of the state of 'hope' and the proposed theses will be based on enthymemes.

THE DENOTATION OF THE CONCEPT OF HOPE

The success of a search depends to a large extent on having determined what one is looking for, which is why, in our case, the preliminary definition of the concept of hope is considered as more than a merely methodological procedure and assumes the practical function of providing a 'description of the wanted.'

In the introduction to his *Filozofia nadziei* [A Philosophy of Hope], Józef Kosian poses a warning: "Hope seems to be a concept that cannot be defined unless the *ignotum per ignotum* fallacy is accepted."[21] Having this risk in

[18] Todd B. K a s h d a n, "Hope: Influencing the Largest Terrain of Health and Well-Being for Greatest Number of People," in: *The Oxford Handbook of Hope*, xix.

[19] Krzysztof W i e c z o r e k, "Między nadzieją a melancholią: Józefa Tischnera myślenie o przyszłości," in *Tischner – człowiek w horyzoncie nadziei*, ed. Elżbieta Struzik (Katowice: Oficyna Wydawnicza Wacław Walasek, 2016), 30.

[20] See, e.g., Claudia B l o e s e r and Titus S t a h l, "Hope," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2017 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/hope/.

[21] Józef K o s i a n, *Filozofia nadziei* (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 1997), 5.

mind, we need to point to the important meanings of 'hope' which will make it possible for us to establish the denotative field of the concept. In a similar attempt, Kosian abandons the concern for precision and aims to find the crucial elements of whatever we tend to associate with hope. As a result, he identifies hope with a special type of consciousness, a "self-conscious awareness" which prompts us whether to perform certain actions or refrain from them in view of our expectations. The awareness in question is accompanied by a specific vision of the future we desire to come true.[22] The vision, however, is marked by a unique quality, namely, "cherishing hope is related precisely to a sense of this newness"[23] and takes place in the horizon of the future. Józef Kozielecki in turn focuses on an important aspect of the vision of the future that accompanies hope: Whenever we hope, we can see a purposeful order of things[24] which is 'outlined' in the longest possible time perspective[25] and which helps us tame uncertainty, thus making our anticipation assume a particular shape. Yet Chantal Delsol notes that hope is simultaneously a decision of the will, as we do not have any knowledge of the matters that relate to the future and we need to decide 'in the dark.'[26]

According to Józef Tischner, it is precisely its orientation towards the future that determines "the basic dimension of hope."[27] "Hope is the spiritual force that steers the human drama out of its hiding and makes it possible for the human being to overcome the obstacles of the present, and turn to the future,"[28] adds Tischner. In turn, Vilém Flusser emphasizes that opening up to the future assumes that we are able to predict to some extent what will happen, and that we are able to bring into existence some events, while suppressing others.[29]

Thus, in the light of the above quoted insights, it seems important to investigate what gives the human being the strength to envision the potential of agency related to the future hope embraces.

Tae Rang Choi, Jung Hwa Choi, and Yongjun Sung write: "Hope essentially arises when individuals desire to obtain a particular goal. Hope is formed

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[22] See ibidem, 6.

[23] Ibidem, 16.

[24] See Józef K o z i e l e c k i, *Psychologia nadziei* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Akademickie Żak, 2005), 16.

[25] See ibidem, 19.

[26] See Chantal D e l s o l, *Les pierres d'angle : À quoi tenons-nous?* (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf 2014). See also Chantal D e l s o l, *Kamienie węgielne: Na czym nam zależy?*, trans. Małgorzata Kowalska (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak, 2018), 214.

[27] Józef T i s c h n e r, "Rozważania na progu jutra," quoted after W i e c z o r e k, "Między nadzieją a melancholią: Józefa Tischnera myślenie o przyszłości," 35.

[28] Ibidem.

[29] See Vilém F l u s e r, "Jak spoglądamy w przyszłość," in *Kultura pisma: Z filozofii słowa i obrazu*, trans. Przemysław Wiatr (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Aletheia, 2018), 265.

from reality-based evaluations of volition and ways of fulfilling uncertain, goal-congruent outcomes.… Specifically, hope is a future-oriented emotion because it focuses on actions and stems from outcomes that have not yet been achieved."[30] The approach to understanding hope the authors express resembles that of Charles R. Snyder, who discovered that "when people discussed their goals, they mentioned two components: the routes to reach those goals and motivations to use those routes."[31] Snyder "labelled these components as "'pathways' and 'agency'"[32] and characterized hope to be a composition of "a sense of successful (a) agency and (b) pathways. Agency refers to goal-directed energy which emphasizes one's perceived capacity to reach desired goals. Pathways refer to cognition that one has different possible routes to reach desired goals"[33] Snyder's final conclusion goes as follows: "Hope is a positive motivational state that is based on interactively derived sense of successful (1) agency (goal-directed energy) and pathways (planning to meet goals)."[34]

The strength of the experienced hope results, therefore, from a sense of influence. "Hopeful thinking consists of the belief that one can find pathways to desired goals, and that one can muster the motivation to use those pathways."[35] Thus hope involves an awareness of the possibility of a positive assessment of implementing a vision that activates the action, as well as of the existence of ways to accomplish this vision. Hongfei Du and Ronnel B. King pay attention to a similar aspect of hope and define it "in terms of one's sense that one can reach one's goals and that one has the means to reach those goals."[36] Their approach, however, does not take into account the community-based, externally located feeling of hope and in order to consider this aspect we need to refer to the concept of Allan B. I. Bernardo, who proposes "to extend hope theory by adding locus-of-hope as a dimension of trait hope. Locus-of-hope refers to

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[30] Tae Rang Choi, Jung Hwa Choi, and Yongjun Sung, "I Hope to Protect Myself from the Threat: The Impact of Self-threat on Prevention—versus Promotion-focused Hope, *Journal of Business Research* 99 (2019): 483.

[31] Quoted after Kevin R. Rand and Jennifer S. Cheavens, "Hope Theory." In *The Oxford Handbook of Positive Psychology*, vol. 2, ed. Shane J. Lopez and C. R. Snyder, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, 324.

[32] Ibidem.

[33] Hongfei Du and Ronnel B. King, "Placing Hope in Self and Others: Exploring the Relationships among Self-construals, Locus of Hope, and Adjustment," *Personality and Individual Differences* 54, no. 3 (2013): 332.

[34] C.R. Snyder, Lori M. Irving, and John R. Anderson, "Hope and Health: Measuring the Will and the Ways," in *Handbook of Social and Clinical Psychology: The Health Perspective*, ed. C. R. Snyder and Donelson R. Forsyth (New York: Pergamon Press, 1991), 287.

[35] Rand and Cheavens, "Hope Theory," 324.

[36] Du and King, "Placing Hope in Self and Others: Exploring the Relationships among Self-construals, Locus of Hope, and Adjustment": 332.

whether the components of trait hope involve internal and external agents and internally or externally generated pathways. The internal locus-of-hope refers to the individual as the agent of goal-attainment cognitions, whereas the external locus-of-hope refers to significant others and external forces as agents of goal-attainment cognitions."[37] In the case of internal placement of hope "the individual is seen as the focal agent of goal attainment,"[38] whereas the external location concerns the family, the peers or higher factors (e.g., a supernatural being).

As indicated earlier, it is also important to realize what hope is not. Roger Scruton, in the context of misunderstood hope, draws attention to a false, optimistic mentality that uses cognitive stereotypes, serving as 'anesthesia' for the uncertainty of the future.[39] Kozielecki describes such attitudes in terms of passive hope: they express a belief that after a period of passive waiting one will reach the expected goal.[40] As this type of hope is built on the foundation of established cognitive schemes and trust in their reliability, it may prove unconstructive: it does not open up to something unknown in the future; rather, it acts like the previously mentioned state of apathy which makes one adopt the belief that 'things will somehow work out in the end.' The opposite of such an attitude is active hope, which makes the individual actively seek solutions and mobilize energy (volition) for their implementation.[41] In the face of an uncertain future, the sense of autonomy and creativity, as well as that of agency, is important. Having hope means trusting the future, i.e., actively taking a bet on it and making a choice.

In the light of the insights into the nature of hope we have described, it can be defined as an active attitude, based on a multidimensional system of beliefs which makes it possible for us to perceive an intentional order in the uncertain future and—which is crucial—embracing both the imagined (potential) modes of action and the motivation necessary to achieve them.[42] As any other attitude, hope has cognitive and emotional components which are interdependent. Therefore, the mentioned system of beliefs also embraces a positive emotional attitude towards the anticipated order and manifests a new quality which is the source of hope. The nature and definition of hope situate it in the realm of the

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[37] Allan B. I. B e r n a r d o, "Extending Hope Theory: Internal and External Locus of Trait Hope," *Personality and Individual Differences* 49, no. 8 (2010): 945.

[38] D u and K i n g, "Placing Hope in Self and Others: Exploring the Relationships among Self-construals, Locus of Hope, and Adjustment": 332.

[39] See Roger S c r u t o n, *The Use of Pessimism and the Danger of False Hope* (New York: Oxford University of Press, 2010), 38–9.

[40] See K o z i e l e c k i, *Psychologia nadziei*, 39.

[41] See ibidem, 40.

[42] For a definition of 'attitude' see William D. C r a n o and Radmila P r i s l i n, "Attitude and Attitude Change: The Fourth Peak," in *Attitudes and Attitude Change*, ed. William D. Crano and Radmila Prislin (Taylor & Francis Group: New York and London, 2006), 3.

future,[43] within a certain potential emerging from what we believe is possible rather than within the realm of knowledge. The act of trust hope presupposes simultaneously signifies an active attitude and determines the scope of the possible agency of the subject.

The source of the perceived order can be either our own potential or that of significant others, including higher factors, but the very fact that the order itself exists is the foundation of strength which allows us to experience hope. Thus, the key moment for the birth of hope is 'seeing' a certain order in an uncertain future, which generates a vision of possible actions and, as such, is mobilizing by itself. When we recognize hope in God, we begin to pray, when we see it in the wisdom of family traditions or in other social factors, we begin to rely on them, and when we find this order in the potential of our own competence, it is ourselves that become the source of our own strength.

In the next part of the article the analysis will focus on the internal placement of hope and thus on a recognition of the factors which make it possible to find the desired order in oneself. From this perspective, the two key aspects are (1) the moment of the 'emergence' of the order we need and (2) the forces generated by the emergence of the order which enable us to 'face' the future.

FINDING HOMO ESPERANS

At this stage of the analysis we shall attempt to trace the sources of the internal placement of hope, that is, to find the answer to the question about what makes it possible for the human being to experience the power flowing from within him or her. The research of this problem has been continued since the 1960s and it can be conceived in terms of collecting the element for the cultural toolbox for 'superwicked times.' Therefore, the conclusions that will follow must not be regarded as 'the latest discoveries.' We must keep in mind that in the case of technical sciences, which provide the model and standards of research for other disciplines, any discovery made more than five years ago is considered no longer valid. Consequently, the approaches to the understanding of hope I shall discuss are going to address a merely fragmentary catalogue of the existing theoretical and practical proposals in this field. Nevertheless, the conceptions selected for analysis can be considered as valuable in terms of the description of the experience of the constitution of hope they provide. Indeed, the views which will be discussed below have been singled out from many others on account of their unique precision in the description of the conditions enabling one to locate hope in oneself or, in other words, to 'find the strength

[43] See D e l s o l, *Kamienie węgielne: Na czym nam zależy*, 215.

in oneself.' Another criterion applied in their selection is that of the empirical setting of the description in question and, in this respect, the concept of optimal experiments worked out by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi seems of particular interest. Csikszentmihalyi based his conclusions on the results of the research conducted on thousands of respondents from around the world, in which he employed the experience sampling method (ESM) he himself had developed.[44] However, before we focus on the analyses conducted by Csikszentmihalyi, we shall briefly refer to Abraham T. Maslow's concept of peak experiences, which historically precedes Csikszentmihalyi's empirical research.

Nadine Weideman emphasizes that the essence of Maslow's approach and of his humanistic psychology was the assumption that "human nature had biological, inbuilt tendencies, that these tendencies were for the good, and that they could be discovered by studying the best specimens that humanity had to offer"[45] (specifically: healthy individuals). "Being psychologically healthy—writes Weidman—did not mean being a 'genius'; an ordinary person could also be self-fulfilling in the healthy way."[46] Maslow recognized self-actualizing people as personifications of mental health: "Self-actualizing people were marked by an openness to experience and perception; trust in their own judgment, even if it meant departure from social norms; an autonomy and independence from other people approval or opinions; a capacity for love, enjoyment."[47] More frequent incidence of so-called peak experiences was a typical characteristic of self-actualizers. Maslow described them as demonstrating "feelings of limitless horizons opening up to the vision, the feeling of being simultaneously more powerful and also more helpless than one ever was before ... finally, the conviction that something extremely important and valuable had happened, so that the subject is to some extent transformed and strengthened even in his life by such experiences."[48] We must bear in mind, though, that a condition necessary for experiencing peak states was having one's deficit needs (the basic requirements of physical and emotional well-being) satisfied.

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[44] See Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, *Flow: The Psychology of Happiness* (London, Sydney, Auckland and Johannesburg: Random House, 2013), 5.

[45] Nadine Weideman, "Between the Counterculture and the Corporation: Abraham Maslow and Humanistic Psychology in the 1960s," in *Groovy Science: Knowledge, Innovation & American Counterculture*, ed. David Kaiser and W. Patrick McCray (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2016), 114.

[46] Ibidem, 115.

[47] Ibidem.

[48] Abraham H. Maslow, *Motivation and Personality* (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 164.

In his research of peak experiences, Maslow used both direct interviews (in the case of 80 participants), surveys (in the case of 190 participants)[49] and other sources, such as personal accounts of authors addressing issues of theology, aesthetics, religion, and philosophy.[50] Based on the collected descriptions, he abstracted the features typical of the so-called meta-motivated *cognition of Being*, which exceeds the motivational mechanisms based on meeting the needs. Maslow distinguished this type of experience from *deficiency cognition* resulting from a sense of lack.[51] Incidentally, a description of the difference between the two types of cognition can be found also in Viktor E. Frankl's *The Will To Meaning*, where the categories of 'opening to the world' and 'bonding with the world' are introduced, the former referring to the tendency of human beings to experience 'sense-filling' in their contact with the world and others (*Welt*), and the latter 'finding its justification in environmental conditions"[52] (*Umwelt*) and resulting from adaptation processes in which human individuals satisfy their needs the way animals do.

The characteristic feature of the cognition of Being is that it renders the world as a whole and triggers total attention. Reality is then experienced in itself rather than as something that can be used. Cognition of this type has the character of a deeper understanding of the object, it becomes selfless and capable of transcending the ego. A peak experience is perceived as self-confirming and self-supporting. It has an internal value, is ideographic and emotionally valued as very positive, it accentuates the relations with the world in which the subject engages, and it is a source of the subject's inner integrity.[53] As Maslow summarizes, "We may define it as an episode, or a spurt in which the powers of the person come together in a particularly efficient and intensely enjoyable way, and in which he is more integrated and less split, more open for experience, more idiosyncratic, more perfectly expressive or spontaneous, or fully functioning, more creative, more humorous, more ego-transcending, more independent of his lower needs, etc. He becomes in these episodes more truly himself, more perfectly actualizing his potentialities, closer to the core of his Being, more fully human."[54]

An important question from the vantage point of the current considerations is whether a peak experience, which Maslow considers as a 'natural' form of

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[49] See Abraham H. Maslow, *Toward a Psychology of Being* (New York, Cincinnati, Toronto, London and Melbourne: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1968), 71.

[50] See ibidem, 72–3.

[51] See ibidem, 73.

[52] Viktor E. Frankl, *The Will to Meaning: Foundation and Applications of Logotherapy* (New York, London and Toronto: Penguin Group, 1988), 31.

[53] See Maslow, *Toward a Psychology of Being*, 74–100.

[54] Ibidem, 97.

cognition for every human being, should be regarded as a hope engendering moment. A positive answer to this question may be justified by the special nature of a peak experience, which qualitatively differs from other types of cognition in that it makes it possible to overcome 'outdated' patterns of thought, inadequate to what the future demands in respect of both thinking and acting, and generating hopelessness. The cognition of Being opens a human individual to the world and renders the search for meaning successful in the holistic, non-instrumental sense, introducing a wider perspective. Thus the cognition of Being releases positive experiences, simultaneously transferring humans to a higher level of valuation and motivation. The enlightenment (discovery, or realization)[55] resulting from the cognition of Being (the recognition that 'it is so') is potentially causative ('I can do it, there is hope'), enabling the subject to make a bold entry into the future. While Maslow acknowledges that the described kind of experience involves a whole series of risks, his doubts appear as a result of a pragmatic assessment of its consequences[56], rather than refer to the very moment an individual is opening up to the future, which is crucial from the perspective of the research on hope.

Csikszentmihalyi, in turn, begins his study with the basic question about the possibility of experiencing happiness and concludes, saying, "Happiness is not something that happens. It is not the result of good fortune or random chance. It is not something that money can buy or power command. It does not depend on outside events, but, rather, on how we interpret them. Happiness, in fact, is a condition that must be prepared for, cultivated, and defended privately by each person. People who learn to control inner experience will be able to determine the quality of their lives, which is as close as any us can come to being happy."[57] However, why does Csikszentmihalyi's discovery matter to us in the context of the issues pertaining to hope? Again, as in the case of Maslow, the objective is to recognize the moment the subject finds an inner strength helpful in restoring the sense of control of the external world. Csikszentmihalyi emphasizes: "We have all experienced times when, instead of being buffeted by anonymous forces, we do feel in control of our actions, master of our own fate. On the rare occasions that it happens, we feel a sense of exhilaration, a deep sense of enjoyment that is long cherished and that becomes a landmark

[55] The category of 'enlightenment,' applicable as a description of a peak experience in the sense of Maslow's theory, is comparable with the phase of 'illumination' recognized as a stage of the creative processes, i.e., with the sudden discovery of the solution to the problem, which—in the case of hope—is a lack of a deliberate order of the reality. See Edward N ę c k a, *Psychologia twórczości* (Gdańsk: Gdańskie Wydawnictwo Psychologiczne, 2012), 104–28.

[56] See M a s l o w, *Toward a Psychology of Being*, 115–24.

[57] C s i k s z e n t m i h a l y i, *Flow: The Psychology of Happiness*, 2.

in memory for what life should be like."[58] What he describes is the so-called optimal experiences, which make the realization of an existing order of things possible and which engender the ability to mindfully control the events. Jeanne Nakamura and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi write:

> Being 'in flow' is the way that some interviewees described the subjective experience of engaging just-manageable challenges by tackling a series of goals, continuously processing feedback about progress, and adjusting action based on this feedback. Under these conditions, experience seamlessly unfolds from moment to moment, and one enters a subjective state with the following characteristics:
>
> • Intense and focused concentration on what one is doing in the present moment;
>
> • Merging of action and awareness;
>
> • Loss of reflective self-consciousness (i.e., loss of awareness of oneself as a social actor);
>
> • A sense that one can control one's actions; that is, a sense that one can in principle deal with the situation because one knows how to respond to whatever happens next;
>
> • Distortion of temporal experience (typically, a sense that time has passed faster than normal);
>
> • Experience of the activity as intrinsically rewarding, such that often the end goal is just an excuse for the process.[59]

The essence of the optimal experience as Csikszentmihalyi describes it is the state of consciousness it involves and, more specifically, the ability to control the events it engenders. In general, the function of consciousness is to process information about what is happening inside and outside the body so that the body can evaluate it and act on the basis of this assessment. Awareness functions as a purgatory for feelings, impressions, experiences and ideas, setting priorities for this information.[60] The possibilities of awareness control are limited in the case of so-called psychic entropy, i.e., the state in which the internal order is confused by an influx of contradictory or disturbing information, such as in situations of pain, anger, frustration, cognitive dissonance, or overwhelming messages. The factor which enables restoration of control over the self is the kind of attention Csikszentmihalyi defines as psychic energy. He says,

> Attention … plays a key role in entering and staying in flow. Entering flow is largely a function of how attention has been focused in the past and how it is focused in the

[58] Ibidem, 3.

[59] Jeanne N a k a m u r a and Mihaly C s i k s z e n t m i h a l y i, "The Concept of Flow," in *The Oxford Handbook of Positive Psychology*, 240.

[60] See Mihaly C s i k s z e n t m i h a l y i, *Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience* (Sydney, Toronto, Auckland, London, and New York: HarperCollins Publisher, 2008), 28–39).

> present by the activity's structural conditions. Interests developed in the past will direct attention to specific challenges. Clear proximal goals, immediate feedback, and just-manageable levels of challenge orient the organism, in a unified and coordinated way, so that attention becomes completely absorbed into the stimulus field defined by the activity.[61]

Therefore, "optimal experiences occur when a person voluntarily focuses their attention on a limited stimulus field, while aversive experiences involve involuntary focusing of attention."[62] In the case of optimal experiences as Csikszentmihalyi describes them (just as before in the case of peak experiences), we are dealing with a new quality of cognition which emerges as a result of the targeted work of our consciousness obtained through the control of attention. In this way, a specific order of thoughts, emotions and values is established once an individual can see the sense of acting and develops mental energy to carry out the activities in question,[63] even should everything take place in unfavorable circumstances. Csikszentmihalyi not only describes optimal experiences as possible, but goes further, suggesting the way to live them through by working out the ability to control one's attention, which facilitates the emergence of a targeted order.

TOWARDS A NEW, PROCESSUAL CONCEPT OF HOPE

In the light of the above considerations a new, processual concept of hope might be delineated. The ways of dealing with uncertainty introduced by Sztompka and described in the introduction to this article placed hope in the realm of ambiguous feelings, distinguishing it from trust conceived as an active attitude supported by a specific type of learning about reality. The work carried out as part of these considerations made it possible to make some semantic shifts in this respect. In accordance with those assumptions, an attempt was made to reconsider the phenomenon of hope with special regard to the 'process'

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[61] N a k a m u r a and C s i k s z e n t m i h a l y i, "The Concept of Flow," 243.

[62] Mihaly C s i k s z e n t m i h a l y i, "Flow and the Foundations of Positive Psychology," in *The Collected Works of Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi* (Dordrecht, Heidelberg, New York, and London: Springer, 2014), 7.

[63] A very interesting example of research on the effects of positive attention and their impact on the sense of well-being is provided by the works of Sonja Lyubomirsky and Kristin Layous. See: Sonja L y u b o m i r s k y and Kristin L a y o u s, "How Do Simple Positive Activities Increase Well-Being?" *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 22, no. 1 (2013): 57–62; Kristin L a y o u s and Sonja L y u b o m i r s k y, "The How, Why, What, When, and Who of Happiness: Mechanisms Underlying the Success of Positive Activity Interventions," in *Positive Emotion: Integrating the Light Sides and the Dark Sides*, ed. by June Gruber and Judith Tedlie Moscowitz (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 473–96.

that allows us to experience it. It has been established that we can understand hope as an active attitude, the foundation of which is an envisioned purposeful order of the anticipated future. The fact of 'seeing' this order is connected with positive emotions: in the wake of the realization of the potential of the future order motivation emerges. Two aspects have been recognized as crucial to this perspective: the moment of the 'emergence' of the order in question and the co-instantaneous forces that stimulate the individual's experience, thus allowing the individual to 'face' the future. Maslow's 'peak experiences' and Csikszentmihalyi's 'optimal experiences' have been recognized as fulfilling those criteria.

The important conclusion which follows from the proposed approach is that hope needs to be understood as a process which begins with the human being actively building a new 'order of thoughts.' The existence of such an order in the consciousness of a human subject turns out the condition of the appearance of hope, and the research material used in this article has confirmed the real possibility of such an order, as well as provided a very practical indication of the kind of mental processes which can trigger it. In *Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience*, Csikszentmihalyi even describes a 'procedure' helpful in building the experience in question within oneself. A strong focus of attention proves to be the precondition of an orderly view of the reality which, in turn, releases positive emotions and motivation in the subject which are necessary in order to free up the subject's agency.

However, do the experiences which have been described here make it possible to point to the moment when hope is born in a human being? Do they give hope for hope? As in the case of any essential question, there are no unambiguous answers. The examples we have analyzed meet the theoretical conditions of the 'occurrence' of hope we determined while setting the denotative field of the concept, but the fact that the model we have created can be considered as coherent does not mean that it is true.

There is, though, a personal experience which can confirm the legitimacy of the train of thought presented here. In the search for the essence of the phenomenon of hope, and in the hope for finding it, the author has experienced that mobilizing sense of 'ordering' that filled the work on this issue with meaning.

Therefore, an experience of hope should not be regarded in terms of a realistic assessment of the existing options. Hope is not about seeing the future. Rather, it calls for a coherent vision of the reality as it should be and for an inner strength making it possible for the person to try and implement the perceived order of things.

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ABSTRACT / ABSTRAKT

Grażyna OSIKA, On Hoping for Hope: The Search for *homo esperans*
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The study focuses on the phenomenon of hope conceived as an orientation which makes it possible for a human being to deal with the uncertainty of the future. The author takes into consideration the new 'processual' sense of the concepts and meanings helpful in understanding the conditions necessary to achieve the state of hope. The study makes use of theoretical analysis, in particular of the concepts of 'peak experiences' and 'optimal experiences,' as worked out by, respectively, Abraham Maslow and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi. The phenomenon of hope has been described with a special focus on the 'process' that allows a human being to experience it.

Keywords: hope, peak experience conception, Maslow, optimal experience conception, Csikszentmihalyi, flow

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Grażyna OSIKA, Nadzieja na nadzieję. W poszukiwaniu *homo esperans*
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Rozważania skupiają się na opisie fenomenu nadziei jako orientacji pozwalającej człowiekowi radzić sobie z niepewnością przyszłości i zmierzają do wypracowania nowych odniesień oraz nowego układu znaczeń pomocnych we wskazaniu warunków, które muszą zostać spełnione, by człowiek mógł osiągnąć stan nadziei. W badaniach wykorzystano analizę teoretyczną, w tym koncepcje doświadczeń szczytowych stworzoną przez Abrahama Maslowa oraz koncepcję doświadczeń optymalnych wypracowaną przez Mihaly'ego Csikszentmihalyiego. Fenomen nadziei opisano ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem „procesu", którego jest ona rezultatem.

Słowa kluczowe: nadzieja, koncepcja doświadczeń szczytowych, Maslow, koncepcja doświadczeń optymalnych, Csikszentmihalyi, „przepływ"

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TO EXPRESS HOPE

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Halszka LELEŃ

ORCADIAN POETICS OF HOPE
Lyrical Dimensions and (Ex)tensions of the Topos in the Poetry of George Mackay Brown

The reality of Brown's poetic Orkney is very much alive with storytelling. The stories that are told or hinted at suggest the survival of ethical values and a symbolic view of life. This is the world of plentiful impressions and of simple hopes like the hope for a rich harvest. Wind is rendered as "the million whispers of fulfilment in the green ears." Even if the wishes and longings of the people are not directly expressed, they are very forcefully present in the indirect way, encoded in the visual traces of human acts of withstanding toil and hardship.

In the context of literary studies, hope has been defined as a tensional phenomenon conceivable through opposite forces to be found in literary texts, especially those rooted in the Christian system of values and in medieval romance tradition. Flo Keyes in *The Literature of Hope in the Middle Ages and Today* describes hope as "the result of the fundamental tension that inheres in romance literature, the tension between the real and the ideal…. This is true for the hero, for the world, for people's expectations, and for the story outcome. Hope, then, is part of the definition of each of these terms, hope that humankind will somehow find a way to be the best it is capable of being...."[1]

In philosophical terms, on the other hand, hope can be conceived after Søren Kierkegaard as "a reaction to nihilism," and "an experience and an interpretation of life." He names it "a specific form of self-transcendence." Most importantly, the philosopher argues that "Hope is striving for an image of the self that transcends the finitude of life," which is linked to the fact that hope provokes an attitude of "interpretation in which life appears in total and final clarity."[2] Both ways of understanding hope, the one rooted in the historical-literary tradition and the one derived from the above-mentioned philosophy, are relevant for viewing the realization of the literary topos of hope in the poetic output of George Mackay Brown (1921−1996), an Orkney poet, fiction writer, and dramatist. His *oeuvre* also reveals a very strong and at the

[1] Flo K e y e s, *The Literature of Hope in the Middle Ages and Today: Connections in Medieval Romance, Modern Fantasy and Science Fiction* (Jefferson, NC, and London: McFarland, 2006), 20.

[2] Quoted after Andreas Moe R a s m u s s e n, "Self, Hope, and the Unconditional: Kierkegaard on Faith and Hope," in: *Anthropology and Philosophy: Dialogues on Trust and Hope*, ed. Sune Liisberg, Esther Oluffa Pedersen, and Anne Line Dalsgård (New York and Oxford: Berghahn, 2015), 235.

same time very subtle (as deliberately kept low-key) influence of a Catholic conceptualization of hope as one of the three theological virtues, along with faith and caritas.

In fact, although the motif of hope seems central in Brown's writing, it has never been pointed out in Brown criticism that the works of this prominent Scottish poet are infused with various indirect and semi-direct realizations of this literary topos. It might be caused by the fact that hope is never named directly in his texts and, moreover, none of Brown's works can be said to be explicitly focused on it. However, the idea of hope defined as: (1) an enduring literary topos related to romance literature, (2) a concept defined by Christian existential philosophy, affecting Brown indirectly through the influence of Kierkegaard on European Romantic and modernist literatures, and (3) a Catholic theological virtue, can definitely be found as one of the basic patterns underlying the making of his fictional and poetic worlds. It can be detected in their constituents, such as the ideological and axiological spheres, in the character structures, and in the broadly understood narrative elements (e.g., conflicts, plot patterns, and others). Since it is impossible within the scope of an article to go through all the aspects of hope in the whole literary output of this prolific author of novels, short stories, essays, dramatic pieces, and poetry, I propose to initiate a scholarly discussion on the presence of hope in Brown's writing by observing some aspects of aesthetic techniques related to this topos in his poetic works. This choice is dictated by the fact that he is perhaps most remembered as an important Scottish poet. For sure, he is at the same time a grossly-overlooked, though in many respects major British and European writer of the second half of the twentieth century, and this justifies the argument that he needs much more critical attention in the field of Polish[3] and international criticism.

As for the Polish connections of Brown, it is worth noting that this Catholic poet was greatly moved by the fact of Karol Wojtyła, the poet of the same generation as himself, becoming Pope in 1978. Brown could sense the unique

[3] The number of translations of Brown's works into Polish is limited, although we can perhaps hope for a change in the situation of almost complete oblivion of Brown's *oeuvre* and of the void in this respect in the publishing market. It was in 1989 that a Polish poet and translator Andrzej Szuba rendered some of Brown's poetry into Polish in a selected poetry collection entitled *Antologia z Wyspy Fok*. With only 2,000 copies printed, the book, produced by the renowned Polish publisher Wydawnictwo Literackie (in the series *Humanum Est*), did not, unfortunately, reach any broad readership. It was nearly thirty years that Polish readers had to wait for two other of Brown's works to be translated into Polish by Michał Alenowicz, both published by Wiatr od Morza. Those were the novels *Winlandia* (2017) (*Vinland*) and *Nad oceanem czasu* (2019) (*Beside the Ocean of Time*). The choice seems very representative of Brown's prose, the more so that the latter work was shortlisted for the Booker Prize for the year 1994. See George Mackay B r o w n, *Beside the Ocean of Time* (London: John Murray, 1994).

combination of the two natures that he thought were redeeming for culture—the poet's and the saint's—in John Paul II. Brown's biographer Maggie Fergusson records the fact that "George had warmed to Karol Wojtyla ever since his election.... He felt him to be a truly good man, and it appealed to him that, like Rognvald Kolson, nephew of Saint Magnus and founder of St. Magnus Cathedral, this pope combined holiness with a love of climbing mountains, of skiing and, above all, of literature and poetry."[4] In saying this she formulates (or perhaps repeats after Brown) the comparison between the Pope and the Orkney saint-poet Rognvald—the nephew of another Orkney saint—Magnus.[5] Fergusson also gives insight into Brown's reaction to the first ever visit by the Pope to Scotland: "In May 1982, he hardly moved from his television during Pope John Paul's II visit to Britain.… As he watched John Paul II celebrate his open-air Mass for 70,000 young people in a rugby stadium in Edinburgh, he was overwhelmed with happiness."[6] Then she hastens to add Brown's exact words uttered in the excitement of the moment: "Such radiance, such goodness. Old and decrepit as I am, I wanted to shout for joy like the kids at Murrayfield."[7] This attitude of joy at seeing the poet-Pope being elected and coming to his country is surely something Brown adopted consciously, as his upbringing was strictly "anti-papist."[8]

To be able to fully comprehend the treatment of hope in Brown's poetry, we need to remember that his religious background was a hybrid one. He only converted to Catholicism in 1961, when he was in his forties. Catholicism, however, had inspired him for many years before his actual mature act of conversion took place, appealing to him through his literary readings and his search for truth. Brown was to a great degree inspired by the Catholic poetry of Gerard Manley Hopkins, as well as by the writings and poetry of St. John Henry Newman, another famous convert. Linden Bicket states that "Brown's creative imagination was fired" by the texts of Hopkins "throughout his life," leading to the development of Brown's concept of "art as sacrament."[9] In his

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[4] Maggie F e r g u s s o n, *George Mackay Brown: The Life* (London: John Murray, 2006), 249.

[5] Both of these medieval Orkney rulers were recognized as saints sometime after their deaths and they are venerated in the local Orkney and Northern European contexts as responsible for consolidating the Orkney sense of identity. St. Magnus did that by offering himself to die for peacemaking, and St. Rognvald by becoming the first Orkney poet, as well as by erecting the massive local cathedral so as to enshrine the relics of St. Magnus.

[6] F e r g u s s o n, *George Mackay Brown: The Life*, 249.

[7] Ibidem.

[8] Joseph P e a r c e, "Escape from a Puritan 'Wasteland,'" *Catholic Herald*, April 14, 2016, https://catholicherald.co.uk/issues/april-15th-2016/escape-from-a-puritan-wasteland/.

[9] Linden B i c k e t, *George Mackay Brown and the Scottish Catholic Imagination* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017), 39.

autobiography *For the Islands I Sing*, Brown himself admits it was Hopkins who inspired him to notice the divine in the ordinary: "Where does the glory come from, that streams forever through the firmament and the world of nature with its endless variety of creatures, and maintains them and keeps them in their courses, and has a keeping of them always, beginning to end? It comes from God; the marvellous bounty comes from God and belongs to the glory of God."[10] In the above quote, Brown emphasizes that the source the glory of creation is God himself, claiming that all his power can be perceived in the world of nature. The idea is evidently indebted to Hopkins' poem "Pied Beauty," where the reader is asked to join in the perception of universal splendor so as to give thanks together with the lyrical self: "Glory be to God for dappled things – / For skies of couple-colour as a brinded cow; / For rose-moles all in stipple upon trout that swim."[11] Brown's words seem to echo, in terms of their semantic impact as well as phrasing the opening of Hopkins' poem, without a verbatim repetition. He praises the glory that "streams forever through the firmament," with the admiration expressed for the "endless variety of creatures."

As for Newman's impact on the Orkney poet, Alison Gray asserts that:

> Learning much from Newman, Mackay Brown too adopted the "phenomenological attitude" that resonated strongly with the reactive ethos of the twentieth century. Newman saw far in advance of his time and was instrumental, along with others, in re-opening a prior period of history that now could emerge for further development. Mackay Brown's readings and re-readings of Newman's *Apologia* [gave him] confirmation of how one can be certain of the truth in one's inner world so marked by doubts and contradicted by one's own social surroundings. Like Newman, an initial vehement tone and hypersensitivity released energies that carried one forward.[12]

As a Brown scholar with background in theology, and privately the poet's long-time friend, Gray notices the crucial inspiration Brown derived from Newman's work that consisted in the defense of his religious beliefs. Brown needed this to face the impact of his social milieu consisting of people who were mostly lukewarm or cold in relation to Christian religious beliefs.

It was only after extended readings of Hopkins and Newman, and a lengthy period of considering the idea, that Brown finally asked to be baptized in the Catholic Church, thus renouncing the "lukewarm" Presbyterianism in which he was brought up,[13] the faith he practiced very loosely, following the example

[10] George Mackay B r o w n, *For the Islands I Sing: An Autobiography* (London: John Murray, 1997), 152.

[11] Gerard Manley H o p k i n s, "Pied Beauty," Poetry Foundation, https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/44399/pied-beauty.

[12] Alison G r a y, *George Mackay Brown: No Separation* (Leominster: Gracewing, 2016), 175.

[13] See P e a r c e, "Escape from a Puritan 'Wasteland.'"

of his "unconvinced" father,[14] who did not even care enough to baptize his children. Brown's embracing of the Church came with great joy on his part, caused particularly by the experience of the Eucharist and sacramental life, and this shocked his secular or Reformed family and friends.[15] The Christian joy coming from faith, hope, and caritas—the central virtues in the Church of which Brown now became part—marked his spiritual experience ever since his conversion. That joy did not leave him throughout his creative lifetime, providing source of support in times of personal crisis. He resorted to hope amid the turbulent depressive moods that he was prone to, and it helped him withstand the experience of human frailty caused by ill-health that troubled him throughout his lifetime following his youthful tuberculosis. In adult life, his sensitive reclusive nature also led him to fall into alcohol addiction, which he ultimately seems to have conquered. With its liturgy of the Mass, its rich symbolism and ritual, as well as its teaching of God's caritas coming with the regenerative power of sacraments, the Church became his resource of personal hope. He reworked all this artistically, but never too directly, into a Christian agrarian imagery of farming, fishing, and flock-tending, modified also by some cultural memory of pagan myths and legends, natural cycles, and northern elemental settings,[16] as well as tinted with the legacy of British regional writing represented by Thomas Hardy.[17] The offering of Christ is a recurring topic in his poetry, often described using archipelagic decorations, as in "Corpus Christi" (1993):

> And I was at the last hill
> When he was notched with five wounds
>
> I stayed to watch (unregarded)
> When Corpus Christi
> Was unhooked from the black wave
> And wrapped, dripping, in the death net
>
> When bread bakers and fishermen
> Came and lingered at dawn
> Beside the stone of time's ending.[18]

[14] See Ron F e r g u s o n, *George Mackay Brown: The Wound and the Gift* (Edinburgh: Saint Andrew Press, 2011).

[15] See F e r g u s s o n, *George Mackay Brown: The Life*, 142.

[16] See Rowena M u r r a y and Brian M u r r a y, *Interrogation of Silence: The Writings of George Mackay Brown* (London and Edinburgh: Steve Savage, 2004), 84.

[17] For a broader discussion of the topic, see Halszka L e l e ń, "Semiotics of Archipelago in George Mackay Brown's Narratives," in *Boundless Scotland: Space in Contemporary Scottish Fiction*, ed. Monika Szuba (Gdańsk: Gdańsk University Press, 2015), 143–4.

[18] George Mackay B r o w n, "Corpus Christi," in *The Collected Poems of George Mackay Brown*, ed. Archie Bevan and Brian Murray (London: John Murray, 2005), 315.

In the poem quoted above, an Orkney boy is a direct witness to the life of Jesus, including his crucifixion and his descent from the cross. The body of Christ is described here as getting "unhooked," as though Corpus Christi was an animal carcass, with the animal having been slaughtered for meat. The purpose of this grand offering is identified as giving peace to the local agricultural workers, as implied by the image of "bread bakers and fishermen [who] / Came and lingered at dawn." The suggestion of this being "time's ending" gives it a particular eschatological perspective.

All the universal, timeless, and at the same time semi-regional and recognizably historic patterns and influences are realized by Brown in a very unobtrusive, and yet semiotically very potent way. The above poem is characteristic for evoking the sense of pre-industrial Orkney, the archipelago as it was in the years preceding the Second World War, in the 1920s and 1930s of Brown's childhood and early youth. The above poem is also an example of Brown's ability to have disparate layers of history and culture converge. This is to some extent the ability that comes as very natural in the Orkney palimpsestic landscape. The universal quality of Brown's writing is evidently ensured by the poet's adhering to the timeless cycles of community work, such as baking bread, fishing, and farming, and by his evoking the natural cycles of human life: birth, death, and regeneration. The quoted poem uses all these motifs in reference to the religious dimension, which offers hope in the figure Jesus raised to life again through Resurrection. This grand topos is frequently represented through the more domestic and lowly motifs of distinctly Orkney character that are also deeply Christian, like the image of new lambs and spring daisies in the meadows in "Spring: the Kids of Feaquoy Farm." In this poem, the theological mysteries of Easter time are explained through an insight into the cycle of nature and the related cycle of farming in the countryside.

A figure with which Brown associated the above array of motifs was an Orkney saint, Magnus, to whom he turned in his private prayers and to whom he addressed many of his poems,[19] including those commemorating the feast of St. Magnus on 16th April, as "Songs for St Magnus Day," "St Magnus Day," and "St Magnus Day in the Island." He revealed in them the lyrical first person's hope for the saint's help in ordinary human affairs not just in Orkney but anywhere in the world. He asked St. Magnus in a very direct way, as can be seen in the following extract from "Song for St Magnus: 16 April": "friend, have a keeping / Of the shepherds on the hill / Whose ewes are having difficult

[19] Linden Bicket analyzes St. Magnus motif in Brown's writing in Chapter "Magnus." See B i c k e t, *George Mackay Brown and the Scottish Catholic Imagination*, 111–41. For the importance of St. Magnus for Brown, see also F e r g u s s o n, *George Mackay Brown: The Life*, 63.

birth / In the last snow."[20] The lyrical self develops this thought in part five of the seven-fold poem. By the end of this part, there is a sudden shift in the geographical setting and the focus is moved from the Orkney context into an African one. The speaker in the poem intercedes for the women in the countries impoverished by civil wars[21] in Europe and in Africa who work to provide sustenance to their families at the time of hunger: "Be present at the fires / Of women in Bosnia and Somalia / Kneading dough smaller than fists."[22] In another part of the poem, he asks St. Magnus to support Catholic priests, identifying their problems and their crucial role in the world: "Magnus, pray for priests / In this time of hate / (Never such hate and anger over the earth)."[23]

The words in parenthesis work as direct turn to the reader, as if to ask him or her to pray for the priests as well, which is left in the sphere of subtle implication. The lyrical self identifies the saint as a natural patron of priests because of what Magnus withstood as he waited overnight in the "kirk in Egilsay."[24] The poem shows a brief insight into the night of vigil before his martyrdom: "At dawn an old priest lit the paschal candle / *Introibo ad altare Dei.*"[25]

The fact that he finishes part VI of this poem with "*Introibo ad altare Dei*"—the opening fragment of the Tridentine Mass that translates into English as "I will go in to the altar of God," clearly implies the hope and power coming from attending the Eucharist. Jason Goroncy notes that the Eucharist was in the center of Brown's understanding of community and that it remained the core of his particular atemporal perception of time:

> Notions both of time and of community are in fact grounded in and sponsor, for Brown, a vision of creation deeply informed by a Christian vision of history; more specifically, a vision appraised in terms of the Eucharist.... It is the Eucharist, and the world appraised through its eyes, that forms a community in the ways that Brown imagines, and that counters the possibility of "finding symbolic resonance in the present" apart from the community's own history and its hopes for the future.[26]

Brown was, however, very cautious not to be overtly pressing or direct in transmitting this experience of Catholic faith and Christian hope to his readers.

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[20] George Mackay B r o w n, "Song for St Magnus: 16 April," in *The Collected Poems of George Mackay Brown*, 403.

[21] The poem was first published in 1999, at the time when the impact of wars could be felt in particular in Bosnia and Somalia, resulting in massive humanitarian crises.

[22] George Mackay B r o w n, "Song for St Magnus: 16 April," 403.

[23] Ibidem, 404.

[24] Ibidem.

[25] Ibidem.

[26] See Jason G o r o n c y, "The Catholicity of Time in the Work of George Mackay Brown," *Pacifica: Australasian Theological Studies* 29, no. 1 (2016): 22–44.

When he describes the Eucharist, he talks about it in very simple, everyday terms, as in the poem "The Doors of Death":

> A poor man sat at my board.
> He broke the bread into blessings.
> …
>
> Who takes plough to the lord's glebe?
> Lord or labourer,
> It is man sets out on the long road
> The Inn of the Cornstalk.[27]

As it can be seen in the above excerpt, Brown relies on the power of a symbolic use of signs. The words like "bread," "blessings," "lord," "labourer," "long road," and "the Inn of the Cornstalk" can be associated with Christian spiritual existence. Sacramental life is in many other poems suggested by images of dough, seed, wine, salt, fish, ploughing, sowing, flailing, and many more. All these appear very prominently, but never too obviously, in his poetry and prose.[28]

Brown's understanding of his creative mission in terms of vocation or obligation to the people of his community and to the world at large can be seen as encoded in his stylistics. His poems reveal an absolutely non-obtrusive use of Christian and universal mythical symbolism that allows his style and his use of aesthetic devices to be very thrifty, often runic in effect.[29] The reader is invariably made to recognize the evoked stories that point to central human values. In this, Brown is a truly Catholic writer who seems to undertake and realize the Christian conception of the role of literature as expressed in Section 62 of the Constitution *Gaudium et Spes*, which he might have read or, at least, could have heard about:

> Literature and the arts are also, in their own way, of great importance…. They strive to make known the proper nature of man, his problems and his experiences…. They have much to do with revealing man's place in history and in the world; with illustrating the miseries and joys, the needs and strengths of man…. Thus they are able to elevate human life, expressed in multiple forms according to various times and regions.[30]

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[27] George Mackay B r o w n, "The Doors of Death," in *The Collected Poems of George Mackay Brown*, 448–9.

[28] See Anna W ę g r z y n i a k o w a, „Browna poezja ku czci chleba," in *Antologia z wyspy fok*, trans. Andrzej Szuba (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1989), 143–4.

[29] See Rasa R u s e c k i e n ė, "That Rune Will Unlock Time's Labyrinth...: Old Norse Themes and Motifs in George Mackay Brown's Poetry," *Scandinavistica Vilnensis*, no. 14 (2019): 116–7.

[30] Second Vatican Council, "Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World *Gaudium et Spes*" promulgated by His Holiness Pope Paul VI on December 7, 1965, Section 62.

Looking at the aesthetic and ethical patterns of Brown's poetry, it is very clear that he was trying to accomplish exactly the kind of task delineated above. He was constantly trying to elevate the Orkney way of living and to acknowledge the dignity of the people of the north, who spend their lives among their "miseries and joys."[31] He was striving to fortify them against the storms of the contemporary world by tentatively suggesting the existence of the rock of faith, hope, and caritas. He implied that these three values are redeeming in nature, and used them as catalyst factors which help reveal the essence behind world phenomena. Writing was Brown's way of indicating the values the generalized northern community and individuals should try to regain. With the condensed symbolic poetics of his works, he was tempting his readers to consider Christian hope, along with faith and caritas, as the sources of Orkney and Northern European culture. In all this he was never too sentimental, opting rather for the symbolic-naturalistic patterns of the troubles of life redeemed by rare moments of joy. This is, as it seems, the core of his understanding of hope, as well as being the essence of his faith-fortified, spiritual and poetic attitudes.

One might well ask why Brown was doing that. Why was he seeking for the sources of hope and ways of fortifying faith? The answer may be found in a broader reflection on how literature of post-romance origin uses the topos of hope. In *The Literature of Hope in the Middle Ages and Today*, Keyes argues: "If the world around one is a happy, healthy world, one need not search for ways to heal it or change it. Hope is not needed until the world falls short of our needs."[32] This is precisely the kind of thinking which seems to emanate from Brown's works focused on hope. His creative output is the response to the contemporary loss of meaning and undermining of values, and a remedy for the crisis of understanding the place of man in the scheme of things. Due to his negative assessment of the departure from the previous, tradition-established ways of life, Brown tries to actively counterbalance the negative impact of progress. He resorts to the time-established mission of the poet and the man of letters—the artist of the word—consisting in a restoration of the sense of identity. In all his poetry and elsewhere, he shows the rays of hope rooted in traditional community life that comes into contact with the elements. A crucial part of his aesthetic strategy is evoking the northern nations' history, with tentative emphasis on the paradigms of the prevailing life and of natural balance. He draws richly on the cultural legacy of Neolithic Orkney, Old Norse literature, Icelandic sagas, *The Orkneyinga Saga*, traditional Scottish ballads, and others, taking them as the prevailing model for composing the poetic or

[31] Ibidem.

[32] K e y e s, *The Literature of Hope in the Middle Ages and Today*, 21.

fictional worlds based on duality of "the concrete and abstract, the mundane and sacred."[33]

The confirmation of the above tendencies in his writing can be found in many written-down recollections of Brown's friends. In her biography of the poet, entitled *The Seed Beneath the Snow*, Joanna Ramsey recalls Brown's mature views of the role of poetry, which she heard directly from him in the last decade of his life.

> George went on to explain his view of the true purpose of poetry: "to enable us to come to terms with those powers that cannot be denied, that surround us wherever we turn." Poetry, he believed, has the power to reconstruct the way in which we see and experience the world: "The Furies ... are transfigured, they become the kindly ones, the powers we have feared have been our friends always. But this knowledge doesn't come easily or too soon."[34]

This reminiscence shows the poet's understanding of literature as a source of hope, found in the practical realization of the artist's program of creative life. However, one can also sense here some traces of a double ethical as well as phenomenological understanding of creative hope. This is the dual understanding that can be derived from modern ontology and epistemology. One might associate it with the philosophical argument which Brown might not have known directly, but of which, being the man of his times, he might have had an intuition: "Hope [can be considered] as the basis for the condition that has, since Heidegger, come to be known as *Dasein*, the unique being-in-the-world of self-conscious being."[35] To Brown, this sort of being-in-the-world is connected with culture and with nature, which nourishes this culture. He does not yield to modern pessimism but instead works on regenerating culture by returning to its roots. In this, he appears to be deeply Catholic and religious, as he seems to follow another intuition grasped in *Gaudium et Spes*. The gist of the idea omnipresent in Brown's poetry is expressed by the title of the relevant chapter of the document, namely, "Proper Development of Culture." The same message is even more extensively delineated in Section 53: "Man comes to a true and full humanity only through culture, that is through the cultivation of the goods and values of nature. Wherever human life is involved, therefore, nature and culture are quite intimately connected one with the other."[36]

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[33] R u s e c k i e n ė, "That Rune Will Unlock Time's Labyrinth...": 117.

[34] Joanna R a m s a y, *The Seed Beneath the Snow: Remembering George Mackay Brown* (Dingwall: Sandstone Press, 2015), 72.

[35] Nancy B i l l i a s, "Hope as a Moral Virtue," in *The Resilience of Hope*, ed. Janette McDonald and Andrea M. Stephenson (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2010), 22.

[36] *Gaudium et Spes*, Section 53.

This intuition can be found both in Brown's poetic texts and elsewhere, explaining the incessant focus of Brown's poetry, fiction, and drama on the culture-established and nature-inspired cycles of rural, farming, and fishing life. The expression for which the author opts is highly patterned and organized, being also very "minimalistic" and operating with "static images as if preserved for eternity."[37] His obsessions are calendar poems, cycle poems, seven-fold poems, poems based on the number twelve, which make it possible to observe the cycle of life in the natural world. He never forgets the human dimension, though, and his primary focus is always the individual experience of the phenomena taking place in the natural world.

In his poems, the Orkney farming and marine reality are connected to hope despite the dark aspects of life, such as death in childbirth, or death at sea, or the toils of a tinker's struggle for survival. This is the essence of Mackay Brown's understanding of human life, described in his archipelagic life stories. Among frequent pictures of figuratively represented human hope, there are the poetic scenes of women standing on the shore—either waiting for the return of the sailors, or peacefully contemplating their failure to return. An example of such a text is "The Old Women," which traces the scornful reactions of old village women to the drunkenness of the lyrical self. The poem ends with showing their tears shed at the death of a young sailor.[38]

A composite poem "Haiku: for The Holy Places," included in the posthumous collection *Travellers* published in 2001, interprets the Orkney reality of "hills half-sunk in the sea"[39] by means of a compassionate and hopeful perspective, pointing to the redeeming goodness of people amidst hardships characteristic of this location. The part of this poem entitled "The Northern Sky" is rendered through the imagery of contrastive "poles of light and darkness."[40] "Sea and cliffs," described further on, are compared to an artistic individual who seems to be both a sculptor and a poet: "Sea, old sculptor, carves from the western ramparts / Stack and cave and skerry, / Sweep harpist, with sagas of salt and stone."[41]

The pictures of stability get combined in images of life and death. The kirkyard is described along with the kirk as "always by the shore," while the tombstones are suggested to tell "The legends of the dead, their carved names

[37] R u s e c k i e n ė, "That Rune Will Unlock Time's Labyrinth...": 117.

[38] See George Mackay B r o w n, "The Old Women," in *The Collected Poems of George Mackay Brown*, 460.

[39] George Mackay B r o w n, "Haiku: for The Holy Places," in *The Collected Poems of George Mackay Brown*, 460.

[40] Ibidem.

[41] Ibidem.

/ Faced east, into first light, among sea sounds."[42] The geographical direction of east is here symbolically used to represent the Holy Land. This spiritual location, as the spatial context for the poem's semantic sphere, is also strongly suggested by the title of the sequence of haiku-like verses.

The reality of Brown's poetic Orkney is very much alive with storytelling. The stories that are told or hinted at suggest the survival of ethical values and a symbolic view of life. This is the world of plentiful impressions and of simple hopes like the hope for a rich harvest. Wind is rendered as "the million whispers of fulfilment in the green ears."[43] Even if the wishes and longings of the people are not directly expressed, with the saga-like poetics of restrained emotions, they are very forcefully present in the indirect way, encoded in the visual traces of human acts of withstanding toil and hardship. This much can be seen in the part of the poem "Haiku: for The Holy Places" entitled "Island Faces." The lyrical evocation of the contrast between the countenances of the farming and fishing folk is reconciled through the shared feature of stoicism visible on all the faces. Hope is also implied by the fact that people agree to be changed by the elements and yet constantly look ahead:

Island Faces
Many masks merge here, in an island face—
Pict, Norseman, Scot
Face of a crofter, gnawed with loam
Face of fishermen, seaman—
Gray of the sea, eyes level as horizons.[44]

Describing the face of a typical islander, the poet uses the concept of multiple masks, which becomes the image of intercultural convergence. It situates Orkney in the middle of a glocal (i.e., global and, at the same time, local), temporally suspended yet also constantly changing macrocosm, which is at the same time depicted as an insular microcosm. It shows the glocal culture which looks ahead of time hoping for survival, while it is deeply immersed in its complex, many-strand history. Another example of an image of hope working through the steadfast waiting and dynamic action is encoded in the image of seabirds at the cliff:

Fishing Bird
It waits, rock-fast, wind-flung
Wing-wind-enthirling
One flash from the sea's hoard.[45]

[42] Ibidem.
[43] Ibidem.
[44] Ibidem, 461.
[45] Ibidem.

We can see here that whenever Brown describes nature, it is clear that the sense of the image exceeds that of the element of natural wildlife although it also surely comprises it. As Dominique Delmaire asserts:

> Brown declares early on in his career that he belongs with those Orkney writers—poets, in fact—that are "interested in essences." For him, thanks to poetry one can "look on life as it was viewed, perhaps, by an angel's eye, *sub specie aeternitatis*,"[46] thus glimpsing what the abbot in *The Voyage of Saint Brandon* calls "a divine order and pattern beyond the range of the five human senses."[47] But, in order to achieve this, the poet must become a demiurge in miniature.[48]

In defining Orkney as a holy place Brown creates a multifarious and multi-faced reality structured so as to point to the eschatological dimension of human life. The reality in question is conceived in universal terms and it evokes the sacred. We can see how another section of the poem "Haiku: for The Holy Places" defines Orkney people in terms of biblical imagery. Brown applies the same set of images that Jesus used in his parables to explain the essential truths of human life to his disciples. Here those images serve to convey the sense of archipelagic, glocal, but also universal identity of man and his place in quotidian life:

> *Fishermen and Crofters*
> They hold the keys to earth and ocean,
> Earth-key the plough;
> Sea-opener, the net and sinker....[49]

In Brown's *oeuvre*, the storytelling in the poems has a compact, runic, and heraldic quality, while the narrative of a human life is conveyed through the tell-tale every-day objects used in apparently static but ultimately symbolic, dynamic ways. These are elements such as "keys," "plough," "net," "sinker," "corn," "fish," or "doors." All of them entail some action, some ritual, some rite of passage. The doors close and open, the corn is produced and eaten, the fish is caught and shared. Brown's way of telling these truths of life relies on making a strong contact with a common reader, the addressee that he envisaged for his poetry from the start of his career, as he stated in an early collection of

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[46] Quoted after George Mackay B r o w n, *An Orkney Tapestry* (London: Quartet Books, 1973), 160.

[47] Quoted after George Mackay B r o w n, *The Voyage of Saint Brandon*: *Three Plays* (London: Chatto & Windus and Hogarth Press, 1984), 146.

[48] Dominique D e l m a i r e, "Rhythm as Spiritual Pursuit in the Poetry of George Mackay Brown," *Études britanniques contemporaines*, no. 39 (2010), https://journals.openedition.org/ebc/2805?lang=en#entries.

[49] George Mackay B r o w n, "Haiku: for The Holy Places," 461.

poems *Loaves and Fishes* (1954). He confessed in a letter to a friend that he intended his poetry to "be simple and forthright and such as a crofter or a fisherman would read and remember with pleasure."[50] In the poems, the readers are confronted with the rudimentary stages of the cycle of life. The characters are shown coming into the archipelagic world or departing from this world, while the aim of their lives and deaths is not directly commented upon, but implied. Invariably, people are heading to some larger, possibly heavenly, reality, while the supposition is kept very low-key in terms of wording, as in the section of the poem "Haiku: for The Holy Places" entitled "Fishermen and Crofters":

> Seventy years nourished with corn and fish,
> They open the mysterious door,
> Go, most into earth,
> a few through the door of the sea.
> They gain the richness of man through the elements.[51]

Although death is shown going "into earth" or "through the door of sea," the suggestion is of this being part of a larger human journey. Hope for the spiritual reality and abundant life is thus expressed, while the life on earth is shown just as a stage on the way there, as suggested by the phrase "they gain the richness." The hardships of life, epigrammatically rendered as "the elements," are thus perceived with the hopeful attitude for their positive ultimate sense.

In shaping his poetic pictures of Orkney community, Brown artistically revives and symbolically reinterprets the Northern European Christian tradition. The legacy of culture is what he sees as the source of hope for the secularized modern world. Brown seems to take on the responsibility of "the artisan of culture of [his] community,"[52] which is a crucial element of the teaching of the Second Vatican Council. When talking to his family and friends about his own occupation, the poet often described himself as a craftsman of the word, comparing himself to a maker of tables.[53] This comparison was not a way of downgrading himself. It revealed his attitude to literature as providing spiritual and (meta)physical sustenance.

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[50] George Mackay B r o w n, Letter to Ernest W. Marwick, January 12, 1954, Kirkwall Library Archive, D31/30/4, quoted after Dominique D e l m a i r e, "The Subject and his Stories: Lyricality in the Narrative Poetry of George Mackay Brown," *Temporel: revue littéraire et artistique*, May 10, 2012, http://temporel.fr/The-Subject-and-his-Stories.

[51] Ibidem.

[52] *Gaudium et Spes*, Section 55.

[53] As remembered by Fraser Dixon and Alison Gray, revealed in conversations with the author of this article in February 2016.

Notably, the combined aesthetic and spiritual treatment of the topos of hope results from Brown's early recognition of the regenerative mission of a poet. He went as far as to suggest that this mission is similar to that of a saint. In his thinking, the two figures can and should work to rebuild the broken foundations of community life. The poem "Prologue," which opens *The Storm*, his first poetic volume of 1954, formulates this idea long before his formal conversion, demonstrating that some of his ideas germinated throughout his lifetime. In "Prologue," Brown expresses the hope that a poet and a saint—represented as a kind of tandem of spiritual workers—can rebuild the ruin the Scottish nation and Orkney has come to through the impact of certain religious reformers. Short as it is, "Prologue" seems to be Brown's anticipatory projection of numerous themes and concerns from his future writing, providing a sort of program-defining statement.[54] Apart from pinpointing his focus as his homeland—the archipelagic reality of the Orkney Islands—it redefines the poet's identity in terms of his role for the community in which he lives. Only then does he state his larger-scale mission for the whole of Scotland. In his confession of why he engages in poetic acts, named as "singing," the lyrical self is all the time universal, as demonstrated by his choice of wording. He suggests establishing connections with different groups of people so as to provide them with aesthetic pleasure and to inspire them with spiritual hopes for a potential regeneration. Thus his poetry offers an insight into the essence of the modern crisis of culture.[55] All the time, his voice is exceedingly patterned, and highly rhythmical in effect, the two features which will always remain the indication of the "divine order"[56] in Brown's poetry:

> For the islands I sing,
> and for a few friends;
> not to foster means
> or be midwife to ends.
>
> For workers in field
> and mill and mine
> who break earth's bread
> and crush her wine.[57]

[54] Archie B e v a n and Brian M u r r a y, "Introduction," in *The Collected Poetry of George Mackay Brown*, xii.

[55] This crisis of culture, as Rowena Murray and Brian Murray show, has been an ongoing concern for Brown, who tried to counteract it, the way he could and on the scale he thought appropriate, with his writing. See M u r r a y and M u r r a y, *Interrogation of Silence*, 124–5.

[56] See D e l m a i r e, "Rhythm as Spiritual Pursuit."

[57] George Mackay B r o w n, "Prologue," in *The Collected Poems of George Mackay Brown*, 1.

While the poet expresses here his personal obligation of singing for his friends, he hastens to add his hope for influencing other groups. They are people engaged in physical work of various types, named through a deeply biblical, symbolic imagery of farmers and workers producing the Eucharistic signs: bread and wine. The symbolic connection of wine to the Christian story of the Incarnation and the Redemption is clear as in Scotland wine is not a typical regional product. This makes bread and wine signs of hope resonant with the universal sacramental image of salvation, as well as pointing to the realization of the human mission of caritas through labor.[58] When the lyrical first person ultimately states, "For Scotland I sing," he shows his intention to be a voice heard everywhere. He hopes to have an impact on the nation he finds physically, culturally, and—implicitly—spiritually ruined:

> For Scotland I sing,
> the Knox-ruined nation,
> that poet and saint
> must rebuild with their passion.[59]

Although it seems like Brown is here strongly against the Reformation as a whole, it is rather the expression of his particular scepticism about the universally positive impact of John Knox on Scottish culture. Brown's attitude was inspired by his teacher and friend Edwin Muir,[60] another Scottish modernist poet of Orkney origin.

As Brown's life in the Orkney community demonstrated, he worked as its cultural convenor, inspiring many artists and people broadly connected with culture to come to Orkney or even to settle there. Ever since its founding in 1977 by a group of his friends and himself, he would invite some renowned poets and writers to the St. Magnus Festival. Brown was also a mentor to poets of a younger generation, such as Alastair Mackie (1925–1995), Alan Spence (born 1947), and Alan Riach (born 1957), to name but a few. Many of them recall, with warm feelings, the fact that it was enough to write a letter to him, sending some early poetry, and come over to tea when visiting Orkney, without arranging the date for the visit.[61] Rowena Murray and Brian Murray

[58] See *Gaudium et Spes*, Section 45.

[59] George Mackay B r o w n, "Prologue," 1.

[60] See Edwin M u i r, *John Knox: Portrait of a Calvinist* (New York: Viking Press, 1929); see also F e r g u s o n, *George Mackay Brown: The Wound and the Gift*.

[61] Alan Riach mentioned it in a conversation with the author of this article in February 2016. In a conversation of May 2014, Alan Spence shared his moment of visiting Brown without prior notice: the then budding poet was "introduced just by knocking at his door." Both poets remember Brown's kind words of encouragement and the older colleague's sound, but gently expressed criticism. Riach and Spence have become very influential Scottish poetic voices.

claim that Brown's writing actually boosted tourism in Orkney: "Like Scott, Wordsworth and Burns, Brown created an industry of visitors to the places he described imaginatively; tourists have been drawn by the descriptions of a creative writer."[62]

Brown was indeed very open and, one can say, ecumenical in his personal contacts as well as influences. The effect he had indeed spread far and wide, as can be exemplified by the friendship he made with Sir Peter Maxwell Davies (1934–2016), the Master of the Queen's Music (2004–2010), as well as the friendship with the Church of Scotland Minister Ron Ferguson. We can see an example of the power of his works to affect people in the fact that *An Orkney Tapestry* was the chief reason for Maxwell Davies moving to Orkney in 1971. The world-famous composer settled in an Atlantic-facing traditional croft in the valley of Rackwick on Hoy as he got fascinated with the location after reading Brown's text overnight. Maxwell Davies, who was an atheist, later on composed many works to the texts by Brown, for instance the chamber opera *The Martyrdom of St Magnus* (which premiered in 1977), inspired by Brown's novel *Magnus* (1973).[63] A similar spiritual influence is remembered by Ron Ferguson, Brown's biographer, in *George Mackay Brown: The Wound and the Gift*. Ferguson acknowledges that while coming, with his family, in 1990, to take over services in St. Magnus Cathedral, he was filled with doubts and fears. He states that he found faith and support that he needed in Brown's poetry: "Will the hushed congregation want me to believe *for* them? Can I even believe for myself? Probably, yes, with a bit of help from the poets. Maybe even from the bard of Stromness himself."[64] Brown's writing evidently gave people hope.

The body of Brown's writing shows that he perceived his mission to work on recovering the world of lost values as the job of rebuilding the community through the little ones. In Brown's numerous works, the central compositional principle is that of drawing the reader's attention to the rejected men. He shows reverence for them, elevates their stance, reveals some faith in them, or at least hope for a change in their situation, be it upon their death. This is so in the poem "The Death Bird,"[65] which shows a contrast between the rich grocer and the local drunkard Peero, only to imply the elevation of the poor. The death of the unfortunate one is announced by a lark's singing "wildly

[62] M u r r a y and M u r r a y, *Interrogation of Silence*, 62.

[63] See Peter M. D a v i e s, "Pax Orcadiensis," in *Selected Writings by Peter Maxwell Davies*, ed. Nicholas Jones (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 127–8.

[64] See F e r g u s o n, *George Mackay Brown: The Wound and the Gift*.

[65] For a more extensive discussion of the poem in question, as well as of the patterns of the little objects and little people, see Halszka L e l e ń, "(Nie)świętość rzeczy najmniejszych a aksjologia codzienności w *Antologii z wyspy fok* George'a Mackaya Browna," in *Święci i świętość w języku, literaturze i kulturze*, ed. Halszka Leleń and Tomasz Żurawlew (Kraków: Universitas, 2018), 325–6.

cheering / Peero's sweet translation / From ratflesh to light."[66] Brown seems to be realizing what *Gaudium et Spes* advocates in Section 27, namely taking the attitude of "reverence for men": "Everyone must consider his every neighbour without exception as another self, taking into account first of all His life and the means necessary to living with dignity, so as not to imitate the rich man who had no concern for the poor man Lazarus."[67]

Earlier in the same text, in the chapter entitled "The Dignity of the Human Person," it is made clear that "the mystery of man" may be realized only "in the mystery of the incarnate word." This association is called "taking on light. For Adam, the first man, was a figure of Him Who was to come, namely Christ the Lord."[68] This is accomplished by Brown in his choice of the metaphors of the agrarian, rural type to describe the common everyday toil of archipelagic community and transpose their hardships into the reality of the parables of Jesus.[69] We can see this quasi-parabolic, universalizing tendency reflected in Brown's numerous poems, such as "Beachcomber," "Tinker's Wife," and "Halcro," where the poet's focus is the weak and the rejected by the community. The poet draws attention to the people of the lowest levels of the archipelagic social ladder through exploring their little hopes and moments of existential and spiritual delight. We can see this principle at work in the poem "A Child's Calendar," which enumerates the seasonal glimpses of Orkney community life and landscape from the little one's perspective, only to relate them all to the story of the Incarnation:

> Nothing in November
> But tinkers at the door, kenning, with cans.
>
> Some December midnight
> Christ, lord, lie warm in our byre.
> Here are stars, an ox, poverty enough.[70]

The imagery of the birth of Jesus is indeed a frequent topos applied figuratively in Brown's writing.[71] His poems recreate the sensory impressions experienced by some little characters of archipelagic Orkney, while they also evoke

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[66] George Mackay B r o w n, "The Death Bird," *The Collected Poems of George Mackay Brown*, 26.

[67] *Gaudium et Spes*, Section 27.

[68] Ibidem, Section 22.

[69] See W ę g r z y n i a k o w a, *Browna poezja ku czci chleba*, 146.

[70] George Mackay B r o w n, "A Child's Calendar," in *The Collected Poems of George Mackay Brown*, 123.

[71] It has been discussed by Linden Bicket in Chapter Five, "The Nativity of Christ," of her monograph. See B i c k e t, *George Mackay Brown and the Scottish Catholic Imagination*, 142–74.

the universalized reality of numerous Nativity scenes. A frequent technique is recalling the petty trials and tribulations of life in the islands, as in the poem "Themes" from the 1959 collection *Loaves and Fishes*. In this poem, Brown connects the archetypal figures of tinkers, women waiting for the sailors on the shore, and ploughmen working in the field, thus creating a composite picture of endurance. The imagery is clearly Christian and biblical. It is rich in allegorical and symbolic overtones evoked by simple concepts, such as "corn," "love," "birth," "death," the "sea," and the "earth." The text is focused on showing the mounting of multi-sensory images:

> Tinker themes cry through
> The closes of my breath—
> Straw and tapestry shaken
> With kennings of love and birth;
> Odyssean corn returning
> Across furrows of death;
> Women scanning the sea;
> Ploughmen wounding the earth.[72]

The poetic picture of the world suggests the hope that words can grasp to reproduce the essence of the experience of the reality. One can clearly see here the logocentric focus of Brown as a poet and writer who always strives to grasp the experience through the poetic means of textual organization. The range of phonetic devices he employs is impressive without ever being overwhelming. The use of the local color of the island (evocations of tinkers, women and ploughmen engaged in everyday toil which serves survival through such activities as breathing and eating, giving birth, and dying) is framed so as to draw attention to the making of words, the essence of *logopoeia*, according to Greek etymology of the term. Thus Brown's poems suggest meanings related to hope and endurance, at the same time representing them in the phenomenological and aesthetic way.

Looking at the above examples, we can find in Brown's works an understanding of hope close to the Catholic reflection on this value present in the teaching of John Paul II. Brown finds and affirms hope in the world as if noting that "creation is permeated with a redemptive sanctification, even a divinization."[73] One might go as far as to say that Brown, like the Pope that he admired so much, seems to cherish "*the fundamental affirmation of the value of existence, the value of creation and of hope in the future life* [which]

[72] George Mackay B r o w n, "Themes," in *The Collected Poems of George Mackay Brown*, 21.

[73] J o h n P a u l II, *Crossing the Threshold of Hope*, ed. Vittorio Messori (New York: Knopf, 2005), 22.

is neither a naïve joy, nor a vain hope."[74] This is the way Pope John Paul II conceptualized hope in *Crossing the Threshold of Hope*. Brown's way of describing hope inherent in the archipelagic existence is definitely Christian and Catholic without his ever stating the fact more openly. It is very consistent with the argument that underlies the Pastoral Constitution *Gaudium et Spes*, which is clear when we look at the opening paragraph of this document. It specifies that the hope of common people is connected with the troubles of daily existence and the indelible precariousness of life. These difficult aspects are identified as the center of the attitude of solidarity of the followers of Jesus towards humanity:

> The joys and the hopes, the griefs and the anxieties of the men of this age, especially those who are poor or in any way afflicted, these are the joys and hopes, the griefs and anxieties of the followers of Christ. Indeed, nothing genuinely human fails to raise an echo in their hearts. For theirs is a community composed of men. United in Christ, they are led by the Holy Spirit in their journey to the Kingdom of their Father and they have welcomed the news of salvation which is meant for every man. That is why this community realizes that it is truly linked with mankind and its history by the deepest of bonds.[75]

As a member of the Orkney community as well as a European poet conscious of his mission, Brown cherished hope in the crucial identity-shaping role of literature, poetry, and narrative. He conceived this as the realization of the aesthetically shaped and aesthetically responsible ancient art of storytelling. It seems that with his work he was trying to give Orkney and Northern European culture and people a sense of identity, as well as to establish and consolidate their sense of belonging, and thus to (re)instill hope.

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[74] Ibidem. Emphasis in the text.

[75] *Gaudium et Spes*, Section 1.

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ABSTRACT / ABSTRAKT

Halszka LELEŃ, Orcadian Poetics of Hope: Lyrical Dimensions and (Ex)tensions of the Topos in the Poetry of George Mackay Brown

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The article overviews the literary topos of hope in the poetic works of major Scottish Catholic writer George Mackay Brown (1921–1996). It turns out that hope, conceived as a theological virtue, determines the underlying patterns of his literary worlds, although Mackay never made it overexplicit or an obvious conclusion for his readers to draw. Rather than directly speak of faith and of the joy of hope that faith brings, Brown opted for the indirect frames of narrating the poetic stories of individual and community ascent and demise, followed by regeneration. His lyrical visions of Orkney archipelagic communities are made universal by focusing on the cycles of human life, represented by birth, toil, and death, often described as entering some further "door." The use of Gospels-rooted plain imagery of farming and fishing makes it possible for the poems to touch upon the fundamental truths of human life and to infuse them with the Christian system of beliefs. In foregrounding this aspect, Brown gently conducts his poetic and ethical mission of working for the benefit of his archipelagic homeland, for Scotland, and for humanity in general. Inspired by Gerald Manley Hopkins and St. John Henry Newman, he seems to have launched upon the mission of reviving the sense of union of the whole creation so as to counter the modern crisis of culture. Brown's imagery of hope and faith can also be set against the Catholic teaching on hope expressed in the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World *Gaudium et Spes* and in the book *Crossing the Threshold of Hope* by John Paul II, whom Brown greatly admired. In Brown's poetic world, art has a sacramental dimension and it can therefore inspire people with hope. At the same time, hope is represented as a virtue which can be found in the most unlikely and poorly facets of individual and communal life. Brown finds glory and hope in the world of everyday work and scarcity. His lyrical evocations get their energy from the juxtaposition of some fundamental signs, highlighted by a sparing use of poetic devices. He frequently operates with runic compactness and saga-like emotional restraint. With the use of the technique of understatement, the idea of hope that permeates the life of an individual and the community among the common daily hardships is all the more powerful and persuasive for the reader who is encouraged to play an active role in searching for the dispersed textual signs.

Keywords: Catholic and universal dimensions of hope, Scottish archipelagic poetry, poetic vision of Orcadian life patterns, George Mackay Brown

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Halszka LELEŃ, Orkadyjska poetyka nadziei. Liryczne wymiary i napięcia toposu w wybranej poezji George'a Mackay'a Browna
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Artykuł bada wielowymiarową realizację toposu nadziei w utworach poetyckich jednego z ważniejszych szkockich pisarzy katolickich George'a Mackay'a Browna (1921-1996). W szczegółowym oglądzie okazuje się, że u Browna nadzieja rozumiana w duchu nauczania Kościoła katolickiego (jako cnota teologiczna) jest podstawą wielu estetycznych uporządkowań i zabiegów w obrębie konstrukcji świata lirycznego. Nigdy jednak nadzieja nie jest ukazywana w sposób zbyt natarczywy dla w dużej mierze protestanckich i ateistycznych czytelników dzieł poety. Zamiast mówić otwarcie o wierze i o radości płynącej z nadziei, którą wiara przynosi, Brown wybiera niebezpośrednie sposoby snucia poetyckich narracji o indywidualnych i wspólnotowych wzlotach i upadkach, przy czym upadki są nieodmiennie drogą do jakiegoś odrodzenia. W poezji Browna liryczne wizje archipelagu Orkadów i jego wspólnot są przy tym ujmowane jako uniwersalne. Zostaje to osiągnięte poprzez liczne odwołania do cyklu ludzkiego życia, na który składają się narodziny, trudy istnienia i śmierć, często ukazywana jako przejście przez jakieś kolejne „drzwi". Użycie prostych, nawiązujących do życia rolników i rybaków, znaków i symboli, zaczerpniętych z preindustrialnych realiów wyspiarskich, jak i z tekstów Ewangelii, sprawia, że wiersze te dotykają fundamentalnych prawd ludzkiego życia i pozwalają naświetlić je za pośrednictwem chrześcijańskiego systemu przekonań i wartości. Poprzez uwypuklenie tych elementów Brown realizuje wizję misji nie tylko poetyckiej, ale też etycznej – pracy dla dobra swego archipelagicznego społeczeństwa, dla Szkocji i dla szeroko pojętej ludzkości. Czerpiąc inspirację z poezji Gerarda Manleya Hopkinsa i św. Johna Henry'ego Newmana, Brown podejmuje swego rodzaju poetycką misję odzyskania, czy też uzyskania, poetyckiego zjednoczenia całego stworzenia, tak aby przeciwdziałać współczesnemu kryzysowi kultury. Sposób, w jaki Brown wykorzystuje topos nadziei i motyw wiary, daje się przy tym zestawić z nauczaniem o nadziei wyrażonym w Konstytucji duszpasterskiej o Kościele w świecie współczesnym *Gaudium et spes* oraz w książce *Przekroczyć próg nadziei* Jana Pawła II. W poetyckiej wizji Browna poezja nabiera swego rodzaju wymiaru sakramentalnego i ma za zadanie inspirować ludzi nadzieją. Brown przedstawia nadzieję jako życiodajną wartość, którą odnaleźć można w najmniejszych i najmniej spektakularnych elementach życia wspólnotowego i jednostkowego.

Słowa kluczowe: katolickie i uniwersalne wymiary nadziei, szkocka poezja archipelagiczna, poetycka wizja życia na Orkadach, George Mackay Brown

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Ferdi McDERMOTT

"THE FAITH I LOVE BEST IS HOPE"
Perspectives of Hope from Charles Péguy

The young girl, Hope, leads the more august pair of Faith and Charity into the light. For Péguy, Hope is also playful and energetic; it is a lively connection to that idea of the real, 'le reel,' that keeps our eyes open, like a watchman's, even when we have first found Faith and Charity. It is linked to joy. It can happen that a form of religion takes root where Faith and Charity have become established habits, but the playful alertness of hope, like that of a little child, has dried up. Religion can become just a system.

> The faith that I love best, says God, is hope. Faith doesn't surprise me. It's not surprising. I am so resplendent in my creation…. That in order not to see me these poor people would have to be blind. Charity, says God, that doesn't surprise me. It's not surprising. These poor creatures are so miserable that unless they had a heart of stone, how could they not have love for each other … But hope, says God, that is something that surprises me. Even me. That is surprising.
>
> Charles Péguy, *The Portal of the Mystery of the Second Virtue*

AN UNDERSTANDING AND EXPERIENCE OF HOPE

For the ancient Greeks hope, or *elpis*, was a kind of blind trust in an unknown future; the idea that everything would turn out well in the end, even if such an attitude was in vain. This was what was left for Pandora, in Hesiod's tale, after she had opened the forbidden box, or rather jar. It was a cruel trick of the gods. Later, and especially among renaissance scholars, there was the interpretation with which moderns are more familiar: hope was a kind of divine blessing for the unfortunate Pandora. In the 16th century, Andrea Alciato in his *Emblemata*[1] and Gabriele Faerno in his *Centum Fabulae*[2] both saw hope as a kind of happy consolation, but should *elpis* in fact be viewed as an evil, just like all the others in the jar that escaped before it? That is how Hesiod and

[1] See, e.g., Andrea A l c i a t o, *Emblemata* (Lugdunum: Mathias Bonhomme, 1550), http://www.emblems.arts.gla.ac.uk/alciato/books.php?id=A50a&o=.

[2] See *Centum fabulae ex antiquis auctoribus delectae, et a Gabriele Faerno Cremonensi carminibus explicatae* (Antverpia: Christophe Plantin, 1567), https://archive.org/details/bub_gb_zXMe9nf1plkC/page/n5/mode/2up.

most of his contemporaries saw it. Could hope be evil precisely because blind optimism leads man to ignore the true desperation of his state? If not evil, then at least, for modern man, *absurd*? It is a perennial question, and the answer to it rather depends on one's view of God and religion.

Of course, in one sense, questions of hope defy reason; it always depends on whether one wants to see things positively or negatively. Some people are hopeful, some are not; even if all of them are, in a profound sense, *hopeless*. In the Resurrection of Jesus Christ, however, Hope assumes not just a moral quality but also a definite end goal: the *beata spes* of the Mass, referring to life in Heaven and the enjoyment of the beatific vision of God. This kind of Hope makes a difference to our life and behaviour now, and in the future. Hope, together with Faith and Charity (Love), is one of the three theological virtues in Christian theology. It unites in one habit of mind the desire for a particular good together with the expectation of receiving it. To be precise—it is the virtue that looks forward to union with God and its accompanying eternal beatitude. St. Thomas writes that while Faith is a function of the intellect, Hope is an act of the will. In fact, he talks about two kinds of hope: first in his discussion of the "passions … common to man and other animals,"[3] and later as one of the theological virtues. We can share with a dog the hope of a treat for good behaviour, for example. For both man and dog, "hope is a movement of the appetitive power ensuing from the apprehension of a future good, difficult but possible to obtain."[4] In its theological dimension, Hope has three distinct attributes: God is its object, it is God who infuses it in us, and it is he also who reveals it to us in Sacred Scripture.[5] So, as with happiness, there is a certain kind of hope that can be obtained by our own powers but whose perfection is only possible through divine grace. The *Catechism of the Catholic Church* explains: "Hope is the theological virtue by which we desire the kingdom of heaven and eternal life as our happiness, placing our trust in Christ's promises and relying not on our own strength, but on the help of the grace of the Holy Spirit."[6] Yet, it adds that although the theological virtue of Hope depends entirely on God, it does in fact respond to something which already exists within our very nature—"to the aspiration to happiness which God has placed in the heart of every man."[7]

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[3] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* I-II, q. 24, a. 1, trans. Laurence Shapcote, https://aquinas.cc/la/en/~ST.I-II.

[4] Ibidem, q. 40, a. 2. Although perhaps it could be observed that the philosophy of mind has progressed a great deal since Aquinas, and that while a dog might be limited to Pavlovian responses, man has—unlike dogs—a real concept of the future. Man's hopefulness has more to do with looking towards that future than with a vague state of readiness or expectation.

[5] See ibidem, I-II, q. 62, a. 1.

[6] *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, § 1817, https://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_INDEX.HTM.

[7] Ibidem, § 1818.

Perhaps we can say then that although Christian Hope springs from Faith in Christ and trust in his promises and is an infused gift of God, a certain kind of hope is already present in those who are seeking God and who are open to the gift of Faith. This is a fruit of that *prevenient grace*, portrayed by Cardinal Charles Journet as an arrow aimed by God at his beloved creatures[8]: the "quickening and assisting grace"[9] already explored by the Council of Trent. Perhaps it could be possible to say, in the light of this, that nobody is beyond hope, or to put it differently: anyone may be permitted to hope. Perhaps, for many, it is a good place to start—it is like a little child, holding out its hand to us. How can one refuse it? In all our definitions of hope, we have not yet mentioned what might be considered as Hope's opposite: despair. For modern man, the temptation to give in, to end it all, is an ever more pressing question. And yet, for most of us, we do not give up; and it is more than an animal survival instinct, even if that is part of it; it is more than a reaction against our fear of the unknown after death, Hamlet's "undiscover'd country, from whose bourn no traveller returns"[10]; it is because God's arrow is not far away, ready to wound us and win us. And the tip of that arrow is surely Hope. Is this view of Hope in fact too presumptuous, too optimistic, even too hopeful?

Above, some attempts to define what hope is and what it is not were mentioned. In the lived reality of our relationship with God it is ultimately more important to *experience* hope that it is to *define* it. Pope John Paul II in the Apostolic Letter *Tertio Millenio Adveniente* invited us to "a renewed appreciation of the theological virtue of hope…. The basic attitude of hope, on the one hand encourages the Christian not to lose sight of the final goal which gives meaning and value to life, and on the other, offers solid and profound reasons for a daily commitment to transform reality in order to make it correspond to God's plan."[11] For the recently canonised John Henry Newman, Hope is about watching and waiting: "The Lord has come and gone; and now we wait," [12] as he wrote in his poem "Hope." But this Hope, or a close relative of it, is a free gift, inscribed on the hearts of all men. For Newman, "such is the definition … of every religious man, who has not the knowledge of Christ; he

[8] See Charles J o u r n e t, The Meaning of Grace (New York: Deus Books, 1962), 36.

[9] See The Council of Trent, *On Justification: First Decree*, Session 6, Chapter 5, http://www.thecounciloftrent.com/ch6.htm.

[10] William S h a k e s p e a r e, *Hamlet*, *prince of Denmark*, Act 3, Scene 1.

[11] J o h n P a u l II, Apostolic Letter *Tertio Millennio Adveniente*, Section 46, http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/apost_letters/1994/documents/hf_jp-ii_apl_19941110_tertio-millennio-adveniente.html.

[12] John Henry N e w m a n, "Hope," quoted in Barb H. Wyman, "Hope of Heaven," https://www.cardinaljohnhenrynewman.com/hope-of-heaven/.

is on the look-out."[13] Hope, somehow, is already inscribed on men's hearts in anticipation of the gift of Faith. She is like the arrow of predestination envisaged by Cardinal Journet, shot from God's bow, seeking out every human soul. But once the gift of Faith is explicitly welcomed, that Hope assumes a new force and a new urgency: as Newman teaches, "We are not simply to believe, but to watch; not simply to love, but to watch; not simply to obey, but to watch; to watch for what? for that great event, Christ's coming."[14]

An author who considered the issue was Charles Péguy. For him the virtue of Hope is possible even when the light of faith has grown very dim; like a little child, Hope leads us by the hand, and leads the tired pair of Faith and Love onward, looking forward to our bright future in Heaven.

CHARLES PIERRE PÉGUY AND HIS TIME

Charles Pierre Péguy was born on January 7, 1873, in Orléans, France, and died on the battlefield on September 5, 1914, at Villeroy, at the very beginning of the First World War. He was a French writer, poet, essayist and reserve military officer. His works include medieval-inspired *mysteries* in free verse, of which his famous text about Hope, "Le Porche de la deuxième vertu,"[15] [*The Portal of the Mystery of the Second Virtue*[16]] (originally published in 1911), is one. He also published collections of more conventional verse poems, such as *La Tapisserie de Notre Dame*[17] [The Tapestry of Our Lady] of 1913, also of mystical inspiration, focused on St. Joan of Arc, very much a patriotic symbol for a France undergoing difficult times. In the context of the stormy French fin de siècle, he was a committed intellectual: first a libertarian socialist activist, attracted to anti-clericalism, and an outspoken *Dreyfusard* during his studies, he moved from 1908 towards a nationalistic and medievalist Catholicism. A common theme throughout his poetry is a preoccupation with social justice as well as a kind of despair about the modern world. In this, and in some other respects, he prefigures the much better-known Albert Camus, who in 1942, in his *Myth of Sisyphus*, observes man's eternal optimism and his search for

[13] John Henry N e w m a n, *Sermon 5: Dispositions for Faith*, in John Henry Newman, "Sermons Preached on Various Occasions," http://www.newmanreader.org/works/occasions/sermon5.html.

