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voxpathrum@kul.lublin.pl; www.voxpatrum.pl

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Wydawnictwo KUL
ul. Konstantynów 1H, 20-708 Lublin
tel. 81 740 93 40, e-mail: wydawnictwo@kul.lublin.pl

Druk i oprawa: volumina.pl Daniel Krzanowski
ul. Księcia Witolda 7-9, 71-063 Szczecin, tel. 91 812 09 08, e-mail: druk@volumina.pl

Artykuły

Santiago Eslava-Bejarano¹

A Noble Pity: ἔλεος in Plato's Philosophy

Pity (ἔλεος), broadly understood as an emotional response to another's misfortune, had a prominent role in Athenian culture. Pity's significance was particularly evident in dramatic and judicial contexts², whose mechanisms afforded groups of citizens opportunities to witness the staged or reported predicaments of others. It is no surprise, then, that both Plato and Aristotle commented on this emotion, albeit in apparently contrasting ways – Plato's stated disregard for pity³ (in *Apology* and *Republic*) standing at odds with Aristotle's appraisal of it as a legitimate and even desirable response (in *Poetics* and *Rhetoric*). Given the scope and extent of pity's role in Greek thought, however, one may revisit and reassess this commonplace opposition, and especially its guiding premise, namely that Plato did away with pity entirely. I argue in this essay against this assumption, proposing instead that Plato conceived a form of pity that would constitute an

¹ Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá (Colombia), MA in Literature, Department of Arts and Humanities; e-mail: s.eslava10@uniandes.edu.co; ORCID: 0000-0002-3079-2462.

² In his book *Pity Transformed*, David Konstan devotes a whole chapter to the role of pity in the judicial context of Ancient Greece and Rome and shows how the appeal to pity was considered to be a legitimate part of the defendant's demonstration of his innocence. Cf. D. Konstan, *Pity Transformed*. London. 2001, p. 49-75.

³ Rana Saadi (*Pity and Disgust in Plato's Republic: The Case of Leontius*, "Classical Philology" 108 (2013) p. 179-201) proposes a reading of *Republic* as a dialogue that disavows pity. There, Saadi identifies Leontius' desire to look at the criminal corpses as an instance of pity, which she characterizes as a "lawless and irrational" emotion of the appetitive part of the soul. Saadi's reading is debatable on several grounds. Indeed, there is no textual mention of this emotion in the passage, and Plato's description of Leontius' response to the corpses does not fit any conventional characterization of pity; moreover, Saadi's conflation of the different partitions of the soul and her allocation of pity in the appetitive part are problematic due to the lack of a clear Platonic stance about the place of pity in the soul.

appropriate answer to a specific kind of misfortune. To understand pity in this sense, I will address Plato's disapproval of pitiful representations in judicial and dramatic contexts, as presented in *Apology* and *Republic*. Then, I will comment on Socrates' statement, in *Gorgias*, that the tyrant is pitiable. Finally, I will address Plato's assessment of pity as part of the noble character in the *Laws* and will consider pity's relationship to anger and punishment.

1. Plato's Apparent Distrust of Pity

1.1. Socrates' Rejection of Pitiful Scenes (τὰ ἐλεῖνὰ ταῦτα δράματα)

Socrates' speech in Plato's *Apology* is an odd defense of his case. Not satisfied with refuting the charges pressed against him, Socrates insists on maintaining the conduct that has infuriated his accusers: "whether you believe Anytus or not, whether you acquit me or not, do so on the understanding that this is my course of action, even if I am to face death many times"⁴. Moreover, he challenges social and judicial conventions by rejecting customary practices in his address to the jury. After contesting the charges, Socrates explains why he did not resort to conventional strategies to elicit the jury's pity. To understand Socrates' challenge, it will be useful to briefly examine the place that pity occupied in Athenian trials.

One striking feature of the Athenian approach to pity was its rightful place in judicial contexts. Rhetoricians considered eliciting pity as a useful device that, far from being a deceptive fallacy, played a role in demonstrating the defendant's innocence. As David Konstan (*The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature*, Toronto 2006) argues in his analysis of this emotion, pity depended on the appraisal of someone's misfortune as undeserved and rested on the evidence of innocence afforded by the accused⁵. This prerequisite is present in surviving testimonies of appeals to pity in judicial contexts and in the most detailed analysis of emotions in Greek philosophy: Aristotle's *Rhetoric*⁶. There, Aristotle outlines one of the cognitive conditions that enabled pity,

⁴ Plato, *Apologia* 30b7- c1.

⁵ Cf. Konstan, *Pity Transformed*, p. 34 and D. Konstan, *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature*, Toronto 2006, p. 202.

⁶ Aristoteles, *Rhetorica* II 1385b.

namely the belief that the observed misfortune was undeserved⁷. Although Konstan's assertion that Greek pity, in general, was founded on this belief is controversial⁸, it is clear that, at least in the context of a trial where one party should be favored and another punished, the appeal to pity was strongly linked to the claim of innocence⁹.

Given this Athenian belief that eliciting pity in the jury was a way of underlining one's innocence, it is understandable that Socrates feels compelled explain his reasons for not resorting to this strategy. Otherwise, he runs the risk of irritating his audience and making them cast their vote in anger (θεῖτο ἄν μετ' ὀργῆς τὴν ψῆφον)¹⁰. The rejected strategy, it is explained, would consist not only in a verbal appeal to the jury's pity but also in provoking this emotion by crying and bringing the accused's family to court¹¹. Such 'pitiful scenes' (τὰ ἐλεινὰ ταῦτα δράματα)¹², as he calls them, must be avoided because they damage one's reputation and they are unjust¹³.

Regarding the first charge, Socrates explains that his reluctance to engage in these scenes stems not from the fact that he is brave in the face of death¹⁴. If that were the case, making a pitiful scene would only damage his reputation as a brave man. On the contrary, he considers these scenes

⁷ The other two cognitive conditions are the appraisal of the other's sufferings as significant and the belief that one is vulnerable to the same misfortune. For a detailed analysis of Aristotelian pity, cf. M. Nussbaum, *Aristotle on Emotions and Rational Persuasion in Aristotle's Rhetoric*, Los Angeles 1996.

⁸ Norman Sandridge (*Felling Vulnerable but Not Too Vulnerable: Pity in Sophocles' Oedipus Coloneus, Ajax and Philoctetes*, "The Classical Journal" 103 (2008) p. 433-448) and Rachana Kamtekar (*Platonic Pity, or Why Compassion Is Not a Platonic Virtue Emotions in Plato*, Boston 2020) have noticed instances in Greek literature in which characters pity people who seem to deserve their misfortunes. According to Kamtekar, "Aristotle needs to give an account of the typical or suitable conditions for the arousal or removal of the feelings, not an account of the necessary and sufficient conditions to cover every case" (p. 313). Indeed, Aristotle deals with a context in which pity is elicited by discursive means; however, there may be instances of pity in which this belief is absent.

⁹ See Sandridge, *Felling Vulnerable but Not Too Vulnerable*, p. 435.

¹⁰ Plato, *Apologia* 34c, 3-5.

¹¹ Socrates discards these scenes because they imply a fear of death and distract the jury from what is relevant. As he develops this argument to state why he rejects this strategy (34d, 9), we may think that, for him, bringing loved ones to the courtroom seizes on the jury's fear of death and distracts them.

¹² Plato, *Apologia* 34e, 2-5 and 35b, 9-c 2.

¹³ Here, I develop Rachana Kamtekar's analysis of Socrates' argument as a two-fold rejection of pitiful scenes that, crucially, does not reject pity *per se*. Cf. Kamtekar, *Platonic Pity*.

¹⁴ Plato, *Apologia* 34e, 1-2.

as dishonorable in general, and goes on to develop the charge of disgracefulness in three stages: eliciting pity in the courtroom is disgraceful for himself, for virtuous men in general, and for the whole city. At all three levels, asking for pity implies an ill-founded fear of death, one that makes the request disreputable.

Firstly, staging a pitiful scene would be disgraceful for Socrates' reputation because of his age and because he is believed to be different from most men¹⁵. Regarding his age – seventy – Konstan argues that pity was usually reserved for those who faced untimely deaths¹⁶, so appealing to this emotion would not be becoming for an elderly citizen. Regarding his difference from other men, Socrates makes explicit what he thinks might be the feature separating him from most people:

It is perhaps on this point and in this respect, gentlemen, that I differ from the majority of people (διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων), and if I were to claim that I am wiser than anyone in anything, it would be in this, that, as I have no adequate knowledge of things in the underworld, so I do not think I have¹⁷.

A few lines before this quote¹⁸, Socrates equated being afraid of death and thinking that one is wise when one is not. For him, fear of death depends on the belief that death is terrible, but no one can confidently assert this view (for all we know, death might be the greatest blessing). When Socrates admits that he does not have adequate knowledge of things in the underworld, then, he is also making clear that he is not afraid of death. These two claims differentiate him from most men and, as noted above, are among the reasons for not engaging in pitiful scenes. Thus, according to Socrates, eliciting pity betrays false beliefs about death. This charge is conspicuous in the next stage of his challenge.

Apart from being disgraceful for himself, these pitiful scenes are disgraceful for any man considered to be superior in wisdom (σοφία) and courage (ἀνδρεία). The reason for this echoes what we have just noted with regard to Socrates' reputation. In trying to elicit pity during a trial, the seemingly virtuous man betrays his appraisal of death as something dreadful (δεινός); he behaves in a way improper for Athenian men. The

¹⁵ Plato, *Apologia* 34e, 4-6.

¹⁶ Konstan, *Pity Transformed*, p. 42.

¹⁷ Plato, *Apologia* 29b, 2-6.

¹⁸ Plato *Apologia* 29a, 4-b, 2.

disgracefulness of these acts, performed by so-called virtuous men, eventually brings dishonor to the city because any stranger who witnesses the best citizens engaging in this behavior will think that the most reputable Athenians are no better than women¹⁹.

In addition to the rejection of pitiful scenes on the grounds of their disgraceful nature, Socrates argues that it is not just (οὐδὲ δίκαιόν) to be acquitted by means of arousing pity in the jury. This charge might, in turn, be considered two-fold; Socrates first develops an argument about the unlawfulness of this practice and, based on this claim, asserts its unholiness. For Socrates, pitiful scenes are unjust because they induce the jury to decide without due consideration of laws. There is a difference between begging (δεῖσθαι) to be acquitted, on the one hand, and, on the other, convincing (πείθειν) a jury by appealing to a legal framework. In responding to pitiful scenes, the jury dispenses justice as a gift or favor (καταχαρίζεσθαι τὰ δίκαια) instead of delivering it according to the law (δικάσειν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους)²⁰.

Here, one may be tempted to think that Socrates is making a distinction between rational and irrational means of reaching a verdict. However, this distinction is not present in the passage. Instead, he seems to be concerned with the relevance of what may be brought to the courtroom. By attending to the pitiful scene of the defendant, the jury runs the risk of passing a verdict that disregards laws and heeds circumstances alien to the charges at stake; this would constitute perjury (ἐπιорκεῖν), as the jury's oath demands that they decide in accordance with the laws and on the specific issue that is the subject of prosecution²¹. In this way, the injustice of the appeal to pity explains its unholiness because dispensing justice as a favor constitutes a violation of the jury's holy oath. In *Apology*, in short, Socrates does not condemn pity per se; instead, he condemns pitiful scenes because they are based on false beliefs about death and because they distract the jury from what is relevant to the case.

¹⁹ Plato *Apologia* 35a, 1-b, 3.

²⁰ Plato *Apologia* 35b, 9-c, 5.

²¹ Demosthenes cites this oath and includes clauses such as: "I will vote in accordance with the laws and the decrees" (Demosthenes, *Against Timocrates* 24, 149, tr. A.T. Murray) and "I will give my verdict strictly on the charge named in the prosecution" (Demosthenes, *Against Timocrates* 24, 151).

1.2. Pity and the Images of Virtue in *Republic X*

In *Republic X*, Plato mentions pity in the last stage of his critique of poetry²², where he launches his chief accusation against this imitative art. Here, Plato regards pity as part of an undesirable and even dangerous response to dramatic representations, without, however, rejecting this emotion altogether. Although I will focus on Socrates' main charge against poetry as it relates to pity, it will be necessary to address his previous analogy between painting and poetry, since it explains why pitying tragic characters is a mistake analogous to assenting to an optical illusion.

After stating that poets “imitate images of virtue”²³ and have no grasp of the truth because their works are at a third remove from reality, Socrates discusses how poetry affects its audience. He relies on an analogy between painting and poetry to explain that imitative arts influence the base and irrational part of the soul, thereby introducing the second and third²⁴ divisions of the soul in *Republic*²⁵. Although he does not explicitly equate the parts of the soul resulting from these different partitions of the soul, the parallelisms between them and the characterizations of the parts in each case give us good reasons to believe that Plato offers two different ways of approaching the same parts of the soul²⁶.

Given their remove from the truth, painting and poetry appeal to a lower part of the soul, characterized in opposition to the λογιστικόν,

²² This is the third major critique of poetry in *Republic*. The other two take place in Books II and III. In Book II, Plato challenges poetry for how it depicts Gods and heroes; in Book III, he addresses how poets depict Hades, and reflects on the style of poetry, preferring simple narration over imitation. For an overview of these critiques, cf. C.L. Griswold, *Plato on Rhetoric and Poetry*, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford 2020.

²³ Plato, *Respublica X* 600e, 4.

²⁴ Plato, *Respublica* 602c-603b and 603c-605a, respectively.

²⁵ The issue of how Plato's argument in Book X relates to his previous proposal in Book IV is beyond the scope of this article. For an examination of this question, cf. J. Moss, *Appearances and Calculations: Plato's Division of the Soul*, in: *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, ed. D. Sedley, New York 2008, p. 35-68. This chapter also informs much of what I argue in this section.

²⁶ The compatibility of these partitions with the previous one in R. IV has been defended by Nehamas (*Plato on Imitation and Poetry in Republic 10, in Plato on Beauty, Wisdom, and the Arts*, New Jersey 1982), who argues that, in R.X, Plato further divides the rational part of R. IV, and, more recently, by Moss (*Plato's Appearance-Assent Account of Belief*, “Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society” 114 (2014) p. 213-238), who argues that the lower part of the soul in R. X comprises the two nonrational parts of R. IV.

the calculative part. In each case, Socrates presents a similar argument to prove that the soul has two parts. Both arguments begin with a statement of the possibility of contradiction, one within the sphere of perception and the other within the sphere of human action²⁷. Then, he presents the adequate response to these contradictions: in the case of optical illusions, measurement (τὸ μετρεῖν) shows how things really are, while in the case of human action, measure (τὸ μετριάζειν) allows the reasonable man to solve his internal conflicts²⁸. Measurement and measure are assigned to a noble part of the soul that, in the first case, is called the calculating part (λογιστικός,) and, in the second, is left unnamed but is characterized as “the best part of us that is willing to follow this rational calculation (τῷ λογισμῷ)”²⁹.

These contradictions, and the manner in which the rational part deals with them, lead to a paradox that is characterized, in the case of optical illusions, as a conflict of beliefs³⁰ – believing that a stick is bent vs. believing in its actual straightness – and, in the case of human action, as a conflict of inclinations³¹ – being prompt to publicly grieve vs. being prompt to restrain oneself. In both cases, the principle of opposites³² leads to the partition of the soul. Indeed, since it is impossible to have two contradictory beliefs or inclinations about the same thing at the same time, there must be two parts of the soul that serve as different seats for each opinion and inclination. Plato states, therefore, that there is a part of the soul that believes in accor-

²⁷ Plato, *Respublica* 602c-d and 603d.

²⁸ Plato, *Respublica* 602d and 603e-604b.

²⁹ Plato, *Respublica* 602e1 and 604d5.

