



Studia i Analizy Nauk o Polityce

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Wstęp

Z wielką przyjemnością przekazujemy Państwu pierwszy numer czasopisma „Studia i Analizy Nauk o Polityce” w 2023 r., i tym samym otwieramy czwarty rok działalności periodyku. Czasopismo na przestrzeni tych lat stało się ważnym akademickim forum, na którym prezentowano pogłębione analizy i dokonywano oceny kluczowych zagadnień politycznych, militarnych i gospodarczych nie tylko w wymiarze globalnym, ale i regionalnym czy lokalnym. Istotnym walorem publikacji jest zarówno jej naukowy, jak i praktyczny charakter. Strukturę czasopisma tworzą artykuły, raporty z badań, recenzje, sprawozdania i polemiki. W periodyku publikowane są artykuły w językach polskim i angielskim. Problematyka pisma obejmuje zagadnienia z zakresu szeroko rozumianych nauk o polityce i administracji, stosunków międzynarodowych, bezpieczeństwa, historii najnowszej oraz komunikowania politycznego. Każdy dział jest redagowany przez niezależny zespół redaktorski tworzony przez naukowców, pracowników ośrodków współpracujących z redakcją w Polsce i za granicą, specjalistów w swoich dziedzinach.

W latach 2020–2022 zespołowi redakcyjnemu udało się terminowo sfinalizować sześć numerów czasopisma oraz wprowadzić periodyk do licznych baz. W 2021 r. została uruchomiona procedura publikacji *online first*, co dało możliwość wcześniejszej publikacji artykułów oraz podniosło atrakcyjność samego czasopisma. Po dwóch latach działalności półrocznik został wpisany na ministerialną listę czasopism. Cechą charakterystyczną periodyku jest różnorodność tematyczna każdego z numerów, dzięki czemu istnieje możliwość naświetlenia problemów z zakresu m.in. stosunków międzynarodowych, globalizacji, migracji, uchodźstwa, bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego, w tym energetycznego, mediów masowych oraz nowych mediów. Od początku istnienia „Studia i Analizy Nauk o Polityce” są otwarte na autorów

z całego świata. Na łamach czasopisma gościmy naukowców zarówno z Europy czy Azji, jak i z Afryki. Zaletą takiej różnorodności jest wielorakość analiz oraz zastosowanie odmiennych perspektyw badawczych.

Obecna dynamika zmieniającej się rzeczywistości międzynarodowej wskazuje na postępującą destabilizację systemu międzynarodowego. W tym momencie powoli przebudowuje się architektura bezpieczeństwa regionu i świata. Można zauważyć tworzące się dwa przeciwstawne bloki – z jednej strony są to państwa demokratyczne, skupione wokół Stanów Zjednoczonych i Unii Europejskiej, z drugiej państwa autorytarne na czele z Chinami i Rosją wraz z państwami sprzyjającymi ich polityce. Przyspieszenia nabierają zjawiska związane z migracjami, oddziaływaniem mediów i nowoczesnych technologii.

Tematyka prezentowanego numeru jest niezwykle zdywersyfikowana, począwszy od problemów z zakresu medioznawstwa i migracji, poprzez litewską politykę zagraniczną w XX w., aż po rolę nowoczesnych technologii w trakcie pandemii. Szeroki zakres zagadnień gwarantuje zróżnicowaną dyskusję naukową, a tym samym zapewnia aktualność wydania. Niewątpliwym atutem jest wysoki stopień interdyscyplinarności badań. Na łamach bieżącego tomu gościmy zarówno krajowych, jak i zagranicznych autorów.

Niniejszy numer otwiera artykuł poświęcony migracji i jej znaczeniu dla bezpieczeństwa europejskiego. Autorki Eleni Daniiloudi-Zielińska, Magdalena El Ghamari oraz Małgorzata Gąsior w publikacji *Śródziemnomorski wymiar nieregularnej migracji w latach 2014–2017 i jego implikacje dla percepcji bezpieczeństwa europejskiego* wskazały na wiele istotnych czynników determinujących zjawisko napływu ludności do Europy oraz opisały zagrożenia, jakie się z tym wiążą. Drugi artykuł dotyczy nowych trendów w mediach społecznościowych w Wietnamie. Międzynarodowy zespół badaczy Phuong Thi Vi, Sabahudin Hadžialić, Adamkolo Mohammed Ibrahim w pracy *Vietnam's Online Newspaper Development Trend in the Context of Social Media* wskazał na czynniki atrakcyjne dla odbiorcy, które zarazem sprzyjają rozwojowi mediów społecznościowych.

W trzecim artykule *Digital Literacy and Awareness of User Location Privacy: What People in Turkey Know About Google COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports?* autorzy İlknur Nina Paslanmaz Uluğ i Cem Sefa Sütcü postawili wiele pytań dotyczących użyteczności nowoczesnych technologii w codziennym życiu, głównie w kontekście pandemii COVID-19. Czwarty artykuł to praca Jarosława Płacheckiego, Cezarego Smuniewskiego oraz Karoliny Kochańczyk-Bonińskiej *Polish Organizations in Ireland. A Stimulus for Research on the National Security of the Republic of Poland*, w której naukowcy

przeanalizowali znaczenie organizacji polonijnych w kontekście polskiej polityki bezpieczeństwa.

Artykułem zamykającym numer jest publikacja Martinasa Malużinasa *Działania Ernestasa Galvanauskasa wobec założeń planu Hymansa – wewnętrzne uwarunkowania polityczne*, dotyczącą ważnego problemu związanego z polityką zagraniczną Litwy i jej relacji z Polską w okresie międzywojennym.

Integralną część czasopisma „Studia i Analizy Nauk o Polityce” stanowią sprawozdania. Pierwsze, autorstwa Anety Bąk-Pituchy, zostało poświęcone Międzynarodowej Konferencji Naukowej „Cybersecurity Threats – Russian Aggression Against Ukraine and Disinformation”, która odbyła się 16 marca 2023 r. Drugie, przygotowane przez Annę Szachon-Pszenny, dotyczy Ogólnopolskiej Konferencji Naukowej „Od Lublina do Lizbony – 15 lat Polski w strefie Schengen. Korzyści dla społeczeństwa obywatelskiego”, która została zorganizowana 27 kwietnia 2023 r. w Katolickim Uniwersytecie Lubelskim Jana Pawła II.

Zapraszamy do lektury
Agnieszka Zaręba

Introduction

It is with great pleasure that we present to you the first issue of the journal “Studies and Analyses of Political Science” in 2023, and thus we open the fourth year of the periodical’s activity. Over the years, the journal has become an important academic forum where in-depth analyses and assessments of key political, military and economic issues have been presented, not only on a global, but also on a regional or local level. An important value of the publication is both its scientific and practical nature. The structure of the journal consists of articles, research reports, reviews, accounts and polemics. The journal publishes articles in Polish and English. The journal’s subject matter covers issues in the broad fields of political science and administration, international relations, security, recent history and political communication. Each section is edited by an independent editorial team made up of researchers, employees of the centres cooperating with the editorial office in Poland and abroad, specialists in their fields.

In 2020-2022, the editorial team managed to finalise six issues of the Journal in a timely manner and introduce the periodical into numerous databases. In 2021, an *online first* publication procedure was launched, which provided the opportunity to publish articles earlier and increased the attractiveness of the journal itself. After two years of operation, the journal was included in the ministerial list of journals. A distinctive feature of the periodical is the thematic diversity of each issue, which makes it possible to highlight issues in the fields of, among others, international relations, globalisation, migration, refugees, international security, including energy, mass media and new media. Since its inception, “Studies and Analyses of Political Science” has been open to authors from all over the world. The journal hosts scientists from Europe, Asia and Africa. The advantage of such diversity is the multiplicity of analyses and the use of different research perspectives.

The current dynamic of changing international reality points to the progressive destabilization of the global system. At this point, the security architecture of the region and the world is slowly being rebuilt. You can see two opposing blocs forming – on the one hand, these are Democratic states, centred around the United States and the European Union, on the other, authoritarian states headed by China and Russia, along with states that favour their policies. The phenomena associated with migration, the influence of the media and modern technologies are gaining momentum.

The theme of the issue is highly diverse, ranging from problems in the field of media studies and migration, through Lithuanian foreign policy in the 20th century, to the role of modern technologies during the pandemic. The wide range of issues guarantees a diverse scientific discussion and thus ensures the timeliness of the publication. An undoubted advantage is the high degree of interdisciplinarity of research. In the pages of the current volume, we welcome both domestic and foreign authors.

This issue opens with an article on migration and its importance to European security. Authors Eleni Daniiloudi-Zielińska, Magdalena El Ghamari and Małgorzata Gąsior, in their publication *The Mediterranean Dimension of Irregular Migration 2014-2017 and its Implications for the Perception of European Security*, identified a number of important factors determining the phenomenon of the influx of people into Europe and described the risks involved. The second article deals with new trends in social media in Vietnam. An international team of researchers Phuong Thi Vi, Sabahudin Hadžialić, and Adamkolo Mohammed Ibrahim, in their paper *Vietnam's Online Newspaper Development Trend in the Context of Social Media*, identified audience-attractive factors that simultaneously favour social media development.

In the third article *Digital Literacy and Awareness of User Location Privacy: What People in Turkey Know About Google COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports?* authors Ilknur Nina Paslanmaz Uluğ and Cem Sefa Sütçü have raised many questions about the usefulness of modern technologies in everyday life, mainly in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. The fourth article is the work of Jarosław Płachecki, Cezary Smuniewski and Karolina Kochańczyk-Bonińska *Polish Organizations in Ireland. A Stimulus for Research on the National Security of the Republic of Poland* in which the researchers analysed the importance of Polish organizations in the context of Polish security policy.

The closing article is the publication of Martinas Malužinas *Actions of Ernestas Galvanauskas Towards the Hymans Plan – Internal Political Circumstances*

on an important issue related to Lithuania's foreign policy and its relations with Poland in the interwar period.


An integral part of the journal "Studies and Analyses of Political Science" are reports. The first, by Aneta Bąk-Pitucha, was dedicated to International Scientific Conference "Cybersecurity Threats - Russian Aggression Against Ukraine and Disinformation", which took place on March 16, 2023. The second, prepared by Anna Szachoń-Pszenny, concerns the All-Polish Scientific Conference 'From Lublin to Lisbon - 15 Years of Poland in the Schengen Area. Benefits for civil society', which was organised on 27 April 2023 at The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin.

We invite you to read
Agnieszka Zaręba


Śródziemnomorski wymiar nieregularnej migracji w latach 2014–2017 i jego implikacje dla percepcji bezpieczeństwa europejskiego

The Mediterranean Dimension of Irregular Migration 2014–2017 and Its Implications for the Perception of European Security


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Streszczenie: Problem nieregularnej migracji do Unii Europejskiej (UE) przez Morze Śródziemne to zjawisko, które towarzyszy Wspólnocie Europejskiej (WE) od wielu lat. Kryzys migracyjny, który rozpoczął się w 2014 r., ukazał całej społeczności międzynarodowej, iż wyzwaniem dla UE jest nie tylko niekontrolowana migracja, ale również to, co stanowi jej przyczynę. W związku z bliskim sąsiedztwem UE z regionem Bliskiego Wschodu i Afryki Północnej (ang. *Middle East and North Africa* – MENA) priorytetem członków WE powinno być zarówno udzielanie pomocy osobom potrzebującym, jak i skuteczne wspieranie państw regionu, borykających się z problemami wewnętrznymi, które w niedalekiej przyszłości mogą tylko tę migrację nasilić. W regionie MENA, zamieszkałym przez ponad 40 mln migrantów i 14 mln wewnętrznych przesiedleńców, mają miejsce liczne klęski żywiołowe, kryzysy (spowodowane przez człowieka czy aktualnie wywołane skutkami pandemii COVID-19) oraz konflikty (są to jedne z najdłużej trwających na świecie). Celem artykułu jest określenie przyczyn kryzysu migracyjnego z lat 2014–2017 oraz ukazanie skali nieregularnej migracji wraz z wynikami prowadzonych badań naukowych. Na szczególną uwagę w tym zakresie zasługuje określenie znaczenia Morza Śródziemnego dla migracji oraz wskazanie odpowiedzi UE na problem niekontrolowanej migracji drogą morską.

Słowa kluczowe: migracja, Unia Europejska, uchodźcy, migranci, Morze Śródziemne, bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe, region MENA

Abstract: The problem of irregular migration to the European Union (EU) via the Mediterranean Sea is a phenomenon that has been with the European Community (EC) for

many years. The migration crisis that began in 2014 has shown the entire international community that the challenge for the EU is not only uncontrolled migration but also what causes it. In the context of the EU's close neighborhood with the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA), the priority of EC members should be both to provide assistance to those in need and to effectively support the countries of the region facing internal problems, which in the near future can only increase this migration. The MENA region, home to more than 40 million migrants and 14 million internally displaced persons, has experienced numerous natural disasters, crises (man-made or currently caused by the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic) and conflicts (some of the longest-running in the world). The aim of the article is to determine the causes of the migration crisis of 2014–2017 and to show the scale of irregular migration along with the results of scientific research. Particularly noteworthy in this respect is the identification of the importance of the Mediterranean Sea for migration and the determination of the EU's response to the problem of uncontrolled migration by sea.

Keywords: migration, European Union, refugees, migrants, Mediterranean, international security, MENA region

Problem nieregularnej migracji do Unii Europejskiej (UE) nie jest zjawiskiem nowym. Już od lat 90. XX w. UE, jak i jej państwa członkowskie były stałym punktem docelowym dla wielu grup migrujących, np. z powodów ekonomicznych lub politycznych. Autorki niniejszego artykułu nieregularne migracje rozumieją jako migracje bez upoważnienia do przekroczenia granicy, czyli nielegalne. Nieregularna, nieuprawniona lub nieudokumentowana migracja to praktyka przekraczania granicy międzynarodowej bez oficjalnej zgody władz. Kontekst nieregularnego migranta trzeba natomiast rozpatrywać dwojako. Po pierwsze, w aspekcie globalnym – nieregularny migrant to osoba, która z powodu nielegalnego wjazdu, naruszenia warunków wjazdu lub wygaśnięcia podstawy prawnej wjazdu i pobytu nie posiada statusu prawnego w kraju tranzytowym lub przyjmującym; po drugie, w aspekcie unijnym – to obywatel państwa trzeciego obecny na terytorium obszaru Schengen, który nie spełnia lub przestał spełniać warunki wjazdu określone w rozporządzeniu Rady UE (Rozporządzenie 2016/399, kodeks graniczny Schengen) lub inne warunki wjazdu (Migration and Home Affairs 2008).

Kryzys migracyjny, który rozpoczął się w 2014 r., stanowiący – w ocenie wielu ekspertów – największe wyzwanie UE, spowodowany był wieloma przeobrażeniami mającymi miejsce w regionie Bliskiego Wschodu i Afryki Północnej (ang. *Middle East and North Africa* – MENA). Przyczyny migracji są różne: ludzie przemieszczają się w poszukiwaniu pracy oraz możliwości

ekonomicznych lub by dołączyć do rodziny, inni w celach edukacyjnych, jeszcze inni, aby uciec przed konfliktem, prześladowaniami, terroryzmem lub łamaniem praw człowieka, niektórzy migrują w odpowiedzi na negatywne skutki zmian klimatycznych, katastrofy naturalne, kataklizmy czy inne czynniki środowiskowe. Analizując złożoność wydarzeń w regionie MENA, z pewnością na uwagę zasługuje spuścizna operacji militarnych w Iraku i Afganistanie z 2003 r., arabskich rewolucji z 2011 r., które rozpoczęły się w Afryce Północnej i dalej objęły Wschód, czy też aktywność organizacji terrorystycznych oraz powstanie kalifatu Daesz w 2015 r. na terenach Syrii i Iraku. Zaś wojna w Ukrainie z 2022 r. dodała kolejną warstwę złożoności dla normalnego funkcjonowania w regionie.

Nieregularne migracje stały się ważnym zjawiskiem społeczno-politycznym, związanym z ekspansją globalizacji i handlu między narodami. Przez dziesięciolecia kształtowała się, a następnie przeobrażała scena społeczna oraz gospodarcza na wielu kontynentach, w wielu regionach i krajach świata. Mieszkańcy regionu MENA posiadają wiele powodów, dla których chcą wyemigrować – są to kwestie ekonomiczne, polityczne, czynniki bezpieczeństwa oraz możliwości edukacyjne. Wydaje się, że przyczyny te bardziej korelują z atmosferą polityczną w poszczególnych krajach, niż są powtarzającymi się kwestiami w całym regionie.

W związku z tym, iż w realizowanych badaniach naukowych nie można ograniczyć się do wskazania jednej przyczyny zaistniałej sytuacji, koniecznym staje się podjęcie głębszej analizy, która uwzględni wielopłaszczyznowość poruszanego problemu. Z punktu widzenia efektywności działań UE najważniejsze – w toku prowadzonych badań – są implikacje dla percepcji bezpieczeństwa europejskiego. Problem badawczy podjęty w ramach niniejszego artykułu stanowi określenie przyczyn zaistniałego kryzysu migracyjnego oraz ukazanie skali nieregularnej migracji. Autorki celowo wybrały zakres czasowy lat 2014–2017, ponieważ ukazuje on istotny moment w procesach migracyjnych do Europy. Historyczna, trzyletnia perspektywa migracyjna oraz zaistniałe wydarzenia w badanym okresie są – w opinii auterek – ważnym punktem wyjścia do debaty nad specyfiką migracji do Europy, tras migracyjnych oraz wydarzeń politycznych. Wobec powyższego zespół badawczy opracował następujące szczegółowe cele badawcze, które zostały sformułowane poprzez:

1. Określenie znaczenia Morza Śródziemnego dla ruchów migracyjnych oraz wskazanie głównych morskich szlaków migracyjnych wiodących przez ten akwen.

2. Zaprezentowanie oraz dokonanie oceny działań UE podejmowanych w odpowiedzi na analizowany problem.
3. Wskazanie państw regionu śródziemnomorskiego, których sytuacja wewnętrzna w przyszłości może potęgować niekontrolowaną migrację.

W związku z tak przyjętą problematyką badawczą autorki zdecydowały się wprowadzić ograniczenia:

- a) przestrzenne – badania będą dotyczyły problemu nieregularnej migracji morskimi szlakami migracyjnymi tylko w rejonie Morza Śródziemnego;
- b) czasowe – analiza zjawiska migracji będzie obejmować lata 2014–2017, natomiast analizie zostaną poddane konsekwencje dla polityki UE do 2022 r.

Należy stwierdzić, iż powyższe rozważania stały się inspiracją oraz zamiarem badawczym. Ów zamiar, w toku prowadzonych badań wstępnych, przekształcono do postaci głównego problemu badawczego, który wyrażono w następującym pytaniu: Jaka była skala nieregularnej migracji do UE drogą morską w tamtym czasie? Problem badawczy poddano dekompozycji do postaci konstytuujących go problemów szczegółowych: Jakie były przyczyny nieregularnej migracji do UE? Jakie jest znaczenie Morza Śródziemnego dla nieregularnej migracji?

1. Przyczyny nieregularnej migracji do Unii Europejskiej

Przeprowadzona analiza podkreśla fakt, że dynamika bezpieczeństwa Bliskiego Wschodu i Afryki Północnej zmieniła się radykalnie w ciągu ostatniej dekady, co więcej – będzie się nadal zmieniać w przewidywalnej przyszłości (World Bank 2018). Na początku 2011 r. większość państw MENA była w stanie pokoju i wydawała się być stosunkowo stabilna, mimo iż rządono w wielu krajach w sposób autorytarny, prowadząc dyktatorskie rządy m.in. w Tunezji, Libii czy Egipcie. Kraje Afryki Północnej były w stanie pokoju pod rządami autorytarnych przywódców (Borderon, Sakdapolrak, Muttarak, Kebede, Pagogna, Sporer 2019). Konflikty arabsko-izraelskie ograniczały się do starć na niskim poziomie między Izraelem a Palestyną. Egipt działał jako stabilna główna siła regionalna. Iran postrzegany był jako słaba potęga militarna zależna od broni o niskiej jakości i datowanej. Islamscy ekstremiści w Iraku wydawali się być pokonani. Inne arabskie państwa Zatoki Perskiej zdawały się być zjednoczone

w Radzie Współpracy Zatoki Perskiej. Jemen był państwem ubogim i nie mógł zaspokoić potrzeb wielu swoich obywateli, ale wciąż wydawał się stabilny. Wydatki na wojsko i zakupy broni były wysokie jak na światowe standardy, ale stanowiły jedynie ograniczone lub umiarkowane obciążenie dla lokalnych gospodarek (World Development Report 2021).

Czynniki, które determinują skalę, jak i kierunek migracji, można podzielić na dwie grupy, tj. wypychające i przyciągające (Rhodes 2018). W ramach pierwszej grupy istotną rolę będą odgrywać czynniki ekonomiczne i edukacyjne. W ramach drugiej należy również wyróżnić te czynniki, które będą zmuszać do migracji, np. katastrofy naturalne, konflikty zbrojne czy wojny domowe. Grupa czynników przyciągających będzie skorelowana z grupą czynników wypychających, gdyż państwa o wysokim stopniu rozwoju gospodarczego, stabilną sytuacją wewnętrzną, w których istnieje poszanowanie praw człowieka zawsze będą pożądanymi punktami docelowymi dla grup migrujących (Borderon i in. 2019).

Problem niekontrolowanej migracji na obszar UE pojawił się już w latach 90. XX w. na skutek przemian geopolitycznych, które przyczyniły się np. do rozpadu Związku Socjalistycznych Republik Radzieckich (ZSRR) czy wojen na Bałkanach, co spowodowało wzrost nieregularnej migracji do państw członkowskich Wspólnoty Europejskiej.

Wzrost ruchów migracyjnych w XXI w. związany był z poszerzeniem grona państw członkowskich UE w 2004 r. oraz strefy Schengen w 2007 r. Choć w tych przypadkach migracja miała najczęściej charakter legalny, to warto podkreślić, iż ponad 100 mln osób, tj. obywateli partycypujących państw, uzyskało możliwość swobodnego przemieszczania się (Nowotnik 2011).

W odniesieniu do podejmowanej problematyki za pierwotną przyczynę kryzysu migracyjnego, który towarzyszył UE od 2014 r., należy wskazać brak zatrudnienia dla mieszkańców Afryki zaliczanych do pierwszego pokolenia eksplozji demograficznej lat 80. XX w. (Martin, Davis, Benton, Waliandy 2019). W podejmowanej analizie czynnik ten jest bardzo istotny, ponieważ przyczynił się do pogłębienia ubóstwa Afrykanów (Dimsdale, Mabey 2018). Z badań wynika, że około 12% populacji tego kontynentu to osoby w wieku poprodukcyjnym, co potwierdzało, iż dla większości mieszkańców zasadniczym problemem był brak pracy, który motywował ich do jej poszukiwania, np. na kontynencie europejskim (Mickiewicz 2017). Na tak prezentujące się pierwotne przyczyny kryzysu migracyjnego nakładały się czynniki wypychające, czyli kryzysy polityczne oraz konflikty wewnętrzne, wśród których należy wyróżnić:

- a) rewolucje w Afryce Północnej i na Bliskim Wschodzie w 2011 r. oraz ich skutki w postaci obalenia rządów w Tunezji, Egipcie i Libii czy pełzającej/hybrydowej wojny domowej w Syrii;
- b) nieudaną próbę demokratyzacji Iraku, która w efekcie wycofania amerykańskich wojsk umożliwiła swobodne funkcjonowanie organizacji ekstremistycznych, w tym powstania organizacji terrorystycznej (Dimsdale, Mabey 2018; El Ghamari 2021);
- c) koncentrację działań wojskowych w Afganistanie od 2003 r. w wyniku operacji reagowania kryzysowego (El Ghamari 2015; Rhodes 2018);
- d) reżimy, np. w Erytrei, czy niestabilne państwa targane aktywnością organizacji terrorystycznych, m.in. Nigeria (Boko Haram), Somalia (Asz-Szabab; Hanne, Flichy de La Neuville 2015).

Po ponad dekadzie zmian i perturbacji w regionie aktualnie żadna z tych kwestii nie jest prawdą. Regionalna rywalizacja, ekstremizm oraz seria politycznych powstań i konfliktów, które kiedyś nazwano „arabską wiosną”, zmieniły region MENA w arenę starć między lokalnymi frakcjami, walki o władzę, korupcji i społecznej frustracji. To, co przed wstrząsami politycznymi, które rozpoczęły się w 2011 r., wydawało się być względnie stabilnym wzorcem rozwoju bezpieczeństwa narodowego i wsparcia zewnętrznego, współcześnie stanowi scenę konfliktów wewnętrznych, nowych bitew z ruchami ekstremistycznymi oraz dużych wojen domowych w Iranie, Libii, Syrii i Jemenie (Naufal, Genc 2015). Wojny domowe, zaangażowanie międzynarodowe i niestabilność stały się równie poważnym wyzwaniem dla bezpieczeństwa i stabilności regionu MENA, jak zagrożenia militarne, ekstremizm i terroryzm. Wysiłki na rzecz reformy systemu rządów i gospodarki nie spełniły potrzeb większości państw (Faath, Mattes 2014). Kryzys COVID-19 dodatkowo pogłębił problemy społeczne i gospodarcze. Wiele reżimów rozpoczęło poważny wyścig zbrojeń (w czasie, gdy stało się to jeszcze bardziej nieosiągalne), podczas gdy ich obywatele wykazywali większe potrzeby w zakresie skutecznych rządów, wskazując na takie problemy, jak: władza wolna od korupcji, walka z ubóstwem, rozwój gospodarczy, godne miejsca pracy i dochody.

Wzrosły również zagrożenia militarne i ekstremizm. Iran pojawił się jako znacznie poważniejsze zagrożenie militarne w Zatoce Perskiej. Inwazja Stanów Zjednoczonych na Irak w 2003 r., jak również walka o pokonanie ekstremistów i zakończenie walk frakcyjnych w Iraku (która wydawała się kończyć w 2011 r.) doprowadziły do dwóch dekad bezpośredniego udziału Stanów Zjednoczonych w aktywnej walce (przy wsparciu bojowym sił

partnerskich). Chociaż doprowadziło to do rozbitcia „kalifatu” tzw. Państwa Islamskiego (ISIS) w Iraku, pozostawiło na miejscu znaczących bojowników ISIS, wzmacniając jednocześnie proirańskie Siły Mobilizacji Ludowej (PMF) i stwarzając poważną niepewność co do tego, czy Irak skończy jako strategiczny partner Stanów Zjednoczonych czy też znajdzie się pod wpływem Iranu. Zaś podmioty niepaństwowe, takie jak m.in. Hezbollah, irackie PMF czy Huti, stały się znaczącym zagrożeniem (podczas gdy Stany Zjednoczone wykorzystywały pomoc w zakresie bezpieczeństwa – i nowo utworzone Brygady Wsparcia Sił Bezpieczeństwa – do stworzenia własnych podmiotów niepaństwowych w Syrii). Inne mocarstwa, w tym m.in. Rosja, zapewniły wsparcie, oddziały bojowe i najemników, aby wesprzeć aktorów niepaństwowych w Libii i Syrii. W szerszym ujęciu Iran, siły Baszara al-Asada w Syrii, libański Hezbollah, proirańskie PMF w Iraku oraz Huti w Jemenie stworzyły koalicję wrogich sił, które zagrażają zarówno interesom Stanów Zjednoczonych, jak i amerykańskim partnerom strategicznym.

W badanym okresie Rosja, podobnie jak i Turcja, umocniła się jako główne mocarstwo i konkurent, odgrywając ważną rolę w zakresie bezpieczeństwa w Libii i Syrii, a także zwiększając swój udział w regionalnym transferze broni. Jednocześnie siły wojskowe i bezpieczeństwa każdego kraju Bliskiego Wschodu i Afryki Północnej nadal zmieniają swoją wielkość, strukturę i postawę, a rezultaty są w najlepszym wypadku mieszane. Wiele państw Bliskiego Wschodu i Afryki Północnej, które dysponują dużymi budżetami na wojsko oraz bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne – i które dokonują ogromnych zakupów broni – ma ograniczone zdolności do walki w realnym świecie i do zapewnienia bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego. Są one słabo przygotowane do radzenia sobie ze zmieniającym się charakterem zagrożeń militarnych w regionie i w dużym stopniu uzależnione są od sił zewnętrznych.

Na szczególną uwagę zasługuje w badanym ujęciu wojna w Ukrainie, która dodała kolejną warstwę złożoności dla normalnego funkcjonowania w regionie. Konflikt w Ukrainie w istotny sposób wpływa na światowe bezpieczeństwo żywnościowe ze względu na znaczącą rolę, jaką Rosja i Ukraina odgrywają na międzynarodowych rynkach rolnych. Aktualnie ok. 33% światowego eksportu pszenicy, 80% eksportu oleju słonecznikowego i 19% eksportu kukurydzy są zakłócone przez paraliż produkcji i transportu na Morzu Czarnym (Bonesh 26.04.2022). Większość państw w regionie MENA jest szczególnie narażona na szoki cen żywności. Są one strukturalnie uzależnione od rynków międzynarodowych, częściowo ze

względu na ich możliwości rolnicze, które z natury są ograniczone przez czynniki geograficzne i klimatyczne, a także przez wzrost demograficzny. Region MENA dokonuje rocznie ok. 33% światowych zakupów zbóż, mimo że region ten reprezentuje jedynie 4% światowej populacji. Ukraina realizuje prawie połowę swojego eksportu pszenicy i ok. 33% eksportu kukurydzy i oleju słonecznikowego do krajów MENA. Dla porównania, kraje takie jak Maroko, Turcja, Iran, Arabia Saudyjska, Izrael i Jordania importują 10–15% swojej pszenicy z Ukrainy. Ponadto Egipt, Tunezja, Oman i Jemen również importują 25–35% swojej pszenicy z Kijowa, zaś w przypadku Libii liczba ta wynosi 50%, a Libanu 65% (Dene, Labow, Silber 4.03.2022). Co więcej, wojna w Ukrainie ma wpływ na dostępność funduszy humanitarnych np. dla Libanu, Algierii, Maroka, Libii, Jemenu, Iraku, Egiptu i Syrii. Większość krajów już doświadczyło spadku finansowania z powodu tego konfliktu zbrojnego. Można wnioskować zatem, że ten negatywny trend w finansowaniu pomocy humanitarnej utrzyma się w ciągu najbliższych miesięcy w związku z nieustającą walką. Kraje MENA da się także opisać poprzez kategorie kryzysowe – kryzysy krytyczne (Syria, Jemen, Libia), chroniczne (Palestyna, Liban, Irak) oraz opanowane (Tunezja, Egipt, Algieria, Jordania, Maroko, Iran). Konflikt w Ukrainie z pewnością spowoduje, że kilka państw regionu MENA znajdzie się na dole listy priorytetów rządów państw darczyńców, instytucji międzynarodowych i światowych mediów. Dla milionów Palestyńczyków, Libańczyków, Jemeńczyków, Stryjczyków i innych, którzy żyją w krajach doświadczających konfliktów, głodu, katastrofalnych załamań gospodarczych i rosnących potrzeb humanitarnych, będzie to równoznaczne z wyłączeniem „krytycznego podtrzymania” życia. Jeszcze przed konfliktem w Ukrainie braki w finansowaniu prowadziły do ograniczania programów i zmniejszania racji żywnościowych w ramach niesionej pomocy (OCHA Services 20.05.2022).

2. Skala nieregularnej migracji do Unii Europejskiej drogą morską

Jak wspomniano, wzrost ruchów migracyjnych do UE nastąpił po 2004 r. i był on związany głównie z migracją zarobkową (Tausch 2019). Kryzys migracyjny, który wystąpił po 2014 r., spowodowany był szeroką skalą czynników, które jedynie zasygnalizowano powyżej. Autorki niniejszego artykułu wychodzą z założenia, iż przyczyny nieregularnej migracji wzajemnie

ze sobą korespondują oraz wynikają ze złożoności problemów lokalnych państw i zagranicznych ingerencji krajów zainteresowanych wpływami w danym regionie. Przez sumę tych czynników można opisać szereg przyczyn, które mogłyby stać się zaczynem do kolejnej publikacji naukowej lub szeregu prac poświęconych każdemu z aspektów przedstawionych powyżej. Z pewnością nie da się także wyróżnić wszystkich czynników wpływających na migracje, bowiem stanowią one zjawisko dynamiczne i ciągle ulegają zmianom, które należy rozpatrywać w szerszym ujęciu historycznym.

W analizowanym przypadku migranci przymusowi wybierali nie tylko trasy lądowe, ale i morskie. Skale migracji z wykorzystaniem poszczególnych szlaków migracyjnych prezentuje tabela 1. Na potrzeby niniejszego opracowania autorki zdecydowały się użyć określenia migranci, przez który należy rozumieć zarówno uchodźców, jak i imigrantów.

Tabela 1. Skala nieregularnej migracji do UE w 2014 r. z uwzględnieniem wykorzystywanych szlaków migracyjnych

Szlaki migracyjne	2014
Środkowośródziemnomorski	159 581
Wschodniośródziemnomorski	46 639
Zachodniobałkański	40 017
Albańsko-grecki	7 466
Zachodniośródziemnomorski	6 007
Wschodni	1 086
Morze Czarne	422
Zachodnioafrykański	237
Inne	10
Ogółem	261 494

Źródło: opracowanie własne na podstawie Frontex 2015.

Skala nieregularnej migracji w 2014 r. wyniosła 261 494 osób (tabela 1). Warto zwrócić uwagę, iż najbardziej obciążonymi presją migracyjną były szlaki prowadzące przez Morze Śródziemne, czyli środkowośródziemnomorski, wschodniośródziemnomorski i zachodniośródziemnomorski. W 2014 r. drogą morską do UE dotarło ogółem 212 227 osób, a droga lądową 49 267 osób (tabela 2), co również potwierdziło, iż migranci najczęściej wybierali morskie szlaki migracyjne.

Tabela 2. Skala nieregularnej migracji do UE w 2014 r.
z uwzględnieniem drogi morskiej i lądowej

Drogi niekontrolowanej migracji	2014
Droga morska	212 227
Droga lądowa	49 267
Ogółem	261 494

Źródło: opracowanie własne na podstawie Frontex 2015: 16.

W 2015 r. skala nieregularnej migracji do UE znacznie wzrosła i wynosiła już 1 046 599 osób (tabela 3; Frontex 2016). W porównaniu do roku poprzedniego wynik ten był czterokrotnie wyższy (261 494 osób). Z przeprowadzonych badań wynika, że w 2015 r. drogą lądową dotarło 34 887 osób, a drogą morską aż 1 011 712 osób, co tylko potwierdziło kluczowe znaczenie akwenu śródziemnomorskiego dla migracji. Dokonana analiza umożliwiła również wskazanie państw „pierwszego wejścia”, czyli tych, do których migranci kierowali się w pierwszej kolejności, a były to Grecja (853 650 osób), Włochy (153 842 osób) oraz Hiszpania (3845 osób). Do tych trzech państw migranci docierali głównie drogą morską. W przypadku Grecji i Włoch najczęściej wykorzystywano szlak wschodniośródziemnomorski oraz środkowośródziemnomorski, natomiast w podróżowaniu do Hiszpanii szlak zachodniośródziemnomorski (tabela 3; Frontex 2014–2017).

Tabela 3. Skala nieregularnej migracji do UE w 2015 r. z uwzględnieniem drogi morskiej i lądowej oraz państw „pierwszego wejścia” (w porządku alfabetycznym)

Państwa „pierwszego wejścia”	Droga morska	Droga lądowa	Ogółem
Bułgaria	-	31 174	31 174
Cypr	269	-	269
Grecja	853 650	3 713	857 363
Hiszpania	3 845	-	3 845
Malta	106	-	106
Włochy	153 842	-	153 842
Ogółem	1 011 712	34 887	1 046 599

Źródło: opracowanie własne na podstawie IOM 2015: 4.

W 2016 r. odnotowano spadek skali nierejestrowanej migracji i wynosiła ona 387 739 osób (tabela 4). Tak znacząca zmiana dostrzegalna była również w przypadku państw, które do 2015 r. były nią najbardziej obciążone. Przykładowo, Grecja w 2015 r. odnotowała „wejścia” w liczbie 857 363 osób, a rok później 176 906 osób, co stanowiło spadek o 79% (Daniiloudi, Gąsior 2015).

Tabela 4. Skala nieregularnej migracji do UE w 2016 r. z uwzględnieniem drogi morskiej i lądowej oraz państw „pierwszego wejścia” (w porządku alfabetycznym)

Państwa „pierwszego wejścia”	Droga morska	Droga lądowa	Ogółem
Bułgaria	-	15 962	15 962
Cypr	189	-	189
Grecja	173 614	3 292	176 906
Hiszpania	8 162	5 084	13 246
Włochy	181 436	-	181 436
Ogółem	363 401	24 338	387 739

Źródło: opracowanie własne na podstawie IOM 2016: 6.

W 2017 r. malejąca skala ruchów migracyjnych była nadal dostrzegalna. Wówczas do UE dotarło ogółem 146 287 osób, w tym drogą morską 137 771 osób, drogą lądową 8516 osób (IOM 2017). Podobnie jak w latach 2014–2015, presją migracyjną obciążone były takie państwa, jak: Włochy, Grecja, Hiszpania, Bułgaria i Cypr (tabela 5).

Tabela 5. Skala nieregularnej migracji do UE w 2017 r. z uwzględnieniem drogi morskiej i lądowej oraz państw „pierwszego wejścia” (w porządku alfabetycznym)

Państwa „pierwszego wejścia”	Droga morska	Droga lądowa	Ogółem
Bułgaria	-	545	545
Cypr	818	-	818
Grecja	19 674	3 659	23 333
Hiszpania	11 861	4 312	16 173
Włochy	105 418	-	105 418
Ogółem	137 771	8 516	146 287

Źródło: opracowanie własne na podstawie IOM 2017: 4.

Z przeprowadzonych badań wynika, że znacząca zmiana w skali nierejestrowanej migracji w 2016 r. i 2017 r. podyktowana była kilkoma czynnikami, wśród których należy wymienić:

- a) porozumienie zawarte między UE a Turcją;
- b) zmiany w normach prawnych dotyczących przekraczania granic, jakie wprowadzały państwa europejskie;
- c) stale wzrastającą liczbę utonięć migrantów na Morzu Śródziemnym.

Zgodnie z obowiązującym porozumieniem turecko-unijnym z czerwca 2016 r. wszyscy migranci, którzy nielegalnie docierali do Grecji przez Turcję, byli do niej zawracani, skąd kolejno przesiedlani do państw członkowskich UE. Dodatkowe korzyści, jakie wynikały z tego porozumienia dla Turcji, powodowały, że państwo to skrupulatnie kontrolowało swoje granice, co mogłoby wznowić rozmowy akcesyjne na linii UE-Turcja czy też podjąć decyzje o zniesieniu wiz unijnych dla obywateli tureckich. W badanym okresie głównym celem UE było wsparcie finansowe Turcji w udzieleniu pomocy Syryjczykom przebywającym na jej terytorium.

Po zawarciu kompromisu 800 migrantów deportowano z Grecji do Turcji, a pod koniec 2016 r. 8389 Syryjczyków zostało przesiedlonych z Turcji do państw członkowskich UE (IOM 2017). Nadto dodatkowym narzędziem stała się zawarta w 2002 r. umowa o readmisji, która umożliwiała zawracanie osób nieupoważnionych do ochrony międzynarodowej z Grecji do Turcji (IOM 2017).

Istotnym elementem stały się także zmiany w regulacjach prawnych dotyczące przekraczania granic, wprowadzane przez niektóre państwa członkowskie. W tym przypadku warto wspomnieć o działaniach podejmowanych przez Węgry. Na mocy porozumienia z 5 lipca 2016 r. służby węgierskie odprowadzały wszystkich nielegalnych migrantów, którzy zostali zatrzymali w odległości 8 km od granicy, do najbliższej strefy tranzytowej, gdzie mogli złożyć wniosek o azyl. Strona węgierska wprowadziła również ograniczenia w zakresie liczby przekroczeń granicy do 20 dziennie, z podziałem na 2 strefy tranzytowe Horgos i Kelebija (IOM 2017).