[14] John Henry N e w m a n, *Parochial & Plain Sermons 4, Sermon 22: Watching*, http://www.newmanreader.org/works/parochial/volume4/sermon22.html.

[15] See Charles P é g u y, "Le Porche de la deuxième vertu," in *Œuvres complètes de Charles Péguy*, vol. 5 (Paris: Éditions de la Nouvelle Revue française, 1916).

[16] See Charles P é g u y, *The Portal of the Mystery of the Second Virtue*, trans. David Louis Schindler Jr (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1996).

[17] See Charles P é g u y, *La Tapisserie de Notre Dame* (Paris: Cahiers de la quinzaine, 1913).

meaning to his travail. Camus recalls the punishment of the gods meted out to Sisyphus for attempting to free men from death: he is condemned to roll a boulder up to the top of a hill only to see it fall down again, before he hopefully rolls it back up again, over and over again, for all eternity.[18] For Camus, with his philosophy of the absurdity of life, there is no hope and no meaning to this existence of ours; hence the mantra of his hopeless hero, Meursault, in his 1942 novel *L'Étranger* (usually rendered as *The Stranger*: "Cela ne veut rien dire"[19] ("That doesn't mean anything"[20]). All those who hope are roundly ridiculed in this absurdist gospel that ends with the banal execution of its rather autistic messiah.

With Péguy, though, suffering humanity seeks meaning and hope, and finds them in the promises of Christ, re-clothed in all their Gospel freshness and authenticity by the engaging voice of a child. The enduring impression one has of Péguy is of a man of Faith who combined a revolutionary spirit with a counter-revolutionary one, motivated by a very raw and human love and concern for other human beings and their fate. Of course, this produced tensions within him, not least in the practice of his Faith; before his death, he is known to have abstained from Holy Communion for several years over his difficulty with the doctrine of eternal punishment for sinners. With him, in fact, his instinct to hope was so deep, so simple and so single-minded that he could not believe anyone could ever be beyond it.

Before providing some highlights from Péguy's great hymn to Hope, I will explore the context into which he was born: a divided and hopeless culture, exasperated by its institutions, torn between religion and science and prone to extreme and polarising tendencies. France at that time had a great deal in common with our own time and perhaps that is why a voice such as Péguy's seems again so pertinent and is being taken up again by all kinds of people from differing perspectives. Even today he is claimed by both the right and the left. Considering Péguy's concern with the sufferings and dignity of the poor, the importance of roots and tradition, the Catholic faith—as also the mistrust he felt about systems, hierarchy and clericalism—it is no wonder that, humanly concerned, he felt dismay in the early 1900s at the prospects of France. And things were only to get worse in the thirty years following his death. It is this context of a divided and partisan society which accounts at least in part for the way in which it took unclassifiable figures hostile to vested interests, such as Péguy, Léon Bloy, Arthur Rimbaud, and indeed Camus (not all of them

[18] See Albert C a m u s, *The Myth of Sisyphus*, trans. Justin O'Brien (London: Penguin, 2013).

[19] Albert C a m u s, *L'Étranger* (Paris: Gallimard, 1957).

[20] Albert C a m u s, *The Stranger*, trans. Matthew Ward (New York: Vintage International, 1989), 3.

Catholic or fully Catholic, and each of them a severe critic of the Catholic and secular establishments), to reach so many future converts from different sectors of a disturbed and divided culture and provide them with bridges back to faith.[21]

The fact that two men, seem both keenly aware of the hopelessness of the human condition, perhaps especially as experienced in their French context, begs the question: where does this sense of ennui come from? Why is it so characteristic of France at the end of nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries? A quick and easy answer would be that it was all part of the fallout of the French Revolution; and it is true enough that nothing was ever the same again in France, or in the world, after that event. But the specific feeling of 'ennui' and the resultant desperate search for meaning is something very characteristic of this period, beginning a century after the Revolution. There was of course, shame from the defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War, a feeling that no doubt fed extreme nationalist sentiments; there was also a certain sadness and apprehension as the champions of scientific progress seemed to be banishing religion from serious public consideration. And yet in the midst of all of this there were convert scientists such as Ferdinand Brunetière (editor of the renowned *Revue des Deux Mondes* and author, in 1895, of the explosive *Science and Religion*[22]), as well as pious and productive academics such as Louis Pasteur, together with the whole host of decadent poets on both sides of the English channel who in considerable numbers returned, one by one, to historic Christianity when it seemed a lost cause. The evidence of this 'ennui,' and its relationship to what can be called 'the Catholic movement' are worth examining in three particular fields: the political situation of France at that time, that of the literary men who chronicled the feeling of malaise and lived it out in their decadent lives, and lastly those philosophers and poets who could be counted 'activists,' seeking a real world solution to the impasse of national despair.

French politics in this period was riddled with tensions and scandals. A large part (especially amongst Catholics and proletarians) of the French public was radically out of sympathy with the aggressively anti-clerical government, which had only come to power through military intervention and bloody reprisals against the Communards and subterfuge (through the 1870s) against the Royalists. Scandal after scandal involving these and other tensions continued to shake the Republic to its foundations (right through to 1840):

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[21] See Frédéric G u g e l o t, *La Conversion des intellectuels au catholicisme en France [1885-1935]* (Paris: CNRS, 2010), 5ff.

[22] See Ferdinand B r u n e t i è r e, *Science and Religion*, trans. Erik Butler (Les Brouzils: Odd Volumes, 2016).

the Boulanger crisis (1889), the Panama scandal (1892), the Fashoda incident (1898), above all the Dreyfus case (1894–1906). In the midst of the Dreyfus case came the anti-clerical crisis of 1905, in which Pope Pius X himself was forced to intervene. The previous pope (Leo XIII) had urged French Catholics to accept the Republic (at least pragmatically) in order to be accepted in turn, but French political society was so deeply divided that neither the Catholics nor the anti-Clericals were inclined in the least to listen. The socialist movement continued to grow under the leadership of Jean Jaurès—but Péguy became disillusioned with him and broke with the movement. Many of these problems stemmed from the disastrous events of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 and its even more disastrous aftermath, with the loss of Alsace-Lorraine provoking an enduring revenge mentality that affected French politics domestically and throughout the Empire. And so the whole country was divided in an increasingly powder keg atmosphere, nowhere perhaps better illustrated than in the Dreyfus case: the anti-Dreyfusards included agnostic nationalists like Charles Maurras, sophisticated agnostics like Paul Valéry and Saint-Saëns, military men, and large numbers of Catholics fearful of the leftist attack on the conservative and mostly Catholic-friendly army. Pro-Dreyfusards included such unlikely bedfellows as Péguy and the essentially bourgeois, determinedly anti-Catholic Émile Zola.

The so-called decadent movement was a kind of chronicle of the listless nature of fin de siècle France as well as a reaction to it. Key precursors and influences here were Charles Baudelaire, Rimbaud, Paul Verlaine and Charles-Marie-Georges Huysmans.[23] 'Ennui' and 'spleen' are central to Baudelaire's poems,[24] but Baudelaire linked them to the sinful condition of man. His solution was ultimately Catholic, with its love of beauty, truth,[25] and order.[26] He was initially prepared to take whatever measures were necessary to achieve visionary intensity for his poems. Later, however, his revulsion at the falseness of narcotically enhanced experience, and fear for his soul, led him to condemn these experiments in the strongest terms: "Any man who does not accept the conditions of this life, sells his soul."[27]

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[23] Huysmans published his works as Joris-Karl Huysmans.

[24] The word 'ennui' appears over twenty times in *Fleurs du Mal*, while the poet named a whole section of the book "Spleen et idéal." See Charles B a u d e l a i r e, *Fleurs du mal / Flowers of Evil*, https://fleursdumal.org/.

[25] See Enid S t a r k i e, *Arthur Rimbaud* (London: Faber & Faber, 1973), 116.

[26] "There all is order and beauty/Luxury, peace, and pleasure." Charles B a u d e l a i r e, "Invitation to the Voyage," in Charles Baudelaire's *Fleurs du mal / Flowers of Evil*, https://fleursdumal.org/poem/148. See also Thomas Stearns E l i o t, "Baudelaire in Our Time," in Thomas Stearns Eliot, *Essays Ancient and Modern* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company), 1936.

[27] Charles B a u d e l a i re, "Morale," in *Les Paradis artificiels*, quoted in Starkie, *Arthur Rimbaud*, 117.

The youthful Rimbaud idolised Baudelaire and agreed with his analysis of Man's condition.[28] His solution was to achieve personal transcendence and illumination through a systematic disordering of the senses. In a letter to Georges Isambard from 13 May, 1871, he wrote: "Now, I am degrading myself as much as possible. Why? I want to be a poet, and I am working to make myself a seer: you will not understand this, and I don't know how to explain it to you. It is a questioning of reaching the unknown by the derangement of all the senses. The sufferings are enormous."[29] Unlike Baudelaire, he was prepared to gamble with his soul and his very identity in this venture. Whether or not we accept the account of his deathbed conversion, he came to the conclusion that he had failed. He could rid himself neither of the sense of sin, nor of the necessity—to him at least—of God. As Starkie comments, "The three principal *leitmotifs* in *Une Saison en enfer* are the problem of sin, the problem of God—his personal need to believe in God—and finally the problem of life, the acceptance of life."[30] So he abandoned poetry in disgust as futile and—in order to salvage his health and sanity—pursued a life of action in Africa.

Verlaine led a completely dissolute life; he produced a body of verse which—in subject and manner—reflected this, and whose influence on the later 19th century was second only to Baudelaire's. Both Rimbaud and the pre-conversion Verlaine were anti-Bourgeois, anti-clerical radicals whose political and social positions were either passively (Verlaine) or actively (Rimbaud) destructive. Their reactions to *metanoia* (religious in Verlaine's case, aesthetic / existential in Rimbaud's) involved no creative or dynamic engagement with the culture: Rimbaud was an enthusiastic supporter of the Commune of 1871; the failure of his apocalyptic political visions was a factor in his abandonment of France and indeed of the whole western world. Verlaine's response was religiously inspired poetry. Both had an impact (Rimbaud through *Saison en enfer*[31] and *Illuminations*[32]) on the Catholic poets of the fin de siècle, but neither man's work nor reaction involved constructive local social engagement. The same can be said of the somewhat later case of Huysmans: his important decadent novel *À rebours*[33]—and its succeeding Durtal tetralogy[34]—illustrated

[28] See S t a r k i e, *Arthur Rimbaud*, 111−8.

[29] Arthur R i m b a u d, "The Seer Letter # 1," https://rimbaudanalysis.wordpress.com/letters/.

[30] See S t a r k i e, *Arthur Rimbaud*, 289f.

[31] See Arthur R i m b a u d, *Une Saison en enfer* (Bruxelles: Alliance typographique (M.-J. Poot et compagnie), 1873).

[32] See Arthur R i m b a u d, *Illuminations* (Paris: Publications de la Vogue, 1886).

[33] See Joris-Karl H u y s m a n s, *À rebours* (Paris: G. Charpentier et Cie, 1884).

[34] See Joris-Karl H u y s m a n s, *Là-Bas* (Paris: Tresse & Stock, Éditeurs, 1891); Joris-Karl H u y s m a n s, *En route* (Paris: Tresse & Stock, Éditeurs, 1895); Joris-Karl H u y s m a n s, *La Cathédrale* (Paris: P.-V. Stock, Éditeur, 1898); Joris-Karl H u y s m a n s, *L'Oblat* (Paris: P.-V. Stock, Éditeur, 1903).

the suffocating ennui produced by hyper-sophisticated modern civilisation on a sensitive mind and the appeal of conversion to Catholicism as a solution; but the author's (and his hero's) specific solution was retreat from society into quasi-monastic life. With all these decadent men, the lack of apparent connection with humanity at large might lead one to accuse them of being self-obsessed.

But a few years later, there were men who proposed socio-political solutions, men who were outward looking and earnest. There were especially the 'outrageous,' anti-social challenges of Barbey d'Aurevilly and his (one time) disciple Bloy. The work of both men involved savage indictments of modern life and pessimistic (though anti-Jansenistic) analyses of human nature. Politically Barbey was an ultra-traditionalist/reactionary, while Bloy was a sign of contradiction to any kind of compromise with ordinary life; and Bloy's condemnation of the generality of contemporary Catholic clergy and Catholic activism and literature was as vitriolic as his view of secular society. *Action Française*—founded in 1898—was a reactionary movement and journal dedicated, under the leadership of the influential intellectual Charles Maurras, to restoring the king and the Catholic Church's central position in French life. It was particularly hostile to influential minorities—like the Jews—perceived as unassimilable and inimical to traditional French identity. Many Catholics and intellectuals critical of the Third Republic (or aspects of its culture) flocked to support it.

In an age of panicky extremes, and faced with the same set of problems, Péguy took another path altogether. He was not at home with the leaders of this movement: "For me, Bloy, Huysmans and … Barbey d'Aurevilly. They are antipathetic to me. As far as I'm concerned, they are pornographers."[35] As for Péguy and his relationship with this recent Catholic-literary patrimony, it is safe to say that he resembles his great precursors in certain individual respects: in Baudelaire's ultimate conviction of the primacy of human nature as a union of body and soul; in Rimbaud's instrumentalising of poetry for higher purposes; in Verlaine's writing specifically Catholic poetry in response to crisis; in Barbey d'Aurevilly's flaying of sectarian secularism; in Bloy's uncompromising independence of faction, including 'official' Catholic ones, and his mystical view of France and history; in *Action Française*'s (and even the more or less Catholic Republican Maurice Barres's) cult of St. Joan of Arc. So Péguy was combining and revisiting many themes already explored by the literary world of the fin de siècle.

Finally, the philosophical influence of Henri Bergson (1859−1941) must not be overlooked. This Jewish philosopher, active in the early 1900s, advo-

[35] Quoted after Stanislas F u m e t, *Histoire de Dieu dans ma vie* (Paris: Fayard, 1978).

cated what became known as realism which was in part a reaction against the perceived disconnection between academic philosophy and everyday lived experience. Péguy first heard Bergson's lectures when a student at the École normale supérieure where he became a devotee, even going to the trouble of transcribing Bergson's lectures and publishing them. Although their thinking later diverged, in those early days, the influence was not all one way: Bergson even admitted that Péguy seemed to have understood what he (Bergson) was thinking before he actually found a way of expressing it.[36] Part of this notion of the real meant a certain kind of permission given to the emotions, to human feeling. In his *Note sur M. Bergson et la Philosophie Bergsonienne*,[37] Péguy asserts that the passions are not inferior to the intellect, as long as those passions are noble. In simple terms, perhaps one could say that the voice of experience and the voice of the heart find their way back into a philosophical discourse hitherto overwhelmed under the weight of logic. As Antoine de Saint-Exupéry's little prince would say a generation later: "This is my secret. It is very simple: one only sees well with the heart. What is truly real (*l'essentiel*) is invisible to the eyes."[38] In his work, Péguy took this idea further than Bergson himself did, perhaps because he was more poet than philosopher.

It is this commitment to what one might call an incarnational intellectualism (linked to real people and real feelings) that causes Péguy, for all his reputed mysticism, to be committed to the hilt to engaging with the great social implications of Catholicism and France (and the people of France)—particularly in *hoping* and, as it were, mystically *seeing* an eventual resolution to the endless conflicts and factions tearing his country apart. And perhaps we can conclude that, in some measure, he succeeded, as—unusually in so faction-riven a country as France has been since the Revolution—Péguy has been claimed by virtually every party as one of their own.

"THE LITTLE GIRL HOPE"

Péguy's epic treatment of Hope takes the form of a strange monologue called *Le Porche du mystère de la deuxième vertu*, or *Portal of the Mystery of the Second Virtue*, in which St. Joan of Arc is receiving a long catechism lesson, framed as a dramatic monologue, from a Franciscan nun called Mad-

[36] See A. E. P i l k i n g t o n, *Bergson and His Influence: A Reassessment*, Cambridge and London: Cambridge University Press, 1976, 95–8.

[37] See Charles P é g u y, *Note sur M. Bergson et la philosophie bergsonienne*, http://obvil.sorbonne-universite.site/corpus/critique/peguy_note-bergson.

[38] Antoine d e S a i n t - E x u p é r y, *Le Petit prince* (Paris: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1943), 83. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.

ame Gervaise. The idea of the medieval porch of a French cathedral makes one think of the medieval mystery plays that were presented under them, but also of those busy carved scenes, so full of saints and allegories, very much giving a tangible aspect to the truths of faith, and often characterised by those arresting but serene smiles of the saints and of our Lady. The tangible, the real, was, as we have seen, something very central for Péguy, very much influenced by the early works of Bergson, who sought to create "a metaphysic which ... aimed to reveal the *réel* (the real) and thus was endowed with an 'organic force' permitting it to be related to life in all sorts of new and fruitful ways which are impossible in the case of a logically self-contained system, which contents itself with being merely *'vrai'* (true), that is, put together in such a way as to satisfy the intellect."[39] For Péguy, the discipleship of the *réel* is also, and preeminently, incarnational, so that he has been hailed as the poet who *enshrined the incarnate word*.

In the *Portal*, Madame Gervaise presents to the young St. Joan the idea that Hope has perhaps been too overshadowed by Faith and Charity. There is even the idea that Hope is almost more accessible and more 'friendly' for the agnostic or the seeker, and that it can, by God's grace, lead us to the fullness of Faith. If one were to speak of a 'temporal procession' of the theological virtues, Hope can be seen as coming first, even if without at least implicit Faith it would be impossible. The perspectives of the convert and the sinner are naturally turned to the last things, as much through fear as through hope: and this perspective needs to be restored to the Christian life, to cure us all of sentimentalism, ritualism, or activism, all of which are extremes into which a Christian can fall when he forgets the object of our hope, to be forever one with Christ in the beatific vision.

Madame Gervaise, with her lessons of catechism, her reminiscences of things that a friendly, almost avuncular God the Father has said to her—in fact the main voice that speaks throughout the poem is God's, through her—her visions, her tales of the saints, is addressing the young girl who will one day awaken France from its slumber and call it back to faith and action. It is clear that Péguy is also thereby addressing the Frenchmen of the early twentieth century who seem to have lost hope in the vocation of their country, to have lost hope in God's promises, to have lost energy and direction. Here is how Péguy describes the three theological virtues:

> For my three virtues, said God.
> The three virtues my creatures.
> My daughters, my children.

[39] P i l k i n g t o n, *Bergson and His Influence: A Reassessment*, 83.

> Are themselves like my other creatures.
> Of the race of men.
> Faith is a loyal Wife.
> Charity is a Mother.
> A loving mother, all heart. Or an elder sister who is like a mother.
> Hope is a little slip of a girl.[40]

In Péguy's poem we see that perhaps when Christ says "unless you become like this child," He is giving us a teaching about hope, illustrated by the hope that lights up the face of every child, something which never ceases to move me as a school teacher, when I see it, and which in Péguy's vision even seems to surprise God Himself:

> That these poor children see how things are going
> and believe tomorrow things will go better.
> That they see how things are going today
> and believe they will go better tomorrow morning.
> That is surprising and it's by far the greatest marvel of our grace.
> And I'm surprised by it myself.[41]

Thus, for Péguy, even God is surprised at the power of Hope:

> What surprises me, says God, is hope.
> And I can't get over it.
> This little hope who seems like nothing at all.
> This little girl hope.[42]

The young girl, Hope, leads the more august pair of Faith and Charity into the light: "And a little child shall lead them" (Is 11:6). We indicated above Newman's image of Hope as a watchman whose desire for a better life keeps him alert. But for Péguy, Hope is also playful and energetic; it is a lively connection to that idea of the real, *lé reel*, that keeps our eyes open, like a watchman's, even when we have first found Faith and Charity. It is linked to joy. The child remains joyful. The adult is tired, and needs, as Clive S. Lewis was, to be "surprised by joy."[43] It can happen that a form of religion takes root where Faith and Charity have become established habits, but the playful alertness of hope, like that of a little child, has dried up. Religion can become just a system. And in this way, whilst materialists (whether Communists or Capitalists) live

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[40] Charles P é g u y, "Le Porche de la deuxième vertu," 264.

[41] Ibidem, 262.

[42] Ibidem, 263.

[43] Clive S. L e w i s, *Surprised by Joy: The Shape of My Early Life* (San Francisco: HarperOne, 2017).

by a physical mechanism, the scholastics can end up promoting little more than a spiritual mechanism. For Péguy, even Holy Mother Church can be entombed by "the rigidity of her bureaucracy."[44] The great twentieth century theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar saw in Péguy "precisely the same polemic against the spirit of systematization that Kierkegaard conducted against Hegelianism."[45] That way of thinking can itself go too far—after all men like St. Thomas and St. Anselm were monks and great contemplatives and their "systematisation" perhaps sprang from profound intuitions of the divinely ordained beauty and order in all things. On the other hand those who sought later to package the early schoolmen in concise manuals for easy consumption in seminaries might more accurately reflect a bureaucratic tendency. And so it was that men such as Henri de Lubac and von Balthasar who, before and after Vatican II, underlined a need for a 'ressourcement,' a rejuvenating drink from the springs of tradition, before any thought of 'aggiornamento.' These men sensed, like Péguy before them, the tiredness of Hope's venerable guardians. In the need for a certain refreshment of our initial joy in the Lord, there are, philosophically, echoes of Kierkegaard's 'repetition'[46] or Heidegger's 'retrieval' (*Wiederholung*)[47] but without the difficulty of abstraction. Because for Péguy, Hope is a little girl, and as the God of Péguy's poem says: "Children are more my creatures than men are." Péguy's God suggests that perhaps every child is an icon of Hope.

Hope became for Péguy a central preoccupation, as *amore* had been for Dante. As Dante's childhood darling Beatrice, an embodiment of pure love, was his guide to the mysteries of God, so with Péguy, the little girl Hope, based on his own daughter Germaine, who was then nine years' old, was the key to a deeper acceptance of the Faith. In fact, perhaps without the inspiration of his children, and this intuition about hope which they gave him, Péguy might never have made the ultimate submission (with confession and Holy Communion) that he made a couple of weeks before his death in battle. For several years, he had been openly Catholic, in a climate of widespread anti-clericalism, even if he had quietly held back on full assent to Catholic teaching as has been mentioned above, due to certain theological difficulties. His conversion story is very much in the context of the *fin de siècle* literary scene in England and

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[44] Charles P é g u y, *Note conjointe sur M. Descartes et la philosophie cartésienne*, http://obvil.sorbonne-universite.site/corpus/critique/peguy_note-descartes/.

[45] Hans Urs v o n B a l t h a s a r, *The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aestetics*, vol. 3, *Studies in Theological Style: Lay Styles*, trans. Andrew Louth, John Saward, Martin Simon, and Rowan Williams, ed. John Riches (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988), 422.

[46] See Søren K i e r k e g a a r d, "Repetition," trans. Howard W. Hong and Edna W. Hong, in Søren Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling: Repetition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).

[47] See Martin H e i d e g g e r, *Being and Time*, trans. Joan Stambough, revised by Dennis J. Schmidt (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010).

France, where intellectuals, in considerable numbers, rejected anti-Catholicism and scientism in favour of a return to religion.

He also had a particular reason to connect childhood and hope. In 1911, his youngest child, Pierre, fell dangerously ill. Péguy set off on a pilgrimage to Chartres. He marched alone, on foot, eighty kilometres a day. "He prayed to Our Lady. He did not ask her to cure his child. That was her affair. He was a busy man. He had an office and a thousand cares. He simply gave the child to her, all his children. The boy was cured. 'Of course,' was Peguy's only comment on the cure."[48] Although he said little about it, this episode marked him profoundly.

Shortly before his death in battle in September 1914, he began (but did not finish) his *Note Conjointe sur M. Descartes et la philosophie cartésienne* in which he explains that in *The Portal of the Mystery of the Second Virtue*,

> the meaning and the strength and the vocation and, so to speak, the virtue of the one we have named the young child Esperance (Hope) burst on to the scene. She is the source of life, because she is the one who constantly *undoes habits*. She is the seed of all spiritual birth. She is the source and the overflowing of grace, for she is the one who constantly strips us of this mortal clothing of *habit*. And it is not in vain that she is theological. Because she is the child princess of the Theological Virtues. And she is the Dauphine and daughter of France. And it is not in vain that she walks in the middle between her two big sisters and that her two big sisters give her their hand. But they do not give her their hand in the sense that we believe. Because she is small, she is believed to need others. To walk. But it is the others on the contrary who need it. And who are happy to give her their hand. To walk. For Faith without her would have grown too accustomed to this world and without her Charity would have grown too accustomed to the poor man. And so Faith without her and Charity without her would each have gotten too accustomed, even to God Himself.[49]

Here Péguy sees the little girl Hope as

> …charged with constantly upsetting our habits. She is charged with always beginning afresh. She is charged with everywhere bringing about beginnings, just as habit brings about everywhere endings and deaths. She is charged with bringing about *organisms* whereas habit brings about everywhere *mechanisms*. She is the principle, this child is the principle of *recreation* where habit is the principle of *decreation*.… She is the ever-young agent of creation and grace…. The two others (Faith and Charity) have their distinct function, but without her, who has no distinct function, the distinct functions of the two others would gradually get bogged down and enslaved to habit.[50]

We may reasonably be concerned by Péguy's opposition between habit and creativity but should not read into it a criticism of the forging of good

[48] See Catriona M a c L e o d, "Charles Peguy (1873–1914)," *The Irish Monthly* 65, no. 770 (1937), 536.

[49] P é g u y, *Note conjointe sur M. Descartes et la philosophie cartésienne*.

[50] Ibidem.

habits and character. Péguy, always an honest *paysan* (countryman) at heart, would not fall into that rarified way of thinking. Rather, in *The Portal*, the four Cardinal virtues (prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice) are represented as the four sturdy legs of a Lorraine carthorse, pulling a plough that represents our relationship with God, based on Faith, Hope, and Charity.

> This plough behind it ploughs the land of Lorraine.
> (But ploughs it on one condition: that one should also pull *it* along).
> Like the plough-horse, the good animal must not only carry and move itself,
> On its four legs, on its four feet,
> But together must drag this plough which, thus animated behind it, ploughs the earth.
> And so it is with the soul, this beast of burden,
> In an earthly plowing, a carnal plowing.
> Not only must the soul move and be carried along by the four virtues,
> pulling and dragging itself,
> But it must also draw and that it drag
> This body sunk in the earth which plows behind her the soil of the earth.[51]

Here we see that for Péguy anything that is true is only absolutely real when incarnated, or *inserted*, into the concrete tangibility of things: in this case in the work of the sturdy horse on its four legs. Could one allow the symbolism to take one a little further, in the spirit of the philosophy of the *réel*? Are not the four cardinal virtues reminiscent of the four cardinal points and the four Aristotelian elements, clear signs of the *réel*, our rootedness in the material world? And does not the trio of Faith, Hope, and Charity, make us think of the Holy Trinity of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, where a poetical metaphysic will allow these virtues to elucidate truths about each Person of the Blessed Trinity? We have seen that Péguy's voice of God, who speaks as God the Father and associates Faith with the evidence of the Creator's work in the world, and evokes the example of Love offered by His Son; although neither Péguy, nor Péguy's voice of God, speaking through Madame Gervaise, says as much, all the signs are there that Hope should make us think of the Holy Spirit, whom we constantly beseech "to renew the face of the earth." This hymn to Hope is surely also a hymn to the Holy Spirit, whom we implore to refresh us and remake us: "Without your spirit, there is nothing in man, nothing that is not harmful. Cleanse that which is unclean, water that which is dry, heal that which is wounded. Bend that which is inflexible, fire that which is chilled, correct what goes astray."[52] Can we not then say that just as the "little girl" Hope renews her guardians, Faith and Charity, so it is the Holy Spirit that renews

[51] P é g u y, "Le Porche de la deuxième vertu," 328.

[52] The hymn *Veni, Sancte Spiritus*, from the Roman Missal, attributed to Pope Innocent III or to Stephen Langton, Archbishop of Canterbury.

our devotion to the Father and the Son, interceding from within us "in sighs too deep for words"?

I draw attention to two more (out of many) aspects of hope as portrayed by Péguy in this masterpiece. First, the way in which Péguy's (or perhaps Madame Gervaise's) very folksy representation of God is Himself able to be hopeful, and therefore somehow to draw us into His own hope through a very human power of attraction. At the end of the poem, God is represented as praising the way in which children understand that night is best, because that is when God is in charge. And yet adults refuse to sleep, failing to place their trust in God. God hopes that the fulfilment of the age will come soon. Here, as throughout *The Portal*, the voice of God is redolent of the beautiful mythic naivety of Antoine de Saint-Exupéry in *Le Petit prince*:

> You tell me of the great silence there will be
> After the end of the reign of man,
> When I will take up my sceptre once more.
> And sometimes I look forward to that,
> Because this man really makes a lot of noise.[53]

And the poem ends with God's humble expression of gratitude to "lady night" for having covered the descent from the Cross and the burial of Christ with a veil of darkness.

The lasting impression, however, of "the little girl Hope", is of her playfulness and a certain unpredictability. Péguy tells of a playful God, of a playful believer and perhaps looks forward to a playful Church, whose heart is constantly rejuvenated by Hope.

> For children, playing, working, resting, stopping, running, are all one.
> All the same. Are all the same thing. They make no distinction.
> They are happy. They enjoy themselves all the time.
> As much when they are working as when they are playing.
> They do not even notice. They are very happy.
> ...Hope also is she who enjoys herself all the time.[54]

But this joy is grounded. It is not a merely terrestrial joy that masks despair and tragedy, and is ultimately terrified of death. It looks forward, as we have said before, to the joys of Heaven. In fact, when we read Péguy, we come to see that this playful and childlike joy is true and real, only if reality gives us a real reason to hope. Gilbert K. Chesterton, in many ways quite similar to

[53] P é g u y, *"Le Porche de la deuxième vertu,"* 453.
[54] Ibidem, 294.

Péguy, once wrote that "if we are to be truly gay, we must believe that there is some eternal gaiety in the nature of things."[55]

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In keeping with the intuition of St. John Paul II, who boldly asserted: "we wish to proclaim that apart from *the mercy* of God there is no other source of *hope* for mankind,"[56] and of Pope Francis. We can observe that it is surely the centrality of Christ's mercy that is essential to this rediscovery of the virtue of Hope, for—as Newman claimed—God "is not only almighty but all-merciful also. Faith is founded on the knowledge that God is almighty, hope is founded on the knowledge that God is all merciful. The presence of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ excites us to hope quite as much as to faith, because His very name Jesus means Saviour, and because He was so loving, meek, and bountiful when He was on earth."[57] And it is the assurance of God's mercy which enabled French spirituality, perhaps overly coloured for centuries by the gloomy influence of Jansenism, and further wounded by the Revolution, to reject the pessimism of Vigny and the limitations of Pascal and to embrace the generous and expansive hope of Péguy. In our world today, no less fractured than that of 1914, if we Christians, as St. Peter invites us to do, would really "give an account of the hope that is in [us]" (1 Pt 3:15), then the world might at last return to Faith and Love, and be healed. The truth of God's mercy means that death need hold no fear for us, and the Hope we have received from Him should lighten our lives and give us joy. That message is as much waiting to be rediscovered in our age as it was in 1911.

The reality of death and the blessed hope of Heaven, which for the believer is every bit as *real*, should keep us always watchful, always cheerful, always child-like, like the ten wise virgins whose abundant store of oil symbolises the abundant hope in their hearts. The English Catholic poet, Alexander Pope (1688–1744), beautifully synthesises these comforting thoughts in these lines from his *Essay on Man*.

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[55] Gilbert K. C h e s t e r t o n, "Omar and the Sacred Vine," in Gilbert K. Chesterton, *Heretics* (Radford: Wilder Publications, 2007), 44.

[56] J o h n P a u l II, Homily at Kraków-Łagiewniki, 17 August 2002, http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/homilies/2002/documents/hf_jp-ii_hom_20020817_shrine-divine-mercy.html.

[57] John Henry N e w m a n, "Sermon 1: The Omnipotence of God the Reason for Faith and Hope," in John Henry Newman, *Nine sermons,* http://www.newmanreader.org/works/ninesermons/sermon1.html.

Hope humbly then; with trembling pinions soar;
Wait the great teacher, Death; and God adore!
What future bliss, he gives not thee to know,
But gives that Hope to be thy blessing now.
Hope springs eternal in the human breast;
Man never is, but always to be blest;
The soul uneasy, and confin'd from home,
Rests, and expatiates, in a life to come.[58]

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[58] Alexander P o p e, *Essay on Man*, Epistle 1, https://www.eighteenthcenturypoetry.org/works/o3676-w0010.shtml.

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ABSTRACT / ABSTRACT

Ferdi McDERMOTT, "The faith I love best is hope": Perspectives of Hope from Charles Péguy

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Following calls from recent popes to a rediscovery of the theological virtue of hope, this paper examines a poem dealing specifically with that subject, by Charles Péguy, a French poet who died in 1914 in the early fighting of the First World War. He is a key figure of what has been called the French Catholic revival. His dramatic monologue takes the form of a catechism lesson addressed to the young St. Joan of Arc, in which Hope is portrayed as a little girl. Rooted in a rediscovery of the "real" and under the influence of the philosopher Bergson, Péguy's message seems to be that a childlike Hope could be the key to a renewal of Faith and Love, and perhaps to a re-energizing of the Christian message. Péguy wrote his poem at a time when France was deeply traumatized by the Franco-Prussian war, the Dreyfus scandal and the anti-clerical purge of the early 20th century. It was a society that had lost is bearings. Many themes of his day are strangely current in our own.

Keywords: Charles Péguy, Bergson, Mysteries, medievalism, suffering, hope, Joan of Arc, Charles Péguy, French Catholic revival

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Ferdi McDERMOTT, "Wiara, którą kocham najbardziej, to nadzieja". O perspektywie nadziei w ujęciu Charlesa Péguy'ego

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Odpowiadając na wezwanie współczesnych papieży zachęcających do ponownego odkrywania teologicznej cnoty nadziei, autor analizuje poemat Charlesa

Péguy'ego poświęcony właśnie tematyce nadziei. Péguy, francuski poeta, poległy w roku 1914, w czasie początkowych walk pierwszej wojny światowej, należał do najważniejszych postaci tak zwanego francuskiego odrodzenia katolickiego. W omawianym utworze, w którym poetycki monolog przeobraża się w lekcję katechizmu udzielaną młodej Joannie d'Arc, nadzieja ukazana została jako mała dziewczynka. Pod wpływem filozofii Henri'ego Bergsona i jego ponownego odkrycia „tego, co rzeczywiste", Péguy wskazuje nadzieję, uosobioną w postaci dziecka, jako klucz do odnowy wiary i miłości, a być może również źródło nowej energii dla przesłania, jakie niesie ze sobą chrześcijaństwo. Czas, w którym powstawał poemat – początek dwudziestego wieku – to we Francji okres kryzysu związanego z wojną francusko-pruską, sprawą Dreyfusa oraz czystkami antyklerykalnymi, a także głęboką dezorientacją społeczną. Wiele spośród poruszanych przez Péguy'ego ważnych wówczas tematów w zaskakujący sposób zachowuje aktualność również dzisiaj.

Słowa kluczowe: Charles Péguy, Henri Bergson, misteria, mediewalizm, cierpienie, nadzieja Joanna d'Arc, Charles Péguy, francuskie odrodzenie katolickie

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Jacek MYDLA

IT'S ALL ABOUT THE WEANS
A Survey of Troubled Procreation and Hope in the Contemporary Northern Irish Mystery Thriller*

Northern Irish authors are keen on making their detectives, many of whom have families with children, alive to a sense of duty and obligation to protect the vulnerable and bring to justice those who have violated their rights. Though there are many crime thrillers in the world where the family life of the detective, if it exists at all, is decoupled from the wider social and criminal abuse of women and children, the risk to which Irish detectives expose their families and the protection they feel compelled to offer them seems notable in the frequency of its appearance as one of the main themes in the plots.

In this article I look at a selection of novels which represent the genre of the mystery thriller, with the aim of seeing how they treat the ideas of maternity and childbearing, and whether those ideas can be related to that of hope. For the literary material, I have chosen contemporary Northern Irish novels, where—for a number of reasons—mothers and children figure prominently. More specifically, I will concentrate on the theme of unwanted pregnancy in three of Claire McGowan's novels. So far, none of her six novels in the Paula Maguire series have been translated into Polish, which is all the more reason to discuss them in a Polish journal.

Perhaps, before we examine the fiction, it is worthwhile to note that the Polish language suggests a connection between pregnancy and hope, namely, in an expression commonly used to describe pregnancy: "być przy nadziei," i.e., "to be in a hopeful state," "to be expecting." The expression suggests that the birth of a child shapes the future in a literal sense; after all, procreation carries the suggestion of pushing life forward, and not only the life of the parents, but also the life of the community and the nation. In McGowan's novels, which feature a female investigator who herself carries the burden of unplanned pregnancy, and thus of choice, there may be little room for unwavering optimism. On the contrary, figures of pregnant women, and of women for whom pregnancy is an issue fraught with significance that goes beyond

* I owe a debt of gratitude to Anne Keithline, with whom I spent multiple hours reading and discussing the novels prior to the submission, and who then helped me give the text a thorough revision, following the reviewers' suggestions.

the personal dimension, become, as it were, nuclei of conflict and they do not simply because the genre thrives on conflict, but also and primarily because of the larger Northern Ireland context, which McGowan has chosen for the setting.

In the first part of this article, I will examine chosen examples of the fictional treatment of the above-mentioned themes in four contemporary male Northern authors: Adrian McKinty (born in Belfast in 1968), author of the Sean Duffy thrillers[1] (among them *The Cold Cold Ground*,[2] *Rain Dogs*,[3] and *Police at the Station and They Don't Look Friendly*[4]); Stuart Neville (born in Armagh in 1972), author of *The Ghosts of Belfast* (aka *The Twelve*)[5] and the Jack Lennon thrillers (among them *Collusion*[6] and *Stolen Souls*[7]); Brian McGilloway (born in Derry in 1974), author of the DI Benedict Devlin mysteries (among them *Borderlands*,[8] *Gallows Lane*,[9] and *The Nameless Dead*[10]) and the DS Lucy Black mysteries (among them *Little Girl Lost*[11]). In the main part of this article, I will discuss the first three Paula Maguire novels by author Claire McGowan (born in Rostrevor, County Down, in 1981): *The Lost*,[12] *The Dead Ground*[13], and *The Silent Dead*.[14] Even though in the male novelists' work childbearing and children characteristically play a major, and in some cases a crucial, role, it is McGowan who gives procreation—and specifically unplanned and unwanted pregnancy—a prominent position, which has to do with the fact that the main protagonist, forensic psychologist Dr Paula Maguire, personally struggles with the issue of unplanned pregnancy, a situation which places her in the very midst of the choice debate.

With the exception of McKinty, the above-named novelists depict post-Good-Friday-Agreement (1998) Northern Ireland, a world which has its prom-

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[1] The term 'mystery thriller' is more capacious than 'crime novel.' In the mystery thriller, the culprit may remain criminally active for almost the entire duration of the investigation. The discovery of the victim's body, which triggers an investigation, does not stop the culprit, and we can expect another murder. Even so, the two basic activities—crime and detection—remain separate.

[2] See Adrian M c K i n t y, *Cold Cold Ground* (London: Serpent's Tail, 2012).

[3] See Adrian M c K i n t y, *Rain Dogs* (London: Serpent's Tail, 2015).

[4] See Adrian M c K i n t y, *Police at the Station and They Don't Look Friendly* (London: Serpent's Tail, 2017).

[5] See Stuart N e v i l l e, *The Ghosts of Belfast* (New York: Soho Crime, 2009).

[6] See Stuart N e v i l l e, *Collusion* (London: Harvill Secker, 2010).

[7] See Stuart N e v i l l e, *Stolen Souls* (London: Vintage, 2012).

[8] See Brian M c G i l l o w a y, *Borderlands* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2007).

[9] See Brian M c G i l l o w a y, *Gallows Lane* (London: Macmillan New Writing, 2008).

[10] See Brian M c G i l l o w a y, *The Nameless Dead* (London: Macmillan, 2012).

[11] See Brian M c G i l l o w a y, *Little Girl Lost* (Leicester: Charnwood 2012).

[12] See Claire M c G o w a n, *The Lost* (London: Headline, 2013).

[13] See Claire M c G o w a n, *The Dead Ground* (London: Headline Publishing Group, 2014).

[14] See Claire M c G o w a n, *The Silent Dead* (London: Headline, 2016 (2015)).

ises for a peaceful future, but which is haunted—in the case of *The Ghosts of Belfast,* literally so—by the Troubles, i.e., the thirty-year-long conflict which claimed thousands of innocent victims, mothers and children among them. Concern for the fate of vulnerable women and children is the distinguishing characteristic of contemporary crime fiction in general; it is a challenge to find a novel in which these are not the victims. Claire McGowan addresses head-on, as it were, the specifically Irish complication: the anti-abortion laws.[15] Persistently and even somewhat obstinately, she works the issues of child abuse and teenage pregnancy into the fabric of her plots, making topical the dilemma of choice, or rather the limited scope of choice left for women. One tends to think that this strategy may be a way of addressing the future for an Ireland, particularly Northern Ireland, in the midst of negotiating its prospects while it is still troubled by the difficult and painful legacy of the sectarian conflict *and* the failure to protect potential victims.

As I have just suggested, it would be farfetched to argue that concern with the victimisation of women and children is a distinctive feature of the contemporary Northern Irish crime thriller. Children, adolescents and women are the 'easy' and—alas—predictable target of illicit actions and operations; on the whole, they are the potential victims of the mechanism of patriarchal oppression. Contemporary crime novels consistently bring to the attention of the readership treacherous areas of contemporary life and the fate of those who are doomed to inhabit those areas. Northern Irish authors are keen on making their detectives, many of whom have families with children, alive to a sense of duty and obligation to protect the vulnerable and bring to justice those who have violated their rights. Though of course there are also many crime thrillers in the world where the family life of the detective, if it exists at all, is decoupled from the wider social and criminal abuse of women and children,[16] the risk to which Irish detectives expose their families and the protection they feel compelled to offer them seems notable in the frequency of its appearance as one of the main themes in the plots. The concern for the wellbeing of the protagonists' families thus runs parallel to the main concern of the plot,

[15] Shortly before the submission of this article in September 2019, the abortion law in Northern Ireland changed; for more information, see, for instance, Marie-Louise C o n n o l l y, "Northern Ireland Abortion Law Changes: What Do They Mean?" at https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-50125124 and Suyin H a y n e s, "After 158 Years U.K. Lawmakers Have Voted to Decriminalize Abortion in Northern Ireland: The Fight's Not Over Yet," https://time.com/5634762/northern-ireland-abortion-law-impact/.

[16] For instance, in Robert Galbraith's (J. K. Rowling's) *Career of Evil* (2015), where the domestic violence and sexual abuse suffered by women and children are major concerns, the detectives—Cormoran Strike and his assistant Robin Ellacott—are unmarried and have no children of their own.

where typically those protagonists are involved in the finding and protection of women and children.

EXAMPLES

Before we turn our attention to McGowan's Paula Maguire series, let us briefly look at some selected 'uses' of childhood in nine Northern Irish novels.

McKinty's Sean Duffy novels, as already mentioned, are set during the Troubles of the 1980s. Concern with children figures prominently in them, both on the professional and personal levels. *Rain Dogs* is a good example. Set in 1987, the typically protracted and increasingly frustrating investigation finally leads Duffy and his RUC colleagues[17] to an institution for adolescent offenders whose inmates have been abused by paedophiles, a conspiracy which may involve celebrities and high-ranking politicians, and which may have been a source of profit for Loyalist paramilitaries.

In the final chapters, there is a significant change of focus, as Duffy's girlfriend—separated from him for some time now—asks him to accompany her on a ferry boat trip to Liverpool. With bitterness, he calls the infamous route "the Great Abortion Trail," "walked by thousands of Irish women and girls every year."[18] The final turnaround in this personal side plot comes with the girlfriend's decision to keep the child. Consequently, in the most recent instalment of the Sean Duffy series, we see Duffy in the new role of the father, with a family to protect. Like other Northern investigators, Duffy puts his family at risk simply by doing his job. For example, the desire to keep his identity unknown has made Duffy's boss decide to use IRA hitmen in an attempt to wipe away Duffy and Duffy's family.[19]

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[17] The Royal Ulster Constabulary, or the police service of Northern Ireland during the Troubles.

[18] M c K i n t y, *Rain Dogs*, 335. In accompanying his girlfriend, Duffy commits a crime: "*Abortion is illegal on the island of Ireland. On both sides of that porous, wiggly border. Assisting someone in the procurement of an abortion is a criminal offence under the catch-all clause of the Offences against the Persons Act (1861)*." Ibidem, 328 (italics in the original).

[19] It is characteristic of the Northern mystery thriller that the protagonists, most of them detectives, have a Catholic background. Neville's Gerry Fegan is a Catholic and even though he may not otherwise have much in common with Duffy and Devlin (and even though he kills a Catholic priest for the latter's complicity in the murder of some British soldiers during the Troubles), his background remains a fact. Duffy—unlike Devlin—is not a practicing Catholic, but his background is impossible to ignore. And indeed, sometimes it becomes a major motivating force behind his actions, as when he says "Sancta Maria" over his sleeping girlfriend, pregnant but at this point determined not to keep the child. See M c K i n t y, *Rain Dogs*, 331.

In Stuart Neville's *The Ghosts of Belfast*, a supernatural thriller which has already earned the position of a classic,[20] the figures of two children play a crucial role in the plot. First, there is the ghost of a child, who appears with its also-ghostly mother. Innocent victims of a Republican bombing, they are now among the twelve ghosts that haunt the main protagonist, Gerry Fegan, a former Republican hitman, now seeking redemption through bloody reckoning. The child and its mother reappear throughout the novel, including in a pivotal moment at its climax. However, it is a real child, Ellen, spiritually in tune with the ghosts, who eventually brings about the much-desired pardoning for Fegan at the end of the novel. The thriller quality has to do with the fact that Fegan has taken under his protection two vulnerable persons: Ellen and her own mother, Marie.

With the twelve ghosts departed to their place of rest, the sequel, *Collusion*, focuses almost exclusively on Fegan's mission to protect the mother and the daughter. The presence of three extremely dangerous males, mutual antagonists, one expressly hired to kill the two vulnerable females, raises the thrills of pursuit and escape a notch higher. By the end of the novel, Marie and the two assassins are dead, but Lennon, the actual father (albeit estranged from his wife and daughter for six years), has been able to save Ellen's life and now is determined to ensure her safe future. But the battle is far from over. In another novel in the Jack Lennon series, *Stolen Souls*, Lennon is struggling to manage his roles as a single father and protector of his daughter, while solving the case of, presumably, the first Irish serial killer, a religious psychopath who preys on teenage girls.

Children and adolescents have a pronounced position in the plots of Brian McGilloway's novels. *Borderlands*, the first in the DI Benedict Devlin series, depicts an investigation into the murder of a sixteen-year-old girl starting on 21st December 2002. By the time a second murder has been committed, this time of a young man, it is clear that the solution lies in the past and that the events of the present will not make sense unless the detective reopens the twenty-year-old case of the disappearance of a prostitute, Mary Knox. The investigation leads to the place in which Mary (was) disappeared[21]—the Three

[20] See analyses in Fiona C o f f e y, "'The place you don't belong': Stuart Neville's Belfast," in *The Contemporary Irish Detective Novel*, ed. Elizabeth Mannion (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 91–108; Brian C l i f f, *Irish Crime Fiction* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 39–44, and Jacek M y d l a, "The Fertility of the Supernatural: Stuart Neville's *The Ghosts of Belfast*," *Lublin Studies in Modern Languages and Literature* 43, no. 2 (2019) (Gothic Explorations: Studies in Literature and Film): 51–9.

[21] The word "to disappear" has a special meaning in this context, as a police inspector explains: "At the time, the IRA has 'disappeared' quite a few people: informers, non-informers, people who spoke out against them in the local shops. Disappeared and never seen again. Provos wouldn't admit it then, but it's coming out now. Tortured them to find out what they'd said, then dumped the bodies on building sites." M c G i l l o w a y, *Borderlands*, 135.

Rivers Hotel, the name referring to a point "where the rivers Finn and Mourne merge into the Foyle."[22] Here McGilloway stages the final and deathly confrontation between Mary's daughter, Yvonne, bent on avenging the death of her mother, and Thomas Powell, Jr., son of a wealthy player from the previous era who had had Mary killed to prevent her exposing his fraud.

This resolution makes the plot vaguely reminiscent of the Gothic classic, *The Castle of Otranto* (1764), where, too, the story told in the present recounts retributive action for transgressions committed in the past. Little wonder then that at the end of *Borderlands* we hear an echo of the same Biblical motto about the sins of the fathers visited on the children to the third and fourth generation.[23] Says McGilloway's inspector about Mary's children and their murders: "In each case, they decided on transferring the punishment for the sins of the father onto the children."[24] This, incidentally, also basically sums up the plot of a Joe Spain novel, *With our Blessing*,[25] which depicts the abuses of Magdalen Laundries in the Republic of Ireland. A glaring manifestation of ruthless patriarchalism, these institutions served to deal with the issues of illegitimate (i.e., out-of-wedlock) pregnancy and single motherhood by separating the female "offenders" and "sinners" from the "respectable" part of society.[26]

Even in cases where Northern Irish detectives do not have families of their own, their sense of personal connection with cases involving young people and women seems unusually keen, perhaps stemming from their close sense of identity with their communities. In McGilloway's *Preserve the Dead*, we are reminded of a case which Lucy Black, a detective with no children or partner of her own, has not been able to solve:

> The picture of Mary Quigg stared down at her. Mary was a child with whom Lucy had had some dealings when she'd first joined the PSNI's Public Protection Unit. Mary's

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[22] Ibidem, 22.

[23] Horace Walpole famously quoted this verse (cf. Numbers 14:18) in the 1764 preface to *The Castle of Otranto* ("the sins of the fathers are visited on their children to the third and fourth generation"). See Horace W a l p o l e, *The Castle of Otranto* (London, Paris, New York & Melbourne: Cassell and Company, Limited), 4. See also Bible Hub, "Numbers 14:18). See also The New American Bible. http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0839/_INDEX.HTM, and The Bible Hub, https://biblehub.com/numbers/14-18.htm. Interestingly, Owen Dudley Edwards, himself a mystery-story author and a Sherlock Holmes scholar, used it in his 1970 study of the source of the conflict in Northern Ireland: *The Sins of our Fathers*. See Owen D u d l e y E d w a r d s, *The Sins of Our Fathers: Roots of Conflict in Northern Ireland* (Dublin and London: Gill and Macmillan, 1970).

[24] M c G i l l o w a y, *Borderlands*, 198.

[25] See Joe S p a i n, *With our Blessing* (London: Quercus, 2016).

[26] *Sex in a Cold Climate* is one of the documentaries about the notorious laundries. See *Sex in a Cold Climate*, Ireland 1998, directed by Steve Humphries, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=43y-YN-2YgiY. See also a feature film, *The Magdalene Sisters*, United Kingdom and Ireland, directed by Peter Mullan, 2002.

> mother's partner had murdered both her and her mother, when he set the house alight and took off with as much money as he could steal. He had never been charged with the killings, having fled to the Republic.... Mary Quigg's picture remained and would do until her killer … finally paid for what he had done.[27]

It is the empathetic zoom-in and close-range perspective of authors such as McGilloway which allows us to see how the recent and Troubles-affected past has influenced the lives of small communities and their most vulnerable members.

I will conclude this part of the article by quoting a passage from McGilloway's *Gallows Lane*, showing us the detective's return to the sanctuary of a peaceful home. The idea of a safe future personified in children is given here a memorable expression:

> It was while I was sorting through old toys that I heard a noise through the baby monitor. Assuming Shane was stirring for a bottle, I went into his room. He was already standing in his cot, his arms gripping the vertical bars, a juvenile prisoner. When he saw me, he raised his arms to be lifted and fell backwards, landing softly on his rump. He giggled once with pleasure, then said, "Daddy." He seemed to take even himself by surprise and repeated it, clearly, beaming with pride at his achievement.... I kissed him lightly on the forehead as he clung to my shirt and found myself smiling. On such small victories must the future be built.[28]

PREGNANCY AND HOPE IN McGOWAN'S PAULA MAGUIRE THRILLERS 1–3

In the remaining part of this article, I will examine the idea of motherhood in three of Claire McGowan's Paula Maguire mysteries. The three novels may be said to be a unit due to the fact that they encompass a crucial period in the life of the protagonist, Dr Paula Maguire, a chartered forensic psychologist and a member of the MPRU, or Missing Persons Response Unit.[29] In the first novel, *The Lost*, Paula returns to her hometown, Ballyterrin, and becomes a member of the Unit.[30] Towards the end of this novel, she realises that she

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[27] Brian M c G i l l o w a y, *Preserve the Dead* (London: Corsair, 2015), 102. PSNI stands for the Police Service of Northern Ireland.

[28] M c G i l l o w a y, *Gallows Lane*, 218–9.

[29] Naturally, the complexion of these issues changes as the series advances and Paula's life evolves; some of the matters discussed here are eventually resolved or simply change in significance. I have chosen to focus here on the first three novels specifically because of the way Paula's pregnancy brings to the fore the issues central to my paper.

[30] Ballyterrin is a fictional town on the border between the North and the South, i.e., Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. As we find out at the beginning of chapter four in *The Lost*, "Ballyterrin meant 'Border Town' in Irish, the place names mangled and anglicized from long centuries of colonization." M c G o w a n, *The Lost*, 28.

is pregnant. Not only is this discovery completely unexpected, but there are two potential fathers. One is Aidan O'Hara, her boyfriend from before she had left Ballyterrin at the age of eighteen, a local patriot and the editor of the *Ballyterrin Gazette*. The other is her current boss and head of the Unit, Guy Brooking, a married Englishman with a troubled family life. At the beginning of the second novel, *The Dead Ground*, Paula is two months pregnant and has to decide whether she wants to keep the baby, the other option being a flight to England to have an abortion. Towards the end of the book, her pregnancy becomes one reason why she herself becomes a target and a potential victim, the plot revolving around a mentally unstable woman who—unable to have children of her own—steals other people's, born and unborn. At the beginning of the third novel, *The Silent Dead*, we again meet Paula, who is now seven months pregnant, no longer able or indeed willing to conceal her pregnancy. In the course of this novel, Paula gives birth; towards the end, Aidan proposes to her, though it remains unknown whether he is the actual father.

Paula's own impending maternity is complemented by a second plot involving motherhood: the mysterious disappearance of Paula's own mother in 1993, when Paula was thirteen years old (she is thirty in *The Lost*).[31] When back in her home town, Paula unofficially reopens the case of her mother's disappearance; by the end of the third book, there is still no evidence that her mother is dead, even though Paula's father has remarried, having obtained a certificate that confirms her death.

In terms of plot arrangement, Paula's unceasing search for her missing mother runs parallel to the official investigations conducted by the MPRU and the police. This is only one of the many examples in which McGowan makes present and painfully relevant the country's troubled and oppressive past.[32] At the beginning of McGowan's *The Lost*, the MPRU start searching for two fifteen-year-old girls who have gone missing, one from a "respectable" Catholic family, the other from the local traveller community.[33] Soon the body

[31] What brings Paula and Aidan together is the fact that the latter lost his father during the Troubles: "John O'Hara … was shot dead by paramilitaries at the paper's office in 1986." Ibidem, 289 (the paper being *The Ballyterrin Gazette*). Now Aidan is the editor. Aidan's father's editorial (see ibidem 171–2) openly attacked the existing legal system, with its strict—and arguably inhumane—anti-abortion legislation.

[32] Concern with unquiet past as a distinctive feature of Northern Irish crime fiction has found some noteworthy expressions in *Little Girl Lost*. A nurse's comments on the state of Lucy Black's father, now suffering from Alzheimer's: "Maybe he's living in the past. Let's face it, it's the national condition in this country." M c G i l l o w a y, *Little Girl Lost*, 140. When, at some point, her mother says to Lucy in an attempt to reassure her, "The past is the past," Lucy answers, "No, it's not.... It's still infecting the present." Ibidem, 311.

[33] Needless to say, I do not use the word "respectable" to express racial bias. I want to point out that McGowan makes the readers aware of the social divisions and tensions of both the relatively small

of the Catholic girl, Cathy, is found. Autopsy results show that the girl was two months pregnant; subsequent investigation uncovers other cases of the abuse of teenage girls—the team's head's own daughter—by the male leader of a Christian "Mission" that recently set up a chapter of sorts in Ballyterrin. The end of the novel reveals that not only has Cathy been killed by her own mother, but that this woman had herself been a victim of sexual assault and impregnation by her father at the age of twelve:

> Yes, I'm Angela McGreavy. Yes, I got pregnant when I was twelve and they made me have the wean. And they took her away and sold her to America and I had to live in that home until I was eighteen.[34]

By "that home" Angela here means an institution for cases like hers: an illegitimate pregnancy, which traditionally was regarded as disgraceful.[35] The abusive father got away with his crime:

> At me day and night, and then when he gets me in trouble, he looks the police in the eye and he says, 'Officers, my daughter's a liar, she's been going round with boys, now you will take her and lock her up.'[36]

The reader is here expected to be shocked by at least two elements: the incestuous abuse of the girl and the practice of selling Irish children to foreigners. It is gruesomely ironic that the child—now an "American" woman in her twenties—has returned to Ballyterrin to find her parents. Moments before her suicide, Angela makes two statements which condemn the oppressive system: "Your da was my da. Happens all the time, especially in Ireland"[37]; "Nobody helped me when I was twelve, did they?… My Cathy, some fella pawing at her the same way. Still no abortion allowed in this country."[38]

These familiar themes return in *The Dead Ground*, yet with greater force and intensity. The events involving violence and sexual abuse against women and children come thick and fast, making the thematic preoccupations of the

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Ballyterrin community and the Irish society in general—addressing these issues is a significant feature of the contemporary crime novel. In view of the final shocking revelations at the end of the novel, the phrase "the façade of Catholic respectability" seems fully justified. See Sharon T i g h e - M o o n e y, "Irreconcilable Differences? The Fraught Relationship Between Women and the Catholic Church in Ireland," in *Tracing the Cultural Legacy of Irish Catholicism: From Galway to Cloyne and Beyond*, ed. by Eamon Maher and Eugene O'Brien (Manchester University Press, 2018), 199.

[34] M c G o w a n, *The Lost*, 355.

[35] An institution like the Magdalene Laundries, called Safe Harbour, which—given the context—has a bitterly ironic sound to it. See ibidem, 58.

[36] Ibidem, 360.

[37] Ibidem.

[38] Ibidem 356.

book almost too rich at times. The book opens with the kidnapping of a day-old infant born to a Polish immigrant couple; soon, a second infant goes missing. These events are followed by the murder of a local pro-choice activist ("abortionist"), as well as a bizarre kidnapping, when the activist's daughter, almost "ready to pop," is found with her belly slit open, bleeding to death, the child gone (a case of "foetal abduction"[39]). The second infant's body is eventually found in the backyard of its own family's home; it transpires that, rather than having been kidnapped, the child had accidentally drowned, and its mother had lied to the police. Paula herself is kidnapped by a madwoman who wants to perform a Caesarean section on her, which would kill both her and her baby. This being prevented, another tale of abuse is brought to light: the perpetrator is a woman that had been made pregnant by her own grandfather, ostensibly a devout Catholic, who, after the birth of the child, attempted unsuccessfully to kill it, only soon to succumb to a heart attack, as though struck down in punishment. Later, having gotten married and become pregnant again, the woman lost another child in horrific circumstances, which left her mentally impaired, and with a pathological craving for a child that "would love her."[40] Her mental condition is supposed to explain her atrocious actions, and, to an extent, exonerate her. To make matters more complicated, the madwoman has been assisted by her sister. The latter is now a Christian visionary who sees the Virgin Mary and has been helping women—among them a friend of Paula's—who struggle with infertility. The result of this avalanche of events, past and present, is an indelible impression of the multigenerational victimization of women and children.

In the third novel, the themes of (unwanted) pregnancy and absent motherhood are joined by that of retributive justice against those who would harm innocent women and children. The plot of *The Silent Dead* involves a search for no fewer than five missing people, all adults, who have been responsible for a bomb massacre in which a dozen innocent civilians were killed ("sixteen dead and hundreds wounded"[41]), including children. Right from the start, the search for the missing people is combined with murder inquiry, as the novel opens with the discovery of the body of one of the so-called "Mayday Five." Yet, despite the fact that the missing people in this book are all adults, the themes of maternity and childhood are ever present. First of all, Paula is now seven months pregnant and keenly self-conscious of it. Numerous passages remind the reader of her condition; her belly, in particular, is always before the reader's eyes:

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[39] M c G o w a n, *The Dead Ground*, 238.

[40] Ibidem, 374. "She doesn't love me. She knows I'm not her mother." Ibidem, 370.

[41] M c G o w a n, *The Silent Dead*, 31.

> She shifted on her swollen feet. The bulk of her belly meant the only way she could comfortably stand was with one hip jutted out, leaning on it, and she didn't think such an insolent pose would cut it before the altar. She'd already seen the priest's eye travelling over her stomach and then pointedly not looking at it. Catholics —they were good at pretending things that did exist didn't. And vice versa.[42]

> The room buzzed with chatter, and as usual men outnumbered women, so Paula, her belly huge, drew every eye.[43]

> But always there was the pressing bump of her child, reminding her that some mistakes just couldn't be ignored.[44]

And so on. Juxtaposing these passages also reveals Paula's preoccupation with the problems of visibility and acknowledgement—what is seen and what is not seen; what is ignored, and what is imagined. The physical growth of Paula's swelling belly, and her intense awareness of it, are thereby linked with the Troubles-era dilemma of the dangers of seeing what one has seen, and the incentive, agonizing though it might be, to un-see it. In such passages, the religious, personal and cultural elements of pregnancy are united with the lingering memory of the Troubles.

Also central to the plot is the figure of a girl, Kira, whose narrative runs parallel to the main action. Kira is haunted by the memories of her sister, Rose, one of the victims of the bombing. Living with the painful memory of her beloved sister, Kira herself is another victim in that she cannot stop living in the past. Although the actual retributive action is performed by adults (members of a support group who meet regularly to remember the victims and to keep the memory of the atrocity fresh), the revelation that it was Kira who invented the scheme comes as no surprise. The killings of the Mayday Five, for which Kira is responsible, are brutal, verging on the sadistic; one of the Five, now a mother of three, is buried alive after a protracted scene of attempted escape, barefoot, through dense woods.

However, McGowan stops short of identifying Kira as an unsympathetic, irredeemable villain. Paula herself identifies and sympathizes with Kira, reflecting through the narrator that "the girl was the same age Paula had been when her mother went, similarly lost, grief stricken."[45] This shared sense of the lost mother figure turns out to be more pertinent than even Paula anticipates. Eventually, it is revealed that Rose was not Kira's sister, but her *mother*. As Kira says to Paula:

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[42] Ibidem, 3.
[43] Ibidem, 62.
[44] Ibidem, 171.
[45] Ibidem, 83.

> 'Mammy [actually the grandmother] used to say things, when she'd drunk too much. So I asked Jamesie – that was Rose's boyfriend. I knew she used to go out with him way back. He said he was my dad. Rose was having me, only she was too young, she was fifteen, so they pretended I was Mammy's and Rose didn't see Jamesie again for years.'[46]

What Paula thinks at this point is also significant; I expect that the reader may take a while to take in this piece of information:

> 'That must have been very difficult.' Paula's mind was racing. It was common practice in Irish families, the youngest member actually being the first grandchild.[47]

But Kira's response is not what Paula might have expected:

> 'Not really.'... 'I knew, you see. I could tell Rose loved me. She talks to me sometimes, still. She said she'd have gladly died like that, instead of me, if that was the choice she had to make. You'd do the same, wouldn't you, miss? For the little girl? You'd die for her. That's what it means when you really love someone.'[48]

In this scene, then, the novel attains a truly Christian bonding between the protagonist and the underage offender. McGowan does not cite the Gospels, but may depend on the reader's recalling one of the most significant passages therein: "This is my commandment: love one another as I love you. No one has greater love than this, to lay down one's life for one's friends. You are my friends if you do what I command you" (Jn 15:12–14).[49]

Given this context, it is a bit less surprising that McGowan lets Kira go virtually unpunished. At the end of the novel, the family, broken as it is, reunite:

> Kira [visiting the cemetery] smiled, and turned to go back to the car where Jamesie was waiting for her. She shut the gate to the graveyard with a squeak, and she didn't look back.[50]

This is how the novel ends. McGowan seems to be saying here that there is a future for this family, like there is a future for Paula's relationship with both potential fathers of her child. All these relationships have had to leave behind a painful past, a past marked by violence, loss, and mourning, but also have been strengthened into a new life by forgiveness, reconciliation, and the need

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[46] Ibidem, 349–50.
[47] Ibidem, 350.
[48] Ibidem.
[49] The New American Bible, http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0839/_INDEX.HTM.
[50] M c G o w a n, *The Silent Dead*, 372.

to look not behind, but ahead. By hope. This is precisely what, early in the novel, Paula thinks when she feels the yet unborn life inside herself:

> Under her smock and cardigan, she stroked the firm rising bump of her pregnancy. This was flesh and certainty, a fresh start, untainted by the past, of the fear she would be born into. Paula just hoped the baby wouldn't see where she was.[51]

If feelings such as this were suppressed or if there were no room for them, there would be no hope.

Claire McGowan, like her fellow Northern authors, starts with the mystery thriller's persistent preoccupation with the "sins of the fathers" and accompanying traumas of the past, and from there explores ways to break free from this painful legacy. To be sure, the central mysteries of McGowan's series have not been entirely dispelled by the end of the third novel; Paula will keep on looking for her mother and other missing persons, and the father of her own child is yet unknown. Yet, as the third novel closes, the heroine has successfully met the challenges of her personal life and is now ready to build a hopeful future for herself, her chosen partner and their new-born daughter. Paula is definitely a liberated woman, fully aware of how oppressive the old mores have been. She understands how wary women, especially young women, have to be of the human predators, particularly those who approach them clad in sheep skins of piety and respectability. Through Paula, McGowan has prepared her readers to welcome and embrace pro-choice legislation on the horizon in real life, while at the same time books such as *The Dead Ground* make readers alert to the bare fact that the ability to choose does not by itself solve the dilemmas that unplanned pregnancy brings to a woman: "'How do you decide?' she [Paula] burst out. 'In this kind of situation, when it's impossible? How do you choose?'"[52] No matter how difficult and perilous Paula's homecoming has turned out to be, her decision to keep her baby may be read as a gesture of reconciliation with her roots and her Catholic background—and a repudiation of the Troubles-era agony born of the necessity to un-see what has been seen.

While there is little doubt that children in the novels of McGowan personify and embody the future, both on a personal (familial) and national level, the author, like her contemporaries, sees complications. That women and children need protection goes without saying, and in both real life and fiction, the legal systems in Northern Ireland and in the Republic attempt to live up to this imperative. Things become less clear-cut when—as is repeatedly the case in McGowan's stories—the people who should be protected

[51] Ibidem, 118.

[52] M c G o w a n, *The Dead Ground*, 251.

somehow fall through the cracks, or are deliberately ignored due to stigma or other circumstances, especially if they are victims of abuse. A recurring motif is that investigators are finding it hard to uncover the truth in a post-Good-Friday-Agreement society bent on leaving the troubled and oppressive past as far behind as possible. Without a personal connection tying a detective to a case, institutional blindness can obscure the facts or make cases vulnerable to political, religious or financial influence. Maybe that is why McGowan and her fellow Northern Irish writers tie their detectives to their cases with such intense personal bonds, involving and even endangering not only themselves, but their families. These authors seem to be saying that while any victims still exist of crimes born of the past, especially those rooted in the system of patriarchal oppression and The Troubles, the fragile peace remains at risk. Even at best, under such conditions, the danger exists that the 'peace' Northern Irish society currently enjoys simply may never translate into 'peace of mind.' If we do not maintain a sense of personal, empathetic and imaginative connection with the victims of past crimes—precisely like that between Lucy Black and Mary Quigg—closure and healing may never be ours.

Although an analogy between author and protagonist may be risky, I would like to conclude by suggesting a parallel between Claire McGowan's novels themselves and the Missing Persons Response Unit they depict. Like Paula Maguire, Claire McGowan has been seeking to persuade us that difficult cases involving the most vulnerable in our society should not be lost sight of; that the efforts of an investigation, no matter how risky for the well-being of the detective and her child, are worth making. No matter how complex the narratives and the web of moral complications, they deserve the effort of proper investigation, which will ensure that a hopeful future remains open.

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ABSTRACT / ABSTRAKT

Jacek MYDLA, It's All About the Weans: A Survey of Troubled Procreation and Hope in the Contemporary Northern Irish Mystery Thriller

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This article relates the idea of hope to themes of motherhood and childhood as handled by contemporary Northern Irish crime authors. The main part of the article discusses the theme of pregnancy in Claire McGowan's Paula Maguire mystery thrillers.

Keywords: Northern Ireland, mystery thriller, the Troubles, pregnancy, maternity, hope

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Jacek MYDLA, "Maleństwa – tylko one się liczą". Wątki trudnej prokreacji i nadziei we współczesnym północnoirlandzkim thrillerze kryminalnym

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Artykuł odnosi pojęcie nadziei do prokreacji i bada, w jaki sposób współczesny północnoirlandzki kryminał (ściślej: thriller kryminalny) przedstawia postaci matek, ojców i dzieci. W głównej części artykułu, autor omawia temat „trudnej prokreacji" w serii powieściowej autorstwa Claire McGowan, w której główną postacią jest psycholog-kryminalista Paula Maguire i gdzie jednym z zasadniczych wątków jest nieplanowana i niechciana ciąża.

Słowa kluczowe: Irlandia Północna, thriller kryminalny, wojna domowa (the Troubles), ciąża, macierzyństwo, nadzieja

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Joanna MICHALCZUK

"TURN BACK IF POSSIBLE!" On Fears Related to the "End" and Hopes for a "Continuation" in Plays by Jarosław Jakubowski

According to Jakubowski, only a new insight into the fundamental philosophical issues can become a source of hope for the humanity. And hope, for its part, is always related to the actual experience of a given person and invokes the view of a human life as an existence turned towards the future, as well as the vision of the human being as 'homo viator' awaiting fulfillment at the end of his, or her, path.

THE PLAYWRIGHT

Jarosław Jakubowski (born in 1974), a valued Polish poet, novelist, journalist, and contributor to the nationwide bi-monthly literary magazine *Topos*, is also among the most interesting Polish playwrights of recent years. Jakubowski made his début in this profession with an on-stage reading of his play "Dom matki" [Mother's House] in the Laboratorium Dramatu Theatre in Warsaw in 2007. He published two collections of plays,[1] some of which were also contributions to journals[2]; others proved themselves worthy the stage. Among the latter, the particularly successful premiere of "Generał" [The General],[3] a story about the life of Wojciech Jaruzelski,[4] is considered as one of the most

[1] See Jarosław J a k u b o w s k i, *"Generał" i inne dramaty polityczne* (Warszawa: Agencja Dramatu i Teatru AdiT, 2014); Jarosław J a k u b o w s k i, *"Prawda" i inne dramaty* (Warszawa: Agencja Dramatu i Teatru AdiT, 2017).

[2] See Jarosław J a k u b o w s k i, "Generał," *Dialog*, no. 12 (2010): 28–80; Jarosław J a k u b o w s k i, "Magik: dwuosobowy utwór sceniczny," *Dialog*, no. 10 (2012): 142–63, Jarosław J a k u b o w s k i, "Kucharz," *Dialog*, no. 10 (2015): 215–37; Jarosław J a k u b o w s k i, "Dożynki: nie-komedia," *Dialog*, no. 6 (2017): 125–55; Jarosław J a k u b o w s k i, "Viva Violetta!" *Fronda Lux*, no. 84–85 (2017): 84–139; Jarosław J a k u b o w s k i, "Wielka podróż Malinowego Królika," *Nowe Sztuki dla Dzieci i Młodzieży*, no. 32 (2011): 285–325, Jarosław J a k u b o w s k i, "Opowieść o Dziewczynce-Wiewiórce," *Nowe Sztuki dla Dzieci i Młodzieży*, no. 42 (2017): 161–91; Jarosław J a k u b o w s k i, "Buława," *Nowy Napis: Liryka, Epika, Dramat*, no. 1 (2019): 201–47.

[3] The play was directed by Aleksandra Popławska and Marek Kalita, and its premiere took place on April 21, 2011, at the IMKA Theatre in Warsaw.

[4] General Wojciech Jaruzelski (1923–2014) was a Polish military officer and a communist politician. He was the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party from 1981 to 1989 and served as Prime Minister from 1981 to 1985. He was personally responsible for the decision to impose martial law in Poland in 1981, which helped him crush the democratic opposition. The period of martial law affected negatively both the political and the economic situation of Poland: nevertheless there have been claims that it was owing to Jaruzelski's brave rule that the Soviet plans to invade Poland were

important and most highly rated performances in the recent years in Poland.[5] It is worth noting, though, that the name of the main character, a historically dubious personage, is not mentioned throughout the play and no unequivocal judgment of his political career is offered. Another play by Jakubowski, *Życie: komedia dla dorosłych* [Life: A Comedy for Adults],[6] was awarded the prize for the best comedy in the Playwright Competition for Comedy Writers 'Komediopisanie,' a contest promoting Polish comedy plays which was held by the Polish Center for Comedy at Teatr Powszechny (Powszechny Theatre) in Łódź in 2010. *Wieczny kwiecień* [Eternal April],[7] in turn, won another edition of 'Metaphors of Reality,' earning not only the jury prize but also the audience award. *Wieczny kwiecień* is a metaphorical reference to the political climate in Poland after the fatal air crash in Smolensk, Russia, of the Polish Air Force plane carrying President Jarosław Kaczyński and 95 other passengers, most of whom represented the Polish political scene.[8] The play unveiled a deep division among the Polish people and the destructive consequences of the continuous confrontation between the main two

abandoned. After the breakthrough of 1989, Jaruzelski served, among others, as the President of Poland. Up to this day, his public activity has been praised by some and condemned by others.

[5] In 2011, the play was awarded the main prize at the R@port Polish Contemporary Plays Festival; in 2010, the same play also reached the finals of the Polish drama competition 'Metaphors of Reality' held by Teatr Polski (Polish Theatre) in Poznań. In 2012, Marek Kalita, playing the role of the General, was among actors awarded the prize for best acting at the Competition for Staging a Polish Contemporary Play, which aims to popularize modern Polish drama and to support theatres staging plays written by Polish playwrights. At the same competition, directors Aleksandra Popławska and Marek Kalita earned an honorable mention. In the annual contest held by the journal *Teatr* [Theatre], Marek Kalita won the prestigious Aleksander Zelwerowicz Award for the best actor in the 2010–2011 theatrical season (for the role of the General, among others).

[6] The play was directed by Paweł Aigner, and its premiere took place at Teatr Powszechny in Łódź on October 22, 2011. See Jarosław Jakubowski, "Życie: Komedia dla dorosłych," in *Antologia współczesnej polskiej komedii*, ed. Anna Maria Dolińska (Łódź: Teatr Powszechny, 2010).

[7] The play was directed by Agnieszka Korytkowska-Mazur and its preview took place on October 10, 2011, at Teatr Polski in Poznań.

[8] The Polish Airforce TU-154 crashed near Smolensk on April 10, 2010, and none of the 96 passengers on board survived the disaster. The plane was carrying the Polish president, his wife, the former President of Poland in exile, Deputy Marshals of the Polish Parliament and Senate, representatives of the Polish Armed Forces, as well as Polish government officials and members of Parliament. The group were to attend an event commemorating the 70th anniversary of the Katyn massacre (a series of mass executions of about 22,000 Polish military officers and intelligentsia carried out by the Soviet Union in April and May 1940). Following the air crash, national mourning was held in Poland from April 10 to April 18th, with people leaving flowers and lights outside the Presidential Palace in Warsaw and praying. All across the country remembrance marches were held and masses for the victims prayed in churches. On April 18, over 150 thousand people participated in the funeral of President Lech Kaczyński and his wife in Cracow, with millions of viewers watching the ceremony on television. The Smolensk air disaster became an important element of the Polish public debate. Investigation into the causes of the crash was undertaken and widely discussed, and marches of remembrance to commemorate the victims were held in Warsaw on every 10th day of each month.

political groupings in Poland: the one following a narrowly conceived national-Catholic tradition (caricatured in the play) and the one contesting the tradition and making a blind turn towards modernity.

One might say that, as a playwright, Jarosław Jakubowski remains a traditionalist. He keeps to his attitude in spite of the ongoing transformations of the Polish theatre, which began in the 1990s and are focused, on the one hand, on the abandonment of the "safe space of play-staging," and, on the other, on efforts to create a theatre "producing plays at its own risk,"[9] which, "due to the worldviews of its creators, breaks the existing narrative structures or even questions the mere possibility of working them out, thus creating, more intensely than ever before, room for controversy, conflict, and antagonism."[10] In an era of new ways of doing stage-work (e.g., on stage workshop-style composition), and with the profession of the dramatist slowly emerging to replace that of the playwright,[11] Jakubowski prefers to remain the latter. Speaking of his potential audience, Jakubowski emphasizes that he would like them not to expect the theatre to break the taboos or to lean towards performance art; rather, he wishes they would need to believe "that they are not all alone going through life with the mental or emotional weight they carry around."[12]

As a playwright, Jakubowski is perceived through the prism of the politically conservative ('rightist') message his plays apparently convey. Indeed, they are 'political,' the Jakubowski has acknowledged, having entitled the first collection of his works *"Generał" i inne dramaty polityczne* ["The General" and Other Political Plays], and confirmed by his conservative non-involvement in the current controversies which mark the Polish public square.[13] His traditionalist approach does not add to his popularity as a playwright in Poland, but, on the other hand, his stance cannot be taken for granted,[14] and approaching Jakubowski's output solely as traditionalist, conservative or politically rightist would amount to bias and simplification.

The presentation of Jakubowski's plays in the current paper is aimed at acquainting international readers with an output of universal appeal. Jakubowski

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[9] Joanna K r a k o w s k a, "Przesiedleni: Wstęp". In *Transfer! Teksty dla teatru*, ed. Joanna Krakowska (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Krytyki Politycznej, 2015), 5. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.

[10] Ibidem, 9.

[11] Unlike the playwright, the dramatist does not end their work, having finished writing the play, but cooperates with the director and the other members of the team during the rehearsals up to the premiere.

[12] J a k u b o w s k i, "Posłowie, czyli o końcu," in Jakubowski, *"Prawda" i inne dramaty*, 459.

[13] See Jarosław C y m e r m a n, "Empatia, czyli uwolnienie głosów," *Teatr*, no. 11 (2017): 81. *Teatr* [The Theatre] is one of the oldest Polish cultural journals covering the most important events of Polish theatrical life.

[14] See ibidem: 80.

shows a deep awareness of the decline of the modern world, which is marked by crises of realities such as fatherhood, the family, traditional values, social roles, and religious faith. As a result, the modern world—a world devoid of transcendence—manifests the consequences the current erosion of the Christian tradition has for culture. However, Jakubowski does not stop at describing manifestations of the decline but provokes his readers and his audience so that they will reflect on things "they do not want (or are scared) to speak about aloud."[15] He wants to create his own textual worlds which do not necessarily follow the rules of a specific performance or of a vision of a chosen director. Rather, he offers his audience a dialogue on the unchangeability of human nature and on issues transcending the horizons set by the contingency of life. Interestingly, at the same time, he does not usurp for himself the role of a judge or a moralist[16]. In it, Jakubowski is unlike numerous contemporary authors whose "texts for the theatre,"[17] reflecting their *Weltanschauung*, "demonstrate that they have abandoned what they call an illusion that there still might be a genuine idea worth articulating in their own words, and who believe that the world resembles a box of scattered puzzles which may be assembled according to one's needs."[18]

By pointing in his plays to the epistemological and axiological crisis of the modern world and to the anthropological consequences of this crisis, apparent today in the proliferation of reductionist attitudes which disregard certain inalienable human needs and question the non-negotiability of the status of the human being as person,[19] Jakubowski warns his audience that the dangers of the reductionist approach are even greater once they remain unnoticed. Jakubowski's plays, both the futuristic ones and those with plots set in the present day, might be disturbing in that they suggest that the dystopian visions created decades ago can still be applied to today's reality. Against such a background, Jakubowski outlines his understanding of hope as a sentiment inherent to human life, yet one inextricably tied to the personal rather than objective dimension of human existence. As such, hope is rooted in the transcendent reality outside the 'here and now,' on the one hand, and, on the other, in the openness to a personal relationship with another human being, built on the

[15] J a k u b o w s k i, "Posłowie, czyli o końcu," 459.

[16] Ibidem, 460.

[17] Joanna Krakowska writes that the so-called 'texts for the theatre' represent a new literary genre. Having been created specifically for the theatre, it is only when used on stage that they assume their final shape. As such, the represent a hybrid genre, 'parasitizing' on original works. See K r a k o w s k a, "Przesiedleni: Wstęp," 10. See also Jacek K o p c i ń s k i, *Wybudzanie: Dramat polski / Interpretacje* (Warsaw: Instytut Badań Literackich PAN, 2018), 10–1.

[18] K r a k o w s k a, "Przesiedleni: Wstęp," 8–9.

[19] See Danuta R a d z i s z e w s k a - S z c z e p a n i a k, "Redukcjonizm antropologiczny i jego konsekwencje," *Nurt SVD: Półrocznik Misjologiczno-Religioznawczy* 50, no. 2 (2006): 378–95.

foundation of lasting values. A chance for hope to become the reality is forever inscribed in the human life conceived as 'something more' than a continuity of metabolic processes.

A brief analysis of selected plays by Jakubowski will demonstrate that his goal is not merely a 'defense' of traditional values. Rather, he suggests that without them as the foundation the truly human element in modern culture is subject to gradual demise, which in turn leaves an apocalyptic mark on modernity, much as contemporary culture might seem to affirm the human being and grant her the greatest possible power.

THE INCONSPICUOUSNESS OF THE HUMAN ELEMENT IN MODERNITY

Jagoda Hernik Spalińska observes that, in his plays, Jakubowski examines the postmodern condition of an individual, as it is manifested in the reality of contemporary Poland.[20] While creating his capacious metaphors of modern social life, he stands out against a majority of authors describing the transformations in Poland at the turn of the new century and does not follow the tendency to pose "diagnoses filled with oikophobic obsessions"[21] or ridicule his compatriots, thus labelling those describing the reality as the good ones and those who are being described as bad.[22] The image of the Polish society we find in Jakubowski's plays is never presented from the position of a ruthless and mocking critic exaggerating the vices of the society in which he lives. Rather, his attitude is that of an attentive observer who "sees and describes things, but also loves what he describes."[23] Hernik Spalińska also emphasizes that the literary synthesis we find in Jakubowski's plays shows that he is as if "a step ahead" of those advancing the generally accepted views of modern social reality, in particular the opinions regarding Polish identity and the condition of European societies.[24] Jakubowski believes that an artist has the duty to be honest towards his audience,[25] but he does not want to destroy their

[20] See Jagoda H e r n i k S p a l i ń s k a, "Jakubowski, czyli Polska ponowoczesna," in *Ikony, pseudoherosi i zwykli śmiertelnicy: Antologia najnowszego dramatu polskiego*, ed. Elżbieta Manthey, Kamila Paprocka, and Piotr Grzymisławski (Warszawa: Agencja Dramatu i Teatru ADiT, 2015), 92–3.

[21] Jagoda H e r n i k S p a l i ń s k a, "Pytania i znaki," in Jakubowski, *"Prawda" i inne dramaty*, 6.

[22] See ibidem.

[23] Ibidem.

[24] See ibidem, 7. See also H e r n i k S p a l i ń s k a, "Jakubowski, czyli Polska ponowoczesna," 96.

[25] See J a k u b o w s k i, "Posłowie, czyli o końcu," 461.

world. There are already too many "fans of destruction,"[26] he says. Instead, he describes himself as a "herald of the end"[27] and wishes to focus the attention of his audience on the consequences of the tendencies, characteristic of the modern demo-liberal (or post-Christian) Western civilization, to "set the human being free from any restrictions arising from religion."[28] His image of man is that of the Nietzschean "last man," the one that survived the "battle for modernity,"[29] the man Witkacy[30] warned about and ridiculed, the one satisfied with his present condition and no longer motivated to seek a betterment of his inner being: the one whose only life goal is survival and lasting comfort.[31] However, Jakubowski believes in the significance of the social aspect of literature and of the theatre. In his view, the reader, having made a mental journey—together with literary protagonists—into the abyss of anguish and pain, or even into the one of effectively repressed emotions, may return "somewhat smarter, perhaps even somewhat better."[32]

THE CHARACTERS

In his play "Znaki" [The Characters],[33] Jakubowski discusses the predicament of a modern writer in a time of the subordination of culture to the dictates of the market. Referring in a way of to his own situation of a playwright, Jakubowski denounces the tendency, common today, to simplify the meaning of words and to degrade them. The propensity in question has developed—in his view—as a result of immediate and unrestricted access to electronic communication, which is a mark of the present time. The main protagonist of the play, who serves as an allegory of the modern creator of culture, is a successful middle-aged writer subjected to pressures limiting his artistic freedom. Challenged by demands to compromise in areas crucial to his profession, he feels degraded not only as an artist, but also as a person. "In order to be recognized by a large publishing house, one needs to meet a number of conditions, many of them strictly commercial ... to bear in mind the so-called target," the author of

[26] Ibidem, 460.

[27] Ibidem.

[28] Ibidem.

[29] H e r n i k S p a l i ń s k a, "Pytania i znaki," 7.

[30] Stanisław Ignacy Witkiewicz (1885–1939), commonly known as Witkacy, was a Polish writer, painter, and philosopher, as well as theorist of catastrophism. He committed suicide after having heard the news of the Soviet invasion of Poland in September 1939.

[31] Ibidem.

[32] J a k u b o w s k i, "Posłowie, czyli o końcu," 459.

[33] Jarosław J a k u b o w s k i, "Znaki," in Jakubowski, *"Prawda" i inne dramaty*, 25–79.

"Znaki" confesses. "Books are nowadays published as merchandise. The same happens with theatrical plays: they are created for a specific need.... Many people allow this system to absorb them. Many do not accept compromise, but the price is non-existence."[34] The protagonist of Jakubowski's play, a traditionalist and an individualist who detests "generalizations of any kind"[35] is faced with a new regulation prohibiting the use of native Polish characters, allegedly for the sake of the convenience of language users. The regulation is a response to the need for a maximum simplification and efficiency of the language used in communication. Moreover, the decree is supposed to foster the economy of time, as well as that of the means of communication. On top of it, the move will be good for the environment. However, the writer believes that the ridiculous administrative decision will result in 'harm' done to the language[36] and that it will turn out destructive not only for literary works as such, but also for humanity itself. After all, it is 'humanity' that literary works express, among others, by describing the identity of the nation and the specificity of its culture. In the face of the oppression he experiences, though, the writer's initial protest against the ridiculous administrative decision fades. His struggle to save his mother tongue[37] gradually disappears and is replaced with his acknowledgement of the idea of a 'cleansed' and more logical language, although he finds it monstrous in its denial of the transcendent roots of all speech.[38] The new idea, however, corresponds to the image of a cleansed and dreary world bereft of any irregularities and of the beauty of the irrational.[39] Having surrendered to the pressure the rationalizers of the language exert on him, the protagonist finds himself unable to withdraw his consent to their idea and becomes a passive tool of the new social system. The helplessness of the writer is an allusion to the helplessness of the language reflecting the epistemological and axiological crises of the present time. The words can no longer "give everything its fitting name,"[40] because the language can no longer "introduce order into anything,"

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[34] Michał Ż a r s k i, "Bezsilność: Z Jarosławem Jakubowskim rozmawia Michał Żarski," *Teatr* 72, no. 11 (2017): 78.