³⁰ In *Plato's Appearance-Assent Account of Belief* (2014), Moss distinguishes two types of *dóxa* in Plato's work: *eikasía* and *pístis*. These types differ in: (1) their objects (*eikasía* is directed at appearances while *πίστις* is directed at the things themselves) and (2) the attitude of the subject towards the object (*eikasía* is passive yielding while *pístis* requires active investigation). The second difference explains the first one because the subject's active role enables her to have opinions about the things themselves. This does not mean that *pístis* is knowledge; it just entails that, in *pístis*, the subject distinguishes appearances from reality. According to Moss' distinction, in tragedy, *eikasía* wins the conflict of beliefs that Plato presents. Although I do not resort to this distinction, as *eikasía* does not explicitly appear here, the contrast between passive yielding and active enquiring does appear and helps us to understand Plato's critique of poetry. For this partition of the soul as a result of conflicting beliefs, cf. T.S. Ganson, *The Rational/Non-Rational Distinction in Plato's Republic*, “Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy” 36 (2009) p. 179-197.

³¹ Plato, *Respublica* 604b.

³² Cf. Plato, *Respublica* IV 406b, where Plato states this principle for the first time.

dance with measure (κατὰ τὰ μέτρα) and follows the guidance of the law³³, and another one that believes in contradiction of measure (παρὰ τὰ μέτρα) and does not follow the guidance of the law. The common feature shared by Plato's two characterizations of the lower part of the soul is that, in both cases, this part yields unreflectively to appearances. Thus, at the end of this twofold partition, Socrates says:

[...] we'll say that an imitative poet puts a bad constitution in the soul of each individual by making images (εἰδῶλα) that are far removed from the truth and by gratifying the irrational part, which cannot distinguish the large and the small but believes that the same things are large at one time and small at another³⁴.

Here, Socrates describes the part of the soul receptive to poetic images as incapable of distinguishing between different magnitudes. This characterization echoes Socrates' previous remarks about the part of the soul that believes in illusions; to this part, the same things appear as having different magnitudes and shapes³⁵. Responding to the poet's images of virtue is analogous to believing in optical illusions, as in both cases the lower part of the soul yields to false appearances.

The twofold division of the soul lays the groundwork for Plato's main critique: that poetry corrupts decent people (τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς)³⁶. Such people behave appropriately when faced with their own misfortunes³⁷. However, in contemplating the plights of others as represented by imitative poetry, they contradict the precepts of reason, abandoning themselves to sympathy³⁸. How is it possible for them to behave in this way? It might precisely be that, because they are reasonable, they see tragedy as an exceptional setting in which reason can relax its vigilance. Indeed, while children or foolish men might take the representation for reality³⁹, making a kind of ontological mistake⁴⁰, reasonable men will not confuse these two realms (i.e.,

³³ Plato, *Respublica* 604b.

³⁴ Plato, *Respublica* 605b-c.

³⁵ Cf. Moss, *Appearances and Calculations*, p. 45.

³⁶ Plato, *Respublica* 605c.

³⁷ Plato, *Respublica* 603e.

³⁸ Plato, *Respublica* 605d.

³⁹ Plato, *Respublica* 598c.

⁴⁰ Elizabeth Belfiore (*Plato's Greatest Accusation against Poetry*, "Canadian Journal of Philosophy" 13 (1983) p. 60) separates the audience's mistakes into two catego-

the world of appearances and the real world). As tragedy belongs to the world of appearances, it might seem like an appropriate instance in which to apply a standard different from the one we uphold in our daily lives. Thus, in bypassing reason's measuring mechanisms, the audience yields to the appearance that public lamentation is not shameful⁴¹. This judgment contravenes a law that should serve as the standard for the reasonable part of the soul: "it is best to keep as quiet as possible in misfortunes and not get excited about them"⁴². Overlooking this law implies ignoring its two axioms: (1) that we do not know what is good or bad in these difficulties and (2) that human affairs are not worthy of great concern⁴³.

By ignoring this law and yielding to appearances, reasonable people are bound to make another serious mistake. Without the vigilance of reason, they might take what is represented as a truthful depiction of real life⁴⁴. In this case, the spectators respond to a false appearance of virtue (εἶδωλον ἀρετῆς)⁴⁵: the image of a so-called virtuous man (ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός) who grieves excessively⁴⁶. Just as with optical illusions, assenting to appearances yields misjudgments: in the case of the sensory illusion, the lower part of the soul believes that a stick under water is bent; in the case of staged tragedy, it believes that a man who grieves publicly can be noble⁴⁷. In the context of tragic representations, therefore, the audience's pity is directed to a false impression. Again, this error is not attributed to pity per se; instead, it is the consequence of the lower part of the soul yielding to appearances without the intervention of the λογιστικόν. Thus, Plato condemns poetry because it promotes wrong judgments about key aspects of human life: in pitying heroes, the audience assents to a false belief about virtue (i.e., that it is

ries: ontological and veridical. The ontological mistake consists in taking the copy for the original (i.e., not recognizing the copy's ontological status), while the veridical mistake consists in recognizing as true a representation that is actually false.

⁴¹ Plato, *Respublica* 606a-b.

⁴² Plato, *Respublica* 604c.

⁴³ Plato, *Respublica* 604b.

⁴⁴ This would be an example of what Belfiore calls a "veridical mistake". Cf. Belfiore, *Plato's Greatest Accusation*, p. 40.

⁴⁵ Plato, *Respublica* 600e, 4.

⁴⁶ Plato, *Respublica* 606b, 1-2.

⁴⁷ While analogous, these mistakes cannot be equated: some optical illusions convey a possible state of affairs (it is possible for a stick to be bent), but no image of virtue can be true. This may be one of the reasons why Plato banishes poetry but not painting from the city.

compatible with public grieving) and false beliefs about misfortune and the worth of human affairs⁴⁸, disregarding the law of reason and its axioms⁴⁹.

What is more, tragedy weakens reason's ability to respond to misfortune outside of the theater since the vicarious experience of giving oneself in sympathy (συμπάσχω) to the plight of another induces the audience to make the other's experience their own. This critique resembles the passage in *Republic* III, where Socrates forbids guardians from engaging in imitation because it might "become part of nature and settle into habits of gesture, voice, and thought"⁵⁰. Here, as in *Republic* III, poetry establishes a habit, not of gesture and voice, but of ill-judgment. In letting the lower part of the soul respond unreflectively to appearances, poetry inaugurates a habit of wrongly pitying and lamenting. Thus, as in *Apology*, Plato rejects pitiful representations without rejecting pity. Here, in tandem with poetry's power of creating bad habits, the false appearances enacted in tragedy explain Plato's apparent disregard for pity.

2. Towards a Noble Pity

2.1. Pity towards the tyrant in *Gorgias*

We have seen how false beliefs about death and virtue inclined jurymen and spectators of tragedies to wrongly pity suffering men. This emotion proved to be dangerous, as it led jurymen to commit perjury and created a habit of bad judgment in decent men. Nevertheless, in *Gorgias*, Socrates says that we should pity the unjust tyrant⁵¹. This appraisal of pity is grounded on the argument that the wrongdoer is more unfortunate than his victim because he must suffer his injustice, which is the greatest harm to the soul. By questioning common notions about harm, Plato opens a place for pity in his philosophy. This opening will also allow us to see how pity relates to justice, thus confirming, to a certain extent, the emotion's place in the Athenian judicial system, built, according to Danielle Allen, upon the deliberate distribution of anger and pity⁵².

⁴⁸ In 387d, Socrates censurs poetry to protect reasonable men from false beliefs about these matters.

⁴⁹ Plato, *Respublica* 604b-c.

⁵⁰ Plato, *Respublica* 395d, 1-3.

⁵¹ Plato, *Gorgias* 469a.

⁵² In the absence of a theory of rights, Allen argues that emotions were the common language that enabled claims of justice and allowed the establishment of relationships

In his exchange with Polus, Socrates tries to convince him that rhetoric is not a τέχνη⁵³. Cornered by Socrates' arguments, Polus shifts the conversation, arguing that even if rhetoric is not an art, it grants tyrants and rhetoricians enviable powers such as banishing and slaughtering⁵⁴. Polus' envy seems to be grounded on the false belief that these powers are beneficial per se. For this reason, Socrates differentiates between goods (τὰ ἀγαθά) – health, wisdom, and wealth – from things that are neither good nor bad (τὰ μεταξὺ) – walking, sitting, sailing, and, surprisingly, slaughtering and banishing⁵⁵. This distinction explains why tyrants do not do what they wish (attain what is good), but only what seems best to them (which may be neutral, or even bad). Thus, the seemingly enviable powers afforded by rhetoric are in fact indifferent, and unjustly exerting them makes the tyrant pitiable⁵⁶ rather than enviable⁵⁷. To sustain the claim that pitying the unjust tyrant is a commendable response, Socrates develops two closely related arguments to prove that (1) doing wrong is more harmful than suffering it⁵⁸, and (2) avoiding the penalty is worse than paying it⁵⁹. The first of these arguments, commonly known as “the refutation of Polus”, starts with the assertion that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it. Polus grants this premise, arguably out of shame⁶⁰, and accepts Socrates' defini-

between citizens. Cf. D. Allen, *The World of Prometheus: The Politics of Punishing in Democratic Athens*, Princeton 2000, p. 150.

⁵³ Plato, *Gorgias* 462b-466a.

⁵⁴ Plato, *Gorgias* 468e, 6-9.

⁵⁵ With this list of objectively beneficial goods, Socrates closes the gap between morality and self-interest, showing how prosocial behavior is in our best interest, even if we don't know it. This affects the evaluation of actions such as slaughtering. Cf. R. Crisp, *Prudential and Moral Reasons*, in: *The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity*, ed. D. Star, Oxford 2018, p. 801-819.

⁵⁶ Plato, *Gorgias* 469a, 4-5.

⁵⁷ Aristotle maintains the contrast between pity and envy. Although he defines both emotions as a kind of pain (*Rh.* 1387b; 1385b), they differ because of the evaluation we make of their intentional objects. While Plato diverges from Aristotle in his appraisals of emotions, we have seen that, for him, cognition also influences emotions by changing how we see their objects (e.g., the soul's emotional response can be misled by wrong beliefs about death). Cf. Konstan, *Pity Transformed*, p. 46

⁵⁸ For injustice as harmful to the wrongdoer, see *Ap.* 30c, 7-e, 1, *Grg.* 469b, 1-c, 2, *R.* 353e, 10-354a, 9.

⁵⁹ Plato, *Gorgias* 472e, 4-7.

⁶⁰ Cf. C. Tarnopolsky, *Prudes, Perverts, and Tyrants: Plato's Gorgias and the Politics of Shame*, Princeton 2010, p. 65-79; R. Barney, *Notes on Plato on the Kalon and the Good*, “Classical Philology” 105 (2010) p. 374.

tion of the noble or fine (καλός)⁶¹ as something pleasurable, beneficial⁶², or both – accordingly, the opposite of the noble would be the shameful, which is defined as something painful, harmful, or both. From these premises, Socrates concludes that wrongdoing is detrimental to the unjust person since it is more shameful, and it is evident that it cannot be more painful for him. This conclusion, in tandem with Socrates’ differentiation between good and indifferent things, aims to undermine the presuppositions that ground Polus’ envy towards the tyrant.

Besides demonstrating that the wrongdoer is unhappy, Socrates wants to show that the unpunished wrongdoer is most miserable. Accordingly, he argues that punishment is a benefit for the guilty person and, consequently, that the unpunished wrongdoer is worse off than the punished one. To reach that conclusion, he gets Polus to admit three premises: (1) to suffer punishment when guilty is to be justly punished, (2) all things just (δίκαια) are fine (καλά), and (3) as an action is done, so it is suffered⁶³. From these premises, Socrates leads Polus to admit that when someone punishes justly, someone is punished justly (because of the third premise). This, in turn, leads to the assertion that if someone is punished justly, she suffers some-

⁶¹ This definition (474d, 3-475b, 2) may be challenged on several grounds. Firstly, Socrates seems to equivocate perspectives, as he first speaks of beautiful things being pleasant *for the beholder*, but then includes other examples in which the pleasure/benefit would be for an *agent or participant* and not for the beholder (see G. Vlastos, *Was Polus Refuted?*, “The American Journal of Philology” 88 (1967) p. 454-460; M. Mackenzie, *Plato on Punishment*, Los Angeles 1984; Tarnopolsky, *Prudes, Perverts, and Tyrants*). Secondly, he seems to equivocate goods in his induction because his first examples deal with material goods (such as figures and colors), while his last examples are about immaterial goods (such as justice and education). For the argument to be valid, it would have to have a fixed perspective and a clear realm. Nevertheless, it may well be the case that this is not a definition at all. As Rachel Barney argues, the absence of any reference to the role of order in this account and the *ad hominem* context in which it takes place strongly suggest that rather than being a definition, Socrates’ remarks may be considered as a list of features present in what we deem to be fine. See Barney, *Notes on Plato*, p. 372.

⁶² Throughout this argument, Plato uses “benefit” (*ōphelia*) and “good” (*agathós*) interchangeably. This usage betrays a prudential notion of “good”. For a detailed explanation of this usage, cf. Barney, *Notes on Plato*, p. 368-380.

⁶³ This principle (“principle of the interconnection of modalities of correlates”, as Dodds dubbed it) applies to transitive verbs. For example, if someone hits rapidly, something is being hit rapidly. However, it does not work for other verbs. If our description were “someone hits voluntarily”, we could not hold the same description in the passive voice without changing the original meaning. Cf. M. Mackenzie, *Plato on Punishment*, Los Angeles 1984, p. 180.

thing fine (because of the second premise); and, because of the definition of the fine in the past argument, it is possible to say that, if that person suffers something fine, then she will suffer something good for her (because it is obvious that being punished is not pleasant). Therefore, punishing someone who is guilty would be beneficial for that person, and it would be preferable for them than avoiding the penalty.

With these arguments, Socrates seeks to alter Polus' appraisal of what constitutes serious harm, alongside his evaluation of the tyrant, in order to change his emotional response from envy to pity. Although it is not clear exactly why injustice is so deleterious to the wrongdoer's soul⁶⁴, Plato acknowledges that, when grounded in correct beliefs, pity is an appropriate response to someone who suffers (even if that person is not aware of her suffering). Thus, far from disregarding this emotion or offering an entirely new conception of it, Plato demonstrates in *Gorgias* the beliefs capable of grounding a rightful pity.

Showing that injustice is a serious harm for the wrongdoer also helps sustain the Socratic assertion that wrongdoing is involuntary. As we have seen, Socrates argued that, in doing unjust actions, the tyrant does not do what he really wants, but only what appears best for him⁶⁵. Indeed, as with all other actions, the unjust action is undertaken for the sake of happiness; however, it damages the soul and impedes the achievement of happiness, thus contradicting the tyrant's real desires⁶⁶. This account of pity as an emotion directed towards someone whose acts have unwillingly brought them serious harm could be read, *prima facie*, as akin to Aristotle's assertion that pity is directed towards involuntary actions⁶⁷. Nevertheless, as Rachana Kamtekar shows in *Platonic Pity, or Why Compassion Is Not a Platonic Virtue*, Aristotle conceives of pity as an emotion based upon the exoneration of the pitied person; consequently, for him, it is incompatible with recognizing that person as a wrongdoer⁶⁸. In contrast, as we have seen,

⁶⁴ However, as Brickhouse and Smith argue (*Socrates on How Wrongdoing Damages the Soul*, "The Journal of Ethics" 11 (2007) p. 348), it is not necessary to resort to *Republic's* psychology to explain this harm. In his discussion with Calicles, Socrates argues that punishment serves to discipline one's soul by hindering the feeding of appetites (505c-506a). Thus, punishment can help avoid the damage of wrongdoing in the soul, which may be seen as the progressive erosion of the soul's cognitive functioning; this would make the correct evaluation of actual benefit a difficult task to perform.