3. „Śródziemnomorska autostrada” – znaczenie Morza Śródziemnego dla nieregularnej migracji. Analiza wyników prowadzonych badań

Autorki niniejszego artykułu starały się przeanalizować przyczyny migracji oraz zbadać szlaki, zarówno morskie, jak i lądowe, wykorzystywane przez zdeterminowanych migrantów w celu dotarcia do Europy. W związku z tym, że podróż szlakami lądowymi była bardzo trudna, m.in. ze względu na konieczność pokonania tysięcy kilometrów oraz funkcjonowania w trudnych warunkach sanitarnych, wiele osób decydowało się na podróż drogą morską. Takie okoliczności spowodowały, iż aktywnie zaczęły działać grupy zajmujące się przemytem ludzi.

Niekontrolowana migracja odbywała się w części zachodniej, centralnej i wschodniej Morza Śródziemnego. Migracja w części zachodniej dotyczyła przejść z Maroka i Algierii do Hiszpanii, przez dwie enklawy, tj. Ceutę i Melillę. Tę granicę morską najczęściej przekraczali obywatele Maroka, Algierii, Nigerii, Kamerunu i Senegalu. Nierejestrowana migracja w tej części morza wspierana była również grupami przemytników działającymi w Mali i Nigerii.

Migracja we wschodniej części Morza Śródziemnego dotyczyła przejść z Turcji do Grecji, a wśród grup migrujących dominowali Syryjczycy, Afgańczycy i Irakijczycy. Był to najczęściej wykorzystywany w 2015 r. szlak. Uszczelnienie przez Grecję granic doprowadziło do zwiększania częstotliwości wykorzystania szlaku środkowo- i zachodniośródziemnomorskiego (Daniiloudi-Zielińska, El Ghamari 2022).

W przypadku tych dwóch państw Afryki Północnej największe wskaźniki wyjścia odnotowały porty Libii. U wybrzeży tego państwa krzyżowały się dwa szlaki migracyjne, tj. wschodnioafrykański, prowadzący z Rogu Afryki na wschód Libii, oraz środkowośródziemnomorski, wiodący z Libii do Włoch. Przemyt ludzi najczęściej rozpoczynał się w trzech portach: Trypolis, Zuwara i Misrata. Kierunkiem migracji były niezmiennie Włochy oraz Wyspa Lampedusa (EUNAVFOR MED – Operation SOPHIA 29.01.2016).

Należy w tym miejscu podkreślić, iż czynnikiem sprzyjającym koncentracji morskich szlaków migracyjnych u wybrzeży Libii była sytuacja wewnętrzna tego państwa. Na skutek arabskiej wiosny oraz obalenia dyktatury Muammara Kaddafiego Libia targana była konfliktami wewnętrznymi, a w efekcie wyborów w 2014 r. pogrążyła się w kryzysie politycznym (El Ghamari 2016). Dodatkowo w 2015 r. znaczny pas wybrzeża zatoki Wielkiej Syrty kontrolowany był przez bojowników tzw. Państwa Islamskiego, dokonujących

ataków na roponośne tereny (Bartoszewicz, El Ghamari 2020). Na skutek destabilizacji wewnętrznej oraz osiągnięcia dość niepokojącego stopnia dysfunkcyjności (The Fund for Peace b.r.) służby porządkowe w żaden sposób nie były w stanie kontrolować sytuacji wewnętrznej oraz egzekwować nieprzestrzegania prawa, co zachęcało grupy przemytnicze do większej aktywności (Minda, Sasnal 10.03.2016).

Z migracją przez Morze Śródziemne związane były również liczne przypadki utonięć. Z przeprowadzonych badań wynika, że skala tego zjawiska w latach 2014–2016 stale wzrastała, osiągając w 2016 r. wynik 5082 ofiar (International Organization for Migration b.r.).

Mimo tego, że najbardziej obciążony migracją był szlak wschodniośródziemnomorski, to w środkowej części odnotowywano najwyższe liczby utonięć. Z podejmowanych analiz wynika, iż głównym powodem tej sytuacji były dramatyczne warunki transportu migrantów. Grupy przemytnicze, mając na względzie zysk, organizowały wyjścia na przepelnionych łodziach, w efekcie czego osoby transportowane często wypadały za burtę lub umierały z powodu uduszenia. Wielokrotnie odnotowywano przypadki zatonięcia jednostek z powodu ich przepelnienia, co najczęściej miało miejsce właśnie w środkowej części Morza Śródziemnego (IOM 2015). Skalę utonięć na Morzu Śródziemnym przedstawia tabela 6.

Tabela 6. Skala utonięć na Morzu Śródziemnym w latach 2014–2017

Rejon Morza Śródziemnego	2014	2015	2016	2017
Część zachodnia	59	102	69	161
Część środkowa	3189	2869	4579	1646
Część wschodnia	35	806	434	61
Ogółem	3283	3777	5082	2993

Źródło: opracowanie własne na podstawie raportów IOM 2015; IOM 2016.

W realizowanych badaniach podjęto się również analizy struktury narodowościowej migrantów (tabela 7). W 2015 r. wśród grup migrujących największy procent stanowili kolejno: Syryjczycy, Afgańczycy, Irakijczycy, co tylko potwierdza, że największe wskaźniki ucieczek dotyczyły państw targanych konfliktami wewnętrznymi. W 2016 r. struktura ta przedstawiała się już inaczej ze względu na większy udział mieszkańców państw Afryki

Subsaharyjskiej (Kłosowicz 2014). Tendencja ta utrzymywała się również w 2017 r., co wskazywało, iż obywatele państw najbardziej niebezpiecznych także wykorzystywali możliwości dotarcia do Europy (UNHCR 2017).

Tabela 7. Struktura narodowościowa migrantów w latach 2015–2017
(w porządku alfabetycznym)

Kraj pochodzenia migrantów	2015	2016	2017
Afganistan	20,2%	12,5%	-
Bangladesz	-	2,2%	10,3%
Erytrea	4,2%	5,9%	-
Gambia	-	3,2%	6,3%
Gwinea	-	3,4%	9,3%
Irak	7,1%	7,9%	-
Iran	2,1%	-	-
Mali	-	2,6%	2,2%
Maroko	-	-	5,4%
Nigeria	2,2%	10,4%	11,7%-
Pakistan	2,7%	2,4%	-
Senegal	-	-	5,7%
Somalia	1,6%	2,1%	-
Sudan	-	2,8%	-
Syria	50,2%	24,1%	7,7%
Wybrzeże Kości Słoniowej	-	3,2%	8,7%

Źródło: opracowanie własne na podstawie IOM 2015; IOM 2016; UNHCR 2017.

Odpowiedź Unii Europejskiej na problem nieregularnej migracji drogą morską

Kryzys migracyjny, który na tak dużą skalę pojawił się w UE w 2014 r. wymagał od członków Wspólnoty Europejskiej podjęcia szeregu działań umożliwiających zarówno zlikwidowanie jego przyczyn, jak i zminimalizowanie skutków. W przypadku analizowanego problemu autorki chciałyby

zwrócić uwagę na działania operacyjne podejmowane w regionie Morza Śródziemnego, które dotyczyły działań Europejskiej Agencji Straży Granicznej i Przybrzeżnej (dalej: Frontex) oraz działań w ramach Wspólnej Polityki Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony (WPBiO).

W 2014 r. w basenie Morza Śródziemnego Frontex prowadził kilka operacji morskich:

- a) Aenas oraz Tryton w centralnej części morza;
- b) Hera, Minerva oraz Indalo w zachodniej części morza;
- c) Posejdon we wschodniej części morza.

W przypadku każdej z nich głównym zadaniem agencji było udzielenie wsparcia państwowym nadbrzeżnym przy kontrolowaniu ich zewnętrznych granic oraz ratowanie życia na morzu. Jak podaje Mariusz Zieliński (2005), operacje te od 2015 r. były kontynuowane, ale w ramach formuły operacji połączonych (ang. *joint operations*). W tym samym roku Frontex również wykorzystał możliwość uruchomienia tzw. szybkich sił interwencyjnych w postaci *Poseidon Rapid Intervention* (Council of the EU and the European Council 2017). Tylko w 2016 r. w ramach operacji Aenas i Tryton siłom Frontexu udało się uratować 38 750 osób. Działania ratownicze przeprowadzane były na wodach włoskich oraz we włoskiej strefie SAR (ang. *Search and Rescue* – poszukiwanie i ratownictwo). Do przeprowadzenia operacji Aenas i Tryton zaangażowano 523 oficerów, 9 jednostek pływających, 3 samoloty oraz 2 helikoptery (Council of the EU and the European Council 2017). W ramach operacji Hera, Indalo i Minerva zadaniem sił Frontexu było udzielenie pomocy Hiszpanii w kontrolowaniu nielegalnego przekraczania granic tego państwa, włącznie z wykrywaniem przypadków posługiwania się fałszywymi dokumentami. Tylko w ciągu dwóch miesięcy 2016 r. uratowano 1140 osób, zaś w działania operacji zaangażowanych było 105 oficerów, 3 jednostki pływające oraz 2 samoloty (Council of the EU and the European Council 2017). W ramach operacji Posejdon siły unijne wspierały Grecję w kontrolowaniu nierejestrowanego przekraczania jej granic, w tym w przeprowadzaniu rejestracji migrantów oraz organizacji ich powrotów. Siły Frontexu patrolowały oraz kontrolowały morskie granice Grecji w sąsiedztwie z Turcją, jak i greckie wyspy. Ogółem w 2016 r. uratowano 37 479 osób. Do przeprowadzenia tej operacji w 2016 r. zaangażowano 667 oficerów, 19 jednostek pływających, 1 samolot oraz 2 helikoptery.

Uzupełnieniem działań Frontexu stała się również operacja militarna pod kryptonimem EUNAVFOR MED SOPHIA (dalej: SOPHIA; Decyzja Rady 2015/972). Operacja ta uruchomiona jeszcze w 2015 r. miała za

zadanie zakłócenie modelu działania przemytników ludzi w południowym rejonie środkowej części Morza Śródziemnego. W związku z tym, że siły unijne mogły działać tylko na morzu otwartym, ich obecność w środkowej części basenu śródziemnomorskiego sprowadzała się do ratowania życia na morzu oraz monitorowania i kontrolowania jednostek, wobec których zachodziło podejrzenie przemytu ludzi. W czerwcu 2016 r. Rada UE podjęła decyzję o poszerzeniu mandatu operacji o następujące zadania: szkolenie sił libijskiej Straży Przybrzeżnej i Marynarki Wojennej oraz egzekwowanie nałożonego przez Organizację Narodów Zjednoczonych (ONZ) embarga na dostawy broni do Libii. Dodatkowo czas trwania operacji został przedłużony do 31 grudnia 2018 r. (Council of the EU and the European Council 2017). Wsparciem sił unijnych w rejonie stała się także operacja prowadzona przez Sojusz Północnoatlantycki pod kryptonimem Sea Guardian, która stanowiła kontynuację operacji Active Endeavour realizowanej na Morzu Śródziemnym.

Tylko w 2016 r. w ramach operacji SOPHIA uratowano 179 475 osób. Dzięki zaangażowaniu operacyjnemu siłom unijnym udało się zatrzymać 101 osób podejrzanych o działalność przemytniczą oraz zniszczono 358 jednostek, którymi dokonywano przemytu ludzi. W następstwie tego, że mandat operacji został poszerzony o przeszkolenie oficerów libijskiej Straży Przybrzeżnej (*Raport AI: Rządy UE zamieszane w przerażające nadużycia wobec uchodźców* 16.12.2017) oraz Marynarki Wojennej udział w nich wzięło 78 osób (Frontex 2017).

W ocenie autorek niniejszego artykułu bezdyskusyjnie należy docenić zaangażowanie operacyjne UE na morzu, jednakże fakt samego działania sił – niestety – nie rozwiązuje zaistniałego problemu. Większość analityków jest zgodna w jednej kwestii: mimo ratowania życia na morzu, działania operacyjne w basenie śródziemnomorskim wspierają przemytników ludzi. Wynika to w głównej mierze z faktu, iż biznes przemytniczy rozwija się na lądzie. Z pewnością pomoc udzielana migrantom na pełnym morzu jest niczym innym jak reagowaniem na skutki aktywności grup przestępczych (*Europol* b.r.). W związku z powyższym ogromnym wyzwaniem, zarówno z punktu widzenia UE, jak i całej społeczności międzynarodowej, jest wspólna oraz solidarna polityka migracyjna i integracyjna, ale również działania na rzecz stabilizacji sytuacji w regionach dotkniętych konfliktami oraz ubóstwem. Poprawa sytuacji w państwach zmagającymi się z licznymi wewnętrznymi problemami ekonomicznymi i społecznymi mogłoby znacząco wpłynąć na zmniejszenie zagrożeń związanych z nierejestrowaną

migracją do państw członkowskich Wspólnoty Europejskiej. Jest to jednak proces długofalowy, do którego potrzebne są wspólne inicjatywy państw europejskich i poszczególnych agend ONZ. Dlatego też działania UE powinny skupiać się także na wewnętrznej polityce migracyjnej oraz integracyjnej. Doświadczenia wewnątrzspółnotowe ostatnich lat pokazują nam z jednej strony dynamikę zmian w tym zakresie (np. reformy systemu azylowego, Europejska Straż Graniczna i Przybrzeżna w ramach wzmacniania bezpieczeństwa granic czy programów integracyjnych), a z drugiej problemy w tworzeniu solidarnościowych systemów ochrony uchodźców.

Wnioski

Poddany analizie problem nieregularnej migracji drogą morską do UE ze względów politycznych stanowił największe wyzwanie Wspólnoty Europejskiej. W ciągu niecałych czterech lat do Europy drogą morską dotarło 1 659 676 osób, które oczekiwały od państw europejskich stosownej pomocy. Niestety, ok. 14 000 osób to także ofiary przemytu ludzi, którym nie udało się szczęśliwie dotrzeć na Stary Kontynent.

Zaistniała sytuacja stanowiła impuls do podjęcia wielorakich działań, co można było zaobserwować m.in. na przykładzie prowadzonych operacji w basenie Morza Śródziemnego. Poza ratowaniem życia na morzu UE próbowała również rozwiązać problemy państw członkowskich, które zostały najbardziej dotknięte presją migracyjną, wprowadzając np. obowiązkową dla wszystkich członków Wspólnoty Europejskiej kwotową relokację nierejestrowanych migrantów z ośrodków greckich i tureckich. Kolejny przykład stanowi dyskusja dotycząca konieczności weryfikacji polityki migracyjnej.

Dużym wsparciem działań UE w odpowiedzi na kryzys migracyjny będzie m.in. stabilizacja wewnętrzna Libii, Syrii, Iraku czy Afganistanu. Stabilność w regionie tych państw umożliwi nie tylko zahamowanie migracji drogą morską i walkę z przemytnikami, ale także stanie się podstawą do podjęcia długofalowej współpracy z UE.

Biorąc pod uwagę sąsiedztwo UE z regionem MENA, niezwykle istotne jest reagowanie na pojawiające się kryzysy oraz stałe monitorowanie sytuacji w regionie i w wybranych państwach. Zbytnia koncentracja na aktualnych problemach Syrii, Iraku czy Afganistanu może spowodować przecenienie problemów innych państw, np. Algierii czy Egiptu, których skutki

ponownie będą dotyczyć obszaru traktatowego. Bardzo ważne w tym przypadku jest podejście analityczne. Trudno jest uzyskać gwarancje, iż państwa, które obecnie są stabilne, za kilka lat nie będą targane wojną domową. Odpowiednimi przykładami będą państwa Afryki Subsaharyjskiej, takie jak Nigeria, Etiopia czy Republika Środkowoafrykańska. Odpowiednia wiedza na temat sytuacji wewnętrznej wybranych państw i zachodzących w nich zmian może w pewien sposób ułatwić reagowanie na zaistniałe kryzysy.

Analizując wypowiedzi niektórych przedstawicieli państw europejskich, autorki nie mogą zgodzić się ze stwierdzeniem, iż zaprezentowana skala migracji jest największą, z jaką UE miała do czynienia. Możliwość porównania danych dotyczących współczesnego kryzysu migracyjnego oraz migracji, która dotknęła Europę w latach 90. XX w., pozwala wnioskować, że skala tych zjawisk jest bardzo zbliżona. Zasadniczą różnicę – którą należy wskazać – stanowi koncentracja presji migracyjnej na kilku państwach członkowskich UE, np. Grecji, Włochach czy Bułgarii.

W podjętej analizie wśród państw członkowskich dostrzeżono również rozbieżne stanowiska dotyczące proponowanych rozwiązań w odpowiedzi na zaistniały kryzys. Różnice te wynikały m.in. z faktu „zabarwienia” problemu migracji wątkiem religijnym i kulturowym, co stanowiło największą przeszkodę w poszukiwaniu kompromisów. Odnosząc się do problemów wybranych państw regionu MENA oraz państw afrykańskich, można wnioskować, iż w ujęciu perspektywicznym problem migracji może być na stałe wpięty w katalog wyzwań UE, dlatego tak ważne jest, aby w zaistniałej sytuacji Wspólnota Europejska wypracowała kolegiąlnie odpowiednie rozwiązania.

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The Mediterranean Dimension of Irregular Migration 2014–2017 and Its Implications for the Perception of European Security

Śródziemnomorski wymiar nieregularnej migracji w latach 2014–2017 i jego
implikacje dla percepcji bezpieczeństwa europejskiego


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Abstract: The problem of irregular migration to the European Union (EU) via the Mediterranean Sea is a phenomenon that has been with the European Community (EC) for many years. The migration crisis that began in 2014 has shown the entire international community that the challenge for the EU is not only uncontrolled migration but also what causes it. In the context of the EU's close neighborhood with the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA), the priority of EC members should be both to provide assistance to those in need and to effectively support the countries of the region facing internal problems, which in the near future can only increase this migration. The MENA region, home to more than 40 million migrants and 14 million internally displaced persons, has experienced numerous natural disasters, crises (man-made or currently caused by the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic) and conflicts (some of the longest-running in the world). The aim of the article is to determine the causes of the migration crisis of 2014–2017 and to show the scale of irregular migration along with the results of scientific research. Particularly noteworthy in this respect is the identification of the importance of the Mediterranean Sea for migration and the determination of the EU's response to the problem of uncontrolled migration by sea.

Keywords: migration, European Union, refugees, migrants, Mediterranean, international security, MENA region

Streszczenie: Problem nieregularnej migracji do Unii Europejskiej (UE) przez Morze Śródziemne to zjawisko, które towarzyszy Wspólnocie Europejskiej (WE) od wielu lat. Kryzys migracyjny, który rozpoczął się w 2014 r., ukazał całej społeczności międzynarodowej,

iz wyzwaniem dla UE jest nie tylko niekontrolowana migracja, ale również to, co stanowi jej przyczynę. W związku z bliskim sąsiedztwem UE z regionem Bliskiego Wschodu i Afryki Północnej (ang. *Middle East and North Africa* – MENA) priorytetem członków WE powinno być zarówno udzielanie pomocy osobom potrzebującym, jak i skuteczne wspieranie państw regionu, borykających się z problemami wewnętrznymi, które w niedalekiej przyszłości mogą tylko tę migrację nasilić. W regionie MENA, zamieszkałym przez ponad 40 mln migrantów i 14 mln wewnętrznych przesiedleńców, mają miejsce liczne klęski żywiołowe, kryzysy (spowodowane przez człowieka czy aktualnie wywołane skutkami pandemii COVID-19) oraz konflikty (są to jedne z najdłużej trwających na świecie). Celem artykułu jest określenie przyczyn kryzysu migracyjnego z lat 2014–2017 oraz ukazanie skali nieregularnej migracji wraz z wynikami prowadzonych badań naukowych. Na szczególną uwagę w tym zakresie zasługuje określenie znaczenia Morza Śródziemnego dla migracji oraz wskazanie odpowiedzi UE na problem niekontrolowanej migracji drogą morską.

Słowa kluczowe: migracja, Unia Europejska, uchodźcy, migranci, Morze Śródziemne, bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe, region MENA

Irregular migration to the European Union (EU) is not a new phenomenon. Since the '90s of the 20th century, the EU and its member states have been a constant destination for many migrant groups, e.g. for economic or political reasons. The authors of this article understand irregular migration as migration without authorization to cross the border, that is, illegal. Irregular, unauthorised or undocumented migration is the practice of crossing an international border without official permission. However, the context of the irregular migrant must be considered in two ways. Firstly, in the global aspect – an irregular migrant is a person who, due to illegal entry, violation of the conditions of entry, or the expiry of the legal basis for entry and stay, does not have legal status in the transit or host country; secondly, in the EU aspect – is a third-country national present on the territory of the Schengen area, who does not meet or no longer meets the entry conditions set out in the EU Council Regulation (Rozporządzenie 2016/399, Schengen borders code) or other conditions of entry (Migration and Home Affairs 2008).

The migration crisis, which began in 2014 and is considered by many experts to be the EU's greatest challenge, has been caused by a number of transformations taking place in the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA). The reasons for Migration vary: people move in search of work and economic opportunities or to join their families, others for educational purposes, others to escape conflict, persecution, terrorism, or human

rights violations, some migrate in response to the negative effects of climate change, natural disasters, cataclysms or other environmental factors. When looking at the complexity of events in the MENA region, the legacy of the 2003 military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Arab revolutions of 2011 that began in North Africa and then spread to the East, the activities of terrorist organizations, and the rise of the Daesh caliphate in 2015 in Syria and Iraq certainly deserve attention. And the 2022 war in Ukraine has added another layer of complexity to normal functioning in the region.

Irregular migration has become an important socio-political phenomenon, associated with the expansion of globalization and trade between nations. Over the decades the social and economic scene in many continents, regions and countries of the world has been shaped and then transformed. The people of the MENA region have many reasons for wanting to emigrate – they are economic, political, security factors and educational opportunities. These reasons seem to correlate more with the political climate in individual countries than they do with recurring issues across the region.

In view of the fact that scientific research can not be limited to identifying one cause of the situation, it becomes necessary to undertake a deeper analysis that takes into account the multifaceted nature of the problem. From the point of view of the effectiveness of EU actions, the most important – in the course of the conducted research – are the implications for the perception of European security. The research problem undertaken within the framework of this article is to identify the causes of the migration crisis that has arisen and to show the scale of irregular migration. The authors deliberately chose the time span of 2014–2017 because it reveals a significant moment in migration processes to Europe. The historical, three-year perspective of migration and the events in the period under review are – in the opinion of the authors – an important starting point for the debate on the specifics of migration to Europe, migration routes and political events. In view of the above, the research team developed the following specific research objectives, which were formulated by:

1. Identify the importance of the Mediterranean Sea for migratory movements and identify the main maritime migratory routes through the Mediterranean.
2. Presentation and evaluation of EU actions taken in response to the analysed problem.

3. Identification of countries in the Mediterranean region whose internal situation in the future may increase uncontrolled migration.

In view of this accepted research problem, the authors decided to introduce restrictions:

- a) spatial – research will address the problem of irregular migration by sea migration routes only in the Mediterranean;
- b) temporal – the analysis of the migration phenomenon will cover the years 2014–2017, while the EU policy implications will be analysed by 2022.

It should be noted that the above considerations have become an inspiration and research intention. This intention, in the course of preliminary research, was transformed into the main research problem, which is expressed in the following question: What was the scale of irregular migration to the EU by sea at that time? The research Problem was decomposed into the form of specific problems constituting It: What were the causes of irregular migration to the EU? What is the role of the Mediterranean in irregular migration?

1. Causes of irregular migration to the European Union

The analysis highlights the fact that the security dynamics of the Middle East and North Africa have changed radically over the past decade, moreover – it will continue to change for the foreseeable future (World Bank 2018). At the beginning of 2011, most of the MENA countries were at peace and appeared to be relatively stable, despite the fact that many countries were ruled in an authoritarian manner, with dictatorial governments in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, among others. The countries of North Africa were at peace under authoritarian leaders (Borderon, Sakdapolrak, Muttarak, Kebede, Pagogna, Sporer 2019). Arab-Israeli conflicts were limited to low-level clashes between Israel and Palestine. Egypt has acted as a stable major regional power. Iran was seen as a weak military power dependent on low-quality and dated weapons. Islamic extremists in Iraq appeared to have been defeated. Other Gulf Arab states appeared to be united in the Gulf Cooperation Council. Yemen was a poor country and could not meet the needs of many of its citizens, but it still seemed stable. Military spending and arms purchases were high by world standards but placed only a limited or moderate burden on local economies (World Development Report 2021).

The factors that determine the scale and direction of migration can be divided into two groups, i.e. pushing and pulling (Rhodes 2018). Within the first group, economic and educational factors will play an important role. Within the second group, it is also necessary to distinguish those factors that will force migration, such as natural disasters, armed conflicts or civil wars. The group of attracting factors will be correlated with the group of pushing factors, since countries with a high degree of economic development, a stable internal situation, and respect for Human Rights will always be desirable destinations for migrant groups (Bor-deron et al. 2019).

The problem of uncontrolled migration to the EU appeared already in the 1990s of the 20th century, as a result of geopolitical changes, which contributed, e.g., to the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) or the wars in the Balkans, which led to an increase in irregular migration to the member states of the European Community.

The growth of migration movements in the 21st century was linked to the enlargement of the EU member states in 2004 and the Schengen area in 2007. Although in these cases migration was mostly legal, it is worth noting that more than 100 million people, i.e. citizens of participating states, have been given the opportunity to move freely (Nowotnik 2011).

With regard to this issue, the primary cause of the migration crisis that has accompanied the EU since 2014 is the lack of employment for Africans belonging to the first generation of the demographic explosion of the 1980s of the 20th century (Martin, Davis, Benton, Waliandy 2019). In this analysis, this factor is very important because it contributed to the deepening poverty of Africans (Dimsdale, Mabey 2018). Studies show that about 12% of the population of this continent are people of working age, which confirmed that for the majority of residents the main problem was the lack of work, which motivated them to seek it, e.g., on the European continent (Mickiewicz 2017). The primary causes of the migration crisis, which were presented in this way, were superimposed by pushing factors, i.e. political crises and internal conflicts, among which it is necessary to distinguish:

- a) the revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East in 2011 and their consequences in the form of the overthrow of governments in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya or the creeping/hybrid civil war in Syria;
- b) the failed attempt to democratize Iraq, which, as a result of the withdrawal of U.S. troops, enabled extremist organisations to function

- freely, including the creation of a terrorist organisation (Dimsdale, Mabey 2018; El Ghamari 2021);
- c) the concentration of military activities in Afghanistan since 2003 as a result of the crisis response operation (El Ghamari 2015; Rhodes 2018);
 - d) regimes, e.g. in Eritrea, or unstable states targeted by the activities of terrorist organisations; among others Nigeria (Boko Haram), Somalia (al-Shabab; Hanne, Flichy de La Neuville 2015).

After more than a decade of change and perturbation in the region, none of these issues are currently true. Regional rivalries, extremism, and a series of political uprisings and conflicts once dubbed the “Arab Spring” have turned the MENA region into an arena of clashes between local factions, power struggles, corruption, and social frustration. What before the political upheaval that began in 2011 seemed to be a relatively stable pattern for the development of national security and external support is now the scene of internal conflicts, new battles with extremist movements, and major civil wars in Iran, Libya, Syria, and Yemen (Naufal, Genc 2015). Civil wars, international involvement and instability have become as serious a challenge to the security and stability of the MENA region as military threats, extremism and terrorism. Efforts to reform the system of government and the economy have failed to meet the needs of most countries (Faath, Mattes 2014). The COVID-19 crisis has further exacerbated social and economic problems. Many regimes began a serious arms race (at a time when this became even more unattainable), while their citizens showed greater needs for effective governance, pointing to problems such as: corruption-free power, poverty reduction, economic development, decent jobs and income.

Military threats and extremism have also increased. Iran has emerged as a much more serious military threat in the Persian Gulf. The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, as well as the struggle to defeat extremists and end factional fighting in Iraq (which seemed to end in 2011), led to two decades of direct U.S. involvement in active combat (with combat support from partner forces). While this has led to the dismantling of the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) “caliphate” in Iraq, it has left significant ISIS fighters in place, while strengthening the pro-Iranian Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) and creating serious uncertainty as to whether Iraq will end up as a strategic partner of the United States or fall under the influence of Iran. And non-state actors such as Hezbollah, the Iraqi PMF and the Houthi, among others, have become a significant threat (while the U.S. has used security assistance – and the newly formed Security Forces Support Brigades – to create its own non-state

actors in Syria). Other powers, including Russia among others, have provided support, combat troops and mercenaries to support non-state actors in Libya and Syria. More broadly, Iran, Bashar al-Assad's forces in Syria, Lebanon's Hezbollah, the pro-Iranian PMF in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen have formed a coalition of hostile forces that threaten both U.S. interests and U.S. strategic partners.

During the period under review, Russia, like Turkey, has established itself as a major power and competitor, playing an important role in security in Libya and Syria, as well as increasing its share in regional arms transfers. At the same time, the military and security forces of every country in the Middle East and North Africa continue to change in size, structure and posture, with mixed results at best. Many countries in the Middle East and North Africa that have large military and internal security budgets – and that make huge arms purchases – have limited real-world combat and internal security capabilities. They are poorly prepared to deal with the changing nature of military threats in the region and are heavily dependent on external forces.

The war in Ukraine deserves special attention, which has added another layer of complexity to the normal functioning of the region. The conflict in Ukraine has a significant impact on global food security due to the significant role that Russia and Ukraine play in international agricultural markets. Currently, around 33% of global wheat exports, 80% of sunflower oil exports, and 19% of maize exports are disrupted by the paralysis of production and transport in the Black Sea (Bonesh 26.04.2022). Most countries in the MENA region are particularly vulnerable to food price shocks. They are structurally dependent on international markets, partly because of their agricultural capabilities, which are inherently limited by geographical and climatic factors, as well as by demographic growth. The MENA Region makes around 33% of the world's cereal purchases, even though the region represents only 4% of the world's population. Ukraine exports almost half of its wheat and around 33% of its corn and sunflower oil to MENA countries. In comparison, countries such as Morocco, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Jordan import 10–15% of their wheat from Ukraine. In addition, Egypt, Tunisia, Oman, and Yemen also import 25–35% of their wheat from Kiev, while the figure for Libya is 50% and Lebanon 65% (Dene, Labow, Silber 4.03.2022). Moreover, the war in Ukraine affects the availability of humanitarian funds, e.g., for Lebanon, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Yemen, Iraq, Egypt, and Syria. Most countries have already experienced a decline in funding due to this armed conflict. It can therefore be concluded that this negative trend

in the financing of humanitarian aid will continue in the coming months due to the ongoing fighting. MENA countries can also be described by crisis categories – critical (Syria, Yemen, Libya), chronic (Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq) and overrun (Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, Morocco, Iran). The conflict in Ukraine is sure to put several countries in the MENA region at the bottom of the list of priorities of donor governments, international institutions and the world media. For the millions of Palestinians, Lebanese, Yemenis, Syrians, and others who live in countries experiencing conflict, hunger, catastrophic economic collapses, and growing humanitarian needs, this will be tantamount to the exclusion of “critical life support.” Even before the conflict in Ukraine, funding shortfalls led to curtailment of programmes and reduced rations of aid (OCHA Services 20.05.2022).

2. Irregular migration to the European Union by sea

As mentioned, the increase in migration movements to the EU occurred after 2004 and was mainly related to labour migration (Tausch 2019). The post-2014 migration crisis was caused by a wide range of factors, which have only been signalled above. The authors of this article assume that the causes of irregular migration correspond to each other and result from the complexity of the problems of local states and foreign interference of countries interested in influencing the given region. By the sum of these factors, one can describe a number of reasons that could become the leaven for the next scientific publication or a series of works devoted to each of the aspects presented above. It is also certainly not possible to distinguish all the factors that influence migration, as it is a dynamic phenomenon and is constantly changing, which must be considered from a broader historical perspective.

In the analysed case, forced migrants chose not only land routes, but also sea routes. The scale of migration using individual migration routes is presented in Table 1. For the purposes of this study, the authors decided to use the term migrants, which should be understood as both refugees and immigrants.

Table 1. Scale of irregular migration to the EU in 2014, taking into account the migration routes used

Migration routes	2014
Central Mediterranean	159 581
East Mediterranean	46 639
Western Balkan	40 017
Albanian-Greek	7 466
West Mediterranean	6 007
Eastern	1 086
Black Sea	422
West African	237
Other	10
Total	261 494

Source: own development based on Frontex 2015.

The scale of irregular migration in 2014 was 261 494 people (Table 1). It is worth noting that the most burdened with migratory pressure were the routes leading through the Mediterranean Sea, i.e. the central, eastern, and western Mediterranean. In 2014, a total of 212 227 people reached the EU by sea and 49 267 by land (Table 2), which also confirmed that migrants were the most likely to choose maritime migration routes.

Table 2. Scale of irregular migration to the EU in 2014, taking into account the sea and land route

Uncontrolled migration routes	2014
Sea route	212 227
Land route	49 267
Total	261 494

Source: own development based on Frontex 2015.

In 2015, irregular migration to the EU has increased significantly to 1 046 599 (Table 3; Frontex 2016). Compared to the previous year, this figure was four times higher (261 494 people). Research shows that in 2015, 34 887 people arrived by land and 1 011 712 by sea, which only confirmed the key importance of the Mediterranean for migration. The analysis also made it possible to identify the countries of “first entry,” i.e. those to which migrants

were directed in the first place: Greece (853 650 people), Italy (153 842 people) and Spain (3 845 people). The migrants reached these three countries mainly by sea. For Greece and Italy, the eastern and central Mediterranean routes were the most frequently used, while for travel to Spain the western Mediterranean route was used (Table 3; Frontex 2014–2017).

Table 3. Scale of irregular migration to the EU in 2015, taking into account sea and land routes and “first entry” countries (in alphabetical order)

“First entry” countries	Sea route	Land route	Total
Bulgaria	-	31 174	31 174
Cyprus	269	-	269
Greece	853 650	3 713	857 363
Spain	3 845	-	3 845
Malta	106	-	106
Italy	153 842	-	153 842
Total	1 011 7121	34 887	1 046 599

Source: own development based on IOM 2015: 4.

In 2016, undocumented migration decreased to 387 739 (Table 4). Such a significant change was also discernible for the countries that were most burdened by it until 2015. For example, Greece in 2015 recorded “entries” of 857 363 people, followed a year later by 176 906 people, a decrease of 79% (Daniiloudi, Gúsior 2015).

Table 4. Scale of irregular migration to the EU in 2016, taking into account sea and land routes and “first entry” countries (in alphabetical order)

“First entry” countries	Sea route	Land route	Total
Bulgaria	-	15 962	15 962
Cyprus	189	-	189
Greece	173 614	3 292	176 906
Spain	8 162	5 084	13 246
Italy	181 436	-	181 436
Total	363 401	24 338	387 739

Source: own development based on IOM 2016: 6.

In 2017, the diminishing scale of migratory movements was still visible. A total of 146 287 people reached the EU at that time, including 137 771 by sea and 8 516 by land (IOM 2017). As in 2014–2015, countries such as Italy, Greece, Spain, Bulgaria, and Cyprus were under migratory pressure (Table 5).

Table 5. Scale of irregular migration to the EU in 2017, taking into account sea and land routes and “first entry” countries (in alphabetical order)

“First entry” countries	Sea route	Land route	Total
Bulgaria	–	545	545
Cyprus	818	–	818
Greece	19 674	3 659	23 333
Spain	11 861	4 312	16 173
Italy	105,418	–	105,418
Total	137 771	8 516	146 287

Source: own development based on IOM 2017: 4.

The research shows that the significant change in the scale of undocumented migration in 2016 and 2017 was dictated by several factors, among which are:

- a) agreement between the EU and Turkey;
- b) changes in border crossing legislation introduced by European countries;
- c) the ever-increasing number of migrant drownings in the Mediterranean.

Under the existing Turkish-EU agreement of June 2016, all migrants who illegally reached Greece via Turkey were returned to Greece, from where they were successively resettled in the EU Member States. The additional benefits that resulted from this agreement for Turkey meant that the country scrupulously controlled its borders, which could reopen EU–Turkey accession talks or decisions on the abolition of EU visas for Turkish citizens. During the period considered, the main objective of the EU was to provide financial support to Turkey in providing assistance to Syrians on its territory.

Following the compromise, 800 migrants were deported from Greece to Turkey, and by the end of 2016, 8389 Syrians were resettled from Turkey to EU Member States (IOM 2017). Moreover, the 2002 readmission agreement, which allowed for the return of persons not entitled to international protection from Greece to Turkey, became an additional tool (IOM 2017).

Changes in border crossing legislation introduced by some member states have also become an important element. In this case, it is worth mentioning the actions taken by Hungary. Under the July 5, 2016 agreement,

Hungarian services escorted all irregular migrants who were apprehended within 8 km of the border to the nearest transit zone, where they could apply for asylum. The Hungarian side also introduced restrictions on the number of border crossings to 20 per day, divided into 2 transit zones Horgos and Kelebija (IOM 2017).

3. “Mediterranean highway” – the importance of the Mediterranean for irregular migration. Analysis of research results

The authors of this article sought to analyse the causes of migration and examine the routes, both sea and land, used by determined migrants to reach Europe. As the journey by land routes was very difficult, not least because of the need to travel thousands of kilometres and to operate under difficult sanitary conditions, many people chose to travel by sea. These circumstances led to the active work of people smuggling groups.

Uncontrolled migration took place in parts of the western, central, and eastern Mediterranean. Migration in the western part involved crossing from Morocco and Algeria to Spain, through two enclaves, i.e. Ceuta and Melilla. This maritime border was most often crossed by citizens of Morocco, Algeria, Nigeria, Cameroon and Senegal. Undocumented migration in this part of the sea was also supported by smuggling groups operating in Mali and Nigeria.

Migration in the eastern Mediterranean involved crossings from Turkey to Greece and the migrant groups were dominated by Syrians, Afghans, and Iraqis. It was the most used route in 2015. The sealing of borders by Greece has led to an increase in the frequency of use of the central and western Mediterranean routes (Daniiloudi-Zielińska, El Ghamari 2022).

For these two North African countries, Libyan ports recorded the highest exit rates. On the coast of this country crossed two migration routes, i.e. east African, leading from the Horn of Africa to the east of Libya, and central Mediterranean, leading from Libya to Italy. People smuggling usually started in three ports: Tripoli, Zuwara and Misrata. The direction of migration was invariably Italy and the Island of Lampedusa (EUNAVFOR MED – Operation SOPHIA 29.01.2016).

It should be stressed here that the internal situation of Libya has been a factor in the concentration of maritime migratory routes off the coast of Libya. As a result of the Arab Spring and the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi's dictatorship, Libya was plagued by internal conflicts and plunged into political crisis

following the 2014 elections (El Ghamari 2016). In addition, in 2015, a significant strip of the coast of the Gulf of Great Sirte was controlled by militants of the so-called Islamic State, launching attacks on the oil fields (Bartoszewicz, El Ghamari 2020). As a result of internal destabilization and the achievement of a rather disturbing degree of dysfunction (The Fund for Peace n.d.) the law enforcement services were in no way able to control the internal situation and enforce non-compliance with the law, which encouraged smuggling groups to become more active (Minda, Sasnal 10.03.2016).

Numerous cases of drowning have also been linked to migration across the Mediterranean. Research shows that the scale of this phenomenon has steadily increased between 2014–2016, reaching 5082 victims in 2016 (International Organization for Migration n.d.).

Although the eastern Mediterranean route was the most heavily migratory, the central part had the highest number of drownings. The analysis shows that the main reason for this situation was the dramatic conditions of transport of migrants. Smuggling groups, with a view to profit, organized exits on overcrowded boats, as a result of which people transported often fell overboard or died of suffocation. There have been numerous reports of shipwrecks due to overcrowding, most often in the central Mediterranean (IOM 2015). The scale of drownings in the Mediterranean is shown in Table 6.

Table 6. The scale of drownings in the Mediterranean in 2014–2017

Mediterranean Region	2014	2015	2016	2017
Western part	59	102	69	161
Central part	3189	2869	4579	1646
Eastern part	35	806	434	61
Total	3283	3777	5082	2993

Source: own development based on IOM reports 2015; IOM 2016.

The research also analyses the national structure of migrants (Table 7). In 2015, among the migrant groups, Syrians, Afghans and Iraqis accounted for the highest percentage, which only confirms that the highest rates of flight were in countries plagued by internal conflicts. In 2016, this structure was already presented differently due to the greater share of residents of Sub-Saharan Africa (Kłosowicz 2014). This trend also continued in 2017, indicating that citizens of the poorest countries were also taking advantage of opportunities to reach Europe (UNHCR 2017).