[35] J a k u b o w s k i, "Znaki," 40.

[36] See ibidem.

[37] In the writer's heroic attempts to 'save' his language, one can trace a reference to poet Cyprian Norwid (1821–1883) with his typical emphasis on the ethical dimension of language and the sacred foundation of words.

[38] J a k u b o w s k i, "Znaki," 48.

[39] See ibidem, 50.

[40] See Cyprian N o r w i d, "Za wstęp (Ogólniki)." In Cyprian Norwid, *Vade-mecum*, ed. Józef Fert (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1990), 14. The line in question is quoted in Patrick Corness's translation. Quoted after Agata B r a j e r s k a - M a z u r, "'Rzeczy – słowo' Norwida w przekładzie na język angielski," *Roczniki Humanistyczne* 66, no. 8 (2018): 89.

or "communicate anything."[41] Instead, it becomes a tool of pressure and manipulation, a mechanism of oppression and enslavement. The imposed 'purity' of language has its dreadful moral consequences in that it makes the language inhuman and paralyzing the consciousness. A similar case is described in George Orwell's *1984*: "It's a beautiful thing, the destruction of words.... The whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the range of thought.... Orthodoxy means not thinking—not needing to think. Orthodoxy is unconsciousness."[42]

In "Znaki," Jakubowski elaborates on the analogy between the situation of ideological pressure characteristic of a totalitarian system, which resulted in the degradation of official discourse to 'badspeak'[43] in the Poland of the communist period, on the one hand, and, on the other, the degradation of language characteristic of the modern times. He draws a parallel between the restrictions of the freedom of speech introduced in the totalitarian past and the compromises writers, in particular playwrights, have to make, should they wish their works to be published or have their plays staged.[44] "The power is in the hands of those who control the language. We live in an age of fake news and we are constantly 'bombarded' with media reports, which are mostly fabricated. Nevertheless many people believe what they hear,"[45] says Jakubowski, and he emphasizes the danger inherent in using the language as a tool to manipulate people's value perception. Strategies serving this purpose are universally—and not infrequently thoughtlessly—employed today, which is alarming. Destruction of the language in the name of a particular vision of 'linguistic perfection' is still a burning issue in Poland, although the communist system was replaced by a democratic one almost three decades ago. Michał Głowiński notes: "Today, 'badspeak' (not only in Poland) assumes various forms and is related to diverse social phenomena; it manifests various ideologies as well as various pathologies."[46]

NOWHERE-MAN AND THE CHEF

In Jakubowski's plays, the danger inherent in modern anthropological conceptions and in their implications is analyzed in reference to ideas which reduce the human being either to *res cogitans* or to *res extensa*. While in the

[41] J a k u b o w s k i, "Znaki," 76.

[42] George O r w e l l, *1984*, https://archive.org/details/NINETEENEIGHTY-FOUR1984ByGeorgeOrwellPDFAudioBook, 65–8.

[43] See Michał G ł o w i ń s k i, *Zła mowa: Jak nie dać się propagandzie?* (Warszawa: Wielka Litera, 2016).

[44] See H e r n i k S p a l i ń s k a, "Pytania i znaki," 22.

[45] Ż a r s k i, "Bezsilność: Z Jarosławem Jakubowskim rozmawia Michał Żarski": 77.

[46] Michał G ł o w i ń s k i, *Zła mowa: Jak nie dać się propagandzie?*, 10.

former case the person is identified with her mind, and her body perceived as an impersonal reality which can be freely manipulated,[47] in the latter, the human being as a whole is seen as a set of material structures.[48] Jakubowski addresses the dangers of anthropological reductionism in his plays "Beatlesi / Zaginiona piosenka" [The Beatles / The Lost Song][49] and "Kucharz" [The Chef].[50] In the former, the world of popular culture icons who, due to their popularity and recognition, fill in the (real or imaginary) deficits of their admirers,[51] is contrasted with the world of an average, unrecognized person, called Nowhere-Man. By creating the character of Nowhere-Man, Jakubowski addresses the issue of stereotypical depreciation of what is native, which is very typical of the Polish mentality. Thus he refers to the fundamental problem of cultural uprootedness, addressed already by Simone Weil, who observed that a person without roots will never be fully a person.[52] Nowhere-Man, who cuts his roots and deprives himself of home, builds his own vision of the world, and of himself in it, on the denial of what he knows and of what has shaped him. "He wants to live a borrowed life; since he does not have a sense of the significance of his own existence, he needs to take over the biography of someone else so that he might feel alive"[53]. Nowhere-Man wants one thing only: to be like his idols, The Beatles. The mentality of the frustrated protagonist, desperate for a success in life, reflects modern transformations of Western culture which lead to an erosion of traditional values established within the Judeo–Christian culture and to their replacement by random values. Thus Jakubowski addresses the issues of relegating the spiritual aspect of life from the public sphere and of pragmatizing the sacred by treating it as if it was "an element of a therapeutic game, based on the need for full satisfaction."[54] He examines the results of the modern dictate of pop culture, which goes as far as determining the shape of religious worship, or even creating religion.[55] In the reality described by Jakubowski,

[47] See R a d z i s z e w s k a - S z c z e p a n i a k, "Redukcjonizm antropologiczny i jego konsekwencje," 386.

[48] See ibidem, 386n.

[49] See J a k u b o w s k i, "Beatlesi/ Zaginiona piosenka," in Jakubowski, *"Prawda" i inne dramaty*, 81–125.

[50] See J a k u b o w s k i, "Kucharz," in Jakubowski, *"Prawda" i inne dramaty*, 227– 64.

[51] See, e.g., Dariusz S k ó r c z e w s k i, "Hegemon jako idol: Zachód jako hegemon wyobrażony." In *Idol w kulturze*, ed. Edward Fiała, Adam Fitas, and Dariusz Skórczewski (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2017), 100–1.

[52] See Simone W e i l, *The Need for Roots*, trans. Arthur Wills (London: Routledge and Keagan Paul, 1952).

[53] Ż a r s k i, "Bezsilność: Z Jarosławem Jakubowskim rozmawia Michał Żarski": 78.

[54] Agata B i e l i k-R o b s o n, *Inna nowoczesność: Pytania o współczesną formułę duchowości* (Kraków: Universitas, 2000), 256.

[55] See Joanna M i c h a l c z u k, *Między zwątpieniem a nadzieją: Wokół problematyki sakralnej w dramacie polskim po roku 1989* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2018), 103–4. See also *Religijność*

the God of the Bible is replaced by divinized man. "There is no Poland, there is no God; there is you," says a member of The Beatles to Nowhere-Man, who yields to the illusory vision of himself as an absolutely free, autonomous and autotelic being, capable of exercising his unbound will in any area of life.[56] While discussing the spiritual void of his protagonists, on the one hand, and divinization of idols as a way to fill in the void, Jakubowski unveils the consequences of "secular idolatrous faith,"[57] involving appropriation, enslavement and destruction of the uniqueness of a human being by an idol from outside religion, which is—paradoxically—accomplished at the request of the individual in question.[58] The blurred identity of modern man, lost among the simulacra, obliterates the border between what is true (and real) and what is false (and merely imagined).[59] Identity destruction affects Nowhere-Man, a representative of billions of "nowhere-men"[60] populating the whole world ("like billions of mirrors which only reflect each other"[61]), as much as it affects those who are made idols and those who create idols: the image builders and image makers who sustain the illusion that the existence of idols is an important value, or even a source of meaning.

Umberto Eco writes that it is in the myth-creating potential of mass culture and in the symbolic images it generates that an average individual finds an embodiment of power which he desires and which he cannot reach.[62] The billions of "nowhere-men" from Jakubowski's play follow a "beautiful lie"[63] which confirms their illusory freedom, encouraging them to believe that everything is allowed and that they can 'make themselves,' since the human nature, despite all its complexity, is a morally neutral material one can shape in any way one wishes[64]. As a result, each of them wastes his or her life by ruining the unique chance to fulfill their humanity they have received.

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w dobie popkultury, ed. Tomasz Chachulski, Jerzy Snopek, and Magdalena Ślusarska (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo UKSW, 2014); Mariusz C z u b a j, *Biodra Elvisa Presleya: Od paleoherosów do neofanów* (Warszawa: WAiP, 2007).

[56] See R a d z i s z e w s k a - S z c z e p a n i a k, "Redukcjonizm antropologiczny i jego konsekwencje," 384.

[57] Edward F i a ł a, Adam F i t a s, and Dariusz S k ó r c z e w s k i, "Idol w kulturze—zarys problematyki," in *Idol w kulturze*, 10.

[58] See ibidem, 11. See also Erich F r o m m, *The Revision of Psychoanalysis* (New York: Routledge, 2019).

[59] See Jean B a u d r i l l a r d, *Simulacra and Simulation*, transl. by Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994), 1–42.

[60] J a k u b o w s k i, "Beatlesi / Zaginiona piosenka," 121.

[61] Ibidem, 121.

[62] See Umberto E c o, *Apocalypse Postponed* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994).

[63] J a k u b o w s k i, "Beatlesi / Zaginiona piosenka," 117.

[64] See R a d z i s z e w s k a - S z c z e p a n i a k, "Redukcjonizm antropologiczny i jego konsekwencje," 384.

The play entitled "Kucharz," in turn, shows a world in which "cooking becomes a religion."[65] We are constantly being told, says Jakubowski, "that we are what we eat, which in a way reduces us to bodies which digest."[66] Eating is no longer considered merely as an activity which serves survival; rather, it is conceived as the true contents of life, having the power to stigmatize a person and to determine, among others, the person's social status.[67] While writing "Kucharz," Jakubowski was undoubtedly inspired by Sławomir Mrożek's play "Krawiec" [The Tailor],[68] where the social standing of a person is determined by her attire and, consequently, the person's identity comes into being in a sartorial workshop. However, one can think also of other contexts, such as, for instance, a play "Odejście Głodomora" [The Passing of a Hunger Artist][69] by Tadeusz Różewicz, inspired in turn by Franz Kafka's short story "A Hunger Artist."[70] The main protagonist of Różewicz's play consents to being locked up in a cage, which he considers the sanctuary of his freedom, and, by his voluntary self-starvation, wishes to make those looking at him realize their lack of freedom, as well as inspire them to change their tedious existence, of which they are unaware.[71] The main protagonist of Jakubowski's play Rozmaryn, a master chef and culinary trend setter (thus also a variety of idol), exercises power over his admirers, frustrated people whose lives have no axiological foundation and who desperately crave for happiness and success. Aware of the social need for new role models and for new 'masters of life,' Rozmaryn manipulates the masses fascinated by him and by his culinary art, which they conceive as the way and purpose of life. However, the media-created attractive image of a master chef and a master of life is absolutely incompatible with the actual psychological profile of the protagonist, who, as a person, evokes "a mixture of pity and disgust"[72] in his student. The latter stays by his side motivated by mere calculation, hoping to take his master's position soon. The

[65] Ż a r s k i, "Bezsilność: Z Jarosławem Jakubowskim rozmawia Michał Żarski": 79.

[66] Ibidem, 79. Jakubowski refers to a famous quote by the German materialist philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach, "Man is what he eats." See Ludwig F e u e r b a c h, *Das Geheimnis des Opfers oder der Mensch ist, was er isst*. *The Mystery of Sacrifice, or Man Is What He Eats* (1862), https://pdfslide.net/documents/ludwig-feuerbach-the-mystery-of-sacrifice-or-man-is-what-he-eats.html.

[67] See Ż a r s k i, "Bezsilność: Z Jarosławem Jakubowskim rozmawia Michał Żarski": 79.

[68] See Sławomir M r o ż e k, "Krawiec," in Sławomir Mrożek, *Wybór dramatów* (Warszawa: Noir sur Blanc, 2000), 7–103.

[69] See Tadeusz R ó ż e w i c z, "Odejście Głodomora," in Tadeusz Różewicz, *Teatr* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1988), vol. 2, 289–330.

[70] See Franz K a f k a, "A Hunger Artist," https://www.kafka-online.info/a-hunger-artist.html.

[71] See R ó ż e w i c z, "Odejście Głodomora," 292. However, according to Jakubowski, "apparently, there are no hunger artists among us any more." See "Prawdziwych głodomorów już nie ma: Rozmawia Dorota Jovanka Ćrilć," *Dialog* 60, no. 10 (2015): 240.

[72] J a k u b o w s k i, "Kucharz," 237.

third character appearing in the play is a female who is supposed to be 'material' for Rozmaryn, the demiurge, to work with. She believes Rozmaryn will newly create her and give her a more perfect shape, preserving her youth and beauty. She says, "You will be able to nourish me, you will create me anew; each cell of my body will be replaced by a new one you shall design."[73] The shocking plot we follow in the course of the play is Jakubowski's way to address the reductionist tendencies in philosophical anthropology, which question the subjectivity of the human being and her personhood, as well as the spiritual dimension of her existence. Although the female character in the play is called "a femme fatale, a woman of an extraordinary beauty,"[74] the motif in question is not used in a standard way. Paradoxically, Jakubowski's 'femme fatale,' rather than using men for her own goals, destroys herself, which she accomplishes in the name of a peculiar self-love: her love of her body. Her decision to starve herself to death is verbalized, "I will eat myself, this is what we both want: you want it in the name of your art, and I want it in the name of my self-love. Can there be a higher form of self-loyalty than eating oneself?"[75] However, what the woman's decision expresses is actually a hatred of herself, and of life as such, which she perceives as meaningless. Indeed, she takes her decision after a period of following the dietary recommendations made for her by Rozmaryn. Confirmed in her belief that she is an exclusively biological creation, she confesses, "I can finally feel there is no crack between myself and my body."[76] Food, which she has grown to detest, is perceived by her merely as means to continue her unnecessary existence, marked by fatigue, fear, and loneliness. An escape into nonexistence renders a certain happiness for her, which is the only kind of happiness she can imagine. "I shall not be happy as long as I am,"[77] confesses the woman. By means of his description of the disastrous consequences of a false image of the human person which undermines the very essence of humanity, Jakubowski conveys the message that reductionist tendencies in philosophical anthropology usually lack a proper insight: those who yield to them, do so unconsciously. In the play, the slow death of what is human is the object of a media spectacle. Digital media, which give celebrities fame and technological immortality, continue their widespread coverage of the shocking performance in which Rozmaryn concludes the dramatic act of the woman, who tells him, "You are going to help me with it; you will eat what I won't be able to." The grotesque distortion of human relationships in the play helps Jakubowski unravel the absurd consequences of a mindless absorption of

[73] Ibidem, 244.
[74] Ibidem, 228.
[75] Ibidem, 260.
[76] Ibidem, 253.
[77] Ibidem, 254.

reductionist and deterministic concepts in anthropology, which, despite their noble goals, annihilate the humanity of the human being rather than restore it. Jakubowski exposes the falsehood on which the life of the master chef is built. Rozmaryn praises a materialistic vision of the human being, and of human life in general, seeking for the essence of existence in taste. The lie Rozmaryn lives is rooted in his uncontrollable egoism, in his contempt for others and in his lack of moral integrity. Addressing the issue of the 'theatre of cooking,' which lulls the vigilance of modern man (or the modern consumer) with an illusion of satisfaction, Jakubowski inspires reflection on the most elementary hunger: the one for humanity, for a meaningful life, for values, and for spirituality.

THE MAN WHO WAS UNABLE TO GO

Reductionist approaches in anthropology frequently result in questioning the human nature and deny the normativity of the rights inscribed in it.[78] As a result, human existence is perceived only 'horizontally,' so to speak, and the possibility of a transcendent relationship with God is excluded. Transcendent reality as such is questioned and reduced to a fact of culture.[79] Jakubowski addresses these issues in his one actor play entitled "Człowiek, który nie umiał odejść" [The Man Who Was Unable to Go], which comprises the protagonist's confession of his entire life; it is a confession, though, deprived of hope for purification or absolution, and resulting in his self-condemnation. The play demonstrates a tragic image of the loneliness of a human being in a world devoid of (T)transcendence. The loneliness the protagonist experiences is total, resembling that described in Louis-Ferdinand Céline's nihilistic novel of destruction *Journey to the End of the Night*, where the reality is depressing and overwhelming to the extent that "the best thing to do when you're in this world ... is to get out of it. Crazy or not, scared or not."[80] Thus Jakubowski takes up the theme of 'trap,' developed by Kafka and Różewicz, among others, and shows his protagonist 'thrown' into existence which turns out a trap; he manages to break free only to find himself in a pitfall of his own consciousness. Jakubowski's protagonist says, "If you constantly think about escaping, you will ultimately try to escape. Or you will hide inside your head and never come

[78] See R a d z i s z e w s k a - S z c z e p a n i a k, "Redukcjonizm antropologiczny i jego konsekwencje," 390–1.

[79] See ibidem, 392–3.

[80] Louis-Ferdinand C é l i n e, *Journey to the End of the Night*, transl. by Ralph Manheim (New York: New Directions, 1983), https://neoalchemist.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/louis-ferdinand-celine-journey-to-the-end-of-the-night.pdf.

out."[81] He resembles the motionless protagonists of the Theatre of the Absurd, frozen in the metaphysical void which surrounds them. As he has courage neither to live nor to die, the protagonist's existence becomes mere vegetation. He is a 'leftover' of what he used to be, a 'dismembered trunk'[82] having lost the power of speech as a result of a prolonged "simulation of silence,"[83] and expressing its existence only by eating and excreting. Paralyzed by a fear of life, the protagonist cannot find his happiness. He is as if poisoned by his hatred of the world, which he perceives through the prism of decay, hypocrisy, wickedness, falsehood, and cruelty, himself also being part of this reality. His hatred of everything around him is fueled by modern artistic creativity, of which he speaks as a member of the audience. As it is the case in "Znaki," artistic creation is no longer a source of hope; rather, it strengthens the belief in the overwhelming power of evil, which gets dangerously trivialized in the reality of today. Jakubowski suggests that what is 'human' dies slowly and that it dies unnoticeably. The catastrophe the human world is in for has been forecast by apparently insignificant events which neither the world itself, nor the artists who debate on it in their work, wish to see. The protagonist of the play sees the inevitability of the disaster in the death of a young tree, "a most innocent being,"[84] which comes as a result of a mindless act of vandalism performed by a young man no less than as a consequence of human consent to evil. In a self-referential scene, Jakubowski shows his readers the literary image of a young tree crushed to the ground, with its trunk smashed. The protagonist of the play is the only one to notice the significance of the tree and, through his mouth, Jakubowski speaks in favor of what has been considered as meaningless, having not fit the arbitrary interpretation of the world imposed as a fashion. "No one will make a movie about my young broken maple tree; no one will give a penny for such a project. The young maple tree does not fit any of the fashionable ideologies and it is not photogenic; moreover, it fell victim to a cruelty which was banal rather than modern, let alone postmodern."[85]

AROUND DYSTOPIA AND POSTAPOCALYPTIC MOTIFS

Problems and anxieties resulting from the reductionist anthropological approaches in philosophy are unraveled also in Jakubowski's plays set in the future and drawing on plot schemes characteristic of popular culture. The plays

[81] J a k u b o w s k i, *Człowiek, który nie umiał odejść*, 181.
[82] Ibidem, 196.
[83] Ibidem.
[84] Ibidem, 186.
[85] Ibidem, 188.

in question, however, are not meant to appeal to the readers with their glamor; rather, they provide an opportunity for the author to develop his futurological visions. His numerous references to classical dystopias and (post)apocalyptic motifs are supposed to inspire the readers' reflection on what makes their world truly 'human.'[86]

LUNA

The events described in the plays "Luna: Romans futurologiczny" [Luna: A Futurological Romance][87] and "Kosmonauci" [The Astronauts][88] are set in the future, when the speed of the degeneration of human activity is a corollary of the rate of the technological progress, which results in a cultural and moral decline. Both plots draw on catastrophic, apocalyptic, and postapocalyptic fiction[89] which is a continuous focus of attention in an era of worldwide prevalence of popular culture. "Luna...," a piece of political fiction, vividly reminds the reader of Aldous Huxley's and George Orwell's classic dystopias.[90] It is a well-known fact that both novels turned out to be prophetic to a greater extent than it was initially assumed, for they foretold the IT and biotechnological revolutions.[91]

Modern dystopian projects, which frequently draw on classic dystopias, are considered as manifestations of various conditions of fear, analogous to those of the early 20th century.[92] Jakubowski's plays, in which catastrophic

[86] See J a k u b o w s k i, "Posłowie, czyli o końcu," 460.

[87] See Jarosław J a k u b o w s k i, "Luna: Romans futurologiczny," in Jakubowski, *"Generał" i inne dramaty polityczne* (Warszawa: Agencja Dramatu i Teatru AdiT, 2014), 343–76.

[88] See Jarosław J a k u b o w s k i, "Kosmonauci," in Jarosław Jakubowski, *"Prawda" i inne dramaty*, 383–409.

[89] I mean the texts of culture which forecast and describe an imminent disaster, as well as those considered as postapocalyptic, which tend to depict the results of the destruction and distortion of the world both for the human being and for the human community, the borderline between the two types of fiction being rather fluid. See Lech M. N i j a k o w s k i, *Świat po apokalipsie: Społeczeństwo w świetle postapokaliptycznych tekstów kultury popularnej* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2018), 30.

[90] See Aldous H u x l e y, *Brave New World* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1932); George O r w e l l, *1984*.

[91] See Francis F u k u y a m a, *Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2002), 3.

[92] See Anna B o g u s k a, "Nowoczesność i zagłada w filmowej dystopii Brunona Gamulina *Sedma kronika*," in *Narracje fantastyczne*, ed. by Ksenia Olkusz and Krzysztof M. Maj (Kraków: Ośrodek Badawczy Facta Ficta, 2017), 317 (https://factaficta.files.wordpress.com/2018/01/narracje-fantastyczne-red-ksenia-olkusz-krzysztof-m-maj.pdf). Referring to Gregory Claeys's psychological approach, which "relates the concept of dystopia to a permanent and unavoidable condition of fear for the humanity," Boguska observes that "the condition of fear as such is subject to a certain

and (post-)apocalyptic motifs become pretexts for metaphorical constructs, vividly depict the problem of modern societies' breaking away from their past, as well as that of their corruption and degeneration, seen as consequences of the civilizational processes. Last but not least, the plays in question point to the implications of a passive acceptance of the direction the current social transformations have assumed. While prompting reflection on the fears of the modern society, Jakubowski actually poses the question whether the vision of the world presented in is plays might be a source of hope. The question about hope is always justified, since hope is a sentiment without which truly human existence would not be possible. However, the question about hope turns out particularly significant and urgent in our times, when the world, suffering from an anthropological and cultural crisis, begins heading towards an inevitable disaster.

"Luna..." is a story about the "world in which memory as such is prohibited."[93] It is a world in which the postulates "to choose freedom and to split away the history of the past with a thick line"[94] are effectively put into practice. A Polish reader will identify these postulates with the slogans popular in the public discourse at the turn of the 21st century. Thus "Luna..." belongs among various texts of culture which serve as a warning against the catastrophic consequences of a cultural amnesia and contrast "the category of memory, which has a positive value ... with its conceptual antonym (or, its reverse side), namely, 'nonmemory,' which is evaluated negatively. Nonmemory is the condition of intellectual and emotional void which changes individuals and entire nations into passive tools used to satisfy someone else's will."[95]

Other motifs characteristic of Jakubowski's plays, such as his diagnosis of the condition of the Western societies and of the Polish identity, also recur in "Luna..." Its plot is set in 2084, in an unspecified city covered in red mist, out of which "giant geometric shapes with countless lights spring up."[96] The 'Statue of Humanity,' resembling the one of Christ the Redeemer, soars above the place, yet its elements which might indeed refer one to Christ have been

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regularity and progresses from natural fears to those socially constructed and socially triggered. See B o g u s k a, "Nowoczesność i zagłada w filmowej dystopii Brunona Gamulina *Sedma kronika*," 316. See also Gregory C l a e y s, *Dystopia: A Natural History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). Thus the fear attributed to modernity results from its "project of oppressive and total ordering and improving the world, which involves various forms of violence, not infrequently encouraging despotic attitudes and leading ... up to a loss of freedom." B o g u s k a, "Nowoczesność i zagłada w filmowej dystopii Brunona Gamulina *Sedma kronika*," 316.

[93] J a k u b o w s k i, *Posłowie*, 377.

[94] Ibidem.

[95] Mateusz B o r o w s k i and Małgorzata S u g i e r a, "Pochwała zapominania." In Zyta Rudzka, *Zimny bufet* (Kraków: Panga Pang, 2012), 12.

[96] J a k u b o w s k i, "Luna: Romans futurologiczny," 345.

removed: only the shape has remained."[97] Visible from every location, the statue luminously radiates "colorful advertising slogans,"[98] thus becoming an emblem of the modern mediatized world of consumerism, as well as a symbol of the new humanism which "rejects all coercion and violence."[99] Just as it is the case in Orwell's *1984* and in Huxley's *Brave New World*, Christianity and family values are considered as things of the past, the traces of which are obliterated. In the *Brave New World*, the emblem of the new era—one of the universal happiness accomplished—is T-shaped and a product of removing the top part of the cross. The values of the past are replaced by new ideas, concisely grasped in the motto, "Community, Identity, Stability."[100] Huxley's protagonists take soma tablets: the perfect pleasure drug which reconciles them with their enemies and makes them more patient and capable of perseverance. The condition soma induces is comparable to that resulting from the possession of moral virtues, but—unlike them—is accomplished effortlessly. In Jakubowski's play, likewise, the passive and happy consumers are fully dedicated to the system and readily accept the "painless"[101] procedure of having their memories erased and, afterwards, are happy to take special red tablets so that their amnesia should be sustained. Just as it is the case in Huxley's novel, both spiritual values and those the culture embodies are destroyed, and there is no place for feelings or passions any more. Weakness, illness, old age, and death, are removed from the horizon of a human life ("There are no cemeteries in the city"[102]), while "pure pleasure,"[103] comfort, prosperity, and financial security become the basic values. Human relations are supplanted by cyberreality, and emotional bonds are replaced by machines which attend to human needs following a mathematically established algorithm. Adam, the protagonist of the play, who is regularly visited by a "female robot for sex tasks"[104] (with a fifty-year warranty), himself becomes an 'artificial' being, fully subdued to the totalitarian authorities. The symbolism of the protagonist's name suggests a clash between the biblical anthropology (which has been questioned and rejected) and its antithesis in the form of the new anthropological conception. By his reference to the Huxleyan vision of the world—one free from violence, harm, conflicts, sadness and illnesses, yet also one in which the human being is deprived of the family, its values, the values culture used to

[97] Ibidem.
[98] Ibidem, 348.
[99] Ibidem, 375.
[100] H u x l e y, *Brave New World*, 16.
[101] J a k u b o w s k i, "Luna: Romans futurologiczny," 345.
[102] Ibidem, 346.
[103] Ibidem, 345.
[104] Ibidem, 362.

embody, and religion—Jakubowski once again inspires reflection on the nature of humanity, on the foundation of human dignity, and on the human nature conceived as a source of values. Although neither in Huxley's novel, nor in the play "Luna..." evil is as obvious as it appears in *1984*,[105] the worlds both works depict have become "unnatural in the most profound sense imaginable, because human nature has been altered."[106]

In "Luna..." the decline of the civilization and of the social rules is global. "There is no escape from this city, but to another one, which is almost identical; then still to another one like that, and so on."[107] The play simultaneously refers, in numerous instances, to the modern history of Poland, as well as to the history of the part of Europe subdued to the Soviet Union after the Second World War. Thus "Luna..." makes numerous allusions to the emblematic images of totalitarian systems. "The Palace of Happiness,"[108] the name of the tallest building in the city, resembles the names of Orwellian "ministries." In a world where words and whole concepts are destroyed, where thinking and consciousness are limited, truth as such certainly does not exist, but still there is the "Ministry of Truth."[109] What becomes 'truth' is a constantly repeated lie. Neither do 'love,' 'peace' or 'plenty' exist, although they each have their respective ministries. In "Luna...," the "Palace of Happiness" suggests the life goal generally accepted in the Huxleyan world, namely, the "faith in happiness as the Sovereign Good."[110] A recurring element of the scenic design in "Luna..." is a "huge screen showing a speaking Head,"[111] which reminds one of the telescreens from *1984* and of the Orwellian reality of permanent surveillance. The omnipresence of screens is a clear sign of the power of the propaganda. Moreover, the Head assumes the role of the traditional chorus as it would appear in an ancient Greek play: it introduces the audience to the context of the events, narrates their course, comments on them, expresses general reflections, sums things up, and simultaneously monitors the events, thus taking control over them and exercising power. The aforementioned problem of 'badspeak' recurs as the problem of language being the main tool of the propaganda used by the oppressive social system. A reading of "Luna..." as a catastrophic or (post)apocalyptic play shows that Jakubowski uses motifs on which also other

[105] See F u k u y a m a, *Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution*, 7.

[106] Ibidem, 6. Fukuyama declares that the aim of his book is to "argue that Huxley was right, that the most significant threat posed by contemporary biotechnology is the possibility that it will alter human nature and thereby move us into a 'posthuman' stage of history." Ibidem, 7.

[107] J a k u b o w s k i, "Luna: Romans futurologiczny," 376.

[108] Ibidem, 345.

[109] See, e.g., O r w e l l, *1984*, 7.

[110] H u x l e y, *Brave New World*, 149.

[111] J a k u b o w s k i, "Luna: Romans futurologiczny," 345.

texts of popular culture extensively draw. However, the difference is that—while borrowing plot schemes from other literary pieces—Jakubowski finds it most important to talk to his audience about the actual problems these plots pinpoint.

The sources of apocalyptic images in modern culture which inspire Jakubowski's plays have been discussed by Lech Nijakowski. Among the playwright's inspirations are myths and religious beliefs about the end of the world (which, however, is not seen dogmatically in the religious sense), as well as biblical accounts, such as, for instance, the one about the Tower of Babel. However, Jakubowski's understanding of the speech confounded by God is very broad. "People are no longer connected by a normative axiological system or by universal images present in their culture. New barbarians appear, ones who are absolutely foreign to one another in the anthropological aspect."[112] The story about the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah and that of the Moloch (the symbol of a monstrous machine in popular culture) serve in his plays as allegories of a super modern city which limits human freedom. Among the cultural images to which Jakubowski refers are also the mythical golem, conceived as the modern man,[113] the flood and Noah's arc myths, but also utopias and dystopias, urban legends, and conspiracy theories.

In the dystopian[114] world of "Luna...," the project of those in power to take absolute control over the city is confronted with the rebellion of the main protagonist and with his attempt to reverse the dystopian social order. Adam, a namesake of the first man, the one expelled from Paradise, evolves to resist its new vision, which is imposed on him in the world without God, which has succeeded the one built on the foundation of traditional biblical values. By means of the symbolism he introduces, Jakubowski once again inspires reflection on the condition of the late postmodern society. The disturbing topicality

[112] N i j a k o w s k i, *Świat po apokalipsie: Społeczeństwo w świetle postapokaliptycznych tekstów kultury popularnej*, 51.

[113] See ibidem, 52.

[114] As Raffaella Baccolini notes, a dystopian work is constructed as the dialectic of a narration and a counter-narration. A narrative on the power dominant in an evil world is juxtaposed with one on the resistance the power encounters. The story usually begins in the 'new reality,' with the main protagonist already living there. As a result of the course of the events, the protagonist becomes aware of the inner contradictions of the dystopian universe and his sense of alienation gradually deepens. See Raffaella B a c c o l i n i, "'It's Not In the Womb the Damage Is Done': The Construction of Gender, Memory and Desire in Katharine Burdekin's *Swastika Night*," in *Le trasformazioni del narrare*, ed. by Erina Siciliani et al. (Brindisi: Schena Editore, 1996), 293–309. The new awareness of the protagonist may make him either reject the dystopian social order or try to change it. See Raffaella B a c c o l i n i and Tom M o y l a n, "Introduction: Dystopia and Histories," in *Dark Horizons: Science Fiction and the Dystopian Imagination*, ed. Raffaella Baccolini and Tom Moylan (New York: Routledge, 2003), 1–12. See also Fryderyk K w i a t k o w s k i, "Czym są gnostyckie dystopie? Refleksja nad gnostycką wizją świata w badaniach nad dystopiami," in *Narracje fantastyczne*, 254.

of apocalyptic and post-apocalyptic motifs in contemporary culture makes Jakubowski's readers and his audience realize the imperative to return to the fundamental philosophical issues concerning the meaning, the ultimate goal, and the value of a human life. Only a new insight into these concepts can be helpful in overcoming the far-reaching consequences of the anthropological crises and of the crisis of culture: the prospect of an inhuman future in which the human being will no longer be considered as person, the human life will no longer be a value, and the axiological foundation of human relations will be destroyed. Thus, according to Jakubowski, only a new insight into the fundamental philosophical issues can become a source of hope for the humanity. And hope, for its part, is always related to the actual experience of a given person and invokes the view of a human life as an existence turned towards the future, as well as the vision of the human being as *homo viator* awaiting fulfillment at the end of his, or her, path.[115] There is no room for hope in the dystopian, dehumanized universe in which Adam joins the "modern police force of the modern state."[116] His world is a trap and he is made to follow the course of life he cannot change or abandon. "I never believed in anything," confesses Adam. "I was an exemplary student in school and at the university; I had the best prospects for my career. I perfectly understood that ... I must serve.... Even when I no longer knew the sense of my service. The routine is that you follow your track and you let the hours, the days, and the months pass.... I was becoming a robot."[117] There is no room for hope in the reality where material comfort and financial security prevail. Such a reality engenders no expectations. Hope would be about what is possible but not yet accessible, what does not yield to deterministic structures and what cannot be controlled. Thus the object of hope lies beyond human capabilities and hope implies trust that what we would welcome will actually be accomplished.[118] Filling the void of human life with artificial contents may dull the feeling of unfulfillment. In their attempt to subdue their nature, as well as the environment in which they live, to themselves, human beings destroy themselves: by aspiring to exercise total control over every aspect of life, they actually annihilate the reality and introduce their own idea of order, simultaneously reducing themselves to this idea.[119]

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[115] See, e.g., Kazimierz K r a j e w s k i, "Nadzieja," in *Wobec nadziei: Aksjologiczne problemy dramatu i teatru XX i XXI wieku*, ed. Joanna Michalczuk and Mariusz Lach (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2018), 13–5.

[116] J a k u b o w s k i, "Luna: Romans futurologiczny," 354.

[117] Ibidem, 367.

[118] See K r a j e w s k i, "Nadzieja," 14–16.

[119] See Bogdan B a r a n, "Opowieść o ostatnim człowieku," In Aldous Huxley, *Nowy wspaniały świat*, trans. Bogdan Baran (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1988), 272.

Adam changes his life and, influenced by Luna, becomes ready for a rebellion. Luna comes from a group of "abnegates,"[120] who refuse to be subordinated to the authorities and inhabit the outskirts of the city (the world), living there in a camp. They resemble the 'coarse' Savages from Huxley's *Brave New World*. While unfulfilled, the budding relationship between Adam and Luna is an attempt to bridge the two disparate worlds and thus to find the common element, which will begin the process of restoring mutual trust between them. For the time being there is no trust: the concept and value of trust have long been compromised. Yet, thanks to Luna, Adam gets acquainted with oral novels,[121] by means of which the "abnegates" hand down to the new generations the memory of the past and of the traditional, then normative hierarchy of values. He also becomes familiar with an inspirational fairy-tale-like story about salvation, including freely interpreted biblical motifs (of the Incarnation, liberation, salvation, punishment for the wicked, demolishment of statues of foreign gods, and the reward for the just and those who preserved moral integrity). Yet the ones who tell him this story do not have faith in its ever becoming a reality. Their world is that of the past: it is a celebration and sanctification of the past. Paradoxically, it shows no orientation towards the future, which only confirms the crisis of great narrations. Adam is the one who actively opposes the 'design' of the world in which human beings became slaves: he attempts to blow up the Statue of Humanity, because he believes that, "What we need is a symbol of resistance, a clear sign for others."[122] By "others," he means those who have stopped looking towards the future, as well as those who have become incapable of deciding about themselves. The protagonist's desire to awaken the slumbering spirit of the people, which only waits for the right signal, echoes the plot of *The Wedding*,[123] a play, of 1901, by Stanisław Wyspiański. A Polish reader will also see here an allusion to the dance of Wyspiański's Straw-man, symbolizing the slumber of the Polish people, deeply and destructively divided about the questions of culture and politics (which Jakubowski expressively showed in the already mentioned play "Wieczny kwiecień").

In the fictional world of Huxley's *Brave New World*, a crucial role is played by Shakespeare's poetry and its power of appeal. Discovered by the

[120] J a k u b o w s k i, "Luna: Romans futurologiczny," 363.

[121] The return to the oral tradition is characteristic of popular postapocalyptic fiction. See N i j a k o w s k i, *Świat po apokalipsie: Społeczeństwo w świetle postapokaliptycznych tekstów kultury popularnej*. See also *Narracje fantastyczne*, ed. Ksenia Olkusz and Krzysztof M. Maj (Kraków: Ośrodek Badawczy Facta Ficta, 2017), https://factaficta.files.wordpress.com/2018/01/narracje-fantastyczne-red-ksenia-olkusz-krzysztof-m-maj.pdf.

[122] J a k u b o w s k i, "Luna: Romans futurologiczny," 371.

[123] See Stanisław W y s p i a ń s k i, *The Wedding*, transl. by Noel Clark (Oberon Books, London, 1998).

Savage, it renders the brave new world infinitely primitive, shallow, and fake. In "Luna...," despite all the differences, a similar significance is given to the poetic text "Zgaśnij księżycu" [Fade Out, Moon][124] by Andrzej Bursa, a Polish poet of the so-called 1956 generation.[125] Against the background of modern (post)apocalyptic culture texts, it is perhaps not an original idea to grant a special role to poetry, which 'awakens' the main protagonist of "Luna...," who has so far obediently continued his 'automatized' life.[126] However, what matters to Jakubowski—a playwright and a poet particularly sensitive to the way words are used in the language—is his poetic vision of the world. By his reference to the poetry of Bursa, Jakubowski reactivates, in his readers' minds, the context of the rebellion of Bursa's generation, marked by the clash between the universe of values and emotions, on the one hand, and the after-war Polish reality which challenged the existing moral order. At the same time, though, the playwright evokes the stable and uncompromising attitude of Bursa, who would openly speak the truth about human existence. The title of Bursa's poem Jakubowski introduced into his play corresponds to the name of its female protagonist Luna. In the high-tech, dehumanized world of the future, the Moon (Luna) seems "tiny"[127] and it looks a relic of the past, but it nevertheless remains outside the control exercised by the human authority, thus being a sign of the latter's only short-term, limited, and merely apparent supremacy.

The main protagonist of the play is executed, which is the punishment for his rebellion, and things seem to be returning to their original state. In the Epilogue of "Luna...," the omnipresent Head (a symbol of political surveillance) assures the citizens about the efficiency of the system,[128] as it did before, in the Prologue of the play. A representative of the government questions the sense of Adam's rebellion, "You came to believe that you can see more than others and that your horizons are broader; you came to believe that you would be able to provide the world with a symbol. The symbol of the beginning and of the end. It was a beautiful idea.... The destruction of the Statue of Humanity would have been like the September 11 attacks *à rebours*. It was then that the

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[124] See Andrzej B u r s a, "Zgaśnij księżycu," in Andrzej Bursa, *Dzieła (prawie) wszystkie*, ed. Wojciech Bonowicz (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak, 2018), 8.

[125] The name "1956 generation of Polish poets" is used to describe the poets whose childhood was marked by the Second World War, who grew up during the time of the Thaw after the death of Stalin in 1953, and for whom the most important experience was the Polish October 1956, with the cultural, as well as political, transformations it brought, among them a return of artistic freedom. The most important poets of the generation were Stanisław Grochowiak, Jerzy Harasymowicz, and Władysław Terlecki.

[126] See, e.g., Monika R a w s k a, "Miasta-światy: Analiza przestrzeni miejskiej w *Equilibrium* Kurta Wimmera i *Incepcji* Christophera Nolana," in *Narracje fantastyczne*, 363–4.

[127] J a k u b o w s k i, "Luna: Romans futurologiczny," 365.

[128] See ibidem, 375–6.

security system in which and owing to which we live began to be forged.... You did not anticipate one thing, though. Namely, the power of habit which is stronger than that of ressentiment. But we have decided to meet your expectations halfway and we will make your execution a symbol. You know. *(laughing)* 'The dawning of eternal victory.' *(stops laughing)* Your solitary death will let us sustain peace among our ranks for a few years."[129] While Jakubowski's direct reference to the terrorist attacks on the United States of America, a symbol of the global power, may prompt critical reflection upon the processes of globalization,[130] the piece actually evokes the Polish context[131] and addresses the post-war moral dilemmas, the question whether the opposition against the new political situation and the communist government should be continued, as well as those about the price of 'survival' and the responsibility for one's attitudes towards the oppressive reality, and—last but not least—about the freedom of describing this reality and about the ideological pressure it exerted. The confidence with which the representative of the authorities speaks about the stability of the government is based on his belief in the power of habit which translates into a prevalence of passive attitudes among the society and an acceptance of some form of oppression. Stanisław Lem was saying, "Humanity always suffers from some form of poverty and faces danger which continually changes its shape."[132] Each and every implementation of a technological innovation generates new ones and there "emerge profitable production

[129] Ibidem, 373.

[130] Such reflection can be found, for instance, in the radical approach of Jean Baudrillard. See e.g. Szymon K o s t e k, "Bezwydarzeniowość i wydarzeniowość: Jean Baudrillard wobec wydarzeń z 11 września 2001 roku," *Anthropos?*, no. 8–9, 2007, http://www.anthropos.us.edu.pl/anthropos5/texty/kostek.htm. Kostek reads Baudrillard in the context of the thought of Zygmunt Bauman. Unlike Bauman, Baudrillard considers globalization as a process negatively affecting culture. In his opinion, globalization is a way towards the ultimate decline of culture, since it washes away the differences between cultures and values. See Jean B a u d r i l l a r d, *Paroxysm: Interviews with Philippe Petit*, trans. Chris Turner (London and New York: Verso, 1998). However, Kostek observes that despite the radical character of Baudrillard's pessimistic visions of the future they involve hope and moralizing, which are inherent in any variety of intellectual radicalism.

[131] Jakubowski directly refers to Cyprian Norwid's "Tyrtej." See Cyprian N o r w i d, "Tyrtej—Prolog," in Cyprian Norwid, *Dramaty*, vol. 2, ed. Julian Maślanka (Lublin: Instytut Badań nad Twórczością Cypriana Norwida KUL, Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL, and Biblioteka Narodowa, 2013), 17. Indirectly, though, the playwright alludes to Jerzy Andrzejewski's novel *Ashes and Diamonds*, which was first published in 1948, at the turning point of Polish after-war history. The title of the book, which posed the question about the future of Poland, draws on Norwid's "Tyrtej." In the succeeding editions of his novel, Andrzejewski made its political appeal increasingly radical. See Jerzy A n d r z e j e w s k i, *Ashes and Diamonds*, transl. by D. J. Welsh (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1997).

[132] "Nieludzkie przyspieszenie: Rozmowa ze Stanisławem Lemem," in Stanisław B e r e ś, *Historia literatury polskiej w rozmowach: XX–XXI wiek*, vol. 1 (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo W.A.B., 2002), 109.

pools,"[133] followed by their monopolization, which is "a new form of political totalitarianism."[134] Adam's rebellion, which is the first and indispensable step towards changing the Statue of Humanity (the distorted version of the figure of Christ the Redeemer) back into one depicting a man (Man), expresses the hope inscribed in the human nature and specific to the human being, as well as the ability of man to rebel against what limits him, degrades him, and destroys him, against any form of evil, also, and perhaps in particular, when it is no longer certain whether any traces of human sacrifice will prove more lasting than "ashes only and confusion,"[135] as Norwid put it.

THE ASTRONAUTS

In Jakubowski's latest play "Kosmonauci," another futurological vision drawing on science fiction and postapocalyptic fiction conventions, the motifs we already know from "Luna..." recur. The metaphorical depiction of the decline of the world based on the traditional values serves the author as a pretext to elaborate on the issue of the new beginning, while simultaneously reactivating the motif of the "eternal return to the roots of humanity."[136] The reader is confronted with an image showing four passengers of a space vehicle facing a dangerous situation: a huge asteroid is headed at a vast speed in the way of the spaceship, while its navigability has been compromised. The journey to "the edge of the universe,"[137] reflecting a fascination with the technological progress, was to prove the "unlimited capabilities of the humankind,"[138] while the passengers were to become "hope and inspiration" for others.[139] Now, with the disaster approaching and no one in the position to prevent it, they turn out helpless victims of insufficient control over the effects of the technological progress. The asteroid passes the spaceship without colliding with it, but the technical defect makes it impossible for the vehicle to continue the flight as planned. One of the passengers believes it was God's intervention that the asteroid did not hit the spaceship, but another says the human factor and a calculation error were responsible. Drifting in the space, the vehicle becomes an apt metaphor of the postmodern world, while the voice of the autopilot,

[133] Ibidem.
[134] Ibidem.
[135] N o r w i d, „Tyrtej—Prolog," 17.
[136] H e r n i k S p a l i ń s k a, *Pytania i znaki*, 13.
[137] J a k u b o w s k i, "Kosmonauci," 405.
[138] Ibidem, 396.
[139] Ibidem, 406.

commanding, "Turn back if possible!"[140] clearly issues a warning against the impending disaster. Although the plot of the play is set in the future, the images which appear on the screen, showing all kinds of evil done by people—the evil that is commonplace, universal, anonymous, and exempt from punishment—prove that the reality has already surpassed all futurological visions.[141] The image of the humanity experiencing its decline—similar to the one we already know from "Luna..."—is implied by the chorus, which provides a commentary on the actions of the protagonists. The actions of the two couples who are the astronauts (cosmonauts)—Aleks and Cecylia, and Bruno and Diana—fill in the time before the disaster strikes and reflect the human condition in the postmodern era, marked by an absence of respected authority, traditional role models and a stable normative value hierarchy. There is no hope or transcendence any more and human beings do not even realize how deeply they need them. Again, Jakubowski refers to the dystopian reality of Huxley's *Brave New World* and to postapocalyptic movies, and his "marriage comedy,"[142] as he has called it himself, engenders the conclusion that "actually, everything has ended and has lost its momentum. The interpersonal church has frozen and we are still desperately trying to rekindle its fire, as well as our passions. Hence the attempts to create new relationships, triangles or new couples, as well as marriage tragedies involving infidelity and abandonment."[143] However, also this time Jakubowski gives his readers a glimmer of hope for "a continuation."[144] The hope is inherent in the protagonists' longing for a safe world. It is a hope for a stable ground under their feet in the literal, as well as metaphorical, senses, conceived also as an axiological foundation, and a hope for an openness to and a bond with another human being. They manifest this hope with what they say and with their gestures expressing compassion and consolation, thus restoring the foundation of humanity. There is hope in their experience of togetherness as they face their difficult situation, strive to repair the spacecraft and find a way to return to the earth in their struggle to survive. Yet the images of a metaphysical void in which the absent meaning is compensated with its imitation, of an apotheosis of civilizational and technological progress which rejects the existing knowledge as anachronism, of uprootedness which results in being cut off from the source of life, prompt something important. By means of these images, Jakubowski persuades his readers that what has been rejected or denied, or consigned to oblivion and nonexistence, actually lives as long

[140] Ibidem, 385.
[141] See B e r e ś, "Nieludzkie przyspieszenie: Rozmowa ze Stanisławem Lemem," 103–6.
[142] Ż a r s k i, "Bezsilność: Z Jarosławem Jakubowskim rozmawia Michał Żarski": 79.
[143] Ibidem, 79.
[144] J a k u b o w s k i, "Kosmonauci," 408.

as man lives. It is like the "Labyrinth"[145] in the play, which continues, forks, and branches infinitely, its reality annexing the present moment. The reality of the Labyrinth may ultimately turn out more powerful than any attempt at destroying it.[146]

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As a playwright who ascertains his rights to create his own textual worlds, to his own style, and to 'his' themes, Jakubowski always puts the human being in the center of his works. If he refers to popular motifs or images, he treats them merely as pretexts to address the issues he finds truly significant. If he describes the decline of the postmodern world, his intention is by no means to shock his readers with apocalyptic visions. Rather, by still believing in the value of words, literary (also theatrical) works, and in their social significance, as well as in the value of dialogue, he speaks about the hope inscribed in a human life: the hope that restores the meaning of things and is far from naive optimism; the hope that is a chance for one to change one's erroneous decisions and for turning back once the chosen path leads to nowhere, the hope which lasts as long as the human life continues and the world exists, as long as the voice saying, "Turn back, if possible!," can still be heard.

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[145] See ibidem, 385–6.

[146] The reality of Labyrinth symbolizes the reality of the rights and truths which have been rejected and dismissed. The Labyrinth grows and becomes increasingly powerful, just as memory does in Tadeusz Kantor's "Theatre of Death." See H e r n i k S p a l i ń s k a, "Pytania i znaki," 10. In Kantor's theatre, the memory born of death develops into a power capable of both creation and destruction, thus making the past the only real time. By existing on a par with the actual events, it questions their being real.

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ABSTRACT / ABSTRAKT

Joanna MICHALCZUK, "Turn back if possible!" On Fears Related to the "End" and Hopes for a "Continuation" in Plays by Jarosław Jakubowski

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The article comprises an analysis of selected plays by Jarosław Jakubowski, one of the most interesting Polish playwrights of the recent years. The analyzed plays were published in two collections of, respectively, 2014 and 2017. Jakubowski's works address the questions of the foundation of the humanity and of the actual meaning of a human life. In his plays, he unveils the consequences of the cultural transformations of modernity. His special focus is the results of the erosion of traditional values (shaped within the Judeo-Christian culture) and he investigates in particular the implications of replacing them with ones that are merely contingent and short-term. Among others, he issues a warning against the destructive tendency to rid the area of public discourse of the spiritual element. His plays are literary exemplifications of the prevalence of anthropological reductionism in the ideational realm, triggered by modern day philosophy. The insights into the social reality of today he offers describe the process of the gradual passing of what is 'human' in our world and are contrasted with the popular view that humankind has power and dominion over everything. Jakubowski's futurological dramas make use of catastrophic and postapocalyptic motifs, which he turns into metaphors. The quotations used in the title of this article come from the play entitled "Kosmonauci" [The Astronauts], in which a severely damaged spaceship with its crew on board drifting in the space becomes a metaphor of the postmodern world. In the wobbly reality that leads to nowhere, Jakubowski's protagonists long for a stable and certain element in their lives and start an unequal fight so as to save both their lives and their humanity. Although the disaster seems unavoidable, Jakubowski leaves his readers with a hope for a "continuation" which is far from naive optimism. It is a hope for the return of what has been rejected and rendered no longer valid by the modern world: the spiritual dimension of human existence and a stable value hierarchy which can become a reliable foundation of human relations.

Keywords: Jarosław Jakubowski, the Polish theatre after 1989, the anthropological perspective in literary studies, (post)apocalyptic fiction, hope

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Joanna MICHALCZUK, „Zawróć, jeśli to możliwe!" O lękach związanych z „końcem" i nadziejach na „dalszy ciąg" w dramatach Jarosława Jakubowskiego

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Artykuł przybliża twórczość dramatyczną Jarosława Jakubowskiego, jednego z najciekawszych polskich dramatopisarzy ostatnich lat, na przykładzie kilku wybranych sztuk pochodzących z dwóch wydanych w Polsce antologii dramatów tego autora: *Generał i inne dramaty polityczne* (2014) oraz *Prawda i inne dramaty* (2017). Odsłaniając w swoich dramatach skutki współczesnych przeobrażeń kulturowych świata Zachodu – skutki erozji tradycyjnych wartości ukształtowanych w obrębie kultury judeochrześcijańskiej i zastępowania ich wartościami przygodnymi, spychania duchowego wymiaru istnienia człowieka poza margines życia społecznego – Jakubowski prowokuje do refleksji nad tym, co stanowi fundament człowieczeństwa, i nad rzeczywistym znaczeniem ludzkiego istnienia. Jego dramaty stają się literacką egzemplifikacją rozmaitych przejawów antropologicznego redukcjonizmu we współczesnej rzeczywistości, uświadamiającą odbiorcy, jak powoli umiera w niej to, co „ludzkie", choć wszystko zdaje się dziś należeć do człowieka i od niego zależeć. Frapujące twórcę problemy i niepokoje związane ze skutkami degeneracyjnych procesów cywilizacyjnych, odcinania się od przeszłości, redukcjonistycznego postrzegania człowieka i biernej akceptacji kierunku dokonujących się zmian znajdują też swoje odzwierciedlenie w przywoływanych w artykule futurologicznych dramatach Jakubowskiego, w których wątki katastroficzne i (post)apokaliptyczne stają się pretekstem do zbudowania konstrukcji metaforycznej. Zamieszczone w tytule artykułu cytaty pochodzą z jednego z nich, ze sztuki zatytułowanej *Kosmonauci*, w której dryfujący w przestrzeni kosmicznej uszkodzony statek z kosmonautami staje się czytelną metaforą ponowoczesnego świata. W chybotliwej, zmierzającej donikąd rzeczywistości bohaterowie Jakubowskiego tęsknią za tym, co stabilne i pewne – za dosłownie i metaforycznie pojętym twardym gruntem pod nogami – i podejmują nierówną walkę o ocalenie własnego życia, ale też własnego człowieczeństwa. Choć katastrofa wydaje się nieunikniona, Jakubowski zostawia odbiorcy daleką od naiwnego optymizmu nadzieję na „dalszy ciąg". Ściśle wiąże się ona z tym, co na skutek redukcjonistycznych zapędów współczesnego świata zostało zdegradowane, unieważnione, odrzucone – z duchowym wymiarem ludzkiego istnienia i stabilnym fundamentem wartości, na którym oprzeć można rzeczywistość międzyludzkich relacji.

Słowa kluczowe: Jarosław Jakubowski, dramat polski po 1989, perspektywa antropologiczna w literaturze, motywy (post)apokaliptyczne, nadzieja

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HOPE IN HISTORY

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JÓZEF TISCHNER
CHAPLAIN OF SOLIDARNOŚĆ AND PHILOSOPHER OF HOPE*

On the theoretical level, Tischner's views on human nature, grace and freedom seem remarkably similar to Niebuhr's. The former speaks of the "ascent" of the human (note the influence of Romanticism on Tischner). The latter envisions a "reconstruction of the self." Both strive to maintain human freedom while acknowledging that ultimately humans are dependent on grace. The difference between the thinking of these two great minds arises in their consideration of the likelihood of the "ascent" or "reconstruction."

> This old but also very new word, solidarity, what does it mean? To what does it call us? What memories does it bring back? To explicate it more precisely, perhaps it is necessary to reach back into the Gospel and seek the origin of the word there. Christ explains its meaning: "Carry one another's burden and in this way fulfill God's law" (paraphrase of Paul in Gal. 6:2). What does it mean to be in solidarity? It means to carry the burden of another person.... Solidarity has still another facet; solidarity does not need to be imposed from the outside by force.... And one more thing—solidarity, the one that is borne from the pages and spirit of the [G]ospel, does not need an enemy or opponent to strengthen itself and grow. It turns towards all and not against anyone.[1]

Fr. Józef Tischner originally preached these words in a now famous sermon on Poland's Wawel Hill in Kraków on October 19, 1980. The occasion was the Solidarity movement's first national convention. His homily during that convention, along with essays later published in a collection entitled *Etyka solidarności*, earned Tischner the title of 'the philosopher of Solidarity' or the 'theologian of Solidarity.'[2] Twenty years later, on the twenty-eighth of June, Tischner died after an ordeal with cancer of the larynx. During those twenty

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[1] Józef T i s c h n e r, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, trans. Marek B. Zaleski and Benjamin Fiore (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1984) 2–3. This is the English translation of Tischner's *Etyka solidarności* (Kraków: Znak, 1981). It was republished in 1992 and 2000 by Znak.

[2] It is debated as to whether Tischner's work was that of a philosopher, Christian humanist, theologian or all three. Upon hearing of Tischner's death, John Paul II spoke of "a theologian and philosopher, who was open to the human being, but never forgot about God." See J a n P a w e ł II, List do kardynała Franciszka Macharskiego, *Tygodnik Powszechny Online*, http: //www.tygodnik.com.pl/ludzie/tischner/jpii.html. Charles Taylor remarked that he sees Tischner as a Christian hu-

years he touched the minds and hearts of millions of Poles and had an indelible impact on Polish society. After his death, many Poles experienced a deep void and wondered if anyone could provide the desperately needed intellectual and pastoral leadership as Tischner did in the struggle to achieve a just, democratic social order. Thus, Adam Michnik opined after Tischner's passing: "For me personally, he [Tischner] was the conscience of Polish democracy. How will Polish democracy manage without Józek's conscience?"[3]

In my judgment, Tischner represents one of the great Christian thinkers of our time. Tischner's deep commitment to pastoral ministry and his social involvement at the grass roots level with the Solidarity movement make him an outstanding example of an engaged Christian philosopher who witnessed to the Gospel through rigorous academic work and actively promoting social change. Tischner's description of the "ethic of Solidarity" that helped overturn the Communist regime in Poland also provides insight into the moral foundations of democracy. As Charles Taylor has written in an essay concerning Tischner's "ethic," we cannot abandon his theory of solidarity because it plays an essential role in the entire project of modern democracy.[4]

In this essay, I will focus primarily on his theological anthropology and its connection to some of his integral ideas concerning social change and the virtue of hope. First, I will explore some of Tischner's thinking on hope. I will then consider how Tischner's views about hope and the nature of the human person led him to conclude that nonviolence can bring about meaningful and lasting social change. In this section of the essay, I will contrast Tischner's ideas with those of the great twentieth century U.S. theologian Reinhold Niebuhr. Like Tischner, Niebuhr also had major influence in the public sphere.[5] However, his more pessimistic view of human nature led him to conclude that nonviolence cannot be an effective tool in the struggle for justice. Thus, Niebuhr serves as

manist. See also Charles T a y l o r, "Będzie nam go brakowało," trans. Tomasz Bieroń, *Tygodnik Powszechny Online*, http://www.tygodnik.com.pl/ludzie/tischner/taylor.html.

[3] This quotation is taken from one of the many recollections about Józef Tischner published in *Gazeta Wyborcza* after his death. It is important to note that the loss of Tischner is felt by Poles from all walks of life, not only the intellectual elite. I have personally witnessed the deep sense of tragedy among Poles. Having noticed that I was reading reflections about Tischner, an elderly woman on a bus in Kraków in summer 2000 turned to me and said, "It is terrible that Fr. Tischner has died. I don't know if there is anyone else in Poland who can be the kind of leader he was to us." Unless otherwise noted, translations are my own.

[4] See Charles T a y l o r, "Kilka refleksji na temat solidarności", trans. Andrzej Pawelec, *Znak* 52, no. 8(543) (2000): 28, http://miesiecznik.znak.com.pl/archiwumpdf/543.pdf. Given the limitations of the present essay, I will not thoroughly treat the elements of Tischner's "ethic of solidarity." For a nuanced discussion of it and its relevance today, see Taylor's essay and Wojciech B o n o w i c z, "Źródła *Etyki solidarności*," *Tygodnik Powszechny*, January 7, 2001: 1, 5.

[5] See Richard Wightman F o x, *Niebuhr: A Biography* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).

an interesting counterpoint to Tischner, revealing more clearly the link between hope, the human person, and social change in Tischner's thought.

HOPE, THE HUMAN PERSON, AND SOCIAL CHANGE

In one of his last public lectures, Tischner spoke of his conversations with the Polish poet Halina Poświatowska, whose struggle to lead a zestful life despite her deteriorating health ceased at age thirty-two. While peering into the eyes of death, she pleaded in one of her poems, "say you won't condone, that I die all alone, in this world so cold and dark."[6] Tischner, who consoled Poświatowska and numerous others during their final days, once mused: "To a certain degree, our Christian faith is tested in our attitude towards death."[7] Afflicted by cancer during his last years, he continued to write from a hospital bed and function as the chair of the philosophy department at the Papal Academy of Theology in Kraków. When asked in an interview if he had ceased to believe in something as a result of his illness, he replied: "Actually, I am starting to believe in more and more 'impossible things.' I am discovering that the world is richer, more colorful than I previously imagined ... my illness has enriched the world for me. It has given me a sense of freedom."[8]

Even in his final moments, Fr. Józef Tischner provided inspiration and wisdom to those who would listen. It would seem that for Tischner the key is the movement from "why have you forsaken me" to "into your hands I commend my spirit." Hope conquers death. This movement allows us to enter the "other side of life" as "children of hope."[9]

The attempt to articulate and provide ground for hope represents one of the distinctive and pervasive characteristics of Tischner's work. Tischner acknowledges that this is a Herculean task after Auschwitz and Kołyma. He claims that the dimensions of the evil of the 'totalitarian epoch' were so great that they surpassed all intellectual categories and intellectual possibilities of compre-

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[6] Halina P o ś w i a t o w s k a, "kiedy umrę kochanie," in Halina Poświatowska, *Właśnie kocham... Indeed I love...*, trans. Maya Peretz (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1997), 213.

[7] Józef T i s c h n e r and Jacek Ż a k o w s k i, *Tischner czyta Katechizm* (Kraków: Znak, 1996), 178.

[8] Quoted after Dorota Z a ń k o, "To, co wiem," *Tygodnik Powszechny Online*, http://www.tygodnik.com.pl/ludzie/tischner/zanko.html.

[9] T i s c h n e r and Ż a k o w s k i, *Tischner czyta Katechizm*, 184. His account of Husserl's death is intriguing. Apparently, Husserl continued to analyze his experiences in writing up until the moment of his death. At one point, he asked his caregiver, Sr. Adelgundis Jaegerschmid, for something to write with because he had seen a great light and wanted to describe it. When she returned, he was dead. The account is noted in the memoirs of Sr. Jaegerschmid.

hending it.[10] Yet, in a speech given to German students of theology in 1993, he contended that "it is not true that at Auschwitz and Kołyma the human being lost. The truth is that the human being won. How was this possible? In order to answer the question, we need to rethink the whole of European thought—Christian and Greek."[11] This reinterpretation must be undertaken from another point of view—from the heart of Auschwitz and Kołyma.[12] In describing his own philosophy in the preface to an earlier work, Tischner explicitly discusses contemporary humanity's crisis of hope. According to Tischner, early philosophy was borne of wonder for the world (e.g., Aristotle). Later, it arose from doubt (e.g., Descartes). Today it is borne of pain. Tischner prophetically states that "the quality of philosophy is determined by the quality of human pain that it seeks to express and assuage. Whoever does not see this is close to betrayal."[13] Betrayal to whom? Betrayal to humanity. The task, therefore, of the philosopher, is to give testimony to our humanity. According to Tischner, not a single contemporary philosophy of the human being bequeathed such a witness to humanity as did Maximilian Kolbe. Kolbe symbolically represents the many who sacrificed themselves for the sake of others.[14] Tischner returns to the heroism of concentration camp prisoners again in his final systematic philosophical work, *Spór o istnienie o człowieka* ["The debate concerning the existence of the human being"]. Like the Viennese psychiatrist Victor Frankl, Tischner points to the freedom of those who gave their lives for others[15] (we will examine Tischner's conception of human freedom in due course, as it is inextricably linked to his hope in humanity).

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[10] See Józef T i s c h n e r, *Nieszczęsny dar wolności* (Karków: Znak, 1996), 66.

[11] Józef T i s c h n e r, *W krainie schorowanej wyobraźni* (Kraków: Znak, 1997), 86.

[12] See ibidem.

[13] Józef T i s c h n e r, *Myślenie według wartości* (Kraków: Znak, 1982), 13.

[14] See ibidem, 12. Tischner often speaks in this vein of his friend, Fr. Jerzy Popiełuszko. Fr. Popiełuszko was brutally slain and dumped into the Vistula river on October 19, 1984 by "SB" (the Polish secret police during the Communist era) officers because of his association with striking trade unions of "Solidarity." He sealed his fate when he sternly criticized the "falsehood" of the Communist regime in a homily. See George W e i g e l, *The Final Revolution: The Resistance Church and the Collapse of Communism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 149.

[15] Tischner refers here to Nazi camps and Soviet camps, such as Kołyma. See Józef T i s c h n e r, *Spór o istnienie człowieka* (Kraków: Znak, 1999), 321. In my judgment, Victor E. Frankl, a survivor of Auschwitz, wrote one of the most profound observations about human freedom in his book, *Man's Search for Meaning*, trans. Ilse Lash (New York: Pocket Books, 1973), 104: "We who lived in concentration camps can remember the men who walked through the huts comforting others, giving away their last piece of bread. They may have been few in number, but they offer sufficient proof that everything can be taken away from a man but one thing: the last of all human freedoms—to choose one's own attitude in any circumstances, to choose one's own way…. Every day, every hour offered the opportunity to make a decision, a decision which determined whether you would or would not submit to those powers which threatened to rob you of your very self, your inner freedom."

Tischner believed that one needed to "work on" human hope in preschoolers, students, and adults in myriad situations. "When I look back at my work as a priest and philosopher, I realize that for decades I mainly worked on human hope,"[16] he once mused. One might easily be tempted to dismiss Tischner's philosophical search for hope. Marx and Lenin made most of us cognizant of the "opium" that religion sometimes provides for those who suffer. Feminist theologians rightfully admonish those who urge us to 'offer up our sufferings' and 'accept our crosses,' while paying no attention to the material circumstances which generate suffering. Tischner, well aware of Marx, Lenin, and the real suffering that ensued from the instantiation of their ideas, refuses to root hope solely beyond this world: "We cannot talk about hope in this way! ... a repository of hope exists: 'carry one another's burden', 'you are mutually each other's trustees of hope and from this trusteeship of hope community is created.'"[17] In other words, it is the responsibility of all members of a community (the Church, for example) to strive to eradicate obstacles to hope and to foster the hope of one another.

How are we to be repositories of hope for one another? Shall we deny or denigrate the suffering of others? Is this just another proposal to 'suffer with dignity'? As we have already seen, the "post Auschwitz, post Kołyma" philosopher does not deny the magnitude of human suffering. "We must accept the fact that our thinking falls under the judgment of the suffering human being."[18] However, Tischner makes this contention in order to critique philosophies that have failed to recognize it. He has not yet put forth any constructive proposals. Hence, the question remains, what verdict shall the high court of humanity render towards Tischner's philosophy? The answer depends on how trenchantly he addresses the problem of suffering and whether he demonstrates that "in the very structure of humanity lies a seed of hope."[19]

In a provocative essay, Tischner censures a "new messianism" that exists in Poland with regard to the suffering that Poles have endured in the last several centuries: partitions, invasion and destruction by the Nazis, and forty years of Soviet domination. In his analysis of this phenomenon, he accuses some Poles of concentrating the eyes of the world on themselves. He acerbically states "Is there something worth looking at in the world other than *my* pain? Whoever doesn't look at my pain is a sinner!"[20] He goes on to say ironically:

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[16] T i s c h n e r and Ż a k o w s k i, *Tischner czyta Katechizm*, 94.

[17] Ibidem.

[18] T i s c h n e r, *Myślenie według wartości*, 324.

[19] "Filozofia z wnętrza metafory: Z Markiem Drwięgą, Janem Andrzejem Kłoczowskim OP i Karolem Tarnowskim, filozofami, rozmawia Jarosław Makowski." *Tygodnik Powszechny Online*. http://www.tygodnik.com.pl/kontrapunkt/48/makow.html. According to Kłoczowski, this was Tischner's goal as a philosopher.

[20] T i s c h n e r, *W krainie schorowanej wyobraźni*, 8.

> However, one needs to ask one's self, what is the nature and meaning of the pain of the defeated such that it is worth universal consideration? There is, after all, much pain in the world. There are famines, poverty, diseases, and wars. Why should we focus on one pain, on the pain of these particular people and not others who are defeated? Because this pain is the messianic pain. It is from this pain that the emancipation of the world will come…. Messianic pain is Polish pain.[21]

While this message was delivered to Poles, it carries universal significance. Tischner asks us to swallow an unsavory dose of medicine. In an age when people often play the 'my suffering is worse than your suffering' game, Tischner's words are timely and necessary.[22] Nonetheless, this precautionary word against fixating on one's own pain does not deny the need for true healing and restoration as a result of real human suffering. This admonition alone does not spawn desperately needed, life-giving hope.

On the one hand, Tischner roots hope eschatologically in the future. Following Meister Eckhart, he claims that when God reveals God's self to human beings, it is always in a partial, perhaps fleeting way. God promises to reveal God's self to us fully only in the future.[23] However, neither this stance nor his rebuke of "messianic pain" overcomes the primary problem with which Tischner must grapple. He phrased the question as follows: "The human being died' engrossed by that which it thought up itself…. Why did the human being destroy itself? Because it discovered that it cannot be good…. Can we reverse this process? Can we make a human being from a game-player?[24]

In other words, without denying that human beings built Auschwitz and Kołyma, took satisfaction from those monstrosities and tried to wash their hands of guilt after the fact, how can we restore faith in the human person? Eschatological hope is ultimately important for Tischner. Yet, he will not abandon the human person. Adumbrating his philosophical project, he maintains it is possible to "make a human being from a game-player" (i.e., one who views all of reality as a game to be won). This can be accomplished by "showing that from the interior of the human being's game we can extract [or call forth] a yearning for that which is truly good, a yearning that through freedom seeks a space for itself."[25] It is

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[21] Ibidem.

[22] I have in mind, for example, the fact that one hears attempts to quantitatively and/or qualitatively argue that the Holocaust was a more heinous crime against humanity than the institution of slavery or vice-versa. In my judgment, this is counterproductive and does not constitute a serious attempt at healing and reconciliation.

[23] T i s c h n e r and Ż a k o w s k i, *Tischner czyta Katechizm*, 92.

[24] T i s c h n er, *Spór o istnienie człowieka*, 64.

[25] Ibidem, 65.

at this moment that we must turn to Tischner's theological anthropology in our quest for his locus of hope.[26]

A thorough analysis of Tischner's theological anthropology exceeds the scope of the present essay. However, it is necessary to present, at least in broad strokes, the interconnected notions of freedom, good and evil (or sin) and grace as they appear in Tischner's writing.[27] The aim is twofold: First, a brief examination of these loci will illuminate the underpinnings of Tischner's philosophy of hope. Second, an understanding of Tischner's anthropology and philosophy/theology of hope will shed light on what Tischner believed could be achieved in the social sphere. One interesting way to do this is to contrast elements of the respective anthropologies of Tischner and Reinhold Niebuhr, and to show how their variant concepts may have produced divergent conclusions regarding social change.[28]

Our point of departure is the 'axiomatic given' of a phenomenologist's analysis of evil. It is the springboard from which we can move through Tischner's anthropology: "Evil is a given. I do not ask if it is an illusion or not. I know—I have experienced in a clear enough manner that in the other exists some kind of embodied evil."[29] Tischner's understanding of sin underscores its various dimensions. In one place, Tischner speaks of the "slavery of evil," which he describes as a loss of freedom. He also claims, in accord with the "Christian conception" of sin, that sin is a basic evil that is "overlaid" upon human nature. Following Hans urs von Balthasar, he also portrays sin as the attempt of "finite freedom" to play or usurp the role of "Infinite Freedom." This is made possible by the glimpse of "Infinite Freedom" that exists within "finite freedom."[30]

Reinhold Niebuhr's intriguing account of sin in *The Nature and Destiny of Man* strikes many similar chords. For example, Niebuhr states that "the

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[26] Polish philosophers Marek Drwięga and Karol Tarnowski point out that Tischner ignored the post Enlightenment disjunction between philosophy and theology. Because he felt that theological categories were necessary to describe the human being, he used them without reservation, thus overcoming what Paul Ricoeur named "consciously controlled schizophrenia." See "Filozofia z wnętrza metafory."

[27] Tischner has returned to questions such as the nature of evil and human freedom again repeatedly in his writing. I recognize that this presentation runs the risk of grossly oversimplifying Tischner's ideas. It should be treated as an initial attempt to outline the most salient points in Tischner's writings on these matters.

[28] The choice of Reinhold Niebuhr is not arbitrary. His stature and impact in the United States makes him one of the few American theologians who have had the same kind of significance for his society as Tischner did for Poland. Like Tischner, he made his impact both through his prolific career and his link to social movements such as the pro-labor Union for Democratic Action. For more on the latter topic, see F o x, *Reinhold Niebuhr: A Biography*, 197.

[29] Józef T i s c h n e r, *Filozofia dramatu* (Paris: Éditions du Dialogue, 1990), 141.

[30] T i s c h n e r, *Spór o istnienie człowieka*, 345.

self lacks the faith and trust to subject itself to God. It seeks to establish itself independently."[31] He also speaks of the slavery of sin: "The ultimate proof of the freedom of the human spirit is its own recognition that its will is not free to choose between good and evil."[32] While many of Niebuhr's ideas echo what we have heard from Tischner, their 'tones' begin to diverge even within the last of Niebuhr's cited statements. It would seem that their paths split (perhaps not radically, but in important ways) in regard to human freedom and grace.

According to Tischner, the Christian concept of grace developed in contradistinction to the pagan, Greek concept of *fatum*. Among their differences, *fatum* ignores or denies the freedom of the human being while grace affords freedom's achievement. Tischner points out that philosophers and theologians have debated throughout the ages over how this seemingly paradoxical statement can be true.[33] In his judgment, the problem of grace represents the crux of the matter; it encompasses the problem of the human being, sin, freedom and responsibility.[34] The Christian concept of grace assumes two things about the human being: first, that human beings are in need of grace; second, that human beings are capable of receiving it.[35]

If grace is that which creates the possibility of human freedom, what *kind* of freedom can it create? For Tischner, grace is the remedy for human evil. Grace is that which *liberates* human beings from the slavery of sin. According to Tischner, Christianity portrays the human being enslaved by sin from birth who can undergo a gradual liberation. Therefore, Christianity does not proclaim an absolute freedom, unlike the Enlightenment, which professes that all human beings are borne totally free.[36] How does grace concretely operate in granting us freedom? Tischner claims that it "fastens wings" to the human being, in order that he or she may gaze "from above" at everything that limits or restrains.[37] While Tischner does not elaborate on these 'restraints' in his philosophical treatises on grace, he proffers insight into their nature in his book entitled *Jak żyć?* [How to live?]. In a sense, the beatitudes free us from the "things of this world"; they allow us to see earthly affairs in the proper perspective. "The hope of the kingdom frees us from slavery in relation to the world"[38] (It is interesting to note that Tischner reflected on the meaning of

[31] Reinhold N i e b u h r, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, vol. 1, *Human Nature* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964), 252.

[32] Ibidem, 258.

[33] T i s c h n e r, *Spór o istnienie człowieka*, 131.

[34] T i s c h n e r and Ż a k o w s k i, *Tischner czyta katechizm*, 129.

[35] T i s c h n e r, *Spór o istnienie człowieka*, 132.

[36] T i s c h n e r, *Nieszczesny dar wolności*, 12.

[37] T i s c h n e r, *Spór o istnienie człowieka*, 297.

[38] T i s c h n e r, *Jak żyć?*, Wrocław: Tum Wydawnictwo Wrocławskiej Księgarni Archidiecezjalnej, 1995, 102.

the Beatitudes for the 'liberation' of Poland in 1982 in articles published during the martial law period[39]). The "human being" of the beatitudes is a pilgrim. The pilgrim, like Abraham, journeys towards a "fatherland." In short, it would seem that for Tischner grace allows the pilgrim to hope in the future and thus to have the courage to travel the path of justice, righteousness and mercy towards union with God. This is a journey of progressive liberation from sin towards absolute freedom or "Infinite Freedom." To be free, is to be free in relation to good and evil.[40] The following passage encapsulates Tischner's understanding of the relationship between grace, freedom and human hope:

> Freedom is the power that liberates hope. It also liberates joy and the feeling of dignity. But how is the passage from despair possible? How is it possible to defeat sadness with joy? How is it possible to conquer contempt and to free the sense of one's dignity? If freedom is a kind of 'ascent,' how is such an 'ascent' possible, raising one's self from the state of despair? Can the human being accomplish this alone? If the human being could, the human would certainly not have fallen. And if he or she has fallen, he or she cannot get up themselves. Freedom means that a human being can accomplish this. On the other hand, however, freedom comes from the outside. In the incomprehensibility of this passage from despair to hope the experience of grace is anchored. Freedom is grace opening up towards grace.[41]

Paradoxically, "freedom comes from the outside." Only the infusion of grace can enable the human being to begin the "ascent" that Tischner describes. Recall, however, that evil embodied in others is an "axiomatic given" for Tischner (perhaps all would readily agree to this). Therefore, either not all human beings are free or there is a possibility to reject grace. Tischner elucidates his position in *Spór o istnienie człowieka* and *Jak żyć?* In the former, he contends that the good cannot be good by force or necessity. "Goodness, in order to be good, must itself 'want to be' good."[42] In the latter work he argues that in order for an act to be considered sinful it must be performed "with at least a dose of consciousness and a degree of freedom."[43] Moreover, "the human being, placed at the foot of the signpost and pushed by grace in that direction, must decide to march. The will must decide."[44] Hence, Tischner explicates why not all human beings decide to "spread their wings and fly" at every given

[39] These articles were later published in book form as *Książeczka pielgrzyma* (Warszawa: Libellus, 1996). This edition indicates the portions of the original texts that were censured out by the Communist authorities.

[40] Tischner, *Spór o istnienie człowieka*, 298.

[41] Ibidem, 317.

[42] Ibidem.

[43] Tischner, *Jak żyć*, 148.

[44] Ibidem, 57.

moment. Freedom, the "grace of all graces,"[45] liberation from sin, is offered to all human beings. This freedom can be freely rejected or accepted. This position is consistent with what we have already heard in the historical sketch of Tischner's life. In salvation history, nothing "must be." Rather, everything "can be."[46] It also resembles *Gaudium et Spes* concerning "the excellence of liberty." The Council fathers argued that "only in freedom can man [sic] direct himself towards goodness."[47]

Reinhold Niebuhr discusses a "reconstruction of the self" in similar terms. It is a consequence of "power" and "grace" from beyond the self. He maintains that the Christian experience is of a new self. "The new self is more truly a real self because the vicious circle of self-centeredness has been broken."[48] It would appear on this basis that he, like Tischner, believes in the possibility of some degree of liberation from the stranglehold of sin, at least theoretically. Elsewhere, as we have seen, Niebuhr contends that "man [sic] is most free in the discovery that he is not free."[49] How are we to make sense of these apparently contradictory claims? In a segment entitled "grace is a power not our own," Niebuhr provides a pithy nuance of his position on grace and freedom:

The real situation is that both affirmations—that only God in Christ can break and reconstruct the sinful self, and that the self must "open the door" and is capable of doing so—are equally true; and they are both unqualifiedly

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[45] The title of one of Tischner's articles is "Wolność – łaska wszystkich łask" [Freedom—the grace of all graces]. It is found in *Nieszczęsny dar wolności*, 10–3.

[46] See footnote 13. This statement gives rise to some questions pertaining to Christology. Does salvation history ultimately depend on human beings or the incision of the Christ-event into human history? Tischner's stance on freedom as grace "from the outside" rescues him from the first potential accusation. Tischner ultimately roots salvation in Jesus Christ. Far from being Pelagian, he merely wants to underscore human freedom. For example, in "the Phenomenology of Justification," we read: "There would be no justification if it were not for Christ's offering.... In order for God to 'justify' the sinner, the sinner should 'convert,' but in order for the sinner to convert, he or she must accept the fruits of redemption. In the act of redemption, someone 'just' intervenes between God and the sinful human being, which, on the one hand, enables God to perform the act of justification; on the other hand, it enables the human being to 'raise' its nature to the level of 'justice.' There is no justification without the savior. The human being alone insults God, but is not capable of rectifying the insult alone." T i s c h n e r, *Spór o istnienie człowieka*, 189–90. See also Tischner, *Ksiądz na manowcach* (Kraków, Znak 1999), 79–80.

[47] The Second Vatican Council, "Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World *Gaudium et Spes*," Section 17, in *The Documents of Vatican II*, ed. Walter Abbot (New York: Guild Press, 1966). See also The Second Vatican Council, "Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy *Sacrosanctum Concilium*," Section 11, and The Second Vatican Council, "Declaration on Religious Freedom *Dignitatis Humanae*," Section 11.

[48] Reinhold N i e b u h r, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, vol. 2, *Human Destiny* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964), 110.

[49] N i e b u h r, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, vol. 1, 260.

true, each on its own level. Yet either affirmation becomes false if it is made without reference to one another.[50]

Hence we see that for Niebuhr, the human must "open the door" and for Tischner the human must "decide to march." Niebuhr indicates that claiming that grace alone produces the reconstruction of the self is tantamount to a "divine determinism." This would "imperil every sense of human responsibility." On the one hand, Reformation theology has run that risk.[51] On the other, Catholic theology errs in trying to precisely delineate human versus divine activity and places them "on the same level."[52]

On the theoretical level, Tischner's views on human nature, grace and freedom seem remarkably similar to Niebuhr's. The former speaks of the "ascent" of the human (note the influence of Romanticism on Tischner). The latter envisions a "reconstruction of the self." Both strive to maintain human freedom while acknowledging that ultimately humans are dependent on grace. The difference between the thinking of these two great minds arises in their consideration of the likelihood of the "ascent" or "reconstruction." It is one thing to hold out the theoretical possibility of "liberation from sin." Does this liberation actually take place? If so, how often? Niebuhr reminds us that "history is filled with endless possibilities of good and evil" and that "every new human potency may be an instrument of chaos as well as order." He maintains that the Reformation most full comprehended "this tragic aspect of history." Its polemic against Catholic doctrines of sanctification, which exhibited a "too-simple confidence in historical possibilities, was well founded."[53] In short, the history of humanity's "denial of the Gospel" militates against any false sense of progress and naive optimism about the human's ability to "reconstruct the self." As we have seen, Niebuhr has a doctrine of grace that theoretically grants this possibility. Yet, in his words, "human pride is more powerful than any instruments of which it avails itself."[54]

While Niebuhr seems to focus on the dark side of human history, Tischner dares to speak of the "discovery of the good." It is intriguing that a philosopher from Poland, a land that has been historically battered by "evil", holds out more hope in the human possibility for liberation from sin than Niebuhr.[55] In an essay entitled *Wiara w mrocznych czasach* ["Faith in Dark Times"], Ti-

[50] N i e b u h r, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, vol. 2, 118.

[51] Ibidem, 116.

[52] Ibidem, 118.

[53] Ibidem, 155.

[54] Ibidem, 128.

[55] While Niebuhr's homeland was 'relatively' prosperous compared to a place like Poland, Niebuhr was deeply disturbed by what he saw on a visit to Germany during World War II. See F o x, *Reinhold Niebuhr: A Biography*, 78.

schner articulates the need to understand the horrors that Central and Eastern Europe experienced. Having pondered how people could have perpetrated such heinous crimes upon their fellow citizens, he states that the experience of evil "opened the door" for the experience of good. According to Tischner, people have struggled to define the good since Aristotle. He claims that it is perhaps indefinable. However, one can "'see' concrete 'good' in those who, jeopardizing their own lives, came to the aid of those who were doomed and often died for others."[56] Once again he names Fr. Maximilian Kolbe and Fr. Jerzy Popiełuszko as paragons of embodied goodness. In the case of Kolbe, those prisoners who witnessed his act underwent a passage from despair to hope. A new attitude reigned among them.[57] Tischner considers what inspired Father Jerzy Popiełuszko to risk his life in the name of truth. Among what he calls "some aspects of the experience of the good," he enumerates the willingness to be heroic and resignation from violence. The latter represents one of the linchpins of Tischner's ethics of Solidarity and will be the focus of the remainder of this essay. For the moment, it will suffice to point out that Popiełuszko acted according to the maxim he often repeated: "Conquer evil with goodness."[58] This phrase, rooted in Paul's letter to the Romans,[59] was often repeated by the Polish Romantic poet Cyprian Norwid. John Paul II also appealed to it during his pilgrimages to Poland during the Communist era.

Tischner's belief, shared by his compatriots, that good can conquer evil and that "evil is not free because it is dependent on hatred of the good" seems to distinguish him from Niebuhr. In his writing on grace, freedom and evil, he ultimately defends the human being's ability to "ascend" or "transcend" those things that enslave him or her. Moreover, it is a *real* possibility. Whereas Niebuhr's reading of history conveys a sense of resignation and pessimism about the possibilities for the embodiment of good, Tischner harkens to paradigmatic examples of "the experience of the good." These exemplars indicate what is truly possible. This belief enables Tischner to hope unwaveringly in the human spirit. It is this hope that drives his insistence on the real possibility of social change brought about through non-violent means. Having seen the anthropological underpinnings of Tischner's philosophy, we may now examine his proposals for the fostering of social change. Once again we will contrast his thinking with Niebuhr's on this matter. It would seem that what has been already stated in regard to Niebuhr's anthropology evinces why what he con-

[56] Józef T i s c h n e r, "Wiara w mrocznych czasach," *Znak* 44, no. 4(443) (1992): 9.

[57] See T i s c h n e r, *Nieszczęsny dar wolności*, 69.

[58] See T i s c h n e r, "Wiara w mrocznych czasach": 10.

[59] Romans 12:20–21: "No, 'if your enemies are hungry feed them; if they are thirsty, give them something to drink; for by doing this you will heap burning coals on their heads.' Do not be overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good."

siders "really historically possible" looks meager in comparison to Tischner's more optimistic proposals.[60]

"We should not think negatively of utopias," urges Tischner. "Utopias say more about the human being than more than one statistic, and to some degree always shape our real world, which is more than we can say about statistics."[61] He hastens to add that utopias do not consider the real force of evil in the world. A world without sickness, death, limitations on freedom and full of harmony is not a possibility. The key, according to Tischner, is to distinguish those utopias which are "fables" from those which can eventually become a real social program. Hope awakens in the "consciousness of the community" a project "for tomorrow." Tischner's reflections on hope and the project for tomorrow came in 1980, a year before he delivered his sermons at the Solidarity conventions. In *Etyka solidarności* we find the most clearly articulated sense of his project for tomorrow. Our primary interest here is not so much the content of the project itself. This is a matter for another essay. We are concerned primarily with the methods to be utilized in its realization.