⁶⁵ Plato, *Gorgias* 467b-468e.

⁶⁶ Cf. Kamtekar, *Platonic Pity*, p. 81-105.

⁶⁷ Aristoteles, *Ethica Nicomachea* 1109b, 31-32.

⁶⁸ Cf. Kamtekar, *Platonic Pity*, p. 320.

Platonic pity is consistent with – but not limited to⁶⁹ – identifying the pitied person as a wrongdoer. This is a considerable difference; however, the fact that Platonic pity may be directed towards a wrongdoer does not entail that, for Plato, pity is compatible with the appraisal of the pitied harm as something deserved. As I will show in the final section, studying pity in the context of the Platonic proposal of a reformatory justice will show that, for him, no one deserves to endure the ultimate consequences of wrongdoing, which are to be avoided through punishment.

2.2. Pity, Anger, and Punishment in *Laws*

In *Laws*, just as in *Gorgias*, pity is said to be directed towards someone in need of punishment⁷⁰. As we already noted, this position is grounded in two main ideas: that wrongdoing is harmful to the unjust person, and that punishment repairs the harm done by injustice. The fifth book of *Laws* maintains these theses and further qualifies them. The Athenian asserts that the most severe consequence of wrongdoing is to have one's soul corrupted by injustice, which means growing like those who are evil. This resemblance to the evil gradually distances the wrongdoer from good men and makes his soul most deformed (κακοσχημονέστατα) and dishonored (ἀτιμότατα)⁷¹.

⁶⁹ In *Laws*, for example, lonely foreigners are said to deserve human and divine pity (729e, 6). Mentioning the gods may suggest that this pity follows a divine model. In pitying a lonely stranger, one wouldn't be required to believe that friendlessness is a serious misfortune, just as the gods understand human predicaments without believing that they, too, are prone to suffer the same evils (Lg. 653c-d). Understanding how bad loneliness may seem to the friendless may be sufficient to feel an appropriate pity that does not entail the evaluations of the pitied person. See also Kamtekar, *Platonic Pity, or Why Compassion Is Not a Platonic Virtue Emotions in Plato*, 324f.

⁷⁰ However, in *Republic*, an appropriate pity seems to be elicited by someone who lacks sound judgment or is unwillingly hindered in their pursuit of knowledge. A telling example would be Socrates' response to Thrasymachus' interruption in *R.* 336e, 10, where he ironically asks for Thrasymachus' pity and argues that "if Polemarchus and I made an error in our investigation, you should know that we did so unwillingly". This example is consistent with the pity felt by the man who, upon seeing the light outside of the cave, thinks about the fate of his former companions, who are still trapped and do not know the real world (*R.* 516c, 6). I believe that the unjust person in *Gorgias* and *Laws* may be like the prisoners in the cave, insofar as both are deceived by false appearances that prevent them from accessing reality and achieving what is truly good.

⁷¹ Plato, *Leges* 728a-b.

Such harm to the soul is identified firstly as the greatest judgment (δίκη) on evildoing. A few lines on, however, the Athenian rectifies his statement by saying that such a state of the soul cannot be called “judgment”, because justice and judgment are fine (καλὸν) things⁷². Instead, it should be called vengeance (τιμωρία): the suffering that follows injustice⁷³.

It is worth noting, however, that, in *Laws*, τιμωρία seems to have two related senses, subsumed by the definition “the suffering that follows injustice”⁷⁴. We have already pointed out the first one: vengeance as the harmful and deformed state of the soul that results from wrongdoing. The second sense would be vengeance as a kind of conventional punishment that, when ruled by justice, contributes either to the reformation of the criminal or to her purgation from society⁷⁵. In this last sense, τιμωρία would depend on justice, although it might include punishments such as beatings, banishing, and even death.

Distinguishing between these senses of vengeance may allow us to understand that, while directed towards wrongdoers, a commendable pity is not felt for people who deserve their sufferings. In her article *Platonic Pity, or Why Compassion is not a Platonic virtue*, Rachana Kamtekar argues that the judgment of un-deservedness (i.e., the belief that the pitied subject does not deserve the endured evil) is an Aristotelian requisite, circumscribed by the scope of *Rhetoric*. Indeed, Kamtekar considers the possibility of instances where this Aristotelian premise is not necessary for pity⁷⁶. At first sight, Platonic pity, directed towards the wrongdoer, might seem to be such an instance where we may rightly say that pity is felt towards someone who deserves what he suffers.

Nevertheless, if what the unjust person suffers is the deformation of her soul (i.e., τιμωρία in its first sense, as differentiated from justice)⁷⁷, pity towards such person does not seem to be compatible with believing that their suffering is deserved. For it is not clear how, in the Platonic framework, one may rightly assert that someone deserves the injustice they suffer. Indeed, if we conceive the judgment of desert as a normative one, then claiming that someone deserves something implies an appraisal of the jus-

⁷² Plato, *Leges* 728c, 2.

⁷³ For a similar distinction, see *Prot.* 324b, where the sophist distinguishes the past-oriented vengeance from the reformatory and future-oriented justice.

⁷⁴ Plato, *Leges* 728c, 3.

⁷⁵ Plato, *Leges* 735d-e.

⁷⁶ Kamtekar, *Platonic Pity*, p. 314.

⁷⁷ Plato, *Leges* 728c, 3.

tice of that distribution – it would be the same as saying that someone justly deserves it. However, stating that such suffering is justly deserved would be contradictory, as the suffering is the injustice itself. Therefore, in saying that wrongdoers deserve what they suffer, their τιμωρία in the first sense, we would be stating that something κακός (suffering injustice in the soul) is καλός (insofar as it is just). Consequently, although Plato differs from Aristotle in admitting that judging someone as a wrongdoer is compatible with pitying them, this does not imply that it is possible to pity someone who deserves such suffering⁷⁸.

So far, we have seen that, in *Laws*, Plato preserves crucial theses that were also present in *Gorgias*. However, what may be considered a Socratic suggestion there becomes here a pivotal aspect of the good citizen's character⁷⁹. Among the traits that make a good man and that form the guarantee for leading a fine life, the Athenian counts a soul capable, as the occasion demands, of both righteous anger and pity. A person's soul should contain both an irascible and a gentle⁸⁰ disposition:

Every man should combine in his character high spirit (θυμοειδῆ) with the utmost gentleness (πρᾶον δὲ ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα), because there is only one way to get out of the reach of crimes committed by other people and which are dangerous and hard to cure (χαλεπὰ καὶ δυσίατα) or even impossible to cure (παράπαν ἀνίατα): you have to overcome them by fighting in self-defense and rigidly punishing (κολάζοντα) them, and no soul can do this without a noble anger (θυμοῦ γενναίου)⁸¹.

⁷⁸ We have commented on Plato's stance concerning two of the three cognitive conditions that Aristotle recognizes for pity. For an explanation of the divergence between Plato and Aristotle regarding the third condition (the belief about one's vulnerability), cf. Kamtekar, *Platonic Pity*, p. 316-319.

⁷⁹ Plato, *Leges* 730b-732d.

⁸⁰ While it is conspicuous why anger (*thymós*) may be the emotional expression of an irascible (*thymoeidēs*) character, it may be less clear why pity (*éleos*) would be the emotional expression of a gentle (*práos*) character. Nevertheless, Plato's notion of calmness is closely related to pity. Indeed, he mentions calmness as the appropriate response towards someone in need of education (*Grg.* 489d; *Lg.* 888a), someone who acted wrongly unwillingly (*R.* 589c; *Lg.* 867b), and as the appropriate way of responding to one's misfortunes (*R.* 387e; *Cr.* 43b). Moreover, in *Phaedo*, Socrates is described by the prison guardian as most gentle (*praótaton*), a trait that explains why he does not get angry with him (*Phd.* 116c). For gentleness, or satisfaction, as the opposite of anger, cf. Konstan, *The Emotions of Ancient Greeks*, p. 89.

⁸¹ Plato, *Leges* 731b, 3-c1.

Firstly, the Athenian asserts the importance of being irascible (θυμοειδῆ), since this trait helps in dealing with people whose injustice is not curable. This distinction between curable and incurable criminals was already proposed by Socrates in his discussion with Callicles in *Gorgias*⁸² and is addressed again by the Athenian, who compares the incurable criminal with a sick animal who must be purged from the herd in order to keep the rest of the animals healthy⁸³. The method of purging criminals from the city is to exert a combination of justice and vengeance upon them⁸⁴, if not to reform them, then at least to eradicate them from the “herd” of good citizens. Here we can appreciate the usefulness of an irascible character, which might help identify when it is appropriate to exert vengeance in its second sense (i.e., as a kind of conventional punishment that may not be aimed at reforming the wrongdoer)⁸⁵.

On the other hand, the Athenian recognizes that there are curable criminals. The man of good character should also identify them and act accordingly, as he must understand that:

[...] no one will ever voluntarily accept the supreme evil into the most valuable part of himself and live with it throughout his life. No: in general, the unjust man deserves just as much pity (ἔλεεινός) as any other sufferer. And you may pity the criminal whose disease is curable, and restrain and abate your anger, instead of persisting in it with the spitefulness of a shrew; but when you have to deal with complete and unmanageably vicious corruption, you must let your anger off its leash. That is why we say that it must be the good man's duty to be high-spirited or gentle as circumstances require⁸⁶.

Here, as in *Gorgias*, the involuntariness of injustice is explained by the fact that it harms the wrongdoer – because no one would willingly pursue the most harmful of evils. In this way, as we already have seen, the appraisal of the magnitude of the harm is a prerequisite of pity. However, the Athenian adds another condition that was not explicitly present in Socrates'

⁸² Plato, *Gorgias* 525b-d.

⁸³ Plato, *Leges* 735b-c.

⁸⁴ Plato, *Leges* 735e.

⁸⁵ To some extent, Plato seems here to maintain the relationship between anger and vengeance common in ancient Greece. Aristotle will go further, as he says that “no one grows angry with a person on whom there is no prospect of taking vengeance” (*Rh.* II 1370b, 13). Cf. Konstan, *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks*, p. 56.

⁸⁶ Plato, *Leges* 731c, 1-d, 5.

call to pity in *Gorgias*, namely, that one “may pity the criminal whose disease is curable”. Just as in the case of rightful anger, the appropriateness of pity depends on the distinction between curable and incurable criminality. The basis for this distinction is the magnitude of the crimes committed⁸⁷ and not the state of the criminal’s soul⁸⁸. Indeed, the criminal’s well-being is not Plato’s sole preoccupation in *Laws*, where punishment should serve both as a reformatory medicine for the wrongdoer and, for the rest of the community, as a deterrent from wrongdoing. Therefore, to be consistent with the two aims of punishment, an appropriate or noble pity must be grounded on an appreciation of the criminal’s curability, which leads to proper reformatory action in the case of minor infractions while leaving space for anger and vengeance towards major criminals.

The characterization of anger and pity as alternative responses to wrongdoing, and the corresponding demand of a double disposition in good citizens, resembles Socrates’ explanation of the guardian’s character in Book II of *Republic*⁸⁹, where the guardian is compared to a dog that is gentle (πρᾶον) towards its own people and high-spirited (μεγαλόθυμον) towards its enemies. Given how Plato considers punishment both as instructional and purgative in *Laws*, we may think of the good citizen’s task as analogous to the guardian’s task in *Republic*. Incurable criminals would deserve forms of punishment appropriate to the treatment of enemies, while curable criminals would deserve forms of punishment that tend to preserve their membership in the community through education. As anger and pity help distinguish these two kinds of criminals, Plato seems to attribute to them a significant social function in the city.

Moreover, in *Republic*, Plato conceives of anger as an active agent in maintaining the soul’s harmony and upholding its natural order. To accomplish this psychological role, anger must be directed towards an appropriate object and must preserve the judgments of reason. In her article *Plato on the Role of Anger in Our Intellectual and Moral Development*, Marta Jimenez shows how we may understand this redirection of anger from an outward-looking retaliatory emotion to an inward-looking reformatory emotion. This change in anger’s object may occur through cross-examination, whereby the subject becomes angry at his own ignorance, or through a subject’s acknowledgment of the weakness of their own desires. Jimenez quotes Leontius’ case in *Republic IV* as an example of a redirec-

⁸⁷ Plato, *Leges* 735e, 3.

⁸⁸ Cf. Mackenzie, *Plato on Punishment*, p. 198.

⁸⁹ Plato, *Respublica* 375a-376c.

tion of anger⁹⁰; according to that story, Leontius gets angry with his own eyes insofar they embody his unruly desire to look at the corpses of dead criminals⁹¹. In the end, Leontius' anger fails in keeping his soul in order; however, Socrates tells us that this example “proves that anger (τὴν ὀργήν) sometimes makes war (πολεμεῖν) against the appetites, as one thing against another”⁹². By finding its appropriate object – which may be one's own passions or an incurable criminal – anger can become a powerful device capable of keeping the order of the soul in check⁹³. Something similar may happen with pity, which must likewise be redirected towards its appropriate object, the curable criminal, instead of being directed towards people suffering apparent misfortune. In this sense, a noble pity – akin to the noble anger – may also contribute to the harmony of the soul, just as pitying the wrong people may disrupt the soul's order by creating bad habits and reinforcing wrong beliefs.

Finally, anger also maintains the order of the soul by preserving the judgments of reason. Being justice-sensitive without being entirely rational makes anger an ally of reason (ξύμμαχον τῷ λόγῳ, *R.* 440b, 3). This alliance is possible because anger can uphold the instructions of reason through the sensations of pleasure and pain⁹⁴. It is not clear what the exact relationship between anger and pleasure and pain is, since Plato does not offer a thorough definition of anger. Nevertheless, the close relationship between anger and pity in Plato's philosophy (and in Greek thought in general) enables us to think that something analogous may happen when pity is appropriately felt⁹⁵. In such cases, pity towards the criminal would be

⁹⁰ Cf. M. Jimenez, *Plato on the Role of Anger in Our Intellectual and Moral Development*, in: *Emotions in Plato*, ed. L. Candioto – O. Renaut, Boston 2020, p. 303.

⁹¹ For a reading of this passage as Plato's rejection of the Athenian notion of anger, see Allen, *The World of Prometheus*, p. 251f.

⁹² Plato, *Republica* 440a, 7-8.

⁹³ Although Plato's description of anger in *Republic* occurs in the context of his tripartition of the soul, this partition need not be an obstacle for holding his remarks in *Gorgias* and *Laws*. In the former, we arguably find an antecedent of the partition, while in *Laws*, we find a laxer psychological model that maintains, to some extent, the *Republic's* partition. See L.A. Dorion, *Enkrateia and the partition of the soul in the Gorgias, Plato and the Divided Self*, Cambridge 2012; A.W. Price, *Emotions in Plato and Aristotle in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion*, Oxford 2009.

⁹⁴ Plato, *Republica* 442c.

⁹⁵ These suggestions are not exempt from difficulties. For instance, we may ask where pity would be allocated in the tripartition of *Republic*. It may also be contentious to assert that Plato's remarks in *Republic* about *thymós* hold for what he says in *Laws*

aligned with reason's demands, supporting them and serving as motivation to act justly, while avoiding ill-directed emotions such as envy towards the tyrant or retaliatory anger towards the criminal.

3. Conclusion

In this article, I have shown that Plato's apparent rejection of pity is, in fact, a rejection of ill-founded pity. In *Apology* and *Republic*, Socrates challenges common Athenian practices that elicit a pity based on false beliefs and that leads to harmful consequences, such as perjury or disgraceful lamenting. As Plato's critique is not directed at pity per se, however, we may see how he leaves open a space for this emotion in human life. The second section of this article showed how, in *Gorgias* and *Laws*, Plato conceives pity as the appropriate response towards someone whose soul has been damaged by injustice. This assessment of pity depends on Socrates' reappraisal of what can be considered serious harm and his reassessment of what would cure it. By proving above all that injustice is a harm for the wrongdoer and that punishment is a benefit, Socrates shows the proper object of pity: an unpunished criminal.