Table 7. The national structure of migrants in 2015–2017 (in alphabetical order)

The country of origin of the migrants	2015	2016	2017
Afghanistan	20.2%	12.5%	-
Bangladesh	-	2.2%	10.3%
Eritrea	4.2%	5.9%	-
Gambia	-	3.2%	6.3%
Guinea	-	3.4%	9.3%
Iraq	7.1%	7.9%	-
Iran	2.1%	-	-
Mali	-	2.6%	2.2%
Morocco	-	-	5.4%
Nigeria	2.2%	10.4%	11.7%
Pakistan	2.7%	2.4%	-
Senegal	-	-	5.7%
Somalia	1.6%	2.1%	-
Sudan	-	2.8%	-
Syria	50.2%	24.1%	7.7%
Ivory Coast	-	3.2%	8.7%

Source: own development based on IOM 2015; IOM 2016; UNHCR 2017.

The European Union's response to irregular migration by sea

The migration crisis that emerged on such a large scale in the EU in 2014 required the members of the European community to take a number of measures to both eliminate its causes and minimize its effects. In the case of the analysed problem, the authors would like to draw attention to the operational activities undertaken in the Mediterranean region, which concerned the activities of the European border and Coast Guard Agency (hereinafter: Frontex) and activities under the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).

In 2014, in the Mediterranean, Frontex conducted several maritime operations:

- a) Aenas and Triton in the central part of the sea;
- b) Hera, Minerva and Indalo in the western part of the sea;
- c) Poseidon in the eastern part of the sea.

For each of them, the agency's main task was to support coastal states in controlling their external borders and to save lives at sea. According to

Mariusz Zieliński (2005), these operations have continued since 2015, but under the joint operations formula. In the same year, Frontex also took advantage of the opportunity to launch the so-called rapid intervention forces in the form of *Poseidon Rapid Intervention* (Council of the EU and the European Council 2017). Only in 2016, the Aenas and Triton operations saved 38 750 lives. Rescue operations were carried out in Italian waters and in the Italian SAR – Search and Rescue. Operations Aenas and Triton involved 523 officers, 9 vessels, 3 aircraft, and 2 helicopters (Council of the EU and the European Council 2017). Under operations Hera, Indalo and Minerva, Frontex forces were tasked with assisting Spain in controlling illegal border crossings, including the detection of fraudulent documents. Only in two months of 2016, 1140 people were rescued and 105 officers, 3 vessels and 2 aircraft were involved in the operation (Council of the EU and the European Council 2017). As part of Operation Poseidon, EU forces supported Greece in controlling the undocumented crossing of its borders, including the registration of migrants and the organisation of their return. Frontex patrolled and controlled Greece’s maritime borders in the vicinity of Turkey, as well as the Greek islands. In total, 37 479 people were rescued in 2016. To carry out this operation in 2016, 667 officers, 19 vessels, 1 aircraft, and 2 helicopters were involved.

Frontex’s activities have also been complemented by a military operation codenamed EUNAVFOR MED SOPHIA (hereinafter: SOPHIA; Decyzja Rady 2015/972). Launched back in 2015, the operation was designed to disrupt the operating pattern of human smugglers in the southern central Mediterranean. Given that EU forces could only operate on the high seas, their presence in the central Mediterranean was limited to saving lives at sea and monitoring and controlling suspected people smugglers. In June 1991, the Council of the EU decided to extend the mandate of the operation to include the following tasks: training of the Libyan coastguard and naval forces and enforcement of the United Nations (UN) arms embargo on Libya. In addition, the duration of the operation was extended until December 31, 2018 (Council of the EU and the European Council 2017). Support for EU forces in the region was also provided by the operation led by the North Atlantic alliance under the code name Sea Guardian, which was a continuation of operation Active Endeavour carried out in the Mediterranean.

Only in 2016, operation SOPHIA saved 179 475 lives. Thanks to its operational involvement, EU forces have managed to apprehend 101 people suspected of smuggling activities and destroyed 358 people smuggling vessels.

Following this, the mandate of the operation was expanded to include the training of officers from the Libyan Coast Guard (*Raport AI: Rządy UE zamieszane w przerażające nadużycia wobec uchodźców* 16.12.2017) and the Navy, 78 people took part (Frontex 2017).

In the opinion of the authors of this article, the EU's operational involvement at sea is undeniably to be welcomed, but the fact of the force itself – unfortunately – does not solve the problem. Most analysts agree on one thing: despite saving lives at sea, operations in the Mediterranean are supporting people smugglers. This is mainly due to the fact that the smuggling business is developing on land. Certainly, the assistance provided to migrants on the high seas is nothing more than a response to the effects of the activities of criminal groups (*Europol* n.d.). A common and solidarity-based migration and integration policy, but also action to stabilise the situation in regions affected by conflict and poverty, is therefore a major challenge, both for the EU and for the international community as a whole. Improving the situation in countries facing a number of internal economic and social problems could significantly reduce the risks associated with undocumented migration to the member states of the European Community. However, this is a long-term process, which requires joint initiatives of European countries and individual UN agendas. Therefore, EU action should also focus on internal migration and integration policies. The intra-Community experience of recent years shows us, on the one hand, the dynamics of change in this area (e.g. asylum reforms, the European Border and Coast Guard in strengthening border security or integration programmes) and, on the other hand, the problems in establishing solidarity-based refugee protection systems.

Conclusions

The problem of irregular migration by sea to the EU for political reasons was the biggest challenge facing the European Community. In less than four years, 1 659 676 people have reached Europe by sea, waiting for help from European countries. Unfortunately, around 14 000 individuals are also victims of people smuggling who have not managed to reach the Old Continent.

The situation that arose provided the impetus for a multiplicity of actions, as could be seen, e.g., in the ongoing operations in the Mediterranean. In addition to saving lives at sea, the EU has also tried to address the

problems of member states that have been most affected by migratory pressure, e.g. by introducing a mandatory quota relocation of undocumented migrants from Greek and Turkish centres for all members of the European Community. Another example is the discussion on the need to review migration policy.

The internal stabilisation of Libya, Syria, Iraq, or Afghanistan, among others, will be a major support for the EU's response to the migration crisis. Stability in the region of these countries will not only make it possible to stop migration by sea and fight smugglers, but will also become the basis for long-term cooperation with the EU.

Given the EU's neighbourhood with the MENA region, it is vital to respond to emerging crises and to monitor the situation in the region and in selected countries on an ongoing basis. Too much focus on the current problems of Syria, Iraq, or Afghanistan can lead to the omission of the problems of other countries, such as Algeria or Egypt, the consequences of which will again affect the treaty area. An analytical approach is very important here. It is difficult to get guarantees that countries that are now stable will not be torn apart by civil war in a few years. Sub-Saharan African countries such as Nigeria, Ethiopia, and the Central African Republic are good examples. Adequate knowledge of the internal situation of selected countries and the changes taking place in them can in some way facilitate the response to emerging crises.

Analysing the statements of some representatives of European countries, the authors cannot agree with the statement that the presented scale of migration is the largest that the EU has faced. Being able to compare data on the contemporary migration crisis and the migration that affected Europe in the 1990s suggests that the scale of these phenomena is very similar. The main difference – which should be pointed out – is the concentration of migration pressure on a few EU Member States, e.g. Greece, Italy, or Bulgaria.

The analysis also found divergent views among member states on proposed responses to the crisis. These differences were due, among other things, to the fact that the migration issue was “tinged” with religious and cultural themes, which was the biggest obstacle to the search for compromises. Referring to the problems of selected countries in the MENA region and African countries, it can be concluded that, in the long term, the problem of migration can be permanently embedded in the EU's catalogue of challenges, which is why it is so important that the European community develops appropriate solutions collectively in the current situation.

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Vietnam's Online Newspaper Development Trend in the Context of Social Media*

Trend rozwoju gazet internetowych w Wietnamie w kontekście mediów
społecznościowych

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Abstract: According to statistics from the Ministry of Information and Communications, as of December 2022, the whole country has 127 news agencies; 670 journal agencies (there are 327 journals of political theory and science, 72 journals of literature and art); 72 radio and television agencies. Personnel operating in the field of journalism are about 41,000 people, of which the radio and television sector is approximately 16,500 people. Compared with 2021, personnel is relatively stable and the number of personnel granted journalist cards increases significantly. There have been 19,356 cases of being granted journalist cards. It is easy for the public to check the names of long-term online newspapers and major readers such as "VnExpress," "Dan Tri," "Vietnamplus," "VietNamNet," etc. The emergence of multimedia journalism is an important step towards shaping the new type of digital storytelling and the future of journalism. In the process of renovation, the Vietnamese press is also gradually transforming and approaching new media products (Long-form/E-Magazine/

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Megastory) that show long, in-depth stories and multi-purpose writing, photos, audio, video, photographers, etc. According to "Vietnamplus" – a press agency leading this trend, when you first bring this type of work to the public, it is unexpected that these works are received more strongly than other types of media. We use questionnaires to build public perceptions and observations as journalists working for five major online newspapers in Vietnam. The data is taken from in-depth interviews with journalists, editors, editorial staff, and editors-in-chief of five major online newspapers in Vietnam. We choose the sample according to the sampling method of the case. In the context of social media, Vietnam's online newspapers have developed and changed significantly. These findings will enrich and have a typical impact by clarifying two main contradictions that exist in Vietnam's online newspapers. Those are conflicts between news products, regular articles and media products, e-magazines, megastory and conflicts in organizations producing online newspapers. From there, the article looks at how Vietnam's online newspaper is going to grow, how it uses visual reporting, and how excited journalists and press managers are about it.

Keywords: Multimedia, Digital-megastory, long-form, e-magazine, online newspaper, social media, Vietnam

Streszczenie: Według danych statystycznych Ministerstwa Informacji i Komunikacji w grudniu 2022 r. w całym Wietnamie działało 127 agencji informacyjnych, 670 agencji czasopism (327 czasopism z zakresu teorii i nauki politycznej, 72 czasopisma z zakresu literatury i sztuki) oraz 72 agencje radiowe i telewizyjne. Personel zatrudniony w tej branży stanowi ok. 41 000 osób, z czego sektor radiowy i telewizyjny to ok. 16 500 osób. W porównaniu z 2021 r. sytuacja kadrowa pozostaje stosunkowo stabilna, a liczba legitymacji dziennikarskich przyznawanych pracownikom tego sektora znacznie wzrosła – odnotowano 19 356 takich przypadków. Obywatele mogą łatwo sprawdzić tytuły wydawanych od dłuższego czasu poczytnych gazet internetowych, takich jak: "VnExpress," "Dan Tri," "Vietnamplus," "VietNamNet." Pojawienie się dziennikarstwa multimedialnego jest ważnym krokiem w kierunku kształtowania nowego rodzaju cyfrowego przedstawiania historii i przyszłości dziennikarstwa. Prasa wietnamska w procesie swojego rozwoju stopniowo przekształca się i przybliża do nowych technologii medialnych (Long-form/E-Magazine/Megastory), które prezentują odbiorcom długie i pogłębione historie, wieloaspektowe relacje, zdjęcia, audio-wideo itp. Jak informuje "Vietnamplus," agencja prasowa monitorująca ten trend, udostępnienie po raz pierwszy wietnamskiej opinii publicznej produktów dziennikarskich w formie online pokazało, że nieoczekiwanie obrazy te zostały silniej odebrane niż inne rodzaje mediów. Jako dziennikarze pracujący dla pięciu głównych gazet internetowych w Wietnamie przygotowaliśmy kwestionariusz służący do badania opinii publicznej. Dane empiryczne zostały uzyskane na podstawie pogłębionych wywiadów przeprowadzonych wśród dziennikarzy, redaktorów, redaktorów naczelnych i pracowników redakcji pięciu głównych gazet internetowych w Wietnamie. Metoda doboru próby została wybrana zgodnie z naukowymi procedurami badawczymi. W odniesieniu do mediów społecznościowych nastąpił znaczny progres w kontekście wietnamskich gazet internetowych. Dane uzyskane na podstawie zrealizowanych badań wzbogacą dotychczasową wiedzę w tym zakresie, ale pomogą także wyjaśnić przyczynę dwóch głównych sprzeczności, z którymi zmagają się współczesne wietnamskie gazety internetowe. Są to konflikty istniejące zarówno między produktami informacyjnymi, zwykłymi artykułami i produktami medialnymi, e-czasopismami, megastory, jak i konflikty w redakcjach wydających gazety internetowe. W tym kontekście celem artykułu jest zbadanie kierunku rozwoju gazet internetowych w Wietnamie, pokazanie, w jaki sposób wykorzystuje się

wizualne relacjonowanie zdarzeń. Istotne jest także naświetlenie atmosfery towarzyszącej dziennikarzom i kierownictwu agencji prasowych w związku z wydawaniem publikacji internetowych.

Słowa kluczowe: Multimedia, Digital-megastory, long-form, e-czasopismo, gazeta internetowa, media społecznościowe, Wietnam

In 2022, the media's information work shows more clearly the leading, proactive, timely and effective role of propagandizing important issues and events of the country, contributing to creating a social consensus festival. Immediately after the advent of the Internet, the world's first online newspaper, the "Chicago Tribune," was born in May 1992, and then in 1994, Hotwired's online version of the first banner ads set the stage for a number of famous US press agencies to publish online versions of newspapers such as the "Los Angeles Times," "USA Today." Online newspapers were born later than physical newspapers, radio and television. However, it has more advantages in terms of interoperability between the newspaper and the public and among the public, and the ability to quickly and easily store and retrieve information.

Author Duong Xuan Son said: "Online newspapers are a new form of journalism that combines the advantages of print, audio, and video newspapers, using high-tech elements as a decisive factor. The process of producing and transmitting information is based on the global internet platform" (Son 2007). In the book *Online Newspaper – Basic Issues*, the definition of "online newspaper" is given as "a type of journalism built in the form of a website, published on the Internet, which has the advantage of conveying information quickly, instantly, multimedia, and highly interactive" (Giang 2011: 53).

Information is easily available because there are no barriers in terms of space, time, or geographical distance as long as the device is linked to the network. As a result, online newspapers are becoming increasingly essential in social life. Online newspapers offer numerous benefits in terms of interactivity, interacting between newspapers and the public, facilitating the creation of press forums, multimedia capabilities, up-to-date news, and the ability to update information quickly, new, hot, and centrally.

In the burgeoning context of social media, studies have shown that when newspapers wanted to enter the online world for the first time, it was believed that the public prefers concise content. It has been this way as it was less time-consuming. But a few years ago, they realized long narrative writing

could be combined with multimedia elements: images, sound, graphics, and video clips. All that makes the articles more interesting for readers.

The online newspaper public is interested in the shortest and most eye-catching news which still maintains an element that is easy to comprehend for all audiences. This study's results are expected to show that Vietnam's online newspapers are developing rapidly, with a variety of multimedia products, maximizing the creativity of the public. Modern newspapers and technological applications are the major challenges for social networks.

1. Literature review – contribution

In the US in the 1980s, "USA Today" started to implement a variety of charts, graphics, and large images presented in eye-catching colours to refresh the appeal of information compared to the black and white newspapers with walls of text from that era. Later on, the way in which information is transmitted through graphic distribution reached European countries such as England, Germany, France, and Spain (1986).

Mark Deuze – a scholar from the University of Amsterdam – is one of the few researchers who have been trying to identify multimedia journalism and the challenges it poses to the content of stories to be covered by journalism. In 2004, he argued in *What is Multimedia Journalism* that multimedia journalism constitutes a new professional identity for journalists, sometimes defining what the public sees or hears and reviewing the definition of multimedia journalism. In another article, he also analyzes news websites and defines the three main characteristics of online journalism: hypertext, interoperability, and multinationalism (Deuze 2004).

1.1. Literature review – contribution 1.0

The first newspaper to start producing this content was the "New York Times" with John Branch's work – *Snowfall-Snowfall* in 2012. The work tells the story of a group of skiers lost in the snow slides. This work combines long text and some multimedia elements such as photos, videos, audio, infographics, etc. This super work attracts a large number of readers to follow and interact when it reaches 3.5 million followers and interactions in the first week of the online technology platform launch. It's one of the first major online stories

to be accepted by the public as a long and engaging piece of press work. The project became so popular that it provoked reactions in the United States, Russia, and a number of other countries. The work became an international hit in 2013 and received the Pulitzer Prize. A number of newspapers then applied this trend of multimedia journalism to their articles (Greenfield 2012).

In 2014, the article *Story First – Publishing Narrative Long-Form Journalism in Digital Environments* by Maria Lassila was analyzed by Atavist, a US publisher, in 2011, and by Long Play, an e-book publication. The debut of Finland in 2013 was marked by long non-fiction works and surveys of international publishers. The results show that the digital online environment offers the press new opportunities for narrative-style articles, such as multimedia elements and online presence, which increase the authenticity and accuracy of the story and undermine its role-playing effects due to too much sensory stimulation.

In June 2016, two researchers, Cornelia Wolf and Alexander Godulla's dissertation *Potentials of Digital Long-Form Journalism* showed readers the potential of long-form journalism today. They conducted a survey among mobile Internet users on the level of online devices. The article proposes integrating the concepts of internet-specific quality and user relevance with quality to focus on the potential for content innovation in media management research. They rely on the relevance of Internet devices in the recipient's communications directory for basic information and the use of digital long formats. Second, the author builds on user expectations about the specific qualities and attitudes of the Internet towards paid advertising and content. Filtering and intuitive usability, you do not want to be part of the story with interactive and engaging features. Another thing to note is that users are willing to pay for a long-term press that meets their needs, but media companies should give people the option to buy instead of paying for a subscription.

1.2. Literature review – contribution 2.0

In July 2018, Kate Kartveit conducted a survey on how audiences react to the structure, the design of visuals, and the narrative flow of a multimedia story entitled *They Never Made It to the End: Reader Uses a Multimedia Narrative*. Research news sites using eye-tracking experiments, the case in this study represents a new phenomenon for the investigation of long-term multimedia features. It is particularly interesting to explore how the reader interacts with this kind of storytelling because the story is constructed as a multimedia story

presented by the author. The findings of this study show that the reader follows along with the author's story flow in a given chapter.

Kobie Van Krieken's *Literary, Long-form, or Narrative Journalism* study from 2019 analyzed and clarified the structural and stylistic characteristics of press stories as well as their impact on current suggestions for future research with a focus on audience assessment of narrative journalism in terms of subjective perception and honesty.

Also in 2019, *Analysis Ketertarikan Generasi Millennial Pada Long-form Journalism Visual Interactive Kompas*, was published by Kompas. In 2016, Kompas launched a new journalism product, namely news writing, a long press type called the Virtual Interactive Compass (VIK). This platform is designed in such a way as to present in-depth news and enrich interactive elements from a multimedia perspective. The Millennials are one of the younger generations living in the digital and online era. The Indonesian Internet Service Providers Association (APJII) announced that the majority of Internet users are from this generation in October 2016. The purpose of this study is to determine which factors are becoming of annual interest to VIK through four aspects, namely: method, accessibility, interactivity, and navigation. This study is a descriptive qualitative study using the case study method. The data collection techniques used in this study were in-depth interviews, document studies, and online data searches. Among the results of this study are the changes in in-depth news writing in the millennial generation; the VIK long-format press presentation with multimedia elements is considered informative and interesting by millennials, and millennials are used to the everyday presence of gadgets, as well as to the search for information.

1.3. Literature review – contribution 3.0

Manuel Menke's *Multimedia Journalism* study of 2019 also analyzed and discussed the new type of journalism. Multimedia journalism is a term for many phenomena involving three aspects: production, presentation and news consumption. The long story covers a number of media platforms and media formats. This study provides a general overview of what multimedia journalism does, and provides a brief history of its appearance. According to those three aspects, both the development of multimedia journalism in practice and the research program on the type of multimedia have already been discussed. The reader will get an overview of how journalists and media companies integrate and create multimedia stories, and how they are reflected

in multimedia work across devices and platforms. The reader will also get background and insight into the use of effects related to the consumption of multimedia news and potential long stories for the public to experience.

Thus, it can be seen that the above studies have provided a great deal of experience and profound and practical solutions to the type of multimedia journalism, but some studies are not really comprehensive. There are certain limitations here. On the other hand, the themes referred to above are mainly surveys and analyses of information in the international press aimed to show the advantages and guidance for the future development of multimedia products.

The book *A Practical Guide to Graphics Reporting. Information Graphics for Print, Web and Broadcast* (2013) by Jennifer George-Palilonis systematically examines the issue of images in digital media. At the same time, the work also provides the most basic theoretical system and concept in this field.

There have also been a number of studies on the type of multimedia journalism in the world, studies selected to survey many newspapers, many stages, and many different focus issues to create a system of issues. This shows that multimedia products are interesting and there are high expectations for the future development of the global press.

1.4. Literature review – contribution 4.0

In Vietnam, information processed in charts and photos has been presented online by “Vietnamplus” since 2005, and “Vietnamplus,” “VnExpress,” “Tuoi Tre” and “Dan Tri” have joined the trend until now. The graphics have been exploited to convey information and attract a large number of readers to follow.

The book from 2010 *Design-Modeling & Layout* by author Roger C. Parkers provided an overview of the illustrations in the form of an online newspaper and suggested ways to best promote the advantages of this reporting format.

The report from 2001 on the results of graphic research in the newspaper *Reporting and Editing News Graphics* by Kelly Barry – Assistant Editor of the US Graphics Division – recently provided very specific statistics on the importance of visual elements in news design, where photographs and graphics are the most important. From there, the author gives the best overview of the methods used to represent diagram information through a number of vivid examples.

The book from 2001-re-published in 2012 *The Language of Journalism* by Vu Quang Hao carefully and systematically explores the language used in journalism (specifically, the book deals with theoretical issues and the language practices of print and broadcast newspapers) and the language of

advertising and advertising reporting. In journalism, the author quoted the language of non-textual information in the tenth part of the book as follows: "The life that exists around us sometimes has many miracles. It's strange. The bird on our roof sings every day, and we never pay attention to letting the day vibrate naturally with every holy voice. The wildflower that has been forgotten for many days without anyone looking at it suddenly blames you for being careless and not seeing that it's so beautiful. The same applies to non-textual information..." (Hao 2016). In terms of non-textual information, the author, Vu Quang Hao, also points out another way of calling it that time, the online newspaper; at the same time, the author has also succeeded in providing initial theoretical foundations for non-textual information (with many forms, such as charts, graphs, diagrams, maps, tables, etc.).

In the book *Content Organization and Print Presentation Design* (Phuong 2006), the author outlines principles and methods for organizing content and designing, and presenting them in newspapers and magazines; using IT software for newspaper design and magazine design such as Photoshop, QuarkXPress, and in addition to the substantive content mentioned above, the author also considered and studied information graphics as an important form and direction for the future development of journalism.

1.5. Literature review – contribution 5.0

Online Newspaper – Basic Issues (Giang 2011) clearly outlined the process of Internet formation and development; the story of the birth and development of the online newspaper. At the same time, the author also outlined the most basic features and characteristics of online newspapers, how to write and present information on online newspapers; the editorial model and the process of producing information for online newspapers, in particular some online newspapers in Vietnam.

The book *Journalism in the Modern Media Environment* (Loi 2014) referred to press issues in the media convergence environment, such as social media, internet communication, and media theories such as "gatekeeper," "silence spiral," "use and satisfaction," "planning;" converging communication, converging newsroom and multimedia writing skills. In particular, the author has systematically researched the term "infographic" or "visual graphic" in the section on multimedia writing skills. From a conceptual interpretation point of view, the author has introduced an infographic design process with three main steps: information interpretation-frame formation-concept design.

The article *Using Graphic Information on Vietnam's Online Newspaper* (Dao 2015), published in "The Journalist Magazine," clarified the concept of the category of infographic and graphic information. Since then the author has pointed out the current situation of using graphic news for "Vietnam-plus" – the first newspaper to use the category of graphic news. Finally, the author also proposed a number of recommendations to improve the quality and quantity of the graphic news genre in today's news speed update contest.

Graphics in Journalism Works on Vietnamese Online Newspapers Today of journalist's Dao Thu Trang, has a theoretical basis for general media graphics and online newspaper graphics. Since then the author has investigated, analysed and assessed the current situation of the use of graphics in the press work of the online newspapers "VnExpress," "Dan Tri," at the same time, he has proposed a number of solutions to improve the graphic quality of current Vietnamese online newspapers.

In 2010, Pham Thi Hong, Institute of Journalism and Propaganda, gave a dissertation on *The Way to Report Multimedia Today on Online Newspapers in Vietnam*. The topic was an online newspaper, and it provides facts and solutions to improve the efficiency of the long-form method.

In 2017, *Today's method of organizing and managing the production of multimedia products for online media in Vietnam*, by Nguyen Chi Thieng, Institute of Press and Propaganda, by means of theoretical research and practical surveys on the organization, management and production of multimedia products in a number of press agencies and online newspapers in Vietnam, the thesis contributes to the reinforcement of the theoretical framework of organizational modality, production management of multimedia products and experience, the organization and management of the production of multimedia products in Vietnam. Knowledge and capacity to organize and manage the production of multimedia products in our country's online newspaper publishers. In addition to the research work, there are also a few long-form works on how to view content, as well as on how to implement a multimedia product in online newspapers in Vietnam.

1.6. Literature review – contribution 6.0

Intensive, interesting, and comprehensive is a way to retain readers of Hang Nga, published in the newspaper "Cong Luan" on 9 2017, which quotes an interview with the editor-in-chief of "Vietnamplus," the journalist Le Quoc Minh. This work shows that Vietnam plus is a pioneering newspaper for multimedia

journalism and how to operate a product. It is also a way to retain readers, providing a lot of interesting and comprehensive information. “Vietnamplus” has many ways of doing this, and innovation over the long term is a highlight that we are focusing on developing. And the hard part is always the gray area and the dedication to use it. As far as human resources are concerned, we are still implementing the policy of doing so on our own, promoting the strengths of each pen, encouraging them to be more creative and passionate about creating their own as well as publishing many new stories. It’s unique indeed.

The article *Writing for Longform is Extremely Interesting* by author H. Nga was published in the “Cong Luan” newspaper on January 18, 2017. The article that records the interview with journalist Cam Tho is an emotional, energetic piece of journalism that is carefully prepared, deep and multidimensional. She said that a long-form article allows readers to measure the effects and interactions with readers. With the characteristics of both content and form, long-form articles provide readers with new experiences in reading online newspapers.

The work *The Press is Looking Back on Itself and a New Direction* by Khoa An, was published by Thanh Hoa Newspaper’s Person on January 18, 2017. The article summarizes the views of journalist Nguyen Ba, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Infonet newspaper, on the tendency to make positive journalism and to explore social issues in a mature and kind manner. However, you need to know how to make the most of it and deepen it to attract readers.

Previous studies have focused on online newspaper research in Vietnam on many aspects such as online media and data journalism. As mentioned, there have been a few studies related to the work of multimedia journalism related to the work of multilateral journalism, referring to different aspects of media work in order to develop and guide the new direction of journalism. In fact, however, there is no complete document on how to apply the modern long-form form of online journalism to the production process of online journalism. Even the development of Vietnamese online newspapers in the context of social media has been mentioned by very few researches mentioned above. It can be seen that the use of long-form articles in online newspapers in Vietnam is becoming a new step for the press, especially online newspapers.

With the objectives set out above, this article is based on the theory of setting the agenda in such a way that on the basis of meeting the information and communication needs of the social public, the media displays the social link method, thereby creating the strength and the society to participate in addressing public needs. From the social intervention theory of the media, it is possible to understand the social interference of the media-the media is the

means of providing information and knowledge and creating a public-social forum for the sharing of knowledge, skills and experience on the basis of actual programs or needs for a specific purpose relating to current events and issues in question; on that basis, to help the public. In addition, this paper also applies the "information society" theory of Canadian media theorist Marshall McLuhan (1911–1980) to the analysis of the social impact of media technology. From a historical point of view, communication techniques (software, technology) have a more social impact than the content of the media itself (online newspaper articles). Communication technology and the influence of social networks play a very important role in influencing media content in online newspapers in Vietnam. The content of the media in the current online newspaper must be changed to suit the technology and to meet the information needs and the way in which it is received by the public.

This study has three contributions to press managers, press agency leaders, journalists and reporters. Firstly, this is one of the few examples of the development of Vietnamese online newspapers under the influence of social media. The findings of this study have significant implications in the context of the growing welcome of technology in modern newsrooms and journalism, as well as the efforts of journalists to maintain a balance between work and life. Secondly, this study identifies the main boundary of the relationship between technological stressors and work-life balance. Specifically, it shows that differences in certain personal resources (job performance in this case) could explain the difference in a journalist's work-life balance experience. Faced with technological stressors, in particular, this study does not only fill important gaps in the literature but also sheds light on how to pursue a work-life balance in the face of inevitable technological tensions in the field of modern press and newsrooms.

2. Data and methods

To answer the research question, we use a variety of research methods to study long-form products that have been published in online newspapers: "ZingNews" "Vietnamplus," "Labour," and "ThanhNien" to see the application of technology to long-form production. The survey method is used to encircle long-form products in the three examined periodicals. From there, there are grounds for assessing the current situation, content and form of this product in the current online newspaper. At the same time, we

interviewed journalists' experts in the field of journalism, learned about the long-standing trend, or exploited a group of journalists who participated in the production of multimedia newspapers in each of their works.

The method of researching document content helps the authors of the theoretical system approach to long-form in online newspapers – the product is accepted by the public as a long and attractive journalistic work, serving the general public and the general public readers of scholarly research in the field of journalism. Through the method of research and statistical survey, the project conducts a survey of long-form products that have been published in the central online newspapers over a period of two years; specifying the actual status of the process, the steps of organizing the production of the content and the form of this product. The quantitative survey method is used to assess the responses of about 270 full-time journalists that are reporters and editors who directly produce multimedia products in Vietnamese online newspapers today. From the survey results of the questionnaire, the authors conducted an analysis-synthesis method to deeply analyze the characteristics, limitations and advantages of modern journalism products to see their role in the field of journalism with the press. From the results obtained through in-depth interview questionnaires with journalists, this study shows the initial parameters of long-form products in the current online newspapers, about the diversity in content when implementing this journalistic masterpiece.

Through the study, it is possible to evaluate the current situation of long-form production in all aspects, in order to improve the quality of information when it is delivered to the public; proposed a number of solutions mainly to create the basis to improve the conditions of production organization and quality of long-form products. From there, helping journalists change their minds, become passionate and excited about making online newspapers, and honour journalists with products with effective depth.

3. Results and discussion – show must go on – indefinitely

Research by the authors has shown that one thing is the disadvantage of text in online newspapers in Vietnam, rather than the dominant graphic part, that even graphic information is 100%.

Some researchers from Western countries believe that graphics is a field of communication in which messages are perceived through the visual path.

Graphic design is the creation of visual solutions to the problems of communication. That's why there are two terms for information graphics (information graphics) and graphic news (new graphics). This is because the information includes information in general and information intended for the press in particular. "Graphic news is an information format that graphically describes events or problems. Pictures can be combined with text or photos for full details and events" (Phuong 2006). In the book *Language of Journalism*, the author Vu Quang Hao uses the term graphically to indicate this element in a group of non-textual languages. The author stated that "information in the press is not published in the form of text but in the form of graphics such as photographs, illustrations, tables, graphs, diagrams, maps..." (Hao 2016). Author "Graphic description is one of the best ways to help readers understand your message quickly is to replace long, cumbersome texts. With short easy-to-understand charts. You can choose from a variety of presentation styles, such as flowcharts, organizational charts and timelines" (Parkers 2010). According to author Nguyen Thanh Loi in the book *Journalism in the Modern Media Environment* "uses images to present information, data or knowledge to form data. Statistics are accurate, specific and clear, making it easy for readers to follow, read and understand" (Loi 2014: 202).

In the opinion of J. George-Palilonis in *A Practical Guide to Graphics Reporting. Information Graphics for Print, Web and Broadcast*, graphic information often promotes more brainstorming because it is attractive to both visual and awareness. Graphic information can tell stories at a level of detail that would not normally be possible. It provides the public with amazingly rich content.

Thus, Main Graph Information is one of the media reporting tools capable of turning large chunks of data into graphic images on any information subject of public interest. It not only acts as a supplement but can stand alone as a complete article. Infographic is an esthetic design activity of a media nature. In fact, graphics are a form of application rendering and an effective type of information art. Each design concept conveys a message, that is, information and beauty.

Vietnamese e-newspapers have all three forms of graphic information-traditional, interactive, and video. Due to the diversity and completeness of this graphic format, it is difficult for any mass media to compete with online newspapers for the attractiveness of images and graphics.

Graphic information on Vietnam's online newspaper is the ability to extend graphics because it is not limited in terms of paper size and capacity. This advantage helps online newspaper graphic designers to be more creative and comfortable in terms of information logic because they are not

limited to a certain framework. This is very appropriate for storytelling-how to report data in journalism when it comes to a specific framework.

In the Vietnamese online newspaper, graphics include interactive graphic information (this is a form of graphic information based on the interactive and multimedia content of online newspapers). With traditional infographics, the reader has a proactive ability to receive information. In order to produce this infographic, the design team needs programming skills to use the Flash or e-software tool.




Figure 1. The most visited websites in Vietnam

Source: Digital Report 2019.

Financial content, security, and consumer prices are often accompanied by graphic images for statistical purposes and the comparison of figures. The frequency of bar graph information in this content is very high and continuous. In addition, forms such as graphs and tables appear in the economic contents.

In particular, interactive graphic information in the form of bar charts is used in almost all types of charts that appear not only in economic information but also in other contents that include statistics (based on “VnExpress” and “Vietnamplus” online newspapers). For example, data on graduation test scores for the 2018 National High School (High School) exam has been updated continuously by “VnExpress” in the form of charts and interactive graphs (numerical graph is used less frequently than chart).

The presentation of graphic details in Vietnam's online newspaper involves charts, maps, graphs, tables, and illustrations. Each representation, such as charts, maps, diagrams, graphs, illustrations and tables, provides distinct effective values for the information to be processed and transmitted to the graphics. Survey findings from online newspapers are diverse and inclined to take advantage of interactive graphic knowledge. This helps infographics to be easier, more portable and smarter (without interaction) than the previous conventional graphic design. In addition, interactivity also enables readers to actively organize layers of information on graphics by opening any interactive positions before or after that, from passive reading to active reading, selecting and manipulating the graphic image of the issue or case that readers are interested in.

Illustrative images also appear a lot in online newspapers, especially in the social and technological categories. It has an explanatory, descriptive, comparative or statistical function. "Vietnamplus" is a newspaper that frequently produces items in a modern direction, able to stand independently and closely observe current domestic and foreign issues that are of great concern to many people.

In the *Infographics* section of "Vietnamplus," on average, about four images and modern graphics such as independent long-form are created per day. This is a very high number in the application of graphic details to Vietnamese online newspapers today because it takes a lot of time for an independent reporter to create a super press work product. This pleasantly completes a daily press release.




Figure 2. Traffic growth rate online newspapers in Vietnam

Source: According to public data on SimilarWeb.

Holding its position as the largest online newspaper in Vietnam, “VnExpress” had 142.2 million visits in December 2021, 9.2% more than the previous month. “VnExpress” is also the only online newspaper with more than 100 million visits per month for many consecutive periods. General website 24h.com.vn ranked second with 81.6 million visits, 5.3% more than the previous month. General information website Channel 14 ranked third with 76.2 million visits, 4.9% more than the previous month. Ranked fourth is the “Zing News” online knowledge magazine, with 67.1 million visits, 2.7% more than the previous month. “Tuoi Tre” online newspaper ranked fifth with 61.4 million visits, 3.5% more than the previous month. “Thanh Nien” online newspaper ranked sixth with 50.2 million visits, 3.2% more compared to the last month.

In the process of testing a new interface version, “Dan Tri” online newspaper ranked seventh with 43.9 million visits, 7.4% more than the previous month. “VietNamNet” online newspaper ranked eighth with 41.6 million visits, 2.6% more than the previous month. The general website Newspaper News is the only one in the TOP 10 that recorded a decrease in visits with 34.7 million visits, a decrease of 0.7% compared to the previous month. General website Soha returned to the TOP 10 with 18.8 million visits, 7.7% more than the previous month.

In addition to diversifying the way of reporting, online newspaper editors do need to ensure that information competition accelerates every hour, even every minute. In addition, these independent entities have brought the infinite area of the online newspaper interface into full operation. With “VnExpress,” the infographics segment is primarily educational material that provides the public with scientific awareness of many different aspects of life (Figure 3).

Most Vietnamese online newspapers are built in a conventional way. They are primarily described in the form of graphs, illustrations, tables and diagrams. These are fairly simple ways of presentation for each of the supplementary graphics for the post. In online newspapers in general and in “Vietnamplus” in particular, tables are the most commonly used type due to their easy and fast production and direct service of the posts. Charts are used frequently, most of which are vertical/horizontal bar charts. Bow-shaped or rectangular diagrams hardly appear in Vietnam’s online newspapers.




Figure 3. Frequency of Internet use by Vietnamese

Source: Digital Report 2019.

The majority of online newspapers in Vietnam have been used in posts. Then in some posts, charts are used when figures need to be listed, but the manner in which they are presented is very clear, they can be taken from the design staff or exported from the Excel file. In recent years, there have been a range of press agencies that are more interested in graphic information and follow the respective lines: 1) Independent graphic files (each graphic is an independent material, a title, a lead, complete content, up-to-date news, oriented towards graphic news); 2) Common type of information (infographics) on a specific subject; 3) A simple illustration.

As a result, Vietnam's online newspaper is evolving in a modern direction, mainly by transmitting message content or statistics, comparing data within and outside Vietnam it is very important in the online newspaper as it comes in a wide range of graphic formats, from traditional to interactive and video.

The second feature is the inconsistency between, on the one hand, the very compact product and, on the other hand, the big product (super product) of the online newspaper.

Quite compact items in the latest online newspaper are news and photo articles as usual. Along with that, there's a huge commodity that co-exists in the online newspaper-long-standing.

Nowadays the definition of long-form or e-magazine or megastory is identified as something similar to journalism. But, then again, there is a strong contribution to the current trending article style.

Multimedia journalism (long-form) is operated using two or more media formats over the Internet or is spread through various media outlets. It's a fusion of communication technologies. The term is used to characterize the rise of modern media. Researchers describe interactive journalism in two ways, both to illustrate the rapid advancement of technology.

In the first definition, scholars argue that the World Wide Web is considered to be the basic tool used by news media to transmit information to the public. According to M. Deuze digital journalism relating to news stories reported on news websites is enhanced by a range of media influences, including literature, versions, pictures, audio, video, and other formats. Long-form is a form of a press product with long articles and broad material. Generally, long-form papers have between 1,000 and 20,000 words. Ask two marketing content experts about the long-form, you'll hear two entirely different perspectives. The first person might argue that making long-form content is dangerous, where the reader's attention span is typically relatively low, whereas the other might argue that making long-form content is a perfect way forward. It's nice to connect with your readers and give them real value and experience. The articles were in-depth and a variety of newspapers were also available to reply.

Even in the technology age, readers not only read short news, but many people also prefer to turn to more in-depth articles that carry real information. Can long-form posts always be desirable in terms of length? If it's just writing, if the long form is just a "long post," the reader would definitely be bored. Some papers are of high quality, but the presentation is not novel and will not optimize the attention of the reader. That's why the latest trend is e-magazines with beautiful designs combined with long in-depth content.

Longform is a multimedia article that may include text, photographs, videos, animations, sound files, and graphic elements built in a completely different way. There, people use the impact title (typically placed in the opening image-called cover), the text becomes versatile with beautifully arranged quotes, and the image is usually rendered full-screen. Today, 86% of readers consider graphics to be the first aspect that attracts consumers to read the content. Items containing photos or videos will increase traffic by 32% on average. Now of course, the definition of long-form or e-magazine is used almost as one or the post format is often known by other names (such

as megastory, special), so long-form articles are certainly required. This is the lovely concept of the e-magazine.