Niebuhr's theory of power in society will serve as the foil against which Tischner's theory of "the adversary," "dialogue," and "revolution" will be examined. Niebuhr's student Larry Rasmussen has neatly summarized one of the central tenets of Niebuhr's theory of power as follows: "social justice is not possible apart from coercion, and since countervailing power is needed to check or destroy oppressive power, the question is how to make new power constellations moral."[62] It is important to note that Niebuhr considers nonviolent resistance a form of coercion.[63]

As we have seen, Tischner maintained that the solidarity "borne from the pages and spirit of the Gospel" does not require external imposition upon people. How then can solidarity grow? Tischner uses the image of planting trees. The awakening of consciences is like the planting of trees: "Someone plants a tree—one, a second, a third ... from these trees a forest grows....Whoever passes by will have to take into account the existence of the trees."[64] It is obvious that most people instinctively want to resort to violence or invoke fear in their oppressor. Yet, the "solidarity of

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[60] Richard Wightman Fox cites an illuminating quotation from Niebuhr's dairy. "I am not going to let my decision in regard to war stand alone. I am going to try to ... experiment with the potency of trust and love much more than I have in the past." See F o x, *Reinhold Niebuhr: A Biography*, 79.

[61] T i s c h n e r, *Myślenie według wartości*, 481. Paul VI stated something similar in regard to "utopias" in his Apostolic Letter *Octogesima Adveniens*, Section 37, http://www.vatican.va/content/paul-vi/en/apost_letters/documents/hf_p-vi_apl_19710514_octogesima-adveniens.html.

[62] Larry R a s m u s s e n, "Niebuhr's Theory of Power," in *Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971)*, ed. Gary A. Gaudin and Douglas J. Hall (Atlanta, Georgia: Scholars Press, 1994), 159.

[63] See Reinhold N i e b u h r, *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932) 250-256.

[64] T i s c h n e r, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, 80.

consciences" renounces the shedding of blood and scare tactics. Instead, it resorts to "shaming." It is worth citing this lengthy passage, as it appears to be at the very core of the ethical approach of the Solidarity movement:

> Today people abhor fear so much that they have not only ceased being afraid but also ceased frightening others. It seems as if frightening has been replaced by shaming. One takes a mirror and puts it in front of adversaries' faces so they can see for themselves what they are. 'You were saying that you want to govern, but in fact, you plundered the forest.' This is the hour of disgrace. After this, some lose all desire to govern, or even if they do not lose it, others are no longer able to take them seriously enough to be able to listen to them. Kings leave because they are no longer needed. The forest still grows.[65]

When the normal course of dialogue or arbitration fails, those who are exploited can shame their oppressors by striking. According to Tischner, the strike, as it was used in Poland, was not an act of violence or coercion. When workers strike they protest against "senseless work"; they continue to work but experience deeper and deeper levels of poverty. Yet, this act forms a "communion of people of goodwill" which has "love in their hearts for those for whom they work."[66]

Perhaps a 'Niebuhrian' response would argue that striking, the stoppage of work and elimination of employers' profits, does not constitute a form of love (Niebuhr is renowned for insisting that social ethics must not purport to solve everything by love). It is an act of coercion. The claim that striking workers love their abusive employers does appear strange at first glance. However, Tischner nuances his position in his discussions concerning the nature of dialogue and revolution.

Responsible, honest dialogue always attempts to find the truth. In this search for truth in dialogue, the dialogue partners must be able to 'feel' the position of the other. Tischner argues that "the full truth is the fruit of our experiences in common—yours about me and mine about you."[67] In other words, responsible dialogue attempts to reveal the situation at hand through mutual engagement. The goal is not to eliminate or destroy the other, but to reveal to him or her the truth about themselves. In the case of the Solidarity movement, the dialogue was primarily about the suffering of Poles caused by the Communist regime. As Tischner states, resolution did not come about easily. The Communist party was not eager to "look themselves in the mirror." Popiełuszko's death, along with the murder and torture of others throughout forty years of Communism, witness to this fact. Nonetheless, Tischner's hope in humanity allows him to end his reflections on dialogue as follows: "Hope is awakening that things and

[65] Ibidem, 80–81.
[66] Ibidem, 81.
[67] Ibidem, 11.

events can be changed. The people involved in the dialogue about solidarity must guard this hope as the apple of their eye."[68]

When sustained resistance is encountered, one must continue to shy away from violent means.[69] This stems from Tischner's conception of revolution. The "revolutionary consciousness," which arises when the "sufferings of some are the offenses of others," often gives rise to the illusion of revolution. The erroneous principle of revenge is applied to the justified sense of offense.[70] However, true revolution is a revolution in "realm of the spirit." It is the accusation of those who have inflicted suffering and at the same time the hope that new solutions can be found to problems that were once impossible to resolve. It is to believe in the "progress" of science, ethics and indeed the human spirit (recall Niebuhr's polemic against progress). Following Hegel, Tischner contends that in order for a revolution to take place there must be real progress. Furthermore, he argues that the measure of a true revolution is the degree to which it is "bloodless."[71]

In analyzing Tischner's ethic of solidarity, it is natural to inquire whether this is feasible in "our world" or whether this is naive optimism. One calls to mind the recent wars in Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya and areas continually riddled with strife, such as Columbia, Zimbabwe and Tibet. Without denying this tragedy, one must admit of the triumph of Solidarity. The remarkable thing about the ethics of Solidarity is that it bore real fruits. While Solidarity's victory does not prove that non-violent, non-coercive revolution will always be successful, it certainly demonstrates that it can happen.[72] Tischner himself preached in 1981 that the significance of a revolution can be seen in its fruits. In his later reflections on the bloodless "Polish revolution," he states that it took Poles under Communism decades to discern that violent struggles against the Communists would only end in defeat.[73] However, the Solidarity movement eventually achieved its goals. As Timothy Garton Ash has written, "Solidarity was the most infectiously hopeful movement in the history of contemporary Europe, and its long term legacy is one of hope."[74]

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[68] Ibidem, 13.

[69] In 1989 Tischner gave a lecture in Caracas in which he urged theologians of liberation to commit themselves to non-violent means of spreading the Gospel. It is published in Józef T i s c h n e r, *Etyka solidarności oraz Homo sovieticus*.

[70] T i s c h n e r, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, 51.

[71] T i s c h n e r, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, 54.

[72] While I do not know with certitude, I venture to guess that Tischner himself was not an absolute pacifist. He created the ethic of Solidarity for a specific movement in a specific place and time. As I mentioned earlier, he did urge liberation theologians to denounce violence. It would seem that while he may acknowledge the need to wage war, he would never relate war to the Gospel in any way.

[73] T i s c h n e r, *Nieszczęsny dar wolności*, 71.

[74] Timothy G a r t o n A s h, *The Polish Revolution: Solidarity* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1983), 337.

Does the existence of democratic Poland from 1989 disprove Niebuhr's claim that justice can only be established through the use of coercive power? Niebuhr did not live to witness Solidarity's victory or the victory of the "Velvet Revolution" in the former Czechoslovakia. However, he did encounter Gandhi's movement and the African American Civil Rights movement, led by Dr. Martin Luther King.[75] While he lauded Gandhi's efforts, Niebuhr criticized him for not recognizing that non-violent resistance was a form of coercion.[76] Would he have chided Tischner for the same reason? Of course, we can only hypothesize. As for the verdict, one must consider the fact that Tischner, and many of the members of the Solidarity movement, were committed to the "truth"; they wanted the Communists to see themselves in the mirror and to change for the better, to undergo conversion (to use religious terms). It would seem that this can be considered an act of love. If someone loves another, he or she wants to bring out the best in her or him, to edify her or him in their journey. Pilgrims assist other pilgrims in their journeys of liberation from sin towards the 'fatherland.' One must also consider Tischner's continued insistence on reconciliation, as opposed to revenge, in his polemics against what is know as 'decommunization' in Central and Eastern Europe.[77] In the context of this issue, Tischner urged that "Forgiveness liberates. From what? Above all, from the principle of revenge."[78] Whatever the verdict may be, the jurors must consider the fact that it in the twentieth century, which has been deemed the bloodiest by many, a peaceful revolution achieved its ends. The Solidarity movement, inspired by the writing of Józef Tischner, defeated the Communist regime. This type of David versus Goliath victory through non-violent means was perhaps unprecedented in human history. Perhaps then we can speak of human progress. In my judgment, this victory should at least call into question both Niebuhr's anthropological claims and his sense of resignation concerning the necessary utilization of coercive force.

Józef Tischner believed and argued for the ability of human beings to undertake an "ascent." This ascent liberates one from self-centeredness and attachment to earthly goods such as power and wealth. God-given grace provides the "wings"

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[75] Rasmussen claims that *Moral Man and Immoral Society* practically laid the basis for the strategy of the American Civil Rights Movement. See R a s m u s s e n, "Niebuhr's Theory of Power," 160.

[76] See N i e b u h r, *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, 251–6.

[77] The process by which all former members of the Communist party stand trial and are officially barred from public life for anywhere from ten years to life. The process has gone in different directions in various former Communist countries. In Poland, 'lustracja' was eventually ruled out.

[78] Józef T i s c h n e r, "Kot pilnujący myszy, czyli cierpienia okresu transformacji," *Znak* 49, no. 7(506) (1997): 42. Of course, Tischner recognizes the complexity of this issue and does not argue for a complete negation of and absolution from Poland's Communist past. He merely argues that all Communists cannot be treated collectively, i.e., individuals joined the party for different reasons.

and "propels" the human being in flight. However, not all human beings "fly"; none are able to "gaze from above" at the shackles of sin at all times. This results from true freedom and the succumbing to the temptation of sin. Some are obviously more encumbered by illness, depression, and other sad twists of fate. Yet, this does not obviate the need for hope. Tischner dedicated his life to hope: hope in the human spirit and hope in human progress. "Hope", he wrote, "is that which allows the human being to overcome the obstacles of the present and to turn towards the future."[79] His perduring hope in the human spirit led him to challenge Poles under martial law to a "revolution in the realm of the spirit." The hope that he maintained bore many fruits, in the social sphere and in the lives of multitudes of individuals. He eradicated systemic evils and assuaged the pain of personal suffering.

I have attempted to illustrate the greatness of Józef Tischner, a "light for the world" (Mt 5:14-16). This essay pays tribute to a man who truly was a "person of the Beatitudes" and attempted to show that in our world which is in many ways broken, exemplars such as Józef Tischner produce character, and their character produces hope (cf. Rom 5:4-5). I also aimed to evince that Tischner's legacy has much to contribute to contemporary debates about social change and solidarity. Tischner himself argued that solidarity and the manner in which it is realized must be continually reinterpreted in new historical contexts.[80] *Etyka solidarności* speaks to the exigent social issues of our time: poverty, unjust wages, discrimination and violence in the social sphere. Hence, earnestly studying Fr. Tischner's philosophy would serve humanity greatly by illuminating the path toward the eradication of these perils and inspiring the hope that it can be achieved. His life and death as a "child of hope" have much to teach us about the "culture of death" that John Paul II denounced in *Evangelium Vitae*. It is my hope that the theological and philosophical communities in the US will recognize this in the near future.

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[79] T i s c h n e r, *Myślenie według wartości*, 480.

[80] See T i s c h n e r, *Etyka Solidarności oraz Homo sovieticus*, 10, 15. In 2001, Wojciech Bonowicz demonstrated how Tischner's claim that "work must make sense" sheds light on the situation of striking nurses in Poland, whose poverty continued to grow due to inordinately low wages. See B o n o w i c z, "Źródła *Etyki solidarności*." I have discussed the changes in the wage structure in Poland in light of the ethics of solidarity in an unpublished essay entitled "Roman Catholic Social Teaching, The Roman Catholic Church and the Free-Market Era in Poland."

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ABSTRACT / ABSTRAKT

Gerald J. BEYER, Józef Tischner: Chaplain of *Solidarność* and Philosopher of Hope
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Józef Tischner's deep commitment to pastoral ministry and his involvement with Solidarność make him an outstanding example of an engaged Christian philosopher who witnessed to the Gospel through rigorous academic work and actively promoting social change. Tischner's description of the ethic of Solidarity, which helped overturn the Communist regime in Poland, also provides insight into the moral foundations of democracy. This article focuses primarily on his theological anthropology and its connection to some of his integral ideas concerning social change and the virtue of hope. First, the article explores some of Tischner's thinking on hope. Next it considers how Tischner's views about hope and the nature of the human person led him to conclude that nonviolence can bring about meaningful and lasting social change. The article contrasts Tischner's ideas with those of the twentieth century U.S. theologian Reinhold Niebuhr. Like Tischner, Niebuhr also had major influence in the public sphere. However, his more pessimistic view of human nature led him to conclude that nonviolence cannot be an effective tool in the struggle for justice. Thus, Niebuhr serves as an interesting counterpoint to Tischner, revealing more clearly the link between hope, the human person, and social change in Tischner's thought.

Keywords: Józef Tischner, hope, social change, theological anthropology, solidarity, Reinhold Niebuhr

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Gerald J. BEYER, Józef Tischner. Kapelan Solidarności i filozof nadziei
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Poświęcenie, z jakim Józef Tischner sprawował posługę duszpasterską, i jego oddanie sprawie Solidarności, czynią zeń znakomity przykład zaangażowanego filozofa chrześcijańskiego, który dawał świadectwo Ewangelii poprzez swoją pracę badawczą oraz działalność na rzecz przemian społecznych. Dokonany przez niego opis etyki solidarności, postawy, która przyczyniła się do obalenia reżimu komunistycznego w Polsce, pozwala również lepiej zrozumieć moralne podstawy demokracji. Niniejszy artykuł skupia się przede wszystkim na rozwijanej przez Tischnera antropologii teologicznej i jej związkach z jego koncepcjami zmiany społecznej oraz cnoty nadziei. W artykule omówiono najpierw wybrane wątki refleksji Tischnera dotyczącej nadziei, a następnie ukazano sposób, w jaki refleksja ta oraz jego poglądy dotyczące osoby ludzkiej doprowadziły go do uznania walki bez przemocy (nonviolence) za środek umożliwiający dokonanie istotnej i trwałej zmiany w społeczeństwie. W artykule zestawiono również idee Tischnera z koncepcjami dwudziestowiecznego teologa amerykańskiego Reinholda Niebuhra. Podobnie jak Tischner, Niebuhr wywarł znaczący wpływ społeczny, lecz jego bardziej pesymistyczny pogląd na naturę nie pozwolił mu uznać metod wolnych od przemocy za skuteczne w walce o sprawiedliwość. Myśl Niebuhra może stanowić interesujący kontrapunkt dla stanowiska Tischnera, uwydatniając obecny w jego myśli związek między nadzieją, osobą ludzką i zmianą społeczną.

Słowa kluczowe: Józef Tischner, nadzieja, zmiana społeczna, antropologia teologiczna, solidarność, Reinhold Niebuhr

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Jakub SADOWSKI

PERESTROIKA AND A SHORT HISTORY OF THE CONCEPT OF HOPE IN SOVIET OFFICIAL DISCOURSE

In Gorbachev's texts and speeches, 'hope' appears not only next to 'expectations,' but also next to 'fear.' The three concepts are adjacent to each other in the context of the criticism of the Stalinist 'deformations of socialism' and they contribute to a euphemistic characterization of the social moods of the period. Various tools for building this veiled description are exciting. The 'fear/alarm and hope' seems to be a very strong figure (considering that it is pronounced in front of the elite of the party nomenclature by the Secretary-General, and thus also by a successor of Stalin).

If one counts the last breaths of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev's farewell TV speech on December 25, 1991, will be one of them. In a way, this event could be regarded as a 'breath of hope.' The historical process of the collapse of the Soviet Union was obviously connected to such reactions as uncertainty, enthusiasm or shock. Nevertheless "hope" was one of the themes closing Gorbachev's farewell address. "I am very much concerned as I am leaving this post," said the first and the last president of the USSR. "However, I also have feelings of hope and faith in you, your wisdom and force of spirit. We are heirs of a great civilization and it now depends on all and everyone whether or not this civilization will make a comeback to a new and decent living today."[1] "I am positive that sooner or later, some day our common efforts will bear fruit and our nations will live in a prosperous, democratic society," said Gorbachev, wishing everyone (and these were his last public words as president) "all the best."[2]

It is worth adding an important detail: all those who base their impressions of this text on the above translation by Reuters would not guess that in the original version, while speaking about the end of his mission, Gorbachev uses the category of 'fear' (Russian *trevoga*) rather than merely expressing the state of 'being concerned.' And it was 'fear' that 'hope' was adjacent to in his speech. It is worth noting, though, that both categories were rare in the official discourse of the USSR (and in the discourse of its leaders).

[1] Reuters, "Text of Gorbachev's Farewell Address," *The New York Times*, December 26, 1991, 12.
[2] Ibidem.

In the dictionary of the Russian language edited by Dmitry Ushakov, the noun "hope" is defined as "the desire, the expectation of something joyful, pleasant, combined with confidence in the feasibility of implementation."[3] These terms are followed by quotations from precedent texts, patterns of the normative use of the term. Alexander Pushkin, Alexander Griboyedov, and Anton Chekhov are quoted. Why do I pay attention to the names of the three Russian classics? The answer is: Because the fact that the lexical unit in question was illustrated only by examples from 19th century literature proves that 'hope' was not a word related to the most extreme, totalitarian Soviet public discourse (i.e., a discourse of a deeply polarized and politically mythologized language, having an exclusive sanction to be in operation in a specific area).[4] Ushakov's four-volume dictionary, published between 1935 and 1940, documents the state of the Russian language of the period when it was severely petrified by ideology and political mythology.[5] It is a valuable source which enables us not only to trace the links between lexical and ideological units but also to develop a view of the degree to which the Russian language had become ideologized. For this purpose, one does not need to look for words such as "party" or "revolution." The density of the network of lexical–ideological connections is evidenced above all by the slogans referring to words that seem to be devoid of a political context. Thus, if one of the meanings of the Russian noun *mir* (in this case "peace") is defined as "absence of war, armed struggle in international relations," the quotation that illustrates it comes from Stalin: "We stand for peace and defend the cause of peace."[6] Similar is the case of the noun "method." Its definition goes as follows: "Way, method, or technique of theoretical research or practical implementation of something." The precedent text that illustrates the word 'method' is again from Stalin: "Lenin's method is not only a restoration but also a concretisation and further development of Marx's critical and revolutionary method."[7] The reader is referred to almost all the classics of Marxism–Leninism: to Lenin and Marx by content, and to Stalin by authorship.

Although Khrushchev's Thaw put an end to the domination of totalitarian discourse in the public sphere, totalitarian language—in a form not far

[3] Entry "Nadezhda," in *Tolkovyy slovar' russkogo yazyka*, ed. D. N. Ushakov, vol. 2, Gosudarstvennoye izdatelstvo inostrannykh i natsional'nykh slovarey, Moskva 1938, 334. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.

[4] See Michał G ł o w i ń s k i, "O dyskursie totalitarnym," in Michał Głowiński, *Dzień Ulissesa i inne szkice na tematy niemitologiczne* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 2000), 37–41.

[5] Ushakov's dictionary—seen as a document recording the state of the totalitarian language—received an excellent linguocultural analysis by Nataliya Kupina. See Nataliya K u p i n a, *Totalitarnyy yazyk: Slovar' i rechevyye reaktsii* (Yekaterinburg and Perm': Izdatel'stvo Ural'skogo universiteta, 1995).

[6] Entry "Mir[2]," in *Tolkovyy slovar' russkogo yazyka*, 224 [working translation].

[7] Entry "Metod," in: *Tolkovyy slovar' russkogo yazyka*, 224 [working translation].

removed from its state as documented by Ushakov—remained a fundamental component of political discourse until the mid-eighties.[8] Neither 'hope' nor 'fear' were desirable categories in this discourse, and they rarely appeared in the statements of the Soviet leaders.

In fact, they were simply unnecessary. In the Lenin era, the shape of official discourse was determined by the phenomenon of utopian consciousness: there was a space in it for the certainty of achieving the ideal 'here and now,' although there were numerous visions of the ideal in question (while in a universe of certainty the category of 'hope' is not useful). In the Stalinist era, there was only one official communist ideal and it was established in the dogmas of the system of state mythology.[9] In the light of the mythological worldview created by the state, the party's 'only right path' towards the ideal was the guarantee that this desired state of social reality would be achieved. 'Hope' again did not fit into that scheme. In official discourse, the Khrushchev era was a return to utopian certainty, best illustrated by the famous enunciation concluding the so-called third program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: The "Party solemnly proclaims: the current generation of the Soviet people will live under communism!"[10]

The situation changed radically during Gorbachev's perestroika. Paradoxically, the appearance of 'hope' was accelerated by the Cold War and the arms race, the demands of which the anachronistic Soviet economy was no longer able to meet. Probably this single factor helped the new Soviet leader discern an ideological perspective unknown to his predecessors: a general human perspective. "Humanity is no longer immortal,"[11] says the title of a chapter of Gorbachev's memoirs, accurately reflecting the rhetoric the Soviet leadership was beginning to consistently articulate. The significance of those words was tragically confirmed by the Chernobyl disaster. Developing his thought, Gorbachev stated, "There is a class interest, a national interest, a group interest, a corporate interest, but there are also human interests. We must recognize that they are a priority, because, in the event of nuclear risk and global environmental crisis, it is first and foremost that the life of mankind is given a priority."[12]

The world first heard such rhetoric from the Soviet leader in December 1988, when he spoke to the United Nations General Assembly. Claims of disar-

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[8] See K u p i n a, *Totalitarnyy yazyk*..., 53.

[9] See Jakub S a d o w s k i, *Między Pałacem Rad i Pałacem Kultury: Studium kultury totalitarnej* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Libron, 2009), 80–94.

[10] *Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza* (Moskva: Politizdat, 1961), 142 [working translation].

[11] Mikhail G o r b a c h e v, *Nayedine s soboy* (Moskva: Grin strit, 2012), 456 [working translation].

[12] Ibidem, 473 [working translation].

mament as "the main problem of the coming century"[13] were preceded by calls for "de-ideologization of interstate relations,"[14] declarations of "inadequacy of attempts to look down on others,"[15] and statements of the values of "unity in diversity."[16] Such a language was undermining the logic of the Soviet ideology, which remained virtually unchanged since the proclamation (at the 14th Party Congress in 1925) of the concept of 'socialism in one country.'

New openly articulated priorities in international relations became the original content of 'New thinking,' the ideological slogan of Gorbachev's team. "'New thinking' expressed the consciousness that there were values higher than those of the communist system, namely, universal values, such as the salvation and survival of mankind, the prevention of the threat of nuclear war," recalls Boris Makarenko, today professor at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, at that time an activist at the Soviet Peace Committee. "And then, as the country came into motion— continues Makarenko—someone grasped the fact that since communist values and ideals are not absolute in relations with the U.S., they may not be ideal in all other areas."[17]

Indeed, emphasizing the importance of universal values (and without the ambition that universal values should be identified with the communist ones) was a sign of gradual resignation from the use of the hermetic ideological language in the discourse of power. As it soon turned out, it was also a sign of a certain change in the rhetoric of Gorbachev himself, with time departing more and more clearly from Marxist–Leninist inspirations. It also marked the beginning of an unprecedented pluralism of public discourse in the post-war USSR, which by its very presence undermined the logic of the existing one-party and mono-ideological system.

It is worth noting that the nuclear threat was one of the contexts in which the term 'hope' began to appear in the statements and writings of the Soviet leader (and subsequently in the official discourse). Although the term was still consistent with the rhetoric of political and ideological confrontation, the rhetoric, as I have stated above, ceased to convey the message with the conviction of an absolute, undeniable (due to the fact that it was articulated by the Secretary-General of the CPSU) reasoning. For example, in his speech on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution, Gorbachev

[13] Mikhail G o r b a c h e v, *Vystupleniye v Organizacii Ob"edinënnykh Naciy. 7 dekabrya 1988 goda*, in Mikhail Gorbachev, *Izbrannyye rechi i stat'i*, vol. 7 (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1990), 199.

[14] Ibidem, 189.

[15] Ibidem, 188.

[16] Ibidem, 189.

[17] Interview with Boris Makarenko, conducted on October 10, 2016, in Moscow, audio recording available in the author's archive, duration: 1 hour 43 min. [working translation].

wondered, "How realistic is our hope that the awareness of the terrible threat the world is facing—and we know that this awareness is making its way even into the higher echelons of the Western ruling elite—will become part of practical policies?"[18] Answering his own question, he expressed a reflection, "The question is whether capitalism can adapt itself to the conditions of a nuclear-weapon-free world, to the conditions of a new and equitable economic order, to the conditions in which the intellectual and moral values of the two world systems will be compared honestly."[19] Therefore, the Soviet leader shifted the responsibility for achieving disarmament to partners representing the capitalist world, but at the same time the statement of the "honest comparison" suggested being open to the values represented by the opponent in the dispute.

In this context, it is worth noting that in the Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev years, the term 'values,' which appeared in official discourse in relation to the capitalist world, should be taken in quotation marks. Within totalitarian language, there is no room for the suggestion that the category of 'value,' positively characterized by the language of communist power and related to such concepts as 'internationalism' or 'equality,' could be used to describe any element of the world considered as hostile.[20] Some of the contexts in which the category of 'hope' appears in Gorbachev's writings also indicate that the previous language of power was being deconstructed. Let us quote a passage from the book *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World* of 1987. "It is probably not easy for a foreign reader to understand many of our difficulties. It is only natural. Each people and each country have a life of their own, their own laws, their hopes and misconceptions, and their ideals."[21] In the above statement, the phrase "foreign reader" should not be surprising: unprecedentedly, the book by the Soviet leader was published almost simultaneously in the USA and in the USSR (moreover, it was the American readers who could read it first!). The expression "our difficulties" was not used randomly: Gorbachev indeed conducted a critical analysis of the state of the economic and social affairs in the USSR, which (in the sense of conveying such message to both foreign and domestic readership) would have been impossible under his predecessors' rule. Likewise, it would have been impossible to say to an external

[18] Mikhail G o r b a c h e v, *October and Perestroika: The Revolution Continues* (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1987), 63.

[19] Ibidem.

[20] See Victor K l e m p e r e r, *The Language of the Third Reich: LTI—Lingua Tertii Imperii. A Philologist's Notebook*, trans. Martin Brady (London, New Delhi, New York and Sydney: Bloomsbury, 2013), 75–6; Vladimir P a p e r n y y, *Kul'tura Dva* (Moskva: Novoye literaturnoye obozreniye, 2006), 284; S a d o w s k i, *Między Pałacem Rad...*, 64–6.

[21] Mikhail G o r b a c h e v, *Perestroika. New Thinking for Our Country and the World*, Harper & Row, Cambridge and New York 1987, 131.

audience that the Soviet people might have their "hopes" and "misconceptions," thus implying a situation far removed from the propaganda ideal. With regard to the internal readership, however, the word "ideals," could not be used in reference to the West without being put in quotation marks. Nevertheless, let us note that 'hope' as it is used in the analyzed extract appears as an element of mediation discourse: it is an attribute of both the socialist and the capitalist worlds and, as such, the common denominator for the two worlds. Therefore, 'hope' is instrumental in creating a space for debate.

However, such a conclusion does not come up on every occasion the term 'hope' appears in Gorbachev's speeches or writings. The most common context in which he refers to 'hope' is international relations—and it is precisely in such cases (albeit infrequently) that the category in question is used by Gorbachev in the way typical of the Soviet language of power. Such was, for instance, the case with his criticism of US conduct, where 'hope' appeared as a component of a typical phraseological construction ("the United States is not ready to part with its hope of winning nuclear superiority"[22]). On other occasions, the concept of 'hope' he used might serve as a building block of a sharp, confrontational message, echoing totalitarian discourse, for instance, when he said, "Hopes of using any advantages in technology or advanced equipment so as to gain superiority over our country are futile. To act on the assumption that the Soviet Union is in a 'hopeless position' and that it is necessary just to press it harder to squeeze out everything the US wants is to err profoundly."[23] The rhetoric and structure of the above statements are reminiscent of the Stalinist construction of an ideological conclusion[24], while the phrase "hopeless position" is put in quotation marks, as in standard texts of the totalitarian language. This emphasizes the distance of the sender from the formulation used by him and blocks the possibility of referring it directly to the situation of the Soviet Union (to which—from the viewpoint of political mythology—the attribute of 'hopeless situation' simply does not apply).

We shall now look at other contexts in which the category of 'hope' appears in texts by Mikhail Gorbachev. Due to their high status and the institutional authority of the Secretary-General, the texts in question provide models and primary references for others functioning within the official discourse. In other words, we shall focus on program manifestoes of perestroika in which the crea-

[22] Ibidem, 239.

[23] Ibidem, 220.

[24] Compare: "To drag the party back after it has gone ahead, to bypass the resolution of the 14th party conference, after it has been confirmed by the Central Committee plenary session, means to get lost in contradictions, not to believe in the cause of building socialism, to get out of Lenin's way and to sign off on your own defeat." Iosif V. S t a l i n, "K voprosam leninizma," in Iosif V. Stalin, *Sochineniya: Tom 8, 1926, Yanvar' – noyabr'*, (Moskva: OGIZ, Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1948), 65 [working translation].

tor of the policy of that name explains and justifies its main assumptions. Two such manifestoes have already been mentioned in this article. The first one is the book *Perestroika: New Thinking...*, which has an indisputable significance: in his memoirs, Gorbachev speaks about it in terms of his political creed.[25] Equally crucial for the analysis seems to be the text of the report he delivered at the joint session of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR held on the commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the Revolution. In the USSR, the contents of the speech were published, also in the English language version, in a separate booklet entitled *October and Perestroika: The Revolution Continues*. The third programmatic text proposed here for analysis is Gorbachev's political report delivered at the 19th Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1988), which laid the foundations for the political changes in the Soviet Union in the years to come. The report is entitled *On the Progress in Implementing the Decisions of the 27th Congress of the CPSU and the Tasks of Deepening Perestroika*.[26]

Interestingly, the noun 'hope' usually appears in the above programmatic texts in the context of the justification of perestroika policy as such. Although the period of the implementation of perestroika turned out to be the beginning of the political, economic, social and cultural transformation, its main objective was the healing of the socialist system. And it was precisely with the ideas of healing socialism that the 'hope' articulated in Gorbachev's texts was connected. The Soviet leader was aware of the existence of the view that the political line he was pursuing led to a departure from Soviet socialism in the form known to date. That is why he admitted: "Does perestroika mean that we are giving up socialism or at least some of its foundations? Some ask this question with hope, others with misgiving."[27] Whoever cherished "hope" and whoever had "misgivings" could hear Gorbachev's firm answer: the goal of perestroika is the "reestablishment of Lenin's conception of socialism."[28] The goal expressed in the quoted statement in fact repeated Khrushchev's theses from the 20th Congress of the CPSU, held in 1956. Gorbachev's "hope" was associated (in any case, in his texts) with a deep belief in the potential of the current system. "Our hope of achieving revolutionary purification and renewal—wrote the author of perestroika— requires tapping the enormous

[25] See G o r b a c h e v, *Nayedine s soboy...*, 493.

[26] See "O khode realizatsii resheniy XXVII s"ezda KPSS i zadachakh po uglubleniyu perestroyki. Doklad General'nogo sekretara TsK KPSS tovarishcha Gorbacheva M. S.," in *XIX Vsesoyuznaya konferentsiya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza. 28 iyunya – 1 iyulya. Stenograficheskiy otchet. V dvukh tomakh. Tom 1* (Moskva: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1988), 19–92.

[27] G o r b a c h e v, *Perestroika. New Thinking...*, 31–2.

[28] G o r b a c h e v, *October and Perestroika...*, 42.

social potentialities of socialism invigorating the individual, the human factor. As a result of perestroika socialism can and must make full use of its potentialities as a truly humanitarian system serving and elevating man."[29] Gorbachev clearly remained a participant in the Soviet intellectual tradition, which saw socialism as a mechanism activating the possibilities inherent in every human being.[30] The belief that the goal thus set is possible to obtain, marked by a utopian attitude in the case of the reality of early Soviet culture and, as such, different from its Stalinist interpretation embracing a political myth, and still different in the 1980s, nevertheless now seemed merely a figure of official rhetoric. Perhaps it was the reason why articulating such theses was associated with hope rather than certainty.

In Gorbachev's view, the "purification of socialism" was a declaration very clearly inscribed in the context of the pluralization of public discourse, which was triggered by the 'glasnost' policy. It resulted in an unprecedented process of reevaluating the Soviet historical legacy, including, above all, the legacy of Stalinism. This process could be observed in the areas of literature and cinema, literary and film criticism, political and historical journalism. In addition, the administrative, management and economic stagnation of almost two decades of the rule of Brezhnev' became the subject of mass criticism. "Yes, we reject everything that deformed socialism in the 1930s, and everything that led to its stagnation in the 1970s," wrote Gorbachev. "But we want a socialism that would be cleansed from the layers and perversions of the past decades and that would inherit the best of what was born of the creative thought of the founders of our doctrine, of what was accomplished by the work and efforts of the people, reflecting their hopes and expectations."[31] We must not overlook the fact that the rhetorical figure "hopes and expectations" appears here in a context implying a broader picture of the unfulfilled obligations of socialism towards its potential beneficiaries. This conclusion is confirmed by the Soviet leader, who, on another occasion, stressed that "the ideas of perestroika have been prompted not just by pragmatic interests and considerations but also by our troubled conscience."[32] While justifying the need to reconstruct socialism, Gorbachev also invoked the authority of writers, cinematographers, and men of culture, recognized to "boost people's belief in the ideological achievements of socialism and hope for spiritual revival of society."[33] Thus the area of culture could become a "carrier of people's hopes."[34] At the same

[29] Ibidem.
[30] See S a d o w s k i, *Między Pałacem Rad*..., 148–59.
[31] *O khode realizatsii*..., 89 [working translation].
[32] G o r b a c h e v, *Perestroika: New Thinking*..., 25.
[33] Ibidem.
[34] See *O khode realizatsii*..., 39

time, the party leader openly admitted that, in the former Soviet Union, such a cultivation of hope would have caused persecution.[35]

In Gorbachev's texts and speeches, 'hope' appears not only next to 'expectations,' but also next to 'fear'—in the combination we have already observed in the case of his farewell speech. The three concepts are adjacent to each other in the context of the criticism of the Stalinist 'deformations of socialism' and they contribute to a euphemistic characterization of the social moods of the period. Various tools for building this veiled description are exciting. On the one hand, Marxist-Leninist theoretical tools are used for the purpose. Stalinism is defined as "a contradiction between the way our society has become and previous methods of leadership"[36]: the category of contradiction clearly implements the concept of the so-called antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions, which is an element of class conflict theory. On the other hand, however, in describing the years following the end of the war, Gorbachev states: "People were devotedly working, studying, seeking new knowledge, accepting difficulties and shortages, but sensing that alarm[37] and hope were building up in society."[38] The 'fear/alarm and hope' formulation in relation to the reality after 1945 is, of course, a euphemistic one. And at the same time this seems to be a very strong figure (considering that it is pronounced in front of the elite of the party nomenclature by the Secretary-General, and thus also by a successor of Stalin).

The co-existence of 'fear' and 'hope' was noted already in Psalm 56: "In God, I will praise his word, in God I have put my trust; I will not fear what flesh can do unto me" (Ps 56:4).[39] It is hard to imagine, however, that the Bible could be an inspiration for the words of the CPSU Secretary-General. In the reality of the USSR of the 1980s, 'fear and hope' was not a phrase from the Book of Psalms, but from a dissident dictionary. This was due to Andrei Sakharov, the most famous Soviet dissident and a Nobel Peace Prize laureate, whose collection of speeches, appeals and letters was published in New York in 1977 under the title *Trevoga i nadezhda* [Fear and Hope]. The essay opening the collection (and bearing the same title), indeed accusing the USSR, was also an appeal to the political elite of the West. Sakharov proposed they should implement a political line towards the countries of the communist bloc which would assume "disarmament, building international confidence, overcoming the closed nature of the socialist system,

[35] See G o r b a c h e v, *Perestroika: New Thinking*..., 25.

[36] Ibidem, 33.

[37] In the original Russian text, the concept is rendered as, again, *trevoga.*

[38] Ibidem, 33–4.

[39] I use King James Version. In this translation, both terms seem to be the most clearly exposed.

and protecting human rights throughout the world."[40] It should be noted that the list of the above priorities resembles the demands articulated by Gorbachev as Secretary-General, perhaps with the exception of "overcoming the closed nature of the socialist system." However, although the phrase in question was not part of Gorbachev's political dictionary, it might be considered as a postulate he implemented—in his international activity—in practice. And although it is impossible to verify the extent to which the Soviet leader, in his reference to 'fear and hope,' consciously referred to Sakharov or the dissident tradition, it is worth recalling that it was Gorbachev who in 1986 decided to end the seven-year exile of Sakharov in Gorky. Moreover, he personally communicated his decision to the Nobel laureate by calling him on the phone at his apartment. The phone was specially and without notice installed by the Soviet services at Sakharov's home the day before.

One should not think that the cases of Mikhail Gorbachev's use of the term 'hope' quoted in this article would determine the essence of his speeches and writings. 'Hope' does not belong among the words with which the reader is confronted on every page. However, it is worth emphasizing once again that against the background of the Soviet authorities' discourse the last leader of the USSR used it in an extraordinary, courageous manner, testifying to a qualitative change in the way political messages were formulated. It would be difficult to defend the thesis that the way the term 'hope' was used by him had a significant impact on the political or journalist discourse in the years of perestroika. It can be said, however, that the presence of the concept of hope was part of the socio-cultural climate of the epoch[41] for which Gorbachev laid the foundations with his personality and political decisions. Indeed, the second half of the 1980s was a time today's Russians often talk about in terms of hope, and just as often in terms of unfulfilled hope.[42] Hopes were associated with Gorbachev himself—the youngest secretary-general of the CPSU for decades—and with

[40] Andrei S a k h a r o v, "Trevoga i nadezhda," in Andrei Sakharov, *Trevoga i nadezhda: Odin god obshchestvennoy deyatel'nosti Andreya Dmitriyevicha Sakharova* (New York: Khronika Press, 1978, 13 [working translation].

[41] It was this climate that entitled Gorbachev's wife, Raisa, to name her memories *I Hope*. The book, published in Moscow in 1991, was immediately translated into English and then into a number of other languages, including Polish. The hopes formulated in the book concerned the success of the author's husband's mission and the fate of the entire USSR. Commenting on the USSR-wide referendum of March 1991 on the preservation of the USSR, Raisa Gorbachev wrote about her "belief and hope" that the Soviet people would "have the strength, self-control and patriotism and ... the common sense" to overcome all the difficulties and obstacles on the way to a "great, renewed, democratic Soviet Union." Raisa G o r b a c h e v, *I Hope*, trans. David Floyd (London: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991), 201.

[42] I am referring here to conclusions from my research on Russian social memory. See Jakub S a d o w s k i, "Perestroyka: eskiz k portretu epokhi v sotcial'noy pamyati rossiyan," *Slavia Orientalis* 68, no. 1 (2019): 101–21.

the dynamically changing reality under his rule: an explosion of freedom of speech, pluralization of politics, and first steps towards the marketisation of the economy. The shock of the end of perestroika and the transformation in the Yeltsin era were all the more painful. "Under Yeltsin, it became clear that the old life was over, under Gorbachev nobody understood it yet."[43] Some remember "hopes gradually turning into rage," others "disappointed hopes" and a lie inscribed in those years. Nevertheless, reminiscences of perestroika as a "time of hope," a time of pluralism and freedom of speech, are a bright feature of the historical memory of the contemporary Russian intelligentsia.

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[43] Interview with D. V., age 48, a resident of Moscow, conducted in Moscow on October 10, 2016, audio recording available in the author's archive, duration: 1 hour 63 min.

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ABSTRACT /ABSTRAKT

Jakub SADOWSKI, Perestroika and a Short History of the Concept of Hope in Soviet Official Discourse

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The article analyses contexts in which the category of hope appears in the texts of Mikhail Gorbachev's speeches and writings. His main programmatic texts and political manifestoes, in which the creator of the perestroika policy explained and justified its main assumptions, have been taken into account. Although "hope" does not belong among words with which Gorbachev's reader is confronted on every page his writings, considered against the background of the Soviet authorities' discourse, the last leader of the USSR uses this term in an extraordinary, courageous manner, testifying to a qualitative change in the way of the formulation of political messages in the Soviet Union.

Keywords: Mikhail Gorbachev, perestroika, Soviet Union, language

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Jakub SADOWSKI, Pierestrojka i krótka historia pojęcia nadziei w oficjalnym dyskursie radzieckim

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W artykule analizowane są konteksty, w których kategoria nadziei pojawia się w tekstach przemówień i pism Michaiła Gorbaczowa. Uwzględniono główne

teksty programowe i manifesty polityczne ostatniego sekretarza generalnego KPZR – teksty, w których twórca polityki pierestrojki wyjaśnia i uzasadnia jej główne założenia. „Nadzieja" nie należy przy tym do słów, z którymi czytelnik Gorbaczowa styka się na każdej stronie jego pism. Na tle dyskursu władz radzieckich ostatni przywódca ZSRR wykorzystuje jednak ten termin w sposób niezwykły, odważny, świadczący o jakościowej zmianie sposobu formułowania przekazów politycznych.

Słowa kluczowe: Michaił Gorbaczow, pierestrojka, ZSRR, język

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HOPE FOR THE UNIVERSITY?
A DEBATE

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Andrzej SZOSTEK

TO SHAPE THE PERSON AND THE COMMUNITY
On the Concept of the University, as seen in the Light of the Thought of John Paul II

The passion that connects researchers, professors, as well as students, the passion for the pursuit for truth for the sake of truth only, for discovering the previously unknown truths and acquiring ever greater knowledge of the world and of man, makes it possible to forge particularly deep bonds between individuals, to create a community grounded in the rational nature of man. Such a concerted search for truth, increasing our knowledge of the world, allows us to control it wisely and opens up new possibilities.

How did John Paul II understand the process of shaping the person and the community, and in particular the process of their reaching maturity? This question ought to be at least briefly addressed in order to show the specific role the university plays, according to John Paul II, in this process. Therefore, the first part of my paper will focus on the understanding of the person and of the community. Only in this perspective can the Pope's addresses to academic communities and his reflections on the mission of the university, seen in a broader cultural and Christian context, be properly understood and appreciated.

SELF-DETERMINATION IN TRUTH AND COMMUNIO PERSONARUM

Cardinal Karol Wojtyła dedicated his anthropological study *The Acting Person* to the question of the human being and to that of the mechanisms and ways by means of which the human being can reach full maturity as a person. Two parts of Wojtyła's work seem particularly important with regard to the subject-matter of this paper: "The Transcendence of the Person in the Action" (Part Two) and "Participation" (Part Four). The former addresses the topic of freedom, the latter is devoted to the process of a person's growing to maturity in the community of persons. The originality of Karol Wojtyła's concept of freedom lies in that he conceives it not as a person's capacity to make his or her own choices undetermined by external factors, but as an ability to exercise self-determination, rooted in the subject's relationship to himself or herself. Furthermore, the relationship in question strongly invokes the moral dimension of human freedom. This is indicated, among others, by the title of the fourth chapter of *The Acting Person,* namely, "Self-determination and Fulfillment".

According to Wojtyła, self-determination "presupposes a special complexity in the structure of the person. Only the one who has possession of himself and is simultaneously his own sole and exclusive possession can be a person."[1] This means that the first aspect of self-determination is that of self-possession, "for only the things that are man's actual possessions can be determined by him."[2] The second aspect of self-determination is self-governance, understood by Wojtyła as a fundamental dimension of the structure of the person rather than a moral sense of self-control. The structure in question is revealed and actualized in any act of the person, even in a morally bad one. "Thus self-governance is man's power to govern himself and not only to control himself."[3] It is important to note that the notion of self-determination has an anthropological, and not merely ethical meaning. Self-determination, in Wojtyła's view, is not a mere function of free will conceived as a spiritual power of man. "In self-determination the will is present first of all as the essential of the person and only then as a power."[4] From the understanding of freedom as self-determination, it follows that whenever I freely choose anything, I simultaneously actualize myself as a person. "When I will anything, then I am also determined by myself."[5]

I am determined by myself—and I fulfill myself as a person. "The fact that every performance of an action means fulfillment makes 'to fulfill' almost synonymous with 'to perform.' … For being the performer of an action man also fulfills himself in it. To fulfill oneself means to actualize, and in a way to bring to the proper fullness, that structure in man which is characteristic for him because of his personality and also because of his being somebody and not merely something."[6] Wojtyła intends to keep his analyses on the ontological rather than on the ethical level, but he emphasizes the fact that "as an existential reality morality is always strictly connected with man as a person.… for the significance of moral values for the person is such that the true fulfillment of the person is accomplished by the positive moral virtuality of the action and not by the mere performance of the action itself. Morally evil virtualities of action, on the other hand, lead to nonfulfillment even though the person is acting."[7] At this point, it is necessary to refer to the concept of conscience, because "it is … the conscience that reveals the dependence on a specific mode of

[1] Karol W o j t y ł a, *The Acting Person*, trans. Andrzej Potocki (Dordrecht, Boston, and London: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979), 105.

[2] Ibidem, 106.

[3] Ibidem, 107.

[4] Ibidem.

[5] Ibidem, 109.

[6] Ibidem, 149–51.

[7] Ibidem, 152–3.

'truth' … inherent in the freedom of man."[8] And the "surrender to the good in truth forms in a way a new moral reality within the person. This new reality has also the normative factor and manifests itself in the formulation of norms and in their role in human actions."[9] Human persons, in contrast to other beings, which are determined by external causes, fulfill themselves by respecting the truth recognized in their conscience; respect for truth does not diminish human freedom; rather it brings out its essential subordination to truth—to any truth, but most importantly to the truth about the subject himself or herself, i.e., the human person, who can reach fulfillment by respecting truth. "Man strives for truth and in his mind the ability to grasp it as a value—by distinguishing it from non truth—is combined with the urge to search and inquire."[10] In this sense, "the normative power of truth within the functioning of the person, is intimately related to the conscience and evidences the freedom the person has in acting. Far from abolishing freedom, truth liberates it."[11]

Personal fulfillment based, on the one hand, on recognizing truth, in particular the truth about oneself, and on respect for it, on the other, is accomplished in being and acting together with other personal subjects. What Wojtyła claims is that not only does each and every one of us need help from others to live and reach his or her goals, but that man by nature acts in community with others. Only in the communal context can the person shape his or her values, set his or her goals in life, and fulfill himself or herself in the dimension of *communio personarum*. The latter is crowned by the category of 'neighbor' and has its fulfillment in the person's participation in the life of his neighbors. Man, created in the image of God who is Love, cannot reach fulfillment, if not through love which connects him to other men and to God. In this sense, the process of maturation must take man away from himself, open him up, and finally help him find the meaning of life in his living for other people: in making a disinterested gift of self to others.[12] The key concept in this part of the reflection on the essence of the human person is 'participation' conceived as a personal subject's active and creative joining other subjects in their realization of the common good. "Participation thus represents a feature of the person itself, that innermost and homogeneous feature which determines that

[8] Ibidem, 154.

[9] Ibidem, 156.

[10] Ibidem, 159.

[11] Ibidem, 166.

[12] Karol Wojtyła expanded upon this idea in a number of papers (see, e.g., Karol W o j t y ł a, "The Person: Subject and Community," in: Karol Wojtyła, *Person and Community: Selected Essays*, trans. Theresa Sandok (New York, San Francisco, Bern, Baltimore, Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Wien, and Paris: Peter Lang, 2008), 219−61), and, as John Paul II, in the cycle of catecheses on human love and marriage (see J o h n P a u l II, *"Man and woman he created them": A Theology of the Body*, trans. Michael Waldstein (Boston: Pauline Books & Media, 2006).

the person existing and acting together with others does so as a person."[13] The person acts together with others whenever there is a goal common to all the members of a given community: a goal so important to all of them that its achievement releases their multidimensional potential and creativity. The fundamental, authentic attitude expressive of this kind of participation is solidarity, which allows the subject not only to contribute to the accomplishment of the external common good, but also to become fulfilled as a person. It is through this kind of participation that community is formed. Therefore, „the *goal* of common acting, when understood in a purely objective and 'material' way, though it includes some elements of the common good and has reference to it, can never fully and completely constitute it. … It also, or even primarily, consists in that which conditions and somehow initiates in the persons acting together their participation, and thereby develops and shapes in them a subjective community of acting."[14]

THE ESSENCE OF THE UNIVERSITY A CONCERTED SEARCH FOR TRUTH

Beginning his address, of June 9, 1987, to the men and women of culture gathered in the Aula Magna of the Catholic University of Lublin (it was the first so important a meeting of the Pope with the scholarly community in Poland), John Paul confessed: "The memory of what the university is—Alma Mater—I still carry alive with me. Not only the memory, but also a sense of debt that must be paid with one's life."[15] Indeed, Karol Wojtyła's studies at the Jagiellonian University and at the Cracow seminary, his teaching at the Faculty of Theology at the Jagiellonian University, then the period of post-graduate research at the Pontifical University of Saint Thomas Aquinas *Angelicum*, and, finally, almost a quarter of a century's work at the Catholic University of Lublin made it possible for him to acquire a deep knowledge of the academic world and to form a strong commitment to the scholarly community. It can be said that although the words he addressed to this community during his apostolic visit of 1987 flowed from the bottom of his heart, they were also grounded in his vast academic experience. The Pope raised a great number of issues related to the role of the university and to its mission. Here, I shall

[13] W o j t y ł a, *The Acting Person*, 269.

[14] Ibidem, 281.

[15] J o h n P a u l II, "Jakie są perspektywy tego pokolenia?" Address to the men and women of culture in the *Aula Magna* of the Catholic University of Lublin, Lublin, June 9, 1987, *L'Osservatore Romano*, Polish Edition, 8, no. 5 (90) (1987): 11. Unless otherwise noted, quotations are translated by Elżbieta Drozdowska.

focus only on his statements concerning the formation of the human person and of the community of people within the structures of the university. However, before I refer to the Pope's speeches on this topic, I would like to recall some truths, seemingly banal in their obviousness, which are nevertheless important for realizing the meaning of John Paul II's appeals.

The first of these banal yet important truths is that it is usually young people who leave their family homes and go to universities to study. Other people who have taken care of them so far, such as parents, teachers, educators, and not infrequently catechists, are no longer responsible for their lives, for the stages of their personal development to come, or for their further education. Young people begin to create their 'life projects' more independently, e.g., by choosing an area of studies, making new friends, and developing relationships which sometimes end up with marriage, or thinking about their future employment. In fact, they also choose, directly or indirectly, the system of values they will follow in their lives. Another important thing, however banal it might seem, is that to study means to engage in the process of learning truth: good students become naturally fascinated by the search for truth and they find joy in discovering it, while participation in this common pursuit shapes their minds and characters. At the same time, however, some students, as much as scholars, might be tempted to succumb to external pressures and abandon their selfless attitudes in research in favor of projects or study curricula improving their chances of financial prosperity in the future or media success. Higher education provides the human being with a great opportunity to reach his or her maturity as a rational being and to build deep and lasting bonds with others thus actualizing his or her participation in the community. Yet it is only an opportunity and whether a student will take full advantage of it depends on the atmosphere the university creates, as well as on his or her attitude. I believe this is the context in which we need to read John Paul II's numerous addresses to academic communities in which he emphasized the fundamental mission of the university. At the risk of inevitable simplifications, I shall now attempt to bring to the fore some of the appeals the Pope made in those speeches.

THE APPEAL FOR A SELFLESS SEARCH FOR TRUTH

In the already quoted address to the representatives of the world of culture delivered at the Catholic University of Lublin on June 9, 1987, the Pope said: "When I speak to you, I have before my soul's eyes all those communities in which the service of knowledge—that is, the service of Truth—becomes the basis for human formation.... By serving the truth out of love for it and by serving those to whom we communicate it, we build a community of people

who are free in truth, we create a community of people united by love for truth and by mutual love in truth, a community of people whose love of truth creates the bond that unites them."[16] The passion that connects researchers, professors as well as students, the passion for the pursuit for truth for the sake of truth only, for discovering the previously unknown truths and acquiring ever greater knowledge of the world and of man, makes it possible to forge particularly deep bonds between individuals, to create a community grounded in the fundamental dimension of humanity: the rational nature of man. Such a concerted search for truth, increasing our knowledge of the world, allows us to control it wisely and opens up new possibilities to make it better suited for human life and development. These immediate benefits, however important, must not overshadow the fact that through his search for truth and knowledge man shapes himself and, because the search for truth is a community endeavor, by participating in it together with others, man builds an authentic community of persons, a *communio personarum*.

Therefore, while appreciating the importance of the university as the place where a concerted search for truth is conducted, the Pope nevertheless issues a warning against reducing the role of the university to that of a higher vocational school whose only aim is to prepare its graduates for competition in the labor market. On June 6, 1979, John Paul II addressed the professors and students of the Catholic University of Lublin present at the special meeting with him in Częstochowa: "The university is part of the struggle for the humanness of man. The mere fact that it is called 'university' ... is meaningless for the cause of man. Indeed, one can even manufacture ... well-trained, educated people; this is not the problem. The problem is whether the enormous spiritual potential of man through which man actualizes his humanness has been liberated.... The mere production of educated, highly trained, specialized individuals does not solve the problem ... of man."[17] The problem of man remains unsolved unless the university supports the development of man's intellectual creativity, unless it helps man shape his own way of thinking. At the same meeting in Częstochowa (in which I was lucky to participate), the Pope also said: "Teaching is indeed one of the tasks of the university, yet the fundamental service the university offers those who enter it, having already developed their intellect and gained some life experience, is to help them learn to think on their own."[18]

[16] Ibidem.

[17] John Paul II, "Spotkanie z Katolickim Uniwersytetem Lubelskim," Częstochowa, June 6, 1979, in *Jan Paweł II: Nauczanie papieskie*, vol. 2, part 1 (1979), ed. Eugeniusz Weron and Antoni Jaroch (Poznań: Pallottinum, 1990), 667.

[18] Ibidem.

In addition, John Paul II warned that science should not succumb to the temptations of unhealthy competition. On August 30, 2001, at a meeting with rectors of Polish universities representing around a hundred academic institutions, the Pope said: "One of the threats connected with globalization is unhealthy competition. It can seem to scholars, indeed to the scientific mindset as such, that in order to survive the competition in the world market, reflection, research and experimentation cannot be conducted only by means of just methods; the latter must be adjusted to predetermined goals and to the interests of public demand, even if this were to involve a violation of the inalienable human rights. In such a perspective, the demands of truth give way to the so-called 'law of the market-place.'"[19] Needless to say, an attitude like this is contrary to the perspective described above in that it not only destroys the opportunity to create a community of people who selflessly seek the truth, but also undermines the very essence of the university.

THE UNIVERSITY IN THE SERVICE OF MAN

At the same meeting, the Pope emphasized that "*concern for the human person*, for his or her humanity, is at the root of the aspiration of the universities…. Regardless of the area of the research, scientific or creative work, anyone who devotes his own knowledge, ability and efforts to it, must ask himself to what extent his work makes him more human, whether it renders every aspect of human life more human or more deserving of the human person; and lastly, whether in the context of the progress he has achieved, man 'is becoming truly better, that is to say, more mature spiritually…' (*Redemptor Hominis*, Section 15)."[20]

Science is, in fact, the motor of progress, and the academic milieu certainly provides great inspiration for progress. Yet the Pope draws attention to the ambiguities of progress, to the fact that, on the one hand, progress facilitates human life and strengthens man's control over the world, but, on the other hand, man may be threatened by the consequences of progress, which may even get out of human control and become fatal. "Indeed, it happens all too often that what man succeeds in producing, thanks to the ever new possibilities offered by scientific theory and technology, becomes the subject of 'alienation'…. Examples of this situation abound. It is enough to mention the innovations in

[19] John Paul II, Address to the Rectors and Professors of the Polish Universities (Castel Gandolfo, August 30, 2001), Section 4, http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/2001/august/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_20010830_docenti-polonia.html.

[20] Ibidem, Section 3.

the fields of physics, especially nuclear physics, or information technology, the exploration of natural resources and, lastly, experimentation in the areas of genetics and biology."[21] To the list of the fields of science where progress may become dangerous to man, the Pope adds some fashionable philosophical ideas and developments in psychology. He also points out that literature and art are not free from such risks. According to John Paul II, the university should be an environment permeated with concern for man and respect for his dignity. At the same time, the Pope stresses the importance of long-term thinking rather than focusing exclusively on man's current needs and threats; thus he encourages the members of the academic community to develop "the capacity to anticipate the effects of human acts and to be responsible for man's situation, not only here and now, but also in the most remote corner of the world and in the indefinite future."[22] This postulate has a clear pedagogical dimension: scholars and students alike should remember that science is to serve all human beings, including those who will populate the earth in the future.

OPENNESS TO GOD

Many academic disciplines have no direct reference to God and John Paul II was well aware of this fact. At the same time, he also realized that in every area of science and the humanities, responsible scholars encounter problems that lie outside the scope of their discipline, provoking them to address questions related to other fields and eventually to cross the boundaries of their research field, opening it up to Mystery. "The man of science will really help humanity if he keeps 'the sense of man's transcendence over the world and of God's over man,'" said the Pope in his speech at UNESCO in 1980.[23] And in Vilnius, after his critical remarks about Marxism and other atheistic ideologies, John Paul II reminded the scholars: "Therefore, ladies and gentlemen of culture and science, you, more than others, have the responsibility not to close the range of human thought to the horizons of mystery."[24] In his Encyclical *Fides et Ratio*, as we know, John Paul II placed a special emphasis on the need for a dialogue between faith and reason (including science). He believed the dialogue in question is particularly important both for shaping the person (scholars and students) and for building a community of people seeking the truth.

[21] Ibidem, Section 2.

[22] Ibidem, Section 4.

[23] John Paul II. Address to UNESCO, Paris, June 2, 1980, Section 22, http://inters.org/John-Paul-II-UNESCO-Culture.

[24] John Paul II. Meeting with World of Culture, Vilnius, September 5, 1993, http://inters.org/meeting-world-culture-vilnius.

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While the above reflections certainly do not exhaust the rich contents of the numerous addresses given by John Paul II to academic communities, I attempted to demonstrate their grounding in the philosophy of man proposed fifty years ago in Karol Wojtyła's study *The Acting Person*. I believe the paper will help the readers realize the significance Karol Wojtyła–John Paul II, former professor of the Catholic University of Lublin and saint of the Catholic Church, attached to the university as the environment in which students and scholars are formed as persons and grow to reach their maturity.

Translated by *Elżbieta Drozdowska*

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ABSTRACT / ABSTRAKT

Andrzej SZOSTEK, To Shape the Person and the Community: On the Concept of the University, as seen in the Light of the Thought of John Paul II

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The first part of the article is focused on Karol Wojtyła's views, proposed in *The Acting Person*, on shaping the person and the community. The key concepts discussed in the paper include the category of freedom conceived as self-determination based on truth and the category of participation as the dimension of the human person that enables him of her to create, together with others, a community of persons (*communio personarum*) to develop and reach her maturity within it. The second part of the article discusses particular guidelines John Paul II, referring to his rich academic experience, offered to the world of the university. The author of the paper emphasizes three such guidelines as specifically related to the university: to selflessly search for truth, to serve the human being, and to be open to God. As these characteristics of the university help shape the person in the community and, at the same time, seem to be threatened, the Pope calls for particular respect for them.

Key words: freedom, truth, community of persons, university, scientific research, education

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Andrzej SZOSTEK, Uniwersytet jako miejsce kształtowania osoby i wspólnoty w ujęciu Jana Pawła II

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Pierwsza część artykułu zawiera przypomnienie Karola Wojtyły koncepcji kształtowania osoby i wspólnoty zawartej w studium *Osoba i czyn*. Kluczowe znaczenie dla tej koncepcji ma kategoria wolności jako samostanowienia poprzez odniesienie do prawdy oraz kategoria uczestnictwa jako tego wymiaru ludzkiej osoby, poprzez który współtworzy ona wraz z innymi wspólnotę osób (*communio personarum*) i w jej ramach dojrzewa do swej osobowej pełni. W drugiej części artykułu omówiono szczególne wskazania, jakie św. Jan Paweł II – w oparciu o swoje bogate doświadczenie uniwersyteckie – kierował do świata akademickiego. Specyficzne dla uniwersytetu są, zdaniem autora artykułu, trzy takie wskazania: bezinteresowne poszukiwanie prawdy, służba człowiekowi oraz otwarcie na Boga. Papież dopomina się o respekt dla tych znamion uniwersytetu, ponieważ wszystkie one dobrze służą kształtowaniu osoby we wspólnocie, a wszystkie zdają się być dziś zagrożone.

Słowa kluczowe: wolność, prawda, wspólnota osób, uniwersytet, nauka, wychowanie

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Imelda CHŁODNA-BŁACH

THE CULTURAL ROLE OF THE UNIVERSITY
A Philosophy of Culture Approach

The condition for the personalist character of academic life, with its diverse manifestations, as well as the cultural and social tasks it fulfills, is a specific type of community. Its purpose is selfless, yet responsible (justified) cognition and communication of truth. The university has an integrating character, i.e., the research it conducts addresses the entire human culture in its spiritual as well as material aspects.

In my article I shall emphasize the crucial role of the university (university education) in the context of the ongoing changes in contemporary culture. Analyzing this issue, I shall indicate the need for humanizing universities in the face of the crisis of university education which has intensified all around the world in recent years.[1]

First, I shall explain my understanding of the key concepts, i.e., those of culture and the university. Culture shall be understood in a broad sense as activities and works of man conceived as a personal (rational and free) being.[2] A philosophical understanding of culture consists in explaining and justifying—by presenting its ultimate constitutive factors—the human way of acting, grounded in the rational and free nature of the human being. I shall consider the university as a group of teachers and their students participating in a particular course of studies at a particular location. The university is a comprehensive and methodical practice of acquiring scientific knowledge and of its transmission at the possibly highest level in a particular cultural epoch, hence the character and the scholarly level of a given university signifies the cultural level of the community in which the university is active.[3] In European culture, the university, committed to the pursuit of the truth, has been the main center for developing and spreading knowledge. The task of the university is to serve the human being who, as a person, can fully develop his or her capacities only on the foundation of truth acquired through rational cognitive effort

[1] See Mieczysław A. K r ą p i e c, "Rozmowy o uniwersytetach," *Znak* 30, no. 6 (1978): 798–803.

[2] On the definition of culture from a philosophical point of view, see Mieczysław A. K r ą p i e c, "Kultura," in *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk, vol. 6 (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2005), 132–8.

[3] See Mieczysław A. K r ą p i e c, "Uniwersytet," in *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii*, ed. Andrzej Maryniarczyk, vol. 9 (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2008), 605.

and free social dialogue.[4] This view pertains to the personalist philosophy of the university, i.e., the philosophy that emphasizes the university's being grounded in the personal structure and dynamics of the human being. Based on the ancient Greek ideal of science, the practice and development of which was closely connected with the personal development of the human being,[5] the philosophy in question also accentuates the personal dimension of university culture and of science, as well as the personal character of values fostered in academic life.

The same ideal provided the foundation for the initial model of the university: the medieval *universitas studiorum*, based on the formula: *fides quaerens intellectum*.[6] The first universities in Europe were established in the context of Christian culture, which synthesized the philosophical accomplishments of the Greeks and the achievements of the Romans in the field of law. Christian culture was focused on the cognitive inquiry into the nature of man and the roots of his actions in a community.[7] The most important ideals developed in ancient Greek culture and subsequently instrumental in the creation of universities in the Middle Ages were those of the love of truth, sharing the truth, and friendship. The ideals in question have never been entirely abandoned in academic practice.

The term '*universitas*' originally described a circle of researchers sharing their knowledge.[8] The university patterned on the medieval idea of the *universitas* is expected to fulfill two fundamental functions: (1) the assimilative function, since the university makes it possible for the exact sciences, philosophy,

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[4] See Andrzej W a w r z y n i a k, "Od redaktora," in Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Człowiek, kultura, uniwersytet*, ed. Andrzej Wawrzyniak (Lublin: Redakcja Wydawnictw KUL, 1982), 10.

[5] It was in the Greek culture that the significance of reason in human life was discovered. The emergence of philosophy and of the arts and sciences, as well as their high social status were consequences of that discovery. Aristotle stressed the unique value of rational cognition; significantly, he began his *Metaphysics* with the words: "By nature all men long to know." A r i s t o t l e, *Metaphysics* 980 a, trans. Hugh Lawson-Tancred (London: Penguin Books, 2004), 4. Aristotle claimed that, in our cognition, we proceed from experience to art conceived as knowledge of the general, then to knowledge, and finally to wisdom, i.e., knowledge of the ultimate causes: "Human beings who naturally desire to know, gradually develop their natural inclination, beginning with everyday experience, passing on to art, next to science, to finally reach the science of sciences: the 'first' philosophy, or metaphysics, which pursues rational answers to the most important human questions. From experiencing sensations shared with animals the human being ascends to wisdom that reaches divine matters (theology)." Piotr J a r o s z y ń s k i, *Człowiek i nauka: Studium z filozofii kultury* (Lublin: Polskie Towarzystwo Tomasza z Akwinu, 2008), 33–4. All quotations are translated by Marcin Garbowski.

[6] See Andrzej W a w r z y n i a k, "Posłowie: O filozofię uniwersytetu," in Krąpiec, *Człowiek, kultura, uniwersytet*, 479.

[7] See K r ą p i e c, "Uniwersytet," 605.

[8] See Mieczysław M a r k o w s k i, *Pierwowzory uniwersytetów* (Olecko: Wydawnictwo Wszechnicy Mazurskiej, 2003), 66–73.

and theology to co-exist in one structure, (2) the integrating and world-view function, i.e., the function of ordering and integrating knowledge in the epistemological sense; the integrating function being particularly important in the wake of an increased specialization in education.[9]

The present paper will be divided into the following parts: (1) considerations focused on the philosophical issues related to the human being and culture, (2) remarks on philosophy as the fundamental academic discipline and on the role philosophy in university education, and (3) reflections on the institution of the university, in particular the contemporary Catholic university.

ANTHROPOLOGICAL AND CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

In the reflection on the university from the perspective of the philosophy of culture, it is necessary to refer to the philosophy of the human being conceived as an autonomous subject of cultural activity, capable of knowing the truth and grounding his or her personal life (lived in love and freedom) in the primary value of truth. In the context of the relationship between the human being and the university, the person is seen as a being that pursues the truth through cultural activity and in cooperation with others.

Therefore, the philosophy of culture approach to the issue of the university should be based on metaphysics and on philosophical anthropology: these disciplines enable an explanation of the multi-faceted fact of being (existence) of man and render an existential concept of person possible. The latter rests on the ultimate, objective (metaphysical) interpretation of the human being as a specific being endowed with a distinctive, personal form of existence. The human person, upon this view, is autonomous and fulfills himself or herself through acts of decision in the context of the existential-axiological reality.[10]

In the present discussion of the problem of the university, the above-described concept of philosophical anthropology has been adopted (1) in the analyses of the personal openness of the human being (with all his or her po-

[9] The views discussed above were proposed by a prominent representative of the Lublin School of Philosophy Mieczysław A. Krąpiec. They show numerous affinities to the concepts developed by John Henry Newman, José Ortega y Gasset, and Karol Wojtyła. See special issues of academic journals dedicated to the theme of the university: *Znak* 30, no. 6 (288) (1978); *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 11, no. 3−4 (1968); *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 21, no. 2 (1978). See also Alasdair M a c I n t y r e, "Catholic Universities: Dangers, Hopes, Choices," in *Higher Learning & Catholic Traditions*, ed. Robert E. Sullivan (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2001), 1–22.

[10] See Mieczysław A. K r ą p i e c, "Człowiek—dramat natury i osoby," in Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Człowiek, kultura, uniwersytet*, 15−41; Mieczysław A. K r ą p i e c, "Człowiek i wartości," in Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Człowiek, kultura, uniwersytet*, 43−57; Mieczysław A. K r ą p i e c, "Karola Wojtyły *Osoba i czyn*," in Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Człowiek, kultura, uniwersytet*, 81–101.

tentialities) to reality as such, to the world of persons, and to one's own being in the pursuit of truth conceived as the key personal value,[11] (2) in the concept of a work of culture as a sign of the intrapersonal creativity of the human spirit and in the theory of the intellectual foundations of personal activities,[12] and (3) in indicating that the co-being of persons constitutes a space where human beings can fulfill themselves in an axiological dimension and where their dignity and completeness as persons who transcend any political or social structures can be affirmed.[13]

It should be emphasized that initially universities focused their research on the human being conceived as a sovereign entity and on the factors enhancing the rationality of human actions.[14] The sovereignty of the human being is manifested in his or her pursuit of personal objectives, i.e., (a) finding the truth through natural and supernatural cognition, (b) accomplishing the good through free acts of will, (c) creating beauty in the processes of poietic cognition, (d) establishing contact with God, thus developing the relationship of sanctity.

Human beings, who exist as persons in the real world, are ends in themselves as they have been created by God in his image and likeness; as such, human beings fulfill their lives exclusively through God. It is therefore necessary to understand the ontic structure of man, the rationality of his actions, his freedom and its limits. To develop this type of knowledge, well-organized, specialized studies are indispensable.

In the context of philosophical anthropology and the philosophy of culture, the personalist meaning of the university becomes evident. Consequently, the university should be a understood as a distinguished path taken by those who are motivated to get to know the truth about the reality; in this sense, the university can be understood as a unique mode of a methodic pursuit of truth, adequate to the ontological structure of the human being, on the one hand, and to the human being's vocation to perfection, on the other.[15]

The condition for the personalist character of academic life, with its diverse manifestations, as well as the cultural and social tasks it fulfills, is a specific type of community. The shape of the *universitas* as the community of those

[11] See Mieczysław A. K r ą p i e c, "Człowiek i wartości," 43–57.

[12] See ibidem; Mieczysław A. K r ą p i e c, "Człowiek twórcą kultury," in Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Człowiek, kultura, uniwersytet*, 103–15; Mieczysław A. K r ą p i e c, "Kultura i wartość," in Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Człowiek, kultura, uniwersytet*, 117–23.

[13] Mieczysław A. K r ą p i e c, "Osoba i społeczność," in Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Człowiek, kultura, uniwersytet*, 161–71; Mieczysław A. K r ą p i e c, *Człowiek i społeczeństwo*, in Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Człowiek, kultura, uniwersytet*, 125–71.

[14] See Mieczysław A. K r ą p i e c, "Uniwersytet," 607.

[15] See W a w r z y n i a k, "Posłowie: O filozofię uniwersytetu," 486.

who teach and those who are taught: *universitas studiorum et studentium*, was worked out already in the Middle Ages.[16] Its purpose is selfless, yet responsible (i.e., justified) cognition and communication of truth. The university has an integrating character, i.e., the research it conducts addresses the entire human culture in its spiritual as well as material aspects.[17]

In reference to spiritual culture, one must emphasize the fundamental role the university plays also at a national level by cultivating Christian culture as a foundation for national identity. Indepth reflection on this theme is an important task of the university: the task that can be accomplished only in a socially organized fashion.[18] In particular, the university should actively engage in research into the constitutive elements of Christian culture as this culture is *par excellence* humanistic.

The humanistic dimension of research should also be preserved in the case of the natural sciences and technology, where the human aspect can easily be lost. Although the achievements of theoretical physics and technology are genuinely impressive, they may become hazardous to human beings.[19] Therefore there is a real need for research and analyses referring both to the

[16] When the university emerged in the Middle Ages as an institution of higher education, the term 'university' did not refer to buildings, administration, bureaucracy, ideology, specialization, or versatile education, but designated a spiritual relationship between the professors and the students which made it possible for the latter to learn to see better and to understand more. The University of Paris was defined as *universitas magistrorum et studentium Parisius commorantium* (the community of teachers and students living in Paris). See Palémon G l o r i e u x, "L'enseignement au Moyen Âge: Téchniques et méthodes en usage à la Faculté de Théologie de Paris, au XIII^{e} siécle," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 35 (1968): 72. The university was above all a community. Without such a community—one of teachers and students—there is no university, despite there being buildings and administrative staff. See Piotr J a r o s z y ń s k i, "Edukacja na rozdrożu cywilizacji," in: *Filozofia i edukacja*, ed. by Piotr Tarasiewicz and Imelda Chłodna (Lublin: Fundacja "Lubelska Szkoła Filozofii Chrześcijańskiej," 2005), 18. The university organized according to the original medieval formula is the best model of serving truth in a community—the model that optimally corresponds to the dignity of truth.

[17] See Henryk K i e r e ś, "Uniwersytet," in: *Służyć kulturze* (Lublin: Instytut Edukacji Narodowej, 1998), 170−1.

[18] "Of course, this is done by people and in people. The results of the work done at the university are 'materialized' in particular human individuals who then become responsible citizens, representatives of their nations and members of the Church.… To be faithful to its vocation, as well as completely independent in the sense of an educational institution, and to fulfill its essential goals, the University must continue its commitment to research and truth." Mieczysław A. K r ą p i e c, "Nauka w służbie prawdy: Rozmowa z Rektorem KUL-u ks. prof. dr. M. A. Krąpcem OP," in *Kierunki* 26, no. 49 (1980): 1.

[19] "The very organization of the natural sciences and technology, as well as the advancements of science, have gained such a level of autonomy that they threaten to escape human rational control and begin their own independent mechanical activity. Despite having been created by man, they may enslave him and become seriously dangerous." Mieczysław A. K r ą p i e c, "O naukowy profil Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego," *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 11, no. 3–4 (1968): 52.

ontic structure of the human being and to the human being as seen from various perspectives, significant to particular individuals as well as to the society as a whole. Such inquiries are helpful in bringing out the fact that the human being is the end of moral actions and of production rather than simply a means to an end. Such realization of the truth about the human being, about their activities and works, makes a deeper understanding of the sense of culture as such possible.

WHAT IS THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY WITHIN THE UNIVERSITY?

Seen from the philosophical point of view, reflection on the university is situated within the general understanding of the fundamental relationship of the human being to truth. The problem of the university can be best addressed by philosophy, which is one of the oldest domains of rational knowledge. The epitome of all arts and sciences, philosophy lies at the foundations of any scientific pursuit, also in the methodological sense. As a type of evaluative knowledge, philosophy does not provide a new cognitive content, but teaches to understand the world, granting the human being a deeper, explanatory view of the reality. The responsibility of philosophy towards the academic community and, indirectly, towards the contemporary world for addressing fundamental existential questions grows with an increasing concern for the humanistic profile of culture.[20]

It is thus necessary to reconsider the presence of philosophy in academic life and the way it supports the university in fulfilling its cultural and social functions. When the university was emerging as an institution, philosophy was recognized as the foundation and the keystone of the edifice of the knowledge and academic education it provided.[21]

The epistemic value of philosophy for the knowledge students can gain at universities is also worth noting. A knowledge-generating and formative role can be played only by a philosophy that offers rational answers to existential questions posed by man in his search for truth about himself. The classical *philosophia perennis* is an instance of such a philosophy, as it relates all knowledge to the human being and the theoretical considerations to the actual

[20] See W a w r z y n i a k, "Posłowie: O filozofię uniwersytetu," 489.

[21] See Mieczysław A. K r ą p i e c, "O potrzebie filozofii," in Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, *Człowiek, kultura, uniwersytet*, 225–30. Allan Bloom's attempt to defend the classical humanities against the unrestrained growth of specialized teaching is also worth noting. See Allan B l o o m, *The Closing of the American Mind: How Higher Education Has Failed Democracy and Impoverished the Souls of Today's Students* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987); see also Imelda Chłodna, *Edukacja amerykańska: Drogi i bezdroża* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, 2008).

reality. This philosophy is universal and rational: it aims to demonstrate, in the ontological sense, both the greatness and the contingency of the human being Above all, *philosophia perennis* is a realist philosophy, which shows how the personal development of an individual and the growth of the society is related to the rational explanation of the reality.

Such a realist, universal and rational philosophy can combine all the individual cognitive aspects of particular scholarly disciplines and particular philosophical systems in one all-encompassing image of the reality. Such a philosophy is the only discipline that helps assess cognitive accuracy of theories, hypotheses, scientific and philosophical systems that embrace partial truths about human beings and the world. A knowledge of this philosophy (or, at least, of the philosophical disciplines that explain how individual disciplines have been constituted) is a condition for a deeper understanding of the arts and sciences studied at the university.[22]

There is a clear need for teaching philosophy to students of mathematics and natural sciences.[23] Likewise, elements of philosophy are necessary in teaching the humanities and theology.[24] Another task philosophy fulfills and one that must not be forgotten is to provide the crucial areas of science with methodological insights.[25] A person with an academic background and representing a high level of intellectual formation needs to be acquainted with philosophical problems, basic methods of philosophical analyses, and fundamental philosophical literature. Denying university students access to philosophy is tantamount to depriving them of the foundations of rational culture and making

[22] See Mieczysław A. K r ą p i e c, "Rola filozofii w działalności uniwersytetu," *Tygodnik Powszechny* 20, no. 50 (1966): 1–2.

[23] "Including lectures in philosophy in the curricula of highly specialized areas of physics and technology has been motivated by the intention not only to provide a deeper historical knowledge of the foundations of particular areas of contemporary science, but also to make university students understand the role of philosophy in developing creative intuition and imagination, to explain how philosophy restores the unity of the reality broken by science into small segments, and to emphasize strictly humanistic function of philosophy, i.e., its ability to enrich the human being as such. The versatile history of philosophy, and a multiplicity of philosophical theories and interpretations greatly broaden the intellectual horizons of future specialists who will be working creatively in a variety of fields." Ibidem.

[24] "A humanist, on the other hand, remains focused on the products of human intellect, i.e., on intentional beings. To know the structure of this kind of being and, in particular, of human thought from which everything (that falls within the scope of the humanities) originates, is thus indispensable for humanistic education. Such knowledge can only be found in philosophy. As to the importance of philosophy for theology: the theology developed over the last two thousand years is, in fact, a philosophical interpretation of the Revelation. And thus all attempts at freeing theology from philosophy are based a misunderstanding." Ibidem: 2.

[25] "Philosophy …, which studies cognition as such, provides the first foundations for a more specialized knowledge proper to different types of formal, real, natural, and humanistic disciplines." Ibidem.

it impossible for them to understand the meaning of the world, the existence of man, and the significance of scientific knowledge.[26] Thus it is important to promote the development of philosophy so that it could serve its cultural functions to the greatest possible extent.

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY AND ITS SPECIAL ROLE IN CULTURE

To conclude, let us consider briefly the role Catholic universities play in contemporary culture.[27] The fact that science, by providing the foundations for present-day economic and social structures, shapes the entire contemporary civilization, makes the role of Catholic universities particularly important. An unprecedented growth in the importance of science in the life of societies throughout the world is the reason why we need to focus on universities as scientific centers. The integrity of academic staff and the quality of their research affect, to a great extent, not only the economic-social development of particular countries, but also the character of their culture. As nowadays science provides the foundation and form to the life of our civilization, the world-view predominant in social environments in which universities and research centers operate becomes particularly important.[28] Therefore, the necessity for in-depth

[26] Mieczysław A. K r ą p i e c, *O potrzebie filozofii*, 230.

[27] From November 29th to 30th 1972, Mieczysław A. Krąpiec, then rector of the Catholic University of Lublin, participated in a conference organized by the Congregation for Semiaries and Institutes of Studies and attended by the delegates of Catholic universities from around the world. The Catholic University of Lublin was the only university from behind the Iron Curtain represented at this conference. The purpose of the conference was to establish *The Charter of Catholic Universities*. The charter "stresses the distinct elements of the university in its traditional understanding (the role of research, teaching and preparing for life in a society), emphasizes the traditional autonomy of the university, incorporates the contemporary stipulations that the entire academic community should participate in managing a university, developing its policy and study curricula; above all, however, the charter postulates a commitment of the academic community to the Christian message. The commitment in question is to be expressed in the presence of theology in the academic curriculum and in all matters inseparably connected with theology as the rational explanation of the Revelation of Christ, both at the level of cognition and that of aspirations pursued in particular social and cultural circumstances. Catholic universities are also the necessary and indispensable factor involved in the work of evangelization undertaken by the Church in contemporary society." See *Tygodnik Powszechny* 27, no. 2 (1973): 3.

[28] Krąpiec believed that this issue has become particularly important in the developing countries and nations: "They are poorer than the developed countries and they have less time to make up for the economic, social and general civilizational retardation. Universities and research centers in those countries are, out of necessity, state-run and they assume in the societies in question the role of driving powers that accelerate civilizational change. Poorer societies … cannot afford to progress slowly, making errors and sustaining losses. They engage major social resources (a large part of their national gross domestic product) in the arts and sciences and demand from them effective solutions

reflection on the human being is, side by side with the increased importance of science in modern civilization, another 'sign of the times.'[29]

In those days, when the social and civilizational face of humanity was not shaped by science, the first European universities were Catholic universities. The community of the faithful cannot afford to stop organizing humanities-oriented universities. The problem of man, currently becoming the most important and the most urgent problem to resolve, is, in its deepest sense, inseparably connected to the Gospel and to the entire context of faith.[30]

While reflecting on the cultural role of the Catholic university, it is necessary to emphasize its personalist character. The personalist perspective, adopted in theology and philosophy, is based on the knowledge concerning the ontic structure of the human being, the most important forms of human activity, the specific human creative powers, and the conditions in which the human being acts.[31] It is only from this perspective that the question: 'Who is the human being?' can be answered.

The process of solving the problem of man should take the form of a co-ordinated effort of research teams, created by various university faculties and inter-faculty bodies, working together on crucial problems. In this way Catholic universities would guarantee integration of all scholarly disciplines and all types of knowledge.

In the Catholic university, the first place belongs to theology, which, as the *doctrina sacra*, is the "study of man in the aspect of salvation."[32] Among

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leading to comprehensive development of those societies." Mieczysław A. K r ą p i e c, "Uniwersytet Katolicki i rozwój narodu," *Seminarium* 26, no. 4 (1974): 794.

[29] See J o h n P a u l II, The Apostolic Constitution on Catholic Universities: *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* (Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1990).

[30] "In the face of the immense progress of science and the development of the contemporary civilization based on science and technology, the human being as such becomes the most important problem to be resolved on an academic level. The questions concerning the ontic structure of the human being, their destiny, the meaning of life, artifacts essentially related to human creativity, and the entire human cultural niche call for research in numerous scholarly disciplines. Such research is possible only in well-organized Catholic universities, in which where theology, philosophy, psychology, sociology, and law, as well as the philologically and historically-oriented humanities will be able to produce an integrated image of the human being as such and to contribute, each in its own way, to the explanation of the 'human phenomenon.' Such a vast array of humanistic interests in research and teaching creates a special academic milieu in which the professors, as well as the students become particularly perceptive about the problem of man—today the most important problem for the entire civilization of the globalizing world." Mieczysław A. K r ą p i e c, "Uniwersytet katolicki i rozwój narodu," *Seminarium* 26, no. 4 (1974): 796–7.

[31] See Mieczysław A. K r ą p i e c, "Rozmowy o uniwersytetach": 801.

[32] See Mieczysław A. K r ą p i e c, "Uniwersytet katolicki i rozwój narodu": 799. The functioning of the ecclesiastical departments (e.g., of theology, philosophy or canon law) in the Catholic university is regulated by the Apostolic Constitution on Ecclesiastical Universities and Faculties *Sapientia Christiana* of 1979.

the humanities, theology is the only discipline that enables the human being to grasp, in a rationally justified way, the deepest meaning of life, conduct, suffering, and work. As a discipline, theology presupposes the natural understanding of man and the world philosophy provides.[33] The understanding of man is accomplished by way of analyzing cognitive, volitional, creative, and religious activities through which man creates the realm of culture, i.e., the environment where the human person can develop and reach maturity.[34] The analyses in question are undertaken within the scope of various academic disciplines.

In its rational effort, theology relies on the research results of the humanities, particularly of philosophy. Thus it is impossible for a Catholic university to function effectively without a faculty of philosophy. Philosophy constitutes the foundation for interreligious dialogue, as well as for the dialogue with non-believers, and it may also become a basis for their agreement.[35] Philosophy can indicate a neutral ground where such an agreement on issues important to the human being, such as human values, basic conditions for human activity, freedom, and communication, may be reached.[36] Undoubtedly, philosophy exerts a humanizing influence on the academic community, due to a predominant position of philosophical anthropology. The influence in question concerns the very foundations of the understanding of man, his existential-personal structure, activities, and the meaning of human life in general.

Philosophy has also provided the context for the emergence of the humanities. In these disciplines an in-depth understanding of man is achieved through the study of human artifacts considered as reflections of the human spirit.[37] The study of the humanities at a Catholic university should aim to fill the 'gaps' in human knowledge, i.e., address problems that cannot be solved by the contemporary civilization based on science and technology. In this respect, the role of Catholic universities is to conduct, particularly in the fields of philosophy

[33] On the role of theology in university education, see John Henry N e w m a n, *The Idea of a University*, http://www.newmanreader.org/works/idea/.

[34] See Mieczysław A. K r ą p i e c, "Uniwersytet," 607.

[35] See Mieczysław A. K r ą p i e c, "Uniwersytet katolicki i rozwój narodu": 801.

[36] The multiplicity of philosophical systems has made it necessary to develop a metatheory of philosophy which will emphasize and describe more precisely the specificity of philosophical knowledge, justification, and explanation. The difference between science and philosophy will thus become clear at as early a stage as possible, i.e., the stage of developing the conceptual apparatus, performing acts of judgement, constructing theories, and adopting criteria of the meaningfulness of philosophical sentences. This will ultimately contribute to the integration of human knowledge by making it possible to assess the value of philosophical inquiries undertaken within different philosophical systems." Ibidem: 802.

[37] See Mieczysław A. K r ą p i e c, "Uniwersytet," 607.

and theology, a theoretical inquiry into humanistic problems in order to find the ultimate foundations for the meaning of a human life.[38]

In this context, two important characteristics of the university, also of the Catholic university, should be mentioned. The first of them is autonomy. The arts and sciences should be completely independent. Any form of instrumentalizing the arts and sciences is unacceptable, they must be developed without any constraints.[39] The autonomy of the arts and sciences is closely connected with their openness, i.e., being free from either external or internal determinants.[40] Absence of internal determination presupposes the concept of open science, i.e., of science that is not understood merely instrumentally (or developed to acquire the know-how), has its own, distinct methodological status, and in order to continue progressing, constantly reflects upon its methods. External indetermination, on the other hand, means that science is not influenced by any ideology and precludes any form of cultural monism.

Therefore the functioning of universities, and in particular of Catholic universities, requires a concerted effort of methodologists—an effort undertaken not only in view of the good of their own universities, but for the benefit of whole society—to spread the knowledge of the specificity of the various domains of the life of the human spirit, thus promoting cultural pluralism.[41] Pluralism, freedom of research and publication, open dialogue, and making clear distinctions (following the guidelines offered by methodology) between various domains of spiritual life are indispensable for cultural openness.

Generally speaking, the role of Catholic universities consists in offering practical solutions to the problem of the co-existence of faith and knowledge and in explaining their autonomous development within their proper areas. As

[38] As Zenon Grocholewski notes, various disciplines taught at Catholic universities should be enriched by philosophical reflection and by the light of the Gospel. See Zenon G r o c h o l e w s k i, "Rola wyższych uczelni katolickich z perspektywy pontyfikatu Jana Pawła II," *Horyzonty Wychowania* 5, no. 9 (2006): 26.