In *Laws*, Plato adds a further prerequisite for an appropriate pity: it should be directed towards someone curable. This belief depends on Plato's twofold notion of punishment as both reformative and a deterrent from wrongdoing. Indeed, in line with his account of the good citizen capable of bearing two apparently contrasting dispositions, there should be pity towards those who can be educated and anger towards those beyond cure. By postulating these emotions as alternative but equally appropriate ways of responding to injustice, Plato echoes a familiar opposition in

because, in the former, he speaks of *thymós* mostly *qua* part of the soul, while in the latter he speaks of it *qua* emotion. I do not have conclusive responses to these challenging objections; however, given the close interrelation between pity and anger, it would be sensible to think of pity as allocated in the same part of the soul as anger. Moreover, if we recognize the tripartite model of the soul as a metaphor for human mental and spiritual life, then we may think of *thymós*, not as a strictly discrete faculty or part of the soul, but as a way of speaking of an important aspect of human life, namely, that we feel emotions such as anger. In this reading, then, what Plato says about *thymós qua* part of the soul might hold for *thymós* understood as an emotion. Douglas Cairns defends this metaphorical reading of the tripartition. Thanks to David Konstan for raising these questions. Cf. D. Cairns, *Ψυχή, Θυμός, and Metaphor in Homer and Plato*, "Études platoniciennes" 11 (2014), in: <http://journals.openedition.org/etudesplatoniciennes/566> (access: 15.03.2022).

Greek culture and suggests a possible way of understanding this desirable pity, taking anger as a model. In helping determine who is to be punished and in maintaining the order of the soul, pity can play a significant social and psychological role in human life⁹⁶.

A Noble Pity: ἔλεος in Plato's Philosophy

(summary)

This article examines Plato's remarks on compassion to show that his apparent rejection of this emotion is, in fact, a rejection of a kind of ill-founded compassion. In the first section, I argue that his criticisms in the *Apology* and the *Republic* are not directed to compassion per se, but to instances in which this emotion betrays false beliefs and is felt in improper contexts. Thus, Plato's criticisms leave room for an appropriate type of pity that should be grounded on true beliefs about harm, virtue, and justice. In the second section, I address Plato's remarks on compassion in the *Gorgias* and the *Laws*, where he asserts that it should be felt towards the unpunished wrongdoer. I argue that such a disposition to feel compassion appropriately—which I have called a “noble compassion”, akin to the “noble anger” (θυμός γενναῖος) present in the *Laws*—is an important feature of the character of an ideal citizen. Thus, for Plato, compassion could contribute to psychological well-being and social order. By inspecting the cognitive and contextual conditions that enable a noble compassion in Platonic philosophy, this article aims to contribute to the study of a crucial emotion both in Greek and Christian philosophy.

Keywords: compassion; anger; belief; Plato

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Benedetto Neola¹

‘Upper’ Mereology of Human Soul and Salvation according to Hermias of Alexandria

1. Introduction

In this paper, I will try to foreground Hermias of Alexandria’s doctrine of the human soul by showing how the Neoplatonist managed to elicit his tenets from the exegesis of Plato’s *Phaedrus*. I will focus particularly on Hermias’ mereology of the soul with reference to the three highest components of the human soul (*i.e.*, discursive thought, intellectual disposition, and the one) to assess to what extent the theorization concerning these aspects lays the groundwork for the doctrine of salvation, which can be fairly labeled as Neoplatonic ethics and hence has a bearing on practical life. This survey will thus not only shed light on Neoplatonic psychology, ontology, and ethics, but also unveil some important exegetical strategies implemented by later Neoplatonists to expand upon Plato’s arguments on the immortality of the soul. After delving into Hermias’ θεωρία, in the final *Appendix* I will briefly set out to make the case that the theoretical construction on the upper mereology of the human soul had a significant bearing on Hermias’ practical life as well, notably when it came to coping with the loss of his beloved ones and to facing his own death. Therefore, in seeing how θεωρία and πράξις were closely intertwined, it will become clear that the philosophical exegesis of texts is not to be conceived of as

¹ Benedetto Neola, PhD holder, University of Salerno (Salerno, Italy) and Sorbonne Université (Paris, France), Alexander von Humboldt Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Philosophische Fakultät (Georg-August-Universität Göttingen); e-mail: benedetto.neola05@gmail.com; ORCID: 0000-0003-1692-4972.

a mere erudite effort, but instead as a salient aspect, charged with meaning, of late antique intellectuals' ordinary life.

2. Hermias of Alexandria and the Human Soul

Hermias of Alexandria (c. 410-455 AD) was a Neoplatonic philosopher who studied, first, in Athens in the Academy held by Syrianus and along with Proclus, and then held himself courses of Platonic philosophy in his hometown, Alexandria of Egypt, between around 435-455 AD². For his teaching, he was also granted a public remuneration from the city, called δημοσία σίτησις³. Upon his premature death, his wife, Aedesia, a relative of Syrianus, was allowed to retain the remuneration to see to it that their sons, Ammonius and Heliodorus, were trained in philosophy so as to inherit the ἐπιστήμη of their father. Therefore, they studied philosophy in Athens under Proclus, and Ammonius, once he returned in Alexandria, became professor of philosophy⁴.

The manuscript tradition attributes to Hermias the only ancient commentary on Plato's *Phaedrus* that has been handed down to us, namely the Εἰς τὸν Πλάτωνος Φαῖδρον Σχόλια⁵. This commentary is divided in three

² Cf. Damascius, *Vita Isidori* 54-56 Athanassiadi. For a general account of his figure cf. R. Goulet, *Hermeias d'Alexandrie*, Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, v. 3, Paris 2000, p. 639-641; M. Perkams, *Hermeias von Alexandrien*, in: *Die Philosophie der Antike 5. Philosophie der Kaiserzeit und Spätantike (Ueberweg)*, ed. Ch. Riedweg – Ch. Horn – D. Wyrwa, Basel 2018, p. 148-150.

³ Cf. Damascius, *Vita Isidori* 56. On the exact nature of this remuneration cf. C. Haas, *Alexandria in Late Antiquity. Topography and Social Conflict*, Baltimore 1997, p. 153; P. Athanassiadi, *Damascius. The Philosophical History. Text with Translation and Notes by Polymnia Athanassiadi*, Athens 1999, p. 157; Goulet, *Hermeias d'Alexandrie*, p. 639.

⁴ Cf. Damascius, *Vita Isidori* 56.

⁵ As a matter of fact, the *communis opinio* holds that the real author of the *Commentary* is Syrianus, Hermias' master. In other words, the *Commentary* would fall under the category of the commentaries ἀπὸ τῆς φωνῆς, that is, coming from the voice of a master and, in Hermias' case, from the voice of Syrianus (on the genre of the commentaries ἀπὸ τῆς φωνῆς, see the still fundamental, yet seminal work of M. Richard, *Ἀπὸ φωνῆς*, "Byzantion" 20 (1950) p. 191-222). Hence, when he was Syrianus' student, Hermias would have written down the lectures on the *Phaedrus* that Syrianus gave in Athens: cf., e.g., C.-P. Manolea, *The Homeric Tradition in Syrianus*, Ant. Stamoulis 2004. The discussion of authorship issue is beyond the scope of this article. However, it seems to me that we should at least take into serious consideration the objections against the *vulgata* put forth by, e.g., M.W. Dickie, *Hermeias on Plato Phaedrus 238d and Synesius*

extensive books and covers the whole of Plato's dialogue⁶. It is a lemmatic commentary and, as such, it deals with individual words and phrases line by line, putting forth either extensive or very brief exegesis. In some cases, Hermias makes salient digressions on specific topics, such as the digression on demonology⁷, and that on contaminations and purifications⁸. Precisely because it is not a philosophical treatise, Hermias' *Commentary* provides insights into almost every aspect of Neoplatonic philosophy, from the doctrine of the soul to ritual thought, from epistemology to mythology, and so on⁹. Moreover, being the only extant ancient commentary on Plato's *Phaedrus*, it is thanks to this text alone that we can try to understand how the Neoplatonists approached the dialogue and how they managed to elicit

Dion 14.2, "The American Journal of Philology" 114/3 (1993) p. 421-440; H. Bernard, *Hermeias von Alexandrien, Kommentar zu Platons Phaidros. Übersetzt und eingeleitet von Hildegund Bernard*, Tübingen 1997; C. Moreschini, *Alla scuola di Siriano: Ermia nella storia del Neoplatonismo*, in: *Syrianus et la Métaphysique de l'Antiquité Tardive. Actes du Colloque International, Université de Genève, 29 septembre - 1^{er} octobre 2006*, ed. A. Longo, Napoli 2009, p. 515-578; S. Fortier, *The Nature of the Scholia on Plato's Phaedrus*, "Phronesis" 63 (2018) p. 449-476.

⁶ The *Commentary* was first edited by Friedrich Ast in 1810, then by Paul Couvreur in 1902, and finally by Carlo Martino Lucarini and Claudio Moreschini in 2012: all the passages that I am going to quote come from this latter edition (cf. C.M. Lucarini – C. Moreschini, *Hermias Alexandrinus. In Platonis Phaedrum Scholia. Ediderunt Carlo M. Lucarini et Claudio Moreschini*, Berlin – Boston 2012). Hildegund Bernard has provided the only translation into a modern language of the entire *Commentary*, to date (cf. H. Bernard, *Hermeias von Alexandrien*). Also, Dirk Baltzly and Michael Share have published the English translation of Book I (cf. D. Baltzly – M. Share, *Hermias. On Plato Phaedrus 227A-245E*, tr. D. Baltzly – M. Share, London 2018). However, they will publish soon the English translation of Books II and III as well. In addition, N. D'Andrès, *Socrate néoplatonicien. Une science de l'amour dans le commentaire de Proclus sur le Premier Alcibiade*, Paris 2020, p. 236-257, has recently provided in an Annex the first French translation of several passages from the *Commentary*.

⁷ Cf. Hermias Alexandrinus, *In Phaedrum* 70, 3-74, 16 Lucarini-Moreschini, on which cf. C. Moreschini, *Alla scuola di Siriano*, p. 549-552; C. Moreschini, *Gods and Demons according to Hermias*, in: *Studies in Hermias' Commentary on Plato's Phaedrus*, ed. J. Finamore – C.-P. Manolea – S. Klitenic Wear, Leiden – Boston 2020, p. 151-168.

⁸ Cf. Hermias Alexandrinus, *In Phaedrum* 78, 26-79, 34.

⁹ Finamore, Manolea, and Klitenic Wear have recently published the first volume entirely dedicated to the contents of Hermias' *Commentary*, notwithstanding the problem of its authorship: cf. *Studies in Hermias' Commentary on Plato's Phaedrus*, ed. J. Finamore – C.-P. Manolea – S. Klitenic Wear, Leiden – Boston 2020. For an in-depth study of Hermias' Platonism, see B. Neola, *Il Platonismo di Ermia di Alessandria. Uno studio sugli in Platonis Phaedrum Scholia. Prefazione di Claudio Moreschini*, Napoli 2022.

from it their theological and philosophical tenets¹⁰. Nonetheless, we are not dealing with a systematic treatise. Hermias' work has nothing to do with Proclus' *Platonic Theology* or *Elements of Theology* (συγγράμματα or πραγματεία). As a lemmatic commentary (σχόλια as ὑπόμνημα), Hermias' text provides a brief exegesis of the Platonic passages and, as such, represents our most complete and extensive source for understanding the spirit with which Platonic philosophers of the 4th–6th century AD approached this text¹¹.

We can elicit from Hermias' *Commentary* a precise and elaborate doctrine of the human soul as a whole¹². However, in what follows, I will limit

¹⁰ It seems that Proclus as well composed a *Commentary on the Phaedrus*, perhaps even a *Commentary on Socrates' palinode* in the *Phaedrus*. Although these works did not survive, Proclus' treatment of Socrates' palinode can still be reconstructed thanks to Book IV of Proclus' *Platonic Theology*, for the Diadochus elaborated on the *Phaedrus*' central myth to construct the doctrine of the intelligible-intellective gods. On Proclus' lost commentaries on the *Phaedrus* cf. H.D. Saffrey – L.G. Westerink, *Proclus. Théologie platonicienne. Livre IV*, Paris 2003, p. XXXVIII-XXXIX; D.P. Taormina, *I limiti dell'umano. Proclo lettore della Palinodia del Fedro*, in: λόγον διδόναι. *La filosofia come esercizio del render ragione. Studi in onore di Giovanni Casertano*, ed. L. Palumbo, Napoli 2012, p. 865-878; M. Rashed, *L'héritage aristotélicien. Textes inédits de l'Antiquité. Nouvelle édition revue et augmentée*, Paris 2016, p. 473-561.

¹¹ On the possible equivalence between σχόλια and ὑπόμνημα, as well as on the various types of commentaries in Antiquity, cf. A.-J. Festugière, *Modes de composition des Commentaires de Proclus*, "Museum Helveticum" 20/2 (1963) p. 77-100; P. Donini, *Le scuole, l'anima, l'impero: la filosofia antica da Antioco a Plotino*, Torino 1982; J. Mansfeld, *Prolegomena. Questions to be Settled Before the Study of an Author, or a Text*, Leiden – New-York – Köln 1994; I. Sluiter, *The Dialectics of Genre: Some Aspects of Secondary Literature and Genre in Antiquity*, in: *Matrices of Genre. Authors, Canons, and Society*, ed. M. Depew – D. Obbink, Cambridge – London 2000, p. 183-204; H. Baltussen, *Aristotelian Commentary Tradition*, in: *The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism*, ed. P. Remes – S. Slaveva-Griffin, London – New York 2014, p. 106-114; L. Cardullo, *Conservare e tramandare la storia di una tradizione: il commentario filosofico antico*, in: *Il valore e la virtù. Studi in onore di Silvana Raffaele*, ed. E. Frasca, Acireale – Roma 2019, p. 1-10; Neola, *Il Platonismo di Ermia di Alessandria*, p. 76-80.