Longform it's the name of the modern genre of multimedia journalism. It's a journalistic product style, with lengthy, in-depth posts, telling stories coupled with many media elements. Many newspapers in Vietnam have applied this pattern to their jobs, and they often call it a journalistic super job. The long-standing subjects discussed include the tireless imagination of the group of reporters. The multimedia aspect is perfectly integrated, and the public senses are thus enhanced. Long-form is a press work that is seen both in content and in presentation form (an integrated multimedia article: text, pictures, films, animations, interactive graphics) in a modern, vibrant design. Reading the Reader's View it is often reserved for papers with stories that are typically non-fiction, narrative or artistic journalism.

Long-form is a "mega journalism work" or a new journalism genre in the digital media age, offering the public a vibrant virtual reality environment to explore and engage with journalistic work. It can be said: long-form is a press work that is delivered in both material and presentation form in a modern format in order to draw attention on a wide scale and to have the potential to spread rapidly.

In the sense of the converging media climate, the need for readers to appreciate news often shifts to a new level, which is the element that attracts and retains "super press functions" (Mega Story). This long-form attracts a large number of followers and interactions with 3.5 million followers and interactions in the first week of its launch on the Internet network. This is one of the first big web articles to be embraced by the public as a lengthy and engaging piece of news-long-form, appealing both to the general public and to scholarly research readers in journalism.

In Vietnam, the production pattern of long-form works appeared not long ago, and it was only in 2016 that newsrooms introduced this new way of counting their fingers. But by 2017, many newsrooms were experimenting, and the practice became widespread. Of course, newsrooms take a different approach: there are agencies that own a team of professional designers, so they deliberately produce quite beautiful and appealing stories, with online newspapers making it very easy. And not really investing in technology as well as in art, there are really high-quality goods, but there are also articles that in the true sense, cannot be considered long-form.

As one of the few newsrooms in Vietnam to use this latest technology, "VietnamPlus" has initially achieved some success. Although several editors

are now introducing long-form articles, “VietnamPlus” must first be listed as a pioneer when it comes to this type of article. Knowing the identity of the reader, the name of the colleague, being rewarded with awards and most importantly, making a positive contribution to society is what journalists aspire to do. And the number of page views cannot be counted for that value.

Long-form is a form of online articles that incorporate multimedia, including text, images, videos, animations, and audio files. Graphic elements are built in a completely new way; versatile font with beautifully organized quotations and images are usually designed in full screen. E-magazine articles are interactive articles that can include text, images, videos, animations, sound files, and graphic elements built in a completely different way. There, people use the effect title (usually placed in the opening image called the cover), the text becomes versatile with beautifully arranged quotations, and the image is usually full-screen (horizontal). This is the type of article that has caught up with current journalism trends, particularly online newspapers: slow journalism. Through the verification process, the author found two major contradictions in the above-mentioned Vietnamese online newspaper (Graphics overwhelms the text-the pattern between compact and bulky products). This is an essential and pervasive contradiction for the creation of Vietnamese online newspapers.

4. Meaningful focus

In order to satisfy the need to rapidly and easily understand the information presented by the public, modern information-oriented articles are the means of distributing news (statistics, contrasts, explanations, storytelling, etc.) to add high productivity to the press.

Modern e-newspapers with the greatest potential for rapid human brain impact through visual illustrations can dominate the future coverage of both traditional and internet media. Online newspapers have created a turning point in the process of sending and receiving information by actively delivering information and personally engaging in input, supplying information, writing posts, etc., enhancing the relationship between journalists, the public and the media, and increasing the social efficiency of the press.

Newspapers will need to be unceasingly imaginative in terms of the type and quality of graphic information in order to establish their own

freedom and in part, to restrict the retrieval of sources from elsewhere. Creativity and autonomy in long-form development often help to establish a distinctive identity for every newspaper, not organized graphic “recipes” that have become stereotypical.

Even if a press agency has developed a standard procedure that simplifies the creation of graphic material, it is like the written press, a photograph or a video, a complete work and a good job. These are two distinct definitions. And while there are some modules, the graphic designer must always be imaginative and alter, or it would produce dull images because they are relatively identical.

The basic graphical information development process consists of the following 10 steps: 1) Selecting the Topic, 2) Research, 3) Collecting the Data, 4) Data Analysis, 5) Finding the Narrative, 6) Sketch the Ideas, 7) Editing, 8) Designing the Idea, 9) Testing, 10) Completing the Infographic.




Figure 4. Infographic Design Process

Source: Akhmad, Sugandi, Nandi, Rahmawati 2018.

In the 10-step phase shown, the graphic designer is shown as the figure in the yellow shirt, the red shirt writer/editor, and the blue shirt data analyst. The functions of the graphic designer and editor appear in almost all of the 10 steps of the process and sometimes cooperate while the data analyst appears in only four steps, analyzing the data, seeking expression, editing, and testing. There are phases in the graphic design process that are just sketching designs and design ideas. This method describes each stage in-depth, but some of the steps are more centred in reality.

There are three key steps to creating an information map: 1) Information Interpretation, 2) Framework Formation, 3) Concept Design.

Information interpretation and structure formation: in fact the two phases of the interpretation of information and the formation of independent structures, after the information has been fully clarified, are generally clear to the reporter. Attention should be paid to the following issues in the process of explaining information and creating a framework.

Explain in depth the knowledge structure that the reporter needs to illustrate, that is, the aggregate relationship (the main concept separated into small ideas) or the comparison relationship. This should be as simple as when writing posts, knowing the material to be shown so that reporters can create a concise, detailed and coherent information system.

The internal logic of each piece of knowledge is very important, what is the relationship between the contents of each component, the logic of time or the logic of geographical place, the mathematical logic, etc.?

Clarifying the relationship between the contents allows the production team to find the most suitable type of knowledge. For example, if the majority of this is mathematical logic, then the expression form is a graph; if it is geographical logic, the map should be used more.

In a case where two or more logical relationships coexist, it is important to clearly identify what is the main logic or logical emphasis that the reporter would like to point out. For example, where there is both a logical relationship between geographical location and mathematical logic, in which the main logic or logic that the reporter would like to point out is the geographical position, the most suitable type is concept design: define the key colour spectrum for infographics, and the colour scheme for infographics, and then define the design style.

In order to be increasingly extensive in terms of content and the type of graphic information in online newspapers in the coming century, the key priority factor that publishers need to equip is human capital. Exports

a clear long-term plan for developing and continuously updating world trends. Building a special infographic development team to study, develop and design a range of modern and colourful graphic formats is the most basic prerequisite for enhancing the quality of online graphic knowledge for the home country newspaper. Infographic production machines must be increasingly skilled with the involvement of reporters, editors and data scientists, data processing experts, and graphic design experts. In the flow of information on the Internet from conventional media and social media, the public appears to be willing to have access to information that is the shortest and easiest to understand.

Conclusion

Nowadays, online newspapers are evolving day by day, a modern media trend is seen as the departure of an online newspaper during the technology boom. It is not clear that this trend will continue for a long time, but for the time being, the advantage of this medium is the fact that it is positively received by the public and the time spent on each of these articles has increased.

This analysis is meaningful for individual journalists and news media managers. The findings of this study indicate that Vietnam's e-newspapers are expected to pursue the evolution of the use of infographics, images, and news content for a long time. When approaching articles in this format, the audience believes that they are reading the Mobile version on the computer or that they are enjoying the news content.

Long-form's arrival has opened a new door for Vietnamese journalism. If current formats of online newspapers are called daily articles, long-form is a high-quality journalism product. It's a new media format based on multimedia technology. Most media currently only use text and still images to transmit information to readers. It can be seen that long-form is the development of Vietnam's online newspaper, articles of this kind are also setting a trend in the Vietnamese newspaper industry, as a range of newsrooms deploys long-form articles with different names such as e-magazine or megastory. Social networks are increasingly evolving, forcing media to find their own way, preventing them from blurring in front of readers.

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Digital Literacy and Awareness of User Location Privacy: What People in Turkey Know About Google COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports?

Umiejętności cyfrowe i świadomość prywatności lokalizacji użytkownika:
Co ludzie w Turcji wiedzą o raportach mobilności społeczności
Google COVID-19?

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Abstract: At the outbreak of the COVID-19, governments, health organizations and large technology companies were not prepared for the measures to be taken against the disease. Contact tracking was widely carried out using location data to prevent the spread of COVID-19 with the use of technological tools, especially smartphones. In this epidemic, economic difficulties also emerged due to the lockdown imposed by the governments. For this reason, social distancing and contact tracing applications have become widespread in order to prevent the disease as soon as possible. Such strategies negatively affected individuals' perceptions of privacy, because authorities gave priority to collecting data from individuals in order to prevent the epidemic. On the other hand, non-governmental organizations suggested that "privacy-first" and "decentralized" approaches should be preferred instead of "data-first" and "centralized" approaches. In this direction, Google and Apple companies have developed a decentralized common API to help fight the virus, which also complies with the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation. And in particular, Google has regularly shared Google Community Mobility Reports (GCMR) publicly by anonymizing the data it collects from Google Maps. Using these reports people and authorities can get movement data about different categories of places such as retail and recreation, supermarkets and pharmacies, parks, public transport, workplaces and residential.

Our aim is to find out whether individuals in Turkey are aware that their location and movement data are being tracked by Google Maps and contact tracing apps for preventing the spread of COVID-19. We also examined their motivations for downloading location

tracing apps and whether they have been taking necessary steps to protect their privacy. We investigated whether they had concerns about the possible future use of contact tracing data collected by the health authorities in Turkey and other institutions like Google.

The scope of the study covers smartphone users. We collected data through an online survey using Google Forms. Our survey consists mostly of narrative questions, where we asked respondents to imagine various scenarios where app manufacturers, mobile phone operators/manufacturers, or the government were using some of their data to study or mitigate the spread of COVID-19. Then, between December 15, 2020, and January 2, 2021 we distributed the survey link to the participants through various social media networks. We reported the results of the data of 444 people collected anonymously by quantitative analysis methods.

As a result of the study, it was determined that the digital literacy levels of the individuals are high due to their high education level. Despite this, it has been revealed that the participants do not read the terms and conditions offered in apps. Individuals who care about privacy expressed their willingness to share their data for the sake of public health. As an answer to the main question of our study, it was concluded that the participants' knowledge of GCMR was insufficient. As a matter of fact, it was understood that individuals were indecisive and worried about the use of their data by the authorities in the future due to the uncertainty experienced during the pandemic period.

Keywords: COVID-19, Google Community Mobility Reports, Digital Literacy, Digital Privacy, Location Data Privacy, Technological Change

Streszczenie: W momencie wybuchu pandemii COVID-19 ani władze państwowe, ani zakłady opieki zdrowotnej, ani duże firmy technologiczne nie były przygotowane na podjęcie walki z tą chorobą. Aby zapobiec rozprzestrzenianiu się COVID-19, na szeroką skalę prowadzono kontrolę kontaktów międzyludzkich za pomocą danych o lokalizacji, głównie narzędzi technologicznych, zwłaszcza smartfonów. Podczas pandemii z powodu blokady narzuconej przez rządy pojawiły się m.in. trudności gospodarcze. Z tej przyczyny aplikacje dystansowania społecznego i śledzenia kontaktów stały się powszechne, aby jak najszybciej zapobiec chorobie. Takie strategie negatywnie wpłynęły na postrzeganie prywatności przez jednostki, ponieważ władze nadały priorytet zbieraniu danych od osób fizycznych w celu zapobiegania pandemii. Z drugiej strony organizacje pozarządowe zasugerowały, że preferowane powinno być podejście „przede wszystkim prywatność” i „zdecentralizowanie” zamiast „przede wszystkim dane” i „scentralizowanie”. Aby pomóc w walce z wirusem, firmy Google i Apple opracowały zdecentralizowany wspólny interfejs API, zgodny także z ogólnym rozporządzeniem Unii Europejskiej o ochronie danych. W szczególności Google regularnie udostępniało publicznie raporty mobilności społeczności Google (ang. Google Community Mobility Reports – GCMR), anonimizując dane gromadzone z Map Google. Korzystając z tych raportów, użytkownicy uzyskiwali dane dotyczące ruchu w takich kategoriach miejsc, jak: handel detaliczny i rekreacja, supermarkety i apteki, parki i transport publiczny, miejsca pracy i zamieszkania.

Problem badawczy artykułu stanowi następujące pytanie: Czy osoby mieszkające w Turcji były świadome, że ich dane o lokalizacji i ruchu są śledzone przez Mapy Google i aplikacje do śledzenia kontaktów w celu zapobiegania rozprzestrzenianiu się COVID-19? Autorzy artykułu zbadali również motywacje Turków do pobierania aplikacji do śledzenia lokalizacji. Zastanawiali się, czy respondenci podejmowali niezbędne kroki w celu ochrony swojej prywatności. Sprawdzili, czy mają oni obawy dotyczące możliwego przyszłego

wykorzystania danych śledzenia kontaktów zebranych przez władze zdrowotne w Turcji i inne instytucje, takie jak np. Google.

Grupę respondentów stanowili użytkownicy smartfonów. Badania zostały zrealizowane za pomocą ankiety online z wykorzystaniem Formularzy Google. Ankieta składała się głównie z pytań narracyjnych. Respondenci byli proszeni o wyobrażenie sobie różnych scenariuszy, w których producenci aplikacji, operatorzy/producenci telefonów komórkowych lub rząd wykorzystywali niektóre ze swoich danych do badania lub łagodzenia rozprzestrzeniania się COVID-19. Następnie między 15 grudnia 2020 r. a 2 stycznia 2021 r. autorzy za pośrednictwem różnych sieci społecznościowych rozpowszechnili link do ankiety. Ankieta została przeprowadzona anonimowo. Analizie ilościowej poddano 444 kwestionariuszy ankiet.

Jak wskazują wyniki badań, poziom umiejętności cyfrowych badanych osób jest wysoki, co warunkuje wysoki poziom ich wykształcenia. Jednocześnie analiza odpowiedzi pokazała, że respondenci nie czytają warunków oferowanych w aplikacjach. Osoby dbające o prywatność wyraziły chęć udostępniania swoich danych w trosce o zdrowie publiczne. Przeprowadzone badania wykazały, iż wiedza ankietowanych na temat GCMR jest niewystarczająca. Respondenci byli niezdecydowani i zaniepokojeni tym, że w przyszłości władze wykorzystają ich dane z powodu niepewności doświadczanej w okresie pandemii.

Słowa kluczowe: COVID-19, Google Community Mobility Reports, umiejętności cyfrowe, prywatność cyfrowa, prywatność danych lokalizacyjnych, zmiany technologiczne

Smartphones are widely used among all age groups in Turkey. According to the state authorities, mobile subscribers reached 82.7m of the 83.6m total population in Turkey as of Q3 of 2020 and 64.5m of the total population are mobile Internet users (BTK, Information and Communication Technologies Authority 2020). They are technologically advanced tools that are equipped with powerful sensors and connectivity features. These sensors and features include Bluetooth capability, digital compass, accelerometer, GPS, Wi-fi, microphone, humidity sensors, health tracing sensors, cameras, etc. (Azad, Arshad, Akmal, Riaz, Abdullah, Imran, Ahmad 2020). In 2020, Google started to share the document named COVID-19 Community Mobility Report with users and governments using location data. The report evaluates the impact of COVID-19 on worldwide mobility with anonymized data received via Google Maps. It shows the movement trends according to geography over time in different categories such as retail and recreation areas, markets and pharmacies, parks, public transportation stations, workplaces, and housing (Google 2020). Google collects the location data of individuals, then processes, and shares them with the public favouring the idea that such reports will provide data support to policies developed to combat COVID-19.

It is widely argued that the location data used by governments and large global technology companies to prevent the virus may bring violations of surveillance, personal data security, and privacy (Leins, Culnane, Rubinstein 2020; Wen, Zhao, Lin, Xuan, Shroff 2020). Governments and researchers around the world are implementing digital contact tracing solutions to stem the spread of this infectious disease. On the other hand, contact tracing itself is not new – it is a well-established part of the response to any contagious disease outbreak (Fahey, Hino 2020). Although contact tracing is an essential tool for public health officials and local communities to fight the spread of novel diseases, such as the COVID-19 pandemic (Cho, Ippolito, Yu 2020), many of these solutions threaten individual rights and privacy (Berke, Bakker, Vepakomma, Larson, Pentland 2020). Apart from issues related to contact tracing apps, as people started to work from home or other places, weaker personal data security issues tended to increase. For example, it had been reported that the Zoom app was hacked and data of about 500K of users were affected in 2020 (Brough, Martin 2020; Mathews 13.04.2020).

Our aim is to find out whether individuals in Turkey are aware that their location and movement data are being tracked by Google Maps and the contact tracing apps for preventing the spread of the COVID-19. We also examined their motivations for downloading location tracing apps and whether they have been taking necessary steps to protect their privacy. We investigated whether they had concerns about the possible future use of contact tracing data collected by the health authorities in Turkey and other institutions like Google.

1. The COVID-19 global pandemic

COVID-19 spread rapidly all over the world after being reported for the first time in Wuhan, China in December 2019, (Ahn, Park, Lee, Hong 2020; Basellini, Alburez-Gutierrez, Fava, Perrotta, Bonetti, Camarda, Zagheni 2020). On January 30, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared a “Public Health Emergency of International Concern,” and then a global pandemic on March 11, 2020 (WHO 16.02.2021). The total reported number of infections by WHO Regions as of February 16th, 2021 is just above 108.2 million with 2.4 million reported deaths worldwide. Turkey has reported 22 thousand deaths related to the COVID-19 and the numbers continue to rise (WHO 16.02.2021).

Due to the lack of an effective treatment method and the vaccine being so new, nearly all countries have adopted different restrictions such as travel bans, social distancing measures, mandatory mask use and various lockout methods to reduce the transmission of COVID-19 and minimize social contact (Basellini et al. 2020). Turkey, which had its first COVID-19 infection on March 11, 2020, according to the Turkish Ministry of Health (2021), has also enforced different measures like travelling limitations, curfew, online education and more to stop COVID-19 from spreading.

2. Surveillance through smartphone apps

Many governments in the world are using smartphone technology to digitally trace contact to prevent the spread of the disease. The Singapore government was the first in the world to launch a national Bluetooth contact tracing app on March 20, 2020 (Michael, Abbas 2020). There is an argument about whether mobile contact tracing architecture should be centralized in which all the detection is performed at a central server, or decentralized, in which each user (i.e., the smartphone) performs the detection. A decentralized one seems preferable because not every user encounter data, but only the diagnosed positive patient record is uploaded to the server. This method is also supported as an industry standard by Apple and Google (Wen et al. 2020). Decentralized contact tracing apps do not share users' information with a central authority but, nevertheless, have other privacy challenges (Bengio, Ippolito, Janda, Jarvie, Prud'homme, Rousseau, Yu 2020). The awareness and thoughts of individuals about these difficulties constitute the main subject of this study.

Surveillance is not a new issue and has not started with the COVID-19 Pandemic. According to Gwendolyn L. Gilbert, Chris Degeling, Jane Johnson (2019), for the reasons of "national security, crime prevention, road safety or public service improvement," states are constantly implementing surveillance methods. Surveillance takes place on citizens' data, when they move from one location to another, when they purchase something or when they spent their leisure time playing video games. These data are collected from many sources like internet searches, posts on social media, smartphone and tablet cameras, credit cards, and wearable devices. Most people are not aware that their data are collected and "anonymously" analyzed,

compared, integrated, and sold to the merchant ships as an old song said* (Gilbert et al. 2019).

As G.L. Gilbert et al. (2019) reported from Amy L. Fairchild, Ronald Bayer, James Colgrove (2007) and Lisa M. Lee, Charles M. Heilig, Angela White (2012); “Surveillance serves as the eyes of public health” or “the finger on the pulse of the health of a community.” The WHO’s definition of surveillance is as the “[...] systematic ongoing collection, collation and analysis of data for public health purposes and the timely dissemination of public health information for assessment and public health response as necessary” (WHO 16.02.2021). According to G.L. Gilbert et al. (2019), disease surveillance to combat and control the negative effects on society exists since the nineteenth century.

As the COVID-19 contact tracing apps collect, analyze and process sensitive information about individuals’ health, location, name, age, e-mail, and nationality, it raises concerns about whether these data are properly treated by legal authorities or by the parties who collect them. Another concern is that if these data are further used after the pandemic and how. Because the apps allow the owners to track the users’ visited locations and interactions on social media (Sharma, Bashir 2020). A recent study showed that contact tracing apps collect sensitive information (Wen et al. 2020). But despite its benefits in tracing and controlling the spread of the virus, publicizing contact trace data raises concerns about individuals’ privacy (Jung, H. Lee, Kim, U. Lee 2020). This type of contact tracing has some other consequences. For example, local businesses can be ordered to close by local governments if visited by COVID-19 infected people (Dubov, Shoptaw 2020).

The decisions of governments and societies during the pandemic process, which can be considered the biggest crisis of our age, will also affect our future. Governments can always track everyone thanks to technology and will continue their surveillance practices by saying that “we are taking measures against the next virus even if the virus ends” (Harari 20.03.2020). With the COVID-19 surveillance, many researchers fear that history will repeat itself. Tanusree Sharma and Masooda Bashir (2020) think that in such times of fear and uncertainty, people will renounce their civil liberties, just as they did on September 11, 2001. Jessica Vitak and Michael Zimmer (2020) highlight that the temporary measures implemented after the terrorist attack in the USA became permanent and say that pandemic measures may likewise permanently

* See *Redemption Song* by Bob Marley from the album *Uprising* (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Redemption_Song).

violate privacy. According to Ángel Díaz's interpretation (7.04.2020), the mass surveillance after the September 11 attacks provides a cautionary story for the COVID-19 pandemic. Such ideas seem very dystopian for now, as the technology and digital literacy of people in 2001 are quite different from the current world. While personal information could easily be collected in the period of September 11, anonymous collective data is generally used now.

3. Contact tracing and privacy dilemma during the COVID-19 pandemic

Although there are undeniable benefits in the containment of the COVID-19 virus, collecting data about the contact histories of people who installed contact tracing apps raises concerns about individuals' privacy (Jung et al. 2020). There is an ongoing discussion about the perils of the effective use of these automated technologies and the danger they bring to the privacy and security of individuals (Simko, Calo, Roesner, Kohno 2020; Sun, Wang, Xue, Tyson, Camtepe, Ranasinghe 2020; Wen et al. 2020).

For contact tracing, it is important to locate people when they are within 1.5m to 2m of an infected person for at least 10 to 15 minutes. More importantly, for such a contagious disease, fast contact tracing is not possible manually (Abeler, Bäcker, Buermeyer, Zillessen 2020). Muhammad Ajmal Azad et al. (2020) argue that "a protocol for contact tracing" is necessary to ensure the proper use of the private data of individuals. This protocol should provide a "consent mechanism" because such apps usually collect data without informing the users. Privacy-literate users may prefer not to share their data. But such behaviour may hamper preventive efforts that governments may have made (Azad et al. 2020). On the other hand, when the number of cases increases as the virus spread all over the world, contact tracing becomes difficult to operate (Cho et al. 2020).

There are some privacy concerns that we seek to find answers to in our research mentioned in a paper by J. Vitak and M. Zimmer (2020). According to the authors, the questions of "who can access data," "how long is data stored," and "for what purposes could that data be used in the future" are the biggest concerns of this pandemic.

Aex Dubov and Steven Shoptaw (2020) argue that there are ethical issues in using contact tracing technology since the success of this technology depends on "people's willingness to participate" and any compulsory measure

may face resistance. To maintain participating and allowing the authorities to contact tracing, voluntariness is essential in deciding to download and share personal information through the app. According to Aaron R. Brough and Kelly D. Martin (2020) “widespread adoption of new surveillance tools to monitor and prevent contagion” has caused weaker protection of data and individuals lost control of their personal information, which they called “eroded privacy.” Further, they argue that such surveillance has forced some people to replace offline activities with online activities.

From an ethical point of view, since adopting massive digital surveillance throughout the world is essential to protect the lives of millions of people, what becomes important for governing authorities is that the policies to combat this disease must consider protecting sensitive data being collected and analyzed and processed. In other words, they must maintain transparency without potential loss of privacy. This is one of the major concerns about privacy rights and civil liberties (Sharma, Bashir 2020).

The containment strategies may cause a negative effect on identifying the COVID-19 positive patients. When they are publicly identified, they may be at risk and face harsh treatment by others in the community. For example, in China, individuals use an app to identify symptoms of the disease and report them to the police (Raskar, Schunemann, Barbar, Vilcans, Gray, Vepakomma, Werner 2020). Similarly, a contact tracing app in Turkey, called Hayat Eve Sığar [n.d.] (HES-Life Fits into Home) has a “report a violation” function to take pictures of the one who is violating the social distancing and self-isolation rules and send them to the authorities.

As the novel COVID-19 is very contagious, to stop spreading needs rapid containment strategies to be applied by governments all around the world. Determining the location and contact history of infected individuals is the priority. The ubiquitous use of smartphones is an advantage, but it has the risk of massive surveillance by exposing private information about people (Raskar et al. 2020). As A. De Carli, M. Franco, A. Gassmann, C. Killer, B. Rodrigues, E. Scheid, D. Schoenbaechler, B. Stiller (2020) and Marcello Ienca and Effy Vayena (2020) comment that if contact tracing apps use these data and algorithms in a responsible manner and be privacy-sensitive, then we can achieve a democratic and open world without sacrificing public trust. Similar tracing apps notifying authorities when patients in quarantine leave their homes are available in Iran and South Korea as well (Raskar et al. 2020).

But it is difficult to achieve the goal of having privacy-sensitive apps. Because, according to Alex Berke et al. (2020), even if these apps anonymize user

data, it is possible to match these data with very few secondary data records to have more information about users. We see a dichotomy in the COVID-19 contact tracing app policy. Priorities of governments around the world differ slightly. One approach is the “privacy-first” which aims to protect user data. On the other end, the “data-first” approach aims to store and benefit user data as much as possible to fight the virus (Fahey, Hino 2020). For example, governments in China, South Korea, Israel, and elsewhere have a data-first approach and openly accessed and used personal data for tracing purposes. On the other hand, particularly in Europe, both national and regional laws enforced a more privacy-focused approach by adhering to the General Data Protection Regulation. The GDPR, which was published on May 4, 2016, became effective on May 25, 2018, thereby placing limitations on such tracing activities (Intersoft Consulting, 2016; Oliver, Lepri, Sterly, Lambiotte, Deletaille, De Nadai, Vinck 2020). The lack of consensus over the use of contact tracing app data among the nations may create some problems including intrusions on citizens’ privacy and challenge the use of “large-scale public data.” People are more sensitive and conscious about their private data and this has not started with the COVID-19 pandemic. It has roots back in Facebook-Cambridge Analytica Scandal in the 2016 US Presidential Elections (Fahey, Hino 2020). Therefore, to protect the democratic climate, it is important to know that although people are aware that some tracing activities are necessary to control and prevent the disease. But there are concerns, specially voiced by human rights siders that this surveillance to be prolonged after the disease ends (Oliver et al. 2020).

4. Permission requirement and what data contact tracing apps collect

Mobile technologies, in general, aim to make our lives easier, more productive, and healthy by collecting various types of personal data, including location and movement data as well as social media content. Users have little understanding of how their data is processed and used for what purposes (Vitak, Zimmer 2020). Muhammad Ajmal Azad et al. (2020) found in their research that most of the apps collect personal data including name, phone number and location. They suggest that giving the user the power to select among a list of permissions may help to achieve the transparency they want. Marcello Ienca and E. Vayena (2020) also point out the same suggesting transparency in public communication about data access and use.

During the pandemic period, individuals became so sensitive about the protection of personal data that the news that WhatsApp updated its terms and privacy principles in the first weeks of January 2021, that we mostly approve without reading while subscribing to the applications, causing a great reaction. Tens of thousands in Turkey used the #WhatsAppSiliyoruz (#deleteWhatsApp) hashtag in their tweets on Twitter. According to the news from BBC, Facebook postponed their new regulation after this reaction (BBC News Turkey 16.01.2021).

5. Google and Apple cooperation

When we consider how it started, this quotation from Katina Michael and Roba Abbas (2020) is quite remarkable:

Invited into the early discussions in the White House to help with a response to coronavirus, it became apparent in the US that the President was requesting the support and expertise of the largest technology firms in the Western world. Ten days before Singapore launched TraceTogether, representatives of Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple, Microsoft, and Twitter were already meeting with the US chief technology officer, Michael Kratsios, on March 10, 2020.¹³ Each had a role to play: Amazon would make sure predatory selling by third parties on its platform would be eradicated, Twitter would minimize the amount of “fake news” being propagated on its platform, and Google could generate location reports to demonstrate how states were keeping to self-isolation orders. But what of the possibility to offer contact tracing? This seemed like the perfect opportunity for America’s biggest companies to come together in a show of solidarity—Google and Apple could join forces on the development of the contact tracing app, Amazon and Microsoft could offer storage and web services, and Facebook and Twitter could cover social media matters.

Google and Apple are the most prominent technology companies in the world. They are supposedly supporting most of the data traffic in the world through their internet servers, operating systems, application stores, smartphones and Internet of Things (IoT) devices (Romm, Harwell, Dwoskin, Timberg 10.04.2020). Google and Apple cooperation is one of the most notable technological partnerships in the COVID-19 pandemic. This tool is widely accepted by privacy siders because it ensures data privacy and

security since it has a decentralized approach thanks to Bluetooth technology (Azad et al. 2020; Whittaker 20.04.2020).

Jessica Vitak and M. Zimmer (2020) also point out that “Google/Apple have resisted pressure from governments who want access to app data to build a picture of population movements in aggregate” and answered users’ expectations about data privacy. On the other hand, after the mob attack on the US Capitol by Trump supporters (Borger 7.01.2021), we saw that Google (Youtube) and Twitter, along with other social media platforms like Facebook and TikTok, restricted/suspended Trump’s accounts, preventing him from posting messages. These “authoritarian acts” are questionable in terms of democratic principles and human rights. After Twitter’s ban on Trump’s account, Jack Dorsey needed to explain their action to the public (Phillips, Ellis-Petersen, Walker, Wong 17.01.2021). Another concern spoken by K. Michael and R. Abbas (2020), regarding the power these technology companies acquiring is that “[for] example, will Google’s FitBit work hand in hand with Android devices gathering 250 000 points a day per user and will other more innovative systems be introduced down the track once the pandemic is over to help us rise to the challenges of the Fourth Industrial Revolution?” On the one hand, the decentralized approach of Google/Apple cooperation has positive returns in terms of human rights. But on the other hand, as these big tech companies have enormous power and control over social media, authoritarian acts may produce negative returns in terms of data privacy.

6. The preventive efforts of Europe and other nations

In Europe, governments are taking some measures to protect the privacy of data. According to European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation, categories of normally protected information such as genetic data, political and religious affiliations, and criminal history can be freely shared in crisis situations (Brough, Martin 2020). Tanusree Sharma and M. Bashir (2020) point out that The European Data Protection Board issued a statement emphasising the importance of protecting personal data while fighting COVID-19. Since it is about processing personal data, this statement is important. The Article 9 mainly states that personal data can be processed in favour of the public interest, proportionately to the intended aim of protecting public health and respecting the rights and freedoms of individuals (Ienca, Vayena 2020).

To combat COVID-19, all nations and their authorities are implementing measures benefiting from technology, especially smartphones, street cameras, thermal cameras, and facial recognition software to identify risky individuals and track their location (Singer, Sang-Hun 24.03.2020). The first country to start using Bluetooth-enabled tracing app was Singapore in March 2020 (Michael, Abbas 2020). India and the United Kingdom use “smart city” technologies. Israel uses tracing technologies to detect user’s smartphone data, tracing movements, contacts and “interpersonal interactions.” Especially in the United States, where the highest death toll was achieved, Google and Apple partnered for contact tracing using smartphones. And in China, a backlash was caused due to an unexplained system that determines people’s contagion risk as red, green, or yellow, even when using public transportation (Abeler et al. 2020; Brough, Martin 2020; Singer, Sang-Hun 24.03.2020). Many countries including Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Estonia, and the Czech Republic, with possible flips by Australia, the UK, New Zealand, and France preferred Google/Apple app technology, instead of using domestic apps (Michael, Abbas 2020). Haohuang Wen et al. (2020) explain that in Turkey, the government-owned HES App stores “the current user’s ID in a readable characteristic.” These fixed ID scans be accessed by a nearby smartphone connected and can track the user. With this ID data, one can track the user when moving around different locations.

When we consider different approaches taken by different nations, we can highlight that there is not only one solution to the problem of tracing individuals while maintaining their privacy. As Md Whaiduzzaman, Md. Razon Hossain, Ahmedur Rahman Shovon, Shanto Roy, Aron Laszka, Rajkumar Buyya, Alistair Barros (2020) posit that using tracing apps should be a “voluntary act” and the authorities or any third party should “not mandate users to use these apps in any circumstances.” In this regard, Kelly D. Martin, Abhishek Borah, Robert W. Palmatier (2017) and A.R. Brough and K.D. Martin (2020) suggest that “providing transparency” and “allowing consumers to control how their data will be used” have positive effects.

7. Social distancing and geolocation

Social distancing has been the most important preventive strategy to combat the spread of COVID-19. It is argued that to get back to regular social and

economic activities, health authorities like WHO and governments especially insist on applying social distancing rules very carefully. These rules are essential “to crowd-source information concerning the health of individuals” and “to ensure that social distancing rules are being respected” (Carli et al. 2020). Lucy Simko et al. (2020) point out that to understand the effect of social distancing, several companies have benefited from geolocation data immobility.

An interesting finding about the implementation of the restrictions is that generally Asian countries have applied the “strict and punishable rules on social distancing.” On the other hand, the European countries have preferred the “recommending people to stay at home” approach and kept privacy and individual freedom untouched (Huynh 2020).

An interesting finding about the effect of social distancing and isolation in Chiou and Tucker’s work as mentioned in a paper by Xiao Huang, Zhenlong Li, Yuqin Jiang, Xinyue Ye, Chengbin Deng, Jiajia Zhang, Xiaoming Li (2020) points out that people with high earnings are more likely to comply with the social distancing regulations.

South Korea’s method of social distancing and contact tracing application deserves a detailed investigation. Because the country did not impose lockdowns and business closures that other countries have implemented. Instead, they made massive COVID-19 testing and effective contact tracing program. It is done by collecting location data of positively tested people. Instead of matching location data from infected people within the population, the government officials preferred to “anonymize” and publish the location data of the patients on websites for everyone on a daily basis. This is remarkably similar to the Google COVID-19 Community Mobility Report. On the other hand, Jay Stanley and Stisa Granick (2020) mention a study that “just knowing the zip code of where you live and where you work will uniquely identify 5 per cent of the population.” When identifying a person is that much easy, being and staying anonymous become a big problem. Therefore, identified location data can have the potential to reveal other sensitive information like “people’s social, sexual, religious, and political associations.”

8. Google Community Mobility Reports

The spread of infectious diseases is much faster, especially considering the mobility of millions of people in our globalising world. As M. Ienca and

E. Vayena (2020) say, COVID-19 has occurred in a much more digitalized and connected world than previous global virus outbreaks. Cell phone data (especially location data) collected from users are used by most governments and large technology companies to measure human mobility and control the spread of COVID-19.

Social distance and curfews, which are important measures for countries trying to control the pandemic, are economically expensive. For this reason, most countries have evaluated digital applications offered by major technology companies to minimize contact. Gabriela Cavalcante de Silva, Sabrina Oliveira, Elizabeth F. Wanner, BLeonardo C.T. Bezerra (2020) explain that Google has offered anonymous mobility data of users free of charge for many countries including Turkey to track social distancing. The GCMR, covering more than 130 countries, is a good example of how tech companies are helping to combat COVID-19. Google hopes that by bringing this study to the public, it will aid critical decisions in dealing with the virus (Dogan 2020). "These Community Mobility Reports aim to provide insights into what has changed in response to policies aimed at combating COVID-19" (Google 2020).

There are different place categories in the report such as "retail and recreation places," "markets and pharmacies," "parks," "public transport stations," and "workplaces and residences" (Google 2020). The Community Mobility Report, first published by Google in March 2020, is based on anonymous aggregated location data from users who have turned on their location history setting (turned off by default in their Google account; Silva et al. 2020). Google says to protect the privacy of its users, personally identifiable information such as location, people and movements will never be used. It also states that users with open location history can turn this setting off at any time and delete their data from their timelines (Google 2020). Google frequently emphasizes the importance it attaches to user privacy and security in its report, which is composed of anonymous data sets, and states that this report is only intended to help fight the COVID-19 outbreak. In addition, Google stresses that these data will never be used after the pandemic.

The GCMR use aggregated, anonymized datasets to graph movement trends by geography and location categories and show occupancy of specific location types. Public health officials have suggested that the use of these data in the fight against COVID-19 can be particularly useful in making critical decisions (Aktay, Bavadekar, Cossoul, Davis, Desfontaines, Wilson 2020). Google has generated the mobility data it provides by comparing visits to certain locations and duration of stay using location data collected from Google

Maps (Yilmazkuday 2021). Google compares the changes during each day with a reference value for that day of the week. The reference day is the median value for the 5-week period between January 3rd and February 6th, 2020 (Barrios, Benmelech, Hochberg, Sapienza, Zingales 2021; Google 2020).

The GCMR reveals the differences in mobility with different location categories in the pre- and post-pandemic periods. In terms of efforts to reduce COVID-19, this report could help combat the pandemic. It can also reveal to what extent measures such as lockdowns and contact tracing work in different regions (Saha, Barman, Chouhan 2020). The GCMR also provided data for most scientific studies conducted during the pandemic period. Using the data provided by Google in its report; Michał Wielechowski, Katarzyna Czech, Łukasz Grzęda (2020) were able to identify changes in mobility in public transport during the pandemic process; Hakan Yilmazkuday (2021) investigated the causal relationship between country-specific changes in mobility and the number of COVID-19 cases and deaths; Ugofilippo Basellini et al. (2020) examined the relationship between human mobility and excessive deaths; Cristina M. Herren, Tenley K. Brownwright, Erin Y. Liu, Nisrine El Amiri, Maimuna S. Majumder (2020) showed that the decrease in mobility can be explained by the degree of economic development and democracy in countries.

Although the GCMR has created a useful dataset to understand the mobility of the pandemic process, choosing January 3rd – February 6th, 2020 as a reference interval can be misleading. This is because there is a differentiation in the mobility of people between January and June, regardless of the pandemic. For example, people who usually stay at home due to the weather during the winter months will move more in the summer.

Examining Google reports on mobility data in Turkey between March 11, 2020, and January 20, 2021, Figure 1 shows that the highest mobility in the “retail and recreation” category was on August 4, 2020 (1.445%), and the lowest on January 1, 2021 (-28.740%). The mobility of the “market and pharmacies” category appears to be the highest on May 22, 2020 (21.126%), and the lowest on April 11, 2020 (-22.980%). The mobility in the “Parks” category appears to be the highest on August 2, 2020 (24.903%) and the lowest on January 3, 2021 (-25.167%). It is observed that the mobility of the “public transport stations” category is the highest on 30 July, 2020 (8.835%) and the lowest on December 5, 2020 (-20.849%). The mobility in the “workplaces” category appears to be the highest on July 26, 2020 (2.709%) and the lowest on January 1, 2021 (-42.634%). It is observed that the mobility of the “housing” category is the highest on January 1, 2021 (12.702%) and the lowest on August 2, 2020 (-1.597%). According

to anonymous data in the report, community mobility in Turkey has decreased during the pandemic period. It strikingly shows the lowest mobility data for the “retail and recreation” and “workplaces” categories on January 1, 2021, while also showing the highest data for the “residential” category. This is due to the intense security measures taken by the state to prevent the New Year celebrations. Looking at the total data of the report, the percentage of movement in crowded areas has decreased significantly. The biggest reason for the decline in the categories of “retail, recreation” and “workplaces” categories is the government bans and the transition of most of the workplaces to the home working system. Again, from the same perspective, the reason for the rise in the “housing” category is the stay-at-home restrictions.




Figure 1. COVID-19 – Google Global Mobility Reports

Note. Data is constantly updated directly from Google. Mobility data is shown for Turkey only.
Source: COVID-19 – Google Mobility Report (2020).