[39] Krąpiec referred to the situation of the Catholic University of Lublin: "We have gained experience during the interwar period, characterized by a good development of the autonomous arts and sciences in Poland, including the growth of universities. All the good we had experienced was included in our statutes that helped us persevere and, in the difficult years following the Second World War, develop our activities in the field of research, teaching, and formation. The good in question was the sovereignty of research and administrative autonomy." Mieczysław A. K r ą p i e c, "Nauka w służbie prawdy: Rozmowa z Rektorem KUL-u ks. prof. dr. M. A. Krąpcem OP": 1.

[40] See ibidem.

[41] "The arts and sciences must defend themselves against all incompetence by clearly defining their subject, purpose, and method. The arts and sciences must defend also other domains of the human spirit in order not to render thinking impossible to fellow human beings. Thinking becomes impossible if one cannot express one's thoughts with words, because a thought can achieve its clear and complete meaning only when it finds its ultimate expression in words." Mieczysław A. K r ą p i e c, "O otwartość uniwersytetów," *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 21, no. 2 (1978): 12.

those areas tend to 'overlap' to a certain extent in the life of a human being, the role of Catholic universities can also be described positively as creating an adequate Catholic culture, while avoiding any kind of one-sided (e.g., fideistic or scientistic) approach.[42]

The reasons for the existence of Catholic universities are thus self-evident. Their objective, which coincides with one the most important tasks of the Catholic Church, is to help the human being understand who he or she is, explaining the ontic structure of the human being and his or her destiny. Therefore the curricula developed at Catholic universities address the following most important aspects of the life of the human being conceived as person: (1) the aspect of salvation (studied by theology), (2) the aspect of the human person's ontic structure and his or her conduct (studied by philosophy), (3) the aspect of living in a community (studied by law and social sciences), and (4) the aspect of creating artifacts (studied by the humanities). So designed, academic education encompasses the totality of human culture. Referring to the university, Pope Benedict XVI postulated a new "experience of *universitas*"[43] which would draw both on the ideas present in the classical culture and on the innovative efforts to find new potentialities and new limits of rationality.

In conclusion, let me reiterate that as the structure and objectives of the Church, as well as the nature of the human being and his or her conduct have not changed in time, the essential objectives of academic education remain as they have always been. They are rooted in the understanding of man as an autonomous, sovereign being. The need to educate human beings and create humanistic culture persists. Also, two major goals pursued by the university are still valid: to understand who the human person is and to defend humanness and help it flourish. Those two goals coincide with the objectives of the realistically conceived culture.

Translated by *Marcin Garbowski*

[42] See Mieczysław A. K r ą p i e c, "Konfesyjność uczelni i wolność nauki," *Zeszyty Naukowe KUL* 1, no. 1 (1958): 19.

[43] See B e n e d i c t XVI, "Faith, Reason and the University: Memories and Reflections." Meeting with the representatives of science, Regensburg, September 12, 2006, http://www.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/speeches/2006/september/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20060912_university-regensburg.html.

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ABSTRACT / ABSTRAKT

Imelda CHŁODNA-BŁACH, The Cultural Role of the University: A Philosophy of Culture Approach

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The article addresses the role of the university in culture. Discussion of this issue is becoming particularly important nowadays, especially with a crisis of humanistic knowledge, on one hand, and the fact that higher education is increasingly becoming mass education, on the other. The author underlines

the humanistic function of the university in the society and in culture. This function is rooted in the personalistic foundations of the university and gives meaning to the tasks it fulfills, such as advancing research and teaching, forming the intelligentsia, providing professional training, spreading knowledge, and promoting culture. The reflection offered in the paper is divided into three parts: (1) considerations focused on the philosophical issues concerning the human being and culture, (2) remarks on philosophy as the fundamental form of scientific cognition and on the role of philosophy in academic education, and (3) reflection on the institution of the university, in particular, the contemporary Catholic university.

Keywords: culture, person, education, university, philosophy, philosophical anthropology

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Imelda CHŁODNA-BŁACH, Rola uniwersytetu w kulturze. Ujęcie filozoficzno-kulturowe

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W artykule ukazano, jaką rolę uniwersytet pełni w kulturze. W dzisiejszych czasach, kiedy z jednej strony zauważamy kryzys wiedzy humanistycznej, a z drugiej strony umasowienie szkolnictwa wyższego, problematyka ta nabierają szczególnego znaczenia. Autorka podkreśla humanistyczną funkcję uniwersytetu w społeczeństwie i kulturze. Funkcja ta odwołuje się do personalistycznych podstaw uczelni i nadaje sens pełnionym przez nią zadaniom: rozwijaniu nauki i nauczania, kształtowaniu inteligencji, kształceniu zawodowemu, upowszechnianiu wiedzy i promowaniu kultury. Podejmowane rozważania koncentrują się na następujących zagadnieniach: (1) filozoficznym ujęciu człowieka i kultury z perspektywy antropologicznej; (2) filozofii jako podstawowej formie poznania naukowego i jej funkcji w edukacji uniwersyteckiej; (3) refleksji nad instytucją uczelni, zwłaszcza współczesnej uczelni katolickiej.

Słowa kluczowe: kultura, osoba, edukacja, uniwersytet, filozofia, antropologia filozoficzna

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Dmytro SHEVCHUK

THE CONTEMPORARY UNIVERSITY
A Tradition that Creates the Future

The concept of the university as a space in which different ideas may be developed and confronted is not new. Such a possibility is inherent in the academic tradition from the beginning of universities, which have always embraced mutually opposed currents of thought. This characteristic is particularly conspicuous in the case of the contemporary university, which combines universalism of research and an administrative hierarchy; applied knowledge and pure knowledge; the academia as such and the particular areas of scholarship.

I dedicate my paper to the three universities each of which I can call my *alma mater*. To them I owe my knowledge and academic values, my outlook on life, and my understanding of the world. They are the Ostroh Academy and the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy (the two oldest universities in Ukraine), and the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin. They are comparable schools despite the fact that the latter is closely connected to the Catholic tradition, while the Ostroh Academy and the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, at their origins in, respectively, the 16th and the 17th century and since their renaissance in the late 20th century, have drawn upon the tradition of the Ukrainian Orthodoxy. The three universities are connected by a strong tradition which has determined their development and makes it possible for them to contribute to the growth of society.

The reflections on the condition of the contemporary university I shall put forward below are based on the debates we have held at the National University 'Ostroh Academy' for three years now, as part of the project entitled "The Mission of the Contemporary University."

PRESENT DAY DEBATE

In discussions on higher education, one hears claims that the classical model of university has been exhausted: university education has declined in its value, the authority of intellectuals has diminished, and the university itself has abandoned its mission. The development of mass higher education and the resulting 'inflation' of the university diploma are believed to be among the reasons for the present situation. Such a diagnosis, however, is merely superficial and it fails to explain the serious problems faced by the contemporary university. In order to realize their entire scope, one also needs to consider a broader

picture of the urgent issues affecting today's world: the rapid changes in the political, social, and economic life which preclude long-term planning, the transformation of the anthropological foundations of culture (the widespread ideas of transhumanism and posthumanity undermine the belief in the exceptionality of human beings), disappearance of lasting identities, the conflicts of interpretations, and the prevalence of post-truth.

All the mentioned problems are responsible for the present transformation of the university which, however, does not consist merely in administrative changes or in the introduction of the new ministerial or governmental regulations, but is about the essence of education as such. New phenomena in this field, such as 'continual education' or 'lifelong learning,' are evidence of the fact that education is no longer considered a lasting result or a completed process, but becomes the foundation for creating new social, cultural, or economic contexts. In other words, contemporary education aims at shaping a personality capable of self-learning and it is for this reason that we need to rethink educational practice as such.

The context of the transformation described above gives rise to the question of the 'purpose of the university' and, indeed, academic milieus have been putting forward questions about the mission, place, objectives, and role of the university in the contemporary world. Should the university be adapted to the conditions of liquid modernity or should it rather uphold the unchanging universal values, striving to overcome the liquidity of the modern times and design a sustained development of the world?

While discussing the contemporary mission of the university, it is important to point to its options of change which conform to its essence. Burton R. Clark, for instance, in his description of the complicated and multidimensional character of the transformation process of the institutions of higher education, proposes the model of a change-oriented university. Analyzing the entrepreneurial potential of contemporary universities and the possibilities of the development of their infrastructure, Clark observes that in the case of universities transformation affects not only numerous elements of their administrative structures, but also the necessity of finding new streams of income, a changing array of base units responsible for different territories of academic activity, and a multiplicity of contradicting, yet enduring beliefs.[1]

The main issue relevant to the change, or transformation of the university is how to reconcile tradition and innovation, how to remain connected to the past and to the permanent system of academic values, at the same time undergoing essential changes, adapting to the demands of the time, and continually revising the

[1] See Burton R. C l a r k, *Sustaining Change in Universities: Continuities in Case Studies and Concepts* (Maidenhead: Society for Research into Higher Education & Open University Press, 2006), 6.

vision of the future. Thus, the following questions are well-justified: Should the university abandon its institutional identity and transform into a 'liquid,' modern institution, which has 'musealized' its own tradition and adapted to the 'liquid modernity'? Or, on the contrary, should it remain the 'island' of stability, and persevere forming human subjects in the time of the 'death of the subject,' as well as commit themselves to the universal values in the time of relativism and seek truth? The above questions certainly do not exhaust the issues pertinent to the contemporary situation of the university. Yet they prompt a third one: Are we not, by mere consideration of such opportunities, falling into the trap of instrumental approach to the university, and is our position not marked by 'four C's, namely, commercialization, commodification, corporatization, and competition?

EVOLUTION OF THE UNIVERSITY

One of the ways to understand the essence of the change of the university and its tradition is to refer to the evolution of higher education institutions which has been going on for almost a thousand years now and produced several models of the university. Can we say that the contemporary university is creating its own model of itself? Or, rather, is the university entering into conflict with its earlier models due to its institutional and ideological indefiniteness? Has the university rejected its previous ideas and missions, while demonstrating that it is incapable of creating a new idea consolidating it and defining its institutional identity? However, even should we find out that the 'conflict' is actually there, it need not be necessarily considered as negative. Analyzing the functioning of conflict in modern culture, Georg Simmel writes that the emergence of an internal conflict in culture is always conducive to its renewal. The same may be true about the university, but also about the crisis of culture and society. Although one may say that the university has been destroyed and lies in ruins,[2] it is also the case that, in the present day discussions, those who proclaim the 'death of the university' immediately announce also its 'resurrection.' Such is, for example, the view of Ronald Barnett who writes that, difficult to believe as it is, the Western university has in fact died; however, the history of the university shows its extraordinary capacity for renewal and adaptation to new conditions, which arouses hope for the miracle of the emergence of the new university.[3]

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[2] See Bill R e a d i n g s, *The University in Ruins* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).

[3] See Ronald B a r n e t t, *Understanding the University: Institution, Idea, Possibilities* (New York: Routledge, 2015).

UNIVERSITY MODELS

The University as a Corporation

The corporational model of the university reaches back to its origin. The idea of a union of the intellectuals and of their autonomy stems from the university's institutional identity. It is common knowledge that the University of Bologna is considered the first institution of this kind. However, it was the 13th century that became a genuine age of universities, which was by no means accidental, as it was then that the medieval corporations developed, the phenomenon having its implications for the institutions of learning. However, medieval intellectuals, who had found their place in the world, proved unable to make correct choices for the future or to face new alternatives, which brought about the crises in the development of the universities without offering any ways to resolve them and contribute to renewal of the academic institutions of the time. One can say that the mental habits of medieval intellectuals immobilized them in this respect.[4] Therefore the 13th century may be considered as the most important to the development of the medieval university, as, in fact, in the following centuries the university would undergo a transformation, and its professors assume a new social and cultural status. Firstly, the intellectual and scholastic was replaced by a new type: that of the intellectual-humanist. Secondly, in the 14th and 15th centuries, the process of the aristocratization of professors began, which led to the emergence of a gap between the scholarship and the education that persisted until the 19th century, when the idea of the university as a research and teaching center emerged.

In the late Middle Ages, 'nationalization' of the universities began: their role in the perception of locality and universality changed (although universities were not yet means of establishing modern national identities). It should be mentioned that the medieval university had a twofold character: on the one hand, it was part of the city in which it was located; on the other hand, it was significant for all the Christian world. In the 14th and 15th centuries universities began to gradually lose their international character and their influence did not go beyond the regions in which they were established. This particular change may be considered as initiating the university models that followed, which fostered a close relationship of those institutions with the national context; as such, they became important for the implementation of the policies of the respective national states.

[4] See Jacques L e G o f f, *Intellectuals in the Middle Ages* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1993), 224.

State-Controlled University

The second model of the university is related to the educational reform introduced by Napoleon Bonaparte, which envisaged that all the universities would be fully state-controlled. Napoleon believed that the state could not develop without a simultaneous development of education and, consequently, wanted to institute changes in the French school system. Such was the beginning of the idea of the 'French university' which, in a sense, was a state-owned corporation. It must be noted that a similar model was implemented after the Second World War also in Eastern Europe. Indeed, in most post-communist countries universities still follow this model: they are subordinated to the state and do not enjoy actual autonomy.

Humboldtian University

However, it is the third model, created in Germany and known as that of the Humboldtian education ideal, which has turned out most significant for the understanding of the evolution of the university. The aim of that model was to support the modern national state. The most important, however, is the fact that the model in question embraced the idea of academic autonomy (state non-intervention in university affairs), as well as that of combining scientific research and education. Although known as the Humboldtian education model, it was also highly regarded by such intellectuals as Johann Fichte, Friedrich Schelling, and Friedrich Schleiermacher, all of whom contributed to its justification and implementation. The essence of the new academic institution was to combine objective science and subjective education. As Wilhelm Humboldt wrote, the purpose of the university should be to conduct scholarly research in the deepest and broadest meaning of the term and to develop teaching materials useful in moral and spiritual formation.

Sadly, the German model of the university was closely related to the rise of the national state. In his programmatic text, Wilhelm Humboldt discussed the relationship between the ideal of the structure of the academic institution and that of the state. In his view, the state should support universities and academic freedom (also financially), which implicated the question why the state should support universities without interfering with their activity. An explanation of this apparent 'paradox' can be found in Wilhelm Humboldt's works. He believed that free research should bear the 'fruit' the state might use to achieve its political goals.

In a sense, universities fulfilled a quasi-religious function in the 19th-century secularized society. The political function of the university consisted in the

formation of a conscious citizen: "University studies, as opposed to specialist education, are the process of autonomous development of all the powers of a human individual, including the moral ones. This is why education through research is, according to Humboldt, simultaneously *moral education* of a person: we expect autonomous philosophical thinking to result in knowing truth and prompt us what the right action in a given situation is."[5] The university tradition is thus put in service of the *ethos* of the community: the *ethos* that supports the idea of the common good, thus defining the community's future.

Martin Heidegger's rector's speech, given at the University of Freiburg on 27 May 1933, is considered as a symbolic end of the model of the university advocated by Humboldt. The main idea of the speech is to strengthen the core of the German university. Heidegger asked whether the university of his time was capable of becoming the spiritual leader of the nation. He believed that to answer this question the university should engage in self-reflection. Therefore, he referred to the concept of will, adopted from the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. He conceived of the existence of the university as the will directed towards the essence of that institution, but the idea was difficult to put into practice in his nihilistic times. And it is for this reason that Heidegger ended his speech with a somewhat esoteric phrase from Plato's *Republic*, "All that is great stands in the storm…" In a sense, this phrase may be read as a prediction or a premonition of the future of the university and the changes to which it would be subject in the late 20th century.

The contemporary transformation of universities leads to their excessive commercialization and to the domination of neoliberal logic in their administration. This tendency began with the reforms introduced by Margaret Thatcher's government in the United Kingdom, which resulted in the decline of the authenticity of academic life. Such, at least, is, for instance, the opinion of Leonidas Donskis, expressed in his conversation with Zygmunt Bauman: "A university, which is supposed to follow a logic (faithfully cherished for centuries) of deliberate thought, unhurried creativity and measured existence, is nowadays forced to become an outfit that rapidly reacts to market fluctuations as well as changes in public opinion and the political environment."[6] In the same conversation, Zygmunt Bauman adds that Thatcher is not the only person to blame, as a large number of university professors joined those who were destroying academic institutions.

The opinions that the academic tradition has been destroyed are to a large extent exaggerated. Instead, it must be affirmed that the traditions began within

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[5] Herbert S c h n ä d e l b a c h, "Universitet Gumboldta," *Logos*, no. 5–6 (2002): 9.

[6] Zygmunt B a u m a n and Leonidas D o n s k i s, *Moral Blindness: The Loss of Sensitivity in Liquid Modernity* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2013), 136.

the models emerging in the history of the university not only have not ceased to exist, but define the contemporary university.

A CRISIS OF THE UNIVERSITY?

Nowadays, one can hear numerous opinions declaring a crisis of the university. As Jaroslav Pelikan observed, diagnosing problems of the university had become a kind of domestic sport or family business.[7] The discussions usually focus on the university not fulfilling its main function: some say that it does not prepare specialists to meet the needs of the market, others claim that it does not educate a critically thinking citizen.

A critique of the contemporary university is presented also in Bill Readings's *The University in Ruins*. The author's principal claim is that the dominating model is, at present, that of the university of excellence. This model has brought to ruin the previous one, that of the university of culture, identified with the Humboldtian university. The cause for that transformation was a decrease in the role of the national state, which has made culture, understood as the symbolic and political equivalent of integration, lose its value. Therefore, university as the main institution of national culture in the national state has been subject to transformation. As a result, the idea of culture has been replaced by that of excellence and the university succumbs to the logic of consumption. As Bill Readings writes, students of a university of excellence are not *like* consumers: they *are*, in fact, consumers.[8] In other words, universities are similar to companies in that they provide services to their clients; in this case they are educational services. According to Readings, the university is transforming into a transnational bureaucratic corporation. Professors (who are simultaneously lecturers and scholars) are no longer central figures in their universities, since the central place has been given to the rectors, to whom all the other members of the academia are liable.

Readings's book contains several proposals of how the idea of the university should be renewed. One of his ideas, which may be called conservative, suggests seeking possibilities to enter into a new agreement with the national state; the problem is, however, that the national state, as it was understood in 19th and at the beginning of the 20th century, no longer exists. Another suggestion is that a new idea of the university should be invented. Such an attempt,

[7] See Jaroslav P e l i k a n, *The Idea of the University: A Reexamination* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).

[8] See R e a d i n g s, The University in Ruins, 27.

however, might also prove ineffective; for instance, the idea of excellence has led to a crisis of the university rather than resolved the existing one.

Readings proposes a new logic of the development of the university. He calls it the logic of institutional pragmatism which rests on the belief that, nowadays, the university needs to reject the views, characteristic of the previous epochs, including the Age of Enlightenment, which posed it as an ideal community which is not subject to change. According to Readings, the university should be open, inclusive, and flexible in relation to those whom it serves and continue the tradition of "being together,"[9] which emerged as part of its essence.

It should be said, however, that the concept of the university as a space in which different ideas may be developed and confronted is not new. Such a possibility is inherent in the academic tradition from the beginning of universities, which have always embraced mutually opposed currents of thought and various realities. This characteristic is particularly conspicuous in the case of the contemporary university, which combines universalism, or egalitarianism, of research and an administrative hierarchy; applied knowledge and pure knowledge; the academia as such and the particular areas of scholarship. This diversity results in a multiplicity of debates and a variety of concepts. The mission of the university makes it possible for the followers of the opposing standpoints to rationally defend their ideas. Alasdair MacIntyre writes precisely in this vein: "Universities are places where conceptions of and standards of rational justification are elaborated, put to work in detailed practices of enquiry, and themselves rationally evaluated, so that only from the university can the wider society learn how to conduct its own debates, practical or theoretical, in a rationally defensible way. But that claim itself can be plausibly advanced only insofar as the university is a place where rival and antagonistic views of rational justification, such as those of genealogists and Thomists, are afforded the opportunity both to develop their own enquiries, in practice and in the articulation of the theory of that practice, and to conduct their intellectual and moral warfare."[10]

TRADITION AND INNOVATION

It is worthwhile to focus on the question of how the tradition of the university is perceived nowadays. In what terms is the relationship between tradition and innovation described at present?

[9] Ibidem, 20.

[10] Alasdair MacIntyre, *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition* (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 1990), 222.

One of the best known ideas on which the contemporary understanding of the university tradition draws is Burton Clark's concept of the "organizational saga" as the foundation for the development of the identity of the university. Clark writes: "An organizational saga is a collective understanding of a unique accomplishment based on historical exploits of a formal organization, offering strong normative bonds within and outside the organization. Believers give loyalty to the organization and take pride and identity from it."[11] The organizational saga of the university is related to its mission and, as such, it is reflected in its organizational practices and values.

Its organizational saga is important to the identity of an institution as it represents its organizational culture. In the case of the university, the purpose of an organizational saga is to create a general image and inspire loyalty to it. Most importantly, though, the organizational saga, despite its being oriented towards the organizational development, may also encourage innovation. While its aim is, in a sense, to define a 'modernization of the tradition,' the concept of the organizational saga may also elucidate the tension between tradition and innovation in the university.

A good illustration of the above discussed notion can be found in the idea of an entrepreneurial university.[12] Burton Clark writes that should the tradition prove insufficient, universities need to develop an entrepreneurial response. In his view, the entrepreneurial university, reluctant to accept state regulations or standardization, is continually experimenting and striving for an institutional identity of its own, and, courageously seeking to be unlike others, enters the 'market.' According to Clark, entrepreneurial universities believe that the experimental change in the character of their activity is more attractive than adhering to the traditional forms of the academia.

The emergence of the idea of the entrepreneurial university may be considered as a response to the threat of an 'avalanche.' This metaphor for the rapid changes which may occur in higher education was proposed by Michael Barber, Katelyn Donnelly, and Saada Rizvi.[13] To prevent the 'avalanche,' the university should seek cooperation with its external environment, respond appropriately to the changes in its surroundings (government, business, civil society), and raise awareness of the risk related to new practices whose results are not obvious.

It is not necessary for the entrepreneurial university to reject tradition. The university's 'entrepreneurship' should be expressed by its capacity to spread its

[11] Burton R. Clark, "The Organizational Saga in Higher Education," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 17 (1972) no. 2: 178.

[12] See Burton R. Clark, *Creating Entrepreneurial Universities: Organizational Pathways of Transformation* (Bingley: Emerald, 1998).

[13] See Michael Barber, Katelyn Donnelly, and Saada Rizvi, *An Avalanche is Coming: Higher Education and the Revolution Ahead*, http://www.avalancheiscoming.com/.

tradition, while, at the same time, transforming the society, rather than by its effective participation in the market or by selling its educational offers. In other words, the 'entrepreneurship' of the university is manifested also in its cultural policy.

THE UNIVERSITY IN DEFENSE OF FREEDOM

The important elements of the university which help maintain its tradition and encourage innovation are related to freedom. The university plays an important role in the emancipatory project of modernity. Its tradition, which includes the freedom to acquire knowledge and the freedom of research, has provided the foundation and justification for freedom as a political vale. One may say that the university *a priori* presupposes a system and organization determined by the ideal of freedom. The system in question is manifested in the general political order and, at the same token, affects its shape. The university is perceived as an institution demonstrating the autonomy of reason, rational (self-)criticism, and the priority of acquiring and spreading knowledge. As such, the university has deserved trust and respect as an institution capable of influencing the shape of society and designing its future.

The reflection on the role of the university in our times, in the aspect of institutional policy in higher education, is related to the general diagnosis of the contemporary world, its cultural, political, or anthropological dimensions. Martha Nussbaum observes that "radical changes are occurring in what democratic societies teach the young, and these changes have not been well thought through."[14] According to Nussbaum, "thirsty for national profit, nations, and their systems of education, are heedlessly discarding skills that are necessary to keep democracies alive. If this trend continues, nations all over the world will soon be producing generations of useful machines, rather than complete citizens who can think for themselves, criticize … and understand the significance of other person's sufferings and achievements."[15]

The university should spread the idea of creating a space in which autonomous and free pursuit of knowledge is possible. In fulfilling this task, it should rely on its own tradition which must play a self-disciplining role. This self-discipline, however, need not be repressive or totalitarian, since it has always had 'gaps' introduced by the ideal of *artes liberales* as such. The self-discipline of the university, defined by its tradition, idea, and mission, is an expression of the university's responsibility for the future.

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[14] See Martha N u s s b a u m, *Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 2.

[15] Ibidem.

Moreover, the autonomy of the university includes the defense of academic freedom. This, however, does not make the university close upon itself. On the contrary, the autonomy of the university is the foundation for its commitment to public issues. It is, therefore, necessary to understand what happens to the university once it becomes 'committed.' First of all, ideals created by the university cross the limits of this institution and are implemented in social and political practices. The process of the academic ideals reaching out to the world is possible because to study at the university means much more than just to acquire knowledge. The evolution of the university (from the medieval corporation to the contemporary models) has proved it is an institution which can effect changes in a human being, forming his or her conscious personal identity that is not limited by the person's being a member of a community, but guided by his of her pursuit of the common good for the future.

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Nowadays, although the tradition of the university is not declining, it is necessary to reflect on it anew in order to create the university's future. University studies may be conceived of as a process of developing the person's life project. However, the view that the university is in crisis should be considered as a confirmation of the poor condition of this institution. As José Ortega y Gasset believed, every reform, if reduced to a struggle against vulgar misdemeanors committed at universities, inevitably becomes vulgar itself. The contemporary university must find a balance: between maintaining academic traditions on the one hand, and, facing the political, economic and cultural temptations and challenges of modernity, on the other; between the national state, which is gradually loosing its sovereignty, and the global market. This is why we ought to consider the university as the tradition that creates its future by implementing its own cultural policy in defense of freedom.

Translated by *Patrycja Mikulska*

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ABSTRACT / ABSTRAKT

Dmytro SHEVCHUK, The Contemporary University: A Tradition That Creates the Future

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Rejecting the frequently raised claim that the tradition of the university is on the decline, the author emphasizes the necessity of grounding the vision of the future of this institution on the reflection on its past. He discusses both historical and contemporary models of the university (e.g., the medieval corporation of scholars, the state-controlled university, the Humboldtian university, and the entrepreneurial university), pointing to the need to find a balance between maintaining academic traditions on the one hand, and, facing the political, economic, and cultural challenges of modernity, on the other; between the national state, which is gradually losing its sovereignty, and the global market. Drawing on the ideas of such authors as Jaroslav Pelikan, Bill Readings, Burton R. Clark, Michael Barber, Katelyn Donnelly, Saada Rizvi, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Martha Nussbaum, the author proposes considering the university as a tradition that creates its future by implementing its own cultural policy in defense of freedom.

Keywords: crisis of the university, transformation of the university, mass education, organizational saga, academic freedom

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Dmytro SHEVCHUK, Współczesny uniwersytet: Tradycja, która buduje przyszłość
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Odrzucając głoszoną dziś często tezę o upadku tradycji uniwersytetu, autor artykułu podkreśla konieczność oparcia wizji przyszłości tej instytucji na refleksji o jej przeszłości. Na podstawie analizy zarówno historycznych modeli uniwersytetu (średniowiecznej korporacji uczonych, uniwersytetu państwowego, uniwersytetu Humboldtowskiego), jak i jego współczesnych koncepcji (np. tak zwanego uniwersytetu przedsiębiorczego), wskazuje on potrzebę znalezienia równowagi między tradycją akademicką a odpowiadaniem na bieżące wyzwania polityczne, gospodarcze i kulturalne, a także między potrzebami tracących suwerenność państw narodowych a wymogami globalnego rynku. Odwołując się do prac autorów takich, jak Jaroslav Pelikan, Bill Readings, Burton R. Clark, Michael Barber, Katelyn Donnelly, Saada Rizvi, Alasdair MacIntyre i Martha Nussbaum, autor przedstawia uniwersytet jako instytucję, w której tradycja służy budowaniu przyszłości i która prowadzi własną politykę kulturową mającą na celu obronę wolności.

Słowa kluczowe: kryzys uniwersytetu, transformacja uniwersytetu, szkolnictwo masowe, saga organizacyjna, wolność akademicka

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Franco IMODA

QUALITY AS A DIMENSION OF ECCLESIALITY*

Considering the national and international academic scene and the challenge posed by the evaluation and promotion of quality, we should continuously ask how to place our universities (and, consequently, the academic community) as a complex system included in the Church. Universities cannot exist but within a situation well expressed in the concept/reality of sacrament: as such, they may be expected to become particularly sensitive areas in which the signs of the times are recognized and responded to.

As the Holy See's Agency for the Evaluation and Promotion of Quality in Ecclesiastical Universities and Faculties (Agenzia della Santa Sede per la Valutazione e la Pormozione della Qualità delle Università e Facoltà Ecclesiastiche, or AVEPRO) celebrates its first ten years of activity, it may be important not only to ask how it has worked and what purpose it has served, but also to consider its significance—and that of its goal of quality evaluation and promotion—with regard to the *nature* and the *mission* of our institutions. Is AVEPRO's activity simply an expression of a commitment to the international community or does it also express a value representative of Church institutions of higher education as an anthropological entity in which our humanity can be fully realized?

With its growing experience, AVEPRO seems to have succeeded, despite some initial resistance, in finding forms of activity which are regarded (*post factum*) by Church universities and faculties as an opportunity for improving their accountability and for greater development. However, it seems that the *quality process* has also quite frequently presented a temptation to engage in a purely technical change considered as something which 'needs to be done.'

In the challenge we are facing, as in the case of any challenge, what seems to constitute limitations may also lead to asking broader and deeper questions: For whom and to what purpose are we responding to this particular challenge? What is the relationship between the one inherent in the quality process and the nature of a faculty whose mission is expressed in 'being the Church'? Which of the aspects of an ecclesiastical institution may be those related to quality

* For an earlier version of this article see https://www.researchgate.net/publication/322538936_La_Qualita_come_dimensione_della_Ecclesialita_in_Educatio_Catholica_Congregazione_per-_l%27Educazione_Cattolica_III_3_pp_63-77.

and how should quality be conceived? Is 'baptizing' those aspects merely an *external rite*, that of obtaining approval from the competent authority, or is it a *transforming experience*, a dynamic process which testifies to their 'being the Church' and having a specific nature and mission? Can and should we therefore go beyond mere 'recognition of degrees/titles' or 'fulfilment of requirements for financial support'?

In this sense, it seems important to reiterate the need to avoid dwelling (which is a common temptation) on the strictly 'academic' aspect of quality, however complex it might be, but to look at the *management* of an institution as a whole.

In outlining the mission of ecclesiastical institutions, the Church documents (Apostolic Constitutions *Veritatis Gaudium*[1] and *Sapientia Christiana*[2]) remind us that, in addition to the teaching/training of students and research, what is commonly known in international circles as the *third mission* is also important: "to collaborate intensely, in accordance with their own nature and in close communion with the Hierarchy, with the local and the universal Church [on] the whole work of evangelization."[3] *Veritatis Gaudium* has also recalled four fundamental goals of the Church institutions of higher education, i.e., evangelization, dialogue, transdisciplinarity, and networking.

While fulfilling the task of evaluating and promoting quality,[4] AVEPRO has faced numerous challenges, and continues this process. First and foremost, there is the complex challenge posed by the situation in which it works. In fact, the ecclesiastical educational institutions in Europe alone are located in twenty-three countries, in which fifteen different languages are spoken; on the global level, the Agency operates in eighty-three nations (twenty-five in Africa, eighteen in the Americas, fifteen in Asia, and two in Oceania).

The institutions AVEPRO embraces with its activities vary significantly in terms of size, organization, specific mission, cultural background, and national

[1] See F r a n c i s, Apostolic Constitution *Veritatis Gaudium* On Ecclesiastical Universities and Faculties, January 29, 2018, https://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/en/bollettino/pubblico/2018/01/29/180129c.html.

[2] See J o h n P a u l II, Apostolic Constitution *Sapientia Christiana* On Ecclesiastical Universities and Faculties, April 17, 1979, http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/apost_constitutions/documents/hf_jp-ii_apc_15041979_sapientia-christiana.html.

[3] *Veritatis Gaudium*, Article 3, Paragraph 3. Burton R. Clark discusses the following relevant factors of development/quality: strengthened steering core, expanded developmental periphery, diversified funding base, stimulated academic heartland, and integrated entrepreneurial culture. See Burton R. C l a r k, *Creating Entrepreneurial Universities: Organizational Pathways to Transformation* (Bingley: Emerald Publishing, 1998). See also Steven C. B a h l s, *Shared Governance in Times of Change: A Practical Guide for Universities and Colleges* (Washington, DC: AGB Press, 2014).

[4] For further reading see Riccardo C i n q u e g r a n i and Valerio N a p o l e o n i, "La valutazione nelle istituzioni accademiche ecclesiastiche: un'introduzione," *Seminarium* 53, nos. 1–2 (2013): 119–33.

context, and can be subdivided into four main groups: pontifical universities; independent educational institutions including one or more faculties; institutions with one or more faculties within Catholic universities; institutions with one or more faculties within state-owned universities. The external evaluations conducted between 2011 and 2017 involved a total of fifty-five universities and one hundred and eleven other institutions/faculties.

In the present reflection, while keeping in mind these levels of complexity, we shall focus on five issues: (1) the definition of quality, (2) the triangle of 'competencies' and interdependence, (3**)** the areas of focus, (4) the Church framework of reference for governance, (5) quality culture and institutional leadership.

THE DEFINITION OF QUALITY

It is clear that "with the Bologna Process, the quality of university education has gained an increasing importance and today, with the reorganization of studies into cycles that has begun in Europe, quality has probably become the main objective."[5]

Without a doubt, quality is a complex concept, and an extremely controversial one, defined in a variety of ways. At least six definitions of quality have been identified by Lee Harvey[6]:

(1) Quality understood as *exceptional* refers to the traditional concept of 'excellence,' usually operationalized as exceptionally high standards of academic achievement. Quality is achieved if the standards are surpassed.

(2) Quality seen as *perfection, or consistency*, focuses on process and sets specifications that it aims to meet. Quality in this sense is summed up by the interrelated ideas of zero defects and getting things right first time.

(3) Quality evaluated in terms of *fitness for purpose* (aim, mission) refers to the extent to which a product or service meets its stated purpose. The purpose may be customer-defined to meet requirements or (in education) institution-defined to reflect the institutional mission (or course objectives).

(4) Describing quality as *fitness of the purpose*, one does not define quality *per se*, but is concerned with whether an organization's quality-related intentions correspond with its purpose, also considering the context.

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[5] Alfredo S q u a r z o n i, "Qualità, assicurazione della qualità, valutazione della qualità, accreditamento della formazione universitaria," *Il Mulino*, no. 2 (2013), https://www.rivisteweb.it/doi/10.12828/74734 (translation mine).

[6] See Lee H a r v e y, "Evaluation for What?" *Teaching in Higher Education* 7, no. 3 (2002): 245–64.

(5) Quality as *monetary value* (investment) focuses on return on investment or expenditure. At the heart of the value-for-money approach in education is the notion of accountability. Public services, including education, are expected to be accountable to the funders.

(6) Definition of quality in terms of *transformation* refers to a process of change, which in higher education adds value to students through their learning experience. Education is not a service for a customer but an ongoing process of the transformation of the participant. This leads to two notions of transformative quality in education: enhancing the consumer and empowering the consumer.

Following careful reflection, it was agreed that the definition of quality that most suits the ends of AVEPRO is "fitness for purpose (aim, mission)," but due attention must be paid also to the "fitness *of* the purpose." Hence, quality can be judged in relation to the extent to which an activity or service achieves the aims expressed in the institution's vision and mission.

THE TRIANGLE OF COMPETENCIES AND INTERDEPENDENCE

It is therefore of great importance to take into serious consideration not only the academic educational contents and processes—which remain fundamental and central—but also the ways in which the educational process is 'governed.' These ways must conform to the considerations regarding each institution's and faculty's 'being the Church' and to the aims indicated in *Sapientia Christiana* (teaching, research, service to the Church/society) and *Veritatis Gaudium* (evangelization, dialogue, transdisciplinarity, networking).

The situation of ecclesiastical institutions of higher education which are called to 'be the Church' can be represented as a 'triangle' involving three 'subjects': the institution in question, the higher governing bodies (the Secretariat of State, the Congregation for Catholic Education, the Episcopal Conferences), and the evaluation agency (AVEPRO).

Three types of relationships between the subjects involved in the triangle may be identified: firstly, and foremostly, the relationship between the institutions (universities or faculties) which enjoy institutional autonomy and the higher governing bodies which regulate the activities of these institutions; secondly, the relationship between the governing bodies and the evaluation agency, which enjoys the independence of judgement and operational autonomy, but conducts its activity to support the governing bodies (by aiming at the improvement of the institutions) and for the purpose of their consultation; lastly, the relationship between the agency and the institutions which define the modes of evaluation (internal and external) and its schedule.

TEN AREAS OF FOCUS

In the light of the experience gained over the ten years of the activity of AVEPRO, ten particular areas of focus can be identified: (1) reinforcing a comprehensive quality culture, (2) governance, organization, and transparency, (3) teaching, (4) teaching staff, (5) resources, (6) 'openness,' (7) the third-cycle evaluation, (8) the Hirsch index and affiliations, (9) recognition of qualifications and employability of graduates, (10) communication and information.

THE CHURCH AS A FRAME OF REFERENCE FOR QUALITY GOVERNANCE

The quality processes have called particular attention to the function of governance. How can one approach this aspect of the nature and mission of the institutions of higher education—and therefore of their quality—in the context of other Church institutions?

In contrast to previous centuries, the problems we are confronted with are, as Otto Semmelroth has suggested, rather ecclesiological than Christological in nature.[7] In this context, one might refer to the notion of the Church as sacrament. The notion in question, developed by the Second Vatican Council by applying the concept of sacrament (analogical to that used in the interpretation of seven sacraments) to the Church as a whole, must involve three fundamental categories: *res tantum*, *sacramentum tantum*, and *res et sacramentum.*

The first two categories: *res tantum* and *sacramentum tantum* indicate the two fundamental dimensions of the Church and refer, respectively, to the charism of the Church (the fundamental grace and love of God which is present in the Church, and which nurtures and enlivens it), and to the Church visible in signs (the Church which exists in time and comprises institutions, structures, and communities, and is therefore regulated by psychosocial laws characteristic of its particular components.

To affirm that the Church is *res et sacramentum* simply means to say that the Church cannot be considered but in its duality: there is no Kingdom of God, on the one hand, and the social incarnation of the Church, on the other, but the Church is the unity embracing these two aspects.

Hence, while speaking of the abovementioned 'ecclesiological problems, or dimensions,' we focus on a possible reductionist approach to the Church.

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[7] See Otto S e m m e l r o t h, *Church and Sacrament*, trans. Emily Schlossberger (Dublin: Gill & MacMillan, 1965); Otto S e m m e l r o t h, "La Chiesa come sacramento di salvezza", in *Mysterium salutis: Nuovo corso di dogmatica come teologia della storia della salvezza*, ed. Johannes Feiner, Magnus Löhrer, and Tommaso Federici, vol. 4, 1. (Brescia: Queriniana, 1972), 377–437.

This can take either of the two forms: the *monophysite* one, which sees the Church as solely *charismatic* (and therefore subject to psychosocial laws and processes to a lesser degree, as if the Spirit active within the body of the Church could operate without human beings); or the *Nestorian* form, which, in contrast, tends to consider the Church solely from the *social* perspective (and therefore focuses exclusively on the laws, institutions, and authorities, separating the Church in the sense of an institution from the Church as a community).

By undermining the complexity of the Church and its unitary nature, the two forms of the reductionist approach would be inadequate in facing the challenges posed by academic institutions and their 'quality.' The Church and its institutions—describing themselves as catholic and ecclesiastical—never cease to be *res et sacramentum*, rather than give priority either to *res tantum* or to *sacramentum tantum*.

The complexity of the Church means that one needs to look at universities—even if they are considered as Church institutions—from both the theological and the psychosocial perspectives. Thus it is particularly important to inquire what *sacramentum* means in this context.

DIMENSIONS OF QUALITY CULTURE AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP

Modern sociology distinguishes between two aspects of society: *societas* (in the sense of German *Gesellschaft*, the institutional aspect of society, its organizations and structures, acting as an intermediary in human relationships, e.g., the nation in which one lives and works) and *communitas* (in the sense of German *Gemeinschaft*, the personal aspect of society, society on a 'human scale,' focused on basic face to face relations, e.g., a family, a circle, a group, or a village).

Social psychology reminds us further that, in order to exist, each human group (community or society), and therefore also the Church (and its institutions), needs to fulfil certain indispensable functions: (1) the *political* function (that of *goal attainment*): to achieve the aims the Church sets for itself, it needs to develop a system of exercising power and authority, (2) the *economic* function (that of *adaptation*): the Church looks for and manages various resources and tools necessary for its survival, (3) the *legal* function (that of *integration*): the Church prepares instruments to resolve internal tensions and divisions emerging in it, (4) the *motivational* function (related to communion, or *participation*, and value): the Church provides motivation for belonging to a group, e.g., due to shared interests, needs, or ideals.

These four functions are fulfilled by a complex structure comprising the following systems and aspects: (1) the *external* system, i.e., the organization of a group in relation to the external environment; an external system makes it possible for the group to act upon the environment, (2) the *internal* system, i.e., the internal organization of a group aimed at achieving a balance of forces within it, (3) the *instrumental* aspect which refers to maintaining the means enabling the Church's pursual of its ends (the visible structure of the Church), (4) the *consummatory* or *expressive* aspect which regards the use of ends, e.g., being able to enjoy the experience of being a community (the people of God).

In the light of the vision of the Church as sacrament, it is important to consider how the above description, which expresses the social (sociological) aspect of the Church, corresponds to the view proposed by the theologian John Courtney Murray, and in particular to the four components of the Church he identifies as those in which authority, and therefore quality, can be placed (*koinonia*–community, *diakonia*–service, people of God, and visible society).[8]

AVERY DULLES'S 'MODELS' OF THE CHURCH

In order to understand the place of authority in the Church, and particularly in its social dimension, it might be useful to refer to the 'models' of the Church proposed by the theologian Avery Dulles. In its addressing the basic aspects of the life of the Church conceived as *res et sacramentum*, each of these models corresponds to one of the fundamental functions outlined above (i.e., adaptation, goal achievement, integration, and motivation).[9]

In particular, Dulles speaks of the Church as: (1) *servant* (in the *political* sphere): in the Church this model does not refer exclusively to power, but connotes a tension, inseparable from the exercise of authority, between power and the service of love to society, (2) *institution*: it is related to the need to bring order to the Church, to adapt it to the environment, and to manage its (not only economic) resources, (3) *herald*: this model refers to the ethical/moral component of values, including spiritual values, proclaimed via testimony and spread through the presence of the charismatic power which necessarily becomes law (hence the tension between its spirit and its letter), (4) *mystical communion*: incarnated in history, the Church calls for a particular kind of

[8] See John C. M u r r a y, "Freedom, Authority, Community," *America* 115, no. 3 (1966): 734–41.

[9] See Avery D u l l e s, *Models of the Church* (New York: Doubleday, 1974). He actually identifies five models, considering the first as a comprehensive entity related to the dimension of mystery/sacrament characterized as a "symbol" or a "symbolic model."

motivation for belonging to it, a motivation rooted in charity rather than in particular interests or needs.

In this context, bearing in mind the limitations of any brief reflection, one might propose the following comparison between the Church and the world of ecclesiastical universities (table 1).

Table 1. Comparison between the Church and ecclesiastical universities

The Church as	University as
Institution: organization	Institution: organization, resources, management
Servant: authority/hierarchy	Service: authority/hierarchy/leadership
Mystical communion: belonging/motivation	Community: belonging/motivation
Herald: values, norms, laws	System: values, norms, laws

The aspect that interests us most is that of quality as a dimension of ecclesiality, as an expression and realization of the Church as sacrament. The Church, and thus any ecclesial institution, including a university or a faculty, should express all the richness of its being sacrament, and as such, it must be considered as a complex whole, irreducible to any one of its aspects. In fact, thanks to its unitary nature, the Church remains in each of its dimensions the sacrament of the presence of God.

In our effort to understand the quality aspect of an institution (a university or a faculty) and its evaluation, we may also refer to an important contribution by the sociologist of religion Thomas O'Dea who has identified *five dilemmas* (or tensions) present in any social body, or community.[10] The description of these dilemmas may clarify—with a surprising pertinency—the dynamic aspect of the abovementioned 'models' of the Church. It is not difficult to grasp how the resolution of the five dilemmas might be relevant to the quality of Church institutions of higher education.

In this context, one can observe that the 'models' proposed by Dulles should not be seen as static, as they embrace a dialectic, an internal tension (perhaps never completely resolved), which becomes the basis upon which the exercise of authority can manifest both the richness inherent in its mission and its fragility.

The dilemmas/tensions described by O'Dea are the following:

(1) The *dilemma of symbolization* is a meta-dilemma which will always persist in the Church being sacrament, and take the form of the problem, or

[10] See Thomas O ' D e a, "Five Dilemmas in the Institutionalization of Religion," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 1, no. 1 (1961): 30–9.

challenge, of how a transcendent message can be effectively made temporal and visible.

(2) The *dilemma of mixed motivation* concerns the reasons for belonging to a religious group/institution. Even in relation to the Church as mystical communion, such reasons may be multiple and varied (some are religious in nature, while others are not, ranging from a quest to satisfy personal interests to a disinterested gift of self).

(3) The *dilemma of power* refers to the fact that the Church, while being a servant, is not exempt from experiencing the dynamic of power. As such, particularly in the exercise of its authority, the Church faces the tension between power and charitable service.

(4) The *administrative*, or *management dilemma* regards in particular the institutional aspect of the Church and the need for an organization to manage its means and resources, although this involves the risk of alienation (the Church becoming an end for itself).

(5) The *dilemma of delimitation* faced by the Church as a herald concerns concretization of the spirit, while remaining faithful to it, or the substitution of the law for the spirit.

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Considering the national and international academic scene and the challenge posed by the evaluation and promotion of quality, we should continuously ask how to place our universities (and, consequently, the academic community) as a complex system included in the Church. Universities cannot exist but within a situation well expressed in the concept/reality of *sacrament*: as such, they may be expected to become particularly sensitive areas in which the signs of the times are recognized and responded to.

Which of the specific characteristics of Church universities distinguish them from other institutions of higher education, or similar institutions serving educational, training, and research purposes? To what extent can a focus on quality aid *reflection* and, possibly, *action* leading to a progressive improvement in understanding the identity and fulfilling the mission of universities which describe themselves as ecclesiastical, or catholic?

Whenever our quality concerns refer to the type of governance implemented in a given institution, it may prove helpful to consider the anthropological framework.[11] In particular, in the light of our experience of the quality process, we may identify and, in a certain sense, reapply (especially in the context of

[11] See B a h l s, *Shared Governance in Times of Change.*

the dilemmas discussed by O'Dea) numerous useful observations which have illuminated—and will continue to do so—various areas of our fragility and ones of strength, as well as opportunities open to us and threats we have to meet.

In other words, we may ask whether *authority* at our universities is managed in terms of service or of domination? Are institutional *resources*, be they economic, financial, human, and cultural, e.g., qualifications and competencies, considered (and become) ends for themselves or are they used as the means towards more universal ends? Are the *norms* regulating the institutional life of universities regarded simply as decrees and laws to be observed or as an expression of the 'spirit' communicating the most profound values of humanity? Is *belonging* to an institution, or community, motivated mainly by individual and utilitarian interests, or by the values which express the fullness of life of a person who can "fully find himself … through a sincere gift of himself"?[12]

The quality evaluation and promotion may be seen and lived through as a complex and demanding process focusing on the weaknesses, but also on the strengths; it may be faced as a threat, but also as a promise, as a challenge, but also as a great opportunity.

It is in the light of this possible perspective that we can mention the *fundamental satisfaction* on the part of the institutions (faculties, universities, but also bishops-chancellors, and the Congregation for Catholic Education) which have become seriously engaged in the cooperation with AVEPRO: an institution whose name indicates not only the *evaluation* of quality, but also—and even more fundamentally—its *promotion*.

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[12] Second Vatican Council, "Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World *Gaudium et Spes*," Section 24, http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_cons_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html.

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ABSTRACT / ABSTRAKT

Franco IMODA, Quality as a Dimension of Ecclesiality
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Reflecting on the ten-year activity of the Holy See's Agency for the Evaluation and Promotion of quality in Ecclesiastical Universities and Faculties (AVEPRO), the author addresses the ways in which a focus on quality might help better understand the identity of Catholic universities and design activities which enable better fulfillment of their mission. Pointing to the complex reality of the Church, he stresses that ecclesiastical institutions of higher education

must be looked at from both the theological and psychosocial perspectives. He refers, among others, to Avery Dulles's description of the models of the Church and Thomas O'Dea's classification of dilemmas faced by Church institutions. In particular, he discusses the identity of such institutions in terms of the theological category of *res et sacramentum* and points to their distinguishing characteristics, giving particular attention to the issue of authority, or leadership, conceived of as service.

Keywords: AVEPRO, quality management, the Church as sacrament, leadership in the Church

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Franco IMODA, Jakość wymiarem eklezjalności

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W świetle dziesięcioletniego doświadczenia działalności Agencji Stolicy Apostolskiej do Spraw Oceny i Promocji Jakości Kształcenia na Uniwersytetach i Wydziałach Kościelnych (AVEPRO), autor omawia wpływ perspektywy jakości na rozumienie tożsamości uniwersytetów katolickich oraz planowanie działań umożliwiających coraz lepszą realizację ich misji. Wskazując na złożoność rzeczywistości, jaką jest Kościół, podkreśla konieczność refleksji nad kościelnym szkolnictwem wyższym zarówno z teologicznego, jak i psychospołecznego punktu widzenia; odwołuje się między innymi do dokonanego przez Avery'ego Dullesa opisu modeli Kościoła oraz do klasyfikacji dylematów, przed którymi stają instytucje kościelne, zaproponowanej przez Thomasa O'Dea. Tożsamość tych instytucji analizuje za pomocą teologicznej kategorii *res et sacramentum* i przedstawia ich cechy charakterystyczne, szczególną uwagę poświęcając kwestii sprawowania władzy rozumianego jako służba.

Słowa kluczowe: AVEPRO, zarządzanie jakością, Kościół jako sakrament, przywództwo w Kościele

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THE CURRENT DISPUTE ON THE STATUS OF THE UNIVERSITY
The Anthropological and Axiological Aspects of the Problem

The academic 'not-doing-anything-in-particular' is actually a form of activity taking place inside the university and, in the long run, ensuring its longevity. If this apparent inactivity is threatened by the requirement of producing immediate effects, the university, being denied the right to work at its own pace, to let reflection mature in its own time, will lose its internal rhythm. The game of appearances and illusions which has replaced the right to 'do nothing' will promote immaturity, eventually impeding the development of both research and teaching.

> The contemporary university suffers from split personality disorder: while the idea of serving the whole truth is apparently still fluttering in it, it is simultaneously striving to transform into a service-providing company, and as such it cannot continue its mission.[1]
>
> Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik

> The academic community has the indispensable right and duty to be the leader in propagating, strengthening, and defending the university as a unique value.[2]
>
> Kazimierz Denek

In the present paper I argue that the ongoing widespread dispute over how universities should function must be considered as an essentially axiological and anthropological controversy.

In order to clarify the problems discussed in this paper, I shall begin by citing Tadeusz Kotarbiński's (1886–1981)[3] description of the freedom to teach and to learn which he enjoyed as professor of the underground Warsaw University during the German Nazi occupation:

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[1] Agnieszka L e k k a-K o w a l i k, "Uniwersytet jako firma usługowa – szansa czy klęska?," *Ethos* 22, no. 1–2 (85–86) (2009), 66. Unless otherwise noted, quotations are translated by Marcin Garbowski.

[2] Kazimierz D e n e k, *Uniwersytet.* "Między tradycją a wyzwaniami współczesności i przyszłości," *Edukacja Humanistyczna*, no. 1 (28), 2013: 9.

[3] See M. R e m b i e r z, "Ethos edukacji i jej filozoficzny logos: Elementy filozofii edukacji w dociekaniach Tadeusza Kotarbińskiego," *Studia z Filozofii Polskiej*, no. 2 (2007): 342–54.

> Lectures and classes … took place in private flats…, in small … groups, … the participants were enthusiasts who studied, because they wanted to…. Nobody interfered with the curriculum, the professor took responsibility for the course and … for the participants of this illegal academy, consumed with the spirit of freedom…. There was no censorship or interference of any authorities. What a paradox! I have never participated in such an absolutely liberal teaching process as… during the darkest years of the German occupation.[4]

The personal responsibility of professors for the subject matter of their lectures and the personal responsibility of students for the course of their studies provide a solid basis for academic freedom. The responsibility of professors plays a fundamental role here and it is worth recalling that the term 'professor' is derived from the Latin *professio*: a public statement, and *professus*, *profiteri*: to testify or confess publicly.[5] By giving a lecture, the professor not only provides information, but also testifies publicly—before the academic community listening to him—that he has adequate reasons for considering the information he proposes for discussion by this community as reliable; thus he becomes a witness and an authority.[6] During the German Nazi occupation, an extremely high price, even the price of life, had to be paid for performing the tasks of a university professor.

Underground teaching, based on self-organization and self-discipline, and thus free from external, institutional framework, may be taken as a model for the ethos of the university inspired by the spirit of freedom. Kotarbiński's paradoxical experience of academic freedom reveals—from the perspective

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[4] Tadeusz K o t a r b i ń s k i, "Z dziejów podziemnego Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego", in: Tadeusz Kotarbiński, *Prakseologia: Część II* (Wrocław, Warszawa, and Kraków: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 2003), 519. In this context it is worth recalling Roger Scruton's description of his participation in illegal academic (philosophical) seminars held in the 1970s, during Communist rule, in Prague. Showing his respect for the Czech people, Scruton refers to that experience of his, while discussing—from the point of view of a Westerner—the (unsatisfactory, in his opinion) condition of the university in our times. See Roger S c r u t o n, "The End of University," *First Things*, April 2015. See also Wiesław T h e i s s, "Universitas, czyli wspólnota oporu w czasach PRL-u (szkic zagadnienia)," in *Innowacje w edukacji akademickiej: szkolnictwo wyższe w procesie zmiany*, ed. Jacek Piekarski and Danuta Urbaniak-Zając (Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 2010), 225–34.

[5] See Anna M u r a w s k a, "O idei uniwersytetu, kompetencjach nauczycieli akademickich oraz nadziei i prawdzie," *Pedagogika Szkoły Wyższej*, no. 17 (2001): 71–5; Ryszard K l e s z c z, "O godności nauczyciela akademickiego," in *Nauka—Etyka—Wiara 2011*, ed. Andrzej Zabołotny and Julian Ławrynowicz (Warszawa: Chrześcijańskie Forum Pracowników Nauki, 2011), 392–402; Jacek Juliusz J a d a c k i, "Etos akademicki," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 53, no. 2 (2005): 75–81; Janina K o s t k i e w i c z, "Nauka i wolność—wartości fundujące uniwersytet," in *Uniwersytet i wartości*, ed. Janina Kostkiewicz (Kraków: Oficyna Wydawnicza Impuls, 2007), 13–34.

[6] See Katarzyna O l b r y c h t, *O roli przykładu, wzoru, autorytetu i mistrza w wychowaniu osobowym* (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2008); Lech W i t k o w s k i, *Wyzwania autorytetu w praktyce społecznej i kulturze symbolicznej* (Kraków: Impuls, 2009).

of anthropology and axiology—the very essence of university studies and academic teaching and should be remembered whenever an attempt to impose political or administrative regulations affecting the autonomy of the university is made.

Kotarbiński's description of academic freedom in the context of the wartime terror—contrasted with present-day practice—helps highlight the dangers inherent in technocratic anthropology and utilitarian axiology which are spreading together with the currently promoted model of the university as a provider of educational services. The dangers in question have been recognized by Bogusław Śliwerski:

> Put in service of market economy, the university becomes an institution objectifying human beings, disregarding their dignity and transforming them into a means to the end which is alien to them. By creating an antagonizing educational context, the authorities seek to impose the one and only correct standpoint … of their own ideology, regardless of whether … the academic community accepts it or not…. By serving mechanisms of market rivalry, institutions of higher education become marketed products characteristic of our times.[7]

Above all, the objectification of human beings destroys their primary human selflessness and transforms the university into a product to be marketed, at the same time demolishing the world of academic values grounded in centuries-long experience.

The ongoing debate on the model of the university entails serious difficulties. Not only does the debate focus on a comparative approach to the past and present identities of the university and on the questions of the meaning and essence of the university amid the current challenges, but it also addresses civilizational changes, as both the present situation of the university and its future seem to be entangled in processes that are, to a large extent, nontransparent. However, the university's entanglement in the processes of civilizational change is often mythologized, interpreted as an 'all-explaining' schema, and seen through the prism of ideological clichés: it is claimed, for instance, that the entanglement in question is an effect of the historical (economic, globalization-related) determinism to which the university must yield and that this irreversible necessity is beyond dispute. Such a radically deterministic standpoint generates a (quasi-religious) belief that civilizational transformation fully determines what the university is supposed to be and what, in fact, it shall be. Needless to say, the standpoint in question severely limits the field for reflection, makes imagina-

[7] Bogusław Ś l i w e r s k i, "Problemy szkolnictwa wyższego—diagnozy i perspektywy," Pedagog, September 27, 2015, http://sliwerski-pedagog.blogspot.com/2015/09/problemy-szkolnictwa-wyzszego-diagnozy.html.

tion sterile, enslaves thought, and invalidates the meaning of free academic debate as a knowledge-generating method. No longer is university supposed to grasp the meaning of the ongoing changes and develop their models, but it is to succumb to those changes and to the political pressure exerted by supporters of the prevailing and (at a given moment) undisputed vision of the transformation. The only course of action that remains acceptable in such a context is to entrust universities to pragmatic managers who understand the requirements (especially the economic ones) of the 'Zeitgeist' and shall accordingly effect the necessary changes. Those who oppose them shall be either reeducated, taught the required competencies, and made to accept the dominant schema of academic practice, or labeled 'anachronistic naïve idealists' who—as persons ignorant of the 'Zeitgeist' and incapable of acquiring necessary competencies, qualifications, or attitudes—are to be excluded from the university seen as an institution determined by cultural transformations. This narrative of adaptive reeducation (or expulsion from the structures of the university) may seem a Cassandra-like prophecy, but I must confess that on a certain occasion, having delivered a lecture on the principles of academic freedom, I was myself described as a 'naïve idealist,' a clearly discrediting epithet. In the long run, though, my 'idealism' proved a 'blessed fault' (*felix culpa*), making me sensitive to the intellectual necessity and practical importance of continuous reflection on the timeliness of the traditional ethos of the university in the context of the ongoing changes in its identity.[8]

In my inquiries, I follow the guidelines suggested by Michał Heller:

> I shall write about the university, education, and academic work. … I promise I shall not say a word about money. Money, however, has something in common with ideas—both money and ideas can lose their value. Nonetheless, there is a difference between them: when money is devalued, a good idea can lead the way out of a financial crisis. However, should ideas lose their value, no money will help.[9]

Emphasizing the financial aspect of how universities function, one seems to forget that money does not possess an inherent, self-propelling power. The belief—perhaps a partly unconscious one—in the creative power and agency of money, as if it were the primary cause, the metaphysical motor of all activity, can make one blind to the special values of the university.

[8] An idea, proposed by Stanisław Majdański, of interdisciplinary studies on the university from the perspective of science studies and general methodology of science, seems worth noting (and perhaps popularizing). See Stanisław M a j d a ń s k i, "O autorytecie i idei uniwersytetu (z refleksji naukoznawczej)," *Summarium*, no. 38 (2009): 63–80.

[9] Michał H e l l e r, "Śmierć uniwersytetów," *Tygodnik Powszechny*, July 2, 2012, https://www.tygodnikpowszechny.pl/smierc-uniwersytetow-16535.

In the classically understood culture of Europe, one recognizes the specific identity of the university and its irreducibility to other, albeit similar, institutions of culture. Universities have a particular way of upholding the ethos of intellectual work and manifesting the cognitive values that serve academic research and education.

The university should distinguish itself from other forms of intellectual culture by pursuing an integrated knowledge of reality, or at least by attempting to combine knowledge of different aspects of reality into a relatively coherent whole. Such a pursuit is motivated by the belief that the unity of the reality should be reflected in a unified knowledge of it. As Tadeusz Czeżowski (1889–1981) reminds us: "Universality is the principle expressed already in the term 'university'…. The circumstance that all the arts and sciences are related to one another in a multiplicity of ways is expressed in this principle."[10] Czeżowski presents a maximalist idea of the universality of the university and extends it to include a consistent outlook on the world: "All [the arts and sciences] seek to achieve a homogenous view of the world and they mutually support one another in this pursuit."[11] The university is also *universitas magistrorum et scholarium*: a community of masters and students, i.e., a community of people responsible for teaching and learning.

The instability of the foundations of the contemporary university and the denial of the very ideas in which it is grounded stand in clear contrast to the memories of his university studies (at the beginning of the 20th century), as Karl Jaspers recorded: "Important teachers I viewed with reverence, all of them, even those of whom I disapproved, with respect for their position. The buildings, the lecture-rooms, the forms of the tradition were objects of reverence for me. What it really was which lent to all this a still visible lustre I did not yet clearly discern."[12]

Thus the community of teachers and students is perceived as a community endowed with a specific aesthetic quality.[13] One might ponder over the noble 'lustre' of the university: What does it consist in? Why is it no longer visible nowadays? What undesirable practices have hidden it from view? How can the lustre of university values be regained and made visible anew? Reflecting on the aesthetic dimension of academic education, Jacek Piekarski offers a potential

[10] Tadeusz C z e ż o w s k i, *O uniwersytecie i studiach uniwersyteckich* (Toruń: Księgarnia Naukowa T. Szczęsny i S-ka, 1946), 8.

[11] Ibidem.

[12] Karl J a s p e r s, *Philosophical Autobiography*, in *The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers*, ed. Paul Arthur Schlipp (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1957), 46.

[13] See Jacek P i e k a r s k i, "Estetyzacja praktyki akademickiej—głos w dyskusji na temat perspektywy uczestniczącej," in *Innowacje w edukacji akademickiej: Szkolnictwo wyższe w procesie zmiany*, 235–51.

answer to these questions: "Participation in creating knowledge is of genuine importance when it is related to the deepest commitment, when it is directed towards the pursuit and discovery of the possibly most significant, individual meaning. This meaning should always be expressed in most perfect possible a way."[14]

This aesthetically attractive and noble lustre of the university appears to originate in the perfectionist attitudes of the members of academic community, in their personal commitment to the pursuit of knowledge, and, in particular, in their striving for the greatest possible excellence in epistemic and social sense.

An emphasis on the traditional values of the university is often accompanied with an anxiety about the decline of these values, as it has been expressed, among others, by John Paul II: "The institution of the university is among the masterpieces of human culture. At the same time, one may feel concern that nowadays this masterpiece is being deformed on a global scale."[15] The social functions of the university are currently considered from the vantage point of the so-called science policy, education policy, or research productivity management, and thus the emphasis has been shifted to the effectiveness of the university in terms of economic profit. Research and teaching are subject to an increasingly close monitoring which involves a jargon alien—or even hostile—to the ethos and values of the traditional university.

I shall present here, in the spirit of critical reflection, a broad sketch of the destruction of academic ethos. Bureaucratic overregulation of the academic structures and milieus encourages narrow-mindedness and reinforces it by coercing researchers and teachers into attempts at the quantification of their, essentially unquantifiable, intellectual effort. As activities required by the bureaucratic directives continue to undermine the intellectual and spiritual culture, the autonomy of the university is being destroyed and replaced by its obedience to military-like discipline.[16] Misleading technocratic ideologies are forcibly imposed (by arbitrary decrees) on academe. New regulations are successively introduced at such a rate that they cannot be absorbed; faculty members are encumbered with the demand to complete countless debilitating forms and to compile meaningless tables. As a result, the atmosphere of the university is literally strewn with paper and academic freedom is lost. To make matters worse, the belief in the 'healing' power of overregulation has its partisans. Their commitment, leading to far-reaching practical consequences, seems to be a form of idolatrous worship of administrative-bureaucratic authority as

[14] Ibidem, 250.

[15] John Paul II, "Spotkanie z Katolickim Uniwersytetem Lubelskim," Częstochowa, June 6, 1979, in *Jan Paweł II: Nauczanie papieskie*, vol. 2, part 1 (1979), ed. Eugeniusz Weron and Antoni Jaroch (Poznań: Pallottinum, 1990), 667.

[16] See Jadwiga Mizińska, *Bezduszny uniwersytet*, Fundacja Homo Inquietus, October 4, 2010, http://homoinquietus.wordpress.com/category/czytelnia/jadwiga-mizinska/.

well as an open expression of distrust in individual human conscience and in its power over the area of the intellectual activity. Such a bureaucratic vision of institutionalized research and teaching proves fatal to the ethos of the university.[17]

It is worth recalling that, in one of his *Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Education* (a work from the mid-19th century), John Henry Newman states: "I have no hesitation in giving the preference to that University which did nothing, over that which exacted of its members an acquaintance with every science under the sun."[18] The academic 'not-doing-anything-in-particular' is actually a form of activity taking place inside the university and, in the long run, ensuring its longevity. If this apparent inactivity is threatened by the requirement of producing immediate and visible effects, the university, being denied the right to work at its own pace, to let reflection mature in its own time, will lose its internal rhythm. The game of appearances and illusions which has replaced the right to 'do nothing' will promote immaturity, eventually impeding the development of both research and teaching.

Being a scholar requires a specific form of asceticism and relinquishing certain types of values in order to pursue the unique values proper to the university. Karl R. Popper points to alarming changes in the situation of his contemporary universities and in university curricula, and particularly to the decline of this necessary asceticism and its replacement by the consumerist approach based on the ideology of equal opportunities:

> The idea of equal opportunity and of equal access to higher education has produced … undesirable effects in some countries. For the impecunious student of my own generation the struggle for knowledge was an adventure, demanding self-denial and sacrifice, which gave the knowledge attained a unique value. I am afraid that this attitude is on the wane. The new right to education has created a different attitude. This right is taken for granted; and what we receive as our due, without sacrifice, we value but little. By making the right to education a gift to the student, society has deprived him of a unique experience.[19]

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[17] See Maria C z e r e p a n i a k - W a l c z a k, "Autonomia w kolorze sepii w inkrustowanej ramie KRR: O procedurach i treściach zmiany w edukacji akademickiej," in *Fabryki dyplomów czy universitas*?, ed. Maria Czerepaniak-Walczak (Kraków: Oficyna Wydawnicza Impuls, 2013), 29–56. "Activities are full of superficiality, they disrupt the hitherto academic traditions … they introduce a formalized system of supervision into university education. The university gives up its autonomy and renounces it for the sake of ensuring its security. It becomes subjected to market games and ad hoc expectations of students and potential employers." Maria C z e r e p a n i a k - W a l c z a k, "Wprowadzenie," in *Fabryki dyplomów czy universitas*? 17.

[18] John Henry N e w m a n, "Knowledge Viewed in Relation to Learning," in John Henry Newman, *The Idea of a University*, http://www.newmanreader.org/works/idea/discourse6.html.

[19] Karl R. P o p p e r, "What Does the West Believe In?" in Karl R. Popper, *In Search of a Better World: Lectures and Essays from Thirty Years*, trans. Laura J. Bennett (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 217.

Experiencing the values of university studies and of acquiring knowledge must not be hampered by reducing the right to study to a social entitlement. Popper points to another threat to the functioning of the university in the context of the development of technological civilization (which became apparent around 1968): "More and more technicians are needed, and as a consequence, more and more PhD students are trained only as technicians. Often they are trained in measuring techniques. And they are not even told what more fundamental problems are to be solved by the measurements they are doing for their doctor's thesis."[20]

Popper believes that providing training which narrows the cognitive horizons is morally execrable and describes it as a "breach of the Hippocratic Oath on the side of the academic teacher."[21] The task of the academic teacher is to "initiate the student into a tradition, and to explain to him the new great problems which arise through the growth of knowledge and which in their turn inspire and motivate all further growth."[22] If higher education is reduced to "training in the field of measuring techniques," the dynamism of intellectual work will weaken and fade, and the university will cease to fulfill its fundamental function.

According to Jaspers, in turn, the obligatory curricula introduced in the first half of the 20th century pose another threat to the quality of university studies and intellectual development:

> Artificial guides such as the syllabi, curricular and other technical devices which convert the university into a high school, are in conflict with the ideal of the university.… Lectures and seminars which are slightly over the student's head and so spur him on to increased effort are better than full comprehension purchased as the price of oversimplification…. The university is turned into a high school in order to achieve a satisfactory average with statistical certainty. This leads to the destruction of the university. As you stifle the student's freedom to learn as he sees fit, you stifle the life of the mind. The life of the mind is never more than a chance achievement amid a sea of failure and frustration.… An atmosphere of uninspired and uninspiring common sense may well produce satisfactory mastery of technical 'know how' and testable factual information. Such an atmosphere, however, stifles genuine understanding and the spirit of adventure in research.[23]

[20] Karl R. P o p p e r, *The Moral Responsibility of the Scientist*, in Karl R. Popper, *The Myth of the Framework: In Defence of Science and Rationality* (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 124.

[21] Ibidem.

[22] Ibidem.

[23] Karl J a s p e r s, *The Idea of the University*, trans. Harold A. T. Reiche and H. F. Vanderschmidt (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1959), 60–1.

Today, the mandatory, detailed curricula are a commonplace occurrence and they are considered as if they were necessary and obvious.

To junior faculty, who are required to prepare innumerable syllabi and complete countless forms, as well as to some the older professors who have become accustomed to the growing bureaucracy, the view expressed by Tadeusz Czeżowski in his dissertation of 1946, may seem surprising: "While the secondary school needs the fixed curriculum to specify the type and scope of information to be taught to students, in the case of the university such a curriculum becomes superfluous. The freedom to teach is, above all, the freedom from complying with an inflexible curriculum. Academic teachers must not be constrained by a curriculum, being able to choose freely the areas of knowledge they wish to present."[24]

The supporters of inflexible curricula, trained by the current regime, are unable to comprehend the essential conditions, so assertively expressed by Czeżowski, for academic freedom. Nowadays, his claim that "the freedom to teach is, above all, the freedom from complying with an inflexible curriculum" is opposed by those who regard themselves as rulers of the academic world. Moreover, contrary to what is often believed, the (missing) freedom from fixed syllabi does not present the most important problem (to some, such freedom is hardly imaginable, so deeply has the lack of inner freedom contaminated them); from the perspective of the idea of the university, the crucial issue is depriving universities of their natural freedom by forcing them into following the curricula imposed by the administration.

Making university professors responsible for the upbringing (in the sense of German *Bildung*) of their students is another cause for concern. The responsibility in question, often indicated in official documents, means that professors, supposedly on the grounds of pedagogically significant objectives, are expected to get their students involved in activities which are, in fact, oversimplistic in the case of adults, i.e., individuals capable of self-education.[25] While it is true that various activities employed by academic teachers in the teaching process may have a formative aspect (e.g., by manner of teaching, professors may shape and strengthen desirable stances in students), if the proper meaning of upbringing (understood as a specific personal relationship between the educator and the student) is to be preserved, what is expected of university professors must not be described by means of the general term 'upbringing.' Instead, it would be useful to specify the scope of the most important formative

[24] Tadeusz C z e ż o w s k i, *O uniwersytecie i studiach uniwersyteckich*, 11.

[25] For a broader understanding of the idea of self-education, see Bogusław Ś l i w e r s k i, *Teoretyczne i empiryczne podstawy samowychowania* (Kraków: Impuls, 2010); Janina Ś w i r k o-P i l i p c z u k, *Samo-dzielność w filozoficznych poglądach i koncepcjach człowieka: Implikacje pedagogiczne* (Szczecin: Przedsiębiorstwo Produkcyjno-Handlowe ZAPOL Dmochowski, 2011).

activities professors should undertake and to define the values and objectives to be attained by way of academic teaching (considered also as formative). The term 'upbringing' used in this context obscures both the proper meaning of upbringing[26] and the specific purpose of university studies.

Hans-Georg Gadamer indicates the difficulties connected with the 'upbringing' of university students. He recollects how, shortly after 1945, in Frankfurt, he was to deliver, on the American initiative, a lecture on the topic of the upbringing provided by the university. The suggested title of the lecture was, "How does a German professor conceive his educational task?" Gadamer's reply to the question was, "unambiguous: he doesn't, because he doesn't have one. He comes much too late for that … A professor who sees his students for a few hours a week and at best comes into contact with them during office hours can mean something similar only for his closest students and co-workers."[27] This reply by Gadamer remains relevant, but, unfortunately, it does not seem to have convinced those who, using the term 'upbringing' in an arbitrary fashion, extend its meaning to include a wide variety of formative activities.

The upbringing given to university students is supposed to stop their alleged immaturity. It seems, however, that such belated attempts at psychological training are doomed to be counterproductive and actually prevent young adults, perceived as overgrown children, from reaching maturity. This, however, does not mean to say that the problem of students' immaturity does not exist. Referring to this question and reflecting on his long experience as university professor, Mieczysław Porębski (1921−2012) claims that indeed it is the freshmen's immaturity rather than their ignorance which is most dangerous for the teaching process. Porębski looks back on his experience as a secondary school student: "My high school provided us with maturity—its graduates were adults. Obtaining the graduation certificate implied further duties in life, among them that of beginning to make their own choices."[28] Commenting on the university of the late 1980s, he observes:

> And now we are told to take care for the upbringing of our students, we are told that those who attend the university are very young and we are supposed not only to teach them, but also to watch, supervise, and test them. In many ways, we are dealing with an attempt to transform the university into a second-rate high school, where one has to 'collect' professors' signatures to confirm one's attendance of the

[26] For a discussion of various ways of understanding upbringing, see Bogusław Ś l i w e r s k i, *Pedagogika ogólna: Podstawowe prawidłowości* (Kraków: Impuls, 2012).

[27] Hans-Georg G a d a m e r, *Philosophical Apprenticeships*, trans. Robert R. Sullivan (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1985), 123.

[28] Mieczysław P o r ę b s k i and Krystyna C z e r n i, *Nie tylko o sztuce: Rozmowy z profesorem Mieczysławem Porębskim* (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Dolnośląskie, 1992), 20.

> courses, and take exams by simply cramming information into one's head. Add to this that terror of deadlines….[29]

Pathological situations which occur in the wake of such erroneous ideas seem to intertwine: combined with the terror of deadlines, the requirement to educate and supervise students is transforming universities into mediocre high schools which impose on boisterous pupils—and also on professors who guard them—the treadmill of discipline which undermines the very meaning of academic freedom. Since the time Porębski expressed his views, the transformation in question has been still intensified as a result of adopting new forms of monitoring and an increasing the terror of deadlines (which applies also to the duty, imposed on the professors, to report on their own work).

Having the new ideas on the role of the university in mind, let us refer again to Karl Jaspers, who reminds us, "University students are adults, not children. They are mature, have full responsibility for themselves."[30] Making the university responsible for upbringing students deprives them of their independence. Jaspers writes: "From the freedom of teaching springs the freedom of learning. No authority, no rules and regulations, no supervision of studies such as are found in high schools must be allowed to hamper the university student. He is free to 'go to the dogs.'"[31] This rather strong statement emphasizes academic freedom and offers an antidote to the fashionable moralizing on the alleged tasks of the university towards mature and independent people.

In order to strengthen my argument, I shall cite Bogusław Śliwerski's unequivocal answer to the question: "Is upbringing students among the tasks of a university professor?"

> No, such an idea brings to mind the communist period. We can, at most, help grown up people work on themselves, perfect themselves, but it is only them who can change their characters or attitudes. This, however, does not exempt us from the duty to show a high level of personal culture, ethicality, and professionalism. If we wish to call them 'upbringing,' so be it, but it is indirect or—as Ellen Key wrote—invisible upbringing.[32]

Thus, from the perspective of a pedagogy based on the correct understanding of the concept of upbringing and on respect for the proper meaning of educational activities, it is unacceptable to foster the illusion that universities

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[29] Ibidem.

[30] J a s p e r s, *The Idea of the University*, 52.

[31] Ibidem, 54.

[32] Grzegorz F i l i p, *Musimy wyjść z platońskiej jaskini: Rozmowa z prof. Bogusławem Śliwerskim, pedagogiem*, https://prenumeruj.forumakademickie.pl/fa/2012/01/musimy-wyjsc-z-platonskiej-jaskini/.

actually give upbringing to students, since the essential obligations of academic staff are different.

Józef M. Bocheński (1902–1995) sees the roots of the current crisis of universities in the state's pressure on them to transform into "facilities which prepare people for practical tasks."[33] In this context, following Jaspers, Bocheński emphasizes the ideal of pure science, stressing that it is "one of the greatest values known to humanity."[34] Bocheński believes that within a model university, the faculty of pure science (i.e., pure mathematics, philosophy, theoretical biology, etc.) should be considered as central: "Around this central faculty there would be practical departments: for engineers, teachers, priests, etc. But, throughout his or her studies, every student would maintain contact with pure science by attending several hours of classes a week at the central faculty."[35] To function well, such a university, i.e., an institution dedicated to developing theoretical knowledge as a value, needs autonomy.[36]

Teaching methods and results of the 'pure science' postulated by Bocheński may, at the same time, provide a form of axiological education which aims at the formation of beliefs and attitudes corresponding to the relevant values. As Józef Tischner, himself a long-term university professor, points out, the fundamental task of an academic teacher consists in "teaching a selfless approach to the subject."[37] The question posed by a student wondering, "What practical benefits shall I gain from my study?", should be given the following answer: "You shall gain a broader knowledge and a better understanding of the reality; this is why learning things and studying at university are worthwhile." All practical interests are derivative from the value of the pursuit of truth.

The contemporary education system is dominated by a 'bribery mentality': students acquire knowledge mainly to obtain good grades which are often seen as a kind of bribe. Such a system—based on this particular form of corruption—has a demoralizing effect on students, undermining their selfless approach to studying. Also, in such a system, the demand for responsibility for truth conceived as the basis for university education, is not respected, as Jan Śniadecki (1756–1830) pointed out: "The love of truth was and will always be the ruling passion of creative minds."[38] Education should enable students to

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[33] Józef M. B o c h e ń s k i, *Między logiką a wiarą: Z Józefem M. Bocheńskim rozmawia Jan Parys* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Literackie Noir sur Blanc, 1995), 35.

[34] Ibidem.

[35] Ibidem.

[36] See Józef M. B o c h e ń s k i, "Autonomia uniwersytetu," in Józef M. Bocheński, *Sens życia i inne eseje* (Kraków: Philed, 1993), 60–71.

[37] Józef T i s c h n e r, Dorota Z a ń k o, Jarosław G o w i n, *Przekonać Pana Boga* (Kraków: Społeczny Instytut Wydawniczy Znak, 1999), 144.

[38] Quoted after Włodzimierz T y b u r s k i, *Myśl etyczna w Polsce od XVI do XIX wieku* (Toruń: Top Kurier, 2000), 308.

creatively expand and deepen their knowledge. By their commitment to the pursuit of knowledge—as Śniadecki emphasizes—students can achieve intellectual humility, which is also a condition for tolerance towards opinions different from their own: "Whoever has forced his way through the thorns and obstacles of science will, not infrequently, see in front of himself obstacles even more formidable than those he has overcome, and thus cannot be humble enough."[39] By absorbing knowledge, we become capable of recognizing our ignorance. Śniadecki adds, "The deeper we delve into knowledge, the better we learn to recognize how much we lack." If one is wanting in humility, "the vanity and pomposity of one's skills" come to the fore, being a clear "sign of a weak mind, incapable of probing into what has germinated and taken root in it." Faulty education—Śniadecki warns us—leads to an increase in the number of "ignorant know-it-alls who take the vestibule of science for its limits and the meager supply of knowledge they possess for the entirety of what human reason has accomplished."[40]

Education divorced from a selfless pursuit of truth is bound to form 'closed minds,' incapable of searching for truth, while mass production of "ignorant know-it-alls" will jeopardize the quality of academic knowledge and of social life. Nowadays, when higher education has been conducted on a mass scale, it is advisable to consider the following words of Karl Jaspers: "Anyone who was studying merely in order to pass an examination or to procure for himself a better position, who, instead of gaining genuine knowledge, wants to have more examination knowledge poured into him, does not belong in a university at all."[41] Selfless acquisition of sound knowledge is thus an important prerequisite of participation in university education.

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In the struggle to implement the idea of the University (I believe the word 'University' should be capitalized to reflect the actual dignity of the institution), considered as a specific world of values and personal stances, one must not stop at dreaming about the 'golden age' of the academia, which has passed irreversibly. Members of the academic community of today need to acquire sufficient knowledge on the essence of the university, as well as theoretical and practical knowledge on the reality which they experience, share, and create. They also need to have a strong sense of themselves as moral subjects and moral agents to be able to establish and maintain the University, thus withstanding

[39] Ibidem.

[40] Ibidem, 309.

[41] Karl J a s p e r s, *Philosophical Autobiography*, 47.

an increasingly widespread belief (expressed in official regulations) in historical and civilizational determinants with which every academic community with no exception supposedly has to comply. One must keep alive the hope that the implementation of the idea of the University is still possible and desired; one must not lose this hope, as it is inseparable from the very existence of universities.

In order not to forfeit the axiologically committed idea of the University, it is necessary to conduct an in-depth, systematic, and multidirectional theoretical and, at the same time, ethically and practically relevant reflection on the identity of the university and its transformations. Such a reflection would contribute to the implementation of the idea of the University.

Despite the frequently raised alarm, the University must not be perceived as a cultural phenomenon that, consigned to oblivion, has left the stage of history. The University remains a humanistic (i.e., genuinely human) task and a challenge to which one should respond by creating, developing, and preserving the academic community. The task and the challenge are addressed particularly—on account of academic tradition and their professional obligations—to philosophers and pedagogues who, collectively, have the necessary intellectual tools to determine the best ways of creating, in any given cultural and civilizational circumstances, the University able to radiate its values despite ideological, economic, and political pressures.

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ABSTRACT / ABSTRAKT

Marek REMBIERZ, The Current Dispute on the Status of the University: The Anthropological and Axiological Aspects of the Problem

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The author claims that the ongoing controversy over the functioning of the university is essentially of an axiological and anthropological nature. The paradox, described by Tadeusz Kotarbiński, of the academic freedom which characterized clandestine education organized during the Nazi occupation in Poland, provides the background against which the author presents threats posed by reductionist technocratic anthropology and utilitarian axiology inherent in the currently promoted model of the university as a provider of educational services. According to the author, the progressing objectification of research and teaching results in an atrophy of selflessness, a quality indispensable in this type of activity, while perceiving university as a product to be marketed undermines the world of academic values. Due to bureaucratic overregulation, researchers and teachers are coerced into attempts at quantification of their, essentially

unquantifiable, intellectual effort. The author expresses also his anxiety about the demand for university professors to take responsibility for the 'upbringing' of their students, i.e., about the expectation that students should be involved in activities which are oversimplistic in the case of individuals capable of self-education. According to the author, such 'belated' attempts at psychological training tend to prove counterproductive and actually encourage immaturity on the part of the students. The author also argues that the system of a military-like discipline imposed on the university contributes to the destruction of its autonomy and that the teaching methods recommended in the official guidelines would be damaging to the intellectual and spiritual culture and to the ethos of the university. In the author's opinion, education divorced from the selfless pursuit of truth is bound to produce 'closed minds,' incapable of a pursuit of truth.

Keywords: university, the academic ethos, academic freedom, objectification of research and teaching, utilitarian axiology

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Marek REMBIERZ, Antropologiczne i aksjologiczne aspekty sporu o status uniwersytetu

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Autor ukazuje współczesne spory dotyczące funkcjonowania uniwersytetu jako spory o charakterze aksjologicznym i antropologicznym. Opisany przez Tadeusza Kotarbińskiego paradoks wolności akademickiej w warunkach tajnego nauczania, organizowanego w Polsce podczas okupacji nazistowskiej, pozwala uwydatnić niebezpieczeństwa związane z redukcjonistyczną antropologią technokratyczną i aksjologią utylitarną, które obecne są wśród założeń promowanego obecnie „usługowego" modelu uniwersytetu. Zdaniem autora, postępująca instrumentalizacja nauki i nauczania prowadzi do zaniku niezbędnej w tego typu działaniach bezinteresowności, a traktowanie uniwersytetu jako produktu będącego przedmiotem zabiegów marketingowych niweczy świat wartości akademickich. Biurokratyczna nadregulacja systemowa wymusza zaś podejmowanie prób ilościowego ujęcia nieprzeliczalnej wartości aktywności intelektualnej. Niepokój autora budzi też narzucanie profesorom obowiązku wychowywania studentów, czyli podejmowania wobec osób dorosłych, zdolnych do samowychowania, nieodpowiednich w tym kontekście działań pedagogicznych. Spóźnionemu wychowywaniu studentów przypisuje się funkcję kompensacyjną, ma ono zaradzić niedojrzałości osób podejmujących studia. Próby takiego „wychowania" nieuchronnie będą jednak, jak wskazuje autor, prowadzić do skutków przeciwnych niż oczekiwane. Autor argumentuje, iż

narzucając uniwersytetowi system koszarowej dyscypliny, niszczy się jego autonomię, a nakazywane w biurokratycznych dyrektywach działania okazują się destrukcyjne dla kultury intelektualnej i duchowej, jak również zabójcze dla ethosu uniwersytetu. Jeśli działania edukacyjne rozmijają się z bezinteresownym dążeniem do prawdy, to kształtowane przez nie umysły pozostają „zamknięte", niezdolne do jej poszukiwania.

Słowa kluczowe: uniwersytet, ethos uniwersytecki, wolność akademicka, instrumentalizacja nauki i nauczania, aksjologia utylitarna

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Balázs M. MEZEI

CAN THE UNITY OF THE UNIVERSITY BE RESTORED IN OUR AGE?

The life-world, as conceived of by Husserl, is the vivid realm of local experience. The philosophy of the people also needs to begin with local experience. It is from local experience that the 'sensus communis' emerges, pointing to the ultimate unity of all knowledge and reality. This unity is first revealed in the form of distinctive traditions of local experience, characteristically reflected in philosophical traditions. To develop the philosophy of the people means to rediscover these traditions and liberate them from the exploitation of intellectual and cultural invasions.

In the current paper I address the problem of the intellectual unity of the university. Intellectual unity, in my view, can mean three things: (1) the unity of research, (2) the intellectual unity of teaching, (3) the unity of a community based on a shared valid paradigm.

Obviously, universities today rarely seek intellectual unity in the third of the above meanings. If one is affiliated with a university, his or her personal and communal identity may not be defined by that fact. The unity of teaching is disrupted by a great number of disciplines taught and a multitude of methodologies used at our universities, while the unity of research is delegated to specific institutions with specific research objectives. Thus it may seem that the 'unity of university' is an empty expression.