¹² Some aspects of Hermias' doctrine of the soul have been explored by C. Moreschini, *Alla scuola di Siriano*; A. Longo, *La réécriture analytico-syllogistique d'un argument platonicien en faveur de l'immortalité de l'âme (Plat. Phaedr. 245c5-246a2). Alcinoos, Alexandre d'Aphrodise, Hermias d'Alexandrie*, "Philosophie antique" 9 (2009) p. 145-164; A. Longo, *What Is the Principle of Movement, the Self-moved (Plato) or the Unmoved (Aristotle)? The Exegetic Strategies of Hermias of Alexandria and Simplicius in Late Antiquity*, in: *Studies in Hermias' Commentary on Plato's Phaedrus*, ed. J. Finamore – C.-P. Manolea – S. Klitenic Wear, Leiden – Boston 2020, p. 115-141;

myself to reconstructing what may be described as the ‘upper’ mereology of the human soul, to the extent that it significantly bears on the Neoplatonic ethics of salvation. It is commonly held that Plato’s *obscuritas* in the *Phaedrus* aroused and still arouses major philosophical concerns among both ancient and modern interpreters, from several different perspectives. As far as the doctrine of the soul is concerned, known as Socrates’ palinode, it is namely the central myth of the dialogue, representing the human soul as a winged chariot striving to reach the Plain of the Truth¹³. Indeed, it lends itself to profoundly different readings, from the problematic correspondence between chariot (ὑπόπτερος ζευγος/πτηνὸν ἄρμα/ὄχημα), horses (ἵπποι), and charioteer (ἡνίοχος/κυβερνήτης) and the parts of the human soul to the consistency of this depiction with significantly distinct accounts of the human soul found in other Platonic dialogues (mostly the *Phaedo*, *Republic*, and *Timaeus*). Also, the allegedly rational ἀπόδειξις that precedes the myth and sets out the immortality of the soul upon consideration of its self-motion turns out to be likewise puzzling on account of both its *incipit* (ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος) and *desinit* (ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀγένητόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον ψυχὴ ἂν εἴη), not to mention the arguably scientific unfolding of the λόγος itself¹⁴. While a comprehensive survey of the ancient reception of these *Phaedrus* passages evades the scope of the present discussion¹⁵, it is

J. Finamore, *Hermias and the Soul’s Pilot*, in: *Defining Platonism. Essays in Honor of the 75th Birthday of John M. Dillon*, ed. J. Finamore – S. Klitenic Wear, Steubenville 2017, p. 228-237; J. Finamore, *The “Second Trace of Life”: Hermias and the Irrational Soul*, in: *Platonic Inquiries. Selected Papers from the Thirteenth Annual Conference of the International Society for Neoplatonic Studies*, ed. C. D’Amico – J. Finamore – N. Strok, Prometheus Trust 2017, p. 187-198; J. Finamore, *Hermias on the Vehicle of the Soul*, in: *Platonic Interpretations. Selected Papers from the Sixteenth Annual Conference of the International Society for Neoplatonic Studies*, ed. J. Finamore – E.D. Perl, Lydney 2019, p. 109-123; J. Finamore, *Hermias and the Ensoulment of the Pneuma*, in: *Studies in Hermias’ Commentary on Plato’s Phaedrus*, ed. J. Finamore – C.-P. Manolea – S. Klitenic Wear, Leiden – Boston 2020, p. 35-49; S. Fortier, *The Nature of the Scholia on Plato’s Phaedrus*; S. Klitenic Wear, *Hermias on the Activities of the Soul: A Commentary on Hermias, In Phdr. 135.14 – 138.9*, in: *Studies in Hermias’ Commentary on Plato’s Phaedrus*, ed. J. Finamore – C.-P. Manolea – S. Klitenic Wear, Leiden – Boston 2020, p. 100-114; B. Neola, *Sulla gnoseologia neoplatonica: ovvero sull’integrazione dell’articolazione stoica e dell’universale aristotelico*, “Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica” 113/2 (2021) p. 475-484; Neola, *Il Platonismo di Ermia di Alessandria*.

¹³ Cf. Plato, *Phaedrus* 246a3-257b6.

¹⁴ Cf. Plato, *Phaedrus* 245c5-246a2.

¹⁵ For in-depth discussions of the *Phaedrus*’ reception in Antiquity, see, e.g., A. Bielmeier, *Die neuplatonische Phaidrosinterpretation*, Padeborn 1930; C. Moreschini,

of great interest to focus on Hermias' exegesis to the extent that it best typifies the Neoplatonic approach to those issues and betrays the inner connection that, according to later Neoplatonists, Plato would have enigmatically established between ontology and ethics.

Hermias is adamant that the human soul is a substance which does not need an earthly body to exist. On the contrary, when the soul is separated from the earthly body, it regains its authentic condition. Commenting on the supposed ignorance that Socrates attributes to himself in the *Phaedrus*¹⁶, Hermias explains that what Socrates ignores is himself *as* pure and absolute soul (ὡς αὐτοψυχὴ καθαρὰ) since he is still in a body, whilst he already knows himself *as* embodied soul (ὡς ἐν σώματι)¹⁷. When the soul descends into the sensible real, it becomes weaker in that it participates in increasing multiplicity¹⁸. Hermias plainly holds that the soul derives its existence (ὑφεστάναι)¹⁹ from three different principles (ἀρχαί): the divine, the intellect, and the soul itself. This multilayered ontological derivation

Elementi dell'esegesi del Fedro nella tarda antichità, in: *Understanding the Phaedrus. Proceedings of the II Symposium Platonicum*, ed. L. Rossetti, Sankt Augustin 1992, p. 191-205; H.D. Saffrey – L.G. Westerink, *Proclus. Théologie platonicienne*, p. IX-XLV; U. Criscuolo, *Esegesi della 'biga' di Fedro 246a ss. fra medio e neoplatonismo*, in: *L'ultima parola. L'analisi dei testi: teorie e pratiche nell'antichità greca e latina. Atti del terzo Colloquio italo-francese coordinato da Luigi Spina e Laurent Pernot*, ed. G. Abbamonte – F. Conti Bizzarro – L. Spina, Napoli 2003, p. 85-104; R. Brouwer, *Hellenistic philosophers on Phaedrus 229b-30a*, "Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society" 235 (2008) p. 30-48; C. Moreschini, *Plato's Phaedrus in Middle-Platonism: Some Interpretations*, "Revue de philosophie ancienne" 38 (2020) p. 93-105.

¹⁶ Cf. Plato, *Phaedrus* 229e5-230a1: "I am still unable, as the Delphic inscription orders, to know myself [οὐ δύναμαι πῶ κατὰ τὸ Δελφικὸν γράμμα γνῶναι ἑμαυτόν]; and it really seems to me ridiculous to look into other things before I have understood that" (tr. A. Nehamas – P. Woodruff, *Plato. Phaedrus*, in: *Plato. Complete Works*, ed. J.M. Cooper, Indianapolis – Cambridge 1997).

¹⁷ Cf. Hermias Alexandrinus, *In Phaedrum* 33, 14-17.

¹⁸ Cf. Hermias Alexandrinus, *In Phaedrum* 67, 26-31: "Because of this it was his habit [Socrates' habit] to lead the young to the recollection of the universal by induction and by particular [examples] since the soul, having dropped out of the shared revolution of the gods and been confined to generation and become as it were cut off and individual [ἀποστενωθεῖσα ἐν τῇ γενέσει, καὶ οἷον ἀποτεμαχισθεῖσα καὶ ἄτομος γενομένη διὰ τῶν μερικῶν καὶ οἰκείων ἑαυτῆ] is then wont to recollect" (tr. D. Baltzly – M. Share, *Hermias*).

¹⁹ Elsewhere in the *Commentary*, Hermias implies a difference between εἶναι and ὑφεστάναι. While εἶναι should be taken to refer to the ontic structure of a thing, ὑφεστάναι should refer to the actual existence of that thing: cf. Hermias Alexandrinus, *In Phaedrum* 142, 32-33.

accounts for the presence within the soul of three different components, namely the one (ἓν), the intellective disposition (τὸ νοερόν), and the discursive thought (διάνοια), which constitutes the soul's *ιδίωμα*²⁰. This ontic structure heavily determines the salvation path that all soul is supposed to pursue during its hearty stay.

Originally and at first the soul was united with the gods (Ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν οὖν καὶ πρῶτον ἦνωτο τοῖς θεοῖς ἢ ψυχῇ) and that 'one' of its was joined to the gods (τὸ ἐν αὐτῆς ἐκεῖνο συνῆπτο τοῖς θεοῖς). Then, withdrawing from that divine union, it descended to intellect (Ἐἶτα ἀποστᾶσα ταύτης τῆς θείας ἐνώσεως κατῆλθεν εἰς νοῦν) and no longer possessed [all] there is in a unified manner and in one but gazed upon it and saw it by means of simple apprehensions and, as it were, direct contacts [on the part] of its intellect. Then, withdrawing from intellect too and descending to reasoning and discursive thought (Ἐπειτα καὶ τοῦ νοῦ ἀποστᾶσα καὶ εἰς λογισμὸν καὶ διάνοιαν κατελθοῦσα), it no longer gazed upon it by means of simple apprehensions either, but by moving syllogistically and step by step and one thing after another from premises to conclusions. Then, departing too from pure reasoning and the psychic mode (Ἐπειτα καὶ τοῦ καθαροῦ λογισμοῦ ἀποστᾶσα καὶ τοῦ ψυχικοῦ ιδιώματος), it descended into generation and was infected with great irrationality and confusion. It must, then, return once more to its own origins and go back once more to the place whence it descended (Δεῖ οὖν αὐτὴν πάλιν ἐπὶ τὰς οἰκείας ἀρχὰς ἀναδραμεῖν, καὶ ὅθεν κατῆλθεν ἐκεῖ πάλιν ἀνελθεῖν) and in this ascend and restoration there four types of madness assist it²¹.

It should not escape our notice that the formula δεῖ οὖν [...] πάλιν, nearly at the end of the text, is quite salient in that it links the ontology to the Neoplatonic *deontological* ethics. In other words, Hermias says that precisely because the human soul has the above-mentioned ontic structure, deriving its being, as it is, from the divine, from the intellect, and from itself, *as a result*, the human soul must then (δεῖ) endeavor to come back where it belongs. We, human beings, ought to deliver ourselves from the

²⁰ Cf. Hermias Alexandrinus, *In Phaedrum* 89, 1-14. As we shall see, the intellectual disposition is actually the highest part of the *διάνοια*: cf. Hermias Alexandrinus, *In Phaedrum* 88, 23-26. The soul derives its being partly from itself in the sense that it can be its own cause of well-being (εἶ εἶναι). But the εἶ εἶναι is *ipso facto* superior to the simple εἶναι. Thus, if the soul can provide itself with well-being, all the more so it must grant itself the simpler being: cf. Hermias Alexandrinus, *In Phaedrum* 89, 10-14.

²¹ Hermias Alexandrinus, *In Phaedrum* 93, 18-30.

sensible dimension in virtue of the ontic structure of the soul which ensouls us. Secondly, it is worth stressing the importance of the last sentence in the cited passage, according to which the four madnesses described in the *Phaedrus*²² would illustrate the path to be pursued in order to return to the origin of the soul, that is, the divine. Thus, in the eyes of Hermias, it is Plato himself the one who has handed down, however enigmatically, the salvific path implied by such as psychological and ontological structure²³. First and foremost, Plato enigmatically revealed that the human soul possesses within itself something which is not psychic strictly speaking, something which does not belong to the psychic mode of existence. From Iamblichus onwards, this component is called the one of the soul²⁴ and could be conceived of as a divine fragment within the human soul. Following in Iamblichus' footsteps, Hermias draws a sharp distinction between two figures that in Socrates' palinode represent the same thing, *i.e.*, the intellect, and holds that, while the charioteer of the winged chariot (ἡνίοχος)²⁵ stands for the soul's intellect, the steersman of the chariot (κυβερνήτης)²⁶ represents the one of the soul instead²⁷. Iamblichus himself defined the latter as θεῖα ψυχή

²² Cf. Plato, *Phaedrus* 244a3-245c4 (mantic, telestic, poetic, and erotic madnesses).

²³ In Hermias' view, Orpheus is the paradigmatic example of a soul who pursued this path by participating in all four madnesses: cf. Hermias Alexandrinus, *In Phaedrum* 92, 28-93, 8.

²⁴ Or the ἄνθος, the flower, of the soul, in keeping with the Chaldean vocabulary: cf. Proclus, *Theologia Platonica* 1, 3, p. 6, 1-6. The one of the soul is further labeled as the ὑπαρξίς of the soul, meaning an ancestral principle within the soul: cf. Hermias Alexandrinus, *In Phaedrum* 158, 31-159, 1, on which see B. Neola, *Il Platonismo di Ermia di Alessandria*, p. 122-144. On the term ὑπαρξίς in Proclus, see C. Steel, "ΥΠΑΡΞΙΣ chez Proclus, in: *Hyparxis e hypostasis nel Neoplatonismo. Atti del I Colloquio Internazionale del Centro di Ricerca sul Neoplatonismo*, ed. F. Romano – D.P. Taormina, Firenze 1994, p. 79-100.

²⁵ Cf. Plato, *Phaedrus* 248a1-4: "As for the other souls, one that follows a god most closely, making itself most like that god, raises of its charioteer up to the place outside and is carried around in the circular motion with the others" (tr. A. Nehamas – P. Woodruff, *Plato. Phaedrus*).

²⁶ Cf. Plato, *Phaedrus* 247c6-d1: "What is in this place is without color and without shape and without solidity, a being that really is what it is, the subject of all true knowledge, visible only to intelligence, the soul's steersman" (tr. A. Nehamas – P. Woodruff, *Plato. Phaedrus*).

²⁷ Cf. Hermias Alexandrinus, *In Phaedrum* 157, 7-16; 158, 24-159, 1; Iamblichus, *In Phaedrum* frg. 6. Cf. Bernard, *Hermeias von Alexandrien*, p. 13-19; Moreschini, *Alla scuola di Siriano*, p. 520-521; B. Neola, *L' "uno" e l' "intelletto" dell' anima umana: ricezioni neoplatoniche del Fedro di Platone*, "Methexis" 33/1 (2021b) p. 197-222.

and held it as the only means to attain the θεοκρασία, the union with the gods²⁸. The epistrophic process of the human soul thus consists in a progressive identification of the soul with a specific component within itself, culminating in the unification with its one whereby to attain the union with the one of the gods. The ultimate goal is granted by the ontic structure of the soul, whose components correspond to the different levels of being (divine being/one, intellective being/intellect, and strictly psychic being/discursive thought) and could thus be viewed as the soul's anchorages in the axiologically different τάξεις of being. Of course, it is up to the human soul whether or not to unify with the highest part within itself and therefore with the highest class within the being. No part within the soul is constantly actualized but stands as a sheer potentiality.

This holds particularly true for the human intellect (*i.e.*, the charioteer/ἡνίοχος) and accounts for the fact that Iamblichus and later Neoplatonists, including Hermias, reprimanded Plotinus' so-called undescended soul theory²⁹. The human soul cannot possibly possess a part always contemplating the intelligible without being conscious of it. Otherwise, all human being would always be happy. Plotinus mistakenly ascribed to the human soul the perpetual intellection proper to the hypostatic Intellect. Moreover, he unduly overlooked the existence of an entire πλῆθος of intellects moving from the hypostatic, divine Intellect to the erratic, feeble human intellect³⁰, and thereby put the undescended part of the human soul (τι ἀντῆς) in direct contact with the noetic realm (ἐν τῷ νοητῷ αἰεὶ)³¹, thus ultimately identifying with one another two utterly dis-

²⁸ Cf. Iamblichus, *Vita Pythagorica* 33, 240, 6-9; Iamblichus, *De mysteriis* 8, 7, p. 270, 2-7. On the one of the soul, see, at least, G. Shaw, *Containing Ecstasy: The Strategies of Iamblichean Theurgy*, "Dionysius" 21 (2003) p. 53-88.

²⁹ Cf. Proclus, *In Timaeum* 3, 334, 10-27 (= Iamblichus, *In Timaeum* frg. 87); Hermias Alexandrinus, *In Phaedrum* 167, 3-6. On the contrast between Plotinus' and later Neoplatonists' views on the human soul cf. J. Rist, *Integration and the Undescended Soul in Plotinus*, "The American Journal of Philology" 88/4 (1967) p. 410-422; C. Steel, *The Changing Self. A study on the Soul in Later Neoplatonism; Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus*, Bruxelles 1978; H.J. Blumenthal, *The Psychology of Plotinus and Later Platonism*, in: *The Perennial Tradition of Neoplatonism*, ed. J.J. Cleary, Leuven 1997, p. 269-290; R.M. Van den Berg, *Proclus and the Myth of the Charioteer*, "Syllecta Classica" 8 (1997) p. 149-162; A. Longo, *Note sulla dottrina plotiniana dell'anima non discesa*, in: *Quid est veritas? Hommage à Jonathan Barnes*, ed. M. Bonelli – A. Longo, Napoli 2010, p. 219-231.

³⁰ Cf. Proclus, *Elementatio Theologica* 166, 4.