9. Economic and social impact of the pandemic

The Coronavirus Disease 2019 will drastically change the global economy as it reduces daily activity and therefore limits business activity (Hussein, Shams, Apu, Rahman, Mamun 2020). In this gloomy period of the economy,

politicians had to choose between saving the lives of millions and saving the economy (Coibion, Gorodnichenko, Weber 2020). Governments temporarily locking down cities to contain the pandemic can reduce the productivity of individuals as well as limit transport operations, affecting the market and causing strong economic losses (Raskar et al. 2020; Wang, Yamamoto 2020; Whaiduzzaman et al. 2020). A restriction has enormous costs for both employers and workers. For this reason, most countries have gradually lifted the quarantine with the decrease in the number of cases in order to mitigate the economic impact of the epidemic. However, the latest epidemiological models predict that lifting the restrictions will cause the epidemic to restart (Basellini et al. 2020; Ferguson, Laydon, Nedjati Gilani, Imai, Ainslie, Bague-lin, Ghani 2020). The economic impact caused by the COVID-19 pandemic that transformed the world has not yet been fully determined, but from a historical perspective, it is predicted to have a major impact as it did during the Great Depression (1929–1933) period (Barro, Ursúa, Weng 2020; Gvili 2020; Laing 2020; Wielechowski et al. 2020). With the rising number of cases due to the secondary COVID-19 outbreak, how countries will save the economy is, unfortunately, a question that has not yet been answered as the spread of virus mutations began in 2021 (Nature 4.02.2021; Roberts 3.02.2021).

Contact tracing practices offered by large companies can prevent the economic downturn brought about by lockdowns. According to K. Michael and R. Abbas (2020), the value proposition of contact tracing practices eased lockdown measures and brought local economies back to work. Looking from another perspective, as Naomi Klein (13.05.2020) said, while COVID-19 kills thousands, large tech companies that have become monopolized are taking the opportunity to expand their power and amount of data. Even though the applications offered by technology giants such as Google and Apple seem to be of public interest during the difficult pandemic period, there is no guarantee that this data will not be used to our disadvantage or sold to governments for the sake of further surveillance.

Another shortcoming of the economic consequences of the COVID-19 crisis is that low-income households have lower-quality technological devices. This will lead to difficulties in using applications developed to prevent the pandemic and less opportunity to develop digital literacy skills (Beaunoyer, Dupéré, Guitton 2020) Contact tracing applications developed by governments and application manufacturers should be available and accessible to everyone. If certain demographic groups have difficulty accessing these applications, the effectiveness of contact tracing applications will decrease (Simko et al. 2020).

Equality and social justice in contact tracing practices are not always possible for all countries and people. People with low income may have difficulty accessing a smartphone, and people who do not have digital literacy may not be able to use these applications (Raskar et al. 2020). The most vulnerable groups in the use of mobile apps are the elderly, the homeless and low-income families. Application developers should consider these disadvantaged groups and come up with solutions accordingly. Limited access to technology can be vital for users during the pandemic period (Dubov, Shoptaw 2020). Additionally, people who are not digitally literate may not be aware of the risks associated with privacy and are therefore vulnerable to data breaches during the COVID-19 period (Anderson, Heesterbeek, Klinkenberg, Hollingsworth 2020).

The increasing use of technology in the COVID-19 pandemic has brought the already existing digital divide to the surface (Beaunoyer et al. 2020; Buchholz, DeHart, Moorman 2020). When population-level inferences are made from the data of people with access to technology, the analysis created over specific populations will mislead the policy, as the remaining disadvantaged groups cannot be included in the reports (Chunara, Cook 2020). People who are not included in the reports will also be lagging in the developments related to the virus, as they do not have the chance to review the reports. Because of these reasons, as Beth A. Buchholz et al. (2020) mention, every citizen must be digitally-literate and access the latest technology available for people of all ages to follow up-to-date information and to connect with their environment during quarantine periods. Digital literacy training should be provided to individuals to enable them to transition to digital citizenship. As Yuval Noah Harari (20.03.2020) stated, we must prepare ourselves for what kind of world we will live in after the pandemic crisis. Digital tracing applications, which are now actively used almost all over the world, may cause great problems in the future. To cope with these challenges, people should be open to transformation and focus on digital literacy education.

10. Purpose of the present study

This study aims to measure individuals' awareness, priorities, and privacy degrees on the use of their data in the COVID-19 pandemic. We aimed to measure the privacy values, concerns, and thoughts of the participants about contact tracing applications during the pandemic. In this study, we provide a summary

of the participants' views on potential contact tracing scenarios. Because as L. Simko et al. (2020) mention, many countries implemented contact tracing applications during the pandemic, and it has socioeconomic effects on society.

We have four main questions (hypotheses) in the research as shown in Figure 2: First, what is the level of digital literacy of individuals? Second, what are the opinions of individuals regarding the use of location data by different sources to study or mitigate the spread of COVID-19? Third, what are individuals' views on Google Community Mobility Reports (GCMR), which is a helpful tool for health authorities as they make critical decisions to combat COVID-19? Finally, did individuals download the HES application, and if so, what are their motivations?




Figure 2. The Research Model

Source: own study.

11. Method

11.1. Sample

We reached 444 people with the online survey method in the study we conducted to measure the digital literacy levels, awareness, and privacy concerns of individuals during the COVID-19 period. Then we eliminated a total of 2 invalid questionnaires.

We asked six demographic questions to participants: age, gender, marital status, education level, employment status, and monthly income. When we examine the demographic characteristics presented in Table 1, it is seen that most of our participants are between the ages of 25–34 (43.9%), the sample is mostly female (61.3%) and more than half of the participants are single ($n_f = 257/442$). According to the results of the survey, most of the participants have a high level of education and most of them are undergraduate, graduate, and doctoral degrees (81.9%). While 65.2% of the participants are working, 25.3% are students or unemployed / looking for jobs. A monthly income of more than half (57.3%) is between 2.501 TL–5.000 TL and 5.001 TL–10.000 TL.

Table 1. Demographic Information of the Sample

Demographic Information	Categories	Frequency	Percentage
Age	≤17 y	10	2.3
	18–24 y	62	14.0
	25–34 y	194	43.9
	35–44 y	81	18.3
	45–64 y	85	19.2
	≥65 y	10	2.3
Gender	Female	271	61.3
	Male	171	38.7
Marital Status	Married	185	41.9
	Single	257	58.1
Education	≤ High school graduate	56	12.7
	Associate degree	24	5.4
	Bachelor's degree	192	43.4
	Master's degree	99	22.4
	Doctorate degree	71	16.1
Occupation	Employed	288	65.2
	Retired	42	9.5
	Student	61	13.8
	Unemployed	51	11.5
Monthly income	≤1.500₺	66	14.9
	1.501–2.500₺	31	7.0
	2.501–5.000₺	109	24.7
	5.001–10.000₺	144	32.6
	10.001–14.999₺	48	10.9
	≥15.000₺	44	10.0

Source: own study.

11.2. Instrument

To collect the data we needed to design an online survey with 29 multiple-choice questions that take about 10 minutes. The survey was inspired by *COVID-19 Contact Tracing and Privacy: Studying Opinion and Preferences* written by L. Simko et al. (2020) and was redesigned for our research. Our survey consists mostly of narrative questions, where we asked respondents to imagine various scenarios where app manufacturers, mobile phone operators/manufacturers, or the government were using some of their data to study or mitigate the spread of COVID-19. In the survey, eight main parts were explained in detail in *Descriptive statistics*. Only participants who knew about the GCMR report could see the survey section for GCMR.

Instead of directly asking about privacy or confidentiality, to avoid prompting participants with questions, we asked about their comfort level in specific situations or the possibility of downloading an app. In the questionnaire, which consisted of Likert scale questions, apart from demographic questions and questions with checkboxes, the participants were asked to rate each question as *poor* (1), *fair* (2), *indifferent* (3), *very good* (4), or *excellent* (5) in response to each question. These ratings were adapted for each question depending on the question. For example, in some questions the options were *I definitely would not* (1), *I would not* (2), *I am indecisive* (3), *I would* (4), *I definitely would* (5).

11.3. Design

We used a quantitative research design in our study. At first, we tested the online survey we created on Google Forms with 15 people who have similar demographic characteristics and completed our pilot study. Then we distributed the survey link to the participants through various social network sites (Twitter, LinkedIn, WhatsApp, Facebook) between December 15, 2020, and January 2, 2021. We analyzed the data of 444 people, collected anonymously, with IBM SPSS Software.

When we look at the limitations of the research, we disseminated the questionnaire online due to COVID-19 and used only social media in announcing the survey. The majority of the participants were highly educated and between the ages of 25–34. This situation caused difficulties in interpreting the survey data. Besides, since we spread the questionnaire online, we were able to reach participants who already had a certain level of digital literacy.

11.4. Results

11.4.1. Descriptive statistics

Are you digitally literate? In this question category, we asked four questions to learn the level of digital literacy of the participants. First, we asked if they knew the privacy settings of the applications installed on their phones, and 65.4% said they did. In the next question, we asked if they knew how to change their location permissions on these applications and 76.6% said they did. Also, we asked the participants whether they read the terms and conditions offered while installing the applications on their phones or when signing up, and 78.3% said they did not. Finally, we asked which of the personal data they think the Google Maps app on their phones can access/the current location data (93.4%), e-mail (55.4%), name (60.4%), home address (70.8%), phone/device type (65.4%), current business/employer (48.4%) and hobbies (23.5%).

COVID-19 degree of anxiety and importance of social distance. We asked participants how worried they were about COVID-19 and 66.9% said they were worried. In another question, we asked if they believed social distancing is an important tool to slow the spread of COVID-19, and 95.7% said they did.

Google Community Mobility Reports questions. We asked participants about Google Mobility Reports in this question category. In the first question which was based on location categories in the data announced by Google, we asked the participants' frequency of being in these locations during the pandemic. When we examine the percentages in Table 2, we observe that participants seldom go to the retail and recreation category (79.0%), sometimes go to grocery and pharmacy (41.0%), few go to parks (65.6%), most never use public transport (83.0%). We concluded that more than half of them do not go to work (56.6%) and almost all of them are in their homes (92.1%).

Table 2. The frequency of being in places (GCMR Categories) in Turkey (December 15, 2020, and January 2, 2021)

GCMR Categories	Never/Rarely	Sometimes	Often/Always
Retail and Recreation	79.0%	18.3%	2.7%
Grocery and Pharmacy	39.1%	41.0%	19.97%
Parks	65.6%	17.6%	16.7%

Transit Stations	83.0%	10.4%	6.6%
Workplaces	56.6%	13.1%	30.3%
Residential	2.9%	5.0%	92.1%

Source: own study.

When we asked respondents if they knew about the GCMR produced using location data to measure community movements and slow the spread of COVID-19, the majority said they did not (80.8%). After this stage, we asked questions about GCMR only to participants who knew the report. The first question we asked the participants who knew the report was their opinion on whether the report would be really useful in preventing the spread of the virus, and more than half of them (68.0%, $n = 85$) said they thought it would be useful. In the other question, we asked whether they would like to share their data for public health if Google said in this report that it would use participants' data and not anonymized location data. Participants could not give a clear answer to this question, as 37.6% said they would not want it, 23.5% would be undecided, 38.9% would be willing to share. Finally, we asked the respondents if they considered the report to give importance to confidentiality, and the overall respondents (48.2%) said they were undecided, while the remaining majority (35.3%) thought they did not.

Questions about cell phone applications. We asked five questions to measure participants' comfort levels and privacy limits about an imaginary application that collects user data to study and mitigates the spreading of COVID-19. In the first question, participants had to choose at least one of the following permissions to be able to use the application after downloading it; permission to access the calendar, permission to access the camera, permission to access the directory, access to location information, access to phone features. We asked if they should grant at least one of the options. Out of 442 participants, 56.1% would not allow a calendar, 96.6% would not allow the camera, 94.3% would not allow a phonebook, 39.4% would not allow location information, 90.7% would not allow phone features, 95.0% would not allow microphone, 96.4% stated that they would not allow messages, 95.5% would not allow storage/recording settings, and 97.5% would not allow photo gallery.

In the next question, we let them suppose that the developers of the imaginary application will always know the locations of the participants but

will never share them with anyone. When we asked the participants if they would use this application, 36.4% said they would never use it, 22.4% were indecisive and 41.2% would use it. In the third question, we let them imagine that the application was produced by different organizations and asked them to evaluate how comfortable they would be with this application. According to the answers of the participants; 41.9% would be comfortable with the Turkish Ministry of Health (HES), 45.9% would be comfortable with the WHO, 34.8% would be comfortable with a university research group, 46.2% would be uncomfortable with Google (Google Maps), 47.5% would be uncomfortable with Apple (Apple Maps), 51.6% would be uncomfortable with Yandex (Yandex Navigation), 46.2% would be uncomfortable with an activist group, 51.8% would be uncomfortable with an entrepreneurial technology company. In another question, the developers of the imaginary application would know the participants' locations and when the participants' COVID-19 tests were positive, the manufacturers of the application would share location data with the government. In such a scenario, 45.7% of the participants said they would not use this application. About half of the respondents (55.2%) said that if the app developers shared their location data publicly, they would not use the app.

Questions about cell phone manufacturers and operators. We asked respondents how comfortable they would be if mobile phone operators/manufacturers would use participants' location data to study or mitigate the spread of the COVID-19, and 49.5% said they would be uncomfortable. In another question, we asked how comfortable the participants would be if mobile phone operators/manufacturers would share their data with the government for the same reason and 62.4% said they would be uncomfortable. Under the same conditions, we asked participants how comfortable they would be if mobile phone operators/manufacturers would share their location data with the government if their COVID-19 tests were positive, and 42.1% said they would be uncomfortable, 42.5% said they would be comfortable. In the last question, we asked participants how comfortable they would be if mobile phone operators/manufacturers would share their location data publicly if their COVID-19 tests were positive, and 63.1% said they would be uncomfortable.

Sharing location data with the government. We asked participants to suppose that the government received location data or contact data directly from an app on their phone or from mobile phone operators to study or mitigate COVID-19. In our question, we asked them to consider that

location data would only be shared with government public health officials, hospitals, and local law enforcement agencies, and how comfortable they would be if they had access to their location data. 46.4% said they would be comfortable with public health officials, 49.3% would be comfortable with hospitals, and 47.7% would be uncomfortable with local law enforcement. In our other government question, we asked how comfortable participants would be if their location data were shared with the government before the first known cases of COVID-19 i.e. before March 2020. The vast majority (76.9%) said it would be uncomfortable.

Why did you download the HES app? We asked the participants if they downloaded the HES app proposed by the Ministry of Health in Turkey to study or mitigate the spread of COVID-19 and 76.5% said that they did download it. We asked those who downloaded the app about the reason and 15.6% said to get on urban public transport, 56.3% said to see the local density of cases around them, 5.4% said because they were infected by COVID-19, 29.0% said because they wondered how the application works, 37.6% said they downloaded it to enter government buildings and 29.6% for intercity or inter-country travel.

After the COVID-19. We asked respondents if they expected app makers or phone operators/producers to stop storing location data after the pandemic was over and 51.8% were expecting it. Likewise, we asked how likely they thought the government was to delete data collected on their smartphones after the pandemic was over, and 67.4% said it was very unlikely. Finally, we asked participants if they were considering deleting applications that use location data from their smartphones to reduce or examine the spread of COVID-19 after the pandemic, and 79.9% answered yes.

11.4.2. Inferential statistics

A significant relationship has been determined by using Fisher's Exact test between knowing the privacy settings on the phone and gender (Chi-Square = 7,334; $p = 0,004$). There is no significant relationship between knowing how to change location permissions on the phone and gender (Chi-Square = 1,366; $p = 0,147$). There is no significant relationship between reading the contracts of applications installed on the phone and gender (Chi-Square = 0,194; $p = 0,372$).

According to the Mann-Whitney U test, there is a significant difference between age groups in terms of knowledge of privacy settings ($U = 19206$; $p = 0,017$). There is a significant difference between age groups in terms of knowing how to change location permissions on the phone ($U = 8997$;

$p = 0,000$). There is no significant difference between age groups in terms of reading the contracts of applications installed on the phone ($U = 15856$; $p = 0,474$). There is no significant difference between education levels in terms of knowledge of privacy settings ($U = 21272$; $p = 0,491$). But there is a significant difference between education levels in terms of knowing how to change location permissions on the phone ($U = 12386$; $p = 0,001$). There is no significant difference between education levels in terms of reading the contracts of applications installed on the phone ($U = 15263$; $p = 0,201$). There is no significant difference between education levels in terms of knowing the GCMR ($U = 13637$; $p = 0,127$). There is no significant difference between gender in terms of concerns about COVID-19 ($U = 21124$; $p = 0,100$).

A significant relationship between knowing the privacy settings on the phone and knowing how to change location permissions on the phone has been determined by Fisher's Exact test (Chi-Square = 83,691; $p = 0,000$).

According to the Mann-Whitney U test, there is no significant difference in COVID-19 anxiety between those who believe that social distance is an important tool and those who do not ($U = 32225$; $p = 0,126$). There is a significant difference between those who believe that social distance is an important tool and those who do not in terms of taking public transport ($U = 32225$; $p = 0,126$).

According to Spearman's Correlation test, there is a significant negative correlation between the COVID-19 anxiety and visiting retail and recreation stores ($\rho = -0,153$; $p = 0,001$). There is a significant negative correlation between COVID-19 anxiety and visiting parks ($\rho = -0,097$; $p = 0,042$). There is a significant correlation between COVID-19 anxiety and staying at residences ($\rho = 0,293$; $p = 0,000$). There is a significant negative correlation between taking public transport and income level ($\rho = -0,233$; $p = 0,000$).

When the trust for the mobile operator/manufacturer to share location data with the government to study or mitigate the spread of COVID-19 increases, the trust for app developers to share it with the government also increases ($\rho = 0,543$; $p = 0,000$). When the trust in the mobile operator/manufacturer using location data to study or mitigate the spread of COVID-19 rises, the trust in the app developers using location data rise ($\rho = 0,512$; $p = 0,000$). When the COVID-19 test is positive, if the trust for the mobile operator/manufacturer sharing location data with the government decreases, the trust for the app developers sharing location data also decreases ($\rho = 0,642$; $p = 0,000$). When the COVID-19 test is positive, if the trust for the mobile operator/manufacturer to share location data with everyone increases, the trust for the application

developers to share location data with everyone increases too ($\rho = 0,581$; $p = 0,000$). The higher the confidence in a mobile operator/manufacturer sharing location data with the government to investigate or mitigate the spread of COVID-19, the higher the confidence in sharing location data with the government prior to COVID-19 ($\rho = 0,488$; $p = 0,000$). For the trust for the application developers to share location data with the government to study or mitigate the spread of COVID-19 gets higher, the trust for the sharing location data with the government before the COVID-19 also gets higher ($\rho = 0,356$; $p = 0,000$). And finally, there is a significant positive correlation between the trust in sharing data with the Health Ministry of Turkey and with Public Health Authorities ($\rho = 0,593$; $p = 0,000$) and with hospitals ($\rho = 0,500$; $p = 0,000$) and with Local Law Enforcement ($\rho = 0,543$; $p = 0,000$).

According to the Mann-Whitney U test, there is a significant difference between people who allow and who do not allow access to location information in terms of the trust for sharing location data with mobile operators/manufacturers to study or mitigate the spread of COVID-19 ($U = 13843$; $p = 0,000$). There is a significant difference between people who allow and who do not allow access to location information in terms of the trust for the sharing of location data with app developers to study or mitigate the spread of COVID-19 ($U = 14958$; $p = 0,000$). Last, but not least, there is a significant difference between those who thought that GCMR would be useful for public health and those who thought that it would be useful in terms of willingness to share their data ($U = 330$; $p = 0,000$). The people, who thought that the report would be beneficial, expressed their willingness to share their data.

11.5. Discussion

When starting this study, our opinion was that the digital literacy rates of the participants were low. On the contrary, in the survey results, the digital literacy level was very high. We attribute this to the high education level of the respondents. When we looked at the questions measuring knowledge about technology, both male and female respondents knew how to change location permissions. It was understood that the majority of the participants did not read the terms and conditions statements. Interestingly, most applications used on phones have terms and conditions and individuals who say that they are sensitive to data privacy do not actually read the statements according to our survey results. With our study, we have proved that the digital literacy rate of the elderly is low. In the survey data, it was observed

that young participants were knowledgeable about privacy settings and location permissions, while this information was scarce for older participants. In addition, considering the level of education and technology competence, it is concluded that the participants with higher education levels are more competent.

The saying “If you’re not paying for the product, you are the product” of Tim O’Reilly (Twitter 2.09.2010) has shown its true meaning in these times. Mobile applications require some permissions from users when downloaded. In the research of T. Sharma and M. Bashir (2020), it was determined that 30 out of 50 applications requested access to the users’ data (location access permission, camera access permission, etc.) on mobile devices. In our study, when an imaginary application requested various permissions to examine or mitigate the spread of COVID-19, the majority of the participants did not want to give consent to these permissions. Contrarily, their tendency to allow access to location information was higher. This may be due to the fact that most of contact tracing applications require location information.

When we asked which personal data they think Google Maps can access out of e-mail, name, current location, home address, phone/device type, current workplace/employer and hobbies, the majority of the participants selected location data. As Mary Atamaniuk (2020) stated in her article, which analyzes the personal data use of the world’s leading brands, Google can actually access all these data. Mary Atamaniuk attributed this to people clicking “accept” in a cookie popup window without reading any information. Our survey concluded that the majority of the participants did not read the service contracts, which supports M. Atamaniuk’s opinion.

The vast majority of respondents said they were very concerned about COVID-19 and thought that social distancing was an important tool to prevent the spread of COVID-19. It was understood from the answers that a small number of participants who did not believe in social distancing frequently took public transportation. The majority of people with a high degree of concern said that they had little or no visits to places such as restaurants and parks. The vast majority of respondents with a high COVID-19 anxiety level stated that they were generally at their homes during the pandemic. They said that they rarely or never visited places such as restaurants, public transportation, workplaces, and parks. Even participants who think social distance is insignificant to preventing COVID-19 have spent the majority of their time in their homes. This may be due to the imposed lockdowns. Participants with low income stated that they used public

transportation more frequently. Unfortunately, even if we are faced with a lethal virus, individuals with low incomes, due to economic reasons, are in more risky environments.

Most participants did not know anything about the GCMR, which Google released using location data to measure community movements and slow the spread of COVID-19. It was a surprising result that the participants with a high degree of digital literacy did not know anything about the report. The minority of the respondents who knew the report said they thought the report was beneficial for stopping COVID-19.

In our study, when we asked the participants with different scenarios about how they would feel if mobile phone manufacturers/operators, app developers and the government use location data to examine or mitigate the spread of COVID-19, the majority said they would be uncomfortable with this scenario. Results showed that the opinions of the participants on this issue were more positive if their COVID-19 tests were positive. Participants who found the GCMR useful for slowing the spread of the COVID-19 said that they could share their personal location data for the benefit of public health. This shows that to fight the virus, respondents are willing to share their data voluntarily with the authorities ignoring their privacy.

Again, in this scenario, half of the participants were annoyed by the use of location data by mobile phone manufacturers/operators or application producers, and more disturbed by the sharing of their data with the government. The answers of the participants were consistent with their previous answers. For example, those who allow location information access also said that mobile phone manufacturers/operators or application manufacturers also allow the use of location data for the same purposes.

Half of the participants were disturbed by the view that the Turkish Ministry of Health or certain units of the government use location data for the same purposes, while the other half were undecided. We think this is due to the fact that most individuals are unsure of what to do, as the virus suddenly entered our lives and changed the world. Individuals had to choose between their health, digital privacy, and economic well-being. This increased their indecision. As Bekir Agirdir mentions, people rely on technology, but they do not trust the people managing technology in Turkey (Instagram [n.d.]).

As with L. Simko et al. (2020) research, more than half of the participants in our study are concerned about data sharing with the government. When we asked the same questions for before and after the COVID-19 scenarios, the

vast majority of the participants said that they would not want to share their location data with the government. They even thought that their personal data collected by the authorities during the pandemic would not be deleted in the future when everything was over. When we asked about the HES application developed by the Turkish Ministry of Health to reduce COVID-19, the participants said that most of them downloaded the application and the reason for downloading was to see the density of cases around them.

All these results showed that individuals are very concerned with their health and data privacy. But they are confused as to what to do to protect their privacy.

11.6. Implications for practice

If our survey could be conducted both online and traditionally offline, we could reach a wider audience in terms of demography. Therefore, this research can be repeated after the COVID-19 pandemic. This way we might be able to observe if there is a change in the opinions of the participants after the pandemic. In this manner, people who do not have digital literacy and the older (+65 of age) audience could be reached.

According to the survey responses, the majority of the participants thought that the data collected during the COVID-19 period would be used after the pandemic. Therefore, such a study can be repeated to observe whether this concern of the participants would change in the future.

Conclusion

Google Community Mobility Reports and similar reports are actually useful in terms of preventing COVID-19 and are open to all users. The result of our study shows that individuals need to know more about reports like GCMR. Such useful reports should become more common. It is very important to ensure that the personal data collected by the monopolized big technology companies and public authorities during the pandemic are used only to prevent COVID-19, so as not to prevent the rights and freedoms of individuals in the future. In order to prevent this, efforts should be made to use the data proportionately, in accordance with ethical rules and sensitive to privacy with state supervision by experts in the field. In addition,

in order to prevent future generations from being spied on by the digitized Big Brother, data usage must be limited, regulated by the law, and strict sanctions should be imposed for the misuse of data. These implementations should ensure a “consent mechanism” between the parties.

Governments and tech companies should consider ethical issues when implementing contact tracing technology in order not to face resistance from users. To do that, the “data-first” approach seems preferable. This is because our study observed that participants approved applications without reading the terms and conditions, despite having a high level of digital literacy. This shows that their awareness of the protection of their personal data is not strong enough.

According to the results of our study, the participants attach importance to privacy and worry about the spread of COVID-19. They are uncertain about what purposes their personal data will be used for in the future. Despite this, they do not hesitate to share their personal data for the benefit of public health. Perhaps the most important of the results we learned from this research is that the participants are very concerned about their personal data after the pandemic is over. These results should be taken into account by non-governmental organizations, authorities and large technology companies without causing eroded privacy and widespread adoption of new surveillance tools. User data and different algorithms should be handled in a responsible manner and be privacy-sensitive, then we can achieve a democratic and open world without sacrificing public trust.

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Polish Organizations in Ireland. A Stimulus for Research on the National Security of the Republic of Poland

Polskie organizacje w Irlandii. Asumpt do badań nad bezpieczeństwem narodowym Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej


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Abstract: The activities for Poland's national security, including its independence and sovereignty, observed over the last centuries, justify reflection on the relevance of the undertakings of the Polish diaspora communities. Polish organizations operating in many countries, thanks to the cultivation of national identity, were able to contribute to Poland regaining its independence in 1918, support the fight against the Germans and Russians during World War II, and then act for liberation from communism. Therefore, the interest of the state assumes care for the Polish community abroad, both its connection with the country and strengthening its sense of responsibility for the homeland. The article presents the characteristics of Polish organizations in Ireland, where Polish emigration has rapidly increased in recent decades. It is stated that the Polish diaspora communities need systemic support from the Polish state through actions to ensure the integrity of the national identity of the Polish diaspora. In the Polish organisations, it is necessary to recognise the strength to promote Polishness, the concern for Poland's national interest, but also the diverse potential for dealing with threats to Poland.

Keywords: Polish organisations in Ireland, emigration, national identity, national security

Streszczenie: Obserwowane na przestrzeni ostatnich stuleci działania na rzecz bezpieczeństwa narodowego Polski – w tym jej niepodległości i suwerenności – upoważniają do refleksji o relewantności przedsięwzięć środowisk polonijnych. Działające w wielu krajach organizacje polonijne, dzięki kultywowaniu tożsamości narodowej, były w stanie przyczynić się do odzyskania przez Polskę niepodległości w 1918 r., wspierać walkę z Niemcami i Rosjanami podczas II wojny światowej, a następnie działać na rzecz wyzwolenia

z komunizmu. Interes państwa zakłada zatem troskę o Polonię, zarówno jej łączność z krajem, jak i wzmacnianie poczucia jej odpowiedzialności za ojczyznę. W artykule przedstawiono charakterystykę polskich organizacji w Irlandii, w której w ostatnich dziesięcioleciach gwałtownie wzrosła w liczbę polska emigracja. Stwierdza się, że środowiska polonijne potrzebują systemowego wsparcia ze strony państwa polskiego poprzez działania na rzecz zapewnienia integralności tożsamości narodowej Polonii. W organizacjach polonijnych należy rozpoznawać siłę do promowania polskości, troski o interes narodowy Polski, ale także różnorodnego potencjału na wypadek zagrożenia Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej.

Słowa kluczowe: Organizacje polskie w Irlandii, emigracja, tożsamość narodowa, bezpieczeństwo narodowe

It is actually an axiom that thinking about the national identity of the Poles implies the need for a reflection on the Polish experience of being an emigrant (Smuniewski 2021a: 315–330; Smuniewski 2021b: 120–121). The research concerning Polish national identity is usually focused on the “awareness” of being a member of the Polish national community. It is noted that this type of identity has been shaped around the language, customs, the Catholic religion, patriotism and the emerged national culture. The last centuries have unequivocally shown that the notion of Poland covers *inter alia* millions of Poles living outside the borders of the motherland. Following the experience of bondage,¹ the totalitarianisms of the 20th century and World War II, penal and forced exiles of Poles to the East, first by the Tsarist and later communist authorities, for the Poles, national security is in a large measure dependent on national identity and sovereignty of acting for preserving own identity. An important part of activities connected with preserving the national identity of the Poles is a concern for Polonia organisations (see more Nowosielski, Dzięglewski 2021). However, it is impossible to provide effective support to those organisations without first getting to know them.

The aim of the conducted research, the effect of which is this article, was to identify Polish organizations operating in Ireland so that on this basis it was possible to formulate conclusions regarding the creation of Poland’s national security. For the purposes of the research, it was assumed that

National security is the most important value, national need and priority goal of the state, individuals and social groups, and at the same time a process

¹ Poland regained independence after 123 years in 1918.

encompassing various means guaranteeing a sustainable, undisturbed existence and national development (of the state), including protection and defence of the state as a political institution, and protection of individuals and the whole of society, their goods and the natural environment against threats that significantly limit its functioning or damage the goods that are subject to special protection (Kitler 2011: 31; Kitler 2018: 38).

The research used the method of analysis and synthesis of existing sources, studies on the Polish community and interviews conducted in the Polish community in Ireland. Leaders of selected Polish diaspora organizations were invited to talks (consultations).

1. The existing typology of Polish organisations in Ireland

Popular classification of Polish organisations in Ireland includes two dichotomous categories based on chronological appearance: “the old *Polonia*,” meaning well-ingrained Polish post-war migration 1939–1990, including the Poles living in Ireland before the European Union (EU) enlargement in May 2004, and “the new *Polonia*” signifying the mass influx of young economic migrants after Poland joined the EU (Dowling 2012: 20, 29). A more elaborate typology of Polish immigrant organisations in Ireland was proposed at the seminar: “The Polish Emigration in Ireland: Yesterday and Today” organised in June 2011 at Dublin City University by the Dublin Faculty of Economics of the Local Government College in Żyrardów.² The original author’s proposal included four main breakdown criteria, taking into consideration: the duration of activity of an organisation, the size of an organisation, the complexity of structure and the purpose of an association (Płachecki 2012: 38). The time criteria would mark the period of their activity – generally before the year 2004, hence the informal division into “old *Polonia*,” represented by the Irish Polish Society (IPS), Ognisko Polskie CLG and the Polish Social and Cultural Association (POSK) – all three based in the Polish House

² The Dublin’s branch of the Local Government College was in existence since 2007. In 2014 the College with its Irish branch has been incorporated into the structure of the Old Polish University in Kielce and nowadays is the Dublin Campus of the Old Polish Academy of Applied Sciences (cf. Płachecki 2015: 147).

in Dublin, and “new *Polonia*,” including today at least 80 Polish groups, associations and Polish weekend schools. The size of an organization in the classical meaning is determined by the number of members who pay the annual fee and the structures formally registered with the Irish authorities. By definition, a distinction is made between the actual membership in an association and clubs of enthusiasts operating via social media, where only “clicks” or “likes” define the number of followers. The third model is based on the relationship between the service provider and the client, which is typical of Polish weekend schools. In this situation, a parent paying a fee for a child attending the school is not a member of the organisation but a customer. The vast majority of Polish organisations in Ireland follow the same solid, classical model, where a membership fee has to be paid. However, the current trends in mass communication and the growing role of social media may change this profile in the future. The average number of members in a typical Polish organisation in Ireland varies 5–40 regular members. In terms of complexity, the organisational structure of the Polish diaspora in Ireland has matured enough to have four umbrella organisations acting as clusters for similar type associations: Ognisko Polskie (owner of the Polish House in Dublin), Forum Polonia, the Polish Educational Society in Ireland and the Polish Federation for Education KID. It has not yet been possible to achieve a single unison voice of the Poles in Ireland, like that of the Poles in the United States and Canada. The statutory goals and declared purposes of the organisations offer more precise ways of classifying Polish groups in Ireland. The following distinction, made by Jarosław Płachecki, reflects the status of Polish organisations in the period 2004–2011:

- a) charitable and self-help organisations,
- b) business and PR groups,
- c) local organisations (focused mainly on acting in a single town or county),
- d) socio-political organisations (with a political agenda, but not political parties),
- e) educational organisations (including Polish weekend schools and tertiary institutions),
- f) youth and cultural organisations (including Polish scouting associations and Polish folk dance ensembles),
- g) women’s organisations (Płachecki 2012: 38).

The growing number of Polish organisations and forms of activity during the second decade of the 21st century enhanced significantly this typology with Polish counselling, religious and patriotic organisations, sports

clubs, folk dance ensembles, poetry and music bands, groups of anonymous alcoholics, *ad hoc* “anti” or “pro” pressure groups and clubs associating individual enthusiasts mainly on social media.³ A similar categorisation of organisations was issued in 2019 by the authors of *The Polish Migrants’ Organisations in Ireland – a summary report* (Dzięglewski 2019). The characteristics were based on a series of interviews and the institutional survey carried out in 2016 and 2017 with representatives of 21 Polish organisations in Ireland and the following types of Polish organisations were identified:

- a) cultural organisations (promotion of Polish culture in Ireland),
- b) aid and social organisations (legal, social and psychological support),
- c) educational organisations (promoting the Polish language and culture among children),
- d) labour and occupational organisations (integration with other Polish professionals),
- e) lobbying and civil (representing workers and encouraging political participation),
- f) integration organisations (mixing with Irish society and other ethnic groups in Ireland),
- g) organisations for the representation and promotion of Poland and a positive image of Poles abroad,
- h) public service organisations (supporting other Polish organisations and Polish events; Dzięglewski 2019: 17–18; Nowosielski, Dzięglewski 2021: 79–80).

The above typology does not take into account many of the organisations listed in the 2011 research (Płachecki 2012), dormant or terminated Polish organisations in Ireland and the most current trends in migrant activities.

2. A reviewed typology of Polish organisations in Ireland in 2022

Two major socio-economic factors have exerted an impact on the contemporary development and *modus operandi* of Polish organisations in Ireland at the beginning of the third decade of the 21st century. Both have the potential to change the operational scope of Polish organisations in the near

³ The ephemerid: “pro,” “anti” or “single enthusiasts” clubs will not be discussed in this article (cf. Płachecki 2021c: 30).

future and both are related to security matters in their Polish and broader European context. The first one was the COVID-19 pandemic, which in the case of Ireland was spreading from February 2020 and put the entire country into a standstill or imposed different forms of restrictions for the next two years until March 2022 (Dowling 2021: 203–206). As a consequence of uncertainty and high property prices many Poles returned to their homes in Poland and many businesses lost their cashflows. The pandemic had a significant influence on the survival of some smaller Polish organisations, particularly Polish weekend schools. From the point of view of national health and security the overloading of the national health service facilities of both countries, high mortality rates, especially in Poland, and the role of fake news resulting in very low vaccination rates in Poland and within the Polish communities in Ireland, should have a very alarming effect in terms of high susceptibility of the Poles to disinformation (see McGarry 2021). Another major factor is the war in Ukraine. All aspects of this conflict have an immediate effect on the societies with a high level of uncertainty as regards the economic situation and experience an unprecedented influx of refugees, such as Poland and other European countries, including Ireland. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Poland opened its borders and people made their homes available to Ukrainians. Polish organisations in Ireland began collecting goods and funds for aid to Ukraine or commenced ongoing support for the Ukrainian cause on top of their usual activities. This has had a significant impact on the way the Polish nation and the Poles are perceived by the whole civilised world, and at that not only the Western hemisphere. Apart from the obvious role of national security in a classical military sense, a new notion of cyber safety, upholding the high level of motivation, national identity and international position of the country seem to be of huge significance.⁴ In Ireland, the promotion of Poland as well as Polish culture and values has been carried out by the Polish Embassy as well as Polish organisations. The long-term effects on the Polish diaspora and its activities will have to be the subject of future research.

These Polish organisations are discussed in chronological order. The declared goals and documented activities of the groups were taken into account:

⁴ In the project of the new Homeland Defence Act (*Ustawa o obronie Ojczyzny*) the notion of cyber safety as well as sovereignty and international position of Poland found its special place in art. 2 item 10 (cf. *Rządowy projekt ustawy 2022/2052*).

- a) Irish social and cultural organisations co-founded by the Poles in the 20th century.

The records show that there were only a very small number of Poles living in Ireland in the early 20th century. Among the most notable was Count Casimir Markiewicz, who lived in Ireland between 1900–1913 and was married to the famous Irish patriot and suffragist Constance Markiewicz (Quigley 2012b). During that period the couple was involved in setting up several social and cultural organisations, including the United Arts Club (still existing at 3 Fitzwilliam Place in Dublin), the Independent Dramatic Company (a theatre group) and the Dublin Fencing Club (Petruszewicz 2000: 26; Quigley 2012a: 15). Another Polish person was Wanda Petronella Brown, who lived in Ireland since the end of the Great War with her Irish husband, Barry. Thanks to Mrs Brown's bequest in her will, in 1986 the National Gallery of Ireland established the John Barry and Petronella Brown Scholarship Fund for the promotion and encouragement of educational research (National Gallery of Ireland 2014: 67). Her name is also strongly associated with the Polish House in Dublin, purchased in 1986 thanks to her generous endowment.⁵ Apart from the Polish House, those institutions have no Polish connections or traces whatsoever, except for their co-founders.

- b) Polish organisations of the early 20th century, the pre-war and post-Second World War period.

There was “no Polish colony” in pre-war Ireland of the early 20th century, perhaps just a few scattered groups of Poles living apart from each other, and among them some descendants of Jewish migrants from the mid-19th century, who were not recognised as Poles by the Irish authorities (Dobrzyńska-Cantwell 1998: 54). Among them was the Briscoe family, who originated from the Polish borderland which is nowadays in Lithuania. Robert Briscoe and his son, Ben, played major roles in 20th-century Irish politics. Establishing the Polish – Irish diplomatic relations in 1929 and arriving in Ireland, Consul Waclaw Tadeusz Dobrzyński, with his wife Janina and daughter Krystyna, accelerated the development of diplomatic, cultural and social connections between the two countries. Little did they know that all three generations of the Dobrzyński family, including W.T. Dobrzyński's grandson Ian

⁵ In her will which was written in 1974 she left a considerable amount of money “for promoting and encouragement the Arts of Music, Painting and Literature in Ireland.” Since she was Polish, the executors of the will decided to put aside a part of these funds for the purpose of promoting Polish arts and culture (cf. Płachecki 2019c: 50).