On the other hand, it is strongly arguable that the expression 'unity of university' is not empty—not even in the third sense, to which I will return at the end of this paper. If we consider the history of universities, we can see that the idea of the university is, in fact, one of unity. It suffices to think of the Academy of Athens, the Musaeum at Alexandria, the Pandidakterion (Imperial University) of Constantinople, or the emerging Western universities of the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and modernity.[1] The idea of unity has always been central to philosophical knowledge and to divine revelation, and also—from the beginning of modernity—to the project of an encyclopedia of human

[1] See *A History of the University in Europe*, vol. 1, *Universities in the Middle Ages*, ed. Walter Rüegg and Hilde de Ridder-Symoens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); *A History of the University in Europe*, vol. 2, *Universities in Early Modern Europe (1500–1800)*, ed. Walter Rüegg and Hilde de Ridder-Symoens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); *A History of the University in Europe*, vol. 3, *Universities in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries (1800–1945)*, ed. Walter Rüegg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); *A History of the University in Europe*, vol. 4, *Universities Since 1945*, ed. Walter Rüegg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

knowledge. The latter was logically and historically dependent on the notion of divine omniscience as, throughout the centuries, the human mind was believed incapable of actual omniscience, yet able to partake of divine knowledge to some extent. In modernity the perspective changed: divine illumination was replaced by overall theories in the sciences, i.e., in philosophy, mathematics, physics, biology, or, later, in psychology and sociology. The creation of new cosmologies by Nicolaus Copernicus, Johannes Kepler, Isaac Newton, Albert Einstein, Werner Heisenberg, and Erwin Schrödinger have been driven by the idea of omniscience attainable to human beings. In this connection, it is noteworthy that the real significance of quantum physics and Gödel's theorem still raises important problems in our day.[2]

My point is simple: the idea of the university presupposes, historically and logically, the idea of the unity of research and teaching. I agree that this unity is better construed as the intellectual unity of teaching and research than as the social unity of a community sharing a valid paradigm, as in the latter sense unity is often conceived in terms of loose collegiality, i.e., companionship and cooperation between colleagues bearing common responsibility. As today collegiality does not mean either deeper community or intellectual unity, we can talk about the *crisis* of the university. The source of the crisis is precisely the divergence between methods and goals we can currently observe, the disunity that calls into question the very *raison d'être* of the millennia-old institution of the university.

The crisis of university reflects the crisis of the sciences. This is due to the fact that, in spite of the scientific revolutions of the past centuries, the unity of the sciences has not been properly conceived: 'the grand theory of everything' is still in the making. Research and teaching are highly diffuse, rival interpretations of quantum physics and conflicting theories in biology or in the humanities multiply. Today it has become almost a dogma that it is in vain to seek any intellectual unity at universities and that we just need to pursue our immediate study goals and thereby develop our particular research and teaching in effective ways. Powerful international companies support such an approach: they need applicable research results so that, for instance, ever more successful versions of artificial intelligence could be constructed.

There is, however, a different model of the intellectual unity of the university, namely, the Catholic university model. The Catholic university regards the requirement of intellectual unity as a standard. It is in the Apostolic Constitution

[2] See Arkady P l o t n i t s k y, *Epistemology and Probability: Bohr, Heisenberg, Schrödinger, and the Nature of Quantum-Theoretical Thinking* (New York: Springer, 2009); *Kurt Gödel: Essays for his Centennial*, ed. Solomon Feferman, Charles Parsons, and Stephen G. Simpson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Karl G i b e r s o n, "Dice and Divine Action," in: *The Oxford Handbook of Divine Revelation*, ed. Balázs M. Mezei, Francesca A. Murphy, and Kenneth Oakes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

Ex Corde Ecclesiae that we can find a clear statement of this requirement. As the requirement of unity seems incompatible with the changes in the contemporary world of higher education, we can also see the struggle in which Catholic universities are engaged today: some are about to abandon their Catholic identity, others seek new ways to follow contemporary trends by changing mandatory courses and introducing diversity curricula. There are also Catholic universities where the implementation of the Great Books Program—an important initiative that involves reading classic works in literature, philosophy, and theology—has been halted, given its emphasis on Western intellectual history.[3]

Below I will argue that the intellectual unity of the university, and especially of the Catholic university, can and must be restored. This becomes clear in the light of a new reading of the Apostolic Constitution *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* and the Encyclical *Fides et Ratio.* Then, if the intellectual unity of Catholic universities is reestablished along the lines of this new reading, the community aspect of the university can also be addressed. In particular, I argue that the philosophical foundation of Catholic universities needs to be reinterpreted and linked to important fields of contemporary science. It is through its renewed philosophical understanding that the unity of universities can be reconsidered and rebuilt.

A RENEWED UNDERSTANDING OF "EX CORDE ECCLESIAE" ON THE PHILOSOPHICAL LEVEL THE NEED FOR A PROPER PHILOSOPHY OF THE UNIVERSITY

The Apostolic Constitution *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* was written thirty years ago and since that time no comparable document on teaching and research on Catholic universities has been published by the Vatican. The issue date is important: it was in 1990 that the collapse of the Soviet system in Europe became obvious. Part and parcel of this system was the Soviet-type university with its ideological bias and forced separation of research and teaching.[4] *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* seeks to overcome both: it argues for a sound philosophy of human personhood as the basis for the university and also for the intellectual unity of research and teaching. The philosophy of human personhood points to theol-

[3] See Tim L a c y, *The Dream of a Democratic Culture: Mortimer J. Adler and the Great Books Idea* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

[4] This separation was introduced when the fruitful combination of teaching and research, the great achievement of German universities during the nineteenth century, was still considered the best way of education. The strict separation of research and teaching took place first in the Soviet Union during the 1920s. The Soviets had a centralized research planning strictly separated from ideological education long before militarized Germany did. See *A History of the University in Europe*, vol. 3, *Universities in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries (1800–1945)*, 663–7.

ogy: the dignity of human persons is grounded in their creation and salvation. All values of human societies are derived from this source. In consequence, research and teaching must be conceived in their organic unity. Faith stands in the center of the Catholic university.

Ex Corde Ecclesiae indicates the outlines of *a philosophy of the university.* The guiding principle of this philosophy is "the cause of truth"[5] or "the impartial search for truth"[6]: "The present age is in urgent need of this kind of disinterested service, namely of proclaiming the meaning of truth, that fundamental value without which freedom, justice and human dignity are extinguished."[7] Truth is one; even if there is a hierarchy within truth, all truths originate in the one divine truth. Any research attaining truth is a form of participation in divine truth. Catholic universities must serve the truth in its variety and unity, i.e., embrace the plurality of objects and methods as they are discussed in science and search for the ultimate unity of all truths in God.

This principle goes hand in hand with "the universal humanism"[8] of the Catholic university. "The very meaning of the human person"[9] must stand at its center. Catholic universities must follow a systematic way of research, i.e., one based on intellectual unity, to be able to achieve "integration of knowledge"[10] and explore "the riches of revelation."[11] As the text claims, "The present age is in urgent need of this kind of disinterested service, namely of proclaiming the meaning of truth, that fundamental value without which freedom, justice and human dignity are extinguished."[12]

This philosophy can be fleshed out in more detail. What we reach, then, is a kind of philosophy which is capable of ensuring the intellectual unity of universities, especially Catholic ones. It is of course not easy to find a common ground among vastly different disciplines, such as mathematics, the natural sciences, and the humanities. Yet the teaching of *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* on the unified philosophy of truth, the center of which is human personhood, provides such a common ground. If we want to regain and even further develop the intellectual unity of the university—which is, in fact, the most important legacy of the history of this institution—the unity of truth must play a decisive role in research and teaching.

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[5] John Paul II, Apostolic Constitution on Catholic Universities *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* (Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1990), Section 4.

[6] Ibidem, Section 5.

[7] Ibidem, Section 4.

[8] Ibidem.

[9] Ibidem, Section 7.

[10] Ibidem, Sections 15, 16, and 17.

[11] Ibidem, Section 5.

[12] Ibidem, Section 4.

To achieve this a unified philosophy must be properly developed. Here again we have a basis to rely on: The Encyclical *Fides et Ratio* by John Paul II explains the nature of the desirable philosophy of truth, while at the same time outlining a viable form of the philosophy of the university.

REFRAMING OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL MESSAGE OF "FIDES ET RATIO" ON THE BASIS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF REVELATION

The Encyclical Letter *Fides et Ratio* contains an overall attempt to redefine philosophy not only in the Catholic context, but also in that of the complexity of contemporary theoretical attempts to understand the world. As an important text in the history of philosophy, *Fides et Ratio* provides a roadmap to the renewal of philosophy. In our present discussion, the following points made in the text are the most important: (1) Philosophy needs to regain its original *courageous* character: it needs to be 'audacious' in discovering new problems and fields of research, (2) philosophy has to take into consideration the Christian traditions, namely, Christian philosophy, not as the official philosophy of the Church, but "rather to indicate a Christian way of philosophizing, a philosophical speculation conceived in dynamic union with faith,"[13] (3) philosophy must be based on fundamental facts, such as "the notion of a free and personal God,"[14] "the reality of sin,"[15] "the notion of the person as a spiritual being,"[16] and "the Christian proclamation of human dignity, equality and freedom, which has undoubtedly influenced modern philosophical thought,"[17] (4) moreover, "in more recent times, there has been the discovery that history as event—so central to Christian Revelation—is important for philosophy as well."[18]

Twenty years after its promulgation, *Fides et Ratio* needs to be reconsidered. Most importantly, we need to recognize that the encyclical may highlight the general form of philosophy related to faith. Even if there is no 'official philosophy' of the Church, there is nevertheless a 'philosophy of philosophy,' as it were, common to the most important thinkers throughout the ages. Not only does this philosophy express "the unity of philosophical experience,"[19] as Étienne Gilson held, but it also exhibits the unity of form, indicating the possibility

[13] John Paul II, Encyclical Letter *Fides et Ratio* (Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1998), Section 76.

[14] Ibidem.

[15] Ibidem.

[16] Ibidem.

[17] Ibidem.

[18] Ibidem.

[19] See Étienne Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1938).

of developing *the philosophy of possible philosophies*, the 'implicit philosophy' of humanity. As *Fides et Ratio* does not elaborate on the form and content of this implicit philosophy, let me daringly identify it with the notion of *the philosophy of divine revelation* I have developed during the past years.[20] Philosophy of revelation is also briefly alluded to in *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* when the document declares the importance of "the exploration of the riches of Revelation."[21]

I use the term 'philosophy of revelation' to refer to a kind of metaphilosophy, a 'philosophy of all possible and actual philosophies' developed on the basis of the ultimate source of human knowledge. I call this ultimate source 'revelation' and offer thereby an interpretation of the received meaning of the term. Originally, i.e., in the sense of the Greek *apocalypsis* or the Hebrew *gala*, 'revelation' refers to the ultimate divine disclosure of the meaning of being, human existence, history, and nature. In a more concrete sense, 'revelation' refers to the teaching of the ultimate verities of being, especially the verities concerning the Trinitarian structure of the divine in itself and in its relations. In this sense, revelation cannot be properly understood by the innate powers of reason; seen as a gift, however, revelation in an overall sense becomes accessible to reason. In other words, reason points to a higher level of understanding, the understanding given in faith in the genuine sense of the word, i.e., faith given by and in God.[22] Thus a philosophy of revelation points to faith, at the same time conceiving what cannot be reached by the philosophy's innate power. In this conceiving, a sort of rational illumination takes place and reason is capable of its reception. A philosophy of revelation is a systematic explication of what is received in illumination and what is referred to in faith.

The noun 'revelation' and the verb 'to reveal' are used one hundred and fifty-two times in the Encyclical Letter *Fides et Ratio*. This shows the importance of these expressions in the text. However, it is not only philosophy in its various forms that is inspired by and directed at revelation, but there is a radical form of philosophy which permeates all forms of philosophical thought: a radical philosophy of divine revelation. In fact, it is philosophy's manifold dependence on revelation that makes philosophy genuinely philosophical; for the unity of truth, the formal object of philosophy, cannot be anything else than the ultimate truth of divine revelation. A philosophy of revelation, therefore, is the most basic, most important, indeed the ultimate form of philosophy, which conceives and explains the reality and various forms of revelation. To

[20] See Balázs M. M e z e i, *Radical Revelation: A Philosophical Approach* (London: T&T, 2017); Balázs M. M e z e i, "Revelation in Phenomenology," In: *The Oxford Handbook of Divine Revelation*.

[21] J o h n P a u l II, *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, Section 5.

[22] See Balázs M. M e z e i, Francesca A. M u r p h y, and Kenneth O a k e s, *Illuminating Faith: An Invitation to Theology* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2015).

some extent this insight has been described, before and after the publication of *Fides et Ratio*, by a number of thinkers, for instance Michel Henry,[23] Jean-Luc Marion,[24] William Desmond,[25] and myself.[26]

Revelation by definition transcends reason, also theological reason. This, however, does not mean that reason is not capable of conceiving revelation. Reason conceives revelation and, at the same time, recognizes that it is not itself capable of fully understanding revelation. In the very act of conceiving revelation reason recognizes revelation's infinite excess. Inspired by revelation and directed at revelation, philosophy is also compelled to understand that revelation is a gift. A gift is not made in a void, but it is embedded in a structure of presuppositions and takes a number of forms. There must be someone—or a body of someone—with the capacity to receive a gift; there must be the capability of recognizing the gift as gift; and there must be the giver that is categorically similar to, yet also different from, the recipient of a gift. Making somebody a gift is not like hitting them with a stone, but rather, to use an ancient metaphor, a gift resembles light falling on a flower, an organism, or an eye. In order that a gift may be given, there must be a certain structure of ontological and epistemological qualities and a metaphysical community which makes the fact of gift meaningful.

Similarly, revelation is realized within a structure of presuppositions and takes a number of forms. Divine revelation is given and received on the basis of a common structure containing substructures and even sub-substructures to which various forms of revelation correspond. 'Radical philosophical theology of revelation' is the name of the endeavor to demonstrate the ultimate importance, the structures and forms of revelation from the philosophical point of view. I also have to add that it is a 'nonstandard' philosophical theology, because it does not remain in the framework of various fragmented notions of philosophy that are mentioned in *Fides et Ratio* but transcends them to reach a unified form. This form of philosophy, in my estimate, may be considered to be the realization of the audacious 'new path' for philosophy encouraged by the encyclical. However, I do not suggest that this new path for philosophy can embrace and understand in a materially proper sense the full reality of revelation. Although it may be conceived and explicated to some extent, revelation essentially transcends reason. Yet this transcendence is conceived on the basis of a common structure shared by reason and revelation.

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[23] See Michel H e n r y, *C'est moi la Vérité: Pour une philosophie du christianisme* (Paris: Seuil, 1996).

[24] See Jean-Luc M a r i o n, *Givenness and Revelation*, trans. Stephen E. Lewis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

[25] See *The William Desmond Reader*, ed. Christopher B. Simpson (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2012).

[26] See M e z e i, *Radical Revelation: A Philosophical Approach*.

This partial overlapping is the overlapping of the finite and the infinite: the finite is defined by and contained in the infinite, whereas the infinite infinitely transcends the finite. Nevertheless, the infinite cannot be strictly separated from the finite; if such were the case, then the infinity of the infinite would be limited, which is impossible. As the medieval dictum says, *infiniti ad finitum nulla proportio*, that is, there is no proportion between revelation and reason. The meaning of *nulla proportio* is not that revelation is isolated from reason, but rather that they are related to one another in such a way that the thesis *nulla proportio* is preserved in the framework of an overall relationship. On this basis, revelation is such that it is already given. In the notion of revelation, we possess the notion of the 'existence' of God, but this existence should not be interpreted in line with traditional notions of being. God is revealed, given, self-revealed, and self-given. He is given to himself and he is given to the non-divine. In this full givenness we may determine a certain aspect as 'being,' but beyond being, God is given in his self-revelation as an absolute fact.[27]

THE EXPANSION OF A PHILOSOPHY OF REVELATION ON THE BASIS OF A PHILOSOPHY OF THE PEOPLE OR A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF LIBERATION

Radical philosophy is to elaborate the original form of human thought as related to the self-disclosure of ultimate reality, i.e., revelation. On the conceptual level we can reach the insight into the necessity of this philosophy by analyzing the striking evolution of the notion of revelation in the history of ideas. More concretely, the history of phenomenology can be reconstructed in terms of the emergence of the understanding that phenomenology is, in its essence, the phenomenology of revelation. From Franz Brentano,[28] through Max Scheler[29] and Martin Heidegger,[30] to Emmanuel Lévinas,[31] Michel Henry

[27] See ibidem, xix.

[28] See Franz B r e n t a n o, *Religion und Philosophie*, ed. by Franziska Mayer Hillebrand (Bern: Francke, 1954); Franz B r e n t a n o, *On the Existence of God*, ed. and trans. Susan F. Krantz (Dordrecht, Boston and Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987).

[29] See Max S c h e l e r, *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, vol. 1, *Religiöse Erneuerung* (Leipzig: Verlag Der Neue Geist / Dr. Peter Reinhold, 1921).

[30] See Martin H e i d e g g e r, *The Basic Writings*, ed. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper, 1993).

[31] See Emmanuel L é v i n a s, *Totalité et Infini: Essai sur l'exteriorité* (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961); Emmanuel L é v i n a s, *Autrement qu'être ou au-dela de l'essence* (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974).

and Jean-Luc Marion, the development of philosophy shows the emergence of revelation as the central subject of philosophical thinking.[32]

However, it seems that there is another way to properly elaborate a philosophy of revelation, that is to take the path of the *filosofía del pueblo*, 'philosophy of the people.' I include this path not only because the thought of Pope Francis emerged from this context, but also because it opens up a possibility to elaborate the question of the sources of a philosophy of divine revelation. As Rocco Buttiglione[33] and Rafael Luciani,[34] among others, have shown, the *teología del pueblo*, one of the developments of liberation theology, contributed to the formation of the intellectual background of Pope Francis. Instead of *teología*, however, I wish to speak of *filosofía* because, logically speaking, if there is a *teología del pueblo*, there is also a *filosofía del pueblo*, a kind of philosophy of liberation. By entering this realm, we perform a move parallel to the discovery and elaboration of the notion of the life-world by the later Edmund Husserl. Husserl recognized that, in order to properly reach the transcendental realm, we need to begin with the most basic experiences and beliefs of our everyday life. This discovery resulted in his writing *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, published in 1938.

At this point we need to clarify some concepts. The life-world, as conceived of by Husserl, is the vivid realm of local experience. The *philosophy of the people* also needs to begin with local experience. It is from local experience that the 'sensus communis' emerges, pointing to the ultimate unity of all knowledge and reality. This unity is first revealed in the form of distinctive traditions of local experience, characteristically reflected in philosophical traditions. To develop the philosophy of the people means to rediscover these traditions and liberate them from the exploitation of intellectual and cultural invasions. A good example is the philosophy of the Vienna Circle. This philosophy is deeply rooted in Central-European traditions, specifically in Austrian philosophy, yet it has been instrumentalized in a philosophy foreign to these traditions and characterized by a naïve realism instead of critical thinking. The basis of the thought of the Vienna Circle was provided by the theory of objects proposed by Alexius Meinong[35] and others—the theory in which also phenomenology is rooted. That is to say, the natural context of the Vienna Circle

[32] See M e z e i, "Revelation in Phenomenology."

[33] See Rocco B u t t i g l i o n e. "Revelation and Theology of the People," in *The Oxford Handbook of Divine Revelation*.

[34] See Rafael L u c i a n i, *Pope Francis and the Theology of the People* (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 2017).

[35] See Alexius M e i n o n g, "The Theory of Objects", trans. Isaac Levi, Dailey B. Terrell, and Roderick Chisholm, in *Realism and the Background of Phenomenology*, ed. Roderick Chisholm (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 1981), 76–117.

type of positivism is phenomenology and hermeneutics, the philosophies of life, history, and being. The 'sensus communis' of these forms of thought is that truth and reality are unequivocally given in these realms in such a way that a certain kind of perception—characteristically 'intellectual insight'—is capable of recognizing them.[36]

The 'philosophy of the people' as *a philosophy of liberation* intends to reclaim the traditions of Central-European philosophy, i.e., the forms of thinking that originated in the distinctive cultural context of the countries situated between the East and West and North and South of Europe. Central-European philosophy includes Austrian, Southern German, Czech, Hungarian, Polish, and Croatian philosophy.[37] However, I am not suggesting a geographical or historical approach to philosophy here. I am merely pointing out that phenomenology is the natural context of a philosophy of revelation, while different philosophies of Central-European origin (criticism as opposed to dogmatism, transcendentalism as opposed to local realism, ontology as opposed to epistemology, etc.) constitute the natural context of phenomenology. It is important to rediscover those traditions and formulate their central message: the message pointing to the radical philosophy of divine revelation.

This philosophy of liberation receives a meaning somewhat different from the meaning of the *filosofía del pueblo.* We need to return to the things themselves, but also to our own traditions in philosophy; we need to liberate them from misunderstanding and misuse. If this endeavor is successful, the result will be a form of philosophy of divine revelation, an audacious philosophy of truth and reality, indeed the implicit philosophy *Fides et Ratio* talks about. There is much work to be done here, and this work requires further interpretation of the work of John Paul II.

If we find the way to this understanding of philosophy, we can hope to regain the very meaning of truth, the meaning of philosophy; and consequently, the meaning of the unity of research and teaching at a university. Just as

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[36] Historically, the concept of intellectual insight is a follow-up of the ancient notion of illumination, continuously present throughout the history of philosophy. Illumination resurfaces in German philosophy as *intellektuelle Anschauung*; later, it has its incarnation in Husserl's 'categorical intuition' and 'intuition of essences.' As traditional epistemology develops into existentialism, ontology, and hermeneutics, the notion of intellectual insight becomes obsolete. However, some works, such as Bernard Lonergan's *Insight,* offer further interpretations of this tradition. See Bernard L o n e r g a n, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran (Toronto, Buffalo, London: Published for Lonergan Research Institute of Regis College, Toronto by University of Toronto Press, 1992). In the framework of a philosophy of revelation, we do not need such categories, because revelation cannot be conceived but by revelation itself, i.e., by what is disclosed in revelation as the reception of revelation.

[37] See Balázs M. M e z e i, "Austrian Theism and the Catholic Principle," in Mezei, *Religion and Revelation after Auschwitz* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 201–19.

through his discovery of the life-world Husserl has made an important step on the way towards overcoming the crisis of the sciences and towards the restoration of the meaning of philosophy, we can contribute to reclaiming the meaning of philosophy and to the intellectual unity of the university by liberating our philosophical life-world, i.e., the Central-European traditions.

Here a short overview of the kinds of philosophy referred to in this paper seems in place. Philosophy as the 'love of wisdom' has been variously developed during the two and a half millennia of its history. While even for Plato philosophy was "a gift from the gods to the mortal race whose value neither has been nor ever will be surpassed,"[38] the unique importance of philosophy was increasingly well understood during and after the Renaissance period. This understanding led to reformulations of the importance of philosophy in itself and in its relationship to other scholarly disciplines, such as theology and the sciences. In the Cartesian turn, the paramount importance of philosophy came to the fore and redefined philosophy as the utmost peak of scholarly endeavors. This kind of approach was further developed in the works of modern philosophers who attempted to redefine philosophy in the context of its traditions, yet in view of a new understanding. It is particularly in the German context that philosophy has become metaphilosophy, a system of understanding comprising all possible and actual branches of knowledge and being. Philosophies of special fields abound, whereas proposing a genuine metaphilosophy, such as the ones developed by Hegel, Husserl, or Heidegger, has proved to be a difficult path. Especially in Catholic circles, however, where traditional conceptions of philosophy survived and were brought to new life, the importance of a fundamental philosophy has always been clearly recognized. This was shown in the Encyclical Letters *Aeterni Patris*[39] of 1879 and *Fides et Ratio* of 1998. While the former argued for an invigorated Thomistic philosophy, the latter emphasized a more complex understanding of philosophy. Nevertheless, both documents agree that it is necessary to revitalize philosophy and express it in new forms, going beyond the needs of special disciplines, methodologies, or particular branches of knowledge. *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* makes it abundantly clear that what is needed is an overall theory of truth; and *Fides et Ratio* urges, as mentioned, an audacious thinking that goes beyond particular problems to comprehend the unique problem of reality. The philosophy of revelation, as presented briefly here, continues this metaphilosophical endeavor supported by important traditions constituting its heritage, and in particular by phenom-

[38] P l a t o, *Timaeus*, trans. Donald J. Zeyl, in *The Complete Works of Plato*, ed. John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997) 47 b, 1250.

[39] L e o XIII, Encyclical Letter *Aeterni Patris* On the Restoration of Christian Philosophy, 1879, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_04081879_aeterni-patris_en.html.

enology. In this sense, philosophy of revelation emerges as the unique kind of thinking which (1) is rooted in the intellectual traditions of the past millennia, (2) offers a new endeavor to redefine philosophy as the overall discipline going beyond particular fields, and (3) develops a new understanding of human thought rising above the traditional distinctions and definitions to create the framework of the intellectual unity of teaching and research in the new millennium.

ORGANIZING UNIVERSITY RESEARCH AND TEACHING AT THE CUTTING-EDGE THEORETICAL ISSUES WITH A SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON AWARENESS RESEARCH AND QUANTUM MECHANICS

As soon as we have secured the framework of the kind philosophy which ensures unity, Catholic universities are in a position to regain their meaning. The fact is, however, that no university can avoid embarking on a similar journey towards reframing the intellectual unity of research and teaching.

The process may then involve the humanities, such as psychology, sociology, linguistics or history (this has in fact happened, to some extent, in the history of phenomenology), as well as mathematical and natural sciences. I shall highlight here only two disciplines that are of a special importance in our perspective: the so-called awareness research (especially the study of near-death experience) and quantum mechanics. Let me explain the reasons why I think these are important fields and in which way they contribute to the unity of university.

Awareness research is a relatively new field, created in the 1970s and developed by, among others, Bruce Greyson (psychiatrist), Kenneth Ring, Melvin Morse (psychologists), and Michael Sabom (cardiologist).[40] They introduced the study of near-death experiences into the academic setting. Awareness research entails specific expertise in the life sciences and in thanatology. On the one hand, awareness research investigates death, dying, and resuscitation, adopting a 'hard,' scientific approach to these issues,[41] on the other hand, it also addresses language, culture, and religion. Thus awareness research is a complex field of scientific investigation into the nature of consciousness, drawing also on cultural studies.

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[40] See *Foundations of Near-Death Research: A Conceptual and Phenomenological Map*, vols. 1 and 2, ed. Alexander Batthyány (Durham, NC: IANDS Publications, 2018).

[41] See Sam P a r n i a, Ken S p e a r p o i n t, Gabriele d e V o s, et al., "AWARE—AWAreness during Resuscitation: A Prospective Study," *Resuscitation: Official Journal of the European Resuscitation Council* 85, no. 12 (2014): 1799−805.

As such, awareness research cannot be consistently carried out without properly formulated cosmology and biology. This leads us to the next decisive field of research contemporary universities must focus on, i.e., quantum physics: not only the mathematics of quantum physics, so important in understanding this groundbreaking field of science, but also the assessment of the interpretations of quantum experiments, such as theories proposed by Ervin Laszlo,[42] Robert Lanza,[43] and Pim van Lommel.[44]

In the present context, I cannot discuss in detail the two important aspects of awareness research, namely, the scientific and the humanistic. It is clear, however, that awareness cannot be analyzed merely on the basis of a simple typology, but we need a higher typological theory, and ultimately phenomenology. On the other hand, quantum mechanics should not be considered as the end of the history of the natural sciences, and although it is the prevailing paradigm today, it must be seen in the context of all the paradigm changes the sciences have produced throughout centuries. Three conclusions are particularly relevant: (1) awareness research offers a springboard to a higher level typology pointing to phenomenology, (2) awareness research reaches into quantum biology and quantum cosmology, i.e., applications of quantum theory, and (3) by connecting these fields, we can achieve a certain unity in research based on the intellectual unity of universities grounded in an overall philosophical understanding.

Such a philosophical understanding can be developed on the basis of the philosophy of human personhood or, more generally, on the basis of the philosophical traditions preserved in Central Europe. The Central European philosophy is a treasury of original insights and systematic developments which, in view of the special importance of this philosophy among other traditions, need to be rethought and further developed.[45]

The steps towards regaining the intellectual unity of research and teaching presented above referred to the context of Catholic universities and were based on the doctrine of the Magisterium. However, it is hardly deniable that other universities have to follow a similar path. The central importance of human personhood in research and teaching is not open to serious dispute. The proper understanding of human personhood, however, must be assessed philosophically. We are all aware of the debates around this question and we know that numerous contemporary authors advance strong arguments against

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[42] See Ervin L a s z l o, *What is Reality? The Map of Cosmos and Consciousness* (New York: SelectBook, 2016).

[43] See Robert L a n z a and Robert B e r m a n. *Biocentrism: How Life and Consciousness are the Keys to Understanding the True Nature of the Universe* (Dallas: Bonbella Books, 2009).

[44] See Pim v a n L o m m e l, *Consciousness Beyond Life: The Science of the Near-Death Experience* (New York: HarperCollins, 2011).

[45] See M e z e i, "Austrian Theism and the Catholic Principle."

the human specificity. However, without acknowledging the unique nature of human personhood we cannot organize our philosophical and scientific knowledge around a center. The "abolition of man,"[46] as C. S. Lewis had it, the reduction of the mind to the brain, is equivalent to losing the organizing center of human knowledge—in fact, the organizing center of truth.

As to these debates, let me say briefly the following: if philosophy is dead, as the late Stephen Hawking claimed, then we are in a logical contradiction, as the statement itself is a philosophical proposition. Saying that philosophy is dead we are actually doing philosophy, and so philosophy is alive. Similarly, if the mind is fully reducible to the brain, then there is no truth. The notion of truth entails the existence of mind, spirit, or intellect; if there is truth, there is the mind as distinct from the brain. The brain as a biophysical and chemical entity does not contain or produce truth; it produces biophysical and chemical processes, the establishing of which stands by definition beyond the physical-chemical process. Thus, to say that the mind *is* brain is self-contradictory.

This and similar contradictions confirm the point that all our knowledge about specific fields in the sciences presupposes not only the existence of truth as such but also the possibility of a theory of truth, i.e., philosophy. What we need is indeed the proper development of this philosophy. We have to do this for the sake of truth, for the sake of the theory of truth, but also for the sake of human knowledge as such. In other words, the theory of truth, i.e., philosophy, and the human person, i.e., a being capable of performing this unique kind of activity, must be at the center of the university. The concrete form and content of such a philosophy are, as I have argued, those of the 'radical philosophical theology of revelation.' If we possess such a philosophy, then we also have the opportunity to reorganize the intellectual unity of universities. Advancing all these arguments, we find ourselves in a situation not dissimilar from Husserl's position when he argued against naturalism and historicism in his famous paper entitled "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science."[47]

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The steps we need to take to regain the intellectual unity of the Catholic university can be shown on a Venn-diagram (figure 1). The diagram describes the movement from the core reflection to the ever-wider elaboration of the re-

[46] See C. S. L e w i s, *The Abolition of Man: Or, Reflections on Education with Special Reference to the Teaching of English in the Upper Forms of Schools* (New York: HarperCollins, 2001).

[47] See Edmund H u s s e r l, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," trans. Marcus Brainard, *New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* 2 (2002): 249−95.

lated dimensions of knowledge. These dimensions and the movement inherent in them portray the parallel developments of research and teaching—within the philosophical framework of the traditions we strongly need to liberate from problematic influences.

The Venn-diagram below outlines the intellectual unity of the university translated into the unity of research. Whether this intellectual unity can lead to 'the unity of a community based on a shared valid paradigm' is a more complex question. It seems that a community that goes beyond a rather formal collegiality would be difficult to achieve at the university with its multiple faculties and disciplines. However, the 'valid paradigm' has been outlined in the present paper. It is indeed 'valid' in accordance with the insights from which my approach proceeds. The paradigm in question provides the basis for a community of those who share the understanding of the intellectual unity of the university. By outlining the intellectual unity, not only do we work together in a community, but we also presuppose the existence of human persons capable of understanding this unity and sharing it in an important way. Thereby we have created the context of a human community that is needed for the third meaning of the unity of the university.

In my conclusion, then, the unity of the university—especially of the Catholic one, but also that of any other university—can be restored on the basis of all three factors, i.e., intellectual effort, the structure of research, and the genuine community of researchers. I add that this is only an outline and the workable community must be formed in the cooperation of scholars, researchers, and intellectuals in the framework of the university as the most important institution of human understanding.

Fig. 1. Steps towards the intellectual unity of the Catholic University.

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ABSTRACT / ABSTRAKT

Balázs M. MEZEI, Can the Unity of the University Be Restored in Our Age?
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In this paper I argue that the intellectual unity of the university, in particular the Catholic university, can and must be restored. This becomes clear in the light of a new reading of the Apostolic Constitution *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* and the Encyclical *Fides et Ratio*—both promulgated with the intention to reform university research and teaching. I offer a reconsideration of these documents on the basis of what I call a 'radical philosophical theology of revelation,' and also on the basis of a 'philosophy of the people' developed with respect to the intellectual background of Pope Francis. If the intellectual unity of the Catholic university is restored along these lines, the question of the genuine community of university researchers and teachers can be addressed anew. In particular, I argue that the philosophical basis of Catholic universities needs to be reinterpreted and linked to important fields of contemporary science, especially quantum theory and awareness study. As I show in a Venn-diagram, the various layers of the unity of university research, teaching and community can be connected to one another in a systemic way in which philosophy, in particular the philosophy of revelation, plays the fundamental role.

Keywords: university, renewal of the Catholic university, philosophy of revelation, philosophy of the people, quantum physics, awareness research, *Ex Corde Ecclesiae, Fides et Ratio*

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Balázs M. MEZEI, Czy możliwe jest w naszych czasach przywrócenie jedności uniwersytetu?

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W artykule wykazuję, że intelektualna jedność uniwersytetu, a zwłaszcza uniwersytetu katolickiego, może i musi zostać przywrócona. Staje się to jasne w świetle nowego odczytania konstytucji apostolskiej *Ex corde Ecclesiae* oraz encykliki *Fides et ratio*, które zostały ogłoszone w celu zainicjowania reformy badań i nauczania prowadzonych na uniwersytetach. Proponuję nową refleksję nad tymi dokumentami opartą na radykalnej teologicznej filozofii Objawienia oraz „filozofii ludu" wyrosłej z intelektualnego kontekstu, w którym osadzone jest nauczanie papieża Franciszka. Jeśli jedność uniwersytetu katolickiego zostanie odbudowana zgodnie z tymi wytycznymi, można będzie również ponownie podjąć kwestię prawdziwej wspólnoty badaczy i wykładowców. W szczególności twierdzę, że należy dokonać reinterpretacji filozoficznych założeń uniwersytetu katolickiego i odnieść je do ważnych obszarów współczesnej nauki, zwłaszcza do teorii kwantów i badań nad świadomością. Jak pokazuję za pomocą diagramu Venna, różne płaszczyzny jedności uniwersytetu: badania, nauczanie i wspólnota, mogą zostać powiązane w system, w którym filozofia, a zwłaszcza filozofia Objawienia, odgrywa podstawową rolę.

Słowa kluczowe: uniwersytet, odnowa uniwersytetu katolickiego, filozofia Objawienia, filozofia ludu, fizyka kwantowa, badania nad świadomością, *Ex corde Ecclesiae*, *Fides et ratio*

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Michael J. JAMES

CATHOLIC HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
A View from the United States

It is an oft-repeated concern of Pope John Paul II and his successors that our rapid advances in science and technology can too easily cloud the human impact and meaning of society's many possible developments. The popes have collectively expressed a great sense of urgency that Catholic universities and colleges, both in their research activities and in their teaching, must be concerned with maintaining the balance that puts human dignity and solidarity before the accumulation of power and wealth.

A BRIEF HISTORY

The first European universities founded in the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries in various European cities were corporations of scholars chartered by the Holy See. When general rules for granting degrees were set, it was by order of pope or Church council. However, the main purpose of a papal charter, at that time, was to give scholars freedom from harassment by local secular or Church authorities. Despite these universities' close ties with Rome, there was very little Church teaching about the role of Catholic universities, and until the New Code of Canon Law of 1983, the Church did not legislate policy on universities.[1]

In the meantime, universities diversified. After the Reformation, many were affiliated with the various Protestant denominations. And, in modern times, many of them abandoned religious affiliation. Around the globe, it became more common for universities to be chartered by state authorities. Occasional exhortations by popes and bishops mainly offered simple encouragement to students and professors in Catholic universities and colleges. Church teaching did not set out a comprehensive philosophy of Catholic higher education. This is understandable because in the centuries between the Council of Trent (1545–1563) and the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965), most activities

[1] See Monika K. H e l l w i g, "What Makes our colleges Catholic?," in *Mission and Identity: A Handbook for Trustees of Catholic Colleges and Universities*, edited by Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges, Association of Jesuit Colleges and Universities & Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities (Washington, DC: Association of Jesuit Colleges and Universities), 45–52.

and institutions of the Catholic Church tended toward uniformity and strong continuity.

On the other hand, the rectors of Catholic universities worldwide, who formed the International Federation of Catholic Universities—created by a Papal Decree in 1948, were preoccupied with defining what made a Catholic university Catholic in an age of so much social transformation. They worked for several decades and were much influenced by the 1965 document Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World *Gaudium et Spes* of the Second Vatican Council. The result of their efforts was a document, *The Catholic University in the Modern World*, that, with minor changes, formed the core of Part I of the Apostolic Constitution on Catholic Universities *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*. The main texts, then, which express the teaching of the Catholic Church on the makeup, task, and conduct of Catholic universities, are the papal document *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* and the two conciliar documents of Vatican II, *Gaudium et Spes* and the Declaration on Christian Education *Gravissimum Educationis*. There is considerable duplication among the three texts. This section of my paper will address these vital documents by following the content of Part I of *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, weaving in material from the other two council documents only when it adds something or points to a different approach.

FROM THE HEART OF THE CHURCH

A significant consequence of the worldwide Second Vatican Council for Catholic colleges and universities was a new understanding of the Christian calling of the laity, in light of diminishing numbers in the vowed religious congregations. To the extent that the Catholicity of the colleges had largely been seen as the charge of the sponsoring religious community, there was a widening gap between the profession of faith and available human resources. Further, a move from ownership of colleges and universities by religious congregations to the installation of lay boards of trustees—without requiring any special introduction of lay trustees to the Church-related history and commitment intrinsic to the colleges—was at first not appreciated.[2] Consequently, due to these and other factors, Catholic colleges and universities found that they could no longer take for granted the religious character of their institutions. They could no longer assume that the values and goals professed by the institutional mission were spontaneously implemented in practice.

[2] See Alice G a l l i n, *Negotiating Identity: Catholic Higher Education since 1960* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000).

In response to these growing concerns, Pope John Paul II promulgated the Apostolic Constitution *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*. This document identified the common characteristics of all Catholic colleges and universities. Every Catholic university, as Catholic, must have the following four essential characteristics: (1) A Christian inspiration, not only of individuals but of the university community as such, (2) a continuing reflection in the light of the Catholic faith upon the growing treasury of human knowledge, to which it seeks to contribute by its own research, (3) fidelity to the Christian message as it comes through the Church, (4) an institutional commitment to the service of the people of God and of the human family in their pilgrimage to the transcendent goal, which gives meaning to life.

Ex Corde Ecclesiae poetically describes that the Catholic university pursues its objectives through its formation of an authentic human community animated by the spirit of Christ. The source of its unity springs from a common dedication to the truth, a common vision of the dignity of the human person, and, ultimately, the person and message of Christ, which gives its distinctive character to the institution.[3]

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY IN THE MODERN WORLD

Over a century before the promulgation of *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, Blessed John Henry Newman described, in *The Rise and Progress of Universities*, a university as "a place where inquiry is pushed forward, and discoveries verified and perfected, and rashness rendered innocuous, and error exposed, by the collision of mind with mind, and knowledge with knowledge."[4]

In the introduction to the Apostolic Constitution *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, Pope John Paul II reflects personally on his own experience as a university professor of philosophy. He portrays the Catholic university as a place where the encounter of faith and reason is taken seriously and pursued into the great complexity of contemporary science, philosophy, social sciences, and so forth.[5] He acknowledges that this involves creativity. Hence, there is bound to be some experimentation, some trial and error, some wrestling with the ways in which secular knowledge is incorporated into the way Catholics see everything by the light of faith. The research, scholarly synthesis, and teaching conducted

[3] See John Paul II, Apostolic Constitution on Catholic Universities *Ex Corde Ecclesiae* (Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1990), Section 21.

[4] John Henry Newman, *The Rise and Progress of Universities*, in John Henry Newman, *The Rise and Progress of Universities: Newman Reader* (Pittsburgh, PA: The National Institute for Newman Studies, 2007), 6.

[5] See *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, Section 1.

in a Catholic university are crucial to the dialogue the Church conducts with the cultures of our time, which is essential to the future of the Church and of the world.[6] Their fruitful pursuit depends on unconditional commitment to the truth, both on the immediate subject of study and at the deeper levels of human existence in which freedom, justice, and human dignity are grounded.[7]

It is an oft-repeated concern of Pope John Paul II and his successors that our rapid advances in science and technology can too easily cloud the human impact and meaning of society's many possible developments. The popes have collectively expressed a great sense of urgency that Catholic universities and colleges, both in their research activities and in their teaching, must be concerned with maintaining the balance that puts human dignity and solidarity before the accumulation of power and wealth.[8]

In the final sections of the document, Pope John Paul II returns to the dominant theme of his pontificate, namely, to the importance of the work the Church must do in order to understand the complex culture of our age: what shapes people's values and expectations, their thoughts and their actions, their relationships and their social structures. The section titled "Cultural Dialogue" returns to the Pope's great hope that Catholic universities and other scholarly institutions will engage the multiple practical and theoretical problems of our contemporary society with special attention to "the meaning of the human person, his or her liberty, dignity, sense of responsibility, and openness to the transcendent … the preeminent value of the family, the primary unit of human culture."[9] He calls on the universities to "discern and evaluate both the aspirations and contradictions in modern culture … the impact of modern technology and especially of the mass media on persons, the family and the institutions and whole of modern culture."[10]

Noting that the task of governing Catholic universities and colleges is increasingly falling to the laity, the Holy Father states his concern that all those responsible for Catholic higher education (such as the boards of trustees) be clear about its purpose: to be a "public, persistent, and universal presence" in the shaping of society's culture and to graduate people who will take on professional and public responsibilities well equipped and critically aware of the issues from a Christian perspective.[11]

[6] See ibidem, Section 3.
[7] See ibidem, Sections 4–6.
[8] See ibidem, Sections 7–8.
[9] Ibidem, Section 45.
[10] Ibidem.
[11] See ibidem, Sections 9–10.

CATHOLIC HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES

American Catholic universities and colleges are a large component of the global strength of Christian higher education and scholarship, but they certainly do not participate in international collaboration in proportion to their capacity.[12] The Roman Catholic hierarchy looks to the numerical, structural, and curricular strength of Catholic institutions in the United States to bring the wisdom of the Catholic intellectual tradition to bear on the economic, sociocultural, and political problems of the contemporary world.[13]

There are 4,724 degree granting institutions of postsecondary education in the United States, enrolling approximately 20.4 million students. 3,099 of these institutions are private and enroll 5.6 million students. Of the private institutions, 1,024 are religiously affiliated and enroll 1.9 million students. Of the religiously affiliated institutions, there are 247 degree-granting Catholic colleges and universities.[14] According to the US Department of Education's Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), during the 2012–2013 academic year, half of the 1.9 million students enrolled in religiously affiliated colleges and universities in the United States were enrolled in Catholic colleges and universities.[15]

There are 29 separate religious denominations in sponsorship of the 1,024 religiously affiliated institutions of higher education accredited and participating in federal student aid programs in the United States. The largest denominational group of institutions is Catholic. Twelve Catholic colleges and universities are sponsored by a diocese. Ten colleges and universities are identified as private-independent. Four are pontifical institutions. The majority of Catholic colleges and universities are sponsored by religious congregations—the largest of which is the Society of Jesus, sponsoring 28 colleges and universities, including Georgetown University, the first Catholic university in the United States.

Catholic colleges and universities include: 7 medical programs; 40 schools of engineering; 29 law schools; 29 nursing science programs; 16 doctoral programs in theology, religion, or ministry; 22 peace studies and conflict resolution programs; 16 women's colleges; 11 doctoral granting institutions; and nine research universities.[16] Catholic colleges and universities are represented in

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[12] See Michael J a m e s, "The Academic Profession, the Common Good, and Globalization," *Current Issues in Catholic Higher Education* 25, no. 1 (2006): 121–35.

[13] See *Ex Corde Ecclesiae.*

[14] See National Center for Education Statistics, *Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS)*, 2016, http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/datacenter/Default.aspx.

[15] See ibidem.

[16] See Association of Catholic Colleges and Universities, *Distinctive Academic Programs: Catholic Higher Education*, 2015, http://www.accunet.org/i4apages/index.cfm?pageid=3791# sthash.

every Carnegie Classification from Associates Degree institutions to Research Universities, with the largest representation among the Masters Colleges and Universities.

CATHOLIC MISSION AND IDENTITY

In terms of students' personal development, American Catholic colleges and universities are effective at integrating intellectual growth with spiritual reflection. Addressing existential questions of meaning and supporting students in holistic personal development remain essential to the mission and identity of Catholic colleges and universities.[17]

Catholic universities excel in interfaith and ecumenical dialogue. In addition to welcoming those of other faiths and with no faith tradition to study, Catholic higher education in the United States welcomes Jews, Muslims, Christians, and others as administrators, faculty, and staff, to be guest speakers, to join in intercultural events, and to participate in the deep and meaningful exchanges that take place through scholarly centers and institutes.

Three out of every four American Catholic colleges and university graduates volunteer, or in other ways participate, in community service (domestically and abroad), compared with fewer than six in ten public university graduates or seven in ten graduates of non-Catholic private universities.[18]

In many cases in the United States, the link between religiously affiliated colleges and universities with the various denominational churches is historical and taken for granted. Some observers have pointed out a certain slippery-slope effect that has taken place throughout the twentieth century, whereby these institutions have become distant from effective relationship to the founding church group and its values.[19]

There is considerable range of variation in the philosophy and practice of the religious colleges of the various Christian denominations. There is also an acknowledged diversity in institutional type, size, history, and demographic

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qd85Dtln.rrXiIbwh.dpbs; Indiana University Center for Postsecondary Research, *The Carnegie Classification of Institutions of Higher Education: 2015 Edition* (Bloomington, n.d.); Women's Colleges, Online Colleges, Scholarships, and Degree Programs, n.d., http://www.college-scholarships.com/schools/women-colleges/.

[17] Sandra M. E s t a n e k, Michael J. J a m e s, Daniel A. N o r t o n, "Assessing Catholic Identity: A Study of Mission Statements of Catholic Colleges and Universities," *Catholic Education: A Journal of Inquiry and Practice* 10, no. 2 (2006): 199–217.

[18] Hardwick Day, *Values that Matter: A Comparative Advantage Alumni Study*, 2016, https://www.catholiccollegesonline.org/resources/pdfs/values-that-matter-2006-hardwick-day.pdf.

[19] See *The Secularization of the Academy*, ed. George M. Marsden and Bradley J. Longfield (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1992).

make-up of students and faculty among the 247 degree-granting Catholic colleges and universities in the United States. Yet, certain common characteristics can be identified in the practice of the academic profession in faith-based colleges and universities that are animated by a shared concern for the common good.

The concern for social justice, both as an institutional priority and a curricular hallmark, is among the more readily identifiable characteristics of American Catholic higher education institutions.[20] Regardless of their intended profession, students are invited to view their career as part of a vocational calling in service of the common good. Catholic social teaching is applied across disciplines in ways both particular to the standards of those disciplines, and as a means of fostering interdisciplinary dialogue and cooperation. Within this framework, a pedagogy of service-learning helps students experience solidarity with their immediate community and society more broadly, while perfecting the intellectual skills to confront contemporary global social problems.

INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS

While historically and culturally representing a significant sector of higher education institutions, Catholic colleges and universities in the United States fare less impressively among the national and global rankings of research universities. Three Catholic universities have consistently appeared among the most competitive rankings. The 2018 U.S. News and World Report ranking included: University of Notre Dame (ranked Top 18), Georgetown University (Top 20), and Boston College (Top 32). Among the international ranking systems, the 2018 US News Global Rankings include: University of Notre Dame (ranked at 181), Georgetown University (Top 279), and Boston College (Top 421). The 2018 Times Higher Education World Ranking includes: Georgetown University (at 123), University of Notre Dame (at 159), and Boston College (at 301–350). The presence of graduate schools of medicine and engineering influence the position in the rankings and many Catholic institutions of higher education are more focused on social sciences, humanities, and undergraduate education, which explains to a certain extent their absence in top rankings.

[20] See Michael J a m e s, "The Mission and Purpose of Colleges and Universities Sponsored by Christian Denominations in the USA," in *The Role of a Religious University*, ed. Yaacov Iram (Ramat Gan: Bar-llan University Press, 2013), 7−30.

A CHALLENGE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY MISSION-DRIVEN IDENTITY AND INTERNATIONALIZATION

Today there are approximately 1,300 Catholic colleges and universities worldwide and the number continues to grow. New Catholic institutions of higher education are predominantly located in Asia, where Catholic communities are growing most rapidly. However, it has emerged from a small pilot study[21] that Catholic identity and internationalization do not appear to have any evident or natural points of contact in institutional life, but rather have developed independently, and often quite unsystematically, of one another.

Internationalization and Catholic identity occupy different and separate organizational domains, they evolve without coordination, and a discourse alluding to where the two are woven together in a meaningful whole could not be found either in official documentation, or in the interviews we carried out with university leaders.[22]

Nevertheless, both identity and internationalization are currently aspects of institutional development that are in the spotlight. Identity may be an older and more established footprint,[23] but it is also the characteristic that is more likely to be in crisis or struggling to redefine itself in the current environment as highlighted in the recent survey on *Instrumentum Laboris*.[24]

We cannot simply reflect once and for all on the original reasons that led to founding a Catholic school or university and leave it at that. We need to reflect continually on this point. In fact, this awareness allows us to grasp ever more clearly the original idea's basic fruitfulness helping us to develop its presence and mission. Moreover, with the passing of time, the cultural and social circumstances can change and new problems can arise: and to address them it is not enough to look at the past. We must rise up to meet today's new challenges.[25]

Internationalization, as it is understood today, has developed over the last 25 years and is increasingly perceived by higher education institutions more as an institutional imperative, rather than a choice. In the current context, it is identified as a key institutional response to the formidable range of is-

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[21] See Andrés B e r n a s c o n i, Hans d e W i t, and Daniela V é l i z - C a l d e r ó n, *Catholic Universities: Identity and Internationalization, A Pilot Project* (Boston, MA: Boston College Center for International Higher Education, 2016).

[22] See ibidem, 5.

[23] See ibidem, 6.

[24] See Angelo P a l e t t a and Italo F i o r i n, "The Challenges of Catholic Education: Evidence from the Responses to the *Instrumentum Laboris*: 'Educating Today and Tomorrow,'" *International Studies in Catholic Education* 8, no. 2 (2016), 136−54.

[25] See ibidem.

sues relating to the globalization of higher education, and yet, at the same time, it is increasingly coming under challenge in certain countries around the world. A recent European study on the internationalization of higher education concludes that the future of internationalization of higher education looks potentially bright, but it is also challenged by increasingly profound, social, economic, and cultural issues, such as the financial crisis, demographic decline, immigration, and ethnic and religious tensions. While it is true that these challenges could impact negatively on further internationalization, they also raise awareness of its importance in developing a meaningful response.[26]

So, while Catholic identity and internationalization may have different origins and be traveling at different speeds, they are both increasingly identified, within the institutions, as essential components for institutional development, and yet may be facing external (and at times internal) pressures that challenge the nature of institutional identity or the assumption that internationalization is necessarily a good thing to the benefit of all concerned.

Whether universities see themselves as local or global players, identity and internationalization play a key part in establishing and sustaining their different roles. Each institution is faced with its own unique context. In some, identity or internationalization may be thriving more than in the other, or coming under increasing pressure to change, and how universities understand and deploy these two elements as a means to foster institutional growth is a function of many factors.

Traditions, fundamental core values and missions, geographical location, size, academic configuration, stages of institutional development as well as internal character will all have impact on institutional choices, and on the ability to respond to the rapidly changing environment in which institutions now operate. No university operates in isolation and beyond the varying degrees of public accountability and institutional autonomy, they are increasingly expected to engage with a growing and more diverse body of external stakeholders, whose views and values may or may not align with those of the institution.

Increasing competitive pressures on higher education institutions today, not only nationally but also across borders, for students, funds, and staff, require them to think strategically about positioning, and the link between identity and internationalization becomes more evident. International partnerships can become a key tool to innovate education and research, to benchmark institutional standards and practices, with a view to enhancing quality and strengthening the university's position. Trends toward decreased tuition revenue and rising

[26] See Hans de Wit, Fiona Hunter, Laura Howard, and Eva Egron-Polak, *Internationalization of Higher Education* (Brussels: European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, 2015), 31.

operating costs imply the need for planning for income generation, and opportunities offered by international student recruitment and strategic partnerships to access international funding sources are increasingly relevant.[27]

Catholic institutions are no exception. They are as varied as secular institutions and their range of ability to respond to the changing environment is as wide. However, any institution seeking to develop a successful response to the current challenges it faces must be purposeful in its approach to both identity and internationalization, if it is to foster longer-term sustainability and embed institutional values and sense of purpose into everyday working practices. This requires strategic planning.

OVERCOMING RESISTANCE TO STRATEGIC PLANNING

When properly done, strategic planning can play a key role in building a pathway for future development. However, it is not a process that always sits comfortably in many universities. They are typically complex, multilevel organizations with a broad range of objectives and areas of activity. The many academic units tend to act independently according to collegial traditions, often within the context of a bureaucratic culture imposed by government agencies through a top down approach and extensive regulation. This makes it difficult to build vertical alignment and horizontal coordination in order to synchronize directions and efforts between the various academic and administrative functions of the university. Consequently, universities often struggle to respond effectively to change, either externally or internally.

The danger is that the declared goals for identity and internationalization are more rhetoric than reality, and that both are more a collection of fragmented activities, managed in an ad hoc manner by individuals or specialized units. Identity cannot be simply captured in a few sentences on a website, policy documents, or promotional materials, and left there. It must be defined, shared, and governed. It must find expression in teaching and learning activities, in the research agenda, in the recruitment policies, and in marketing strategies. This cannot be left to an ad hoc approach or to the work of a single office.

If internationalization is understood to be about improving the quality of education and research for all students and staff and making a meaningful

[27] See John L. D a v i e s and Fiona J. H. H u n t e r, "Globalisation in Higher Education and the Implications for the Design and Implementation of Institutional Strategies for Internationalisation," in *Encyclopedia of International Higher Education Systems and Institutions*, ed. Pedro Teixeira and Jung Cheol Shin (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, forthcoming).

contribution to society,[28] it is hard to imagine how this can be done without an intentional, systematic process that can over time set up policies, structures, and procedures to internationalize teaching and learning, foster intercultural competences in students and staff, enhance standards, build partnerships and alliances, and so on. If it is to be embedded across key academic activities, it cannot be left exclusively to the international office. "International education can no longer be seen as a fragmented list of activities executed by international offices and a small group of motivated internationalists among staff and students. Internationalization should on the contrary be integrated, broad and part of an institution's core mission."[29]

Identity and internationalization are hailed as fundamental to mission, and yet they are typically not connected to one another, because they are not properly embedded in institutional practice. The problem is essentially a systemic one. Both identity and internationalization are often disconnected from each other and from many other parts of the institution. However, identity is an expression of institutional purpose and therefore a powerful guide to institutional decision-making and direction. Internationalization, when properly embedded, can serve as a strong driver for identity and institutional development. In order for them to be effective, they need to be managed through an institutional strategic planning process that identifies how the different activities will contribute to the delivery of the strategic objectives, and embeds them in the everyday life of the university.

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For a critical consideration of Catholic identity and internationalization of Catholic universities in the twenty-first Century, it is salient to recall that a major breakthrough of the Second Vatican Council of the Roman Catholic Church in the early 1960s was the document *Gaudium et Spes*. Building on the vision of the Church as People of God, the document addressed not the responsibility of the hierarchy, but the vocation of lay leadership in a complex and rapidly changing world. Describing major world problems from a gospel perspective, the document identified Catholic universities among the agents to respond. What *Gaudium et Spes* and *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*—and many of the social encyclicals of the last five popes—make clear, is that the human problems

[28] See de Wit, Hunter, Howard, and Egron-Polak, *Internationalization of Higher Education*, 29.

[29] Uwe Brandenburg and Hans de Wit, "Has International Education Lost Its Way?," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, November 15, 2011, http://www.chronicle.com/blogs/worldwise/has-international-education-lost-its-way/28891.

and challenges of our time are inevitably worldwide problems.[30] For Catholic higher education to address the ethical challenges of globalization and plurality, it is necessary to cultivate a global awareness and to build the resources for global outreach through an intentional, mission-driven planning process.

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[30] See J a m e s, "The Academic Profession, the Common Good, and Globalization."

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ABSTRACT / ABSTRAKT

Michael J. JAMES, Catholic Higher Education in the Twenty-First Century: A View from the United States

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The research, scholarly synthesis, and teaching conducted in a Catholic university are crucial to the dialogue the Church conducts with the cultures of our time, which is essential to the future of the Church and of the world. Their fruitful pursuit depends on unconditional commitment to the truth, both on the immediate subject of study and at the deeper levels of human existence in which freedom, justice, and human dignity are grounded. A significant consequence of the worldwide Second Vatican Council for Catholic colleges and universities was a new understanding of the Christian calling of the laity, in light of diminishing numbers in the vowed religious congregations. To the extent that the Catholicity of the colleges had largely been seen as the charge of the sponsoring religious community, there was a widening gap between the profession of faith and available human resources. Further, a move from ownership of colleges and universities by religious congregations to the installation of lay boards of trustees—without requiring any special introduction of lay trustees to the church-related history and commitment intrinsic to the colleges—was at first not appreciated. Consequently, due to these and other factors, Catholic colleges and universities found that they could no longer take for granted the religious character of their institutions. They could no longer assume that the values and goals professed by the institutional mission were spontaneously implemented in practice. In response to these growing concerns, Pope John Paul II promulgated the Apostolic Constitution *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*. This document identified the common characteristics of all Catholic colleges and universities. In the introduction to *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, Pope John Paul II reflects personally on his own experience as a university professor of philosophy. He portrays the Catholic university as a place where the encounter of faith and reason is taken seriously and pursued into the great complexity of contemporary science, philosophy, social sciences, and so forth. He acknowledges that this involves creativity. Hence, there is bound to be some experimentation, some trial and error, some wrestling with the ways in which secular knowledge is incorporated into the way Catholics see everything by the light of faith.

Keywords: Catholic higher education, mission and identity, Catholic higher education and internationalization, Catholic social teaching, John Paul II, Vatican II, *Ex Corde Ecclesiae*, mission-centered strategic planning

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Michael J. JAMES, Katolickie szkolnictwo wyższe w dwudziestym pierwszym wieku. Spojrzenie z perspektywy Stanów Zjednoczonych

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Badania naukowe i nauczanie prowadzone na uniwersytetach katolickich oraz dokonywane tam syntezy odgrywają zasadniczą rolę w dialogu Kościoła z kulturą współczesną − dialogu istotnym dla przyszłości zarówno Kościoła, jak i świata. Owocna działalność uniwersytetów katolickich oparta jest na bezwarunkowym zaangażowaniu w poszukiwanie prawdy dotyczącej zarówno bezpośrednio przedmiotu ich badań, jak i głębszych pokładów egzystencji człowieka, z których wyrastają ludzka godność, wolność i sprawiedliwość. Wobec zmniejszającej się liczebności zgromadzeń zakonnych ważnym przesłaniem Soboru Watykańskiego II dla katolickich szkół wyższych i uniwersytetów stało się nowe rozumienie chrześcijańskiego powołania osób świeckich. Katolicki charakter szkół wciąż wiązano z wspierającymi je zakonami, jednocześnie jednak szkołom tym coraz trudniej było pozyskiwać pracowników wyznających wiarę katolicką. Początkowo nie dostrzegano znaczenia faktu, że szkoły wyższe i uniwersytety przestały być własnością zgromadzeń zakonnych, a w skład ustanowionych w nich zarządów weszły osoby świeckie, których nie wprowadzano w żaden szczególny sposób w kwestie związane z historią Kościoła czy zobowiązaniami wobec konkretnych szkół. Wskutek oddziaływania tych i innych czynników religijny charakter instytucji prowadzonych przez katolickie szkoły wyższe i uniwersytety przestał być oczywistością. Nie można już było zakładać, że wartości i cele zawarte w misji tych instytucji zostaną spontanicznie zrealizowane. Wobec rosnących problemów Jan Paweł II ogłosił Konstytucję apostolską *Ex corde Ecclesiae*. Dokument ten określa wspólne cechy wszystkich katolickich szkół wyższych i uniwersytetów. We wstępie do *Ex corde Ecclesiae* Jan Paweł II dokonuje osobistej refleksji nad swoim doświadczeniem profesora filozofii na uniwersytecie. Papież przedstawia uniwersytet katolicki jako miejsce, w którym poważnie traktuje się spotkanie wiary i rozumu, odkrywając znaczenie tego spotkania w kontekście ogromnej złożoności współczesnych nauk przyrodniczych, filozofii czy nauk społecznych, co − jak przyznaje − wymaga twórczej pracy. Dlatego nieuchronne jest eksperymentowanie, podejmowanie prób, popełnianie błędów i zmaganie się z trudnościami łączenia wiedzy świeckiej z właściwym katolikom postrzeganiem wszystkich aspektów rzeczywistości w świetle wiary.

Słowa kluczowe: katolickie szkolnictwo wyższe, misja i tożsamość, katolickie szkolnictwo wyższe a umiędzynarodowienie, nauczanie społeczne Kościoła katolickiego, Jan Paweł II, Sobór Watykański II, *Ex corde Ecclesiae*, planowanie strategiczne skoncentrowane na misji

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KAROL WOJTYŁA—JOHN PAUL II
INSPIRATIONS

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Jarosław MERECKI

MODERNITY AND THE FAMILY, AS SEEN IN LIGHT OF THE TEACHING OF ST. JOHN PAUL II

Modernity sees man as an individual who is separate from other human beings and interested in satisfying his or her own needs. A person is the center of her world. If, indeed, "we never really advance a step beyond ourselves," a human person never overcomes her solitude, not even in a relationship with another. No wonder that on such grounds the idea of love as a gift of self becomes incomprehensible. How can a person make a gift of self to another, if she is unable to leave the confines of her loneliness?

At the beginning of the pontificate of St. John Paul II, the future of the family as a social unit did not look very promising. Marxism and liberalism, two modern currents of thought influential at the time, considered the family as an institution of the past and overcome in the process of modernization. The family was said to imply bonds that hindered rather than promoted free development of the individual and, as such, to oppose progress and liberation (e.g., women's liberation or sexual liberation).

Confronting the situation, John Paul II showed the courage to be 'the sign of contradiction' and decided to put the issue of the family in the center of his teaching and his pastoral activity. In his various speeches, the Pope would show the beauty of the family as a 'communion of persons,' who—through their mutual and selfless gift of self beget a new identity, precisely that of a communion. The mutual gift in question is in its essence free, unconditional and ultimate—taught John Paul II—and it is this gift, fully lived through, that lies at the heart of conjugal love.

While the vision of love proposed by the Pope did not subscribe to the ideas of the 'mainstream' of Western culture, one can say that in developing his teaching, John Paul II followed the example of Christ himself. Indeed, Christ's proclamation of the Gospel of marriage and the family went against the practice universally accepted in the culture of his times. When Jesus spoke of the indissolubility of marriage, the Pharisees would invoke the authority of Moses, who had commanded that, if need be, the man give the woman a bill of divorce and dismiss her (cf. Mt 19:3–8). Christ, however, did not regard the practice accepted in his times as the ultimate criterion of his teaching and, instead, asked his disciples to look to the 'beginning,' that is, to the original design of God for man and woman, which was marriage and the family.

TRUTH AND FREEDOM

In 1991, the year beginning a new historical era marked by the collapse of communism, the Special Assembly of the Synod of Bishops for Europe took place in the Vatican. Together with the European bishops, John Paul II wanted to reflect on the opportunities the new phase of European history created and the challenges it posed. On that occasion, Tadeusz Styczeń, a Polish philosopher and successor of Karol Wojtyła to the chair of ethics at the Catholic University of Lublin, wrote an article with an interesting and somewhat provocative title: "Conscience and Europe, or Should the Pope invite Aristotle to the 1991 Synod of Bishops for Europe, what Would the Philosopher Have to Say?"[1] What was the idea Styczeń elaborated in the article? In his opinion, the fundamental problem of Western culture was its mistaken view of the moral conscience, caused by a wrong conception of the relationship between truth and freedom, which has been reversed. The heart of the problem might be described as follows: Human freedom has been granted the power to create the truth about man. While in Eastern Europe, for decades subjected to the communist ideology, the power in question was attributed to the collective consciousness, the West developed a form of individualism that granted such a prerogative to every individual conscience. However, the element common to both visions was the belief that the truth about man is the result of a free decision rather than an existing reality that precedes any human resolution. Thus, it was accepted that truth can and must be created by man himself as he exercises his freedom, and that, consequently, each person has his or her own truth. It is not difficult to imagine that such 'individual' truths may easily enter in conflict with one another.

Likewise—we may add—Western culture questioned another important concept, namely, that of natural law. 'Nature' was considered to be the realm of merely bare facts rather than of values or meanings, the latter considered as products of reason and freedom responsible for giving nature its truly human sense. In consequence, the role of reason in the field of morality was changed: once expected to find objective truth, reason was now considered as a creative faculty with the task to determine the contents of truth. To put it simply, while the pre-modern times saw the specific trait of man in human reason with its ability to acquire knowledge of objective truth, independent of the preferences of the subject and identical for all, to modernity, which has questioned such a capability of reason, what distinguishes man from all other beings in the

[1] See Tadeusz S t y c z e ń, "Sumienie a Europa, czyli gdyby Ojciec Święty zaprosił Arystotelesa na Synod Biskupów Europy 1991," in Styczeń, *Solidarność wyzwala* (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, 1993), 203–19.

world is his freedom, which creates subjective truths. "We never really advance a step beyond ourselves,"[2] wrote David Hume, who is counted among the fathers of modern philosophy, and his idea indeed expresses the essence of the modern (as well as postmodern) vision of man, which has had its repercussions also in the field of moral theology.

John Paul II addressed modern intellectual currents in his encyclical *Veritatis Splendor*, where he wrote:

> Certain tendencies in contemporary moral theology, under the influence of the currents of subjectivism and individualism ... involve novel interpretations of the relationship of freedom to the moral law, human nature and conscience, and propose novel criteria for the moral evaluation of acts. Despite their variety, these tendencies are at one in lessening or even denying the dependence of freedom on truth.[3]

It is understandable that in a vision which weakens or even denies the relationship between truth and freedom, there is no place for universally valid moral norms, that is, rules that do not allow exceptions. According to such a vision, a human person is unique, each moral situation being also unique and unrepeatable. Moral norms, which must necessarily be general, cannot account for the vicissitudes of a human life and, therefore, apply at the most in a majority of cases (*ut in pluribus*), but not in each of them. Occasionally, performing an act prohibited by a general rule might be justified—say the proponents of this view—by the calculus of the values at play in the given situation. This also refers to the moral norms regarding marriage; for instance, it becomes impossible on such grounds to consider the indissolubility of marriage as a norm valid always and without exception. One might say, yes, there are good reasons why it is better for marriages to be stable, but marriages cannot be required to follow the principle of indissolubility in any situation. Ultimately—the proponents of this view argue—the validity of any moral norm referred to a particular case depends on the decision of conscience (*Gewissensentscheidung*) taken by the person concerned. Not surprisingly, human bonds become increasingly fragile once such ideas are applied in real life.

One needs to note, though, that the ideas discussed above are a corollary to a more general concept of man. Modernity sees man primarily as an individual who is separate from other human beings and interested in satisfying his or her own needs. A person is the center of her world, others entering her

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[2] David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book 1, "Of the Understanding," Part 2, "Of the Ideas of Space and Time," Section 6, "Of the Idea of Existence, and of External Existence," ed. Lewis A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896), vol. 1, 42.

[3] John Paul II, Encyclical Letter *Veritatis Splendor*, August 6, 1993 (Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1993), Section 33.

cognitive horizon merely as potential objects of desire. If, indeed, "we never really advance a step beyond ourselves," a human person never overcomes her solitude, not even in a relationship with another. No wonder that on such grounds the idea of love as a gift of self becomes incomprehensible. How can a person make a gift of self to another, if she is unable to leave the confines of her loneliness? How can an individual who is first and foremost interested in the satisfaction of her own desires come to love another person exclusively for the sake of that person?

Yet when Tadeusz Styczeń proposed that the Holy Father invite Aristotle to the Synod of Bishops for Europe he probably had in mind one more thing. Aristotle's perennial ideas are the reason why he is universally considered as a great teacher of humanity and one who knew the depth of the human heart, the essence of happiness, as well as what helps us accomplish our goals. Also today, it is from him that we can learn the wisdom of life. Even though we are not always willing to admit it, we need masters of humanity in today's world, and perhaps today we need them more than we ever did in the past. We want to get to know who we really are and what we really want, and for this purpose we need the wisdom of the masters of thought who deeply reflected on man and who can help us answer important questions regarding the meaning of things. For instance, there are occasions when we feel like doing something appealing to us at the moment. However, can we say that what we feel like doing at the moment is what we really want in life? In the case of every human being, one might see a superficial self and an inner one, the desires of the former not always coinciding with the preferences of the latter. And, as a result, we sometimes make mistakes which are very difficult to rectify. So it is good to listen to those who are confirmed as true masters of humanity. They may speak to us about things which perhaps are not obvious at the moment or which are in conflict with our immediate desires, but involved in a specific situation, we do not always perceive the reality objectively enough. It is then worth referring to the wisdom of the masters of humanity who can show us the values we perhaps fail to notice at the time being. This is no different from situations that happen in everyday life: faced with a difficult existential problem, we often seek the advice of a friend who wishes us well, but is not directly involved in the specific condition we experience and can therefore pass a more objective judgment.

Nowadays there is no doubt that John Paul II was a great expert on the human heart. Throughout his life—as theatrical actor, poet, philosopher, theologian, and in particular as pastor—he wanted to fathom the mystery of man. He probed deeply into the human experience, interpreting it in the light of the Revelation. In the context of the present reflections, it is important to note that already at the beginning of his pastoral work Wojtyła was particularly fascinated by the phenomenon of love born in the hearts of a man and a woman and

culminating in their starting a family. In the interview with Vittorio Messori, he himself confessed, "As a young priest I learned to love human love."[4] His love of human love lasted throughout his lifetime and earned him the name of the Pope of the family. Since Karol Wojtyła is universally considered as a great expert on and a friend of the family, one might rephrase the title of Styczeń's essay, and ask: What would happen should Pope St. Francis invite John Paul II to the Synod on the Family? What would the Pope of the family say to address the problems and challenges the family is facing today? How would he respond to the questions which emerged during the Synod?

On the one hand, it is indeed true that each person is unique and unrepeatable. Everyone lives their specific existence in a different way, and no definition of man can ever give justice to the richness of the reality of a human life. Each person is ultimately a freedom center creating its own history, and everyone embraces their own truths. On the other hand, though, we need to confront the objective truth about man. One might say that a good life integrates the latter with the one and unrepeatable history of a human existence. However, the truth about man cannot be imposed on an individual existence by force, since it would destroy the person's freedom, the fundamental condition for a good life. Only if freely assumed, can truth guide a person towards her individual fulfillment. Yet it is important that the truth about man be remembered and referred to. This task is of particular value today, when certain intellectual currents of thought still question the existence of truth as such, and one is tempted to succumb to skepticism and to forsake the fundamental truths about man which provide the 'space' within which everyone is called to live their human lives.

Before we investigate more closely the vision of the family we can reconstruct on the basis of the wisdom and teaching of John Paul II, we shall stop for a moment to analyze the origins of the modern vision of man.

THE MODERN VISION OF MAN AND THE FAMILY

In a considerable part of modern political philosophy reflecting on the social life of man, the point of departure is the assumption that, rather than mutual support and friendship, there exist a primordial conflict and enmity among human beings. In ancient and medieval philosophy, the prevailing model of social life was that of 'cooperation': it was assumed that human beings are naturally oriented towards collaboration and only by way of joint effort can

[4] John Paul II, *Crossing the Threshold of Hope*, ed. Vittorio Messori (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005), 158.

they accomplish the potential inscribed in their nature. In that sense, Aristotle defined man as a social animal and called those who claimed to be able to live outside society "either beasts, or gods."[5] Drawing on man's natural inclination to social life, ancient and medieval philosophy described the institutions which enable man to exercise his social nature in the best way possible, that is, the family and the state.

Modern philosophy, by contrast, chooses as its point of departure a vision of primeval conflict (one needs to note that this choice was undoubtedly influenced by the experience of religious wars in Europe). Thomas Hobbes, the first theorist of the modern state, argues that the natural situation of man is that of "war of all men against all men"[6] (*bellum omnium in omnes*) and, therefore, the natural state in which human beings live is governed by the principle *homo homini lupus* (man to man is an arrant wolf).[7] Hobbes held that man is naturally selfish, focused on himself, and on the satisfaction of his needs and desires, which he accomplishes even at the expense of others, so it is only by force that he can be socialized. The original conflict can be contained only through a limitation of human freedom, which in its natural state is unlimited and can go as far as to take the life of another. It is here that we find the justification of the modern idea of the social contract. In the state of nature, no man can feel strong enough not to fear the abuse from others. Therefore, a certain limitation of originally unlimited freedom is advantageous for all: everyone gives up a part of their freedom (for instance, the option to kill or rob another) in order to create a space in which social life will become possible. The function of the state is, on the one hand, to ensure that such a limitation of freedom is effective rather than simulated, and, on the other, to threaten with sanctions those who might abuse the contract, taking advantage of the self-restraint of others without adopting the same attitude themselves. Incidentally, in Hobbes's vision of social life, enjoying rights is related to being a subject to force. And consequently, should one turn out stronger than others, one need not feel bound by any freedom-limiting laws. In other words, the sphere of justice established according to the principles put forward by Hobbes is artificial rather than natural and thus it is weak: it will suffice to think about the situation of an unborn child who has no force at her disposal to claim her rights and only for this reason remains outside the sphere of so conceived justice.

The idea of the original, primordial conflict can be found also in later philosophy, among others in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's master–slave

[5] A r i s t o t l e, *Politics*, 1253a29, trans. T. A. Sinclair (Penguin: Harmondsworth, 1986).

[6] Thomas H o b b e s, *De Cive: Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society*, ed. Howard Warrender (Oxford, New York and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1983), 49.

[7] See ibidem, 24.

dialectic,[8] in Karl Marx's theory of class struggle,[9] in Friedrich Nietzsche's concept of the "will to power,"[10] or in Jean-Paul Sartre's analysis of the 'dialectic of gaze,' famously captured in the phrase "Hell is—other people."[11] In our context, the latter vision is particularly eloquent. According to Sartre, a human being is affirmed as a subject by the power of her gaze: by means of looking at the world and giving the objects the meanings they have for her, a person makes the world *hers*. It is thanks to the ability of gazing at the world that a human being lives the life of a subject, while the other beings she encounters in the world (also non-human living beings) have merely the status of objects for her. In other words, since I can gaze at the world in such way, while the world is incapable of gazing at me, I can feel the master of my world. However, it is not true that it is only me gazing at the world: I am myself subject to other people's gaze. Other people also gaze at me. Sartre finds this fact extremely irritating, since it casts a doubt on human subjectivity. Why is that so? Because due to the sight of others directed at me, I find out that I am not the only master of the world. On the contrary, to another person, I may well be one of world's objects. In this way, every other person, due to her existence, deprives me of the experience of the unboundedness of my freedom. To Sartre, such is the main reason for atheism: God cannot exist, because should he exist, there would be someone there continuously gazing at me, thus making me an object (depriving me of my freedom and, consequently, of my subjectivity). It is not difficult to notice that, within Sartre's vision of human subjectivity, human relations are necessarily those of conflict. To assert my subjectivity, I have to somehow neutralize the gaze of others, because its very existence becomes unbearable to me. I can kill the other (as Cain did), but I can also reduce her to an object in my world, subjecting her to my plans and making her satisfy my needs. Using the Hegelian metaphor, one might say, 'In my world, I can make the other a slave.' On the grounds of such a vision of man also family relationships are perceived in terms of a struggle for self-affirmation which is accomplished by way of exploitation of others.

One cannot certainly deny that human freedom embraces a potential for aggression and that particular individuals frequently affirm their subjectivity at the cost of the subjectivity of others. In our daily lives we are all too often confronted with the 'face of Cain.' But perhaps it is worth posing ourselves the

[8] See Georg Friedrich Wilhelm H e g e l, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford, New York, Toronto and Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1977), 111–9.

[9] See Karl M a r x, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, ed. Friedrich Engels, vol. 1, *The Process of Production of Capital*, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2011).

[10] See Friedrich N i e t z s c h e, *Will to Power*, trans. Michael A. Scarpitti and R. Kevin Hill (London: Penguin, 2017).

[11] Jean Paul S a r t r e, *No Exit*, https://ia600700.us.archive.org/11/items/NoExit/NoExit.pdf.

question whether we can indeed truly say that the most fundamental relationship between human beings is that of a conflict. Is it true that the most original human experience is that of mutual animosity and alienation? It is not without a reason that I have mentioned the name of the biblical Cain. The opening chapters of the Book of Genesis describe with great realism a potential conflict between two persons which may have fatal consequences for either of them. The message of the Bible, however, is not that it is conflict that expresses the original truth about the human being, or the ultimate model for human relations. Rather, conflict is a result of the betrayal of the primordial truth. In the Book of Genesis, the story of Cain and Abel in fact follows that about the original sin, which resulted from an act of disobedience to God's original design for man. God's plan—which indeed expressed the original truth about man—can be seen in the original experience of the first human beings, Adam and Eve, before the fall.

In his theology of the body, expounded in a series of catecheses he gave in the early years of his pontificate, John Paul II included a profound philosophical and theological analysis of the original experience of the first human beings. The condition of Adam, who is initially alone (his 'original solitude'), shows, on the one hand, his position in relation to the rest of the creation (out of the entire creation, only he, Adam, is a person: a subject to whom all the non-human world is given as objects he can subdue). On the other hand, though, Adam's experience of original solitude is described in terms of discomfort: he needs someone with whom he might enter into an interpersonal relationship. Thus, the Creator says, "It is not good for the man to be alone" (Gn 2:18). And only with the creation of a woman is Adam capable of the fulfillment of his humanity; only now can he encounter a being with whom he can enter into a deep interpersonal relationship which today we call love and which is impossible in the case of non-personal beings.

One also needs to note that, according to the Bible, sexual difference is part of God's original design for man: "Man and woman he created them."[12] Interestingly, when Plato, in his exquisite dialogue on love, reflects on the origin of sexual difference, he says that the primeval man was round (the Greeks believed that the sphere was the most perfect shape), and it was only because Zeus wanted to humble men's pride that he cut them in two. As a result, each two parts originally belonging to each other seek to restore their lost unity, which explains why the man and the woman are attracted to each other.[13] While the Platonic myth is beautiful, one immediately notices how it differs

[12] See J o h n P a u l II, *Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body*, trans. Michael Waldstein (Boston, MA: Pauline Books, 2006).

[13] See P l a t o, "Symposium," in *The Dialogues of Plato*, trans. Benjamin Jowett, https://webs.ucm.es/info/diciex/gente/agf/plato/The_Dialogues_of_Plato_v0.1.pdf, 1655.

from the biblical account. In the Bible, sexual difference exists even before the fall of man and it is part of the 'original design' of God. In a sense one can say that sexual difference as such—the fact that a human being exists either as a male or as a female—is part of the Christian identity and one cannot think of Christianity without recognizing this difference. The first man was created in the image and likeness of God, but it was only after the creation of the second human being, the woman, that the two—together—became a representation of God, who—which we otherwise know from the Christian revelation—is not a solitary God, but the Triune One, the communion of the three divine Persons. Therefore, as noted by John Paul II, it is not in his solitude that the first man becomes the image and likeness of God; rather, it happens in his communion with the woman, when the two persons begin to exist for each other.

Thus, according to the biblical image of the human relations as they were 'in the beginning,' the original truth about man did not embrace conflict, but a mutual relationship between the man and the woman: a relationship in which both persons affirmed their humanity by a mutual gift of self rather than by subjecting the other to his or her will. This original experience still remains part of the one in which human beings share as a consequence of the first sin, however ambiguous—precisely due to the sin—a human life might turn out. Even human weakness and sinfulness cannot 'cancel' the original truth: the fact that man and woman have been created for each other.

A human being needs to belong to someone. Man and woman have been created free and they want to live their freedom in concrete situations of life. However, although freedom is a fundamental value, it is not the principal one. Freedom is given to men and women so that they can realize other values, including the greatest one among them, namely that of, love. In other words, only free beings are capable of love and human beings have been given freedom precisely because they can love. We encounter a paradox here: a person who loves is free and belongs to herself, but at the same time she wants to belong to another. Although modernity understands freedom primarily as autonomy and independence, it turns out that the experience of belonging to each other in love not only does not diminish one's freedom, but also turns out its best fulfillment. Perhaps the greatest misfortune one can experience is to feel one does not belong to anyone. John Paul II addressed the importance of love in his first encyclical *Redemptor Hominis*, where he said, "Man cannot live without love. He remains a being that is incomprehensible for himself, his life is senseless, if love is not revealed to him, if he does not encounter love, if he does not experience it and make it his own, if he does not participate intimately in it."[14]

[14] John Paul II, Encyclical Letter *Redemptor Hominis*, March 4, 1979 (Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1979), Section 10.

Now, marriage and family are a privileged space where one experiences participation and donation. The family is a community of the gift, because it is founded on the mutual gift of persons: the gift which is simultaneously the most fundamental principle of its existence. Through spousal love, man and woman in a certain sense redefine themselves by redefining their identity, and from now on neither of them can live without a reference to the other person, with whom they are bound by the bond of gift. Neither of them can say what they want without considering what their loved one wants. Karol Wojtyła developed that theme in his three-act play *The Jeweler's Shop*. In one of its scenes, Teresa, a young woman who is in love, reflects, as she is standing in front the window of a shoe-shop,

> I was looking for high-heeled shoes.
> There were many sports shoes,
> many comfortable walking shoes,
> but I was really straining my eyes
> for high-heeled shoes.
>
> Andrew is so much taller than I
> that I have to add a little to my height
> —and so I was thinking about Andrew,
> about Andrew and about myself.
> I was now constantly thinking about us two;
> he must surely think like this too—
> so he must rejoice at my thought.[15]

The thoughts that cross Teresa's mind reflect her experience of the presence of Andrew, which becomes the criterion of the decisions she takes, even the most banal ones, such as the choice of shoes to buy. The same idea was well explained by Rocco Buttiglione, a teacher of mine, who, in one of his lectures, said something like, 'When a friend of mine asks me whether I will accompany him in his trip to the mountains or to the seashore, I answer, "I do not know, first I need to know what my wife will think about it." I do not say this because I'm afraid to take the decision without her consent; rather, my love for my wife is greater than my love for the mountains, or for the sea, and I really do not know what I want without knowing what she wants.'

Thus, the experience of belonging to each other, which is characteristic of marriage, leads one to a discovery of the original meaning of freedom, which does not consist in doing whatever we might happen to wish to do in a particular situation (the kind of freedom we share with animals, which are free

[15] Karol W o j t y ł a, *The Jeweler's Shop: A Meditation on the Sacrament of Matrimony, Passing on Occasion into a Drama*, trans. Bogusław Taborski (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992), 32.

in that they follow their instincts), but in the ability to give ourselves, in love, completely to another person. In such a context, John Paul II would usually quote the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World *Gaudium et Spes* of the Second Vatican Council, which teaches, as follows:

> Indeed, the Lord Jesus, when He prayed to the Father, 'that all may be one ... as we are one' (John 17:21–22) opened up vistas closed to human reason, for He implied a certain likeness between the union of the divine Persons, and the unity of God's sons in truth and charity. This likeness reveals that man, who is the only creature on earth which God willed for itself, cannot fully find himself except through a sincere gift of himself.[16]

This ability—the ability to express the gift love—is already present in the body of the human person, who, says Cardinal. Angelo Scola, is created from the beginning as a "dual unity".[17] This fundamental truth has been inscribed in the constitution of the human body either as male or as female: man and woman have been created for each other. John Paul II beautifully says,

> The human body, with its sex—its masculinity and femininity—seen in the very mystery of creation, is not only a source of fruitfulness and of procreation, as in the whole natural order, but contains "from the beginning" the "spousal" attribute, that is, the power to express love: precisely that love in which the human person becomes a gift and—through this gift—fulfills the very meaning of his being and existence.[18]

Marriage creates a natural space for spousal love. However, neither modern anthropology nor modern social or political philosophy has given much attention to this experience. The main reference point for contemporary philosophical thought remains the human being seen as an individual who needs to be socialized, for which purpose a certain amount of violence is required. It is perhaps due to that focus that modernity has worked out the concept of freedom in which every other person is seen as a threat. Others are considered as competitors rather than collaborators in their exercise of freedom.

It is not surprising that, within such a vision of man and his freedom, human bonds, also the bond of marriage, become fragile. If one is interested primarily in the potential benefit the bond that ties a person to another might bring, the relationship is going to rest on the result of the calculation of its advantages and disadvantages. A constant evaluation serves as the yardstick

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[16] The Second Vatican Council, Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World *Gaudium et Spes*, Section 24, http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_const_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html.

[17] See Angelo S c o l a, *The Nuptial Mystery* (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2005), 11.

[18] J o h n P a u l II, *Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body*, 185−6.

of the judgment whether the bond is worth keeping. Appraisal of this kind actually needs to be made even before the relationship starts and, consequently, marriage is not considered in such cases as a stable union or one 'for life.' Rather, throughout its course, marriage is continually subject to assessment, which is to prove whether it pleases both parties. Should marriage not bring the expected satisfaction to either of them, there are no longer reasons for continuing it. This specific turn in the understanding of marriage has been aptly described by sociologists.[19]

Freedom conceived as independence from others necessarily implicates loneliness. Although Adam was initially alone, his solitude ultimately resulted in encountering Eve and in his communion with her: "The two of them become one body," says the Book of Genesis in 2:24. On the modern view, however, human beings can feel truly free provided they do not develop strong bonds with others. They certainly have relationships, yet ones not deep enough to touch and change the identities of the persons involved. As a result, the experiences that build up a human life in modernity turn out shallow, as if stopping at the 'surface' of things, and nothing, not even love, can help persons overcome their original solitude.