³¹ Cf. Plotinus, *Enneades* 4, 8 [10], 8, 2-3; 4, 1 [4], 1, 12-13.

tinct intellectual principles. Instead, the human soul is endowed with an intellectual disposition (διάθεσις) to actualize. Hermias further confirms this by saying that the apex of the human soul is the intellectual soul or, to take up the Aristotelian vocabulary, the δυνάμει νοῦς³². Hermias' τὸ νοερόν is tantamount to Iamblichus' κατὰ νοῦν διάθεσις³³ and Proclus' λόγος νοοειδής³⁴ in the sense that we are not dealing with an always-contemplating part within the human soul (such as the undescended soul in Plotinus), but with a mere potentiality and disposition to actualize. However, even when a human soul does indeed succeed in activating its intellectual substratum, it does not share in the purest intellectual apprehension proper to the divine Intellect, but rather partakes, in an ultimately discursive manner, in the intellectual light of the particular intellect, namely the last substantial instantiation of the unparticipated Intellect³⁵.

Following the same line of thought, the one within the human soul (*i.e.*, the steersman/κυβερνήτης) must be awakened in order to unite with the gods or, perhaps better, human beings must be awakened in order to perceive the union of the one within themselves with the gods³⁶. This could be attained

³² Cf. Hermias Alexandrinus, *In Phaedrum* 88, 24-26.

³³ Cf. Iamblichus, *De anima* 51.

³⁴ Cf. Proclus, *In Timaeum* 1, 245, 13-25.

³⁵ S. Fortier, *Proclus on the Climax of the Phaedrus (247c6–d1)*, in: *The Reception of Plato's Phaedrus from Antiquity to the Renaissance*, ed. S. Delcomminette – P. d'Houine – M.-A. Gavray, Berlin – Boston 2020, p. 199-218, clearly argued that our soul is capable of intellection insofar as, after a process of purification, it can receive the light of a particular intellect (μερικὸς νοῦς) and thus render its own λόγος νοοειδής. This would be the meaning of *Timaeus* 27d6-28a4, where we are told that the intelligible is grasped by the νόησις along with the λογισμός, and of *Phaedrus* 247c6-d1, where Socrates states that the real being can be grasped exclusively by the νοῦς and is the object of the ἐπιστήμη. The intelligible is seized by the particular intellect alone, with which our intellectual disposition can unite, thus sharing in its intellectual insight. However, the fact that Hermias and Proclus conceived of our intellectual disposition in the same terms does not also mean that they shared the same interpretation of *Phaedrus* 247c6-d1: cf. Bernard, *Hermeias von Alexandrien*; Moerschini, *Alla scuola di Siriano*; Fortier, *The Nature of the Scholia on Plato's Phaedrus*; Neola, *L'“uno” e l'“intelletto” dell'anima umana. On human intellect according to later Neoplatonists*, see also D.G. MacIsaac, 'The Nous of the Partial Soul in Proclus'. *Commentary on the First Alcibiades of Plato, “Dionysius”* 29 (2011) p. 29-60.

³⁶ Unfortunately, our human soul οὐκ ἀεὶ ἐνθουσιᾷ: cf. Hermias Alexandrinus, *In Phaedrum* 90, 17 (see C.-P. Manolea, *Possessed and Inspired: Hermias on Divine Madness*, “The International Journal of the Platonic Tradition” 7 (2013) p. 156-179, as to why the soul cannot possibly always experience such a divine state).

only if the soul manages to purify its luminous vehicle (ἀύγοειδὲς ὄχημα). Also elaborating on the mysterious ὄχημα of the soul in the *Phaedrus*³⁷, later Neoplatonists hold that the human soul ensouls three different bodies or vehicles: the luminous vehicle, the pneumatic vehicle, and the earthly body³⁸. Expect for the luminous vehicle which eternally belongs to the soul, the pneumatic vehicle and the earthly body are taken up by the soul during its descent into the sensible realm. The pneumatic vehicle is composed of the cosmic elements and its presence is a *condicio sine qua non* for receiving the irrational life afterwards. Hermias likens those elements to chitons that the soul wears during the descent³⁹. Finally, the earthly body is taken up on earth, in keeping with what Plato imparted in the *Phaedrus*⁴⁰. Upon death, the soul leaves the body and the pneumatic vehicle behind while ascending to the intelligible and keeps the luminous vehicle alone. The luminous vehicle is the ungenerated and immortal receptacle⁴¹ of the divine illuminations or the divine breath, as it is endowed with a sublime αἴσθησις enabling it to perceive the divine emanations⁴². Even if the gods, ἀὐτῶ τῶ εἶναι, constantly irradiate τὰ δεύτερα, human souls are not always able to perceive that light. They are illuminated without being aware of it⁴³. Purification through philosophy and performance of rituals⁴⁴ may deliver the soul of all sensible accretions and activate in due succession the intel-

³⁷ Cf. Plato, *Phaedrus* 247b1-2.

³⁸ On the doctrine of the soul's vehicles cf. J. Trouillard, *L'Un et l'âme selon Proclus*, Paris 1972; J. Finamore, *Iamblichus and the Theory of the Vehicle of the Soul*, American Classical Studies 14, Chico 1985; Finamore, *Hermias and the Ensoulment*.

³⁹ Cf. Hermias Alexandrinus, *In Phaedrum* 201, 24-26.

⁴⁰ Cf. Plato, *Phaedrus* 246c2-6: "but a soul that sheds its wings wanders until it lights on something solid [στερεοῦ τινοῦ], where it settles and takes on an earthly body [σῶμα γήινον], which, then, owing to the power of this soul, seems to move itself".

⁴¹ Cf. Proclus, *Elementatio Theologica* 196.

⁴² Cf. Hermias Alexandrinus, *In Phaedrum* 77, 22-25.

⁴³ Cf. what Proclus, *De decem dubitationes circa providentiam* 3, 16, 24-28 says in discussing the relationship between human beings and divine providence: "Just like someone sleeping in the light of the sun may because of his sleep not be aware of being illuminated, but on waking up would see himself bathe in light. Such a person might then think that the light is present, and is present to him for the first time, although it was he who was not present to the light, because of his ignorance" (tr. J. Opsomer – C. Steel, *Proclus: Ten Problems Concerning Providence*, London – New Delhi – New York – Sydney 2012).

⁴⁴ On the *continuum* between philosophy and rituality, see C. Addey, *Divination and Theurgy in Neoplatonism. Oracles of the Gods*, London – New York 2014.

lectual disposition and, then, the one of the soul by purifying its luminous vehicle⁴⁵. This is the path towards the ἔνωσις τοῖς θεοῖς⁴⁶.

However, behind all these considerations lays the fundamental assumption that the soul or, more precisely, the rational soul is immortal, in keeping, once again, with what Plato imparted in the dialogues and notably in the *Phaedrus*⁴⁷. As I mentioned, in this latter dialogue, Plato momentarily argued for the immortality of the soul on the basis of its alleged self-motion. Hermias firmly believed that the *Phaedrus* proof was the demonstration *par excellence* of the immortality of the soul: οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ οὕτω δυσχυρίσατο ὡς ἐνταῦθα τῇ ἀθανασίᾳ τῆς ψυχῆς⁴⁸. Drawing on the lost *Commentary on the Phaedrus* by Proclus, John Philoponus tells us the reason as to why this proof had a *place de choix* among later Neoplatonists. While the *Phaedo* elicits the immortality of the soul from the soul's ἐνέργειαι, the *Phaedrus* proves its immortality upon consideration of the soul's οὐσία, namely the self-motion (αὐτοκινησία)⁴⁹. Rivers of ink have flowed over the proof of the immortality of the soul in *Phaedr.* 245c5-246a2⁵⁰. In addition to the issue of the alleged inconsistency of Socrates' arguments, the initial statement, namely ψυχή πᾶσα ἀθάνατος, still raises a host of questions as to how we should interpret the phrase ψυχή πᾶσα. Hermias already testifies for the existence of several different interpretations of this sentence. For instance, he reports that, according to the Stoic Posidonius, Plato would have meant the soul of the cosmos. Also, Hermias blames the Middle-Platonist Harpocration on the ground that he would have mistakenly taken the phrase

⁴⁵ On the contaminations and purifications of the luminous vehicle, see Hierocles, *In Carmen Aureum* 26, 3, 1-5.

⁴⁶ Cf. G. Shaw, *Theurgy: Rituals of Unification in the Neoplatonism of Iamblichus*, "Traditio" 41 (1985) p. 1-28; G. Shaw, *Theurgy and the Soul. The Neoplatonism of Iamblichus*, Pennsylvania 1995; I. Tanaseanu-Döbler, *Theurgy in Late Antiquity. The Invention of a Ritual Tradition*, Göttingen – Bristol 2013.

⁴⁷ According to the Middle-Platonist Atticus, the immortality of the soul was the only δόγμα which held together the Platonic tradition (ἀίρεσις): cf. Atticus, frg. 7 des Places, *apud* Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica* 15, 9, 1, 1-15, 9, 3, 1.

⁴⁸ Hermias Alexandrinus, *In Phaedrum* 125, 25-26.

⁴⁹ Cf. Philoponus, *De aeternitate mundi* 253, 19-254, 3 Rabe: "ὅσω οὖν ἡ οὐσία τῆς ψυχῆς τελειότερα καὶ κρείττων τῆς ἐνεργείας αὐτῆς, τοσοῦτω καὶ ἡ ἐνταῦθα [in the *Phaedrus*] περὶ τῆς ἀθανασίας τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπόδειξις κρείττων καὶ ἀκριβεστέρα τῆς ἐν Φαίδωνι".

⁵⁰ Cf., e.g., R. Hackforth, *Plato's Phaedrus. Translated with Introduction and Commentary*, Cambridge 1952; G.J. De Vries, *A Commentary on the Phaedrus of Plato*, Amsterdam 1969; C. Rowe, *Plato, Phaedrus. With Translation and Commentary*, Warminster 1986.

to allude to each kind of soul, including the soul of ants. On the contrary, Hermias firmly believes that Plato meant the rational soul alone⁵¹.

Let us first set out the actual premises of the arguments in isolation in [their logical] sequence, since Plato has presented them in a scattered fashion. The first [of the two arguments], then, goes like this. The soul is self-moved; that which is self-moved is in perpetual motion; that which is in perpetual motion is immortal; therefore the soul is immortal. This argument, then, will show us that [the soul] is not destroyed by its own agency. [And the second like this]. The soul is self-moved; that which is self-moved is a source of motion; the source of motion is ungenerated; that which is ungenerated is imperishable; that which is imperishable is immortal; therefore the soul is immortal. This argument shows us that the soul is not destroyed by anything else either⁵².

However, a systematic philosopher such as Hermias goes far beyond Plato's arguments and reconstruct a precise metaphysical and theological system in which the soul finds its place⁵³. To justify the existence of such

⁵¹ Cf. Hermias Alexandrinus, *In Phaedrum* 107, 27-108, 6. *Per incidens*, the anonymous author of the *Axiochus*, usually referred to as Pseudo Plato, seems to interpret ψυχή πᾶσα as 'the soul as a whole': cf. Pseudo Plato, *Axiochus* 372a5-7. According to Beghini's recent reconstruction, the philosopher hiding behind the mask of Plato could be Philo of Larissa: cf. A. Beghini, [*Platone*], *Assioco. Saggio introduttivo, edizione critica, traduzione e commento a cura di Andrea Beghini*, Baden 2020.

⁵² Hermias Alexandrinus, *In Phaedrum* 109, 21-28. On Hermias' treatment of the proof of the immortality of the soul in *Phaedrus* 245c5-246a2, see Longo, *What Is the Principle of Movement*.

⁵³ The fact that the *Scholia on the Phaedrus* is not a systematic treatise does not entail that Hermias is not a systematic philosopher. It is worthwhile to distinguish between, on the one hand, the formal aspect of a text and, on the other, the philosophical mindset of its author. In other words, what Hermias says in explaining Plato's dialogue in a manner which may not appear to be constantly systematic always implies an underlying, precise system of thought. It cannot be otherwise, since in Late Antiquity philosophy patently displays dogmatic and systematic characteristics, and the exegetical effort is intended to show that Plato himself handed down a coherent and consistent system of thought. This attitude towards Plato's philosophy ultimately dates back to the Imperial Age, when it stood as a reaction against the sceptic reading of Plato's *corpus* widespread in the Hellenistic Academy: see, e.g., *The Origins of the Platonic System: Platonisms of the Early Empire and Their Philosophical Contexts*, ed. M. Bonazzi – J. Opsomer, Leuven 2009. However, in Late Antiquity this trend was further reinforced by the smooth transition of philosophy into a *religious* philosophy, notably thanks to Iamblichus' *magisterium*, ultimately bringing out the view that both Plato and ancient Greek figures of wisdom, such as Orpheus, Homer, and Pythagoras, were the-

a thing as the self-mover and therefore to make clearer Plato's arguments, Hermias resorts to the Neoplatonic triad of being (εἶναι), life (ζωή), and intellect (νοῦς)⁵⁴. He argues that, on the one hand, some entities receive their being from other entities and, on the other, some beings receive the being from themselves (e.g., the heaven and the intellects)⁵⁵. Similarly, some beings receive their life from others, while other beings possess a life from their own. For instance, a human being receives life from another human being and the Sun, whilst again the heaven and the intellect own the life παρ' ἑαυτῶν. In the first case, we are dealing with an ἐπέισακτος life, while in the latter with a συμφοῦς one⁵⁶. Finally, some beings receive the intellectual faculties from outside and *ipso facto* become intellectual while not being intellectual by nature, such as ὁ δυνάμει νοῦς, while others possess the intellection by their own nature and think themselves, such as ὁ ἐνεργεῖα νοῦς⁵⁷. This λόγος must be applied also to the case of movement. Some beings receive the movement from other beings, that is, the ἕτεροκίνητα, while others are their own source of movement, that is, the αὐτοκίνητα. This construction is further clarified by Hermias through

ologians inspired directly by the gods. As a consequence, on the one hand Plato's dialogues, along with, for instance, the Orphic poems and the *Chaldean Oracles*, ended up being viewed as sacred texts imparting revealed knowledge, while, on the other, the figure of the exegete came closer to being that of a priest: cf., e.g., P. Athansassiadi, *Apamea and The Chaldaean Oracles: A Holy City and a Holy Book*, in: *The Philosopher and Society in Late Antiquity. Essays in Honour of Peter Brown*, ed. A. Smith, Swansea 2005, p. 117-143; P. Athansassiadi, *P. La lutte pour l'orthodoxie dans le Platonisme tardif, de Numénius à Damascius*, Paris 2006; P. Athansassiadi, *The Creation of Orthodoxy in Neoplatonism*, in: *Philosophy and Power in the Graeco-Roman World. Essays in Honour of Miriam Griffin*, ed. G. Clark – T. Rajak, Oxford 2007, p. 271-291; P. Athansassiadi, *Mutations of Hellenism in Late Antiquity*, Farnham – Burlington 2015.

⁵⁴ For a thorough analysis of this triad in the co-disciple Proclus, see P. D'Hoine, *Platonic Forms and the Triad of Being, Life, and Intellect*, in: *All From One. A Guide to Proclus*, ed. P. Hoine – M. Martijn, Oxford 2017, p. 98-121.

⁵⁵ Cf. Hermias Alexandrinus, *In Phaedrum* 111, 6-10.

⁵⁶ Cf. Hermias Alexandrinus, *In Phaedrum* 111, 12-16. Hermias' phrasing ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ καὶ ἥλιος is a quotation from Aristotelis, *Physica* 194b13, on which Syrianus as well drew in his *Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics* to prove that man has both a perishable and an imperishable cause: cf. Syrianus, *In Metaphysica* 10, 27-29.