Cantwell, would stay in Ireland or elsewhere in the wake of World War II, never to return to their native Poland. Consul General W.T. Dobrzyński, apart from his diplomatic duties, undertook a series of cultural and social activities and in May 1934 established the Irish-Polish Society, known also as the Irish-Polish Circle (Dobrzyńska-Cantwell 1998: 84). The founding members of the Society were: Lord Longford – as the President, Consul W.T. Dobrzyński, Dr Denis J. Coffey – President of the University College in Dublin, Col. Jeremiah J. O’Connell, Capt. D.A. McManus, Rev. J.J. Coyne, Dr Tierney, Sir Joseph Glynn, F.M. Summerfield, Mr Justice Reddin and Mr Barry Brown (Petronella’s husband). The aim of the Society was “the cultural and economic development through organising lectures, exhibitions, sporting events and sharing knowledge about both countries” (Płachecki 2021b: 36). The outbreak of World War II in September 1939 found the society active in organising “Irish funds for Poles” and in 1940 a collection for Polish refugee soldiers in England; they presented a cheque personally to Gen. Władysław Sikorski in London (Płachecki 2021b: 40). After the war, the society had to be reorganised with new members joining: Lord Mayor of Dublin Peadar Doyle, Gen. Sean MacEoin, Desmond Fitzgerald, member of the Irish Parliament, Sean Brady and the editor of the Catholic newspaper “Standard” Peadar O’Curry. The new goal of the renewed society was to collect funds and organise the relocation of Polish students, veterans of the war, from England to Irish universities. The first twelve Polish students arrived in Ireland in 1946, and in the years 1950–1965, thanks to the Polish *Veritas* in England, hundreds of them studied at Irish colleges (Doherty 2021: 40–44). Consul W.T. Dobrzyński’s retirement in the mid-1950s’ terminated the Irish-Polish Society, though the arrival of young and ambitious Poles helped establish new Polish organisations in Ireland. The first post-war Polish organisation was the Irish Branch of the Association of Polish Combatants in Great Britain with almost a hundred members, mostly students, organised in three circles. The first General Meeting took place in Dublin on December 3–4, 1949. The purpose of the Association was to establish cultural, educational and self-help activities among the members. The elected President of the Association was Zbigniew Grabianowski (Kałuski 2007). From 1955 the Polish Student’s Association at Trinity College, led by its Chairman Jarosław Piekarkiewicz and Vice-Chairman Jan Kamiński, played a very active role in maintaining Polish identity. Another Polish organisation was the Polish Folk Dance Circle, active since 1955, with Maria Hinnan and Andrzej Kielanowski among many other Polish students.

Both organisations took part in the annual Carnival of Nations organised at Trinity College (Quigley 2021: 48–50). None of these organisations has survived until the present, though some of their members became leaders of the growing Polish community in Ireland. A new era in diplomatic relations between Ireland and Poland began with the opening of the Polish Trade Mission Bureau in September 1964 (Skolimowski, Lusiński 2001: 28). This, however, was the Polish People's Republic government institution with clearly both economic as well as political goals. From the late 1970s, there are records of the Irish-Polish Cultural Society with the socialist activist and academic teacher Dr John de Courcy-Ireland as Chairman, Mary Flynn as Secretary, and patrons: Sean O'Faolain, Prof. Roger McHugh, Eileen Craig, Prof. Anne Crookshank, Dr Michael Scott, Maureen Charlton and one Polish woman – Lunia Ryan. The Society did not survive and was dissolved in the 1980s. The goal of the Society, with an address at 6, Herman Street in Dublin, was “to promote Polish culture through interaction with the Irish Community” maintaining some connections with the Polish Trade Mission Bureau in Dublin. Dr de Courcy's group refused to cooperate with the newly established IPS (see *Appendix I, The Archival Documents* 2020: 174).

c) “Old Polonia” – the post-war Polish organisations.

The oldest, still-existing Polish organisation in Ireland is the IPS, established in January 1979, shortly after the historic election of the Polish Pope John Paul II in 1978. The IPS meet for the first time in Newpark Comprehensive School in Blackrock with the first official address of its initiator Fr. Claus Cieszyński at the Jesuit House of Studies in Milltown Park, Dublin 6. The founding members of the Society were: J. Kamiński, Chairman, Helena Johnston, Secretary and members: Sean Lyons, Paul Cusack, Artur Tyszkiewicz, Michał Scheunert and William Johnston (Dowling 2015: 30; Johnston 2020: 165). The purpose for which the Society was established was “to promote greater mutual interest and understanding between the Irish and Polish communities through social and cultural activities and to promote, sponsor, teach, study, advance and encourage interests in and knowledge of the culture, history, peoples, language and traditions generally of Poland and the Polish people” (*Rules of the Irish Polish Society* 2015: 225). Apart from the typical social and cultural activities, for a brief period 1981–1983, the Society was involved as a pressure group in the charitable Aid for Poland project and in the *quasi*-political campaign against imposing martial law in Poland. This included organising two protests outside the Soviet Embassy on the 3rd and 24th of January 1982, and the impressive Aid for

Poland campaign, which dispatched shipments of 20 containers of goods to Poland and donated over £250,000 to John Paul's office for distribution in Poland. Within 18 months, thanks to the involvement of the IPS and its two former Chairpersons, Prof. Maciej Smoleński and Dr Janina Lyons, a total amount of £300,000 in goods and money was sent to Poland during martial law. This would not have happened without close cooperation with the Charitable Commission of the Episcopate of Poland, Fr. Ireneusz Antkowiak, and the Irish Catholic Church led by Archbishop of Dublin, Dr Dermot Ryan.⁶ During that time the Society supported the Irish-Polish Solidarity Committee formed for a brief period in January 1982 with 17 Polish and Irish trade unionists and students.⁷ In 1986, an opportunity arose for acquiring a building for the IPS. In September of that year, a new charitable organisation was formed under the name of the POSK, with IPS members Henryk Lebioda, Prof. M. Smoleński and Dr Janina Krzyżanowska-Lyons as Secretary. Using the funds Petronella Brown had left in her will of 1974, a large Georgian house at 20 Fitzwilliam Place in Dublin was purchased in October 1986 for £140,000 (Płachecki 2019b: 17–20). The purpose of the new organisation as the owner of the House was to administer, manage and maintain the historic building as well as organise funds and means for its functioning as the only Polish social and cultural institution in Ireland. In November 1997, POSK changed its name to Ognisko Polskie and under this name has been operating to this day, managing the affairs of the Polish House in Dublin. An additional function of Ognisko as a publishing house is to research and publish books on the Polish Diaspora in Ireland. In January 1998, a new, revised POSK II was formed with the main goal of preserving Polish heritage, culture and language in Ireland. The board of the newly established POSK was made up of its founders: Barbara Szustkiewicz, Grzegorz Jarocki, H. Lebioda, Janina Lyons, Urszula Scheunert, M. Smoleński and Wanda Ni Laighin. In 2003, POSK elected a new Chairperson, Krystyna Pycińska-Taylor, who has been serving in this position until the present. Today, in a complementary way, the three "sisters," the oldest Polish organisations in Ireland are based in the Polish House in Dublin and serve as

⁶ More about the IPS's involvement in the Aid for Poland and anti-martial law campaign, cf. Lyons 2018: 159; Smoleński 31.12.1981: 11; Smoleński 21.01.1982: 9.

⁷ Among the Polish representatives were Solidarity activists from Poland, who had visited the United Kingdom just before martial law in Poland was imposed: Jan Cywiński, Wojciech Kowalewski and Marek Gorzdecki. Well-known Irish members were: John Daly, John Mitchell and Alex White (cf. White 20.03.1982: 17).

keepers of Polish identity, language, culture, history, integration and traditional Polish values in 21st century Ireland. In October 2019, the IPS celebrated the 40th anniversary of its activities with the attendance of HE Polish Ambassador to Ireland, Anna Sochańska, Rector of the Old Polish University Prof. Jolanta Góral-Pótroła, Dr Joanna Pyłat, Vice-Chairperson of the World Research Council of Poles Abroad, and many other distinguished guests (*40 Years of the IPS 2020*: 125). Today, the IPS is a vibrant social and cultural organisation addressing its activities to Polish-Irish families, Irish Polonophiles, the Irish of Polish descent, and Poles born outside of Poland who do not speak the Polish language. The IPS organises conferences, lectures, concerts, poetry readings as well as other social and cultural events, mainly in the Polish House in Dublin. Since 2014, the Society has been publishing *The Irish Polish Society Yearbook* and other serial publications, which are the main source of the history and knowledge of the Polish Diaspora in Ireland.

d) Polish educational organisations and weekend schools after 2004.

According to the Polish Embassy sources, currently, there are 53 Polish schools in Ireland, including five Polish Schools at the Polish Embassy based in Dublin, Cork, Limerick, Cavan and Waterford, with a total number of 6.5 thousand students (Płachecki 2021a). Among them are three types of organisational structures: semi-state Polish Schools at the Embassy, a small number of private schools and preschool nurseries, and a vast majority of weekend Polish community schools (Płachecki 2019a: 127–147).⁸ Generally, all 53 known schools are run or sponsored by some sort of association of parents, teachers or shareholders and all of them potentially may get support from the Polish Embassy or other Polish state funds, even the private ones. The oldest educational society is the Polish Educational Association at the Polish School at the Embassy in Dublin (SPK) founded in July 2009. Similar organisations were soon organised in all five SPK Embassy Schools and in 2014 the Federation of Polish Educational Associations was set up as an umbrella organisation for all five.⁹ Following this standard, in February 2010 the other Polish weekend schools formed similar organisations: the Polish Weekend School SEN established by the Polish Teachers Association, and in 2017 an umbrella organisation – the Polish Federation for Education KID for 12 more schools.

⁸ About the Polish education in Ireland also see Augustyniak 2013: 32–38; Nestor 2014: 29–55; Pędrak 2017: 13–22.

⁹ The Federation of Polish Educational Associations was resolved (cf. Wawrzyńska 2017: 101).

In 2012, the Polish Educational Society in Ireland was formed as an umbrella organisation, which today affiliates 22 weekend schools, including the Dublin Branch of the Old Polish University in Kielce.¹⁰ By law, parallel parents' associations had to be formed, which doubled the number of organisations in all 53 Polish weekend schools in Ireland. This phenomenon is specific only to the Polish community in Ireland. No other ethnic or national minority in Ireland has a similar network of schools or educational organisations run by parents or teachers. The dynamics of the emergence of the entire Polish Sunday school system deserve to be discussed separately, especially in the wider context – those of the traditional (USA) and those after Poland's accession to the EU in 2004.

e) Polish local organisations.

These are among the earliest Polish organisations founded after the huge influx of Poles after 2004, based mainly in towns or counties. This geographical range is often communicated in the name of the organisation: My Cork Association (2005), Galway Irish-Polish Association (2007), MultiCity Polish Association in Kilkenny (2010), Gorey.pl – Polish Cultural Association (2015), Polish Community in Waterford (2017), Midlands Polish Community in Athlone (2018) and others (*Organizacje polonijne w Irlandii* [n.d.]; Płachecki 2012: 40). The nature of their activities is mostly cultural and integrational.

f) Charitable and self-help organisations.

These organisations are involved in charitable support for the Poles in Ireland who find themselves in difficult personal, professional, health or family circumstances. They often provide support and consultations to alcohol or drug addicts, as well as to victims of domestic abuse or lonely seniors, offering them lectures and group sessions. They obtain some form of financial assistance from Irish or Polish sources, hence their charitable legal status, or are co-operating with local churches or Polish chaplaincies when no such assistance is required, as in the case of Polish AA groups. The oldest ones are: Support and Integration Centre "Together-Razem" in Cork (2006), Centre for Psychological Support "Parasol" at the Dominican Church in Dublin and AA groups or family AL ANON groups: "Górnik" in Athlone, "Damy Radę" in Kingscourt, "Emigranci" in Cork, "Horyzont" in Dublin and many others (*Polskojęzyczne grupy wsparcia w Irlandii* [n.d.]). This type of groups should also include Polish sections of Irish charitable

¹⁰ A current list of Polish weekend schools (cf. *Szkoły polskie* [b.d.]).

organisations such as Centrum My Mind, Crosscare Migrant Project, and support groups for Polish women in Ireland, such as: Centre for Counseling and Therapy (CKU) or AA group "Gaja" (Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych 2013: 104–105). A separate type of self-help organisation was Help for Jobseekers Forum founded in 2012. This initiative, involving a series of interactive workshops and lectures, offered professional and legal assistance in seeking a job, writing a CV and psychological support because of the difficult economic situation during the recession in Ireland (2008–2013). In early 2022, another humanitarian disaster caused by the Russian invasion brought Poles and Ukrainians together. A series of new initiatives have been put forward by Polish groups and organisations, which refocused their activities on sending goods and money to support Ukrainian refugees in Poland or directly to Ukrainian cities. The organisations involved in such assistance include: "Together-Razem," Polish Educational Association with the cooperation of an Irish company, the Pallet Network, My Cork, the Irish branch of the Great Orchestra of Christmas Charity (WOŚP Dublin), Polish Scouting Team "Bieszczady" and many others. This phenomenon, no doubt, will be the subject of separate studies and analyses in the near future.

g) Polish youth organisations, folk dance and music groups.

There are several Polish scouting organisations registered in Ireland, with the oldest 87th Polish Scouting Ireland founded in October 2007 by Anita Regucka-Kwaśnik and Mirosław Kaczmarczyk, as well as regional groups – Galway Polish Scouts and Polish Scouts Association in Galway "Na szlaku." In 2012, this led to the creation of the Polish Scouting Association (Hufiec Bieszczady) based in Dublin, consisting today of nine regional districts in Cork, Balbriggan, Limerick, Shannon, Waterford, Wexford and three in Dublin (*Historia Hufca* [n.d.]). Among the Polish sporting groups based in Ireland, the most known are Polish Eagles in Dublin and Football Club Polonia, based at the SPK Polish School in Dublin. martial arts amateurs train at the Bushido Club of Ju Jitsu Self-Defence, also based in the Polish School SPK in Dublin. The School also organises dance lessons in the Club of Sporting Dance (*Zajęcia pozalekcyjne* [n.d.]). Among other dance groups is the oldest Polish Folk Dance Group-Shamrock founded in 2009. Singing enthusiasts can perform in the poetic-music group ArkaJana, Magical White Song Circle or Plot of the Third Stanza, all specialising in Polish traditional songs. All three groups are based in the Polish House in Dublin (*Wydarzenia 2015* [n.d.]).

h) Polish libraries.

The first Polish library was the Wanda Petronella Brown Library opened in 1987 by POSK in the Polish House, in which the bulk of the collection was donated by London POSK and included some rare volumes published by Polish World War II veterans. A subsequent Polish library was established in 2005 in the Polish School SPK at the Polish Embassy in Dublin, and then consequently in many other Polish weekend schools. Following the establishment of the Polish Chaplaincy in Ireland in 2006 the Library at St. Audoen's Church Parochial House was opened at 14 High Street in Dublin. In 2008, one of the biggest Polish institutions of this kind in Ireland – the Polish Community Centre “Biblary” was established by Aneta Kubas. In 2011, the Polish branch of the Local Government College founded a Polish Study Section at the Public Library in Blanchardstown, and then Polish sections were established at public libraries in Arklow, Cork, Galway, etc.

i) Polish umbrella organisations in Ireland.

The Poles in Ireland have no central organisation that would unite all groups in a single organised voice. Even a strong educational network of schools, despite trying, did not manage to form one structure, and in fact, produced three rivalling umbrella organisations as mentioned above: the Polish Educational Society in Ireland (2012), the Federation of Polish Educational Associations (2014, now dormant) and the Polish Federation for Education KID (2017). The oldest umbrella organisation is Ognisko Polskie (1986), which as the owner and administrator of the Polish House supports financially “the old *Polonia*”: the IPS and the POSK. Even Forum Polonia, established in 2008 as “a network for information sharing, mutual support, social integration and defence of Polish minority interests in the Republic of Ireland,” failed to consolidate the majority of Polish organisations in Ireland (Płachecki 2012: 41).

j) Business, public relations and socio-political organisations.

The first business-related Polish group was established in 2007 in Dublin – Ireland Poland Business Association CLG and since 2017 its activities have been stopped. Following in its steps the Polish Business Club was established in 2009 by Wojciech Wrona, which today is also a dormant organisation. Another ephemeral organisation was the Polish Community in Ireland, a PR company established in 2010 which, having organised the Great Gala of the Irish Miss Polonia in Liberty Hall, Dublin, suspended its activities in 2011. Forum Polonia, already mentioned above, is an umbrella non-governmental organisation (NGO) for several Polish NGOs and, as an association derived from the Forum of Active Poles, included such activists as: Anna Paś, Emilia

Marchelewska, Barnaba Dorda and Anna Michalska (Płachecki 2012: 41). As its main objective Forum Polonia provides a platform for communication, representation and common policy stance on issues relevant to the Polish community in Ireland (*Forum Polonia Charter* [n.d.]). In 2009 and 2014, the Forum was involved in a PR campaign “You are at home, Vote!” addressed to Poles participating in Irish local elections, and since 2015 has been the main organiser of the Polska-Éire Festival (Fanning, O’Boyle, Di Bucchianico 2014). Today, Forum Polonia is the only Polish NGO in Ireland with a clear and sound message, calling for broader participation of Poles in Irish political life. It is focused mainly on the “new *Polonia*” using modern PR methods of communication. Perhaps one day this will produce a Polish representative in a local council or even to the Irish parliament as a means of integration with the Irish society as well as serving Polish interests, identity and image.

Conclusions

The diagnosis, made thanks to the characteristics of Polish organizations in Ireland presented above and thanks to the interviews conducted in Ireland (carried out for the purposes of this study), allows us to formulate general and specific conclusions regarding the national identity of Poles in the world, and thus the national security of the Republic of Poland.

History has left a deep impression on the Polish way of thinking about living outside one’s own country, the inability to return to the homeland. The experience of being an emigrant for political reasons is deeply ingrained in the Polish consciousness, which undoubtedly prompted the decision to emigrate for economic reasons. This consciousness seems to suggest: “After all one can be a Pole outside of Poland, speak Polish, nurture one’s own traditions, be a patriot when living out of Poland.” At the interface of integral thinking about the national identity of Poland and being an emigrant the following issues. First, the profound conviction of the Poles that peoples have the right to their own states, to independence and sovereignty, to their own culture and identity, to live in their own land, to religious freedom, building their own future should be sought in Polish history. Secondly, the migration policy of the state cannot ignore identity issues. Thirdly, the concern of the Republic of Poland about the Poles who for various reasons stay outside of Poland, the concern about their national identity is part of the concern about national security.

Expounding on the third issue, which is focused on the dependence between the national identity of the Poles living outside of the borders of their homeland and the national security of Poland, there is a need for formulating a clear postulate. All activities of the Republic of Poland addressed to the Polonia should be perceived in direct reference to current and future national security. The national security policy which disregards the defence potential of the Polonia is incomplete. That is why it is necessary to postulate coordination of the national security policy with the policy towards the Polonia.¹¹ Obviously, this has nothing to do with promoting desertion of the homeland but rather meeting the actual situation halfway: outside of Poland there are Poles who may prove to be a great force of defence should the national security of the country be endangered. The multifaceted policy towards the Polonia, coordinated with the national security policy, should be tightly bonded with the challenges of the economic and social policies, which cannot be done without linkages with foreign policy, cultural policy and educational policy. Hence the need to monitor and support the readiness of the Poles who live abroad (in particular the Polish elites – people holding high positions in the social structure of their host countries) to get involved in the potential defence of Poland, undertake tasks linked with the implementation of the policy towards the Polonia, promotion of Poland as well as carry out public diplomacy on her behalf. In the case of a war waged on the territory of the Republic of Poland, it is exactly the Polonia organizations which should be recognised as capable of creating various types of support for those who fight for the homeland. It is the Polonia organisations which should be perceived as capable of exerting international pressure for the defence of Poland by the allied powers. The Poles who live outside of Poland may prove to be: a safe haven for refugees from the area of warfare, an asylum for those who seek shelter, a social base.

It is even an axiom in security sciences that caring for the national identity of children and young people is building the future national security of Poland. Therefore, it is important to think about the education of young Poles living outside the country. Polish youth express interest in learning the Polish language. This interest is greater if learning Polish is combined with an organized summer holiday in Poland. Such organized events, organized in cooperation with secondary schools or universities from Poland, should be seen as a great opportunity to effectively improve the language

¹¹ On changes in the Polonia policy of the 3rd Republic of Poland, cf. Nwosielski, Nowak 2017: 73–89.

skills of young Poles living abroad and to deepen their knowledge of Polish culture, history, national heritage, traditions and geography. Such a summer holiday will contribute to the integration and activation of children and youth of Polish descent. By promoting higher education, it will be an incentive to study at Polish universities.

The integration of the Polish diaspora community has been and is associated with the involvement of specific people, formal and informal groups. Representatives of the Polish community postulate that it is necessary to document and commemorate such activities and people. This means that systematic research and funding are needed: firstly, to secure documentation within individual Polish communities abroad (often private archives exposed to destruction), and secondly, to popularize the collected material. Without systematic funding, it is impossible to disseminate knowledge about places and people important for national memory abroad, their importance for history, heritage and national identity, and the promotion of Polish culture. The activities of individuals and groups are related to places that are often symbolic for the Polish diaspora. Representatives of Polish diaspora organisations postulate that further support is needed for the revitalization, renovation and restoration of Polish or Polish-related monuments located outside the country. Particularly interesting is the proposal to build an interactive website that is a database of knowledge about people, places and events of the Polish diaspora in the world. Such a service could fulfil various functions. Firstly, to be a collection of information about historical facts, and secondly, to provide information about current events. Such a service could help to explore and learn from many places in the world by following the traces of Poles there and of events connected with Poland.

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Działania Ernestasa Galvanauskasa wobec założeń planu Hymansa – wewnętrzne uwarunkowania polityczne

Actions by Ernestas Galvanauskas Towards the Hymans Plan – Internal Political Circumstances

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Streszczenie: Ernestas Galvanauskas – polityk, naukowiec i osoba publiczna – jest postacią mało znaną opinii społecznej nie tylko na Litwie, ale i w Polsce. Litewscy historycy i politolodowie postrzegają go jednak jako jednego z bardziej wpływowych polityków, który przyczynił się do budowania państwowego bytu litewskiego, bardziej niż premier Augustinas Voldemaras czy prezydent Antanas Smetona. Odrodzenie państwa litewskiego nierozzerwalnie wiąże się z osobą E. Galvanauskasa. Był on zaangażowany w proces modernizacji Kłajpedy, doprowadził do rozwoju ekonomii litewskiej, którą zastosował w praktyce do zarządzania gospodarką kraju. Cel badawczy niniejszego artykułu stanowi pogłębiona analiza działalności dyplomatycznej E. Galvanauskasa wobec planu Hymansa, w czasie gdy pełnił on funkcję premiera rządu oraz ministra spraw zagranicznych. W polskiej literaturze przedmiotu brakuje źródeł dotyczących problematyki dziejów Litwy i relacji litewsko-polskich w okresie międzywojennym, zwłaszcza w kontekście aktywności politycznej E. Galvanauskasa.

Słowa kluczowe: Ernestas Galvanauskas, stosunki polsko-litewskie, Liga Narodów, plan Hymansa

Abstract: Ernestas Galvanauskas – politician, scientist and public figure – is a person little known to public opinion not only in Lithuania but also in Poland. However, Lithuanian historians and political scientists see him as one of the more influential politicians who contributed to the construction of the Lithuanian state, more than Prime Minister Augustinas Voldemaras or President Antanas Smetona. The revival of the Lithuanian state is inextricably linked with the person of E. Galvanauskas. He was involved in the process of modernization of Klaipėda, led to the development of Lithuanian economics, which he applied in practice to manage the country's economy. The research objective of this article is an in-depth analysis of the diplomatic activities of E. Galvanauskas in relation to the Hymans plan while he was Prime Minister of the government and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Polish literature on the subject lacks sources concerning the history of Lithuania and Lithuanian-Polish relations in the interwar period, especially in the context of E. Galvanauskas' political activity.

Keywords: Ernestas Galvanauskas, Polish-Lithuanian relations, League of Nations, Hymans plan

W 1918 r. Polska i Litwa odzyskały niepodległość. Rząd polski wysunął propozycję utworzenia wspólnego państwa, którą rząd litewski odrzucił. Pomiędzy dwoma odrodzonymi państwami doszło do konfliktu zbrojnego, a przedmiotem sporu była przynależność państwowa terenów granicznych. Po zakończeniu konfliktu polsko-litewskiego ziemie południowo-wschodniej Litwy wraz z Wilnem na mocy umowy suwalskiej zostały uznane za część Litwy, jednak Polska nie zastosowała się do postanowień i w październiku 1920 r. doszło do tzw. buntu Żeligowskiego, w wyniku którego zajęta została Wileńszczyzna. Po niepowodzeniu międzypaństwowych negocjacji pokojowych Liga Narodów podjęła się normalizacji sytuacji. Paul Hymans, prezydent Ligi Narodów, przedstawił 20 maja 1921 r. własną propozycję pokojową. Obejmowała ona utworzenie z Litwy dwóch kantonów narodowościowych ze stolicą w Wilnie i powiązanie tak powstałego państwa z Polską, co było w większości powieleniem polskiej idei federacyjnej głoszonej przez Marszałka Polski Józefa Piłsudskiego. Wobec dalszego braku porozumienia 3 września P. Hymans zaproponował autonomię Wileńszczyzny w ramach Litwy, co spotkało się z odmową ze strony polskiej. Ostatecznie 21 września 1921 r. Liga Narodów zakończyła wszelkie próby zażegnania sporu, 3 lutego 1923 r. zdecydowała o podziale pomiędzy obie strony tzw. strefy pasa neutralnego, a 15 marca 1923 r. Konferencja Ambasadorów, wykonując postanowienia art. 87 traktatu wersalskiego, podjęła decyzję o uznaniu polskich granic.

Celem badawczym niniejszego artykułu jest analiza działalności dyplomatycznej polityka Ernestasa Galvanauskasa wobec planu Hymansa. W artykule omówiono także politykę zagraniczną prowadzoną przez E. Galvanauskasa w kluczowych dla Litwy latach 1920–1921. Był to okres próby przebudowy stosunków polsko-litewskich, głównie w kontekście Wileńszczyzny. Badając wybrane przypadki z perspektywy aktorów politycznych, niniejszy artykuł może pomóc wyjaśnić, dlaczego niektóre z ich decyzji odbiegały od tradycyjnej międzynarodowej polityki zagranicznej bazującej na konsensusie. Zakres przedmiotowy artykułu wytycza konflikt na linii Kowno–Warszawa. Zakres podmiotowy odnosi się natomiast do sylwetki polityka E. Galvanauskasa. Zakres terytorialny zaś obejmuje ziemie litewskie i obszary będące pod administracją litewską (m.in. obszar Kłajpedy) oraz ziemie II Rzeczypospolitej i obszar będący pod administracją polską (m.in. obszar wileński). Ramy chronologiczne pola badawczego wyznaczają lata 1920–1921.

Realizację celów badawczych umożliwiło zaimplementowanie metody historycznej, która służy do ustalenia faktu historycznego. Niniejsza analiza

stanowi punkt wyjścia do dalszych badań naukowych. Hipoteza badawcza sformułowana w artykule bazuje na założeniu, że działalność dyplomatyczna E. Galvanauskasa oparta była na interesach sprzecznych ze skrajnie prawicowo-nacjonalistyczną opozycją, na czele której stał Antanas Smetona.

1. Biografia polityczna Ernestasa Galvanauskasa (1882–1967)

Po uzyskaniu matury w Mintawie w 1902 r. E. Galvanauskas rozpoczął naukę w Instytucie Leśnictwa w Sankt Petersburgu. W tym samym roku został członkiem Litewskiej Partii Demokratycznej. W 1905 r. był przedstawicielem Związku Rolników, a dzięki aktywnej pracy i zaangażowaniu został reprezentantem Wielkiego Sejmu Wilna („Lietuvos ukininkas” 1906: 528). W swoich memoriałach o wileńskim sejmie pisał:

Podczas wystąpienia każda partia próbowała przyciągać sobie jak najwięcej zwolenników, każda zmagala się z innymi ugrupowaniami, każda coś oferowała, ale żadna niewiele uwagi poświęciła temu, czego powinno się wymagać i co będzie służyło narodowi litewskiemu. Sejm wileński to było miejsce, gdzie odbyły się pierwsze wzmianki pomiędzy wszystkimi partiami litewskimi, nie były one [partie polityczne – M.M.] przygotowane i nie były chętne do współpracy, każda posiadała swoje ambicje. W takich warunkach nawet długoplanowe kwestie były nie do rozwiązania, stawały się obiektem nieuniknionych ostrych starć (Audėnas 1990: 7)¹.

Na podstawie powyższej wypowiedzi można sformułować kilka uwag. Przede wszystkim widać pierwszą ważną cechę osobowości E. Galvanauskasa: przez całą swoją karierę na litewskiej scenie politycznej unikał intryg oraz gier politycznych. Z tego powodu jest stosunkowo mało rozpoznawany w historii i myśli politycznej Litwy. Po drugie, nie pisał politycznych manifestów ani nie tworzył programów politycznych. Właściwie był bardziej politycznym wykonawcą niż ideologiem. Stąd w litewskiej literaturze nie ma żadnych jego zbiorów cytatów lub pamiętników, w przeciwieństwie do A. Smetony czy Augustinasa Voldemarasa. Jednakże jego wpływ na rządy jest odczuwalny we wszystkich najważniejszych wydarzeniach litewskiej historii, począwszy od 1919 r. do co najmniej 1926 r. (Varnas 2018).

¹ Wszystkie tłumaczenia z języka litewskiego pochodzą od autora artykułu.

Za swoją aktywną działalność polityczną, w tym za udział w sejmie wileńskim, był represjonowany przez administrację carską. W 1906 r. został aresztowany i przez kilka miesięcy więziony w Poniewieżu. W 1908 r., uświadomiwszy sobie, iż dłużej nie może przybywać na Litwie i w Imperium Rosyjskim, wyemigrował do Belgii, gdzie na uniwersytecie technicznym w Liège kontynuował studia inżynierskie. W 1912 r. uzyskał dyplom inżyniera górniczego, a w 1913 r. dyplom inżyniera elektryka (Banevičius 1991: 58). Nie mogąc znaleźć zatrudnienia, zafascynowany górami i klimatem bałkańskim, wyjechał do Serbii, gdzie w 1914 r. został zatrudniony we francusko-serbskim przedsiębiorstwie kolejowym. W okresie nadchodzącej Wielkiej Wojny, podobnie jak większość działaczy politycznych, wyemigrował do Europy Zachodniej. W 1916 r. przybył do Paryża, gdzie podjął pracę jako inżynier elektrotechnik. W stolicy Francji rozpoczęła się jego druga odsłona drogi politycznej. Poznał tam litewskiego dyplomata i delegata na Paryż Osakarasa Milašiusa, który zaproponował mu pracę sekretarza w delegacji litewskiej na trwającej konferencji pokojowej w Paryżu (E. Galvanauskas bardzo dobrze władał językiem francuskim). Ernestas Galvanauskas był odpowiedzialny nie tylko za przygotowanie tekstów państwowych na konferencję paryską, ale także za ubiór i wygląd reprezentacyjny A. Voldemarasa, przez co miał także wpływ na kreowanie jego zewnętrznego wizerunku w Paryżu (Klimas 1990: 159).

Z politycznego punktu widzenia E. Galvanauskas służył pomocą delegacji litewskiej. Pozyskana przez niego sympatia litewskich delegatów nie tylko wynikała z jego oddania i pracowitości na rzecz delegacji z A. Voldemaraszem na czele, lecz przede wszystkim z tego, iż przez dłuższy czas był osobą bezpartyjną, przez co bezstronnie politycznie – to wzbudzało większe zaufanie. W sierpniu 1919 r. E. Galvanauskas udał się na Europejski Kongres Socjalistów w Lucernie. Po konferencji został zaproszony przez Jonasa Vileišisa, szefa delegacji litewskiej, na negocjacje do Berlina w sprawie udzielenia pożyczki rządowi litewskiemu na jego działalność. W czerwcu 1919 r. E. Galvanauskas pod namową J. Vileišisa wrócił na Litwę, by wkrótce objąć stanowisko premiera. W tym punkcie warto zwrócić uwagę, że E. Galvanauskas zyskał dużą sympatię i uznanie szefa delegacji J. Vileišisa, który rekomendował go do sprawowania najwyższych funkcji w państwie, przedstawił go jako osobę lojalną, pracowitą, a co najważniejsze – nienależącą do żadnego stronnictwa politycznego (Martišius 2003: 118).

2. Konsekwencje kryzysu w gabinecie ministra Mykolasa Sleževičiausa

Początkowy etap kariery politycznej profesjonalnie przygotował E. Galvanauskasa do pracy w sferze administracyjnej, dyplomatycznej oraz gospodarczej. Na początku września 1919 r. wybuchł kryzys w gabinecie Mykolasa Sleževičiausa, gdyż rząd nie radził sobie z nowymi wyzwaniami na arenie międzynarodowej. Z tego powodu opozycja zażądała zmian. Prezydent A. Smetona 30 września 1919 r. zarządził nadzwyczajną naradę w sejmie, gdzie zebrali się wszyscy przedstawiciele litewskich partii. Podczas narady A. Smetona zaproponował utworzenie rządu dla E. Galvanauskasa, ponieważ – według taktyki politycznej prezydenta – niepartyjny kandydat mógłby zjednoczyć spolaryzowaną litewską elitę polityczną. Dnia 7 października 1919 r. E. Galvanauskas utworzył piąty litewski rząd, a 19 kwietnia 1920 r. A. Smetona przekazał funkcję głowy państwa Aleksandrowi Stulginskovi (Grinius 1954: 211). Ze względu na kryzys ekonomiczny w kraju na początku 1921 r. E. Galvanauskas z aprobatą nowego prezydenta objął stanowisko ministra finansów. Na Litwie brakowało profesjonalnych dyplomatów, z tego też powodu E. Galvanauskas zdecydował się być szefem delegacji litewskiej w Brukseli oraz w Genewie w trakcie negocjacji z delegacją polską („Akiraščiai” 1973: 53).

W tym miejscu warto zadać pytanie, dlaczego w styczniu 1921 r. E. Galvanauskas zdecydował się wziąć na siebie odpowiedzialność w rokowaniach dyplomatycznych z Polską na rzecz planu Hymansa. Zarówno partia rządząca, jak i opozycja 21 stycznia 1921 r. wspólnie wyraziły pretensje A. Smetonie, iż jego przyjaciel i najbliższy współpracownik minister A. Voldemaras jest pasywny w Lidze Narodów. Dowiedziawszy się o tym, minister jeszcze tego samego dnia zrezygnował z mandatu szefa litewskiej delegacji w Lidze Narodów. Prezydent A. Smetona zaproponował stanowisko E. Galvanauskasowi, który oficjalnie 1 lutego 1921 r. stanął na czele delegacji litewskiej w Lidze Narodów (Bukaitė 2016: 178). Dyplomata w Paryżu, Petras Klimas, o tym wydarzeniu w swoim memoriale napisał:

Powstały wątpliwości co do nowego sternika dyplomacji litewskiej, ponieważ Voldemaras był największą naszą siłą intelektualną w Lidze Narodów. Wciąż dla nas był *homo novus* jako nadmiernie abstrakcyjny myśliciel, dialektyk. Poza tym odszedł od publicznej działalności, przeczuwając, iż on i jego ugrupowanie polityczne tracą na popularności w sejmie. Z tego powodu trzeba było szukać bardziej odpowiedzialnego przedstawiciela w gronie rządu (1990: 293).

Można wnioskować, iż głównym powodem odejścia A. Voldemarasa był spadek jego popularności i autorytetu wśród najbliższych jego współpracowników, dlatego stał się on pasywny zarówno w sejmie, jak i w rządzie, co ostatecznie doprowadziło w 1920 r. do utraty stanowiska.

3. Sprawa Wilna na forum Ligi Narodów

Już na początku negocjacji, gdy zapadały w Radzie Ligi Narodów plany plebiscytu na terytorium wileńskim, E. Galvanauskas zażądał od członków Rady, by konsekwencje plebiscytu zostały uznane przez stronę polską. Zdaniem litewskiego premiera Polska wielokrotnie łamała zasady związane z linią demarkacyjną. Także z inicjatywy E. Galvanauskasa zrodził się argument w Lidze Narodów, by plebiscyt odłożyć. Ponieważ w tym czasie na arenie międzynarodowej Litwa nadal nie posiadała statusu *de jure*, dlatego z politycznego punktu widzenia to właśnie ona, w odróżnieniu do Polski, zajmowała nierówną pozycję w Lidze Narodów.

Ernestasowi Galvanauskasowi udało się przekonać wszystkich członków Rady Ligi Narodów w kwestii Wilna, że potrzebna jest inna opcja rozwiązania tego konfliktu niż organizowanie plebiscytu. W jego opinii miała być to opcja, która byłaby zgodna ze wszystkimi przyjętymi rezolucjami Rady w kwestii sporu między stronami na linii Polska–Litwa (Klimas 1990: 296). W tym celu oba państwa powinny wysłać swoich przedstawicieli rządowych do Brukseli, gdzie P. Hymans, minister spraw zagranicznych Belgii, stał na czele mediacji pomiędzy stronami konfliktu.

Dnia 11 maja 1921 r. odbyły się pierwsze negocjacje polsko-litewskie dotyczące sporu Wilna, gdzie P. Hymans obu stronom zaproponował swój plan (plan Hymansa). Treść tego planu zawierała zasadniczą myśl modelu szwajcarskiego: Litwa musiałaby stać się krajem związkowym, utworzonym z dwóch kantonów: Wilna i Kowna. Polityka zagraniczna, wojskowa i sprawy gospodarcze w przyszłości powinny być regulowane przez wspólne ciało polityczne wybierane przez litewskie i polskie parlamenty (*Hymanso projektas vyriausiuose kr. d. p. organuose* 1928: 6–8). Druga teza planu wskazywała, iż z Kłajpedy i jej portu korzystać będzie bez żadnych ograniczeń celnych strona Polska. W odpowiedzi E. Galvanauskas oświadczył, iż jest to dobra podstawa do dalszych dyskusji na forum Ligi Narodów, lecz obawiał się, że z punktu widzenia ekonomicznego silniejsza gospodarczo Polska pochłonie Litwę

swoją potęgą oraz nie będzie wpłacała do skarbu litewskiego cła, co w efekcie osłabi litewską ekonomię (Galva 1982: 17). Obie strony odrzuciły projekt, jednakże warto pogłębić analizę histograficzną, z której wynika, iż E. Galvanauskas nie odrzucał projektu Hymansa w całości (Valsonokas 1989: 8).

Ernestas Galvanauskas dobrze rozumiał wizję, jaką zaoferował mediator P. Hymans, który widział Litwę jako państwo-prowincję pod opieką prozachodniej orientacji Polski. Z tego powodu E. Galvanauskas daleko mówił, iż negocjacje mogą iść według tego projektu, lecz bez elementów federacyjnych. Równocześnie referował, że negocjacje z Polską można prowadzić w następujący sposób: po pierwsze, podpisać umowę o ochronie mniejszości na Litwie i w Polsce na podstawie zasadniczej, odpowiedniej umowy zawartej w Wersalu, po drugie, zawrzeć między stronami konwencji obrony wojskowej (Jegelavičius 1997: 315).

W czasie sesji Ligi Narodów 21 czerwca 1921 r. bezpośrednio zapytany przez P. Hymansa, co sądzi o pozostaniu pod polskimi auspicjami, E. Galvanauskas odpowiedział,

iz jego zdaniem priorytetową sprawą jest zażegnanie napięć przez zagwarantowanie praw mniejszości w Kownie i na Litwie, ponieważ te miejsca stają się ogniwem konfliktów. Po drugie, zawarcie konwencji wojennej ma służyć ograniczeniu spraw obronnych Polski w potencjalnym konflikcie z Litwą, tj. zawarcia umowy o tak zwanej nieagresji przeciwko Litwie. W kwestii Kłajpedy, kompletnie odmówił prowadzenia jakiegokolwiek negocjacji w tym temacie (Jegelavičius 1997: 316).

Inne elementy projektu, zdaniem E. Galvanauskasa, były warte omówienia, co w efekcie stanowiło *modus vivendi*. Dlatego w ówczesnej sytuacji usatysfakcjonowana Rada Ligi Narodów 28 czerwca 1921 r. uchwaliła rezolucję, w myśl której rozmowy dotyczące planu Hymansa miały być kontynuowane na najbliższej sesji Rady w Brukseli.