From the perspective of modernity and postmodernity (which is in its essence a continuation and radicalization of modernity) everything becomes *liquid*. The term, coined by Polish sociologist Zygmunt Bauman,[20] is used to describe the fact that, in contemporary reality, nothing is stable, everything is temporary, and there are no lasting points of support. In a liquid society also love and marriage become liquid. In the cultural climate in which everything is short-lived, one can hardly imagine a bond which might last 'forever.' Marriage is no more than a contract, and its terms, freely set by the two parties in question, can be terminated any time, should either of them consider the other is failing to meet its provisions.

REVOCABLE AND IRREVOCABLE RELATIONS

Robert Spaemann reminds us that, "there is an immense appeal in the idea that the union of a man and a woman is 'written in the stars,'"[21] and that it is intended to last throughout their lifetimes despite the inevitable transformations

[19] See Anthony Giddens, *The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love & Eroticism in Modern Societies* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992); Ulrich Beck, *The Normal Chaos of Love*, trans. Mark Ritter and Janet Wiebel (Oxford: Polity Press, 1995).

[20] See Zygmunt Bauman, *Liquid Modernity* (Oxford: Polity Press, 2000).

[21] Robert Spaemann, "Divorce and Remarriage," *First Things*, August 2014, https://www.firstthings.com/article/2014/08/divorce-and-remarriage.

it will undergo. Karol Wojtyła was well aware that human love is 'wounded' by sin and therefore needs a strong foundation. A poet's confession confirms this view. "Yet each man kills what he loves,"[22] wrote Oscar Wilde in his "Ballad of Reading Gaol." Indeed, with his merely human capacities, man is incapable of absolute, unambiguous love, even though he might sincerely wish it. Human love is necessarily marked by original sin, or, to use the language of theology, by concupiscence which has entered the human heart. Therefore human love needs to be once again made whole. However, this does not mean that human love, as it is, is not meant to be forever lasting; rather, its fragility should motivate the persons in question to seek support which will help them remain faithful to the vows they once made. The protagonists of the play *The Jeweller's Shop* are aware of this fact, and they reflect on their love, which has only just begun:

> How can it be done, Teresa,
> for you to stay in Andrew forever?
> How can it be done, Andrew,
> for you to stay in Teresa forever?
> Since man will not endure in man
> and man will not suffice.[23]

John Paul II teaches that the support human beings need is offered to them precisely in the sacrament of marriage, in which the mutual love of the man and the woman becomes united with divine love, which has never betrayed man and which, to show the human beings its irrevocability, chose to die on the cross. Through the sacrament of marriage, the newly wedded couple receives the grace of participation in this unconditional and definitive love, so that their mutual gift of self can also last forever in each other.

It is due to the mutual gift of self it implies that the spousal relationship may be described as unconditional and irrevocable. It embraces the 'common project for life' in which both the man and the woman participate on equal terms. Such a project not only encompasses the lives of the two of them, but transforms their existence into that of a 'community of life': their togetherness permeates their home, their parenthood, and their everyday problems.

Unlike the spousal bond, conditional and revocable relationships are not intended as 'projects for life' involving permanent engagement. They remain open to termination, should any of the conditions on which they rest not be

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[22] Oscar Wilde, "Ballad of Reading Gaol," https://www.bl.uk/collection-items/the-ballad-of-reading-gaol-by-oscar-wilde.

[23] Wojtyła, *The Jeweler's Shop: A Meditation on the Sacrament of Matrimony, Passing on Occasion into a Drama*, 41.

met. They are precarious in their nature, experienced as 'survival strategies,' and thus replaceable by more perfect ones.

In the an irrevocable relationship, the person is accepted in her entirety both in the synchronic sense (as she is now) and in the diachronic one (as she changes over time). This, however, is not tantamount to an uncritical acceptance of everything that the other is, and those who truly love their spouses want to help them follow their deepest vocation and, if necessary, overcome their shortcomings and vices. Contrary to popular belief, true love does not mean acceptance of everything the loved one does. Not even God loves us in such a way. But if God calls us to repent, it means that he does not want us to remain as we are now. He wants us to change our lives and our actions so that we can become more faithful to our human and Christian vocation. However, God remains faithful in his love for us in that he does not stop telling us, 'It is good that you exist.' In this sense, God's love for us is unconditional and irrevocable. And spousal love, which establishes an irrevocable relationship between the man and the woman, in some sense reflects this love of God.

In contrast to the marital bond, in a revocable relationship, the other is accepted 'under certain conditions,' rather than being affirmed in the totality of his or her being; what is affirmed is certain characteristics of the person which meet the desires and expectations of her partner.

The spousal relationship is public in the sense that husband and wife take responsibility for each other (as well as for their children) before the society. Marriage is a natural and privileged environment in which children are born and educated. There is no better alternative for the education and bringing up of children than the family in which both parents fulfill their respective roles. It is in the family that the children receive "the gift of humanity,"[24] as John Paul II put it.

As opposed to the 'revocable' relationships characteristic of modern times, generally perceived as 'private matters' and not expected to accept any responsibilities towards the society, marriage has a fundamental social role and needs to enjoy a special recognition by public authorities (*favor iuris*).

In the case of a spousal relationship, the freedom of the persons in it is accomplished through their 'mutual belonging to each other,' which, however, does not undermine the individual nature of either person, but offers each of them an opportunity to reach their full human potential, and the same is true about children reared in families. Being a husband, a wife, a son or a daughter in a family creates a profound relationship with its other members which cannot be simply cancelled. It is perhaps most evident in the case of the relation-

[24] John Paul II, Letter to Families *Gratissimam Sane*, February 2, 1994, (Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1994), Section 16.

ship between parents and their children: despite all the vicissitudes of life, one can never stop being a son or a daughter of one's parents. A relationship of a similar nature is established also between husband and wife, and since it defines their identity, it cannot simply expire. By contrast, in a revocable relationship the parties wish to preserve their respective 'autonomies' and, as a result, the bond between them does not really affect their identities, and is ultimately is considered as contingent.

At the base of the spousal relationship there is sexual difference and complementarity of the sexes. Therefore, in a spousal relationship, having children is natural and is not perceived in terms of a difficult choice: it comes as a consequence of the spouses' mutual gift of self which finds its 'incarnation' in every child they conceive. Although not every morally licit union of a man and a woman can be fruitful in this sense, the aspect of 'transcendence towards the third person' should not be a priori ruled out from it. In his book *Love and Responsibility*,[25] Karol Wojtyła observes that the awareness of the possibility of becoming a mother (or a father) is decisive for the way in which the sexual union is experienced and gives existential significance to the sexual act as such, which then involves the whole person, with his or her personal destiny. Being a mother or a father is a lifelong vocation and taking responsibility for the conception of a child is a mark of the greatness of spousal love. It also makes it possible for the husband and the wife to experience more deeply who they are. In the religious perspective, still another aspect of the marital union may be observed: transcendence towards the *third one* means at the same time transcendence towards the *Third One*, or the Creator, who is present whenever a new person is being called to life. One can metaphorically say that by the decision of God the union between a man and a woman has been chosen as a privileged space in the world to create new life. In his theology of the body John Paul II observes:

> When they unite with each other (in the conjugal act) so closely so as to become "one flesh," man and woman rediscover every time and in a special way the mystery of creation, thus returning to the union in humanity "flesh from my flesh and bone from my bones" that allows them to recognize each other reciprocally and to call each other by name, as they did the first time.[26]

It is worth analyzing what happens once the dimension of transcendence towards the third one is intentionally excluded from the sexual union. In his book *Eroticism*, Georges Bataille describes the erotic experience as it is ap-

[25] See Karol W o j t y ł a, *Love and Responsibility*, trans. H. T. Willetts (London and New York: William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd. and Farrar, Straus and Giroux Inc., 1981).

[26] J o h n P a u l II, *Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body*, 167.

pears on the grounds of the vision of man who is irreparably closed in himself. As Hume said, within such a vision, man is incapable of taking a step beyond himself and cannot overcome his solitude even in an erotic act. This means that even in the erotic act the person of the opposite sex is exploited and that this act involves a form of violence against the individuality of the other. Bataille writes:

> In essence, the domain of eroticism is the domain of violence, of violation…. What does physical eroticism signify if not a violation of the very being of its practitioners?—a violation bordering on death, bordering on murder? … On a lower level that this implied violence—a violence matched by the separate individual's sense of continuous violation—the world of habit and shared egotism begins, another mode of discontinuity, in fact.[27]

It is striking that Bataille does not refer in his analysis of the erotic act to its transcendent dimension, which we have described as the 'transcendence towards the third one.' It is perhaps due to this absence that, in Bataille's interpretation, the erotic act is incapable of fulfilling its promise and does not result in a true unity between the man and the woman. Instead, it manifests their dual selfishness. Although they reach out towards the other, they remain separate, living through their respective 'discontinuities.' In the case of a nuptial relation, as seen by John Paul II, the transcendence towards the third one, which provides the ultimate horizon of an erotic act, makes the man and the woman open themselves up to the gift of life which sums up their existence and is received in the child: the third one.

In this way, the spousal relationship, based on the irrevocable gift of self and open to the gift of life, can become a record of the history of the couple in question. Their shared history is built upon their common identity, impossible in the case of a revocable relationship, which can at best remain an important, albeit not decisive, event in the biographies of the persons who experience it. An irrevocable relationship embraces the whole person and owing to its solemn nature the couple can live through the drama of existence *and* taste the true flavor of life. A revocable relationship, instead, in its contingency does not 'touch' the person or change her deepest self, because the other is ultimately replaceable. While an irrevocable relationship is dramatic, a revocable one remains 'banal': it stops at the surface of things and makes it impossible for the persons involved to discover a deeper meaning of their lives.

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[27] Georges B a t a i l l e, *Erotism: Death and Sensuality*, trans. Mary Dalwood (San Francisco: City Light Books, 1986), 16−8.

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What is the future of the family? Social sciences teach us that family forms change over time. We have witnessed, for instance, the decline of the multi-generational family and its transition to the nuclear one, as well as the decline of the patriarchal family. The fact itself that the patterns of the family change does not yet tell us whether we are dealing with its progress or regression. In Western culture, we have definitely observed changes for better, such as the change of the once diminished position of the woman, or of the relationship between parents and children. There is, however, a 'horizon,' within which all the transformations of the family take place and should they go beyond this horizon, the essence of the marriage and the family as such will be changed. This 'essence' has been defined by sociologist Pierpaolo Donati as the 'genome of the family.'[28] Therefore, the basis of the family is the bond between the man and the woman, who—at least such is their intention—want to go beyond themselves by becoming parents. The family can only fulfill its social function if it remains what it is by its nature, that is, the communion of persons open to the conception of a new life, based on the principle of the irrevocable gift of self. And such is the teaching that the Pope of the family has left us.

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ABSTRACT / ABSTRAKT

Jarosław MERECKI, Modernity and the Family, as seen in the Light of the Teaching of St. John Paul II

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Modern philosophy of man has assumed that the original human condition is that of conflict and has made this presumption its starting point. Consequently, it proposes that the originally unbounded freedom of human individuals be limited by means of a social contract. John Paul II juxtaposes this vision of man and society with his teaching on the community, in which the starting point is the relationship between a man and a woman who confirm their humanity by means of an unselfish gift of self to the other, rather than by subordinating the other to his or her will. Marriage and the family represent the type of community which is governed by the principle of gift. While the ways of understanding marriage and the family change throughout history, one can speak of an array of their original qualities which make up their essence as social institutions regardless of the historical period. Among them are: gift, reciprocity, sexuality, and parenthood. Together, they may be considered as a specific 'genome' of marriage and the family.

Keywords: family, person, community, relationship, love

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Jarosław MERECKI, Nowoczesność i rodzina w świetle nauczania św. Jana Pawła II

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Nowożytna filozofia człowieka za swój punkt wyjścia przyjęła ideę konfliktu między jednostkami, których pierwotnie nieograniczona wolność zostaje ograniczona poprzez kontrakt społeczny. Tej filozofii Jan Paweł II przeciwstawia wizję człowieka, której punktem wyjścia jest relacja mężczyzna–kobieta, gdzie dwie osoby potwierdzają swoje człowieczeństwo nie poprzez poddanie drugiej osoby własnej woli, ale poprzez dar z siebie, który składają sobie nawzajem. Małżeństwo i rodzina są rodzajem wspólnoty, której wewnętrzną zasadą istnienia jest zasada daru. Sposoby rozumienia małżeństwa i rodziny zmieniają się w dziejach. Istnieje jednak podstawowy i istotny zbiór cech, które należą do istoty tych instytucji społecznych. Są to: dar, wzajemność, płciowość i rodzicielstwo, które stanowią swego rodzaju genom małżeństwa i rodziny.

Słowa kluczowe: rodzina, osoba, wspólnota, relacja, miłość

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THINKING ABOUT THE FATHERLAND...

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Adam FITAS

MILESTONES IN POLISH CULTURAL AWARENESS

Reflecting on the Polish heritage, I have decided to choose five monuments of art which may be considered as icons representing the complex socio-cultural realities in the history of Poland from the 10th to the 20th centuries. Appealing to the viewer via his or her sense perception, those artifacts might provide—if accompanied with a competent commentary—a visual key to the vicissitudes of Polish history and culture, frequently incomprehensible to those who approach them from outside.

The title of this paper has been inspired by the article "Kamienie milowe polskiej świadomości historycznej"[1] [Milestones of Polish Cultural Consciousness] written by Janusz Tazbir thirty years ago. Tazbir, an excellent historian and expert in early Polish culture, mentions twelve most important documents which are believed by him to have shaped Polish national identity, and in particular the historical awareness of the Polish people: (1) "Tractatus de potestate papae et imperatoris respectu infidelium"[2] by Paweł Włodkowic, written at the beginning of the 15th century, (2) *Annales seu Cronicae incliti Regni Poloniae*[3] by Jan Długosz, (3) the Act of the Union of Lublin[4] (1569), (4) the General Confederation of Warsaw[5] (1573), (5) *Żywoty świętych*[6] [The Lives of Saints]

[1] See Janusz T a z b i r, "Kamienie milowe polskiej świadomości historycznej," in Janusz Tazbir, *Pisma wybrane*, vol. 4, *Studia nad kulturą staropolską* (Kraków: Universitas, 2001), 321–40. The paper first appeared in the weekly *Polityka* in 1988. In his article, Tazbir referred to another work which aimed to present breakthrough events in the history of the world. In the opening sentence of his paper, the Polish historian confesses, "I came up with the idea of this article after reading Friedrich Heer's *Die grossen Dokumente der Weltgechichte*, prepared in cooperation with Xaver Schnieperer (Frankfurt am Main: Wolfgand Krüger, 1978), and comprising an analysis of thirty items, from the Code of Hammurabi to the drawings carried by the Pioneer 10 space probe launched in March 1972." T a z b i r, "Kamienie milowe polskiej świadomości historycznej," 321. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.

[2] See Paweł W ł o d k o w i c, "Tractatus de potestate papae et imperatoris respectu infidelium," in *Starodawne prawa polskiego pomniki*, vol. 5, pt. 1, ed. Michał Bobrzyński (Kraków: Sumptibus Academiae Litterarum, 1878), 161–85, 186–94.

[3] See *Ioannis Dlugossii Annales seu Cronicae incliti Regni Poloniae* (Varsaviae: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1997), https://polona.pl/item/ioannis-dlugossi-annales-seu-cronicae-incliti-regni-poloniae-lib-10-11-1404-1412,MzczMTU2OTQ/8/#info:metadata.

[4] See *Unia Lubelska, 1 lipca 1569* (Warszawa: Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, 2017), http://agad.gov.pl/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/unia-2C.pdf.

[5] See "Konfederacja generalna warszawska, 28 stycznia 1573 r.," in Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, https://agad.gov.pl/?page_id=968.

[6] See Piotr S k a r g a, *Żywoty świętych Starego i Nowego Zakonu* (Kraków: Z drukarniey Andrzeya Piotrkowczyka, 1598), https://polona.pl/item/zywoty-swietych-starego-y-nowego-zakonu-na-kazdy-dzien-przez-caly-rok-wybrane-z-powaznych,NDA1ODQ1Mzg/1/#info:metadata.

Figure 1. The Gniezno Doors.
Photograph by Tomasz Fedor.
Source: Wikimedia Commons

Figure 2. The Gniezno Doors, detail.
Photograph by Tomasz Fedor.
Source: Wikimedia Commons

Figure 3. The Chapel of the Holy Trinity at the Lublin Castle.
Photograph by Hans A. Rosbach.
Source: Wikimedia Commons

Figure 4. Jan Matejko, *Rejtan: Upadek Polski* [Rejtan, or The Fall of Poland], 1866, oil paint on canvas.
Photograph by Maciej Szczepańczyk.
Location: The Royal Castle in Warsaw—Museum
Source: Wikimedia Commons
Public Domain

Figure 5. Andrzej Wróblewski, *Rozstrzelanie VI* [Execution VI], 1949, oil paint on canvas.
Location: Private collection

Figure 6. Replicas of the poster *W samo południe 4 czerwca 1989* [High Noon, June 4th, 1989] by Tomasz Sarnecki.
Photograph by Wistula.
Source: Wikimedia Commons

by Piotr Skarga, (6) the Constitution of May 3[7] (1791), (7) "Dąbrowski Mazurka,"[8] (8) *Pan Tadeusz, czyli ostatni zajazd na Litwie*[9] [*Pan Tadeusz, or The Last Foray in Lithuania*[10]] by Adam Mickiewicz (1834), (9) *Księgi narodu polskiego i pielgrzymstwa polskiego*[11] [The Books of the Polish Nation and its Pilgrimage] by Adam Mickiewicz (1832), (10) Henryk Sienkiewicz's trilogy (*Ogniem i mieczem*[12] [*With Fire and Sword*[13]], *Potop*[14] [*The Deluge*[15]], and *Pan Wołodyjowski*[16] [*Pan Michael*[17]], (11) *Wesele*[18] [*The Wedding*[19]] by Stanisław Wyspiański, (12) *Kamienie na szaniec*[20] [*Stones for the Rampart*[21]] by Aleksander Kamiński.

I shall not discuss the appositeness of Tazbir's choice of texts despite the fact that already after my first reading of his article I was astonished by the gaps

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[7] See "Konstytucja 3 maja," in Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych, https://agad.gov.pl/?page_id=1675.

[8] See *Polish National Anthem: Jeszcze Polska nie zgnięła* (n.p.: Atlantis Publishing, 1943), https://polona.pl/item/polish-national-anthem-jeszcze-polska-nie-zginela,ODAyMTA3Mjk/0/#info:metadata.

[9] See Adam M i c k i e w i c z, *Pan Tadeusz, czyli ostatni zajazd na Litwie*, vols. 1 and 2 (Paryż: A. Pinard, 1834), https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k133014k/f9.image.

[10] See Adam M i c k i e w i c z, *Pan Tadeusz, or the Last Foray in Lithuania*, trans. George Rapall Noyes (London, Toronto, Paris, and New York: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., J. M. Dent et Fils, and E.P. Dutton & Co., 1917), https://www.gutenberg.org/files/28240/28240-h/28240-h.html.

[11] See Adam M i c k i e w i c z, *Księgi narodu i pielgrzymstwa polskiego* (Paryż: A. Pinard, 1832), https://polona.pl/item/ksiegi-narodu-polskiego-i-pielgrzymstwa-polskiego,Nzc4MDE1OTc/12/#info:metadata.

[12] See Henryk S i e n k i e w i c z, *Ogniem i mieczem*, vols. 1 and 2 (Warszawa: Gebethner i Wolff, 1889), https://polona.pl/item/ogniem-i-mieczem-powiesc-z-lat-dawnych-t-1,NTgxODE1NDg/6/#info:metadata, https://polona.pl/item/ogniem-i-mieczem-powiesc-z-lat-dawnych-t-2,NTgxODE1NDk/6/#info:metadata.

[13] See Henryk S i e n k i e w i c z, *With Fire and Sword: An Historical Novel of Poland and Russia*, trans. Jeremiah Curtin (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1898), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=hvd.hw2l2j&view=1up&seq=.

[14] See Henryk S i e n k i e w i c z, *Potop* (Warszawa: Fundacja Nowoczesna Polska, 2016), https://polona.pl/item/potop,NzA2NjEyNDM/0/#info:metadata.

[15] See Henryk S i e n k i e w i c z, *The Deluge: An Historical Novel of Poland, Sweden, and Russia*, trans. Jeremiah Curtin (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1915), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015027661977&view=1up&seq=11.

[16] See Henryk S i e n k i e w i c z, *Pan Wołodyjowski* (Warszawa: PIW, 1987).

[17] See Henryk S i e n k i e w i c z, *Pan Michael: An Historical Novel of Poland, the Ukraine, and Turkey*, trans. Jeremiah Curtin (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1893), https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=hvd.32044094975463&view=1up&seq=11.

[18] See Stanisław W y s p i a ń s k i, *Wesele: Dramat w 3 aktach* (Kraków: Drukarnia Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 1901), https://polona.pl/item/wesele-dramat-w-3-aktach,NTc1MDEw/4/#info:metadata.

[19] See Stanisław W y s p i a ń s k i, *The Wedding*, trans. Noel Clark (London: Oberon Books, 1998).

[20] See Aleksander K a m i ń s k i, *Kamienie na szaniec* (Warszawa: Komisja Propagandy Biura Informacji i Propagandy Komendy Głównej AK, 1943).

[21] See Aleksander K a m i ń s k i, *Stones for the Ramparts: The Story of Two Lads in the Polish Underground Movement*, trans. Artur Horowicz (Łódź: Marron Edition, 2007).

in his catalog, especially by the absence of works representing the early and the recent periods in the Polish history. Tazbir's analysis starts with a treatise composed at the beginning of the 15th century and ends with a novel issued during World War II, as if Polish historical awareness began to develop only during the Jagiellonian period and ceased to develop in 1945. Without a doubt, it would be possible to supplement the cited list with *Gesta principium Polonorum* (*The Deeds of the Princes of the Poles*)[22] by Gallus Anonymus or "Bogurodzica,"[23] created during the reign of the Piast dynasty, or with the list of the twenty one demands of the 1980 Inter-Factory Strike Committee.[24] Moreover, the 'first part' of Tazbir's catalog comprises mainly historical documents, while its 'second part' includes only literary works. Naturally, it is a meaningful asymmetry, as it suggests the division of the history of Poland into the period of independence (the First Polish Republic, 1569–1795) and the time of 'enslavement' (Partitions, 1772–1795, and World War II); however, Tazbir is not consistent in his choices, as the underlying concept of historical awareness he fosters seems to be frequently replaced by that of mythological consciousness. Finally, all the 'milestones' he indicates are verbal in their nature, thus remaining to a large extent inaccessible to the global public (particularly nowadays, when image and visualization are broadly used as a starting point for further historical exploration).

As I have just mentioned, my objective is not to discuss the cited list, but to compile a slightly different catalog. While Tazbir emphasized the historical and literary awareness of the inhabitants of the Polish Republic, my intention is to focus on broadly understood Polish cultural identity. So, I propose to juxtapose events, works of art, and historical figures, each of them related to a respective breakthrough in the history of Polish culture.

However, I shall attempt to go even further. My intention is to include in my list items with the greatest possible potential for communication, i.e., texts of culture which, like lenses, would bring to focus the most important qualities and cultural issues characteristic of a given period of history. Reflecting on the

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[22] See G a l l u s A n o n y m u s, *Gesta principium Polonorum*: *The Deeds of the Princes of the Poles*, trans. Paul W. Knoll and Frank Schaer (Budapest and New York: Central European University, 2003).

[23] See *Bogurodzica*, https://polona.pl/item/bogurodzica,Njg5MDU1MDE/1/#info:metadata.

[24] See "21 postulatów z 17 sierpnia 1980 roku," Komisja Krajowa NSZZ Solidarność, http://www.solidarnosc.org.pl/21-postulatow. See also: "Twenty-One Demands, Gdańsk, August 1980: The Birth of the Solidarity Trades Union—A Massive Social Movement," UNESCO, Memory of the World, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-information/memory-of-the-world/register/full-list-of-registered-heritage/registered-heritage-page-8/twenty-one-demands-gdansk-august-1980-the-birth-of-the-solidarity-trades-union-a-massive-social-movement/.

As Tazbir's paper was first published in the 1980s, he was unable to include the latter document: the regime's censorship was still strict at the time.

Polish heritage, I have decided to choose five monuments of art which may be considered as icons representing the complex socio-cultural realities in the history of Poland from the 10th to the 20th centuries. It is not by accident that I have selected those iconic works: through their visual expressiveness they appear predestined for the task to which I have assigned them. Besides, being easier to comprehend than strictly verbal texts, the works in question might exert a much greater influence and be appreciated in a wide range of cultural contexts. Appealing to the viewer via his or her sense perception, those artifacts might provide—if accompanied with a competent commentary—a visual key to the vicissitudes of Polish history and culture, frequently incomprehensible to those who approach them from outside. In the successive sections of the paper, I shall propose my catalog of the milestones of Polish cultural awareness, or (if I may use an even more solemn expression) a 'Pentateuch' of Polish culture.

THE GNIEZNO DOORS

Along with the oldest Polish poem "Bogurodzica," the Gniezno Doors (figures 1 and 2) might be regarded, for a variety of reasons, as a powerful symbol of the nascent Polish state.

Firstly, the Gniezno Doors were made in the second half of the 12th century, but the imagery employed by their decorators refers to the beginnings of the Polish state in the 10th century and expresses the commitment to the Christian religion adopted by Mieszko I in AD 966 (in fact, the baptism of Mieszko was tantamount to the creation of the First Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth). Between the 9th and 11th centuries, the concept of Christianity and Europe became inseparable in the central and eastern parts of the European continent. The new Christian countries adopted either the Western rite (Hungary, Bohemia, Poland), or the Eastern one (Rus). The Gniezno Doors point directly to the authority of Rome, and thus the newly formed Polish state may be regarded as subject to a dominant influence of Western civilization (i.e., occidentalization), the second, Eastern, or Byzantine, root of Christian culture[25] being never entirely abandoned. Therefore one can say without any exaggeration that the Gniezno Doors combine, in an exceptionally expressive fashion, the fundamental semantics of the door as an object symbolizing a passageway and transition from one space to another with additional, symbolic meanings: the Gniezno Doors are also suggestive of legends penetrating into the historical reality, tribal communities turning

[25] For an extensive study of this subject see Jerzy K ł o c z o w s k i, *Młodsza Europa: Europa Środkowo-Wschodnia w cywilizacji chrześcijańskiej średniowiecza* (Warszawa: PIW, 2003).

into civilized states, and pagan beliefs replaced by Christianity. It is therefore not by accident that in the 17th-century descriptions of canonical visitations (and probably much earlier), the Gniezno Doors were called *Porta Regia*[26]: the Royal Door.

Secondly, the Gniezno Doors are a monument to the cult of St. Adalbert, bishop of Prague, who has been regarded by most Polish historians as the first evangelizer of the pagan Prussia. His activity was cited as a vivid example of how Western Christianity had been introduced to Poland via Bohemia. The canonization of St. Adalbert in AD 999 precedes by only a year the pilgrimage undertaken by emperor Otto III to the Holy Sepulcher, the erection of the Gniezno archbishopric, and the announcement of the coronation of Bolesław I the Brave (the coronation took place a quarter of a century later and sealed the independence and high status of the Polish state). The Czech context would prove to be significant also in the next decades, particularly in the 11th century, when the young metropolis was invaded by the Czech prince Brzetysław, and the Gniezno cathedral was stripped of St. Adalbert's relics. It was only during the reign of Casimir I the Restorer that the temple was risen from the ruins and, in AD 1090, the translation of the relics to Gniezno took place. In other words, the Czech context, invoked by the life and martyrdom of St. Adalbert, provided the keystone of the difficult process of growth and consolidation of the Polish state during the first two centuries of its existence.

Thirdly, the Gniezno Doors combine the local (characteristic of the 12th-century young, developing state) manner of representing landscape and human figures with the universal cultural codes of the Christian Middle Ages. A monumental collection of scholarly studies published in the 1950s[27] makes the reader aware of the fact that the Gniezno Doors, a masterpiece of the Romanesque bas-relief, drawing on the art of Flemish masters, may be considered as a visual counterpart of Dante's *Divine Comedy* and thus as a synthesis of the medieval vision of the world and man. The extensive studies by Aleksander Gieysztor,[28] Jad-

[26] That Latin name of the Gniezno Doors was used in the title of a most interesting album presenting the monument in detail; the publication contains color photographs of the individual quarters of the doors. See Adam B u j a k and Adam S. L a b u d a, *Porta regia: Drzwi Gnieźnieńskie* (Gniezno: Fundacja Świętego Wojciecha, 1998).

[27] See *Drzwi Gnieźnieńskie*: *Praca zbiorowa*, ed. Michał Walicki, vol. 1 (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1956); *Drzwi Gnieźnieńskie*: *Praca zbiorowa*, ed. Michał Walicki, vol. 2 (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1959).

[28] See Aleksander G i e y s z t o r, *Drzwi Gnieźnieńskie jako wyraz polskiej świadomości narodowościowej XII wieku*, in *Drzwi Gnieźnieńskie*, vol. 1, 1–19.

wiga Karwasińska,[29] Marian Morelowski,[30] Lech Kalinowski,[31] and Zdzisław Kępiński,[32] comprised in the mentioned publication, as well as the captivating essays (on the religious motifs present in the imagery of the doors) by Janusz Stanisław Pasierb[33] and (on the architectural motifs) by Adam Labuda,[34] indicate how remarkable—ideologically and artistically—the masterpiece in question is. Not only are the Gniezno Doors a powerful icon of Polish culture, but they may also serve as an excellent visual introduction to the culture of the entire European continent. Like a bronze-cast book, they reveal the deepest axiological roots of Europe: the Graeco-Roman antiquity and Christianity. A great variety of mythical and biblical motifs and symbols are woven into the multithreaded epic narratives told both in the centrally located panels and in the decorative frieze which runs around the visual chronicle of the life of St. Adalbert. In its time, the *Porta Regia* played the role of a *Biblia Pauperum* and, should we deliver it from its purgatory-like existence of a museum piece, it may serve a similar function today. Being an icon of the first centuries of the Polish state, the Gniezno Doors take us back to our beginnings and enable a fresh insight into our history.

THE CHAPEL OF THE HOLY TRINITY AT THE LUBLIN CASTLE

The Polish-Lithuanian Unions of the late 14th and the early 15th centuries (the Union of Krewo of 1385 and the Union of Horodło of 1413) were the most important events which initiated the long process of the formation of a new state organism: an immense country with a great ethnic diversity. To the valleys, mountains, and uplands, vast areas of steppe and taiga were added. The Poles, Germans, and Jews who had until then populated the country were joined by Lithuanians, as well as by a large number of Ruthenians, the protoplasts of the inhabitants of today's Belarus and Ukraine. A significant eastward expansion of the country resulted also in an increased religious diversity: the population of the First Polish Republic comprised, along with Roman Catholics, also

[29] See Jadwiga K a r w a s i ń s k a, *Drzwi Gnieźnieńskie a rozwój legendy o biskupie Wojciechu*, in *Drzwi Gnieźnieńskie*, vol. 1, 20–41.

[30] See Marian M o r e l o w s k i, *Drzwi Gnieźnieńskie, ich związek ze sztuką obcą a problem rodzimości*, in *Drzwi Gnieźnieńskie*, vol. 1, 42–100.

[31] See Lech K a l i n o w s k i, *Treści ideowe i artystyczne Drzwi Gnieźnieńskich*, in *Drzwi Gnieźnieńskie*, vol. 2, 7–160.

[32] See Zdzisław K ę p i ń s k i, *Symbolika Drzwi Gnieźnieńskich*, in *Drzwi Gnieźnieńskie*, vol. 2, 161–384.

[33] See Janusz Stanisław P a s i e r b, "Próba syntezy treści ideowych Drzwi Gnieźnieńskich," *Biuletyn Historii Sztuki* 30 (1968): 240–2.

[34] See Adam L a b u d a, *Introduction*, in *Porta regia*, 18–24.

a large proportion of the Orthodox Church members, as well as adherents of Islam and other religions.

The 14th-century Chapel of the Holy Trinity (figure 3) may help visualize the process of the integration of that new country, which, since the 1569 Union of Lublin, was called the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The chapel belongs among Europe's best-preserved monuments and combines the achievements of Western architecture (the Gothic temple) with the Byzantine painting style, which makes it unique.[35] The artistic 'union' in question accomplished in the chapel was made possible by king Władysław II Jagiełło, who unified the lands of the Polish Crown with those of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Jagiełło was an admirer of Byzantine painting and commissioned decoration of royal chambers and numerous temples in Poland, among others in Sandomierz, Wiślica, and Cracow, as well as in the Holy Cross Mountain Monastery. Some of those works, e.g., in the Chapel of the Birth of the Holy Virgin Mary (or St. Mary's Chapel) at the Wawel Castle, are being discovered only now.[36]

The decoration of the Holy Trinity Chapel by a team of Ruthenian painters led by Master Andrey was completed in 1418, i.e., at the time of the consolidation of the Polish-Lithuanian alliance after the Battle of Grunwald and progressing integration of the Polish Republic. The image of Poland as a vast multinational state (spanning, at the time of its greatest territorial prosperity, from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea) in which the nobility played a particularly important cultural and political role was for centuries the main component of Polish identity. Not only was that image kept alive until the 18th-century partitions of Poland, but (as the 19th century poems: Mickiewicz's *Pan Tadeusz* and Wincenty Pol's *Pieśń o ziemi naszej*[37] [The Song of Our Land], testify) it survived until 1918, when the independence of Poland was restored. The nobility, which was developing into the most important political entity in the 15th century, would later become the only 'moving spirit' of the Commonwealth; in fact, until the 18th century, the specific system of 'nobles' democracy' was the main factor unifying that large and varied community of nations and religions.

[35] For more information on the Chapel of the Holy Trinity, see a monumental album by Anna R ó ż y c k a B r y z e k, *Freski bizantyńsko-ruskie fundacji Jagiełły w kaplicy Zamku Lubelskiego* (Lublin: Muzeum Lubelskie, 2000).

[36] Małgorzata Smorąg-Różycka reported new findings concerning this subject-matter in her paper "Byzantine Paintings in the Jagiellonian Poland: New Research Perspectives" presented at the LXVI Conference of the Association of Art Historians *Sztuka pogranicz*y, Lublin, November 16, 2017.

[37] See Wincenty P o l, *Pieśń o ziemi naszej* (Lwów: Wydawnictwo Macierzy Polskiej, 1891), https://www.wbc.poznan.pl/dlibra/show-content/publication/edition/109750?id=109750.

Today, we are almost certain that the Chapel of the Holy Trinity was born out of Jagiełło's fascination with Eastern art rather than from the king's wish to affirm the union between Poland and Lithuania.[38] However, by revealing the complexity of the entirely new culture created by that historical act, the chapel may be regarded as a symbolic icon of the Polish history of the 15th and the 16th centuries.[39] Perhaps, contemplating the Byzantine frescos in the context of Gothic architecture might help understand the words, so puzzling to international readers, written by Mickiewicz in Polish, "Litwo! Ojczyzno moja!"[40] ("Lithuania, my country"[41]). Therefore, as a means to synthetically represent the history of Poland, I would choose the interior of the Chapel of the Holy Trinity, emerging as the second (after the Gniezno Doors) milestone in Polish cultural awareness.

"REJTAN, OR THE FALL OF POLAND" BY JAN MATEJKO

Completed in 1866 as an expression of the painter's experiences following the suppression of the January Insurrection, *Rejtan: Upadek Polski* [Rejtan, or the Fall of Poland] (figure 4) by Jan Matejko provides, in my opinion, a perfect summary of the history of Poland from 1772 (the year of its First Partition) to 1918 (the year when Poland regained its independence).

Incidentally, through his paintings, from *Zaprowadzenie chrześcijaństwa R.P. 965* [Introduction of Christianity to Poland, AD 965] to *Polonia. Rok 1863* [Polonia: Year 1863] (his only work devoted to the theme of Poland after the Partitions), Matejko seems to be teaching us an intensive course in Polish history. The latter work shows three female figures which are allegories of Poland, Russia, and Lithuania and reveal the painter's rootedness in the same cultural awareness which had been the symbolic source of the Chapel of the Holy Trinity.

It is also worth noting that *Rejtan* may be interpreted as part of Matejko's series of paintings addressing the fall of Poland [42] (*Stańczyk* of 1862, *Kazanie Skargi* [Skarga's Sermon] of 1864, and *Polonia* of 1864, were all created prior to *Rejtan*).

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[38] The issue was also discussed in the cited presentation by Smorąg-Różycka.

[39] For an introduction to the topic, as seen from the perspective of the history of Polish literature, see Władysław P a n a s *Literatura polska w perspektywie Rzeczypospolitej wielu narodów*, "Roczniki Humanistyczne" 55, no. 1 (2007): 216–26.

[40] M i c k i e w i c z, *Pan Tadeusz, czyli ostatni zajazd na Litwie*, vol. 1, 7.

[41] M i c k i e w i c z, *Pan Tadeusz, or the Last Foray in Lithuania.*

[42] See *Matejko: Obrazy olejne: Katalog*, ed. by Krystyna Sroczyńska (Warszawa: Instytut Sztuki PAN, 1993), 80.

At first glance, the choice of *Rejtan* as another milestone of Polish cultural awareness appears problematic. The controversy which broke out shortly after the painting had been completed and the criticism it received from Matejko's countrymen and from art critics, despite its success with the audience at the Paris International Exhibition of 1867, are universally known.[43] It has also been admitted that the work is confusing and literally brims with historical inaccuracies. Numerous works on Matejko cite the story told by Stanisław Tarnowski who, while attending the Paris Exhibition, had overheard an intriguing explanation of the painting, "The one lying on the ground has lost heavily at cards, which is what those scattered ducats hint at, and he is about to blow his brains out, while those three standing over him are trying to persuade him not to despair at such trifles."[44]

And yet I believe that as a synthesis and allegory of the experience of the Partitions and of Polish martyrdom, *Rejtan, or The Fall of Poland* finds no equals. While the first part of the title (the name of the deputy who was regarded as the patron saint of the insurrectionary acts during the 123 years of captivity) is a symbol of disagreement and resistance, the second (frequently forgotten) part of the title emphasizes the condition of the Polish state: its descent to the underworld, as it were, but not its total collapse. The fact that Poland was not completely lost, so well reflected in Dąbrowski's *Mazurka*, was also expressed in Matejko's painting, in a figure of a young man with a four-cornered cap (*rogatywka*) and a saber in his hands. The figure may be interpreted as that of a harbinger of the experience of the Polish nation, which, although deprived of its state, would survive through its culture: the experience which Bohdan Cywiński compared to a perseverant telling of our national 'tale' of sovereignty.[45]

Thus, Matejko's painting—if supplied with necessary commentary—conveys a condensed vision: not one of the cause of the fall of the First Polish Republic, but rather that of its entirely new destiny in the coming century. Matejko, who is known to have supported the January Insurrection by delivering weapons to the insurgents, was acutely aware that the new future was approaching. *Rejtan*, painted after the Insurrection had been crashed, was so explained by the artist:

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[43] On the reception of the painting by the critics and the general public in Paris, see Marek Z g ó r n i a k, *Matejko w Paryżu*: *Opinie krytyków francuskich z lat 1865-1870* (Kraków: Instytut Historii Sztuki Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 1998), 153–82.

[44] Quoted after Z g ó r n i a k, *Matejko w Paryżu*, 172.

[45] See Bohdan C y w i ń s k i, *Baśń niepodległa, czyli w stronę politologii kultury: Wykłady witebskie* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Trio, 2006).

> The man on the ground, vibrant with the fire of enthusiasm and the pain of despair, ready for sacrifice up to the point of martyrdom—symbolizes the nation, that is Poland, thrown to the ground with brutal force, treachery, bribery, rape, and pillage, but not defeated. *Rejtan* is a historical symbol … The Nation-Rejtan will endure, like he did in the *Sejm* [Parliament] chamber, stubbornly, forever, until the mad idea of the homeland without a land of its own had taken root; the Nation will last as lasts the memory of Rejtan's virtue and Rejtan's love.[46]

Interestingly enough, *Rejtan* belongs among the most characteristic and most popular paintings by Jan Matejko, its relevance having been recognized in a variety of later political contexts.[47]

"EXECUTION VI" BY ANDRZEJ WRÓBLEWSKI

Another work I have chosen as a milestone of Polish cultural awareness is, in fact, located within the same paradigm as Matejko's *Rejtan*. Described by Maria Janion as the romantic model, it emerged with the Partitions of Poland and ended with its regaining full independence in 1989.[48] Upon Janion's view, the twenty years of freedom of the Second Polish Republic, between 1918 and 1939, are but a mere episode: perhaps not unimportant, yet not meaningful enough to permanently change Polish national consciousness shaped during the time of 'captivity.'

The work I have in mind is the famous series of paintings entitled *Rozstrzelania* [Executions] by Andrzej Wróblewski. However, I shall not focus on the most frequently discussed *Rosztrzelanie surrealistyczne* (or *Rozstrzelanie VIII*) [The Surrealist Execution], but on the one, posthumously entitled *Rozstrzelanie VI* [Execution VI] (figure 5), which differs from the others in the series in that it shows not only the victim, but also the executioner.

In fact, the whole *oeuvre* of Andrzej Wróblewski, an extraordinary artist who prematurely died at the age of thirty, might be regarded as a guide to the history of both the Second Polish Republic and the People's Republic of Poland. His early works, created before *Rozstrzelania*, include references to the 20th-century avant-garde movement and to surrealism, some of his later paintings are

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[46] Quoted after Maria S z y p o w s k a, *Jan Matejko wszystkim znany* (Poznań: Zysk i S-ka Wydawnictwo, 2016), 148.

[47] For more information on this subject, see Ewa Ch o j e c k a, "Jana Matejki 'Rejtan' – powrót czy pożegnanie?" *Alma Mater*, no. 3 (2002), http://web.archive.org/web/20100527193501/http://www3.uj.edu.pl/alma/alma/45/01/13.html.

[48] See Maria J a n i o n, "Zmierzch paradygmatu," in Maria Janion, *"Czy będziesz wiedział, co przeżyłeś"* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sic!, 1996), 5–23. The essay was written between 1990 and 1992.

connected to socialist realism, while others bear witness to the objectification of human beings, portraying them as defective and reduced to mere flesh.[49]

The work I have selected, *Rozstrzelanie VI*, painted (like others in the cycle) within a short period of time, in the first half of 1949, is remarkable for its power of expression, metaphor and symbol, although art historians associate it with Wróblewski's return to realism and the so-called photographic painting. Regardless of any detailed aesthetic analyses, however, the painting may be viewed as both a universal study of death (with the horrible harvest it reaped in the 20th century) and a symbol of tragic local history (with the almost total extermination of Jews and the death of millions of Poles). The actual extermination of a large part of the community which had lived in Central and Eastern Europe for centuries resulted in a radical change in that community's cultural awareness. Auschwitz and Kołyma, i.e., the German and the Soviet extermination camps, will remain universally comprehensible symbols of that time; from our Polish perspective, such symbols include the Warsaw Uprising and the Katyń Massacre, the latter representing a 'decapitation' of the Polish nation. The disintegration of man caused by an anonymous tormentor (the executioner in Wróblewski's painting does not have any features clearly indicating either type of totalitarianism) may be interpreted as a symbolic representation of the fate which awaited the new political entity Poland became after 1945.

The symbolism of *Rozstrzelanie VI* is even more powerful should one extend the narrative constructed in the picture to include more recent history. In fact, executions in Poland did not cease; instead, they continued taking place in woods or in prison basements. The deadly shots resounding in Poznań, Gdańsk, and Silesia bore witness to the fate of the nation which, 'chained' to communist ideology under the Soviet occupation, was still deprived of sovereignty. By depicting, in his late works, human figures as 'chaired,' petrified, or maimed, not only does Wróblewski grasp the condition of people afflicted by war, but he also portrays the 'Soviet man,' dramatically transformed (like the

[49] See Dorota J a r e c k a, "Sztuka przedstawiania zła: O 'Rozstrzelaniach' Andrzeja Wróblewskiego," in *Figury i figuracje: Materiały LIV ogólnopolskiej sesji naukowej Stowarzyszenia Historyków Sztuki, Lublin 20-22 października 2005*, ed. Małgorzata Kitowska-Łysiak, Ryszard Kasperowicz, Marcin Lachowski, and Lechosław Lameński (Warszawa, Stowarzyszenie Historyków Sztuki, 2006), 273–86. Jarecka writes in depth about the rootedness of Wróblewski's *Executions* in the past, referring back to Goya or Manet, as well as to Dante's *Divine Comedy* and to ancient art; she also discusses the ways in which Wróblewski anticipated the aesthetics of the future. See also Marcin L a c h o w s k i, "'Rozstrzelania' *Andrzeja Wróblewskiego* – 'socjalizacja' *śmierci*", in *Figury i figuracje*, 239–53; Joanna K o r d j a k - P i o t r o w s k a, "Przekształcenia: Obraz człowieka w twórczości Andrzeja Wróblewskiego (1955-1957)", in *Figury i figuracje*, 255–72. For more on *Rozstrzelanie VI*, see interesting remarks in *Andrzej Wróblewski nieznany*, ed. Jan Michalski (Kraków: Galeria Zderzak, 1993), 50–7.

hollow men in the poem by T. S. Eliot[50]) by the reality in which he happened to exist. It is not by coincidence that the commentators of Wróblewski's works juxtapose his *oeuvre* with that of other great Polish symbolists of his time: Tadeusz Kantor and Tadeusz Różewicz.

"HIGH NOON" BY TOMASZ SARNECKI

The decline of the romantic-symbolic paradigm, became apparent in Poland in the years following 1989, in the period of the so-called political transformation (the term is not entirely out of use today). Having been involved, as a fresh high school graduate, in the campaign supporting the first partly free democratic elections of June 4th, 1989, I remember that historical moment well. One can perhaps describe it as the final act—as if the last 'cavalry charge'—in some ways connected to the myth of Romanticism, or 'Wallenrodism,' and to political engagement expressed in underground activities, reading of samizdats, and long conversations until the small hours of the morning.

The famous election campaign poster *W samo południe 4 czerwca 1989* [High Noon, June 4th, 1989] (figure 6) by Tomasz Sarnecki (deceased in 2018, then a student of the Warsaw Academy of Fine Arts) seemed to me a particularly iconic picture of that time, and I was certainly not alone in perceiving it as a symbol of how Polish culture would change after 1989. The poster featured Gary Cooper, popular also in Poland for his leading part in the eponymous American Western film of the early 1950s. The walking figure of the actor was altered only slightly: Sarnecki placed the emblem of Solidarity over the sheriff's badge and changed the revolver in his hand into a ballot. On the one hand, the image defined good and evil in an unprecedented way, pointing to the need for protecting the state from 'bandits' and for supporting democracy; on the other hand, it signaled the beginning of a new cultural paradigm. With the advent of democracy, the opening of the borders and of the society, we were gradually abandoning our romantic myth and embarking on a path towards an Americanized version of popular Western culture, waking up, at the same time, to a new reality and recognizing the necessity to both rediscover our identity and create it anew. By choosing a well-known actor playing in a cult movie—and not, for instance, Lech Wałęsa or John Paul II—Sarnecki anticipated the future in which our enemy would no longer be defined clearly; instead, we would have to grapple with various elusive forms of neocolonialism. As Janion correctly diagnosed, what happened after 1989 was "internationalization of

[50] Thomas Stearns E l i o t, "The Hollow Men," http://aduni.org/~heather/occs/honors/Poem.htm.

culture on a previously unknown scale, but not at the level of—symbolically speaking—'Thomas Mann,' but at that of a western, an illustrated magazine, and rock-and-roll."[51]

Has Polish culture been able to cope with the new situation? It is not for me to answer this question, but I believe that we still remain within the paradigm opened before us by the poster with Gary Cooper walking towards us.

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[51] Maria J a n i o n, *Beethoven i Casino de Paris*, in Janion, *"Czy będziesz wiedział, co przeżyłeś,"* 25.

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ABSTRACT / ABSTRAKT

Adam FITAS, Milestones in Polish Cultural Awareness
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Referring to Janusz Tazbir's article on the milestones of Polish historical awareness, published thirty years ago, the author offers a novel perspective on the most important monuments of the history of Poland. The works described in the

paper include: the Gniezno Door, the Chapel of the Holy Trinity at the Lublin Castle, the paintings: *Rejtan. Upadek Polski* [Rejtan, or the Fall of Poland] by Jan Matejko, and *Rozstrzelania VI* [Execution VI] by Andrzej Wróblewski, as well as *W samo południe 4 czerwca 1989* [High Noon, June 4th, 1989], a poster by Tomasz Sarnecki. Each of these iconic masterpieces may be considered as making a breakthrough in the history of Polish culture. Due to their visual nature, the artifacts in question are more accessible to international public than works of purely verbal character and might be effectively used to present and discuss Polish cultural identity.

Keywords: Polish culture, Polish history, masterpiece, cultural identity

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Adam FITAS, Kamienie milowe polskiej świadomości kulturowej
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Nawiązując do opublikowanego przed trzydziestu laty artykułu Janusza Tazbira „Kamienie milowe polskiej świadomości historycznej," autor przedstawia nowe spojrzenie na najważniejsze dla dziejów Polski zabytki. W artykule omówiono pięć takich kluczowych tekstów kultury: Drzwi Gnieźnieńskie, kaplicę św. Trójcy na Zamku Lubelskim, obrazy *Rejtan. Upadek Polski* Jana Matejki i *Rozstrzelania VI* Andrzeja Wróblewskiego oraz plakat *W samo południe 4 czerwca 1989* Tomasza Sarneckiego. Te ikoniczne arcydzieła można uznać za przełomowe dla naszej świadomości kulturowej. Dzięki swemu wizualnemu charakterowi są one bardziej przystępne dla międzynarodowego odbiorcy niż dokumenty czysto werbalne i można je skutecznie wykorzystywać w prezentowaniu polskiej tożsamości kulturowej i debacie nad nią.

Słowa kluczowe: kultura polska, historia Polski, arcydzieło, tożsamość kulturowa

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Andrzej JAROSZYŃSKI

THINKING ABOUT THE FATHERLAND...
Confession of a Diplomat

A diplomat is expected to be an obedient civil servant rather than a patriot. A government employs its representatives abroad principally not because they love (or declare to love) their mother country, but because they are committed to serve it regardless of their sentiments. The tension between the public and the private within diplomatic duties should be as invisible as a foreign servant's religion or political preferences. A diplomat's task is to understand, to assimilate, and to persuade the Other, whether an opponent, a partner or a rival.

What I am going to write about is personal by experience, subjective by opinion and independent of political bias. It is an essay pretending only to touch on the topic which it cannot exhaustingly examine.

My *patria*—motherland, fatherland, and homeland combined—had been somewhat schizophrenic prior to 1989, as most of my generation's experiences had been. I sincerely detested the Polish People's Republic as a political and ideological system governed by aliens and for alien purposes. In fact, I almost felt like a foreigner in my own country. Moreover, my university studies in English language and literature added to my sense of living in 'non-splendid' isolation. However, as an individual and a private person, I did cherish my own personal little Poland. First, it was rather an imagined Poland, saved mainly from bits of the family history. Second, it was the reality fed by Radio Free Europe, contemporary Western literature and arts, and, on top of these, a reality marked by attachment to the Catholic Church. This was the 'country' I argued with and often ridiculed, but still cherished much more than I accepted or recognized the surrounding, real and unreal, socialist state. Characteristically, I quarreled and argued with pre-war Poland and her heritage more than I seriously studied Marx or was curious about the tenets of communism, which I regarded as almost barbaric, but certainly as boring. Interestingly, one of the most powerful arguments in rejecting communism was its cheapness, shabbiness, or simply ugliness. I certainly shared many of the above opinions with my generation and was influenced by leaders of the democratic opposition. The values we shared were reclaiming national history and culture, drawing on the Christian tradition, and embracing Polish Romanticism. Moreover, we distrusted revolution and political parties, and opted for nonviolent conflict resolution and pluralism.

Out of the many gurus I had, one name must be mentioned as far as the shaping of my love and hate for the fatherland was concerned. I am thinking

about Witold Gombrowicz. He said that the more you are yourself, the more you will express your nationality, in contrast to the majority of Poles, who wanted to be Polish rather than human beings and, thus, lost their spiritual independence. As a 'citizen of the world,' Gombrowicz constantly wrote about his homeland as 'the living essence of man rather that a blot on the map.' My own Poland was a sort of inner, illegal country of the mind in an outer, legal People's Poland.

I earnestly never thought about leaving my country and becoming an émigré. Partly, because I had never suffered brutal oppression, partly because I never desired material success or comfort. Moreover, I was so deeply submerged in the Polish reality that I could not imagine reinventing myself as a self-made man in the West.

Last but not least, my fatherland did not appear just as a country. It was a duty that hurts but is for life. It also provided the basis for my self-judgment, the possibility of which I would have lost, had I decided to emigrate.

The Solidarity movement had been the first opportunity for me to 'open up' my private Poland so that I could merge with and serve in the official, public arena. Then, when offered a post of consul right after the breakdown of the regime in 1990, I accepted my new engagement both as a civic duty and as a personal opportunity, with no need for membership of any party. I did not learn much about my new profession from the old cadre, so I had to find out about things by doing them, and that process was an adventure in itself. From then on, my *patria* became my fatherland: the official, political state structure and neither a private nor an abstract nation. In other words, it was neither my love for my country, together with its place in world politics, nor the national identity, but predominantly matters of State, conceived as a unit of analysis and activities in world affairs, which became the daily reality for me in my new job of a diplomat.

However, a diplomat is expected to be an obedient civil servant rather than a patriot. A government employs its representatives abroad principally not because they love (or declare to love) their mother country, but because they are committed to serve it regardless of their sentiments, 'being careful in conduct and unimpeachable in character.' The tension between the public and the private within diplomatic duties should be as invisible as a foreign servant's religion or political preferences. A diplomat works for his country through a government. A diplomat's task is to understand, to assimilate, and to persuade the Other, whether an opponent, a partner or a rival.

Fortunately, in the early 1990s, new Polish diplomats in America received generous, much as calculated, assistance and were welcomed with a general expectation of the success of Poland. In America, one could feel the difference between success driven patriotism and the failure driven one, the latter being historically the Polish variety.

It has been said that power without diplomacy is blind, but it is equally true that diplomacy without power is impotent. That is why, Polish diplomacy did not join in the proverbial aversion to the use of power which is characteristic of Western European states. The priority of Polish foreign policy was membership of NATO. I felt that contributing to the first Polish international success, that is, our membership of NATO, was worth minimizing my previous private 'mental country' with its intellectual passions and fascinations. Likewise, the new agenda was also worth neglecting the old wounds and divisions from the socialist era. In all fairness, it must be said that most diplomats coming from the old regime clearly demonstrated the shallowness of their previous communist belief, as well as enormous ability to 'change colors,' in some cases with good will and for the good of the country. I sometimes had the feeling that had we known how superficial and opportunistic our former oppressors' loyalties were, perhaps less harm and fewer misfortunes would have occurred on our side. If patriotism is understood as an integrating element, the glue that binds different groups in achieving an extraordinary, historic target to provide lasting security to the whole country, then, all of us, new and old diplomats, joined in that endeavor.

In 1990, my first mission took me to Chicago, the greatest community of Poles and Polish Americans in the USA.

The cooperation and confrontation with Poles living in the US opened my eyes to two things. Firstly, it showed the workings of the traditional Polish motto, "God, Honour, Fatherland," when put into practice in a free society. Secondly, I was dealing with a community and its institutions not governed by influential elites.

The idea of mandatory use of the Polish language in the universal, common Catholic Church outside Poland seemed to be driven not by religion but by our national needs. One would have expected that, at least abroad, Polish Catholics would become more catholic than at home. The word 'honor' sounds noble, but in America it is somewhat old-fashioned and bizarre. Their idea of fatherland, in turn, or rather one of the mother country, seen in a frozen image—imagined rather than real and collectivist rather than individual—made me recall similar preferences of some of my countrymen at home.

However, the issue the new Polish foreign service in the USA found most urgent was the inability of the Polish ethnic groups to gain visibility or create an effective political lobby. To me, it was illuminating to find out that living in a free and democratic country does not automatically translate into success or influence. The anti-elitist and anti-intellectual attitudes of the Polish diaspora combined with our well known national fault of factiousness, and, above all, with the absence of leadership or funds, which also functioned as a warning against the problems Poland might encounter while adopting democracy as

a model for institutions and for the people. The narrative of 'the Poles staying apart' even without communism imposed on them by an external political power was clearly observable in the case of the Polish communities in America, as well as in other countries, where I served later. Part of my consular mission in Chicago was to persuade my Polish-American partners to take advantage of the American institutions and of the opportunities provided for the American ethnic groups.

Needless to add, in my missions in America, Norway, and Australia, I had to deal with two diverse and internally divided generations of the Polish diaspora, in other words, the older Polish community and the more recent arrivals. The above-mentioned image of Polish Americans, Norwegians, or Australians as being politically invisible, socially mute, and financially needy was true about the traditional, organized, and institutionalized diaspora. Some of its 'ethno-representative' and 'culture preserving' organizations acted with hopes of re-creating a pre-war Poland, while others tried to work out a substitute for the Polish life. Deeply religious and conservative as far the social issues were concerned, they distanced themselves from more secular, integrative and cosmopolitan new arrivals living in metropolitan areas. The traditional organizations, however, though withering away, are still more powerful and politically cohesive than loosely integrated groups of Polish pro-multicultural liberal democrats. However, while there are some individual exceptions, neither group participates actively or successfully in their new homeland's political, social, or economic mainstream.

Polish communities are rarely complained of, except for having unpronounceable names. At the same time, they are not regarded as supporting or threatening the stability or prosperity of the host countries.

The relations between the new Polish diplomatic service and Polish communities abroad can serve as a good illustration of the tribulations and challenges both sides faced. Very soon it became clear that the Polish diaspora was not able to supply significant financial or political aid to help Poland in its 'return' to the West. Neither were the traditional Polish institutions abroad recognized at home as instrumental in the process of modernization, which by nature meant rejecting or neglecting the traditional life style. Although the successive Polish governments recognized the autonomy of Polish organizations abroad and supplied thousands of medals and distinctions to veterans and political refugees, their hopes were focused upon the newly assimilated and successful professionals. However, those individuals, independent and free from collective national or family obligations, treated their engagement primarily as a business or transactional policy. One way or another, a majority of Polish diplomats, among them their bosses in Warsaw, looked reluctantly, if not grudgingly, on the possibilities of achieving a desired cooperation with

the Polish diaspora, and most of them did their best not to become involved in any such cooperation. No wonder then that the current establishment in Poland is regarded by a majority of expatriates as their own. No wonder, too, that the expectations towards the patriotic diaspora are very high nowadays, since, generally speaking, its members are considered as part of the Polish nation.

Another area which has been controversial and in fact unsuccessfully managed by the post-communist Polish diplomacy is promotion of culture as a tool in foreign relations. In the case of a middle-size country which is not a world power and whose recognition dependents on its alliances with the powerful, an international image, supported by distinct national branding in culture, is one of the few tools diplomacy can use. Paradoxically, it was the late Cold War period that happened to be that of the golden era of the visibility and recognition of Polish culture. Polish music, film, literature, and theatre of the period were innovative and experimental in form, as well as unique in tackling the relationship between man, history, and politics, using local references to express universal messages. Obviously, those accomplishments could not be promoted by the old regime, partly because they were politically inappropriate, and partly because they opposed the regime.

With the decline of arts and the rise of globalization with its mass culture, the post-1989 Poland tried to catch up with the Western trends by imitating and following them. Poland became less and less 'Polish' and no longer cultivated its living myths or symbols, neither did it foster the specific national brands. The culture of the new capitalist Poland was neither innovative nor experimental; rather, it became mediocre. Paradoxically, after 1989, it tended to blindly follow the 'fashionable' West, unlike it had done in the past, when it demonstrated artistic creativity far from the dictates of social realism or the propaganda of the state. Consequently, the promotion of the Polish post-1989 culture has been tantamount to the promotion of artists from Poland or those born in Poland. Incidentally, one cannot help the observation that the Poles who gained worldwide recognition in the past, or those who still enjoy it, were mostly émigrés or immigrants, such af Tadeusz Kościuszko, Frederic Chopin, Joseph Conrad, Czesław Miłosz, or Roman Polański, to enumerate just a few. At any rate, without significant accomplishments in the realm of popular culture, or particular novelties in an elite area, it is increasingly difficult to use culture as a tool of diplomacy with the purpose of establishing the image of a country as modern, dynamic and marketable. Needless to add, as it is the case with the problems concerning the Polish diaspora, few diplomats only strive to promote Polish culture seriously and ambitiously, considering such actions as a step in their own careers.

I must confess that my attitude to those problems was perhaps not very typical. I had previously met many Polish émigrés in the United Kingdom and

in the United States, as well as lectured for many students with a Polish background, so their gains and pains were familiar to me. Likewise, my English studies and the courses I taught in comparative literature shaped my interest in Polish as well as world culture.

I felt especially at home in the company of veterans and political refugees—members of Polish pre-war intelligentsia—from the generation of my parents. They were politically marginal but socially interesting as story-tellers, ironic observers, and above all people with class (at least most of them). They seemed to have put their war dramas and the loss of their country behind them and rarely cherished their Polishness in an openly patriotic way, let alone for the sake of keeping up the appearances. My peers, expatriates from Poland, were even more private in their display of patriotism. However, I must admit that—like many of my countrymen—I would react emotionally whenever I met a person from my hometown, and gave additional credit to anyone (foreign partners of mine) who happened to know anything about the city.

My diplomatic service was based on the traditional understanding of diplomacy, which I conceived as the tool of foreign policy performed by government institutions. However, I also witnessed two other types of diplomacy emerge: (1) public diplomacy and (2) supranational and transnational diplomacy. Both are connected to the changing role and image of the nation and the state.

Public diplomacy exercises influence through communication with the general public within another nation rather than by attempting to influence the other nation's government directly. Broadly speaking, it aims at communication with the foreign public in order to establish a dialogue designed to inform as well as to influence. At the center of our efforts were universities and think-tanks, as well as the mass media. Technological advancements and the advent of digital diplomacy now allow instant communication with foreign public. Facebook and Twitter diplomacy are increasingly used by world leaders and diplomats. In such cases, diplomacy usually resembles international communication and dialogues, a kind of hybrid activity expressing global changes. In the past, it was a sense of glory and glamour, as well as a long and turbulent history, that provided reasons for the national pride and served as a powerful, however soft, tools of power in diplomacy. Today, the prestige of a country is corollary of its public safety, welfare, and infrastructural wonders. Countries and nations assume the role of facilities providing material goods, security and pleasures. Moreover, diplomatic targets and their implementation are now more transparent and a country's diplomacy is made accountable to the domestic voters, in particular when foreign policy is treated as secondary to domestic objectives.

An activity related to public diplomacy is the practice of branding a nation, involving the promotion of its image abroad. Branding guru Wally Olins was

hired in 2003 to market Poland abroad effectively in a national branding programme. According to studies he carried out together with his team, perceptions of Poland in Western Europe were hazy, confused, and rather negative. Poland was seen as poor, grey, boring, and inhabited by peasants. In the background, there were images of Solidarity, Pope John Paul II, anti-semitism, Chopin, and war time heroism. Eventually one core idea, that of *creative tension*, emerged, based on the dualities and inner contradictions of the Polish character. Mr. Olins explained that *Poland is part of the West and also understands the East; Polish people are passionate and idealistic, and also practical and resourceful; the Polish character is ambitious and also down to earth.* Fortunately, the project was stopped, then abandoned, and now is hardly remembered.

As a matter of fact, Poland appeared to be a success story especially due to her smooth economic and financial transformation in the 1990s. My American partners even joked that Europe was turned upside down because the Frenchmen now spoke English, Germans became pacifists, and Poles turned to business. During my mission in Oslo, the mass media there pointed out to Poland's membership of the European Union as an example of enormous progress only to be envied by Norwegians. In Australia, in turn, the public was astonished to find out that Poland was among the few countries, including of course Australia, to avoid the global financial crisis. At the same time, the successive Polish governments were unable to build on those achievements, just as they failed to build a new positive and lasting branding around Poland's heroes John Paul II and Lech Wałęsa.

The inefficiency of Polish diplomacy in the field of international public relations can be best seen in the handling of the problem of the "Polish death/concentration camps" misnomer, which distorts history and offends Poles both at home and aboard. The Campaign Against "Polish Camps" conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which began in 2004, has reduced the use of this false phrase, occurring world-wide, but then opened up an international discussion on the Polish complicity in the German atrocities of the Second World War.

Curiously, one of the most successful nation branding efforts was that of the 'Polish plumber,' who 'came into life' in 2004 in France. Before the European Constitution referendum of May 2005, heated debates started in France about the newly joined countries. The 'Polish plumber,' a persona created by French anti-constitution campaigners, emerged as a low-wage worker from a new member state who threatened the jobs of French workers. Poland reacted with a most creative campaign to improve the image of Poles and Poland in France, though: instead of competing with the French working class for a job, a Polish plumber invited all French citizens to visit Poland. The campaign in question was an instance of the new diplomacy which used an attractive

and distinctive visual figure appealing both to the senses and to the emotions, while having the least to do with the Polish national image. What worked was a publicity trick radically different from the unsuccessful intellectual ideas, such as those proposed earlier by Olins. Popularizing Poland as a commercial commodity was hardly acceptable to diplomats, though, who regarded their job as a craft. It was all right to promote Polish affairs in different communities and to use culture as a diplomatic tool, but to pass the objective of national branding to market operators seemed to be short-lived, superficial, and of no political duration.

Another challenging phenomenon which has recently appeared in the world of diplomacy is its supranational conception, developed mainly within the European Union as The European External Action Service, formally launched on December 1, 2010. A European Union diplomat neither represents a state, nor is an international civil officer working for an international organization, such as, for instance, the United Nations. Rather, he or she represents the entire European Union abroad, protects and promotes its interests, as well as carries out negotiations on its behalf. A diplomat representing the European Union is not, or rather must not, be governed by national interests. The position of a European diplomat, however, is similar to that of a state one, that is, he or she has privileges and immunities. Some believe that there will be an ever-increasing role for the Corps of Brussels diplomats, as the staff of the European Union take over seats previously occupied by representatives of national foreign offices.

While serving as the Polish ambassador in Canberra, Australia, I had a chance to work with the EU Delegation (in other words, EU Embassy) headed by the ambassador. Specific challenges could already be seen in the formal way of avoiding the names "embassy" and "ambassador" so as not to equal the EU status with that of a Member State. Furthermore, the head of a European Union delegation bears the nationality of one of the European Union Member States, also represented in the same corps by a national diplomatic mission. Prudence and courtesy are therefore crucial. The head of the European Union delegation to Canberra was particularly sensitive during our meetings to represent the good of the entire European Union. He tried very hard to promote its visibility in Australia, which was taken there as another European experiment hardly interfering with the bilateral relations with specific European states

It is important to note that today also another category of diplomacy, the so-called transnational diplomacy, is on the rise. A transnational diplomat represents non-governmental organisations, international corporations or can be an "ambassador of good will" (this role is usually assumed by celebrities) acting on behalf of the UNICEF, UNESCO or other UN institutions. Such

diplomats do not have a diplomatic status, but perform important diplomatic tasks dealing with representation, negotiations, and public promotion.

While discussing the rise of supranational diplomacy one needs to have in mind that it was the Holy See that first introduced this kind of representation. In this respect, the Vatican—as much as royal courts and trading posts—was instrumental in creating modern diplomacy. It is worth remembering, though, that the criterion the Holy See has always used while sending its nuncios and missionaries to their posts, as well as while sponsoring scholars, was not that of their nationality, but of their competences and loyalty to the common good of the Church.

According to some observers, the existence of supranational and transnational diplomacy, accompanied by dynamic multinational relations, is obvious evidence of the decline of the importance of the state and the nation in international relations. Particularly the nation—just like the family or religion—ceases to be considered as a natural, God-given, and everlasting environment of a human being. The concept of nation is regarded now as a product of history, human imagination, and formal culture (sustained by means of schooling and state churches). As a result, patriotism has lost its position as part of high, or even mass culture, and is slowly declining in public education and discourse. The question of national identity, or patriotism, is perceived as a realm of individual choices and experience, and often manifested nowadays only in cuisine and language. On the other hand, though, patriotism conceived as devotion and commitment to one's mother country is welcome and used by governments, both at home and overseas, for their own purposes.

The idea of a nation seems to be outdated today and gives way to those of federation, alliance, or a super state, consequently leading to cosmopolitanism. Particularly within the European project, there have been attempts at reducing (and later abolishing) states as separate political units, as well as nationhood as an element of political considerations and practice. The postwar Europe has already turned from nationalism to pooled sovereignty. The ideal is promotion of cosmopolitanism together with multiculturalism, environmental protection, human rights, secular values, and transgender equality. The slogan calling for no borders, no religion, and no private property as the guarantee of global peace and happiness is well known from John Lennon's song *Imagine.* Diplomats, no doubt, enjoy the tune but they realize that once Lennon's dreams about a world without borders and with a brotherhood of men and women come true, none of them will be needed any longer. However, the social and political life seems to constantly confirm that the need for, or obsession with, identity and national interests will never die down.

One of the ways to oppose the tendency towards cosmopolitanism is adopting the so-called populist orientation, which is gaining importance in recent

times. One view of the mass support for populism is that it is driven by the economic insecurity perspective. The other, which, I believe, focuses on a more decisive factor, points to 'the cultural backlash.' It explains the support for populist politicians as a return of once-predominant sectors of the population to the tradition. The populist attitude questions such values as cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism, secularization, and transgender culture. It opts for a national sovereignty and advocates self-interest of the nation, putting it above that of international organizations and cooperation. Populist discourse emphasizes the nation as the key integrating element in the society and, consequently, promotes the nation's historical heritage and distinctness. Populists claim to represent 'the real people,' or 'the silent majority.' Populism is essentially anti-pluralist, which contradicts the norm of coexistence—'live and let live'—on which both democracy and diplomacy rest. Populist leaders are mistrustful of the elites, as well as of the establishment and of the experts, diplomats being frequently included in the latter category.

After joining the European Union, Poland tried to combine the liberal democratic trend in politics with the protection of the nation's security, simultaneously making an effort to catch up, in the economic and social senses, with Western European countries. Modernization, almost synonymous with Europeanization, was considered as the most essential task. Connected with it was a general desire to return to normalcy, to become a well-governed, prosperous, and law-abiding country rather than a permanent trouble-maker, a romantic warrior, or an over-ambitious actor disliked by others, in particular by the neighbors.

As for the main strategic aims of Polish foreign policy, which dictates the objectives of diplomacy, Russia is traditionally viewed as a potential existential threat, and thus military security plays a key role. Challenges of a non-military nature (e.g., migration, the climate change, and terrorism) are not as important in the case of Poland as they are in many other European countries. Despite the transformations after 1989 (the collapse of the bipolar division and the growth of non-state entities), the dominant category in the realm of security is that of the neorealist paradigm, in which the main actors in international relations are states which seek classical security (i.e., survival, inviolability of borders, and territorial integrity).

Thus, and rightly so, Poland is seen as the most pro-Western, pro-American, and anti-Russian state among the former Warsaw Pact members. Joining NATO and the European Union was the crowning accomplishment of Polish foreign policy. The dual enlargement offered Poland a space in Europe (i.e., the European Union) where it could continue to engage with America (in NATO), while providing an institutional and normative framework for the process of modernization. Recently, however, Poland's pro-European, or more precisely, pro-European Union position has been questioned.

Russian aggression in Ukraine has posed and is still posing the most serious test for Polish and European security since the end of the Cold War. The current Polish government, seeking more American presence on the Polish soil and more American equipment in the Polish armed forces, counts on the US–Polish compatibility of threat assessment and hopes for a military action of the USA in Poland and Central Europe, should such a need occur.

The present Polish government—in office since 2015—has in fact continued the post-1989 strategic aims to avoid the 'grey zone' of uncertainty by anchoring the country permanently in the Western security system (i.e., in NATO and in the EU) and by a closer partnership with the USA. The attention to the relations with Russia and the support for Ukraine also remain unchanged. However, newcomers—as I call the current government—have introduced some reorientations. Their slogan, "we're rising from our knees," was not only symbolic but of a qualitative nature. Foreign policy started to be treated as secondary to the domestic objectives of a radical rebuilding of the state and society. Skepticism towards the future of European integration, as well as ignoring the previous 'Europeanization' paradigm, seems to be the most important change of attitude.

The European Union is seen as a causal factor of mass migration, or as fundamentally unaccountable in its policy regarding migration and terrorism. It is also treated as a 'Napoleon without teeth,' that is, as providing neither hard power capabilities nor a sound common foreign and defence policy. In addition, the European Union is accused of political correctness, not naming the real threats or enemies, and of being guided by deep-rooted pacifist attitudes resulting in a non-confrontational policy.

The skepticism towards the European Union not only comes from the Polish government's assessment of the actual situation, but is built on some ideological assumptions, such as the priority of a nation over a community and the disapproval of liberal democracy as the dominant socio-cultural model. According to this paradigm, nation is not seen primarily as a political entity (in the sense of a community of citizens), rather, it is considered in terms of its historical tradition and cultural unity. The role of the state is then to define and pursue the national interests.

In my diplomatic roles, I was spared balancing and choosing between the liberal (cosmopolitan) model and the populist (nationalist) orientation. However, as Adam Zamoyski maintains, "The principal difference between two competing parties lies in their outlook and sense of Polish nationhood. The Civic Platform party tends to be uncomfortable with Poland's past and aspire above all to be 'good Europeans' with a cosmopolitan mindset. The victorious Law and Justice party attracts people who cannot forget the wrongs of World War II, people who find the idea of the secular, liberal Western world

too challenging and seek comfort in a sort of provincialism that wraps itself in religious and patriotic slogans."[1]

However, while handling this issue diplomats must have in mind the essential fact that although they are primarily public servants of their own governments, they are also obliged to look beyond their direct service and try to contribute to building an international order based on cooperation, as well as on respect for the law and the human rights. They also need to contribute to the political culture promoting integration rather than confrontation in foreign relations. Moreover, diplomats cannot perform their function in contradiction to their own idea of the fatherland.

No doubt that for those like myself, who joined the diplomatic corps in their mid-life period and under specific historical circumstances, it was very difficult to accept many inconveniences on a scale unknown before, in my case in academic life, with which my career had been connected. The challenges in question consisted, above all, in using people, culture, and ideas as diplomatic tools; in the need to accept a superficial style of life, devoid of friendships and non-targeted contacts, and—last but not least—in conventionality in both the savoir vivre with its confines and the use of a 'diplomatic lie,' often called a professional lie. The latter resulted from a convention, an informal agreement necessary to be able to conduct the art of diplomacy.

However, while serving as a diplomat, I rarely felt that my 'private image of the fatherland' collided or rebelled against the public one I was to serve. I never regretted that, this way or another, I had to give priority to loyalty over admiration or nostalgia. For, to be a diplomat, one agrees to treat his or her political and personal preferences as private, unless they directly oppose the aims and ways of the government's program one serves. Understood personally rather than politically, Polishness is not about one's birthplace, but about one's self-awareness which never leaves the person, wherever they might travel. It is an attribute of our deep individual identity and helps us understand ourselves in dialogue, or in confrontation, with the Other without the fear of getting lost.

Maurycy Szczucki, the main protagonist of the 2018 novel *The Death of the Fronsac*[2] by Neal Ascherson, is a triple emigrant: a soldier fighting abroad, an exile who returns to Poland and is then expelled, and finally, someone who settles in Scotland and visits his homeland as a British subject. He recalls a certain incident which took place during the pilgrimage of John Paul II to Scotland.

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[1] Adam Z a m o y s ki, "The Problem With Poland's New Nationalism," *Foreign Policy*, January 27, 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/27/the-problem-with-polands-new-nationalism/.

[2] See Neal A s c h e r s o n, *The Death of the Fronsac* (New York: Apollo, 2018).

I was close when he [John Paul II] came through the crowd. A woman was holding up a tiny girl in red-white folk dress. He stopped, and asked the child in our (Polish) language: '*Gdzie Polska*? Where is Poland?' She looked back at him bewildered. The Pope took her small fist, pressed it against her heart and said: 'Poland is here.' I was furious to find my eyes filled with tears. Why? Such cheap sentimentality! Such shameless conflation of soul with a stretch of land, such an inoculation of that old God-Fatherland serum into the blood of a child. But then I remembered that I had done the same. ... Except that back then, I had thumped (my friend's) fist against my chest: 'Polska tu! Poland is here!'[3]

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ABSTRACT / ABSTRAKT

Andrzej JAROSZYŃSKI, Thinking about the Fatherland...: Confession of a Diplomat

The essay comprises a personal account of a former Polish diplomat of his experience and concept of the fatherland. The paper describes the development of the author's sense of his national identity, beginning with his experience of the communist Poland, and continuing up to the period of his diplomatic service after 1989. In the conclusion, the author discusses the question of nationality as a person's identity.

Keywords: Poland, fatherland and motherland, national and individual identity, opposition to communism, diplomacy

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Andrzej JAROSZYŃSKI, Myśląc Ojczyzna... Słowo dyplomaty

Esej przedstawia osobiste poglądy byłego polskiego dyplomaty dotyczące pojęcia ojczyzny oraz jego doświadczenie patriotyzmu. Autor opisuje ewolucję

[3] Ibidem, 186.

swojego rozumienia tożsamości narodowej, poczynając od swojego doświadczenia ojczyzny w komunistycznej Polsce i analizując jego rozwój aż do czasu, kiedy po roku 1989 reprezentował Polskę jako dyplomata. W podsumowaniu rozważa kwestię narodowości jako osobistej tożsamości.

Słowa kluczowe: Polska, ojczyzna, tożsamość narodowa i indywidualna, opozycja wobec komunizmu, dyplomacja

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Paulina DAWIDEK

HOPE
On Existing in spite of Reality

Is it possible to learn to hope? One might perhaps find the answer to this question by looking at the lives of those who, in the face of adversity, manage to 'move on,' enjoy life, and, simply, be happy. Research shows that such people have faith in themselves, adopt a proactive attitude, and persevere despite failures. Charles R. Snyder, a precursor of positive psychology, suggests that there is another characteristic they share: that of hope. According to Snyder, hope is not an emotion, but a specific mode of thinking, and involves positive energy focused on reaching the set goal.[1]

Hope seems to be woven into the tissue of our lives; it is also a gift which should be shared with others. Undoubtedly, St. John Paul II was a man of persistent and fervent hope who, throughout his life, bore witness to his experience of "the God of hope" (Rom 15:13). A testimony of hope which "does not disappoint" (Rom 5:5) can be found in the prophetic words of the homily he preached at the mass inaugurating his pontificate. Reflecting on this event in the book *Crossing the Threshold of Hope*, the Pope reminisces: "When, on October 22, 1978, I said the words 'Be not afraid!' in St. Peter's Square, I could not fully know how far they would take me and the entire Church. Their meaning came more from the Holy Spirit."[2] Cardinal Leon Joseph Suenens, in turn, in his poetic answer to the question, "Why am I a man of hope?" writes: "Because I believe that every morning God is new, that he is creating the world exactly at this particular moment, and not one in the past, enveloped in cloud and forgotten."[3]

The personalistic concept of hope, hope conceived as a value and expressed in a literary work of art, as well as the aim of hoping and the duty to hope are among the themes discussed in the volume *Wobec nadziei: Aksjologiczne problemy dramatu i teatru XX i XXI wieku*[4] [Confronting

[1] See Charles R. S n y d e r, *Handbook of Hope: Theory, Measures and Applications*, (San Diego: Laurence Academic Press, 2000), 25–6.

[2] J o h n P a u l II, *Crossing the Threshold of Hope*, ed. Vittorio Messori, trans. Jenny McPhee and Martha McPhee (New York: Alfred A. Knopf), 218–9.

[3] Leo Joseph S u e n e n s, "Dlaczego jestem człowiekiem nadziei?," *W drodze* 4, no. 4 (1976): 4. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.

[4] See *Wobec nadziei: Aksjologiczne problemy dramatu i teatru XX i XXI wieku* [Confronting Hope: On the Axiological Problems in the Plays and Stage Productions of the 20th and the 21st Centuries], ed. Joanna Michalczuk and Mariusz Lach (Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL 2018). The earlier versions of the articles collected in the volume were presented at the

Hope: On the Axiological Problems in the Plays and Stage Productions of 20th and the 21st Centuries]. The articles collected in the book address the need, arising in the context of the current socio-cultural crises, to reintroduce anthropological research on values into the humanities.

Wobec nadziei comprises three parts, preceded with a theological and philosophical study "Nadzieja"[5] [Hope] by Kazimierz Krajewski who describes hope as an act of the human person projected towards the future: the person knows that the best is yet to come and her heart reaches out towards it in an ardent and active expectancy. Thus a hopeful person does not succumb to difficulties, but continues fighting and eventually wins, being able to enjoy her future victory in finding happiness. The theological perspective Krajewski adopts shows hope as rooted in God's promise, in the belief that through his grace man will achieve eternal happiness. The author emphasizes the connection of hope to faith and love and, following Paul the Apostle (cf. 1 Thes 5:8), compares the three virtues to an armour protecting a human being in the struggle for salvation. On this view, Christian hope is related to the desire for happiness which God has put in the human heart. So understood, hope strengthens and purifies human actions, guides the human being towards the Kingdom of God, and provides an answer to the mystery of human life.

The first part of the book, entitled "Nacinanie sykomory" [Cutting the Sycamore Fruits], opens with the article "Teatr wobec nadziei"[6] [The Theatre Confronting Hope] by Wojciech Kaczmarek. In his reflection on the anthropological crisis of the 20th-century theatre, Kaczmarek uses the biblical metaphor, taken from the Book of Amos, of dressing sycamores (cf. Am 7:14), i.e., cutting the sycamore fruits, which otherwise would not ripen. Applied to modern Europe and its culture, which manifest the need for being "cut" in order to achieve maturity, the metaphor in question makes it possible for Kaczmarek to assess the scale of the anthropological crisis in which they are immersed. In his view, the crisis of culture, reflected also by contemporary literary works and modern theatre, may be resolved only by way of being "cut with Logos,"[7] which would inspire Europe to return to its Christian roots. Therefore, the author proposes that dramatics should clearly distinguish the genuinely Christian elements of modern spiritual culture from those entirely foreign to Christianity.

The other paper included in the first part of the reviewed monograph, Ryszard Strzelecki's "Perypetie ludzkiej podmiotowości w dzisiejszej refleksji kulturowej"[8] [The Vicissitudes of Human Subjectivity in Present-Day Reflection on Culture], addresses the difficulty to express hope in postmodern discourse. Strzelecki discusses the limitations of the postmodern vision of man, juxtaposing it with the metaphysics of the human person (in the classical philosophical sense), and the image of man implicated by the philosophy of dialogue, and

conference *Wobec nadziei* [Confronting Hope] organized by the Department of Drama and Theatre at the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Poland, on May 30, 2016.

[5] See Kazimierz K r a j e w s k i, "Nadzieja," in *Wobec nadziei*, 13–28.

[6] See Wojciech K a c z m a r e k, "Teatr wobec nadziei," in *Wobec nadziei*, 31–46. For more information on the Polish and European drama and theatre in the 19th and 20th centuries, see Wojciech K a c z m a r e k, *Przeniknąć człowieka: Chrześcijański horyzont dramatu i teatru XX wieku* (Lublin, Wydawnictwo KUL, 2016).

[7] K a c z m a r e k, "Teatr wobec nadziei," 39.

[8] See Ryszard S t r z e l e c k i, "Perypetie ludzkiej podmiotowości w dzisiejszej refleksji kulturowej," in *Wobec nadziei*, 47–66.

personalism. The author contrasts the image of the man of hope these philosophies advance with that of the postmodern subject who, torn between the various polarities of his condition, experiences different forms of *acedia*, described by Jean-Paul Sartre's and Albert Camus. Strzelecki holds, however, that the so-called post-Christian times are marked by *autarkia*, the attitude expressing the need to become independent of God and, as such, opposed to Christian hope. Discussing the anthropological problem of the identity of a human being, the author points to the strong tendency to adopt a reductionist conception of man which is characteristic of the postmodern times: the human being is most frequently seen as *homo ludens*, who exists in the unreal, globalized and anonymous world of consumption. Tradition and transcendence regarded as the primary sources of moral norms and duties are then rejected. The negation of values and of the moral order such an approach proposes in the name of the autonomy of a human being is tantamount to a violation of the ontological status of man and eventually results in his self-destruction.

The second part of the monograph, *Na ścieżkach interpretacji: Wobec najważniejszych pytań* [On the Paths of Interpretation: Confronting the Most Important Questions], focuses on selected plays written in the 20th and 21st centuries. In the article *Zmierzając ku nadziei? Człowiek i transcendencja w dramacie początku XX wieku*[9] [Heading towards Hope? Man and Transcendence in Drama of the Early 20th Century], which opens this section, Anna Podstawka argues that, shaped amidst an anthropological crisis, "the theatre of the early 20th century gradually transforms into a meditation on the existential eradication of the human being, on man existing in a void."[10] In the analytical part of her paper, Podstawka focuses on three Polish plays. Firstly, she discusses *Sędziowie*[11] [The Judges] by Stanisław Wyspiański, who while portraying the tragedy suffered by a rural family and examining the possibility of their redemption passes a symbolic judgement over himself and the humanity. Secondly, Podstawka interprets *Sygnały*[12] [The Signals] by Ewa Szelburg-Zarembina, a drama telling the story of villagers enslaved with work symbolizing human existence reduced to mere vegetation, and argues that the awareness of the consequences of the deep social stratification made the writer's generation search for fresh sources of spirituality. Finally, Podstawka analyzes Jan Kasprowicz's *Marchołt* [Marcolf],[13] a play depicting the experience of disorientation, so characteristic of modernist culture, of the human being in the relativist world of disintegrating values. In his drama, Kasprowicz reflects on man's longing for spiritual balance, his struggle to probe the mystery of human existence, and his sinking in sin. Despite having been created to do good, man must

[9] See Anna P o d s t a w k a, "Zmierzając ku nadziei? Człowiek i transcendencja w dramacie początku XX wieku," in *Wobec nadziei*, 69–88. See also Anna P o d s t a w k a, "Antynomie ludzkiej kondycji w Marchołcie Jana Kasprowicza," *Acta Universitatis Lodziensis: Folia Litteraria Polonica*" 33, no. 3 (2016): 171–85.

[10] Wojciech K a c z m a r e k, "Horyzont antropologiczny młodopolskiego dramatu i teatru," in: *Młoda Polska w najnowszych badaniach*, ed. Edward Jakiel and Tadeusz Linkner (Gdańsk: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, 2016), 148.

[11] See Stanisław W y s p i a ń s k i, *Sędziowie: Tragedya* (Kraków: n.p., 1907).

[12] See Ewa S z e l b u r g - Z a r e m b i n a, *Sygnały* (Warszawa: Gebethner i Wolff, 1933).