⁵⁷ Cf. Hermias Alexandrinus, *In Phaedrum* 111, 16-18. This further confirms that the human intellect should be regarded as a sheer intellectual disposition, for, as we have seen, Hermias takes the apex of our soul to be the δυνάμει νοῦς. Hence, the human intellect, *qua* δυνάμει νοῦς, belongs to those things which νοητικὰ γίνονται (111, 17), while not being intellectually actualized by nature.

a theological tenet, which here comes particularly in handy as it allows the Neoplatonist to show the agreement between Plato and Aristotle. The theological tenet is the following: "In all existing things nature does not move immediately from opposite to opposite"⁵⁸. Hence, if we accept the existence of the unmoved superior to the other-moved and that of the other-moved, then we are compelled to accept the existence of the self-moved as well, namely the soul⁵⁹.

Taking stock at this point, we can legitimately conclude that Hermias held the soul to be immortal, *qua* rational and thus self-moving being. While being first and foremost a rational entity, though, the human soul is endowed with multiple faculties (πολυδύναμος) or dispositions⁶⁰. Due to its over-engagement with the sensible dimension, the human soul constantly runs the risk of abandoning its *ιδίωμα*, namely the rational, discursive thought, whose highest aspect is the intellect. Instead, it should (δεῖ) return to its own causes (οἰκεῖαι ἀρχαί)⁶¹, the divine, the intellect, and itself. Thus, the first step of the reversion process is the conversion towards itself resulting in the soul's self-knowledge, namely in apprehending that the soul's *ιδίωμα* is the discursive thought⁶². Then, the soul shall become aware of the highest part of its rational component, that is, the νοῦς or the νοερόν or the δύναμις νοῦς (Socrates' ἡνίοχος). Nevertheless, being active νοερός, thereby sharing in the intellective light of the particular intellect transcending it, is not the summit of the soul ascent, for the soul owes something of

⁵⁸ Hermias Alexandrinus, *In Phaedrum* 110, 25-26: "ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς οὐσίσι οὐκ ἀμέσως ἢ φύσις ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου ἐπὶ τὸ ἐναντίον χωρεῖ".

⁵⁹ Cf. Hermias Alexandrinus, *In Phaedrum* 111, 26-29: "And likewise with motion. It will be unclear which unmoved we are referring to – the kind that is inferior to the other-moved or the kind that is superior to it – unless the self-moved has been mentioned between".

⁶⁰ Cf. Hermias Alexandrinus, *In Phaedrum* 152, 14-18; 165, 2-5; 208, 10-14. On the concepts of *πολυδύναμος* in late antique doctrines of the soul, see E. Eliasson, *L'anima e l'individuo*, in: *Filosofia tardoantica*, ed. R. Chiaradonna, Roma 2012, p. 213-231.

⁶¹ Quite interestingly, Hermias holds that Socrates is constantly attached to his own causes: cf. Hermias Alexandrinus, *In Phaedrum* 15, 19-23; 35, 1-4. On the figure of Socrates in Late Antiquity cf. *The Neoplatonic Socrates*, ed. D. Layne – H. Tarrant, Philadelphia 2014; D'Andrès, *Socrate néoplatonicien*.

⁶² This process involves, *inter alia*, the projection of the confused notions (ἔννοιαι) of the truthful rational principles that the soul possesses within itself κατ' οὐσίαν (οὐσιώδεις λόγοι) as a gift from the Demiurge: cf. Hermias Alexandrinus, *In Phaedrum* 54, 17-25. On the projection process, and its roots in the Stoic articulation process, cf. C. Helmig, *Forms and Concepts. Concept Formation in the Platonic Tradition*, Berlin – Boston 2012; Neola, *Sulla gnoseologia neoplatonica*.

its existence to the gods themselves. The divine fragment within the ontic structure of the soul is the most united parcel of the soul (ένικώτατον) and, insofar as it brings a trace of the superessential One, it goes by the name of one (Socrates' κυβερνήτης)⁶³. This ineffable symbol of the unitary existence of the gods within the human soul⁶⁴ must be awakened in order for the soul to unite with the gods or, *rectius*, in order for the soul to stop being a soul to blend in with the divine, to exchange its psychic mode of existence with a highest and ineffable one, to escape a life ψυκιχῶς and plunge into a dimension θείως⁶⁵. This ultimate condition will be best fulfilled after the death and the separation from the body, when the soul who purified itself during its earthly stay will finally withdraw from the multiplicity, the partiality, and the dispersion to remain solely, as αὐτοψυχή καθαρά, with its purest and divine luminous vehicle.

3. *Appendix: A Note on the Relationship between Theoria and Praxis*

After this necessarily not-exhaustive description of Hermias' doctrine of the soul, it is interesting to shift, now in conclusion, to Hermias' ordinary life to show that this complex and multilayered system was not 'dead subject' but an important resource and precious treasure for coping with the threatening moments of the everyday life. Hence, moving from Hermias' *Commentary* to Hermias' ordinary life, let us read two striking passages from the *Life of Isidore* by Damascius, the last Diadochus of the Athenian Academy.

A boy, older than the philosophers [Ammonius and Heliodorus], was born to Hemeias from Aedesia, and when he was seven months old Aedesia was playing with him as is natural, and softening her voice she would call him "babion" or even "little child". On hearing this, he became angry and castigated these childish diminutives, pronouncing his criticism in a clear and articulate voice. *He [Damascius] relates many other extraordinary anecdotes about this child and says that since he could not endure bodily existence, he*

⁶³ Cf. Hermias Alexandrinus, *In Phaedrum* 88, 26-30.

⁶⁴ Proclus defines it as an ἄρρητον σύνθημα τῆς τῶν θεῶν ἐνιαίας ὑποστάσεως; cf. Proclus, *In Rempublicam* 1, 177, 15-23.

⁶⁵ Cf. Hermias Alexandrinus, *In Phaedrum* 30, 21-25; 152, 31-32; Iamblichus, *De mysteriis* 3, 4, p. 110, 11-p. 111, 17.

departed from life at the age of seven; for his soul could not be contained in this earthly region⁶⁶.

It is said that as he [Hermias] was dying he swore to Aegyptus that the soul is immortal and imperishable. What gave him this courage was his virtuous life disowning the bodily nature, turning to itself and experiencing the separation as it already stood face to face with immortality⁶⁷.

These telling passages show us how late antique Neoplatonists shaped their whole lives in accordance with the eschatological and metaphysical doctrines elicited from Plato's dialogues, that I have tried to reconstruct here. We can see how, faced with the death of a seven-years old son, two Neoplatonic parents strived to accept the tremendous loss. And how did they do it? Resorting to what is said in Plato's dialogues, dialogues that they have read, studied, scrutinized, and interpreted for a lifetime. They could have thus told themselves that their seven-years old son was not dead, for he was ascending the path to the divine. His soul had a one within itself insofar as it derived from the divine. He was supposed to (δεῖ) come back from where he had once descended, and that is exactly what it did. Along the same lines, Hermias managed to face his own approaching death with courage and firmness insofar as he had been living his whole life disowning the bodily nature and turning to himself. In turning to himself, he gained awareness of the ontic structure of his soul and its μέτρα, its limits⁶⁸. On the deathbed, he knew that he was going to leave the enchantment of multiplicity and partiality of the sensible dimension to regain the status of an absolute and pure soul. He was confident that, on the path leading upwards, he would have dismissed the chitons that his soul had taken up when descending to earth. Freed from the earthly

⁶⁶ Damascius, *Vita Isidori* frg. 57: “Ὅτι τῷ Ἑρμείᾳ ἐκ τῆς Αἰδεσίας πρεσβύτερον τῶν φιλοσόφων υἱέων τίκτεται παιδίον, καὶ ἡ Αἰδεσία τῷ υἱεῖ ἐπὶ ἑπτὰ μῆνας ἀπὸ γενέσεως ἄγοντι προσέπαιζε τε οἷα εἰκός, καὶ βάβιον ἢ καὶ παιδίον ἀνεκάλει, ὑποκορίζουσα τὴν φωνήν. Ὁ δὲ ἀκούσας ἠγανάκτησε καὶ ἐπετίμησε τὸν παιδικὸν τοῦτον ὑποκορισμὸν, τὸρὰν καὶ διηρθρωμένην τὴν ἐπιτίμησιν ἐξενεγκών. Καὶ ἄλλα δὲ πολλὰ περὶ τοῦ παιδὸς τούτου τερατολογεῖ, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἀνεχόμενος τὴν ἐν σώματι ζωὴν ἐπὶ ἑπτὰ ἐτῶν τοῦ βίου ἀπέστη· οὐ γὰρ ἐχώρει αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν ὁ περὶ γῆν ὄδε τόπος” (tr. P. Athanassiadi, *Damascius*, who put Photius' words in italic to distinguish them from those of Damascius).

⁶⁷ Damascius, *Vita Isidori* frg. 54: “ὁμομοκένοι λέγεται πρὸς τὸν Αἴγυπτον τελευτῶντα ἀθάνατον εἶναι καὶ ἀνώλεθρον τὴν ψυχὴν. Ἐποίει δὲ τοῦτο τὸ θάρρος ἢ εὐζωΐα ἀναινομένη τὴν τοῦ σώματος φύσιν καὶ εἰς ἑαυτὴν ἐπιστρέφουσα καὶ συναισθηνομένη τοῦ χωρισμοῦ καὶ ἄντικρυς ἤδη τῆς ἀθανασίας”.

⁶⁸ Cf. Proclus, *In Alcibiadem I* 227, 9-228, 1; 87, 22-88, 2.

body and the pneumatic vehicle, his soul was going to remain solely with the luminous vehicle to finally reunite with τὸ θεῖον, its highest ἀρχή. He had tried all his life to attain this goal by leading a life of purification and philosophy following the lead of Plato and the other ancient *auctoritates*. Hence, he could now firmly face death as he “already stood face to face with immortality”: for he knew that his rational soul was immortal and that it would not cease to move.

‘Upper’ Mereology of Human Soul and Salvation according to Hermias of Alexandria

(summary)

With my article, I try to show how the Neoplatonist Hermias of Alexandria (c. 410-455 AD) elaborated on Plato’s arguments on the immortality of the human soul in order to forge a coherent psychological and ontological system which is in tune with a precise ethics of salvation. In the final *Appendix*, I propose that these doctrines of the soul were not just erudite theories but turned out to be an actual and effective tool for coping with the threatening moments of the everyday life (notably for coping with the loss of the beloved ones and for facing death).

Keywords: Neoplatonism; Hermias of Alexandria; Plato’s *Phaedrus*; Doctrine of the Soul; Eschatology

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Piotr Ashwin-Siejkowski¹

The Second Century Debate about the Therapy of Passions – Various Christian Remedies

1. Introduction

Half of a century ago Eric R. Dodds famously described the period of time when Christianity emerged in the Graeco-Roman world as the ‘age of anxiety’². In his view, an element of good fortune helped to spread Christianity in Roman society, especially as paganism became more irrational and superstitious. More recently Robin Lane Fox has challenged the accuracy of this tag and replaced it with ‘the age of anger’³. No doubt, anger caused by various insane emperors (Caligula, Nero, Commodus), fear of uncertainty, phobias against others (Jews⁴ and Christians⁵), including

¹ Dr Piotr Ashwin-Siejkowski, Senior Research Fellow at the Department of Theology and Religious Studies at King’s College London; email: piotr.ashwin-siejkowski@kcl.ac.uk; ORCID: 0000-0003-1477-7681.

² E.R. Dodds, *Pagan and Christian in the Age of Anxiety: Some aspects of religious experience from Marcus Aurelius to Constantine*, Cambridge 1965. Dodds’ study prompted an academic debate, see more in P. Brown, *Religion and Society in the Age of Augustine*, New York 1972, p. 74-93.

³ R.L. Fox *Pagans and Christians In the Mediterranean World from the Second Century AD to the Conversion of Constantine*, London 1986, p. 65.

⁴ For instance, pogrom of the Jews in Alexandria in 38 CE, more in, Philo of Alexandria, *In Flaccum*. see W. van der Horst, *Philo’s Flaccus: the first pogrom: introduction, translation, and commentary*, Leiden 2003.

⁵ First persecution of Christians happened in Rome under Nero, see Tacitus, *Annales* 15, 44. Some scholars question this account, among others, see B.D. Show, *The Myth of the Neronian Persecution*, “The Journal of Roman Studies” 105 (2015) p. 73-100,

philosophers⁶, caused some of the strongest emotions in various parts of the Roman Empire and in different strata of Roman society. The historical context of the abuse of political power by emperors (the human factor), famine, plagues and earthquakes (natural causes)⁷, the unkindness and silence of the gods (the religious aspect), led various Graeco-Roman philosophers to question the proper response to these sources of afflictions. Human emotions such as rage, dread, desire, greed, hopelessness⁸ and others called out for, as Martha C. Nussbaum suggested, ‘a therapy’⁹ of the human soul or mind. In brief, you can’t change the character of the emperor, or of the master of your household, you are powerless in the face of nature, you are also weak in comparison with gods of the Pantheon, but you can educate and train your mind. The Roman Stoics¹⁰, the Aristotelians¹¹, Cynics¹²,

see also W.J.C. Blom, *Why the Testimonium Taciteum Is Authentic: A Response to Carrier*, *VigCh* 73/5 (2019) p. 564-581.

⁶ Vespasian expelled Stoic philosophers from Rome, cf. Dio Cassius, *Historia Romana* LXVI 12 and 13.

⁷ Lydia’s earthquake in 17 CE, see Gaius Plinius Secundus (or Maior), *Naturalis Historia* 2, 86, 200; Pompeii’s earthquake in 66 CE. See various discussions in “Vox Patrum” 78 (2021).

⁸ The list of emotions varied in the views of different authors. For instance, Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae Philosophorum* 7, 111, lists grief/distress, fear, desire and pleasure. Philo Judaeus, *Quod omnis probus liber sit* 159 points out four passions: pleasure, fear, distress and anger. For Galen, there were more than four affections, see his *De affectuum dignotione* I 3. For Plutarch the dominant affection is anger, in *De cohibenda ira*.

⁹ M.C. Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire. Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics*, Princeton 1994.

¹⁰ Among Old Stoics, Zeno defined ‘passion’ as ‘an irrational and contrary to nature motion of the soul’, in Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae Philosophorum* 7, 110. See Chrysippus, *De Affectionibus* and discussion in T. Tieleman, *Chrysippus’ On Affections: Reconstructions and Interpretations*, Leiden 2003, p. 140-197; for the Middle Stoa, more in P. Steinmetz, *Die Stoa*, in: *Die Philosophie der Antiker*, v. 4: *Die hellenistische Philosophie*, ed. H. Flashar, Basel 1994, p. 491-716. The Roman Stoics will be discussed in the next section of this paper.

¹¹ See, for instance, Theophrastus, *On Emotions*, in Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae Philosophorum* 45.

¹² Bionis Borysthenes wrote a treatise *De Ira*, c. I 16-17 in ed. and tr. G. Indelli, *Filodemo: L’Ira*, Naples 1988, p. 63. On Cynic model of life according to the nature, here understood as harmony with natural needs, see D.E. Aune, *The Problem of the Passions in Cynicism*, in: *Passions and Moral Progress in Graeco-Roman Thought*, ed. J.T. Fitzgerald, London 2008, p. 48-66.

Epicureans¹³ and Middle Platonists¹⁴, including Philo of Alexandria¹⁵ all searched for a panacea to calm down negative emotions and put the passions under the control of the human mind. This was seen as the way to happiness (here: εὐδαιμονία)¹⁶ in this life. The various Christian communities arriving on this scene, such as Pauline, Judeo-Christian and Docetic groups¹⁷ immediately became engaged in the ongoing debate about the power of the emotions. Those early Christian communities, spreading throughout different social strata with greater philosophical interests, would soon propose their own therapies. In order to assess their proposals, we should first sketch out what already was being said about the restriction of affections in the Graeco-Roman milieu.