4. Efekty działalności dyplomatycznej Ernestasa Galvanauskasa

Plan Hymansa spowodował głośny oddźwięk na Litwie. Na początku lipca 1921 r. w stolicy zapanował niepokój, wywierana presja opozycyjna na E. Galvanauskasa nakazywała jego niedopuszczenie lub kontynuowanie

dyskusji, jak i wchodzenie w dalsze rokowania w sprawie możliwości zawarcia federacyjnych lub unijnych związków z Polską. Litewski ruch antyhymansowski, organizowany przez radyklane skrzydło, czyli Litewską Partię Socjaldemokratyczną i Partię Postępu Narodowego, skłonił E. Galvanauskasa do wystosowania 22 lipca 1921 r. swojej noty, w której przedstawił stanowisko wobec planu Hymansa. Wskazał w niej na faktyczne powody (wywołane na Litwie) niepozwalające wykonać rezolucji z 28 czerwca (Abromaitis 2004: 219). Inicjatywą E. Galvanauskasa było także przedstawienie kolejnego pisma Radzie Ligi Narodów. Nota zyskała aprobatę sejmiku litewskiego, a jej główna teza brzmiała, iż aby kontynuować negocjacje z Polską na forum Ligi, potrzebna jest realizacja umowy suwalskiej², ponieważ umowa ta gwarantowała zaufanie dla rządu litewskiego wobec Polski oraz zabezpieczała podstawy do kontynuowania rokowań bez napięć („Voruta” 2012: 13). Delegacja polska, na czele z ministrem przy Lidze Narodów Szymonem Askenazym, zapoznawszy się z dokumentem E. Galvanauskasa, odrzuciła żądania litewskiego premiera, co skutkowało kolejnymi bezowocnymi rokowaniami między stronami.

Na początku września 1921 r. na jesiennej sesji Ligi Narodów P. Hymans przedstawił drugą wersję planu, którego tezy były korzystniejsze dla strony litewskiej. Założenia planu zostały skonsultowane z przedstawicielem Litwy w Anglii Tomaszem Naruszewiczem. Jednak istota planu nie stanowiła podstawy do dyskusji, było to porozumienie, które musiało być zaakceptowane przez obie strony konfliktu. W drugiej wersji planu porzucano ideę kantonu, autonomia została zaoferowana regionowi wileńskiemu, sugerowano zakładanie oddzielnych sztabów generalnych na terytorium Wilna, ich działalność miałyby być koordynowane przez obie strony, a w czasie potencjalnej wojny Polska miałaby prawo korzystać z terytorium wileńskiego. W wyniku nacisków ze strony Rady Ligi Narodów E. Galvanauskas zgodził się kontynuować negocjacje w kierunku drugiego planu Hymansa (Žepkaitė 1980: 148).

W związku z tym na Litwie powstała nowa fala protestów przeciwko drugiemu planowi Hymanasa (*Dar dėl Ženevos rezoliucijos. Didelis mitingas – demonstracija Kaune* 12.07.1921: 1–3). W politycznych oraz społecznych spotkaniach bezwzględnie apelowano do E. Galvanauskasa, aby nie

² Umowa suwalska ustanawiała linię demarkacyjną, która przyznawała znaczną część obwodu wileńskiego Litwie, lecz nie Wilno, a także porozumienie o zakończeniu wojny, przewidując tym samym procedurę wymiany jeńców wojennych między stronami.

zawierał żadnych związków konfederacyjnych z Polską, z powodu których ucierpiałaby niepodległość Litwy, i aby starał się utrzymać na forum Ligi Narodów kwestię niezależności Litwy z jej stolicą Wilnem (*Piliečių balsai. Vilkaviškio gyventojų rezoliucija* 1921: 3). Z tej przyczyny 1 listopada 1921 r. E. Galvanauskas zorganizował konferencję dla delegatów przy Lidze Narodów w Kownie, a w przededniu miał spotkanie w sejmie z działaczami publicznymi, liderami partii i frakcji. Na konferencji oświadczył, iż wszyscy są nastawieni na odrzucenie planu Hymansa, zarówno jego wersji pierwszej, jak i drugiej. Ich argumenty zostały oparte na polityce wewnętrznej oraz na zdecydowanych reakcjach społecznych przeciwko jakiegokolwiek bliższemu związkowi z Polską. Przyjęcie propozycji P. Hymansa wywołałoby poważne zamieszania, które mogłyby doprowadzić do katastrofy w skali całego kraju (*Lietuvos Centrinis Valstybes Archyvas, Lietuvos pasiuntinių konferencijos posėdžio protokolai* 31.10.1921, f. 383, b. 118). Podczas konferencji delegatów E. Galvanauskas wspominał również, że w razie zamieszek prawdopodobnie aktywnie w te sprawy zaangażuje się armia litewska. Jednocześnie podkreślał konieczność prowadzenia dalszych negocjacji w sprawie drugiego planu Hymansa, ponieważ odrzucenie go oznaczałoby koniec mediacji, a w konsekwencji zrzeczenie się Wilna i całego kraju. Dalej, jak oświadczył szef delegacji, może to doprowadzić do wojny z Polską i okupacji Litwy jako całości, a następnie, w jego opinii, nie wolno zapomnieć, że jeżeli Polska utraci niepodległość, Litwa też nie przetrwa jako byt państwowy (*I sesijos 124 posėdis* 20.09.1921). Pod koniec listopada 1921 r. do członków litewskiego sejmiku została wystosowana odezwa autorstwa Litewskiego Komitetu Ratowania Narodu. W treści apelu zawarte zostało żądanie, by członkowie sejmiku kategorycznie odrzucili przyjęcie przez rząd litewski drugiej wersji planu Hymansa (*Kauno mitingo nutarimas dėl Hymanso projekto* 1921: 6). Kilka dni później członkowie rządu litewskiego, w tym E. Galvanauskas, otrzymywali anonimowe groźby dotyczące tego, co się stanie, jeśli zaakceptują propozycje Ligi Narodów (Žepkaitė 1978: 206).

Dnia 24 listopada 1921 r. litewski działacz społeczny Zigmundas Žemaitis przybył na konferencję frakcji Litewskiej Partii Socjaldemokratów oraz Partii Związku Chłopów, oświadczając, że nowy premier rządu Kazys Grinius poinformował go, iż jego gabinet ministrów sprawę planu Hymansa będzie rozważać 25 listopada, a jego rezolucja nie będzie wymagała ratyfikacji sejmiku. Jednocześnie Z. Žemaitis obawiał się, że sejm będzie uprawniony jedynie do ratyfikowania traktatów przygotowanych po akceptacji projektu. Członkowie frakcji nie byli pewni, czy gabinet ministrów nie

przyjmie projektu bez wiedzy sejmu, dlatego niektórzy członkowie frakcji nalegali na gwarancje, że tak się nie stanie, podczas gdy pozostali wyrażali brak zaufania do gabinetu ministrów K. Griniusa (*Steigiamojo Seimo LSLDP ir LVS frakcijų bloko protokolai* 24.11.1921: 343). Gabinet ministrów miał za zadanie w dniu 25 listopada rozważyć plan Hymansa bez wiedzy sejmu i niezależnie od tego ciała zaakceptować go lub odrzucić podczas spotkania lobby masońskiego. Zigmundas Žemaitis 22 listopada został mianowany na ministra bez teki do spraw Białorusinów w rządzie Dominika Semaški. *Sensu largo* minister D. Semaška chciał skonsultować się nie tylko z Z. Žemaitisem, ale i z pozostałymi członkami masonerii w kwestii planu Hymansa. Warto zwrócić uwagę, iż Z. Žemaitis oraz Kowieńska Loża, założona 1 lutego 1920 r. przez wolnomularzy i byłego premiera Mikołaja Šležvičiusa, opowiedzieli się za przejęciem planu Hymansa. Większość członków kowieńskiej loży masońskiej była zwolennikami planu. Natomiast minister D. Semaška, będąc jednocześnie członkiem kowieńskiej loży masońskiej i przeciwnikiem planu Hymansa, wraz z ministrem spraw wewnętrznych Rapolasem Skipitisem poddał się do dymisji.

Na uwagę zasługuje fakt, iż w gabinecie ministrów była zdecydowana większość zwolenników planu Hymansa i planowali go zaakceptować z niewielkimi zastrzeżeniami. Michał Römer, gorliwy zwolennik porozumienia z Polską, w swoim memoriale wyraził to następująco:

Jestem świadom, że jest potrzeba przyjąć plan Hymansa, lecz nie w taki sposób, w jaki sobie propagują zwolennicy tej sprawy w gabinecie ministrów, jest to nie do przyjęcia. Ta pogarda dla litewskiej demokracji, Sejmu, Konstytucji oraz establishmentu na litewskiej scenie politycznej nie powinna być zwana działaniami politycznymi wokół planu Ligi. Rozumiem i uzasadniłbym podjęcie decyzji przez gabinet ministrów, która się nie boi brać inicjatywy dyktatorskiej, jednakże obecni spekulanci litewskiego establishmentu są tchórzliwi, chcą osiągnąć cel poprzez zwodzenie, oszukiwanie i kłamstwa, traktując zasady demokracji litewskiej jak naiwne dziecko. Nie jestem zaskoczony, że Liga Narodów: Anglia i Francja, przekonuje litewski establishment do podejmowania takich metod działania, ponieważ są zainteresowani rozstrzygnięciem kwestii Wilna w jak najszybszym terminie. Z tego powodu szukają jakiegokolwiek drogi do osiągnięcia celu (Römeris, Miknys, Grigaitienė 2013: 30).

Na podstawie krytycznej oceny sytuacji politycznej na Litwie M. Römer obwiniał Ligę Narodów, iż traktowała litewskie społeczeństwo jako naród, który musi zostać oszukany i którego nie można przekonać do czegokolwiek,

a mając to na uwadze, rząd litewski postępował w ten sam sposób, natomiast Liga Narodów narzucała rządowi litewskiemu swoje propozycje.

Dnia 25 listopada 1921 r. w celu zapobieżenia przyjęcia planu Hymansa podjęto próbę zamachu na życie szefa delegacji litewskiej E. Galvanauskasa. Materiał wybuchowy został podłożony na parapet w jego sypialni. Podczas eksplozji E. Galvanauskas został ciężko ranny. Jak podają źródła, uratowało go to, że podczas wybuchu nie spał, a odwróciwszy się plecami do okna, grał w karty. Nie było wątpliwości, że z powodów politycznych E. Galvanauskas był bardzo niewygodną postacią na arenie politycznej. Organ prasowy organizacji paramilitarnej Związku Strzelców Litewskich „Trimitas” publicznie potępiał akt terroru, aczkolwiek nazwał to rezultatem napiętej sytuacji politycznej na Litwie oraz konsekwencją interwencjonizmu Ligi Narodów w wewnętrzne sprawy polityczne Litwy (*Patamsių riteriai* 1921: 3). Członek delegacji litewskiej P. Klimas w swoim memoriale pisał, że zaledwie po 40 latach dowiedział się, że zamach był zorganizowany przez kilka osób i wskazał ich nazwiska: Balis Sruoga, Jonas Strazda oraz Miksa Kalmantavičius-Kalmantas. W czasie zamachu pisarz B. Sruoga studiował w Monachium, dlatego wątpliwe jest, by mógł przyczynić się do tego aktu. Wspominano też o innej wersji, że inicjatorem zamachu był Wincenty Krevė-Mickievčius, a jego wykonawcą oficer Józef Mikuckis (Čepėnas 1992: 650).

W 1923 r. ujawniono, że głównym realizatorem zamachu był Feliksas Šemeta, aktywny działacz na rzecz ruchu niepodległościowego. Wraz ze swoimi braćmi Aleksandrem i Hipolitasem w walce przeciwko zachodniej armii ochotniczej (lit. *Bermontininkai*) stworzyli słyną grupę „Kužiai”, która militarnie wspierała komendę Telšiai oraz batalion Janikščiai. Do końca października 1923 r. F. Šemeta walczył z Polakami, a następnie został przywódcą oddziału partyzanckiego. Jako członek Związku Strzelców Litewskich współpracował z kowieńskim kontrwywiadem wojennym. Jego udział w realizowaniu zamachu na E. Galvanauskasa został potwierdzony przez byłego członka litewskiego sejmu i prawnika Zigmunda Toliuška. W swoim wspomnieniu pisał, że szczególnie wrogą pozycję wobec planu Hymansa zajął Vladislavas Putvinskis – dowódca Związku Strzelców Litewskich. Jego zdaniem przyjęcie planu Hymansa spowodowałoby wejście Litwy w orbitę polskich wpływów politycznych, ekonomicznych i kulturalnych, a w dalszej perspektywie Litwa, jako słabszy partner dla Polski, straciłaby swoją niezależność i została inkorporowana w skład jej terytorium. W opinii Z. Toliuška, aby plan Hymansa nie został przyjęty, postanowiono usunąć najbardziej

wpływowego zwolennika rozwiązań Ligi Narodów – E. Galvanauskasa. Poza W. Putvinskisem w skład kierownictwa Związku Strzelców Litewskich wchodził tacy przywódca, jak: Mikas Mikelevičius, Pranas Klimaitis, Aleksandras Marcinkevičius, Liudas Vailionis, Antanas Žmuidžinavičius, jednakże o planie dokonania zamachu na E. Galvanauskasa było poinformowane najbliższe grono przyjaciół V. Putvinskisa. Jak pisał Z. Toliušis, W. Putvinskis był powiernikiem F. Šemetę, pochodzącego z okręgu Szawle, i to jemu zlecono przeprowadzenie zamachu (Toliušis 1968: 178).

W 1923 r. po zbadaniu i wyjaśnieniu sprawy śledczej oraz ujawnieniu nazwisk zamachowców przez kontrwywiad kowieński V. Putvinskis doradził F. Šemetowi, by w jak najszybszym czasie opuścił Litwę i wyjechał na Łotwę. Następnie podsunął mu myśl, aby z Rygi F. Šemeta dostał się do Moskwy w celu zdobycia nowych dokumentów identyfikacyjnych i znalezienia pracy w pobliżu granicy litewskiej. Opuściwszy kraj 12 listopada 1923 r., został aresztowany na terytorium Związku Socjalistycznych Republik Radzieckich (ZSSR). Do września 1924 r. był więziony na Łubiance w Moskwie. Za nielegalne przekroczenie granicy radzieckiej został skazany na 3 lata obozu koncentracyjnego w Solowkach. Po odbyciu kary drugą decyzją sądu najwyższego ZSSR został deportowany na 10 lat na Syberię do Tulun. W obozie pracy przymusowej w Irkucku, gdzie pracował jako stolarz w bibliotece miejskiej, został oskarżony w 1938 r. za propagowanie trockizmu i skazany na kolejne 3 lata pobytu w obozie pracy przymusowej. Wkrótce oskarżono go o szpiegostwo na rzecz zwolenników Lwa Trockiego, co posłużyło jako dowód jego skazania i rozstrzelania (Žadeikytė 2013).

W zorganizowaniu zamachu na szefa dyplomacji litewskiej brał udział członek zarządu centralnego Związku Strzelców Litewskich Antanas Gravgrokas. Jego syn Vytautas Gravgrokas wspominał, że ojciec oraz kapitan Antanas Petruškevičius i inna niezidentyfikowana osoba, członek Związku Strzelców Litewskich, zdetonowali materiał wybuchowy (Anton von Gravrock asmeninis archyvas, *Atsiminimai* 2015). W 1905 r. A. Gravgrokas był członkiem prezydium Wielkiego Sejmu Wileńskiego, aktywnie angażował się w rewolucyjne wydarzenia. Na początku 1921 r. wstąpił w szeregi Związku Strzelców Litewskich, a w czasie organizowania zamachu na życie E. Galvanauskasa pełnił funkcję redaktora organu prasowego Związku Strzelców Litewskich „Trimitas”. Na jego łamach oficjalnie walczył o status publiczny organizacji. W latach 1932–1933 był burmistrzem miasta Kowna. W swojej autobiografii A. Gravgrokas pisał, iż E. Galvanauskasa dobrze znał z działalności Wielkiego Sejmu Wileńskiego, a odczuwając

w stosunku do niego antypatię, postanowił wziąć udział w zamachu (Anton von Gravrock asmeninis archyvas, A. Gravrogkas, *Autobiografija* 1941).

Kolejną osobą zaangażowaną w przygotowanie zamachu na życie E. Galvanauskasa był litewski żołnierz Antanas Petruškevičius. Do litewskich sił zbrojnych wstąpił 28 stycznia 1919 r., brał udział w walkach przeciwko bolszewikom i Polakom. Jego ojciec Laurynas Petruškevičius został aresztowany przez polskich żołnierzy, następnie więziony w Sejnach. Przesłuchiwany i torturowany zmarł w 1924 r. (Dainos Kemeraitienės asmeninis archyvas, Antanas Petruškevičius, Stasys Petruškevičius, Vincas Petruškevičius, Andrius Petruškevičius, Juozas Petruškevičius, *I ir II pasaulinio karo metų pergvyenti prisiminimai* 2005: 6). Śmierć ojca oraz osobiste doświadczenia okrucieństw zadanych mu przez polskich żołnierzy nałożyły się na antypolską postawę działacza, w wyniku czego, jak przyzna, zaangażował się w zorganizowanie zamachu na E. Galvanauskasa – najbardziej aktywnego zwolennika planu Hymansa. Po głębszej analizie faktów można wnioskować, że nie ma jednoznacznych dowodów na tę historię. Antanas Petruškevičius do 21 listopada 1942 r. (został rozstrzelany w więzieniu w Swierdłowsku) był zobowiązany do utrzymania w tajemnicy przebiegu tamtych wypadków.

W 1935 r. redaktor Viktoras Biržiška na łamach gazety „Trimitas” pisał, że na jednym z posiedzeń konspiracyjnych w sierpniu 1921 r. Polska Organizacja Wojskowa we współpracy z kowieńskimi Polakami miała dokonać zamachu na życie ministra E. Galvanauskasa oraz Józefa Purickisa, którzy byli jedynymi i najbardziej wpływowymi zwolennikami planu Hymansa. Jednakże zorganizowanie zamachu dokonał Związek Strzelców Litewskich oraz ruch antyhymansowski na czele z A. Smetoną oraz A. Voldemarąsem (Biržiška 2013: 187). Z analiz wynika jednak, że w czasie gdy A. Smetona sprawował władzę w państwie (1926–1939), redaktorowi V. Biržiške wydano instrukcję, aby publicznie na łamach prasy kompromitował w tej sprawie środowiska polskie.

Po szybkiej rekonwalescencji 3 grudnia 1921 r. E. Galvanauskas zorganizował spotkanie Rady Ministrów, na którym apelował, aby ministrowie przy podejmowaniu decyzji dotyczących planu Hymansa nie brali pod uwagę zamachu i nacisków ze strony Związku Strzelców Litewskich i działaczy ruchu antyhymansowskiego. Przekonywał, iż plan Hymansa należy zaakceptować w „dniu dzisiejszym” („Karys” 1921: 2). Jednakże tego samego dnia Rada Ministrów nie odważyła się przyjąć planu Ligi Narodów i oficjalnie go odrzuciła. Sejm Ustawodawczy Litwy 22 grudnia 1921 r.

jednogłośnie zatwierdził decyzję Rady Ministrów o niezaakceptowaniu planu Hymansa, który miał rozwiązać spór między Litwą a Polską (*I sesijos 156 posėdis* 22.12.1922). Deputowany z partii Ludowców Jan Staugaitis oświadczył, że Polska politycznie i ekonomicznie jest silniejsza, dlatego plan Ligi Narodów posłużył Polsce jako narzędzie, aby doprowadzić Litwę do związku federacyjnego. Przywódca Chrześcijańskich Demokratów Mykolas Krupavičius podkreślał z kolei, że plan Hymansa jest nie do przyjęcia, ponieważ niesie niewolnictwo i niszczy suwerenność państwa litewskiego. Natomiast Steponas Kairys, polityk Socjaldemokratyczny, skrytykował rząd za to, że pozwolił E. Galvanauskowi i delegacji pod jego kierownictwem ulegać naciskom ze strony Ententy, nie zwracając przy tym uwagi na opinię litewskiego narodu. Przekonywał, że propozycja przewodniczącego P. Hymansa była tylko pierwszym etapem dla Litwy oraz nadal istnieje duże ryzyko utraty niepodległości. Podsumowując, apelował do sejmku o konieczności konsolidowania wszystkich sił społeczeństwa litewskiego, by utrzymać silną linię polityczną wobec Polski i Ligi Narodów.

W imieniu rządu litewskiego E. Galvanauskas 24 grudnia 1921 r. w nocy do Ligi Narodów powiadomił: „Rozważając propozycję Rady Ligi Narodów ze wszystkich stron, litewska Rada Ministrów jest zobligowana z najgłębszym żalem nie zaakceptować jej zalecanego pojednania z Polską” („Lietuva” 1921: 1). Ernestas Galvanauskas wskazał następujące argumenty przeciwko planowi Hymansa: 1) po przyjęciu planu reforma rolna na Litwie byłaby zawieszona; 2) Litwa zostałaby włączona w polskie wojny imperialistyczne; 3) Litwa, będąca małym państwem, stałaby się prowincją Polski. Z analiz wynika, że realizowana reforma rolna na początku 1921 r. najbardziej dotknęła strachem litewską ludność wiejską, gdy grożono jej, w przypadku pojednania z Polską, zabranieciem ziem litewskich przez polski establishment (Laurinavičius 2004: 257). Aby skonsolidować litewski naród chłopski przeciwko planowi Ligi Narodów i Polski, największa frakcja Sejmu Ustawodawczego Litwy – blok Chrześcijańsko Demokratyczny, partii Ludowców i Socjaldemokratów – wykorzystała ten lęk i namówiła E. Galvanauskasa do wpisania tego argumentu jako zasadniczej przyczyny odrzucania propozycji P. Hymansa (*Steigiamojo Seimo atsišaukimas „Piliečiai”* 1920).

Później w swoim memoriale przyszedł prezydent Litwy K. Grinius pisał, że jemu, E. Galvanauskowi oraz J. Purickisowi plan Hymansa z mniej istotnymi poprawkami wydawał się do zaakceptowania, ale dla wielu nieodpowiedzialnych patriotów, zwłaszcza młodszego pokolenia – żołnierzy,

studentów, był nie do przyjęcia. Zdaniem K. Griniusa plan Hymansa w tym czasie był jedyną okazją do odzyskania Wilna. Był przekonany, że posiadanie własnej administracji, szkół i kierownictwa, jak również lokalnej armii litewskiej było dobrą opcją do możliwości połączenie Wilna z Litwą Kowieńską (Ilgunas 2000: 259). Augustinas Janulaitis, prawnik i członek sejmiku z ramienia partii Socjaldemokratów, w swoim artykule pisał, że plan Hymansa zasadniczo zmieniał stan prawa i konstytucję państwa litewskiego, prawo należało wyłącznie do Sejmu Ustawodawczego, a nie do kompetencji Rady Ministrów. Dalej w artykule potępiał wszystkich liderów partii, którzy w obawie o to, że plan Ligi Narodów stanie się przedmiotem debaty w sejmie, postanowili pełną odpowiedzialnością obarczyć E. Galvanauskasa i Radę Ministrów (Janulaitis 1921: 2).

Duet Voldemaras-Smetona uważnie i podejrzliwie śledził działalność i postawę E. Galvanauskasa w stosunkach z Polską. Na łamach organu prasowego Partii Postępu Narodowego A. Voldemaras twierdził, że E. Galvanauskas był zwolennikiem planu Hymansa i chciał w jak najszybszym czasie plan ten uchwalić. Jednakże w ostatniej chwili, pod naciskiem Partii Postępu Narodowego oraz socjalistów, był zmuszony odrzucić plan Ligi Narodów. Następnie głosił tezę, że myśl polityczna litewskich socjalistów miała na celu odwrócenie Litwy od wpływów politycznych Zachodu i zwrócenie jej w kierunku Rosji radzieckiej. Natomiast celem politycznym Partii Postępu Narodowego było uskutecznianie radykalniejszej retoryki antypolskiej. Gdy Partia Postępu Narodowego przegrała wybory do Sejmu Ustawodawczego w 1922 r., nie uzyskała ani jednego mandatu. Nie mogąc pogodzić się z przegraną, rozpoczęła kampanię antyhymansowską, aby przeciwstawić się E. Galvanauskasowi, rządowi oraz sejmowi litewskiemu (Voldemaras 1922: 1-2). Warto także zwrócić uwagę, że ściśle tajne bezpośrednie kontakty z ambasadą Rosji, jakie utrzymywała Partia Postępu Narodowego, a nie partia Socjaldemokratów, potwierdzają współpracę tejże partii z Rosją radziecką. Archiwalia rosyjskie zostały zbadane przez profesora Uniwersytetu Wileńskiego Zenonasa Butkusa. Z analizy tej wynika, iż E. Galvanauskas nie był zwolennikiem ani autorytarnego reżimu, ani liderów Partii Postępu Narodowego A. Smetony i A. Voldemarasa – jego wizja planu Hymansa wyróżniała się.

Będąc już na emigracji, dyplomata Vaclovas Sidzikauskas, współpracownik E. Galvanauskasa, przyznał w swoich pamiętnikach, że chociaż E. Galvanauskasowi nie udało się rozwiązać problemu granic z Polską, to jego stanowisko w tej sprawie było słuszne, ponieważ był on zwolennikiem

poprawy stosunków z Polską. Zdaniem V. Sidzikauskasa brak dążeń do zmiany stosunków z Polską pod przymusem opozycji i paramilitarnych organizacji, np. Związku Strzelców Litewskich, ułatwiał proces konsolidacji narodowej, przyspieszał rozwój świadomości narodowej, wzmacniał determinację walki o wartości patriotyczne. Według prognozy politycznej V. Sidzikauskasa, jeżeli E. Galvanauskas przekonałby Radę Ministrów do zaakceptowania propozycji P. Hymansa w 1921 r., prawdopodobnie Wilno znalazłoby się w strefach sowieckiej Białorusi, a po II wojnie światowej w komunistycznej Polsce (Sidzikauskas 1970: 65).

Wnioski

W niniejszym artykule podjęto próbę wykazania, że działalność dyplomatyczna E. Galvanauskasa wobec planu Hymansa cechowała się pragmatyzmem³. Jak pokazała dokonana analiza, w wielu przypadkach E. Galvanauskas kierował się bardziej intuicyjnym niż strategicznym wyborem instrumentów polityki zagranicznej. Chęć bycia odmiennym od poprzednika stanowi też próbę pokazania, iż E. Galvanauskas nie był tylko kontynuatorem polityki zagranicznej, jakiej oczekiwała skrajna litewska opozycja. Prowadzoną przez siebie politykę zagraniczną chciał kreować w taki sposób, by wyróżniała się nie tylko pragmatycznością zastosowanych rozwiązań, ale i stylem, który mógłby być mniej konfrontacyjny w stosunku do Polski. Kryzys polityczny na Litwie, który nasilał się od 1921 r., i regularna presja ze strony opozycji doprowadziły do definitywnego zerwania stosunków dyplomatycznych z Polską, co skutkowało także tym, że rozmowy o przyjęciu projektu Hymansa ostatecznie zakończyły się niepowodzeniem. W ten sposób zmarnowano szansę na odbudowę choć namiastki Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego, związanego z Polską.

³ Przez politykę pragmatyczną E. Galvanauskasa należy rozumieć wykorzystanie wszelkich okazji do realizacji interesów Litwy, również związanych z rozwiązaniami federacyjnymi, przy jednoczesnym zachowaniu poprawnych relacji z Warszawą.

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Actions by Ernestas Galvanauskas Towards the Hymans Plan – Internal Political Circumstances

Działania Ernestasa Galvanauskasa wobec założeń planu Hymansa – wewnętrzne uwarunkowania polityczne

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Abstract: Ernestas Galvanauskas – politician, scientist and public figure – is a person little known to public opinion not only in Lithuania but also in Poland. However, Lithuanian historians and political scientists see him as one of the more influential politicians who contributed to the construction of the Lithuanian state, more than Prime Minister Augustinas Voldemaras or President Antanas Smetona. The revival of the Lithuanian state is inextricably linked with the person of E. Galvanauskas. He was involved in the process of modernization of Klaipėda, led to the development of Lithuanian economics, which he applied in practice to manage the country's economy. The research objective of this article is an in-depth analysis of the diplomatic activities of E. Galvanauskas in relation to the Hymans plan while he was Prime Minister of the government and Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Polish literature on the subject lacks sources concerning the history of Lithuania and Lithuanian-Polish relations in the interwar period, especially in the context of E. Galvanauskas' political activity.

Keywords: Ernestas Galvanauskas, Polish-Lithuanian relations, League of Nations, Hymans plan

Streszczenie: Ernestas Galvanauskas – polityk, naukowiec i osoba publiczna – jest postacią mało znaną opinii społecznej nie tylko na Litwie, ale i w Polsce. Litewscy historycy i politolodzy postrzegają go jednak jako jednego z bardziej wpływowych polityków, który przyczynił się do budowania państwowego bytu litewskiego, bardziej niż premier Augustinas Voldemaras czy prezydent Antanas Smetona. Odrodzenie państwa litewskiego nierozdzielnie wiąże się z osobą E. Galvanauskasa. Był on zaangażowany w proces modernizacji Kłajpedy, doprowadził do rozwoju ekonomii litewskiej, którą zastosował w praktyce do zarządzania gospodarką kraju. Cel badawczy niniejszego artykułu stanowi pogłębiona analiza działalności dyplomatycznej E. Galvanauskasa wobec planu Hymansa, w czasie gdy pełnił on funkcję premiera rządu oraz ministra spraw zagranicznych. W polskiej literaturze przedmiotu brakuje źródeł dotyczących problematyki dziejów Litwy i relacji litewsko-polskich w okresie międzywojennym, zwłaszcza w kontekście aktywności politycznej E. Galvanauskasa.

Słowa kluczowe: Ernestas Galvanauskas, stosunki polsko-litewskie, Liga Narodów, plan Hymansa

In 1918, Poland and Lithuania regained their independence. The Polish government put forward a proposal to create a common state, which the Lithuanian government rejected. Between the two revived States there was an armed conflict, and the subject of the dispute was the nationality of the border areas. After the end of the Polish-Lithuanian conflict, the lands of southeastern Lithuania together with Vilnius were recognized as part of Lithuania under the Suwałki agreement, but Poland did not comply with the provisions and in October 1920 there was the so-called Żeligowski rebellion, as a result of which the Vilnius region was occupied. After the failure of the inter-state peace negotiations, the League of Nations began to normalize the situation. Paul Hymans, President of the League of Nations, presented on May 20, 1921, his own peace proposal. It involved the creation of two national cantons out of Lithuania, with the capital in Vilnius, and the linking of the state thus created with Poland, which was largely a replication of the Polish federation idea propounded by Polish Marshal Józef Piłsudski. In the face of the continuing lack of agreement, on September 3, P. Hymans proposed the autonomy of Vilnius region within Lithuania, which was rejected by Poland. Finally, on September 21, 1921, the League of Nations ended all attempts to settle the dispute, on February 3, 1923 it decided to divide the so-called neutral belt zone between the two sides, and on March 15, 1923 the Conference of Ambassadors, implementing the provisions of Article 87 of the Treaty of Versailles, decided to recognise the Polish borders.

The research objective of this article is to analyse the diplomatic activities of politician Ernestas Galvanauskas towards the Hymans plan. The article also discusses the foreign policy pursued by E. Galvanauskas in the crucial years of 1920–1921 in Lithuania. It was a period of trying to rebuild Polish-Lithuanian relations, mainly in the context of Vilnius. By examining selected cases from the perspective of political actors, this article can help explain why some of their decisions deviated from traditional consensus-based international foreign policy. The scope of the article delineates the Kaunas–Warsaw conflict. The subject matter, on the other hand, refers to the silhouette of the politician E. Galvanauskas. The territorial scope includes Lithuanian lands and areas under the Lithuanian administration (among others the territory of Klaipėda) and the lands of the Second Republic and the area under the Polish administration (among others Vilnius region). The chronological framework of the research field defines the years 1920–1921.

The realisation of the research objectives was made possible by the implementation of the historical method, which is used to establish a historical fact. This analysis provides a starting point for further research. The research hypothesis formulated in the article is based on the assumption that the diplomatic activity of E. Galvanauskas was based on interests contrary to the far-right nationalist opposition, headed by Antanas Smetona.

1. Political biography of Ernestas Galvanauskas (1882–1967)

After obtaining his matriculation in Mintawa in 1902, E. Galvanauskas began his studies at the Forestry Institute in St. Petersburg. In the same year, he became a member of the Lithuanian Democratic Party. In 1905, he was a representative of the Farmers' Union, and thanks to his active work and involvement in representing their affairs, he became a representative of the Great Seimas of Vilnius (*"Lietuvos ukininkas"* 1906: 528). In his memoirs about the Vilnius Seimas, he wrote:

During the speech, each party tried to attract as many supporters as possible, each struggled with other groups, each offered something, but none paid much attention to what should be required and what will serve the Lithuanian people. The Vilnius Seimas was the place where the first encounters between all Lithuanian parties took place, they [political parties – M.M.] were not prepared and were not willing to cooperate, each had its own ambitions. In such conditions, even long-term issues were insoluble, they became the object of inevitable sharp clashes (Audėnas 1990: 7).¹

On the basis of the above, a few comments can be made. First of all, one can see the first important feature of E. Galvanauskas' personality: throughout his career on the Lithuanian political scene, he avoided intrigues and political games. For this reason, he is relatively unrecognised in Lithuanian history and political thought. Secondly, he did not write political manifestos or create political programs. In fact, he was more of a political performer than an ideologue. Therefore, in Lithuanian literature, there are no collections of his quotations or memoirs, unlike A. Smetona or Augustinas

¹ All translations from the Lithuanian language come from the author of the article.

Voldemaras. However, his influence on governments is felt in all the most important events of Lithuanian history, beginning in 1919 until at least 1926. (Varnas 2018).

For his active political activity, including participation in the Vilnius Seimas, he was repressed by the Tsarist administration. In 1906, he was arrested and imprisoned in Poniewież for several months. In 1908, realizing that he could no longer come to Lithuania and the Russian Empire, he emigrated to Belgium, where he continued his engineering studies at the Technical University of Liège. In 1912, he graduated as a mining engineer, and as an electrical engineer in 1913 (Banevičius 1991: 58). Unable to find employment, fascinated by the mountains and the Balkan climate, he left for Serbia, where in 1914 he was employed by a French-Serbian railway company. During the coming Great War, like most political activists, he emigrated to Western Europe. In 1916, he moved to Paris where he worked as an electrical engineer. In the capital of France began his second instalment of the political road. There he met a Lithuanian diplomat and delegate to Paris Osakaras Milašius, who offered him a job as a secretary in the Lithuanian delegation to the ongoing peace conference in Paris (E. Galvanauskas spoke French very well). Ernestas Galvanauskas was responsible not only for the preparation of state texts for the Paris conference but also for the attire and representative appearance of A. Voldemaras, which also influenced the creation of his external image in Paris (Klimas 1990: 159).

From a political point of view, E. Galvanauskas assisted the Lithuanian delegation. The sympathy of the Lithuanian delegates won by him was not only due to his dedication and diligence in favour of the delegation headed by A. Voldemaras but above all due to the fact that for a long time, he was a non-partisan person, which made him politically impartial – this inspired greater confidence. In 1912, E. Galvanauskas went to the European Congress of Socialists in Lucerne. After the conference, he was invited by Jonas Vileišis, head of the Lithuanian delegation, to Berlin for negotiations on a loan to the Lithuanian government for his activities. In June 1911, E. Galvanauskas, under the persuasion of J. Vileišis, returned to Lithuania to soon take up the post of Prime Minister. At this point, it is worth noting that E. Galvanauskas gained great sympathy and recognition from the head of the delegation J. Vileišis, who recommended him to perform the highest functions in the state, presented him as a loyal, hard-working person, and most importantly – not belonging to any political party (Martišius 2003: 118).

2. Consequences of the crisis in the Cabinet of Minister Mykolas Sleževičius

The initial stage of his political career professionally prepared E. Galvanauskas for work in the administrative, diplomatic and economic spheres. At the beginning of September 1919, a crisis broke out in the Cabinet of Mykolas Sleževičius, as the government did not cope with new challenges in the international arena. For this reason, the opposition demanded changes. On September 30, 1919, President A. Smeton ordered an extraordinary meeting in the Seimas, where all representatives of Lithuanian parties gathered. During the meeting, A. Smeton proposed the formation of a government for E. Galvanauskas, because – according to the political tactics of the president – a non-partisan candidate could unite the polarized Lithuanian political elite. On October 7, 1919, E. Galvanauskas formed the fifth Lithuanian government, and on April 19, 1920 A. Smetona transferred the post of head of state to Alexander Stulginsk (Grinius 1954: 211). Due to the economic crisis in the country in early 1921, E. Galvanauskas assumed the position of Minister of Finance with the approval of the new President. Lithuania lacked professional diplomats, which is why E. Galvanauskas decided to be the head of the Lithuanian delegation in Brussels and in Geneva during negotiations with the Polish delegation (“Akiraščiai” 1973: 53).

At this point it is worth asking why, in January 1921, E. Galvanauskas decided to take responsibility in diplomatic negotiations with Poland in favour of the Hymans plan. Both the ruling party and the opposition on January 21, 1921 jointly expressed their resentment to A. Smetona that his friend and closest collaborator Minister A. Voldemaras was passive in the League of Nations. Having learned of this, A. Voldemaras resigned the same day as the head of the Lithuanian delegation to the League of Nations. President A. Smetona offered the position to E. Galvanauskas, who officially headed the Lithuanian delegation to the League of Nations on February 1, 1921 (Bukaitė 2016: 178). The diplomat in Paris, Petras Klimas, wrote about this event in his memorial:

Doubts arose about the new helmsman of Lithuanian diplomacy because Volde-
maras was our greatest intellectual force in the League of Nations. He was still
homo novus for us as an overly abstract thinker, a dialectician. In addition, he
retired from public activity, sensing that he and his political group were losing
popularity in the Seimas. For this reason, it was necessary to look for a more
responsible representative in the government (1990: 293).

It can be concluded that the main reason for the departure of A. Voldemaras was the decline in his popularity and authority among his closest associates, therefore he became passive both in the Seimas and in the government, which eventually led to the loss of his position in 1920.

3. Vilnius case at the League of Nations forum

Already at the beginning of the negotiations, when plans for a plebiscite on the territory of Vilnius were being drawn up in the Council of the League of Nations, E. Galvanauskas demanded from the members of the Council that the consequences of the plebiscite be recognized by the Polish side. According to the Lithuanian Prime Minister, Poland has repeatedly violated the rules related to the demarcation line. Also on the initiative of E. Galvanauskas, an argument arose in the league of Nations to postpone the plebiscite. Since at that time, Lithuania still did not have a *de jure* status in the international arena, from a political point of view it was Lithuania, unlike Poland, that occupied an unequal position in the League of Nations.

Ernestas Galvanauskas managed to convince all members of the Council of the League of Nations on the Vilnius issue that another option was needed to resolve the conflict than holding a plebiscite. In his opinion, this was to be an option that would be consistent with all previous Council resolutions adopted on the dispute between the parties on the Poland-Lithuania line (Klimas 1990: 296). To this end, both countries should send their government representatives to Brussels, where P. Hymans, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belgium, headed the mediation between the parties to the conflict.

On May 11, 1921, the first Polish-Lithuanian negotiations concerning the Vilnius dispute took place, where P. Hymans proposed his plan (the Hymans plan) to both sides. The content of this plan contained the basic idea of the Swiss model: Lithuania would have to become a federal state, formed from two cantons: Vilnius and Kaunas. Foreign, military and economic policy in the future should be governed by a common political body elected by the Lithuanian and Polish parliaments (*Hymanso projektas vyriausiuose kr. d. p. organuose* 1928: 6–8). The second thesis of the plan indicated that Klaipėda and its port would be used by the Polish

side without any customs restrictions. In response, E. Galvanauskas stated that this was a good basis for further discussions at the League of Nations forum, but he was afraid that from an economic point of view, economically stronger Poland would absorb Lithuania with its power and would not pay Lithuanian customs duties to the Treasury, which would ultimately weaken the Lithuanian economy (Galva 1982: 17). Both sides rejected the project, but it is worth deepening the historiographic analysis, which shows that E. Galvanauskas did not reject the project of Hymans in its entirety (Valsonokas 1989: 8).

Ernestas Galvanauskas understood well the vision offered by the mediator P. Hymans, who saw Lithuania as a state-province under the care of the pro-Western orientation of Poland. For this reason, E. Galvanauskas went on to say that negotiations could proceed according to this project, but without Federation elements. At the same time, he reported that negotiations with Poland could be conducted as follows: first, to sign an agreement on the protection of minorities in Lithuania and Poland on the basis of the basic, relevant agreement concluded in Versailles, and secondly, to conclude a military defence convention between the parties (Jegelavičius 1997: 315).