[13] See Jan K a s p r o w i c z, *Marchołt gruby a sprośny: Jego narodzin, życia i śmierci misterjum tragikomiczne w obrazach czterech zamknięte* (Lwów: Gubrynowicz, 1920).

continually experience tension between spirituality and carnality, between idealistic desires and lust, between his need for freedom and his enslavement in illusions of happiness the hedonistic world offers him. However, as Podstawka suggests, Kasprowicz's play, despite its complexity, "does not provide a complete answer to the existential dilemmas; rather, it rediscovers a path leading to the Christian value order and shows how the attitude of humility develops and the faith in Providence grows."[14] Podstawka's complex interpretation of the discussed plays, combined with her clear perception of the weakening of Europe's Christian roots, is the background against which she scrutinizes unresolved conflicts of conscience characteristic of the late 19th and the early 20th centuries.

Podstawka's reflection on the meaning of human existence may be considered as an introduction to the interpretation of Georges Bernanos's *Dialogues des carmélites*[15] [*The Carmelites*[16]] proposed by Maria Jolanta Olszewska in the next article in this section.[17] It is worth noting that Bernanos wrote his last work while suffering from a terminal illness and struggling with the fear of death. According to Olszewska, in his play he made "a perfect use of the fact that the concept of drama refers literally to the drama of human condition, but also to a genre which is supposed to express a playwright's worldview."[18] *Dialogues des carmélites* is based on a novella *Die Letzte am Schafott*[19] [The Last One at the Scaffold] by Gertrud von Le Fort. Against the background of the brutal history of the French revolution, Bernanos places the fictional character of Blanche de la Force, a nun and a former aristocrat. The most characteristic feature of her character is morbid fear: from the play, we learn that her entering a convent was actually an escape from the dangers of the world, and we witness her flight from the convent in an attempt to save her life. Ultimately, however, the virtue of courage triumphs in Blanche's heart and, free from the fear of death, she joins other nuns on their way to the scaffold. *Dialogues des carmélites* is a masterpiece and a work of a deeply theological nature. In telling the story of sister Blanche, Bernanos reflects on the topic with which he was particularly concerned: that of the agony of Christ in the garden of Gethsemane. *Dialogues des carmélites* focuses on the specific psychological and spiritual aspects of what Christ lived through at that time: his fear, exhaustion, and his internal struggle to follow the choice once made, his experience depicting the *kenosis* of the God-Man, his complete 'self-emptying,' in which he embraces all human suffering.

In an article on the play "Drzewo"[20] [The Tree] by Wiesław Myśliwski, Agnieszka Jarosz[21] addresses the question of the most important 'point of reference' for a human life. She finds the motif of hope in the construction of the characters in the

[14] See P o d s t a w k a, "Zmierzając ku nadziei?" 85.

[15] See Georges B e r n a n o s, *Dialogues des carmélites* (Neuchâtel: Éditions de la Baconnière and Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1949).

[16] See Georges B e r n a n o s, *The Carmelites*, trans. Gerard Hopkins (London: Collins Fontana, 1961).

[17] See Maria J. O l s z e w s k a, "W kleszczach lęku, czyli *Dialogi karmelitanek* Georgesa Bernanosa," in *Wobec nadziei*, 89–119.

[18] Ibidem, 89.

[19] See Gertrud v o n L e F o r t, *Die Letzte am Schaffot: Novelle* (München: Kösel & Pustet, 1931).

[20] See Wiesław M y ś l i w s k i, "Drzewo," *Twórczość*, no. 7 (1988): 11–73.

[21] See Agnieszka J a r o s z, "'Ale nieraz bywa tak, że coś nie jest, a jest, i prawdziwsze niż by było": Ujęcia nadziei w *Drzewie* Wiesława Myśliwskiego," in *Wobec nadziei*, 121–43.

play, inhabitants of the 'temporal' world, who "appear lost and, their lives determined by the new reality, cannot find a way in it, nevertheless trying to function as best as they can."[22] The same motif appears in the 'supernatural' world also present in the play which intermingles with that of the living. One of the non-obvious aspects of hope which can be traced in Myśliwski's drama is the victory over the enigmatic tempter who spreads doubt but, in the end, is defeated. In a still different way, hope is expressed by the eponymous tree which becomes a source of conflict. Following Dariusz Kulesza's interpretation, Jarosz considers the symbolism of the tree as pertaining to the Judeo-Christian context, which is particularly close to Myśliwski's poetic world; accordingly, the tree may be interpreted as both the tree of life and the one of the knowledge of good and evil.[23]

The article "'Co mają zrobić ci, którzy nie widzieli?' Od wiary w Słowo do apokryficznej gry między słowami – na przykładzie *Szawła* Roberta Urbańskiego"[24] [Those who have not seen, what are they to do? From the Faith in the Word to an Apocryphal Play on Words: An Analysis of *Szaweł* by Robert Urbański] by Joanna Michalczuk addresses the complex issue of the apocryphal discourse in contemporary literature, offering an interpretation of the categories of the religious play and its 'canonical' and 'apocryphal' elements. From among the contemporary Polish dramas whose authors use apocryphal motifs, Michalczuk has chosen the play which refers to the heritage of the biblical canon: Robert Urbański's *Szaweł* [Saul] (which premiered in 2004). She brings together interpretations of the kerygma provided by theology and literary studies and non-textual elements comprising "figural representations, elements of collective consciousness: archetypical human situations, and the ways in which they are understood."[25] Thus the reference to the canonical texts and representations becomes a reference to the kerygma, i.e., to God's message of love proclaimed to man. Michalczuk claims that Urbański's drama, by pointing to values which are universal yet unrelated to the kerygma as the source of hope, leads to conclusions which are in conflict with the Christian anthropology. The apocryphal story told by Urbański, in many ways similar to the one we find in the New Testament, explores the mystery of the transformation of Saul of Tarsus, a persecutor of Christians, into St. Paul, who became known as the Apostle of Nations. The playwright ponders the sense of offering one's life to God and rejecting all the 'earthly' feelings, including love. What kind of sacrifice does God's love demand? Did Saul make right decision, having chosen to die for faith? Was he right to reject the love of a woman in order not to let desire interfere with his mission to proclaim the love of God? And what about the others, those who, unlike him, have not seen Jesus? What are they to do? As an apocryphal text, Urbański's work deprives the canonical message of its exclusiveness and makes the object of faith lose its dogmatic nature, become ambiguous, and thus open up to human creativity. Although Joanna Michalczuk interprets *Szaweł* as a story about the human nature and the human pursuit of God, her analysis of the play results in a metaphorical image of the Church of the Christians of the early 21st century.

[22] Ibidem, 124.

[23] Ibidem, 134.

[24] See Joanna M i c h a l c z u k, "'Co mają zrobić ci, którzy nie widzieli?' Od wiary w Słowo do apokryficznej gry między słowami – na przykładzie *Szawła* Roberta Urbańskiego," in *Wobec nadziei*, 145–81.

[25] Ibidem, 157.

A reflection on modern theatre and on the direct and indirect influences of drama on both the audience and the performers is proposed in Sylwia Dęga-Frątczak's paper "Teatr 'za kratami,' ale z nadzieją"[26] [A Theatre 'Behind Bars,' but Still with Hope]. Dęga-Frątczak describes theatre-related resocialization activities undertaken in the penitentiary center in Sieradz, Poland, by showing the role of literature, and particularly of staging plays, in the process of the social rehabilitation of prisoners: introduced into the 'non-theatrical' space of the prison, theatre helps the inmates engage in self-creating activities and in personality transformation.

The use of modern theatre activities in education is discussed by Agnieszka Oseła in the paper "Aksjologiczne barwy świata teatru młodzieżowego"[27] [The Axiological 'Colours' of the Youth Theatre]. As educator and drama activities leader in secondary schools, as well as director and manager of a university theatre group, Oseła emphasizes that, by helping individuals determine their aesthetic, personality-related, and social goals, theatre opens them up to highest values and makes them sensitive to the needs of others. To substantiate her claims, the author presents the drama group established at a secondary school in Zwierzyniec, Poland, and shows how their work confirms Wiesław Karolak's observation: "Creative activity resembles play…. Experiencing the joy of creation is more important than the greatness of the work."[28]

The activity of youth theatre groups is discussed also by Mariusz Lach in the article "Reformy Juliusza Osterwy na początku XXI wieku w amatorskim teatrze religijnym"[29] [Juliusz Osterwa's Reforms in the Amateur Religious Theatre in the Early 21st Century]. The author argues that theatre imbued with religious values frequently becomes a space in which young people can grow by both improving their acting skills and developing as persons. Reinterpreting the concepts of teamwork and shared responsibility, as proposed by Janusz Osterwa and Mieczysław Limanowski (founders of 'Reduta,' Poland's first laboratory theatre, based on the idea of a 'holy' theatre resembling a convent or a commune), Lach observes that the environments in which young actors currently receive their formal education do not offer them communality or shared vision. At the same time, amateur youth drama groups, born spontaneously, gradually engender in their members an authentic need for teamwork, so characteristic of the beginnings of 'Reduta.'

The authors of the papers collected in *Wobec nadziei* place a particular emphasis on hope conceived as "the perspective most appropriate … to discover and contemplate truth: the truth about Christianity, about man, about our world."[30] The variety of approaches they adopt, their insightful analyses of their chosen plays, theatre productions, and scholarly discussions, as well as the penetrating diagnoses of urgent social and cultural problems, make the volume an important contribution to literary and theatre studies. However, although scholarly in nature, the book may also become a companion for the reader on his or her path to self-knowledge and transformation.

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[26] See Sylwia D ę g a - F r ą t c z a k, "Teatr 'za kratami,' ale z nadzieją," in *Wobec nadziei*, 185–92.

[27] See Agnieszka O s e ł a, "Aksjologiczne barwy świata teatru młodzieżowego," in *Wobec nadziei*, 193–209.

[28] Wiesław K a r o l a k, *Sztuka jako zabawa: Zabawa jako sztuka* (Warszawa: Centralny Ośrodek Doskonalenia Nauczycieli, 1999), 11.

[29] See Mariusz L a c h, "Reformy Juliusza Osterwy na początku XXI wieku w amatorskim teatrze religijnym," in *Wobec nadziei*, 211–21.

[30] Józef T i s c h n e r, *Myślenie według wartości* (Znak: Kraków, 2011), 6.

BOOKS RECOMMENDED BY *ETHOS*

The Lublin School of Philosophy: A Comparative Perspective, ed. Jacek Wojtysiak, Zbigniew Wróblewski, and Arkadiusz Gut, Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, e-book, forthcoming in 2020.

In the history of philosophy, the after-war period brought a rapid development of the currents of thought known today as existentialism, philosophy of dialogue, personalism, and analytic philosophy. The ideas proposed by their representatives profoundly shaped Western culture of the period and, to this day, have not ceased to inspire it. However, in the wake of the political division of Europe after the Second World War and the existence of the Iron Curtain, which effectively blocked not only the flow of people, but also the spreading of ideas, the contact between Western intellectuals and their peers in Eastern and Central Europe was largely reduced. The ideas developed in Poland and in the other countries of the Soviet Bloc did not have much chance to become part of the European collective consciousness, let alone 'compete' with the main intellectual trends of the time. With Marxism officially considered as the political doctrine conveying the ultimate explanation of the history of culture, as well as the only 'adequate' anthropology, the situation of philosophers in Central and Eastern Europe was particularly difficult. The ideological pressure prevented free research in the field of the humanities, and the ubiquitous censorship impeded unrestricted exchange of thought. In that situation, an 'oasis' of intellectual freedom behind the Iron Curtain was the Catholic University of Lublin, the only nonpublic institution of tertiary education which was simultaneously a research center. Throughout the communist period its professors were not infrequently persecuted, whereas its graduates were not welcome employees in state owned enterprises. Despite all the adversities—or maybe to defy them—the philosophers from the Catholic University of Lublin began a close cooperation involving common pursuit of the most acute philosophical issues of the time, not the least of them being the need for a theoretical debate with Marxism in the field of anthropology and social theory.

The authors of the articles comprised in *The Lublin School of Philosophy: A Comparative Perspective* present the history and a detailed theoretical account of the development of the philosophical theory at the Catholic University of Lublin, pointing out that the coherence of the conducted research, as well as the consistency of the methodology employed by the Lublin philosophers (which was not insignificant in the case of the debate with Marxism) indeed makes it possible to consider the output of the Lublin philosophers in terms of a 'school' of classical, or realist, philosophy.

Among the philosophers who may be regarded as the founders of the Lublin School were Stefan Swieżawski (historian of philosophy), Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec (metaphysician), Jerzy Kalinowski and Stanisław Kamiński (logicians and methodologists), and Karol Wojtyła (ethicist). All of them believed in the primary role of the history of philosophy and of logic in both developing and teaching philosophy. They also considered metaphysics (the theory of being) as the central discipline, and worked out the doctrine of existential Thomism: an original (while coinciding with the conceptions proposed by Étienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain) interpretation of the thought of Thomas Aquinas. The research objectives of the Lublin philosophers embraced a new rendition of the most important issues of classical philosophy in dialogue with modernity and with the awareness of both the potential and the limitations of science as such, and of natural sciences, in particular. Despite the modifications of the above outlined project in the course of its advancement, the Lublin School of Philosophy has significantly influenced Polish philosophy of the late 20th century, as well as worked out an interesting basis for the Christian outlook. It was owing to the Lublin scholars and their methodology distinguishing science from philosophy, on the one hand, and from religion, on the other, that the autonomy of philosophy as a natural insight was clearly demonstrated, and Poles received an intellectual alternative to Marxism and scientism, propagated by the official ideology of the State.

The present book is an attempt to compare the output of the Lublin School of Philosophy with that of the chosen philosophical schools or currents of thought of the turn of the 21st century. The opening part of the volume comprises a comparison of selected issues developed by Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec and his students within their conception of metaphysics with debates on similar issues continued in analytic philosophy, on the one hand, and in contemporary Thomism, on the other.

The second part of the book embraces a discussion of the disciplines scrutinized in the Lublin School by Antoni Bazyli Stępień, that is, epistemology, philosophical psychology (known today as the philosophy of mind), and aesthetics, as well as their comparison to the parallel concepts developed by Roman Ingarden in his phenomenological theory. The authors point also to the similarity between Stępień's understanding of the object of philosophical psychology and that of today's cognitivism.

The third part of the book includes methodological reflection on the foundation of the sciences (and human knowledge as such), and analyzes the output of Stanisław Kamiński in the fields of metaphilosophy and semiotics. The authors demonstrate that certain issues brought up by Kamiński (e.g., the multidisciplinary approach, the integration of sciences, and definition as a statement of the

meaning of the word) are now addressed by the philosophy of science and the philosophy of language.
The concluding part of the book comprises an analysis of the philosophy of nature (which combines traditional natural philosophy with modern cosmology), as understood by philosophers from the Lublin School. Interestingly, a majority of those pursuing philosophy of nature were not existential Thomists, but followed the Thomism of the Louvain School or developed their views outside Thomism, for instance, by 'philosophizing in the context of science.'
The value of the book lies in that it presents the so far unknown output of the Lublin School philosophers to international readers, on the one hand filling the gap caused by the fact that the philosophy in question was developed behind the Iron Curtain and, as such, largely inaccessible to Western European public. On the other hand, the volume proposes a comprehensive philosophical approach to the understanding of man and culture which may be considered as alternative to the ones prevailing in the postmodern era. We recommend the book to contemporary philosophers, in particular to those interested in the specificity of existential Thomism and in the history of the philosophy developed behind the Iron Curtain, but also to philosophy students, who may find in it a comparative history of this discipline, as seen from the perspective of the late 20th century.

D. Ch.

The Lublin School of Philosophy: History—Conceptions—Disputes, ed. Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik and Paweł Gondek, Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, e-book, forthcoming in 2020.

The recommended volume scrutinizes the specificity of the problems, as well as the particular issues, studied in the Lublin School of Philosophy in the mid- and late 20th century. The Lublin philosophers were, on the one hand, involved in systematic philosophical investigations, but, on the other, they were engaged in the inevitable controversy with the Marxist ideology officially prevailing in Poland at the time. Interestingly, Marxism, as well as existential Thomism developed by the Lublin School, emphasized the significance of philosophy both to an individual human existence and to social life as such. They differed, however, in the interpretation of this significance and in the concept of the human person each of them, respectively, entailed. While the Lublin philosophers stressed that philosophy needs to be based on a faithful reading of reality, in particular of the reality of the human being, and considered such a reading as normative, Marxists would not grant philosophy an autonomy and treat it as a tool helpful in their attempt to introduce global political change. Thus the concept which was at the core of the controversy was that of truth: the truth-based vision of reality and truth-inspired actions. No wonder that the view that philosophizing is a moral task, and philosophy, in its nature, manifests the self-awareness of culture collided with that of philosophy conceived as instrumental in the struggle for a classless society.
The articles collected in the volume are written by the Lublin School scholars of the second and third generation, many of them having had an opportunity

to collaborate with the thinkers who originally created the intellectual center in question, such as, Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec, Karol Wojtyla, Jerzy Kalinowski, Stefan Swieżawski, and Stanisław Kamiński.

In her "Introduction," Agnieszka Lekka-Kowalik states that the book has three main objectives: (1) it provides a historically based overview of persons and concepts which made up the phenomenon of the Lublin School of Philosophy; (2) it identifies hitherto unsolved or new problems and, as such, invite the reader to 'philosophize' together with the Lublin thinkers; and (3) it is supposed to inspire tools for further research on the output of the Lublin School of Philosophy and on its 'paradigm of philosophizing.' The papers the volume compiles are followed by photographs from the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin Archive.

Among the issues the particular articles discuss are the history of the Lublin School of Philosophy, the social and intellectual context in which it emerged, the phases of its development, its relation to the Aristotelian and Thomistic traditions, its contribution to Polish and global culture, and, in particular, to overcoming communism in Poland. The method of philosophizing specific to the Lublin School has been analyzed and described as a realistic approach involving strict methodological tools, inspired by the accomplishments of the earlier Lvov–Warsaw School, and resulting in a consistent, methodologically homogenous philosophical project valid to this day. In the historical perspective, the realistic metaphysical philosophy it developed belongs to the train of *philosophiae perennis* (perennial philosophy). As such, the Lublin School philosophy opposes idealism, which it sees as the root of the present crisis of culture and rationality. A special consideration has been given to the specificity of the Lublin personalism, which combines contribution from thinkers as different as Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec and Karol Wojtyła, thus expressing the openness of the School to insights from metaphysics as well as from moral philosophy and ethics. In a separate article, the language of the theory of being (metaphysics) has been analyzed, pointing to the significance of existential judgments rather than to conceptualization. The scrutiny of the methods of making philosophy in the School shows in turn its methodological sources. Basic methodological tools used in the Lublin School are discussed, among them metaphysical separation as the method of formulating the notion of being, decontradictifying explanation (i.e., finding such an explanation which cannot be refuted unless the explained facts are denied), non-refutable justification, analysis of the possible existence of truths which are at the same time factual and necessary, negative justification and its types; delineating the space for hypotheses in the theory of being, and historicism. The place and significance of logic, in particular for the theory of being, ethics, and philosophy of nature (as advanced in the Lublin School) have been analyzed with the special focus on the logical foundations for practical cognition and the logic of norms.

An interesting part of the book is the article analyzing the disputes and controversies among the Lublin scholars which were continued over the years. Although the Lublin academics adopted the same paradigm of philosophy, they held numerous debates within this paradigm, some of them long-lasting. Among the controversial issues which inspired polemics were: the scope of the application of the phenomenological method and its efficacy in attaining the defined objectives of philosophizing; the status of epistemology and its relation to

metaphysics (the issue of what philosophical discipline should be considered as 'the first philosophy'), the cognitive object of moral philosophy and the primary norm for morality (*bonum est faciendum* or *persona est affirmanda*?), the object and purpose of metaphysics, the status of the philosophy of nature, the understanding of classical philosophy, the applicability of formal logic to classical philosophy, the role of direct experience and existential judgments in developing metaphysics, and problem of the existence and nature of intentional objects.

Last but not least, the book includes a separate article on the Lublin School of Philosophy as a cultural phenomenon, discussing its specificity and rootedness in Polish culture and the Polish tradition of scholarly debate. The School in question is described in terms of a community of academics, but also one of friends and colleagues, to whom philosophical work meant more than a career and who were ready for sacrifices in order to be able to continue their pursuit of the value of truth.

The volume is addressed to philosophers, in particular those pursuing the study of culture, and to students of philosophy, but also to readers interested in the intellectual history of Poland and, more generally, in the history of academic institutions in the countries behind the Iron Curtain.

D. Ch.

Alfred M. Wierzbicki, *Osoba i moralność* [The Person and Morality], Lublin: Wydawnictwo KUL, forthcoming in 2020.

In the recommended volume, Alfred M. Wierzbicki presents the output of two 20th-century Polish philosophers: Karol Wojtyła, who held the Chair of Ethics at the Catholic University of Lublin from 1954 to 1978, when he was elected Pope John Paul II, and Tadeusz Styczeń, Wojtyła's student and close collaborator, as well as his successor to the university chair. Wierzbicki describes the ethics developed by Wojtyła and Styczeń as part of what he calls "a personalistic awakening," conceived as the birth of a philosophical and theological current aimed at the renewal of Catholic thought. While considering whether the discussed Lublin thinkers might be regarded as the founders of a distinct school within the personalistic movement, the author identifies the ideas they shared with other philosophers who opposed the reductionist, positivist approach to the human being characteristic of the period and, at the same time, underscores Wojtyła's and Styczeń's original contribution both to personalism and to the 20th-century philosophy as such.

Developed as a result of the existential and social experience of the totalitarian systems of nazism and communism, and in opposition to the philosophies adopted by their theoreticians, the thought of the Lublin personalists is not, in Wierzbicki's view, simply a response to the historical situation. In fact, Wojtyła and Styczeń began a new philosophy, developed mainly in the field of ethics, combining the classical, Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophy of being with the modern philosophy of the subject. Such a synthesis was made possible by virtue of an in-depth reflection on the historical experience of man, which

embraced, on the one hand, a negation and destruction of humanity and, on the other hand, the effort to safeguard—to use Wojtyła's term—"the irreducible in man."

The first part of Wierzbicki's book shows the emergence of Wojtyła's new model of ethics out of two intellectual endeavors: (1) reflection on the ideas proposed by prominent philosophers of the past (such as, e.g., Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and Max Scheler) in order to extract their pre-personalistic intuitions, and (2) phenomenological analysis of the content of the direct experience in which the human being experiences himself as a moral agent. One of the paths along which Wojtyła's philosophy developed to reach its maturity is illustrated by an analysis of what Wierzbicki calls "the personalistic *corpus*," i.e., the future pope's three works: *Miłość i odpowiedzialność* (*Love and Responsibility*), *Osoba i czyn* (*The Acting Person*), and *Człowiek w polu odpowiedzialności* (*Man in the Field of Responsibility*). The first of these works comprises an ethical (philosophical, as opposed to theological) reflection on specific ethical problems, i.e., ones related to the Catholic teaching on human sexuality and marriage. The ethical analyses in question led Wojtyła to formulate the personalistic norm in the light of which the person is considered as a *bonum* towards which the only adequate attitude is love. In the second work of the *corpus*, Wojtyła temporarily abandoned ethical inquiry and turned to philosophical anthropology, striving for a better understanding of the structure and dynamics of the human being as a person: a conscious subject capable of self-determination and the efficient cause of his actions, existing and fulfilling himself in a community centered on the common good. Wojtyła's return to ethics, based, as it were, on the results of his anthropological reflection, is expressed in the third volume of the series. The work, which remains unfinished, was initially designed as a textbook, its concluding part authored by Tadeusz Styczeń.

Although the project Wojtyła began with *Człowiek w polu odpowiedzialności* has never been completed, Styczeń—as Wierzbicki shows in the second part of the recommended volume—continues developing his teacher's fundamental metaethical and ethical insights with his own original analyses, formulating a new variety of personalistic ethics. Inspired by existential Thomism, on the one hand, and focused on a precise analysis of the experience of morality, on the other, he revised the traditional deductive model of ethics (upheld in Thomistic textbooks), in which moral norms are derived from anthropological and metaphysical propositions. In his new model, ethics is an independent philosophical discipline: it is empirical in the sense of being grounded in the experience of the existence of the moral duty (opposed to the sensualistic concept of experience), and as such, culminates in the metaphysics of morality.

Wierzbicki describes numerous discussions in which Styczeń engaged both with the philosophical tradition, e.g., by proposing a solution to the problem of the transition from 'is' statements to 'ought' statements indicated by Hume, and with his contemporaries, e.g., with such thinkers as Tadeusz Kotarbiński or Tadeusz Czeżowski, who sought the concept of ethics based on experience and independent of especially religion and theology. These considerations are followed by a presentation of selected ongoing controversies provoked by Styczeń's views and their interpretation. An example of such a controversy

may be the debate on his alleged 'veritative' personalism (which holds that the normative, or morally binding, power of truth is the fundamental principle of ethics, and which, as such, is opposed to the personalism focused on the dignity of the person) or on the role of truth in the moral life of a person.

Never disregarding the universal character of the ideas and controversies he presents, Wierzbicki helps the reader understand their significance by placing them against the background of the historical events and social issues of the time (such as Styczeń's particular insistence on the significance of truthfulness in social life in the context of the Solidarity movement of 1980 and the martial law imposed in 1981 to crash it).

In *The Person and Morality*, not only does Wierzbicki explain the views of Karol Wojtyła and Tadeusz Styczeń, but he also provides the reader with an insight into their style of philosophizing and, perhaps, into their exceptional relationship of teacher and pupil, collaborators, and—last but not least—friends. Moreover, the book seems deeply informed by the personal experience of its author, himself a student of Styczeń's, as well as a participant in the discussions and witness to the events he describes. We recommend Wierzbicki's 'double portrait' of the two Lublin personalists to contemporary philosophers, theologians, and historians, as well as students of any of these disciplines. The volume may be of special interest to all those who wish to understand better the thought of John Paul II, but also to any reader willing to explore the impact of philosophical ideas on cultural, social and political life.

P. M.

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Agnieszka LEKKA-KOWALIK

A HOPE FOR REASON

Hope is a common phenomenon in human life. And yet once we try to conceptualize it, we face the problem St. Augustine described while trying to define time: "If no one asks me, I know: if I wish to explain it to one that asketh, I know not."[1] Nevertheless there have been continuous attempts at explaining the nature of hope. According to the standard account, hope is always a relational phenomenon: a human person hopes for a certain outcome, and to hope for this outcome is to desire it and to believe that its realization is possible, although not inevitable. On this view, hope is considered as a compound attitude.

However, a current discussion on hope[2] shows that the standard account faces various difficulties. The first is that hope comes in degrees and the 'degree' of hope a person cherishes might determine what she will decide about her future. For instance, an ill person may *greatly* hope to recover and book a holiday trip despite her illness. Another person, though, suffering from the same condition, may have somewhat smaller hopes of recovery and will prefer not to make any holiday plans. There is no difference between the two cases in respect of the beliefs and the desires of the persons involved: each of them knows that, by the time her vacation approaches, her recovery is possible, although not certain (i.e., not inevitable), and recovery is what both of them desire. What is, then, the factor determining the degree of the hope each of them cherishes? One can certainly assume that there may be circumstances justifying the first person's greater hope, for instance, she may be younger and have no concomitant diseases. Still, even such information does not fully explain the difference, and one may easily imagine a situation in which two persons with more or less the same medical condition, subjected to the same experimental treatment applied by the same team of doctors, will not show the same degree of hope. Thus the standard account of hope needs to be supplemented.

The contents of this 'supplement,' though, require further analysis. One might claim that the degree of hope a person cherishes depends on the strength of the person's character or personality. Yet it is not that simple, for an act of hoping may be directed towards various objects. In this context, Phillip Pettit introduces the concept of 'substantial hopes.'[3] One may hope for things like having a good lunch, passing an exam, or being qualified

[1] *The Confessions of St. Augustine*, Book XI, trans. Edward Bouverie Pusey (Create Space Independent Publishing Platform, 2013), 87.

[2] See Jack M. K w o n g, "What is Hope?" *European Journal of Philosophy* 27, no. 1 (2019): 243–54.

[3] See Phillip P e t t i t, "Hope and Its Place in Mind," *The Annals of the American Academy* 592(2004), 152–65.

for an experimental cancer therapy. There is no need for a deep analysis of the listed cases to see that the objects of hope differ in their *objective* importance to a human life and that the importance in question is not unrecognized. Whenever hope concerns things which are vital to a human life *and* the chance of the object of hope being accomplished is low, one might argue that, at the time of ordeal, hope will provide additional strength. This is why one usually tries to awake hope in a seriously ill friend rather than build up her character; it is hope which will have a motivational potential helping the ill person decide on an experimental treatment, even though her *belief* in its effect might not be justified by the body of medical data. In order to explain why hope is a source of energy and motivation, Luc Boven introduces the idea of mental-imagining, that is, imagining what it would be like should the 'hope for' a given state of affairs actually come true.[4] According to Boven, hoping involves (1) the desire of a certain state of affairs, (2) the belief that the state of affairs in question *can* actually come true and that things will then evolve for the better, as well as (3) an image of the state of affairs and of the world in general after the particular hope is accomplished. On this view, any 'substantial' hope must show marks of durability and stability which will help sustain one's actions and one's attitude, should things begin to go awry.

However, Boven's proposal renders the difference between hope and despair non-existent, since in both cases the person shares certain desires and beliefs, and can entertain the image of the desired outcome coming true. Yet, which Boven fails to address, in the case of hope the image in question might be a 'source of energy' for the person to 'fight for the desired outcome,' while in the case of despair it might significantly weaken her attitude. Ariel Meirav has attempted to distinguish despair from hope by pointing to an external factor.[5] While in both cases we can recognize there is a gap between, on the one hand, the state of affairs we desire and see as possible, and, on the other, actions which are within our power to ascertain this state of affairs, whether we hope or despair depends on how we evaluate the factors which 'close' the gap: if we think that they work in our favor, we hope, if we think they are against us, we despair. Jack M. Kwong rightly points out that such an explanation hardly works, for we might not know the factors in question, or they might simply be neutral natural forces. He uses the following example: We hope to win the lottery, but in this case the 'external factors' are the accidental workings of the physical forces in the lottery drum, and we are not in the position to evaluate them either as good or as bad for us—nevertheless, we hope to win the lottery.[6] Still another insight has been developed by Adrienne M. Martin, who complements the 'orthodox' view of hope by adding an 'incorporation' element: what distinguishes hope from attitudes such as despair is that the hopeful person incorporates her desire as a *reason* for her actions.[7] Hope makes it possible for a human person to organize her activities around a certain outcome, for instance, plan a vacation despite her illness rather than cancel all her plans. Such an incorporation comprises two elements: (1) one needs to regard the probability of the desired outcome as sufficiently high to engage rationally in its pursuit and

[4] See Luc Boven, "The Value of Hope," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 59, no. 3 (1999), 667–81.

[5] See Ariel Meirav, "The Nature of Hope," *Ratio* 22, no. 2 (2009): 216–33.

[6] Kwong, "What is Hope?"

[7] See Adrienne M. Martin, *How We Hope: A Moral Psychology* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014).

(2) to become a reason justifying her activities, the outcome must be appealing enough to the person. This approach seems analogous to Mieczysław A. Krąpiec's explanation of the interplay of reason and will in an act of decision-making: Something appeals to the person as good and makes her will move from being passive to action by giving her a reason and motivation to act.[8] The claim Philip Pettit makes goes even further: Hoping embraces a 'cognitive resolve' to act *as if* the desired outcome was going to occur, even should one admit that the possibility of it being the case is rather low.[9] However, Kwong claims that none of the above attempts at supplementing the account of hope as a compound attitude allows to distinguish between hope and despair, and he develops his own solution: "My proposal for the missing ingredient in the standard account of hope is that a person must, in addition to possessing the relevant belief-desire structure, be able to *see* a way in which the desired outcome can come about. Moreover, she must see the way to the hoped-for outcome as a genuine possibility."[10] Kwong goes as far as to claim that should a person despair but suddenly discover a way leading to the desired outcome, she will shift from despair to hope.

Some other thinkers argue in turn that hope is a primitive mental state. The view is expressed, for instance, by Gabriel Segal and Mark Textor.[11] Claudia Blöser radicalizes their position by questioning the claim that desire and belief are necessary conditions for hope. We hope in a great variety of ways—she claims—and the search for elements that are common to all cases might be fruitless. At best we may assume that cases of hope are related in terms of Wittgenstein's family resemblance.[12]

We do not need to delve further into philosophical or psychological debates. What has been said so far is enough to show that hope is a peculiar phenomenon. It is omnipresent, and one might say that there is no domain of human life from which the language of hope is absent. Yet proverbs, which are supposed to be the wisdom of nations, teach us that people express contradictory views on the meaning of hope and on its significance, such as 'Hope is the mother of fools,' 'He who lives on hope, dies of hunger,' 'He that lives in hope dances to an ill tune,' or 'Hope and expectation are a fool's income,' but also 'Hope is the physician of each misery,' 'Hope is the last thing ever lost,' 'As long as there is life, there is hope,' or 'Hope is grief's best music.'[13] Regardless of how hope is conceived, we seem to agree—as already Thomas Aquinas stressed—that "the object of hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain."[14] In the same vein, Paul J. Wadell adds, "There is no need for hope if we can easily get what we want, but neither is there

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[8] See Mieczysław A. K r ą p i e c, "Decyzja – bytem moralnym," *Roczniki Filozoficzne* 31, no. 2 (1983): 47–65.

[9] See Phillip P e t t i t, "Hope and its Place in Mind," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 592, no. 1 (2004): 152–65.

[10] K w o n g, "What is Hope?": 246.

[11] See Gabriel S e g a l and Mark T e x t o r, "Hope as a Primitive Mental State," *Ratio* 28, no. 2 (2015), 207–22.

[12] See Claudia B l ö s e r, "Hope as an Irreducible Concept," *Ratio* 32, no. 3 (2019), 205–14.

[13] See The List of World Proverbs: Proverbs about Hope, http://www.listofproverbs.com/keywords/hope/10.htm.

[14] T h o m a s A q u i n a s, *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 17, a. 1, https://www.newadvent.org/summa/3017.htm.

any reason to hope when what we desire is completely beyond our grasp."[15] Aquinas considers hope as a kind of passion and the authors whose views we have discussed seem to grasp it precisely in the same way, although they do not emphasize as strongly as he did that the good in question should be difficult to get. So understood, hope becomes—as noted earlier—a reason for acting. But hope can become a reason for action only when it is *justified*: the person must recognize that the desired outcome is really attainable and can see a way of attaining it. Hope is then different from irrational optimism, a pure emotion which prompts 'everything will be all right,' and it differs from the blind faith that 'this way or another things will turn out fine,' as well as from the illusion that 'something good will come up.' Thus, genuine hope is rational, realistic and empirically grounded, or, in other words, based on experience. It might then be that proverbs critical of this passion refer to phenomena which are unlike genuine hope.

The term 'desire' also deserves attention. A hopeful person sees the hoped-for outcome as something good, but we might ask whether the outcome in question should be objectively good or it will suffice if it is good merely for the hopeful one. The opposition is certainly not straightforward, for certain goods might be both objectively and subjectively good. However, there might be cases of outcomes which are only subjectively good. Thus, to overcome this problem one needs to answer the question, 'Who am I *really*?' rather than, 'How do I understand myself?' or 'How do other people perceive me?' We cannot obviously begin a discussion of the nature of the human person here, but neither can we disregard the fact that we tend to find hope to succeed in morally bad actions at least disturbing. Although statements like, 'I hope my uncle will be murdered soon,' 'I hope to rob a rich friend of mine,' 'I hope he will abandon ill-wishing his uncle,' or 'I hope his friend will prevent the robbery," all seem to express genuine hope, we tend to disapprove of the two former ones. Thus, following our natural insight, we need to put forward the hypothesis that we are dealing with genuine hope only if its desired outcome is objectively good. Our intuitive response can be further justified by the joy and relief we experience whenever we find out that 'hopes' for objectively immoral outcomes have been frustrated. Agatha Christie's short story *Wasps' Nest* is a good illustration of this point: John Harrison, who is terminally ill, plans to commit suicide so as to make his rival for the love of a woman arrested on suspicion of murder and hanged. In a sense, Harrison hopes to murder his rival. However, Hercule Poirot, the famous detective who happens to be a friend of his, spoils the plan. At the end of the story, Harrison expresses his gratitude to Poirot, who has ruined his hopes: although he will die, he will not die as a murderer.

Hope is a genuinely personalistic phenomenon. Aquinas observes that the desired outcome can be attained by one's own effort, but also with the help from others. "Hope is made more perfect, because we hope chiefly in our friends,"[16] he says. What he means is that there are more reasons for hope when we have friends to rely on rather than when we act on our own. This insight is grasped in the current philosophical and psychological literature on hope, which frequently refers to its particular cases. A person hoping, for instance, for the victory of her favorite sports team may be motivated by the fact that the team has a new coach who is better than the previous one. A writer hoping to finish

[15] Paul J. Wadd ell, "Hope: The Forgotten Virtue of Our Time," *America: The Jesuit Review*, Nov. 21, 2016, https://www.americamagazine.org/faith/2016/11/07/hope-forgotten-virtue-our-time.

[16] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 17, a. 8.

a new book on time may put his hopes in a friend who might provide an organizing idea for the material the writer has gathered. This line of reasoning may be further developed so as to show that, even in cases when the hopeful person apparently relies on things like amulets or rituals, there is always a personal element involved in the situation of hoping. For instance, the hopeful one will believe that the person who has sold her the amulet did not cheat and that the amulet is genuine, or the person resorting to a ritual will trust that it has been appropriately chosen and is performed by an authorized person. Aquinas's claim that our hope is more perfect when we have friends should be taken seriously, for what distinguishes friends from strangers is the mutual love that connects us with them. Our hope to attain an objective good we desire is better justified—and therefore more rational—once we believe that our friends will help us. Hope then necessarily entails trust.

However, we need to bring out yet another element. We have claimed that the hope which provides a reason to act and which sustains the person's actions and attitudes whenever things go awry must be realistic, rational, based on experience, but also stable, durable, and firm. Otherwise it cannot be a *reason to act*. So, whenever we hope, we build ourselves as hopeful persons. And, as such, we will ever more readily adopt a hopeful attitude if only our realistic and rational evaluation of a given situation renders *reasons* to hope. Therefore hope may be seen as a virtue not only in the theological sense, but also in everyday life. The theological sense of hope, however, confirms our analysis. *The Concise Catholic Dictionary* defines hope, as follows: "The theological virtue which is a supernatural gift bestowed by God through which one trusts God will grant eternal life and the means of obtaining it providing one cooperates. Hope is composed of desire and expectation together with a recognition of the difficulty to be overcome in achieving eternal life."[17] The view of hope as a trust-based rational, realistic, and personal passion explains well the phenomenon of 'hoping against hope.' Whenever we desire something and discover that attaining it is beyond our and our friends' power, there is still the last resort, the omnipotent Love, that is, God. Thus 'hope against hope' is not a manifestation of an over-optimistic attitude: In such cases hope becomes a rational defense against fear and despair.

The above analysis prompts one more conclusion. We have identified hope as a rational phenomenon. The object of genuine hope is an actual good and hope can always be justified, which means that there is always an answer to the question of *why we hope*, and this answer is different from the one to the question of *why we hope for this particular thing*. Any genuine, that is, justified hope might become a reason to act in a certain way, and thereby our decision to act this way is, in such cases, rational. Thus, through the phenomenon of hope, rationality shows itself as a crucial quality of the human person. Hope presupposes reason as a distinct human faculty. In order to genuinely hope, a person must employ reason. We may then say that in order to hope reasonably we need to hope for our reason to work properly and we need to have faith in reason. This, in turn, brings up the question of truth. We need to believe that the object of our hope is truly good, that it is truly attainable, and that our friend truly loves us and will work to make our hopes come true. Genuine hope presupposes the truth of things, the hopeful person's love of truth and her objection to living an illusion. Fr. Jerzy Szymik

[17] Robert C. B r o d e r i c k, "Hope," in Robert C. Broderick, *The Concise Catholic Dictionary* (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1944), 77.

has summarized this idea by saying that "faith is a hope for love," whereas "hope can be there because faith tells the truth about love."[18] The reason to hope, hope for the cognitive power of reason, love of truth, a recognition of the truth about love, faith in reason and the reason to believe—all of them are intertwined in an act of hoping. This is why we may conclude by referring to the famous words attributed to Pliny the Elder, "Hope is the pillar that holds up the world."

[18] Jerzy S z y m i k, "Piękno katolicyzmu: wiara: Jak się łączą – wiara, nadzieja, miłość," https://biblia.wiara.pl/doc/2309801.Piekno-katolicyzmu-wiara.

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Maria FILIPIAK

ON HOPE
A Bibliography of Addresses by John Paul II

Abbreviations
IGP – *Insegnamenti di Giovanni Paolo II* [Città del Vaticano]

I (1978), pp. 477
II (1979) [vol. 1], pp. 1729
II (1979) vol. 2, pp. 157
III (1980) vol. 1, pp. 1983
III (1980) vol. 2, pp. 1869
IV (1981) vol. 1, pp. 1292
IV (1981) vol. 2, pp. 1313
V (1982) vol. 1, pp. 1376
V (1982) vol. 2, pp. 2497
V (1982) vol. 3, pp. 1751
VI (1983) vol. 1, pp. 1730
VI (1983) vol. 2, pp. 1496
VII (1984) vol. 1, pp. 2016
VII (1984) vol. 2, pp. 1708
VIII (1985) vol. 1, pp. 2081
VIII (1985) vol. 2, pp. 1683
IX (1986) vol. 1, pp. 2204
IX (1986) vol. 2, pp. 2242
X (1987) vol. 1, pp. 1482
X (1987) vol. 2, pp. 2582
X (1987) vol. 3, pp. 1812
XI (1988) vol. 1, pp. 1073
XI (1988) vol. 2, pp. 2625
XI (1988) vol. 3, pp. 1405
XI (1988) vol. 4, pp. 2317
XII (1989) vol. 1, pp. (1945
XII (1989) vol. 2, pp. 1783
XIII (1990) vol. 1, pp. 1885
XIII (1990) vol. 2, pp. 1888
XIV (1991) vol. 1, pp. 1983
XIV (1991) vol. 2, pp. 1619
XV (1992) vol. 1, pp. 2147
XV (1992) vol. 2, pp. 1119
XVI (1993) vol. 1, pp. 1855
XVI (1993) vol. 2, pp. 1725
XVII (1994) vol. 1, pp. 1367
XVII (1994) vol. 2, pp. 1281
XVIII (1995) vol. 1, pp. 2054
XVIII (1995) vol. 2, pp. 1589
XIX (1996) vol. 1, pp. 1798
XIX (1996) vol. 2, pp. 1206
XX (1997) vol. 1, pp. 1799
XX (1997) vol. 2, pp. 1230
XXI (1998) vol. 1, pp. 1669
XXI (1998) vol. 2, pp. 1483
XXII (1999) vol. 1, pp. 1660
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XXIII (2000) vol. 2, pp. 1463
XXIV (2001) vol. 1, pp. 1607
XXIV (2001) vol. 2, pp. 1376
XXV (2002) vol. 1, pp. 1290
XXV (2002) vol. 2, pp. 1130
XXVI (2003) vol. 1, pp. 1298
XXVI (2003) vol. 2, pp. 1(205
XXVII (2004) vol. 1, pp. 1063
XXVII (2004) vol. 2, pp. 933
XXVIII (2005), pp. 333

1978

1. “Portate la gioia e la speranza.” Address to the young people gathered in the Vatican Basilica. November 22. IGP I, 189–91.

1979

2. “Dalla fede in Cristo nasce la nostra speranza.” Homily at the Holy Mass at the Parish of St. Basil in Rome. March 11. IGP II, 1, 518–22.

3. “Nel giorno della Risurrezione l’esordio della nuova Speranza.” *Urbi et Orbi* Message on Easter Sunday. April 15. IGP II, 1, 911–7.

4. “Le nuove Chiese: centri vivi di aggregazione umana e cristiana.” Angelus. May 5. IGP II, 1, 1182–3.

5. “Un messaggio di ottimismo e di Speranza.” Address at Rome’s Ciampino Airport. June 10. IGP II, 1, 1530–2.

6. “I bambini rappresentano l’innocenza da riconquistare.” Angelus. July 22. IGP II, 2, 768.

7. “Vive con Maria la nostra speranza.” Homily at the Holy Mass for the Solemnity of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary. August 15. IGP II, 2, 134–6.

8. “La fede e la speranza per il futuro dell’umanità.” Address to the pilgrims from the Archdiocese of Bologna. September 22. IGP II, 2, 342–7.

9. “Maria, segno di speranza per tutte le generazioni.” Address at the National Shrine of the Immaculate Conception, Washington, USA. October 7. IGP II, 2, 675–6.

10. “Napoli ha bisogno di sperare nella giustizia e nella carità.” Address to the people of Naples. October 21. IGP II, 2, 825–31.

11. “Celebriamo con i nostri morti la speranza della vita eterna.” Homily at the Holy Mass at the Roman Cementary of Campo Verano. November 1. IGP II, 2, 1018–21.

12. “La vostra fiducia nell’uomo e nella società.” Address to the members of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. November 12. IGP II, 2, 1144–6.

13. “Un cammino di grande speranza.” Address at Rome’s Fiumicino Airport. November 28. IGP II, 2, 1259–60.

14. “Ferma speranza in Dio perché sorga un’era nuova.”Address to the Patriarch Dimítrios I. November 29. IGP II, 2, 1268–69.

15. “Giovanni Paolo II al ‘Santo Spirito’ reca speranza ai sofferenti.” Address to the patients of the Roman Santo Spirito Hospital. December 23. IGP II, 2, 1506–10.

16. “Nel messaggio del Natale la manifestazione della speranza.” Te Deum. December 31. IGP II, 2, 1537–41.

1980

17. “Sono qui come uomo di religione, di speranza e di pace.” Address at the welcoming Ceremony at Kinshasa, Zaire. May 2. IGP III, 1,1060–3.

18. “La preghiera di Cristo per l’unità: ragione della nostra speranza.” Address to representatives of other Christian confessions in Ghana. May 8. IGP III, 1, 1243–4.

19. “Dal Vangelo nuova forza per una fede piena di speranza Address on the occasion of the 450 anniversary of the *Confessio Augustana*. June 26. IGP III, 1, 1840–3.

20. “La cultura del Brasile nasce dalla croce.” Homily at the Holy Mass at the Cathedral of Brasilia. June 30. IGP III, 1, 1941–6.

21. “Sorgente di speranza nella vita eterna.” Homily at the Holy Mass for the Solemnity of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary. August 15. IGP III, 2, 405–8.

22. “Una speranza costruttiva criterio della strategia dello sviluppo.” Address to the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization. August 26. IGP III, 2, 438–45. In English.

23. “Questo è un rendimento di grazie, questa è un’ora di speranza.” Address to the Bishops of Burma on their *ad limina* visit. October 10. IGP III, 2, 821–4.

24. “Messaggio di speranza per le Chiese locali che crescono.” Address to the Bishops of Thailand on their *ad limina* visit. November 27. IGP III, 2, 1434–38.

25. “L’uomo d’oggi ha bisogno di speranza e di gioia.” Address to the members of the Circolo San Pietro. December 23. IGP III, 2, 1786–88.

1981

26. “Segno vivo di speranza in Giappone e in tutta l’Asia.” Address to the representatives of non–Catholic Christian Churches in the Apostolic Nunciature of Tokyo, Japan. February 24. IGP IV, 1, 503–5.

27. “Dialogo sulla lingua, la speranza, lo sport, la musica, l’amore, la pace.” Meeting with young people in Budokan, Tokyo, Japan. February 24. IGP IV, 1, 518–25.

28. “Procedete sempre con chiarezza e con fiducia nella ricerca della verità accanto ai giovani d’oggi.” Address to the students participating in Convegno Veritas. March 7. IGP IV, 1, 635–8.

29. “Nello spirito dell’alleanza cristiana la speranza di divenire un’umanità nuova.” Address to the Young People of Bergamo, Italy. April 26. IGP IV, 1, 1028–32.

30. “L’importanza dell’eredità spirituale dell’Europa per il suo avvenire.” Address to the participants in the Congress of Europe. November 12. IGP IV, 2, 610–3.

31. “Affidandosi a Maria la Chiesa vuole testimoniare a tutti gli uomini la speranza.” Homily at the Holy Mass at the Basilica of Saint Mary Major. December 8. IGP IV, 2, 871–5.

1982

32. “La vostra operosità scientifica e didattica ravvivi e custodisca la speranza.” Address at the Antonianum Pontifical University. January 16. IGP V, 1, 135–42.

33. “Sull’esempio dei vostri santi e martiri restate sempre uniti e confermate i fratelli nella fede.” Address to the Bishops of Czechoslovakia on their *ad limina* visit. March 11. IGP V, 1, 806–12.

34. “È un viaggio di amore nella speranza della riconciliazione e della pace.” Greetings during the layover at the International Airport of Rio de Janeiro, Brasil. June 11. IGP V, 2, 2175–8.

35. “Il nostro pellegrinaggio terreno acquista speranza dalla Madre.” Homily at the Liturgy of the Word. November 6. IGP V, 3, 1187–93.

36. “Una parola di speranza cristiana a sostegno delle preoccupazioni pastorali.” Address to the French Bishops of the Provence–Méditerranée Apostolic Region on their *ad limina* visit. November 18. IGP V, 3, 1317–26.

37. “Coltivate in voi la forza necessaria a caricare di speranza la vostra Sicilia.” Address to the young people gathered in Piazza Politeama in Palermo, Italy. November 21. IGP V, 3, 1396–400.

38. “La nostra volontà di unione sia segno di speranza per il mondo diviso.” Address to the Bishops of Scotland on their *ad limina* visit. November 30. IGP V, 3, 1481–4. In English.

39. “Il matrimonio-sacramento si compie nella prospettiva della speranza escatologica.” General Audience. December 1. IGP V, 3, 1485–98.

40. “L’Anno Santo della Redenzione è annuncio di speranza, di salvezza e di misericordia.” To the Bishops of Kenya on their *ad limina* visit. December 6. IGP V, 3, 1531–4.

1983

41. “La Risurrezione di Cristo è la garanzia per il cristiano che nutre la speranza.” Homily at the Holy Mass at the Roman Parish of Our Lady of Lourdes. February 11. IGP VI, 1, 416–20.

42. “Riconosciamo nella ‘Croce con Cristo’ il fondamento della nostra speranza.” General Audience. March 30. IGP VI, 1, 853–61.

43. “Infondete nelle popolazioni zairesi speranza ed audacia evangeliche.” Address to the Bishops of Zaire on their *ad limina* visit. April 12. IGP VI, 1, 928–33.

44 “Uniti in un abbraccio di pace, di comunione e di speranza.” Address to the Bishops of Nicaragua on their *ad limina* visit. May 16. IGP VI, 1, 1254–7.

45. “Nella santità si manifesta costantemente l’inesauribile forza della redenzione di Cristo.” Homily for the beatification of Rafał Kalinowski and Albert Chmielowski, Cracow, Poland. June 22. IGP VI, 1, 1638–47.

46. “Maria, segno di speranza per il popolo di Dio.” Letter to the Archbishop of Malta and the Bishop of Gozo on the occasion of the 9th International Mariological Congress and 16th International Marian Congress. August 26. IGP VI, 2, 309–13. In English.

47. “La croce segno di speranza e di liberazione.” General Audience. September 7. IGP VI, 2, 396–407.

48. “Dio benedica l’Austria perchè sia cuore del Continente.” Address at the welcoming ceremony at the International Airport in Schwechat, Vienna, Austria. September 10. IGP VI, 2, 434–5.

49. “Il cammino della speranza per un ritorno alle radici spirituali dell’uomo.” Homily at the Holy Mass closing ‘Katholikentag,’ Vienna, Austria. September 11. IGP VI, 2, 457–65.

50. “Siate testimoni di speranza.” To the young people of Saint Charles Therapeutic Center of Castel Gandolfo. September 18. IGP VI, 2, 573–5.

51. “L’intensa nazionale è possibile in un Libano libero ed unito.” Address to the Lebanese faithful. October 13. IGP VI, 2, 759–64.

52. "Riscoprire il 'coraggio della speranza' e accogliere l'invito alla 'gioia dell'avvento.'" Homily at the Holy Mass at the Roman Parish of St. Camillo de Lellis. December 11. IGP VI, 2, 1319–23.

1984

53. "Catastrofe nucleare e piaga della fame si affacciano agghiaccianti all'orizzonte del mondo: In Maria, Madre di Cristo, la nostra speranza di pace." Homily at the Holy Mass for the Solemnity of Mary, Mother of God, and for the 17th World Day of Peace. January 1. IGP VII, l, 3–8.

54. "Nella certezza della fede il cristiano guarda al futuro con 'motivata Speranza.'" Address to the delegates to the Students' Movement of Catholic Action. February 25. IGP VII, 1, 513–5.

55. "La società ha bisogno di instancabili ricercatori della verità." Address to members of French Parliamentary Assemblies. March 5. IGP VII, 1, 626–8.

56. "La Chiesa e il mondo affidati a Maria per riconciliare gli uomini con Dio." Address to the pilgrims from Poland. March 26. IGP VII, 1, 848–53.

57. "Il rinnovamento spirituale del Giubileo speranza per la comunità ecclesiale." Message to the Assembly of the Italian Episcopal Conference. May 1. IGP VII, 1, 1175–9.

58. "Al sacerdozio, dono di Dio per l'uomo, il prete risponde col dono di se stesso." Homily at the Holy Mass in Taegu, South Korea. May 5. IGP VII, 1, 1249–53.

59. "Collaborazione ecumenica, speranza per il futuro." Address to the leaders of other Christian communities. May 6. IGP VII, 1, 1283–5.

60. "Le giovani generazioni sono sensibili ad un più dinamico annuncio di Cristo." Address to the Bishops of Thailand. May 11. IGP VII, 1, 1382–6.

61. "L'amore ci fa conoscere più profondamente Cristo." Address at the Holy Mass in Viterbo, Italy. May 27. IGP VII, 1, 1542–6.

62. "Ricerca scientifica ed informazione per dare speranza ai malati di cancro." Address to the delegation of the American Cancer Society. June 2. IGP VII, 1, 1590–1.

63. "La vitalità degli Istituti religiosi implica il rinnovamento della vita comunitria." Address to members of religious institutes, Fribourg, 13. IGP VII, 1, 1698–703.

64. "Uomo, che guardi con terrore il frutto del tuo lavoro, ricordati che la speranza è in Dio." Homily at the Holy Mass in Lucerne, 16 VI. IGP VII, 1, 1839–46.

65. "Offrite ai rifugiati la speranza, non solo la protezione." Message to the participants in the Second International Conference of the United Nations for the Assistance of Refugees in Africa. July 5. IGP VII, 2, 26–8.

66. "La ricchezza spirituale della Chiesa in Lituania segno di speranza per il mondo." Angelus. August 26. IGP VII, 2, 245–7.

67. "Maria: modello primordiale della Chiesa, fonte della nostra fede e della nostra speranza." Homily at the Holy Mass at the Sanctuary Notre-Dame du Cap in Quebec, Canada. September 10. IGP VII, 2, 412–9.

68. "Sono venuto qui per dirvi una parola di fraternità, d'incoraggiamento, di speranza." Address at the welcoming ceremony at Lamezia Terme, Calabria, Italy. October 5. IGP VII, 2, 755–9.

69. "Necessaria e urgente la sintesi tra istituzioni, risorse ed energie per ridare fiducia e speranza." Address to the people of Catanzaro, Italy. October 6 X. IGP VII, 2, 778–81.

70. “Fedeltà al passato di fede, sguardo alle sfide del presente, impegno per una nuova evangelizzazione.” Address for the inauguration of the ‘5th Centenary Novena,’ Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. October 12. IGP VII, 2, 885–97.

71. “San Carlo precursore di pastoralità vissuta attenta alle giovani speranze dell’avvenire.” Address to the community of the Borromeo Institute. November 3. IGP VII, 2, 1113–8.

72. “Nella solidarietà è la speranza dei polacchi.” Address at the audience for Polish pilgrims. December 24. IGP VII, 2, 1655–9.

1985

73. “Accolgo nel mio cuore la vostra Via Crucis.” Address at the meeting with the people of Guasmo, Ecuador. February 1. IGP VIII, 1, 322–6.

74. “L’unione tra i cristiani fonte di speranza per il Medio Oriente.” Message to the Patriarchs and members of the Middle East Churches. March 2. IGP VIII, 1, 577–8.

75. “Condurre il fratello sofferente alla sorgente della speranza.” Address to the members of the the Hospitalité de Notre Dame de Lourdes. March 18. IGP VIII, 1, 668–71.

76. “Il dialogo con Dio e con l’uomo per non deludere quanti sono alla ricerca della fede e della speranza.” Address to the participants in the Plenary Assembly of the Secretariat for Non-Believers. March 22. IGP VIII, 1, 688–93.

77. “La speranza del Libano è nei valori che uniscono.” Address to the parliamentary delegation of Lebanon. March 29. IGP VIII, 1, 852–4.

78. “Eroica testimonianza di fedeltà alla Chiesa.” Address to a group of pilgrims from Latvia. May 3. IGP VIII, 1, 1173–4.

79. “Vocazioni, famiglia, difesa della vita sono gli impegni prioritari per una efficace azione pastorale.” Adress to the priests and members of religious institutes gathered in the cathedral of Utrecht, Netherlands. May 12. IGP VIII, 1, 1285–93.

80. “Dovete sempre testimoniare il valore vero di ogni vita.” Homily at the Holy Mass for the sick in the Hague, Netherlands. May 13. IGP VIII, 1, 1303–9.

81. “Pace, giustizia, fraternità, saranno possibili se perseguite secondo lo spirito di Cristo.” Address to the young people of Wallonia and Brussels in Namur, Belgium. May 18. IGP VIII, 1,1500–10.

82. “Un mondo senza arte difficilmente si può aprire alla fede e all’amore.” Homily at the Holy Mass for artists in Brussels, Belgium. May 20. IGP VIII, 1, 1560–9.

83. “Giovani, siate annunciatori del Vangelo in questa ora cruciale della storia umana.” Message for the World Mission Day. June 8. IGP VIII, 1, 1743–9.

84. “La pace è speranza della gioventù e vera prospettiva per il mondo.” Address to the new ambassdor of Canada to the Holy See. November 7. IGP VIII, 2, 1211–3.

85. “La solidarietà con i sofferenti è un segno che fa bene sperare nelle nuove generazioni.” Address to the representatives of the Youth Missionary Service. December 23. IGP VIII, 2, 1591–2.

1986

86. “La Chiesa lucana guarda al suo futuro nello spirito della comunione ecclesiale.” Address to the Bishops of Basilicata on their *ad limina* visit. April 26. IGP IX, 1, 1143–7.

87. “Le religiose: segno di speranza.” Address at the meeting with nuns. April 27. IGP IX, 1, 1173.

88. Encyclical Letter *Dominum et Vivificantem* on the Holy Spirit in the Life of the Church and the World. May 18. Sections 2, 47, 56, 57, 66, 67.

89. “Fatevi umili ma forti testimoni della vita dovunque essa è in pericolo, disprezzata, non accolta.” Address for the inauguration of the Italian Paralympic Championships. June 8. IGP IX, 1, 1791–6.

90. “Vengo per condividere la vostra fede, i vostri affanni, le vostre speranze.” Address at the El Dorado International Airport of Bogotà, Colombia. July 1. IGP IX, 2, 11–4.

91. “Il servizio del Vescovo nella Chiesa colombiana maestro di verità, modello di santità, testimone di speranza.” Address to the Bishops of the Episcopal Conference of Colombia. July 2. IGP IX, 2, 56–65.

92. “Sono venuto per seminare nei cuori parole di fede e di speranza.” Address to the public authorities of Lérida, Spain. July 6. IGP IX, 2, 175–7.

93. “È il momento del giusto riconoscimento del diritto degli aborygeni alla terra.” Address to the Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders, Alice Spring, Australia. November 29. IGP IX, 2, 1756–63.

1987

94. “La cultura è speranza ed il cristiano se ne fa interprete.” Address to the teachers and students of the Carlo Tincani Institute in Bologna, Italy. January 24. IGP X, 1, 181–4.

95. Encyclical Letter *Redemptoris Mater* on the Blessed Virgin Mary in the Life of the Pilgrim Church. March 25. Sections 2, 11, 14, 15, 22, 26, 29, 30, 33, 42, 44, 47, 50, 52.

96. “La Chiesa ha bisogno della famiglia per restituire al mondo la speranza.” Homily at the Holy Mass for families at the Airport of Valparaiso, Chile. April 2. IGP X, 1, 959–68.

97. “Nei luoghi silenziosi della preghiera mariana si scopre il fulcro autentico della storia dell’uomo.” Homily at the recital of Lauds in Kevelaer, Germany. May 2. IGP X, 2, 1518–25.

98. “Ogni violazione dei diritti dell’uomo costituisce una minaccia alla pace.” Address at the Royal Castle in Warsaw, Poland. June 8. IGP X, 2, 2043–7.

99. “Apritevi alla verità, che è Cristo, per portare al mondo la speranza.” Address to the seminarians, priests, and members of religious institutes gathered at the cathedral of Szczecin, Poland. June 11. IGP X, 2, 2129–39.

100. “L’eroismo odierno di un giovane è il coraggio di persistere in una testimonianza di fede.” Address to young people at the Liturgy of the Word at the Westerplatte Peninsula, Gdańsk, Poland. June 12. IGP X, 2, 2150–8.

101. “Non è lecito permettere la degradazione degli uomini mentre ci si è assunti per essi la responsabilità davanti alla storia.” Address to the participants in the ‘Jasna Góra Appeal,’ Częstochowa, Poland. June 12. IGP X, 2, 2180–5.

102. Encyclical Letter *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis* for the 20th Anniversary of *Populorum Progressio*. December 30. IGP X, 3, 1547–664. Sections 6, 12, 13, 19, 20, 24, 38, 42, 44, 45, 47, 49.

1988

103. "Vi porto un messaggio di speranza, che non è passività." Address to workers, farmers, and miners, Oruro, Bolivia. May 11. IGP XI, 2, 1285–92.

104. "Si avvicini il giorno del bacio della pace fra la Chiesa Cattolica e la Chiesa Ortodossa." Homily at the Liturgy in the Byzantine-Ukrainian rite for the millennium of the baptism of St. Vladimir. July 10. IGP XI, 3, 73–80.

1989

105. "Il mondo si trova ad affrontare nuove sfide ma il Vangelo di Cristo è la nostra speranza." Address at the ecumenical meeting at the National Shirne of Thingvellir, Iceland. June 3. IGP XII, 1, 1483–9. In English.

106. "Il presbitero è l'uomo della speranza." Angelus. December 24. IGP XII, 2, 1613–23.

1990

107. "Crollano muri, si aprono frontiere ma permangono enormi barriere tra le speranze di giustizia e la loro realizzazione nel mondo." Address to the Plenary Assembly of the Pontifical Council of Culture. January12. IGP XIII, 1, 58–62.

108. "Il mondo comprende di nuovo che l'uomo non può vivere senza Dio." *Urbi et Orbi* Message on Easter Sunday, 15 IV. IGP XIII, 1, 901–10.

109. "Ecco, la notte è passata: il vostro pellegrinaggio verso la libertà deve tuttavia continuare." Homily at the Holy Mass at the Shrine of Velehrad. April 22. IGP XIII, 1, 976–81.

110. "È nel focolare familiare che si inizia a costruire un mondo migliore." Homily at the Holy Mass for the faithful of the Diocese of Willemstad at the Stadium of the Sentro Deportivo Kòrsou, Lesser Antilles. May 13. IGP XIII, 1, 1287–94.

111. Encyclical Letter *Redemptoris Missio* On the Permanent Validity of the Church's Missionary Mandate. December 7. IGP XIII, 2, 1398–483. Sections 24, 25, 36, 39, 51, 56, 68, 69, 70, 86, 90, 91.

1991

112. "La pace è ancora possibile, la guerra segnerebbe il declino di tutta l'umanità." Address to the Diplomatic Corps accredited to the Holy See. January12. IGP XIV, 1, 78–93.

113. "Dai profondi cambiamenti sociali rinasce la speranza di un''Europa dello Spirito.'" Address to the Diplomatic Corps accredited to Poland. June 8. IGP XIV, 1, 1600–6.

114. "Lo Spirito Santo, caparra della speranza escatologica e fonte della perservanza finale." General Audience. July 3. IGP XIV, 2, 27–36.

115. "Brigida di Svezia, santa dalle dimensioni europee, segno profetico di riconciliazione e di speranza." Homily at the Holy Mass on the 6th centenary of canonization of St. Bridget. October 6. IGP XIV, 2, 750–4.

116. “Tossicodipendenze e alcoolismo frustrano la persona proprio nella sua capacità di comunione e di dono.” Address to the participants in the 6th International Conference “Drugs and Alcohol against Life,” November 23. IGP XIV, 2, 1248–53.

117. “Ridisegnare il volto cristiano dell’Europa.” Angelus. December 15. IGP XIV, 2, 1392–3.

1992

118. “1992: Anno delle nuove vie del Vangelo.” Homily at the Holy Mass for the Solemnity of Mary, Mother of God. January 1. IGP XV, 1, 1–5.

119. “Suscitare una nuova cultura dell’amore e della speranza, ispirata dalla verità.” Address to the Plenary Assembly of the Pontifical Council of Culture. January 10. IGP XV, 1, 46–52.

120. “Sicurezza, cooperazione el salvaguardia della dimensione dell’uomo.” Address to the Diplomatic Corps accredited to the Holy See. January 11. IGP XV, 1, 61–75.

121. “Dal vivo passato missionario e dal martirio è nata la grande speranza incarnata nel dinamismo dei giovani.” General Audience. March 4. IGP XV, 1, 535–44.

122. Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortaion *Pastores Dabo Vobis* on the Formation of Priests in the Circumstances of the Present Day. March 25. IGP XV, 1, 700–957.

123. “Nella Chiesa, comunità profetica, la testimonianza della speranza.” General Audience. May 27. IGP XV, 1, 1605–8.

124. “Forti nello spirito di comunione servite il popolo aprendo nuove strade di giustizia e di progresso.” Address to the Bishops of the Episcopal Conference of Angola and São Tomé e Príncipe, Luanda, Angola. June 7. IGP XV, 1, 1756–63.

125. “Gli incontri giovanili con Maria: festa della speranza, desiderio e attesa di un mondo migliore.” Angelus. August 15. IGP XV, 2, 108–9.

126. “Non considieratevi maestri al di fuori di Cristo, bensì testimoni e servitori della sua parola.” Homily at the Holy Mass at the Cathedral of Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. October 10. IGP XV, 2, 273–81.

127. “‘Cristo ieri, oggi e sempre’ si faccia vita nelle persone, nelle famiglie e nella società dominicana.” Address during the farewell ceremony at Las Américas International Airport of Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. October 14. IGP XV, 2, 366–8.

128. “Alla Croazia ed alle altre nazioni coinvolte nella guerra non vengano meno l’atenzione e il sostegno internazionale.” Address to the Bishops of the Croatian Episcopal Conference. November 9. IGP XV, 2, 512–7.

1993

129. “Il vostro popolo ha bisogno di essere liberato dalle antiche paure e di sentirsi dire che è amato da Dio.” Address to the Bishops of the Episcopal Conference of Benin in Cotonou. February 3. IGP XVI, 1, 266–73.

130. “L’Africa chiede al mondo una rinnovata solidarietà: non possiamo lasciarla sola!” Angelus. February 14. IGP XVI, 1, 436–8.

131. “Non cedete mai alla tentazione dello scoraggiamento, aggrappatevi alla vita e alla speranza: La Chiesa è accanto a voi.” Address to the prisoners in the Malaspina Penitentiary in Caltanissetta, Italy. May 10. IGP XVI, 1, 1178–81.

132. “Camminiamo con Maria verso la gioia del compimento glorioso nel Regno di Dio.” Regina Coeli. May 23 V. IGP XVI, 1, 1303–4.

133. “La vostra missione deve essere come luce che brilla di verità e di soprannaturale carità.” Address to the General Chapter of the Marians of the Immaculate Conception. June 22. IGP XVI, 1, 1621–4.

134. Encyclical Letter *Veritatis Splendor*. August 6. IGP XVI, 2, 156–375. Sections 27, 60, 61, 64, 103, 109, 112, 120.

135. “A Denver grideramo, con la voce generosa dei giovani, l’impegno della Chiesa per la vita e per la pace.” Angelus. August 8. IGP XVI, 2, 376–9.

136. “America, difendi la vita!” Address during the welcome ceremony at the International Airport of Denver, USA. August 12. IGP XVI, 2, 444–8. In English.

137. “Contro tutte le forze della morte, Gesù Cristo continua a rappresentare l’unica speranza di vita.” Address at the vigil of prayer at Cherry State Park of Denver, USA, on the occasion of the 8th World Youth Day. August 14. IGP XVI, 2, 480–94. In English.

138. “L’Immacolata sta nel cuore del Mistero pasquale come ‘grembo’ del Redentore e primizia dei credenti.” Angelus. December 8. IGP XVI, 2, 1429–33.

139. “Il cammino del Sinodo diocesano è stato una manifestazione concreta di comunione apostolica.” Homily at the Holy Mass celebrated in thnaksgiving for the year 1993. December 31. IGP XVI, 2, 1586–91.

1994

140. “Dal ‘Santuario’ del dolore la preghiera del Padre apre gli animi alla ‘primavera autentica,’” Angelus. May V. IGP XVII, 1, 1042–3.

141. “Di fronte ai sentimenti di instabilità e di incertezza, la Chiesa è chiamata a testimoniare la speranza.” Address to the participants in the Plenary Assembly of the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace. September 29. IGP XVII, 2, 414–7.

142. *Crossing the Threshold of Hope*. Edited by Vittorio Messori. Translated by Jenny McPhee and Martha McPhee. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1994.

1995

143. “Aprite il Vangelo e scoprite che Cristo è la gioia, la roccia su cui la vostra debolezza si trasforma in forza.” Homily at the Holy Mass on the occasion of the 10th World Youth Day in Manila, Philippines. January 15. IGP XVIII, 1, 133–41.

144. “Parrocchia di Santa Giovanna Antida Thouret.” Homily at the Holy Mass at the Parish of St. Giovanna Antida Thouret in Rome. March 12. IGP XVIII, 1, 492–500.

145. Encyclical Letter *Evangelium Vitae* On the Value and Inviolability of Human Life. March 25. IGP XVIII, 1, 605–840. Sections 2, 5, 14, 15, 24, 25, 26, 31, 32, 44, 46, 49, 50, 64, 67, 74, 81, 85, 86, 88, 93, 94, 97, 99, 105.

146. “Per ogni cuore umano assetato di luce e di salvezza è risorta con Cristo la speranza.” Homily at the Easter Vigil at the Vatican Basilica. April 15. IGP XVIII, 1, 988–991.

147. Apostolic Letter *Orientale Lumen* to Mark the Centenary of *Orientalium Dignitas* of Pope Leo XIII. May 2. IGP XVIII, 1, 1118–79. Sections 1, 6, 8, 19, 28.

148. Encyclical Letter *Ut Unum Sint* On Commitment to Ecumenism. May 25. IGP XVIII, 1, 1434–1570. Sections 1, 4, 8, 17, 25, 26, 42, 53, 57, 63, 65, 69, 84, 99, 102.

149. "Uniti nella Casa di Maria per deporre un nuovo seme di speranza nella travagliata Europa dei nostri giorni." Address at the meeting with the young people on the Esplanade of Montroso in Loreto, Italy. September 9. IGP XVIII, 2, 338–43.

150. Apostolic Exhortation *Ecclesia in Africa* On the Church in Africa and its Evangelizing Mission Towards the Year 2000. September 14. IGP XVIII, 2, 373–541.

151. "Dai diritti dell'uomo ai diritti delle Nazioni." General Audience. October 11. IGP XVIII, 2, 808–18.

152. "La profetica attualità della *Gaudium et spes*." Angelus. October 29. IGP XVIII, 2, 1000–3.

153. "La Chiesa ha voluto davvero abbracciare il mondo." Address for the 30th anniversary of the proclamation of the Second Vatican Council's Pastoral Constitution *Gaudium et Spes*. November 8. IGP XVIII, 2, 1052–60.

1996

154. "I bambini sono il germoglio del Terzo Millennio: Non spegniamo la speranza nel loro cuore!" Angelus. January 1. IGP XIX, 1, 5–16.

155. Apostolic Exhortation *Vita Consecrata* On the Consecrated Life and Its Mission in the Church and in the World. March 25. IGP XIX, 1, 604–836. Sections 7, 13, 26, 27, 51, 58, 64, 74, 90, 99, 105, 112.

156. "Solo la fede e l'amore possono vincere la paura e riaccendere la speranza." Address at the meeting with youth at the airport of Postojna, Slovenia. May 18. IGP XIX, 1, 1281–1287.

157. "Maria illumina il destino dell'uomo." Angelus. August 14. IGP XIX, 2, 171–4.

1997

158. "È venuto per tutti il tempo di un profondo esame di coscienza: è venuto il tempo di un deciso impegno per la riconciliazione e la pace." Homily at Vespers with priests, religious and seminarians in Sarajevo. April 12. IGP XX, 1, 663–8.

159. "Ancora un ricordo del viaggio a Sarajevo e l'annuncio dell'imminente pellegrinaggio nella repubblica Ceca." Angelus. April 20. IGP XX, 1, 742–5.

160. "Come il primo grande Vescovo boemo siete chiamati ad affrontare le sfide che provocano oggi la vostra coscienza pastorale." Address at the meeting with the members of the Czech Episcopal Conference. April 25. IGP XX, 1, 815–22.

161. "Davvero qui il Vangelo non è stato predicato invano! La vostra storia cristiana non è finita, i vostri Santi non tacciono." Regina Coeli. April 27. IGP XX, 1, 839–40.

162. "Bisogna saper usare la propria libertà. Non lasciate che vi si renda schiavi!" Homily at the youth meeting, Poznań, Poland. June 3. IGP XX, 1, 1384–91.

163. "Da Parigi la speranza dei giovani è rimbalzata nel mondo." General Audience. August 27. IGP XX, 2, 221–8.

164. “Suscitare una grande mobilitazione delle coscienze, perché l’umanità si orienti e cammini secondo l’ordine che Dio ha impresso nella creazione.” Angelus. September 14. IGP XX, 2, 325–9.

165. “Maria: la Madre dell’unità e della speranza.” General Audience. November 12. IGP XX, 2, 791–8.

166. “Nell’implorazione al Bambino di Betlemme il grido dei popoli anelanti alla libertà; la voce di quanti sono impegnati ad abbattere barriere, il silenzio angosciato dei nuovi poveri.” *Urbi et Orbi* Message. December 25. IGP XX, 2, 1094–8.

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167. “Vengo come pellegrino di amore, verità e Speranza: Cuba si apra al mondo, il mondo si apra a Cuba.” Address at the welcome ceremony at the airport of La Habana, Cuba. January 21. IGP XXI, 1, 158–61.

168. “Sorretti dallo Spirito, comunicare la speranza.” Message for the 32nd World Communications Day. January 24. IGP XXI, 1, 234–7.

169. “Chiamati ad una dedizione senza riserve in un momento particolare della storia della Chiesa e dell’umanità.” Homily at the Holy Mass for the Solemnity of the Chair of St. Peter the Apostle. February 22. IGP XXI, 1, 409–13.

170. “Vittoriosi attraverso la ‘grande tribolazione.’” Homily for the beatification of eleven Spanish nuns and a Lebanese Maronite monk. May 10. IGP XXI, 1, 875–80.

171. Encyclical Letter *Fides et Ratio* On the Relationship between Faith and Reason. September 14. IGP XXI, 2, 375–454. Sections 5, 21, 26, 46, 74, 79, 90, 96.

172. “Lo Spirito ‘speranza che non delude.’” General Audience. November 11. IGP XXI, 2, 973–81.

173. “Segni di speranza presenti nel nostro tempo.” General Audience. November 18. IGP XXI, 2, 1029–36.

174. “I segni di speranza presenti nella Chiesa.” General Audience. November 25. IGP XXI, 2, 1085–8.

175. “La speranza come attesa e preparazione del Regno di Dio.” General Audience. December 2. IGP XXI, 2, 1172–9.

1999

176. “Mai più attacchi alla vita.” Homily at the Holy Mass at the Basilica of Our Lady of Guadalupe in Mexico City. January 23. IGP XXII, 1, 119–25.

177. “La grande ‘notte di veglia’ del Padre.” Homily at the Easter Vigil. April 3. IGP XXII, 1, 688–90.

178. “Paese ponte tra Oriente e Occidente, alla soglia del nuovo millennio poggia ancora il tuo futuro sulla salda roccia del Vangelo.” Address at the welcome ceremony in Bucarest, Romania. May 7. IGP XXII, 1, 909–13.

179. “Alla vigilla del Grande Giubileo vengo come un pellegrino dai figli e dalle figlie della mia patria con parole di fede, speranza e carità.” Address at the welcome ceremony in Gdańsk, Poland. June 5. IGP XXII, 1, 1195–8.

180. “La libertà per non essere sciupata esige un’enorme mobilitazione e la disponibilità spirituale di tutta la Chiesa.” Address to the Episcopal Conference of Poland, Warsaw, Poland. June 11. IGP XXII, 1, 1284–92. Sections 8, 9.

181. “Il nuovi Beati sono la testimonianza della vittoria di Cristo, il dono che restituisce la speranza.” Homily at the Holy Mass in Warsaw, Poland. June 13. IGP XXII, 1, 1326–33.

182. “Anton Martin Slomšek, pastore cattolico, è stato un tralcio che ha recato frutti abbondanti di santità cristiana, di singolare ricchezza culturale e di alto amor patrio.” Homily for the beatification of Bishop Anton Martin Slomšek. September 19. IGP XXII, 1, 374–8.

183. “Europa del terzo millennio, non rassegnarti a modi di pensare e di vivere che non hanno futuro.” Homily at the Holy Mass for the inauguration of the 2nd Special Synod of the Bishops Assembly for Europe. October 1. IGP XXII, 2, 535–40.

184. “La firma della Dichiarazione congiunta sulla dottrina della giustificazione per la fede: una pietra miliare sulla non facile strada della ricomposizione della piena unità tra i cristiani.” Angelus. October 31. IGP XXII, 2, 679–81.

185. “Avvento 1999: ‘Atrio’ d’ingresso nel Grande Giubileo.” Angelus. December 5. IGP XXII, 2, 1087–9.

2000

186. “La Chiesa stringe al suo cuore i testimoni del Vangelo della sofferenza.” Address for the Jubilee celebrations for the seek and healthcare workers. January 11. IGP XXIII, 1, 168–73.

187. “I miei occhi si volgono ora verso la Terra Santa….” Angelus. February 27. IGP XXIII, 1, 279–81.

188. “Perdonati e disposti a perdonare, i cristiani entrano nel terzo millennio come testimoni più credibili della speranza.” Angelus. March 12. IGP XXIII, 1, 356–7.

189. “Questa notte di veglia porta a compimento quella del Natale: Betlemme e il Calvario richiamano lo stesso mistero.” Homily at the Easter Vigil. April 22. IGP XXIII, 1, 660–3.

190. “Primavera del Grande Giubeleo del 2000: un palpito permanente di santità in Piazza San Pietro.” Homily for the canonization of twenty seven new saints. May 21. IGP XXIII, 1, 901–6.

191. “Un programma di evangelizzazione per il terzo millennio.” Homily at the Holy Mass for the participants in the Polish National Jubilee Pilgrimage. July 6. IGP XXIII, 2, 26–31.

192. “Fede, speranza, carità in prospettiva ecumenica.” General Audience. November 22. IGP XXIII, 2, 933–41.

193. “Fede, speranza, carità in prospettiva del dialogo interreligioso.” General Audience. November 29. IGP XXIII, 2, 979–86.

2001

194. “Verso nuovi cieli e una nuova terra.” General Audience. January 31. IGP XXIV, 1, 256–62. Section 3.

195. “Un soffio di rinnovata speranza.” Angelus. February 25. IGP XXIV, 1, 452–4.

196. “Uomini e donne del Terzo Millennio, questo nostro mondo può cambiare!” *Urbi et Orbi* Message. April 15. IGP XXIV, 1, 737–47.

197. “Un fecondo dialogo intereligioso basato sulla centralità della persona è l’unica via per allontanare lo spettro delle guerre di religione.” Message for the 87th World Day of Migration. July 25. IGP XXIV, 2, 105–9.

198. “Il viaggio apostolico in Kazakhstan e Armenia ha lasciato nel mio cuore impressioni ed emozioni vivissime.” General Audience. October 3. IGP XXIV, 2, 509–16.

199. “Nel mondo della salute l’esercizio del potere non si ispiri al desiderio di dominio o di profitto, ma sia animato da sincero spirito di servizio.” Address to the participants in the 16th International Conference on “Power and Health.” November 17. IGP XXIV, 2, 746–8.

200. “Le giornate del 14 dicembre e del 24 gennaio aiutino a creare nel mondo un clima più disteso e solidale.” Angelus. December 2. IGP XXIV, 2, 1001–3.

2002

201. “La Chiesa affida oggi ai fanciulli il compito di evangelizzare.” Angelus. January 6. IGP XXV, 1, 23–5.

202. “Salmo 42: Desiderio del Tempio di Dio.” General Audience. February 6. IGP XXV, 1, 162–8.

203. “La Quaresima, un cammino di conversione lungo i sentieri dell’amore e della gratuità.” General Audience. March 13. IGP XXV, 1, 214–9.

204. “Cantico: 1 Samuele 2, 1–10: La gioia e la speranza degli umili è in Dio.” General Audience. March 20. IGP XXV, 1, 400–6.

205. “Uomini e donne del terzo millennio! Là dove entra Cristo risorto, entra con Lui la vera pace!” *Urbi et Orbi* Message on Easter Sunday. March 31. IGP XXV, 1, 467–78.

206. “Le nuove frontiere del progresso delle scienze della vita siano improntate alla cultura della vita per dare all’uomo risposte valide e profonde.” Address to the participants in the Plenary Meeting of the Pontifical Council for the Pastoral Assistance to Healthcare Workers. May 2. IGP XXV, 1, 660–2.

207. “Voi siete giovani e il Papa è vecchio: Ma egli ancora si identifica con le vostre attese e con le vostre speranze.” Homily at the Holy Mass closing the 17the World Youth Day in the Downsview Park, Toronto, Canada. July 28. IGP XXV, 2, 103–6.

208. “La canonizzazione di Fratel Pedro de Betancur deve costruire un vero momento di grazia e di rinnovamento per il Guatemala.” Address at the welcoming ceremony in Guatemala. July 29. IGP XXV, 2, 117–8.

209. “Irreprensibili nella vita personale, familiare e pubblica, hanno sofferto il martirio per la fedeltà alla Chiesa Cattolica.” Homily at the Liturgy of the Word at the Basilica of Our Lady of Guadalupe in Mexico City. August 1. IGP XXV, 2, 130–3.

210. “I tre scopi del mio pellegrinaggio.” Address at the welcoming ceremony in Cracow, Poland. August 16. IGP XXV, 2, 165–8.

211. “Uscire dal grigiore quotidiano.” Angelus, December 1. IGP XXV, 2, 812–4.

212. “Dalle famiglie cristiane un segno di speranza per il mondo.” Angelus. December 15. IGP XXV, 2, 906–8.

213. “L’attenzione alle vocazioni, inserita all’interno della scelta di missionarietà, costituisce la linea portante della vita e della pastorale della Chiesa di Roma.” Homily at the Vespers on the Solemnity of Mary, Mother of God. January 31. IGP XXV, 2, 949–51.

2003

214. “La famiglia via privilegiata di dialogo, di riconciliazione e di pace.” Angelus. Januray 26. IGP XXVI, 1, 119–121.

215. “Salmo 89: Su di noi sia la bontà del Signore.” General Audience. March 26. IGP XXVI, 1, 273–8.

216. Encyclical Letter *Ecclesia de Eucharistia* On the Eucharist in its Relationship to the Church. April 17. IGP XXVI, 1, 468–512. Sections 1, 20, 59.

217. “Crescete nella santità.” Letter to the Archdiocese of Kraków and to the Church of Poland. May 8. IGP XXVI, 1, 683–6.

218. “Salmo 107: Lode a Dio e invocazione di aiuto.” General Audience. May 28. IGP XXVI, 1, 846–52.

219. Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation *Ecclesia in Europa* On Jesus Christ, Alive in His Church, the Source of Hope for Europe. June 28. IGP XXVI, 1, 1004–83. Sections 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 106, 107.

220. “La Chiesa è impegnata a costruire in Europa e nel mondo una ‘città degna dell’uomo.” Angelus, August 10. IGP XXVI, 2, 118–20.

221. “Maria ci orienta nel quotidiano cammino dell’esistenza terrena.” Angelus. August 15. IGP XXVI, 2, 132–4.

222. “Messaggio al Cardinale Crescenzio Sepe, speciale rappresentante all’ordinazione episcopale del primo Prefetto Apostolico di Ulaabaatar, Mongolia, e alla benedizione della Cattedrale.” Message to Cardinal Crescenzio Sepe, Special Envoy in Mongolia. August 22. IGP XXVI, 2, 147–9.

223. “Il Vescovo Vasil’ Hopko e Suor Zdenka Cecilia Schelingová, due esempi luminosi di fedeltà in tempi di dura e spietata persecuzione.” Homily for the beatification of the martyrs Vasil’ Hopko and Zdenka Schelingová, Bratislava, Slovakia. September 14. IGP XXVI, 2, 249–51.

224. Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation *Pastores Gregis* On the Bishop, Servant of the Gospel of Jesus Christ for the Hope of the World. October 16. IGP XXVI, 2, 392–598. Sections 2, 3, 4, 5.

225. “Non violenza, perdono, riconciliazione.” Angelus. November 30. IGP XXVI, 2, 840–1.

226. “Un Avvento di speranza.” General Audience. December 17. IGP XXVI, 2, 990–2.

2004

227. “Salmo 10: Nel Signore è la fiducia del giusto.” General Audience. January 28. IGP XXVII, 1, 108–12.

228. “Lourdes: quella polla d’acqua….” Angelus. February 8 II. IGP XXVII, 1, 168–70.

229. “Fate tutto ciò che è in vostro potere affinché la vita, tutta la vita, sia rispettata dal concepimento sino alla sua fine naturale.” Homily at the Holy Mass at the Shrine of Lourdes, France. August 15. IGP XXVII, 2, 136–9.

230. “Cristo, speranza per l’Africa.” Message for the 12th World Day of the Sick. September 8. IGP XXVII, 2, 223–8.

231. “Il ‘perchè’ dell’uomo: La risposta di Dio.” Angelus. September 19. IGP XXVII, 2, 279–81.

232. “I settimanali diocesani, singolari ‘pulpiti’ per l’annuncio del Vangelo della verità e della Speranza.” Address to the participants in the Assembly of the Italian Federation of Catholic Weeklies. December 3 XII. IGP XVII, 2, 645–6.

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> G.E.M. A n s c o m b e, *Nowożytna filozofia moralności*, tłum. M. Roszyk, „Ethos" 23(2010) nr 4(92), s. 39-60.

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> S. J u d y c k i, *Istnienie i natura duszy ludzkiej*, w: *Antropologia*, red. ks. S. Janeczek, Wydawnictwo KUL, Lublin 2010, s. 121-177.

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