During the session of the League of Nations on June 21, 1921, directly asked by P. Hymans what he thought about remaining under Polish auspices, E. Galvanauskas replied

that in his opinion the priority was to resolve the conflict by guaranteeing the rights of minorities in Kaunas and Lithuania because these places become a nexus of conflicts. Secondly, the conclusion of a war convention is intended to limit Poland's defence matters in a potential conflict with Lithuania, i.e. the conclusion of a so-called non-aggression agreement against Lithuania. On the issue of Klaipėda, he completely refused to conduct any negotiations on this issue (Jegelavičius 1997: 316).

Other elements of the project, according to E. Galvanauskas, were worth discussing, which in effect constituted a *modus vivendi*. Therefore, in the then situation, the satisfied Council of the League of Nations passed a resolution on June 28, 1921, according to which talks on the Hymans plan were to be continued at the next session of the Council in Brussels.

4. Effects of diplomatic activity of Ernestas Galvanauskas

The Hymans plan caused a loud resonance in Lithuania. At the beginning of September 1919, unrest reigned in the capital, opposition pressure on E. Galvanauskas ordered him not to allow or continue discussions, as well as to enter into further negotiations on the possibility of concluding federal or union relations with Poland. The Lithuanian anti-Hymans movement, organized by the radical wing, i.e. the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party and the Party of National Progress, prompted E. Galvanauskas to issue his note on July 22, 1921, in which he presented his position on the Hymans plan. In the note, he pointed to the actual reasons (raised in Lithuania) for not allowing the implementation of the resolution of June 28 (Abromaitis 2004: 219). Ernestas Galvanauskas' initiative was also to present another letter to the Council of the League of Nations. The note was approved by the Lithuanian Seimas, and its main thesis was that in order to continue negotiations with Poland on the forum of the League, it is necessary to implement the Suwałki Agreement,² because this agreement guaranteed the confidence of the Lithuanian government towards Poland and secured the basis for continuing negotiations without tension ("Voruta" 2012: 13). The Polish delegation, headed by the Minister at the League of Nations Szymon Askenazy, having read the document of E. Galvanauskas, rejected the demands of the Lithuanian Prime Minister, which resulted in further fruitless negotiations between the parties.

At the beginning of September 1921, at the autumn session of the League of Nations, P. Hymans presented the second version of the plan, the theses of which were more favourable for the Lithuanian side. The assumptions of the plan were consulted with the representative of Lithuania in England Tomas Narusevicius. However, the essence of the plan was not the basis for discussion, it was an agreement that had to be accepted by both sides of the conflict. In the second version of the plan, the idea of a canton was abandoned, autonomy was offered to the Vilnius region, it was suggested to establish separate general staffs on the territory of Vilnius, their activities would be coordinated by both sides and during a potential war Poland would have the right to use the Vilnius territory. As a result of pressure from the Council of the League

² The Suwałki agreement established a demarcation line, which granted a significant part of the Vilnius Oblast to Lithuania, but not Vilnius, as well as an agreement on the end of the war, thus providing for the procedure for the exchange of prisoners of war between the parties.

of Nations, E. Galvanauskas agreed to continue negotiations towards the second Hymans plan (Žepkaitė 1980: 148).

In this regard, a new wave of protests against the second Hymans plan arose in Lithuania (*Dar dėl Ženevos rezoliucijos. Didelis mitingas – demonstracija Kaune* 12.07.1921: 1–3). In political and social meetings, E. Galvanauskas was strongly urged not to enter into any Confederal relations with Poland, because of which the independence of Lithuania would suffer, and to try to keep the issue of Lithuania's independence with its capital Vilnius on the Forum of the League of Nations (*Piliečių balsai. Vilkaviškio gyventojų rezoliucija* 1921: 3). Therefore, on November 1, 1921, E. Galvanauskas organized a conference for delegates to the League of Nations in Kaunas, and on the eve he had a meeting in the Seimas with public activists, leaders of parties and factions. At the conference, he stated that everyone is determined to reject the Hymans plan, both its first and second versions. Their arguments were based on internal politics and on strong social reactions against any closer union with Poland. The adoption of P. Hymans' proposal would cause serious confusion which could lead to a national disaster (Lietuvos Centrinis Valstybes Archyvas, *Lietuvos pasiuntinių konferencijos posėdžio protokolas* 31.10.1921, f. 383, b. 118). During the conference of delegates, E. Galvanauskas also mentioned that in the event of riots, the Lithuanian Army is likely to be actively involved in these matters. At the same time, he stressed the need for further negotiations on the second Hymans plan, since rejecting it would mean the end of mediation, and, consequently, the renunciation of Vilnius and the entire country. Further, as the head of the delegation stated, this could lead to a war with Poland and the occupation of Lithuania as a whole, and then, as he said, We must not forget that if Poland loses its independence, Lithuania will not survive as a state entity either (*I sesijos 124 posėdis* 20.09.1921). At the end of November 1921, an appeal was sent to the members of the Lithuanian Seimas by the Lithuanian Committee for the Salvation of the Nation. The appeal included a demand that the members of the Seimas categorically reject the adoption by the Lithuanian government of the second version of the Hymans plan (*Kauno mitingo nutarimas dėl Hymanso projekto* 1921: 6). A few days later, members of the Lithuanian government, including E. Galvanauskas, received anonymous threats about what would happen if they accepted the proposals of the League of Nations (Žepkaitė 1978: 206).

November 24, 1921, Lithuanian social activist Zigmundas Žemaitis arrived at the conference of the factions of the Lithuanian Social Democratic

Party and the Peasants' Union Party, stating that the new Prime Minister of the government Kazys Grinius informed him that his cabinet of Ministers will consider the issue of the Hymans plan on November 25, and its resolution will not require ratification by the Seimas. At the same time, Z. Žemaitis feared that the Seimas would only be entitled to ratify treaties prepared after the adoption of the draft. Members of the faction were not sure whether the cabinet of Ministers would not adopt the draft without the knowledge of the Seimas, so some members of the faction insisted on guarantees that this would not happen, while others expressed no confidence in the Cabinet of Ministers of K. Grinius (*Steigiamojo Seimo LSLDP ir LVS frakcijų bloko protokolas 24.11.1921: 343*). The Cabinet of Ministers was tasked on November 25 to consider the Hymans plan without the knowledge of the Seimas and independently of that body to accept it or reject it at a meeting of the Masonic lobby. On November 22, Z. Žemaitis was appointed Minister without portfolio for Belarusian affairs in the government of Dominik Semaška. In a broad sense, Minister D. Semaška wanted to consult not only Z. Žemaitis but also other members of Freemasonry about the Hymans plan. It is worth noting that Z. Žemaitis and the Kaunas Lodge, founded on February 1, 1920, by Freemasons and former Prime Minister Mikołaj Śleżvičius, opted for the adoption of the Hymans plan. Most of the members of the Kaunas Masonic Lodge were supporters of the Hymans plan. However, Minister D. Semaška, being at the same time a member of the Kaunas Masonic Lodge and an opponent of the Hymans plan, together with the Minister of the Interior, Rapolas Skipitis, resigned.

It is noteworthy that in the Cabinet of Ministers, there was a vast majority of supporters of the Hymans plan and they planned to accept it with minor reservations. Michał Römer, an ardent supporter of the agreement with Poland, expressed this in his memorial as follows:

I am aware that there is a need to adopt the Hymans plan, but not in the way that the proponents of this cause in the cabinet are promoting it, it is unacceptable. This contempt for Lithuanian democracy, the Seimas, the Constitution and the establishment on the Lithuanian political scene should not be called political actions around the League plan. I understand and would justify the decision of the Cabinet of Ministers, which is not afraid to take the initiative of a dictator, but the current speculators of the Lithuanian establishment are cowardly, they want to achieve the goal by deceiving, cheating and lying, treating the principles of Lithuanian democracy as a naive child. I am not surprised that

the League of Nations: England and France, convinces the Lithuanian establishment to undertake such methods of action, because they are interested in resolving the issue of Vilnius as soon as possible. For this reason, they are looking for any way to achieve the goal (Römeris, Miknys, Grigaitienė 2013: 30).

Based on his critical assessment of the political situation in Lithuania, M. Römer accused the League of Nations of treating Lithuanian society as a nation that must be deceived and cannot be convinced of anything, and with this in mind, the Lithuanian government acted in the same way, while the League of Nations imposed its proposals on the Lithuanian government.

November 24, 1921, in order to prevent the adoption of the Hymans plan, an attempt was made on the life of the head of the Lithuanian delegation, E. Galvanauskas. The explosive was planted on the windowsill of his bedroom. During the explosion, E. Galvanauskas was seriously injured. According to sources, he was saved by the fact that he was awake during the explosion, and turned his back to the window, playing cards. There was no doubt that for political reasons E. Galvanauskas was a very inconvenient figure in the political arena. The press organ of the Lithuanian Riflemen's Union paramilitary organization "Trinitas" publicly condemned the act of terror, although it called it the result of the tense political situation in Lithuania and the consequence of the League of Nations interventionism in the internal political affairs of Lithuania (*Patamsių riteriai* 1921: 3). A member of the Lithuanian delegation, P. Klimas, wrote in his memorial that only after 40 years he learned that the attack was organized by several people and indicated their names: Balis Sruoga, Jonas Strazda and Miksa Kalmantavičius-Kalmantas. At the time of the assassination, the writer B. Sruoga was studying in Munich, so it is doubtful that he could have contributed to this act. Another version was also mentioned, that the initiator of the attempt was Wincenty Krevė-Mickievčius, and its executor was officer Józef Mikuckis (Čepėnas 1992: 650).

In 1923, it was revealed that the main perpetrator of the attack was Feliksas Šemeta, an active activist for the independence movement. Together with his brothers Alexander and Hipolitas, in the fight against the Western Volunteer Army (lit. *Bermontininkai*), they created the famous "Kužiai" group, which militarily supported the Telšiai command and the Janikščiai battalion. By the end of October 1923, F. Šemeta fought against the Poles and then became the leader of the partisan detachment. As a member of the Lithuanian Riflemen's Union, he cooperated with the Kaunas war counterintelligence. His involvement in the assassination of E. Galvanauskas

was confirmed by a former member of the Lithuanian Seimas and lawyer Zigmund Toliušis. In his memoirs, he wrote that Vladislavas Putvinskis, the commander of the Lithuanian Riflemen's Union, took a particularly hostile position against the Hymans plan. In his opinion, the adoption of the Hymans plan would cause Lithuania to enter the orbit of Polish political, economic and cultural influence, and in the future Lithuania, as a weaker partner for Poland, would lose its independence and be incorporated into its territory. In the opinion of Z. Toliušis, in order for the Hymans plan not to be adopted, it was decided to remove the most influential supporter of the League of Nations solutions – E. Galvanauskas. In addition to V. Putvinskis, the leadership of the Lithuanian Riflemen's Association included such leaders as: Mikas Mikelevičius, Pranas Klimaitis, Aleksandras Marcinkevičius, Liudas Vailionis, Antanas Žmuidžinavičius, however, the closest friends of V. Putvinskis were informed about the plan to assassinate E. Galvanauskas. As he wrote from Z. Toliušis, W. Putvinskis was a confidant of F. Šemeta, a native of the District of Šiauliai, and it was he who was commissioned to carry out the assassination (Toliušis 1968: 178).

In 1923, after the investigation and clarification of the case and the disclosure of the names of the Bombers by the Kaunas counterintelligence, V. Putvinskis advised F. Šemet to leave Lithuania and go to Latvia as soon as possible. Then he suggested that from Riga, F. Šemeta get to Moscow in order to obtain new identification documents and find work near the Lithuanian border. Leaving the country on November 12, 1923, he was arrested on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Until September 1924 he was imprisoned in Lubyanka in Moscow. For illegally crossing the Soviet border, he was sentenced to 3 years in a concentration camp in Solovki. After serving his sentence, by the second decision of the Supreme Court of the USSR, he was deported to Tulun in Siberia for 10 years. In the forced labour camp in Irkutsk, where he worked as a carpenter in the city library, he was accused in 1938 of promoting Trotskyism and sentenced to another 3 years in a forced labour camp. He was soon accused of spying for Trotsky's supporters, which served as evidence for his conviction and execution (Žadeikytė 2013).

Antanas Gravgrokas, a member of the central board of the Lithuanian Riflemen's Union, participated in the organization of the assassination attempt on the head of the Lithuanian diplomacy. His son Vytautas Gravgrokas mentioned that his father and captain Antanas Petruškevičius and another unidentified person, a member of the Lithuanian Riflemen's Union,

detonated an explosive (Anton von Gravrock asmeninis archyvas, *Atsiminimai* 2015). In 1905, A. Gravrokas was a member of the praesidium of the Great Seimas of Vilnius, he was actively involved in revolutionary events. At the beginning of 1921, he joined the ranks of the Lithuanian Riflemen's Union, and at the time of organizing the attempt on the life of E. Galvanauskas, he served as editor of the press organ of the Lithuanian Riflemen's Union, "Trimitas." On its pages, he officially fought for the public status of the organization. In 1932–1933 he was the mayor of Kaunas. In his autobiography, A. Gravrokas wrote that E. Galvanauskas was well known from the activities of the Great Seimas of Vilnius, and feeling antipathy towards him, decided to take part in the assassination (Anton von Gravrock asmeninis archyvas, A. Gravrokas, *Autobiografija* 1941).

Another person involved in the attempt on the life of E. Galvanauskas was the Lithuanian soldier Antanas Petruškevičius. He joined the Lithuanian armed forces on January 28, 1919 and took part in the battles against the Bolsheviks and Poles. His father Laurynas Petruškevičius was arrested by Polish soldiers, and then imprisoned in Sejny. Interrogated and tortured, he died in 1924 (Dainos Kemeraitienės asmeninis archyvas, Antanas Petruškevičius, Stasys Petruškevičius, Vincas Petruškevičius, Andrius Petruškevičius, Juozas Petruškevičius, *I ir II pasaulinio karo metų pergyventi prisiminimai* 2005: 6). The death of his father and the personal experience of the atrocities inflicted on him by Polish soldiers imposed on the anti-Polish attitude of the activist, as a result of which, as he admits, he became involved in organizing the assassination of E. Galvanauskas – the most active supporter of the Hymans plan. After a deeper analysis of the facts, it can be concluded that there is no unambiguous evidence for this story. Until November 21, 1942 (he was shot in the prison in Sverdlovsk), Antanas Petruškevičius was obliged to keep the course of those events secret.

In 1935, editor Viktoras Biržiška wrote in the "Trimitas" newspaper that during one of the underground meetings in August 1921, The Polish Military Organization, in cooperation with Kaunas Poles, was to assassinate Minister E. Galvanauskas and Józef Purickis, who they were the only and most influential supporters of the Hymans plan. However, the assassination was organized by the Lithuanian Riflemen's Union and the anti-Hymans movement led by A. Smetona and A. Voldemaras (Biržiška 2013: 187). However, the analyses show that while A. Smeton was in power in the state (1926–1939), the editor V. Biržiška was instructed to publicly compromise the Polish environment in the press.

After a quick recovery on December 3, 1921, E. Galvanauskas organised a meeting of the Council of Ministers, at which he urged Ministers not to take into account the assassination and pressure from the Lithuanian Riflemen's Union and activists of the anti-Hymans movement when making decisions on the Hymans plan. He argued that Hymans plan should be accepted "today" ("Karys" 1921: 2). However, on the same day, the Council of Ministers did not dare to adopt the League of Nations plan and officially rejected it. On December 22, 1921, the Legislative Seimas of Lithuania unanimously approved the decision of the Council of Ministers not to accept the Hymans plan, which was to resolve the dispute between Lithuania and Poland (*I sesijos 156 posėdis* 22.12.1922). People's Party MP Jan Staugaitis said that Poland is politically and economically stronger, which is why the League of Nations plan was used by Poland as a tool to bring Lithuania into a federal union. The leader of the Christian Democrats, Mykolas Krupavičius, stressed that the Hymans plan is unacceptable because it carries slavery and destroys the sovereignty of the Lithuanian state. On the other hand, Steponas Kairys, a Social Democratic politician, criticized the government for allowing E. Galvanauskas and the delegation under his leadership to succumb to pressure from the Entente without paying attention to the opinion of the Lithuanian people. He argued that the proposal of president P. Hymans was only the first stage for Lithuania and that there is still a high risk of losing its independence. In conclusion, he appealed to the Seimas about the need to consolidate all the forces of Lithuanian society in order to maintain a strong political line towards Poland and the League of Nations.

On behalf of the Lithuanian government, E. Galvanauskas on December 24, 1921 in a memo to the League of Nations notified: "Having considered the proposal of the Council of the League of Nations from all sides, the Lithuanian Council of Ministers is obliged with the deepest regret not to accept its recommended reconciliation with Poland" ("Lietuva" 1921: 1). Ernestas Galvanauskas pointed out the following arguments against the Hymans Plan: 1) after the adoption of the plan, agricultural reform in Lithuania would be suspended; 2) Lithuania would be included in the Polish imperialist wars; 3) Lithuania, being a small state, would become a province of Poland. Analyses show that the implemented agrarian reform at the beginning of 1921 affected the Lithuanian rural population most with fear when they were threatened, in case of reconciliation with Poland, with the taking of Lithuanian lands by the Polish establishment (Laurinavičius 2004: 257). In order to consolidate the Lithuanian peasant nation against the league of

Nations and Poland's plan, the largest faction of the Lithuanian legislative Seimas – the Christian Democratic bloc, the People's and Social Democratic parties – took advantage of this fear and persuaded E. Galvanauskas to enter this argument as the main reason for rejecting the proposal of P. Hymans (*Steigiamojo Seimo atsišaukimas "Piliečiai" 1920*).

Later, in his memorial, the future president of Lithuania, K. Grinius, wrote that for him, E. Galvanauskas and J. Purickis, the Hymans plan with minor amendments seemed acceptable, but for many irresponsible patriots, especially the younger generation – soldiers, students, it was unacceptable parties. According to K. Grinius, the Hymans plan at that time was the only opportunity to regain Vilnius. He was convinced that having its own administration, schools and leadership, as well as a local Lithuanian Army was a good option for the possibility of combining Vilnius with Kaunas Lithuania (Ilgunas 2000: 259). Augustinas Janulaitis, a lawyer and member of the Seimas from the Social Democrats party, wrote in his article that the Hymans plan fundamentally changed the state of law and the Constitution of the Lithuanian state, the law belonged only to the Legislative Seimas, and not to the competence of the Council of Ministers. Further in the article, he condemned all party leaders who, fearing that the League of Nations plan would become the subject of debate in the Seimas, decided to hold E. Galvanauskas and the Council of Ministers fully responsible (Janulaitis 1921: 2).

The Voldemaras-Smeton duo closely and suspiciously followed the activities and attitude of E. Galvanauskas in relations with Poland. In the pages of the press organ of the Party of National Progress, A. Voldemaras claimed that E. Galvanauskas was a supporter of the Hymans plan and wanted to pass it as soon as possible. However, at the last moment, under pressure from the Party of National Progress and the socialists, he was forced to reject the League of Nations plan. Then he preached the thesis that the political thought of the Lithuanian Socialists was aimed at turning Lithuania away from the political influence of the West and turning it towards Soviet Russia. On the other hand, the political goal of the Party of National Progress was to implement more radical anti-Polish rhetoric. When the Party of National Progress lost the legislative elections in 1922, it did not win a single seat. Unable to accept the defeat, it launched an anti-Hymans campaign to oppose E. Galvanauskas, the government and the Lithuanian Seimas (Voldemaras 1922: 1-2). It is also worth noting that the top secret direct contacts with the Russian Embassy maintained by the Party of National Progress, and not the party of Social Democrats, confirm the cooperation

of this party with Soviet Russia. The Russian archives were examined by Professor Zenonas Butkus of Vilnius University. This analysis shows that E. Galvanauskas was not a supporter of either the authoritarian regime or the leaders of the Party of National Progress A. Smetona and A. Voldemaras – his vision of the Hymans plan stood out.

Already in exile, the diplomat Vaclovas Sidzikauskas, a colleague of E. Galvanauskas, admitted in his memoirs that although E. Galvanauskas failed to solve the problem of borders with Poland, his position on this issue was correct, since he was a supporter of improving relations with Poland. According to V. Sidzikauskas, the lack of efforts to change relations with Poland under the pressure of the opposition and paramilitary organizations, such as the Lithuanian Riflemen's Union, facilitated the process of national consolidation, accelerated the development of national consciousness, and strengthened the determination to fight for patriotic values. According to the political forecast of V. Sidzikauskas, if E. Galvanauskas had persuaded the Council of Ministers to accept the proposal of P. Hymans in 1921, Vilnius would probably have found itself in the zones of Soviet Belarus, and after World War II in communist Poland (Sidzikauskas 1970: 65).

Conclusions

In this article, an attempt is made to show that the diplomatic activity of E. Galvanauskas against the Hymans plan was characterized by pragmatism.³ As the analysis showed, in many cases, E. Galvanauskas was guided by a more intuitive than strategic choice of foreign policy instruments. The desire to be different from his predecessor is also an attempt to show that E. Galvanauskas was not only a continuator of the foreign policy that the extreme Lithuanian opposition expected. He wanted to create his foreign policy in such a way that it would be distinguished not only by the pragmatism of the solutions used but also by a style that could be less confrontational towards Poland. The political crisis in Lithuania, which intensified from 1921, and regular pressure from the opposition led to a definitive break in

³ The pragmatic policy of E. Galvanauskas should be understood as the use of all opportunities to pursue the interests of Lithuania, including those related to federation solutions while maintaining proper relations with Warsaw.

diplomatic relations with Poland, which also resulted in the fact that talks on the adoption of the Hymans project ultimately failed. In this way, the chance to rebuild at least a substitute for the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, associated with Poland, was wasted.

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**Sprawozdanie z Międzynarodowej Konferencji Naukowej
„Cybersecurity Threats – Russian Aggression Against
Ukraine and Disinformation”**

16 marca 2023 roku

ANETA BĄK-PITUCHA

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Dnia 16 marca 2023 r. odbyła się międzynarodowa konferencja „Cybersecurity Threats – Russian Aggression Against Ukraine and Disinformation”, której współorganizatorami były znane ośrodki naukowe w Polsce i za granicą. Konferencja została zarejestrowana na platformie MS Teams. Organizatorami naukowego wydarzenia były następujące instytucje badawcze: Instytut Nauk o Polityce i Administracji Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego Jana Pawła II (KUL), War Studies University Academic Center for Cybersecurity Policy, ITSTIME – Italian Team for Security, Terroristic Issues & Managing Emergencies, Polish Research Society for Press Law, Institute of Intellectual Property and Medical Law.

W Radzie Naukowej zasiadli naukowcy: dr hab. Katarzyna Chałubińska-Jentkiewicz (Akademia Sztuki Wojennej w Warszawie), Prof. Marco Lombardi, Ph.D. (Catholic University of Sacred Heart, Włochy), Assoc. Prof. Federico Constantini, Ph.D. (University of Udine, Włochy), dr hab. Małgorzata Czuryk (Uniwersytet Warmińsko-Mazurski w Olsztynie), Assoc. Prof. Lucas J. Ruiz Díaz, Ph.D. (University of Granada, Hiszpania), Assoc. Prof. Oksana Evsyukova, Ph.D. (University of Educational Management, Ukraina), prof. Mirosław Karpiuk (Uniwersytet Warmińsko-Mazurski w Olsztynie), prof. Miroslav Kelemen (Technical University of Kosice, Słowacja), dr hab. Agnieszka Łukasik-Turecka, prof. KUL, dr hab. Jan Maciejewski (Uniwersytet Wrocławski), Assoc. Prof. Claudio Melchior, Ph.D. (University of Udine, Włochy), Assoc. Prof. Francesco Pira, Ph.D. (University of Messina, Włochy), dr hab. Beata Piskorska, prof. KUL, Assoc. Prof. Lucas J. Ruiz, Ph.D. (University of Granada, Hiszpania), Assoc. Prof. Alida Maria Silletti, Ph.D. (University of Bari Aldo Moro, Włochy), Assoc. Prof. Nicola Strizzolo, Ph.D. (University of Teramo,

Włochy), Assoc. Prof. Simone Tosoni, Ph.D. (Catholic University of Sacred Heart, Włochy), dr hab. Barbara Wiśniewska-Paź (Uniwersytet Wrocławski).

Komitet Organizacyjny tworzyli również: dr hab. Urszula Soler – przewodnicząca (KUL), Paulina Krawczyk, doktorantka (Akademia Sztuki Wojennej w Warszawie), dr Anna Makuch (Akademia Ekonomiczno-Humanistyczna w Warszawie), dr Zbigniew Nowak (Akademia Sztuki Wojennej w Warszawie), Paweł Pelc, doktorant (Akademia Sztuki Wojennej w Warszawie), dr Filip Radoniewicz (Akademia Sztuki Wojennej w Warszawie), Sławomir Stalmach (Akademia Sztuki Wojennej w Warszawie).

Uroczystego otwarcia dokonali: dr hab. K. Chałubińska-Jentkiewicz (Academic Center for Cybersecurity Policy) i prof. M. Lombardi.

Temat konferencji dotyczył problemów aktualnych i ważkich, a mianowicie zagrożeń cyberbezpieczeństwa w kontekście rosyjskiej agresji na Ukrainę. Symposium naukowe zostało podzielone na sześć paneli. Pierwszy panel „Media Law and Media Narratives” moderowała dr hab. U. Soler, zaś prelegentami byli: Assoc. Prof. C. Melchior, Ph.D., prof. dr hab. István Hoffman (Eötvös Loránd University, Uniwersytet Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej), prof. Oleg Gushchyn, Ph.D. (Taras Shevchenko National University, Ukraina), dr Paweł Terpiłowski (Fact-Checking Organization Demagog) oraz dr hab. K. Chałubińska-Jentkiewicz.

Moderującym drugi panel „Disinformation – an Activity Beyond the Level of Conventional Warfare” był Federico Borgonovo. Rozważania na temat dezinformacji prezentowali następujący badacze: prof. Ryszard Szpyra (Akademia Sztuki Wojennej w Warszawie), Assoc. Prof. Kitti Mezei, Ph.D. (Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Węgry), F. Borgonovo (Intern), Simone Castagna (Intern), Giulia Porrino (Intern; ITSTIME, Catholic University of Sacred Heart, Włochy), Assoc. Prof. N. Strizzolo, Ph.D., Assoc. Prof. Gianugo Cossi, Ph.D. (University of Udine, Włochy) oraz Assoc. Prof. Sergii Prylipko, Ph.D. (National University of Life and Environmental Sciences of Ukraine, Ukraina).

Trzeciej grupie panelistów przewodniczyła dr A. Makuch. W tej części konferencji wiele uwagi poświęcono planowemu wywieraniu presji na atakowane państwo za pomocą dezinformacji, zastraszania czy gróźb. W panelu „PsyOps – Perception Trap” wzięli udział eksperci: Assoc. Prof. Francesco Pira, Ph.D., Carmela Mento (University of Messina, Włochy), Assoc. Prof. Yuriy Zaliznyak, Ph.D. (Ivan Franko National University in Lviv, Ukraina), dr Aleksandra Kuczyńska-Zonik (KUL, Instytut Europy Środkowej w Lublinie), Assoc. Prof. F. Constantini, Ph.D. oraz dr hab. U. Soler.

W czwartym panelu „International Aspects of Disinformation in the First Year of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine” osobą odpowiedzialną za moderację była dr A. Kuczyńska-Zonik. Dyskusję na temat skutków dezinformacji, treści jej przekazów po bezprecedensowym ataku Rosji na Ukrainę prowadzili: Assoc. Prof. L.J. Ruiz Díaz, Ph.D., dr hab. A. Łukasik-Turecka, prof. KUL*, dr Sara Hungler (Eötvös Loránd University, Węgry), Patrycja Oksińska (Naukowa i Akademicka Sieć Komputerowa – Państwowy Instytut Badawczy – NASK) oraz dr A. Makuch.

Piąty panel „Strategies to Build and Breaking Social Resilience to Disinformation” prowadziła dr Anna Szachon-Pszenny (KUL). W tej części dyskusji również skupiono się na zjawisku dezinformacji, także w odniesieniu do uchodźców, oraz na budowaniu odporności społecznej na jej działanie. Głównymi prelegentami, którzy prezentowali swoje wyniki badań, byli: dr Monika Nowikowska (Akademia Sztuki Wojennej w Warszawie), Tetiana Mykhailova, doktorantka (National Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of Ukraine, Ukraina), dr Aneta Bąk-Pitucha (KUL), dr A. Szachon-Pszenny, dr Agnieszka Zaręba (KUL), Assoc. Prof. Oksana Evsyukova, Ph.D. (National University of Life and Environmental Sciences of Ukraine, Ukraina) oraz P. Pelc.

Ostatnim panelem „Disinformation in Public Administration – Challenges and Dilemmas” kierowała dr hab. K. Chałubińska-Jentkiewicz. W gronie prelegentów byli: prof. dr hab. Jacek Sobczak (Institute of Intellectual Property and Medical Law, Akademia Ekonomiczno-Humanistyczna w Warszawie), Assoc. Prof. Ksenia Kakareko, Ph.D. (Uniwersytet Warszawski), dr hab. Maria Gołda-Sobczak (Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu), dr Anna Wilińska-Zelek (Polish Research Society for Press Law), dr Przemysław Wasyluk (Institute of Intellectual Property and Medical Law, Akademia Ekonomiczno-Humanistyczna w Warszawie) oraz Kamil Kapla, doktorant (Institute of Intellectual Property and Medical Law). Dyskutowano na temat dezinformacji w aspekcie prawno-administracyjnym, szczególnie odnosząc tę kwestię do wyzwania, z jakimi musi mierzyć się administracja

* Dr hab. A. Łukasik-Turecka, prof. KUL, dyrektor Instytutu Nauk o Polityce i Administracji KUL, przedstawiła wyniki analizy treści przekazów dezinformacyjnych, które pojawiły się w przestrzeni medialnej po 24 lutego 2022 r. Zob. szerzej: M. Musiał-Karg, A. Łukasik-Turecka (2023), *Disinformation in the Media Space During the War in Ukraine. How Did Kremlin's Fake News Blame Ukraine, the USA and NATO for the Invasion*, [w:] M. Musiał-Karg, N. Lubik-Rzeczek (red.), *The War in Ukraine. (Dis)information – Perception – Attitudes*, (Berlin: Peter Lang): 13-38.

publiczna zarówno w Polsce, jak i w Unii Europejskiej. Podsumowania owocnych dyskusji dokonała dr hab. K. Chałubińska-Jentkiewicz.

Dezinformacja, obok aspektu militarnego, okazała się skutecznym narzędziem Rosjan, którzy wykorzystują ją od początku agresji na Ukrainę. Powielanie nieprawdziwych informacji nie wynika tylko ze skoordynowanych działań, często jest to efekt działalności tzw. trolli. Odbiorcy, także profesjonalne media nie zawsze mogą odróżnić prawdziwe informacje od *fake newsów*. W związku z tym temat dezinformacji podjęty na konferencji międzynarodowej nie traci na swej aktualności i z pewnością stanie się przyczynkiem do kolejnych badań naukowych.

**Sprawozdanie z Ogólnopolskiej Konferencji Naukowej
„Od Lublina do Lizbony – 15 lat Polski w strefie Schengen.
Korzyści dla społeczeństwa obywatelskiego”
27 kwietnia 2023 roku**

ANNA SZACHOŃ-PSZENNY

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Dnia 27 kwietnia 2023 r. w Katolickim Uniwersytecie Lubelskim Jana Pawła II odbyła się Ogólnopolska Konferencja Naukowa „Od Lublina do Lizbony – 15 lat Polski w strefie Schengen. Korzyści dla społeczeństwa obywatelskiego”. Konferencja stała się okazją do podsumowania 15. rocznicy pełnego włączenia Polski do strefy Schengen.

Organizatorami byli: Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II (KUL), Fundacja Konrada Adenauera w Polsce, Instytut Nauk o Polityce i Administracji KUL, Instytut Ekonomii i Finansów Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej (UMCS), Polskie Towarzystwo Studiów Europejskich (PTSE) Oddział Lubelski, Koło Naukowe Stosunków Międzynarodowych KUL, Stowarzyszenie Edukacji i Badań Międzynarodowych ERIA oraz Fundacja Rozwoju KUL.

Celem organizatorów konferencji było stworzenie przestrzeni do dyskusji naukowców i praktyków na temat „obszaru bez granic” po 15 latach od największego pełnego rozszerzenia strefy Schengen na granice lądowe, morskie i powietrzne o Polskę i 8 innych państw członkowskich Unii Europejskiej (UE): Słowację, Czechy, Węgry, Słowenię, Litwę, Łotwę, Estonię i Malte. Główna tematyka dotyczyła oceny 15 lat członkostwa Polski w strefie Schengen, które umożliwiło swobodne przemieszczanie się po „Europie bez granic” od Lublina do Lizbony. O wadze, jaką organizatorzy nadali problematyce strefy Schengen oraz jej znaczeniu dla społeczeństwa obywatelskiego, świadczy ujęcie paneli w wymiarze naukowym i praktycznym. Panel pierwszy naukowy „«Obszar bez granic» – wymiar polityczny, prawny, społeczny, ekonomiczny” stanowił dyskusję przedstawicieli środowiska akademickiego zajmujących się strefą Schengen w wymiarze

naukowym. Panel drugi praktyczny „Strefa Schengen – doświadczenia służb na granicy wschodniej” był spotkaniem eksperckim przedstawicieli administracji publicznej (m.in. Straży Granicznej, Krajowej Administracji Skarbowej), którzy przedstawili doświadczenia służb na granicy wschodniej strefy Schengen z perspektywy 15 lat jej funkcjonowania. Prelegenci obu paneli podsumowali naukowo-praktyczne aspekty członkostwa Polski i innych państw w strefie Schengen w kontekście korzyści dla społeczeństwa obywatelskiego oraz wpływu na bezpieczeństwo wewnętrzne UE. Jednocześnie określili też najnowsze wyzwania strefy Schengen i formułowali postulaty *de lege lata* oraz *de lege ferenda* odpowiadania na kryzysy, przed jakimi stoją państwa strefy Schengen na wschodniej granicy zewnętrznej. Na konferencji przedstawiona została także inicjatywa naukowa powstała po włączeniu Polski do strefy Schengen, jaką jest lubelska szkoła transgraniczna. Konferencja w ramach seminariów Adenauera była wspólną, kolejną inicjatywą – przedsięwzięciem realizowanym z Instytutem Nauk o Polityce i Administracji KUL oraz Instytutem Ekonomii i Finansów UMCS.

Radę Naukową konferencji tworzyli zarówno polscy, jak i zagraniczni naukowcy: prof. dr hab. Wiesław Czyżowicz (Wyższa Szkoła Przedsiębiorczości i Administracji), prof. dr hab. Artur Gruszcak (Uniwersytet Jagielloński), dr hab. Ewa Gwardzińska, prof. SGH (Szkoła Główna Handlowa), dr hab. Marcin Kosienkowski, prof. KUL, prof. dr hab. Artur Kuś (Uniwersytet Jana Kochanowskiego w Kielcach), dr hab. Agnieszka Łukasik-Turecka, prof. KUL, Assoc. Prof. Claudio Melchior (University of Udine, Włochy), Assoc. Prof. Francesco Pira (University of Messina, Włochy), dr hab. Beata Piskorska, prof. KUL, Assoc. Prof. Nicola Strizzolo (University of Teramo, Włochy), prof. dr hab. Paweł Turczyński (Uniwersytet Wrocławski) oraz dr hab. Jacek Wołoszyn, prof. KUL.

Komitet Organizacyjny pod przewodnictwem dr Anny Szachoń-Pszenny (KUL) tworzyli: dr hab. Piotr Witkowski, prof. UMCS, dr Agnieszka Zaręba (KUL) oraz dr Aneta Bąk-Pitucha (KUL). Patronat medialny nad konferencją sprawowało Nowe Radio, gdzie konferencja została wcześniej zapowiedziana, a następnie podsumowana. Konferencja odbyła się stacjonarnie, ale posiadała streaming na YouTube i połączenie na platformie MS Teams.

Uroczystego otwarcia ogólnopolskiej konferencji naukowej dokonała dr hab. B. Piskorska, prof. KUL, prorektor ds. studentów, doktorantów i rozwoju KUL oraz prezes PTSE Oddział Lubelski.

Konferencja składała się z panelu naukowego i praktycznego, z których każdy zakończył się dyskusją. Panel pierwszy naukowy moderowała

dr A. Zaręba. Prelegenci wygłosili następujące referaty: prof. dr hab. Andrzej Miszczuk (UMCS) – *Transformacja uwarunkowań współpracy transgranicznej w procesie integracji europejskiej*; dr hab. Anastazja Gajda, prof. SHG – *Stosowanie najnowszych technologii na granicach zewnętrznych UE*; dr hab. Anna Moraczewska, prof. UMCS – *Analiza ryzyka dla strefy Schengen na podstawie doświadczeń 15 lat funkcjonowania*; dr hab. Maciej Cesarz (Uniwersytet Wrocławski) – *Zmiany w polityce wizowej UE po rozszerzeniu strefy Schengen*; dr A. Szachoń-Pszenny – *Zmiana funkcji wschodniej granicy UE w perspektywie strefy Schengen i wojny w Ukrainie*. Poruszane tematy pokazywały z jednej strony wielowymiarowe przemiany na wschodniej granicy zewnętrznej strefy Schengen na podstawie doświadczeń 15 lat funkcjonowania, z drugiej wskazywały na nowe wyzwania, z którymi mierzy się aktualnie Polska i cała UE w związku ze złożoną sytuacją na granicy wschodniej UE. Rozpoczynając od etapów rozwoju i funkcji granicy oraz wyzwań w obszarach przygranicznych, przedstawiono innowacyjne zagadnienia: sztuczna inteligencja na granicy, nowe metody analizy ryzyka, wyzwania w zakresie polityki wizowej, zmiana funkcji wschodniej granicy UE w perspektywie wieloaspektowych wyzwań powodowanych wojną w Ukrainie. Panel zakończył się merytoryczną dyskusją rozwijającą powyższe zagadnienia. Po jej zakończeniu dr hab. P. Witkowski, prof. UMCS i dr A. Szachoń-Pszenny zaprezentowali ideę i szeroki dorobek naukowy lubelskiej szkoły transgranicznej, zapraszając naukowców i wszystkich zainteresowanych do współpracy.

Moderującym panel drugi – praktyczny był dr Ryszard Suduł, były przewodniczący grupy roboczej Nadbużańskiego Oddziału Straży Granicznej (NOSG) ds. Schengen (Uniwersytet Rzeszowski). Prelegenci w tym panelu wygłosili następujące referaty: dr Stanisław Dubaj, były przewodniczący grupy roboczej NOSG ds. UE (Akademia Zamojska) – *Zmiana struktur i zadań Straży Granicznej po wejściu do strefy Schengen*; dr hab. P. Witkowski, prof. UMCS, były dyrektor Izby Celnej w Białej Podlaskiej – *Reorganizacja polskiej administracji celnej w europejskim procesie integracyjnym*; dr Iryna Kozak-Balaniuk (KUL) – *Zmiany dotyczące wjazdu i pobytu cudzoziemców przed i po rozszerzeniu strefy Schengen*; Paweł Prokop (Fundacja Inicjatyw Menedżerskich i Polsko-Ukraińska Izba Gospodarcza) – *Przeobrażenia obsługi granicznej w ocenie przedsiębiorców*; młodszy inspektor Bogusław Gromadzki, zastępca dyrektora Izby Administracji Skarbowej w Lublinie ds. cła i granicy – *Aktualne uwarunkowania kontroli celnej na wschodniej granicy Unii Europejskiej*; dr Justyna Marzec (UMCS) – *Mechanizmy wczesnego ostrzegania w wielowymiarowym zarządzaniu granicami zewnętrznymi Unii Europejskiej*. Zmiany

zadań i reorganizacja administracji granicznej i celnej po wejściu do UE i strefy Schengen przedstawione przez byłych i obecnych funkcjonariuszy Straży Granicznej i Służby Celno-Skarbowej oraz wyzwania z perspektywy przedsiębiorców czy cudzoziemców były okazją do podsumowań, a także przedstawienia nowych zadań i interesujących wniosków. Poruszana przez praktyków tematyka okazała się na tyle ciekawa, że wywołała niekończącą się dyskusję panelową z licznymi pytaniami od uczestników spotkania. Wskazuje to, że problematyka konferencji jest tak aktualna, iż będzie kontynuowana podczas kolejnych spotkań naukowców i praktyków.

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