¹³ For Epicurus's views on emotions, see Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae Philosophorum* 10, 28 and his *Opinions on Emotions against Timocrates*, in Philodemus, *On the Stoics* 3, in: *Epicurus, Opinions on Emotions against Timocrates*, in Philodemus, *On the Stoics*, in: T. Dorandi, *Filodemo, Gli Stoici (PHerc. 155 e 339)*, "Cronache Ercolanesi" 12 (1982) p. 91-133. As noted by M. Trapp, Epicureans promoted the ways of achievement of 'a state of physical and mental pleasure' (*Philosophy in the Roman Empire. Ethics, Politics and Society*, Aldershot 2008, p. 39).

¹⁴ See Alcinous, *Didaskalikos* 32; Maximus Tyrius, *Orationes* 20, 4; 27, 5 and 41, 5.

¹⁵ See his *Quis rerum divinarum heres sit* 269. Philo's ethical theory of controlling passions and promoting *apatheia* has drawn a great amount of academic attention, D. Winston, *Philo's ethical theory*, in: *Band 21/1. Halbband Religion (Hellenistisches Judentum in römischer Zeit: Philon und Josephus)*, ed. W. Haase, Berlin 1983, p. 372-416, J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists 80 B.C. to A.D. 220*, London 1996, p. 151-153. More recently (in Polish) M. Osmański, *Filona z Aleksandrii etyka upodabniania się do Boga*, Lublin 2007, p. 201-238; C. Levy, *Philo's Ethics*, in: *The Cambridge Companion to Philo*, ed. A. Kamesar, Cambridge 2009, p. 146-171. In this place I can only mention Philo's important allegorical interpretation of the Biblical character of 'Eve' as a metaphor for passions, while 'Adam' would stand for the mind. I have discussed this famous allegory in my paper: *Clement of Alexandria on the Creation of Eve: Exegesis in the Service of a Pedagogical Project*, "Studia Patristica" 66 (2013) p. 53-59.

¹⁶ See further comments on this term by Nussbaum, 15, the footnote 5.

¹⁷ We encounter some early Christian Docetic groups already mentioned in the New Testament, see 1 John 4:2 and discussion by T. Rasimus, *Johannine Opponents, The Gospel of John, And Gnosticism*, in: *Nag Hammadi à 70 ans. Qu'avons-nous appris? (Colloque international, Québec, Université Laval, 29-31 mai 2015)*, ed. E. Crégheur – L. Painchaud – T. Rasimus, Leuven 2019, p. 201-218, see also relevant study by U.C. von Wahlde, *Gnosticism, Docetism, And the Judaisms of The First Century*, London 2015, p. 61-98.

2. The power of the emotions – disturbing experiences among the Graeco-Roman philosophical schools and the search for a remedy

Galen of Pergamon (c.129-c. 216 CE), the well-known physician and philosopher of Platonic inclination, succinctly spelled out the feelings of many people of his time: “the doctrine of the virtues follows necessarily from the doctrine of the emotions”¹⁸. The main task of somebody who aimed to reach wisdom and ‘human flourishing’ (Nussbaum)¹⁹ in their lifetime was ‘progress’ (προκοπή) towards virtue. Plutarch’s title of his work *How a Man may become aware of his progress in virtue*, encapsulates one of many didactic efforts to promote ‘progress in virtue’ as well as to recognise the greatest obstacle: ‘vice’ (κακία). The Stoics and the Middle Platonists upheld that people faced a simple choice: either progress towards virtue, which includes the role of the mind as a guide, or fall into vice and a chaotic existence succumbing to emotions. There was no *via media*²⁰. The philosophical debate did not centre around the issue of whether or not to engage with that effort of progress, but centred around the question: should the affections be totally eradicated (Roman Stoics, but also Alcinous on curiosity)²¹, or just put under the control of the mind (Peripatetics, Sceptics, but also Plutarch)²². Especially among the Roman Stoics the pedagogical effort was placed on a correct response to the various judgments²³ and impressions: examination and if necessary unattachment²⁴. That proposed therapy would include ongoing daily exercise/training (ἄσκησις) of the correct use of or abstinence from those impressions which in turn stir up strong emotions: on one occasion desire, on another anger²⁵. At the centre of the therapy of the passions recommended by the Roman Stoics would be found a meditative way of life²⁶, self-discipline²⁷

¹⁸ Aelius Galenus, *De placitis Hipocratis et Platonis* 5, 6, 1.

¹⁹ Nussbaum, 15, the footnote 5.

²⁰ This dichotomy came from the earlier Platonic theory of the human soul with two aspects (or levels) of the irrational soul: one producing anger and the second desire. Both negative inclinations should be kept under control. On Plato’s theory of the soul, see recent discussion by Ch. Shields, *Plato’s Divided Soul*, in: *Partitioning the Soul Debates from Plato to Leibniz*, ed. K. Corcilius – D. Perler, Berlin 2014, p. 15-38.

²¹ Alcinous, *Didaskalikos* 32, 4.

²² Plutarchus, *De cohibenda ira* 453; Plutarchus, *De tranquillitate animi* 465 A-C.

²³ Arrianus, *Encheiridion* 5.

²⁴ See Epictetus, *De Epicteti philosophi dissertationibus* 2, 18, 25.

²⁵ See for instance, *De Epicteti philosophi dissertationibus* 3, 24, 84-88.

²⁶ Marcus Aurelius, *De seipso* VI 11; VIII 48.

²⁷ Marcus Aurelius, *De seipso* III 8.

and a lack of strong reactions to the events and people that we can't control²⁸. The advice given by Middle Platonists would be quite similar; the difference would place our practice of virtue with the philosophical and spiritual efforts to assimilate to the transcendent God²⁹. The Roman Stoics, Middle Platonists and Peripatetics would agree that, for the achievement of a virtuous life, a life free from the dominance of the passions, primacy should be given to human reason³⁰. Only under its guidance is it possible to grow in virtue and away from the passions. A radically different proposal came from the Epicureans for whom the passions, especially pleasure (ἡδονή), was not a source of distraction but the object of quest. For them, as for Diogenes of Oenoanda, the pursuit of pleasure, which included the affections, was explained as natural, positive, and fundamental³¹.

Having the arrival of Christianity to the Graeco-Roman, Jewish Palestinian and soon Hellenistic stages in mind, I would like to propose the following trajectories of the development of the subject of the passions/emotions. First, chronologically I start with the Apostle Paul and, on the basis of his authentic (or undisputed) letters, I will assess whether or not he was influenced by any type of philosophical school which dealt with the emotions as sketched above. Secondly, again using chronology as a guide, I will briefly note the issue of Jesus' emotions as testified especially in the Gospel of John³². Again, as the emergence of each canonical Gospel was a rather complex process, the question arises whether the theological milieu behind each Gospel reflected the philosophical debate on the disturbance of the emotions.

The subject of Paul's dependence on the teachings of various Graeco-Roman schools of philosophy and indeed, their rhetoric, whether plausible or not, has been a subject of ongoing debate³³. For our discussion it is im-

²⁸ Marcus Aurelius, *De seipso* V 22; V 35; VII 58.

²⁹ Alcinous, *Didaskalikos* 28; Philo Judaeus, *De fuga et inventione* 63.

³⁰ Seneca, *Ep.* 76, 9-10; Titus Aurelius Alexander, *De Anima* 3, 1; Maximus Tyrius, *Orationes* 33, 7.

³¹ Diogenes Oenoandensis, *Fragmenta* 25, c. 2, 9 and 29 in: J. William, *Diogenes Oenoandensis Fragmenta*, Lipsiae 1907, more recently M.F. Smith, *The Philosophical Inscription of Diogenes of Oinoanda*, Vienna 1996.

³² The scope of this paper does not allow me to explore other non-canonical Gospels which depict Jesus' emotions (e.g. anger) either as a child or later in his life as an adult man.

³³ In the most recent scholarship see T. Paige, *Philosophy*, in: *Dictionary of Paul and His Letters*, ed. G.F. Hawthorne – R.P. Martin – D.G. Reid, Downers Grove 1993, p. 713-718; B.W. Winter, *Philo and Paul among Sophists*, Grand Rapids 2002, p. 111-202; R.M. Thorsteinsson, *Stoicism as Key to Pauline Ethics in Romans*, in: *Stoicism in Early*

portant to point out David Ch. Aune's recent contribution to that debate. Aune briefly presents the role of the passions in Paul's correspondence³⁴, together with some modern commentaries on that subject. While engaging with some Pauline letters (1-2 Corinthians, 1 Thessalonians, Romans)³⁵ and vocabulary such as 'endurance of suffering' (e.g. 2Cor 1:3-7)³⁶, 'affliction' (e.g. 2Cor 4:17; 6:4, 8:2) 'grief' (1Thess 4:13-18) 'anxiety' (e.g. 1Cor 7:32-35), 'anger' (Rom 12:19-21), 'sexual pleasures or desires' (Rom 1:26-27)³⁷, Aune argues that Paul's use of philosophical terminology served his didactic purpose. It was his exhortation to commitment to his Gospel and building closer relationships among the members of his churches, as well as warning against those passions which, in Paul's view, had negative power and could destroy Christian life. I endorse Aune's observation about the double purpose of Paul's rhetoric on the passions: on the one hand to build up stronger emotional relationships in the communities of believers (with for instance love and compassion), but also on the other hand to warn them about the danger of 'sinful' emotions to the Christian life, such as sexual lust or greed. This Pauline intuition will remain one of his most significant contributions to the debate about the passions in centuries to come. Even this short note on Paul's didactic use of the passions is very important to our wider discussion of early Christianity. Paul was the most influential Apostle during the second century and his influence on various communities across the whole spectrum of Christianity cannot be underestimated³⁸.

Equally short but important consideration should be given to the second and last set of examples, this time related to the Gospel of John and its portrayal of Jesus' emotions. Here we are dealing with the Christian matrix, which will have a massive impact on the understanding and interpretation of emotions in Christian tradition. No doubt Jesus, as depicted by the fourth Gospel, showed different emotions such as 'joy' (J 15:11), 'grief' (J 12:27) and 'anger' (J 2:14-22). Harold W. Attridge has discussed

Christianity, ed. I. Dunderberg – T. Engberg-Pedersen – T. Rasimus, Grand Rapids 2010, p. 15-38. I am fully aware that the subject of Paul's assimilation of some philosophical ideas is a very complex and attracted attention of many scholars arguing for opposite evaluation. This place in only sketch some elements of that engagement in the context of my discussion of passion.

³⁴ D.Ch. Aune, *Passions in the Pauline Epistles*, in: *Passions and Moral Progress in Greco-Roman Thought*, London – New York 2008, p. 221-237.

³⁵ I would also include in the discussion Paul's *Epistle to Galatians* with 5:19-21.

³⁶ These references are mine.

³⁷ But also see 1Cor 5:1-8; 6:9-10; 10:8; 2Cor 12:21; 1Thess 4:3.

³⁸ More in *Paul in the Second Century*, ed. M.F. Bird – J.R. Dodson, London 2011.

these strong emotions displayed by Jesus³⁹. Staring with ‘anger’, Jesus’ aggressive behaviour in the temple was motivated, according to the Gospel of John, by ‘zeal’ (ζήλος), which is not exactly ‘anger’ (ὀργή). Still it shows a clear affinity with anger in Jesus’ reaction. Grief, in the Gospel of John, denoted by the verb ταραύσσω, expresses the commotion of Jesus’ soul⁴⁰. While, ‘joy’ (χαρά), although a positive affection, expresses another form of disturbance of the soul. In the light of the fourth Gospel, we clearly see a human aspect of Jesus, the ‘Word who became flesh’ (J 1:14), who, unlike an ideal Stoic sage, shows emotions, or in the Stoic context, imperfections, yet is still proclaimed as divine. In my view, this is a highly interesting feature of the Gospel of John, the latest canonical Gospel, as it does not try to compete with the philosophical ideals of the sage or holy man, it shows its autonomy and, on the contrary, preserves the testimony of Jesus’ emotional responses to various circumstances of his life.

In conclusion to this section, I wish to propose that in our chronological period (1st-2nd CE) the disturbing power of the emotions was given significant attention. With the exception of the Epicureans, the philosophical schools tried to propose different methods of dealing with their destructive nature. The emerging Christianity, in its pluralism of traditions, engaged with that discussion but its engagement during the first CE did not yet receive a specific philosophical formation. For this to be corrected, we need to wait until the second century and the greater assimilation of philosophical models into Christian ethical proposals. Before we discuss that assimilation, another source of negative emotions needs to be noted.

3. Dealing with cosmological fears – apocalyptic tensions and the response from myth

Both gentiles and Jews of the first century of the CE witnessed the tragic fall of Jerusalem in Judea and the dramatic explosion of Mount Vesuvius in southern Italy. They were overcome by fear and shock⁴¹.

³⁹ H.W. Attridge, *An “Emotional” Jesus and Stoic Tradition*, in: *Stoicism in Early Christianity*, ed. I. Dunderberg – T. Engberg-Pedersen – T. Rasmussen, Grand Rapids 2010, p. 77-92, especially here 80-82.

⁴⁰ Attridge pays attention to the various manuscripts as they use different Greek to denote Jesus’ response.

⁴¹ Flavius Josephus, *De Bello Judaico* 19-23; Gaius Plinius Caecilius (Minor), *Epistula* VI 16 and 20.

Strong emotions ran through human minds in the face of both tragedies. At the same time the religious mindset in Palestine, where Christianity originated, was saturated with apocalyptic expectations: the end of the world was thought to be near and humanity waited for God's mighty judgment. It is well established by modern scholars that the proclamation of the original Christian message about Jesus' life, death and resurrection, as well the expectation of his quick return, happened in the context of Jewish apocalypticism⁴². The Book of Revelation, to give one example, encapsulates this literary genre. On one side early Christians were influenced by the apocalyptic scenario of the end of the current world, on the other, natural and political events seemed to confirm that the current world was reaching its final stage. The powers of this world were shaken; the split between the realm of darkness or death and the realm of light and life were more visible than ever. Not surprisingly, theologians and exegetes searched for the source of that current drama. Is the transgression in Paradise affecting the present age? Is God's providence still acting in this level of reality or does some type of Fate dominate this earth? Some answers were proposed by Christian theologians who assimilated Stoic and Platonic notions in order to provide their fellow believers with a better understanding.

Irenaeus of Lyons, the second century Christian Apologist, preserves in his polemic an intriguing account of a Christian myth⁴³ with its central story about the power of the passions in the cosmic scenario. This story, by Irenaeus' theological standards, captures the error of heresy. The significance of this narrative relates to the Christian theological attempt to respond to the question 'why we are in this world in the first place', or 'why we are separated from God and how can we be redeemed?'. These questions were echoed in a complex document preserved later during the same century by Clement of Alexandria which received the title: the *Excerpts from Theodotus*⁴⁴. Again, as in the case of the previous philosophical therapies, the Christian myth suggested a way of healing from the destructive passions. First, let's recreate the main features and characters of the myth.

⁴² More in a highly valuable study related to my discussion in A.Y. Collins, *Cosmology and Eschatology in Jewish and Christian Apocalypticism*, Leiden 2000.

⁴³ I discuss the use of the myth by Christian authors in *Valentinus' Legacy and Polyphony of Voices*, London – New York 2021, p. 37-60.

⁴⁴ See my recent discussion of the document in *Valentinus' Legacy* p. 141-160, especially p. 147 with the quotation of the passage 78, 1-2.

According to Irenaeus' version⁴⁵, and here I present only a sketch of the myth, the youngest of the spiritual beings in the realm of perfection, named here as a feminine Wisdom/Sophia, moved by her strong emotion (πάθος)⁴⁶. She desired to know the Father⁴⁷. This Apophatic Father, the God of All, was beyond her reach, because of his divine, perfect nature, Sophia/Wisdom expressed 'love/affection' (στοργή/*delectio*) and at the same time another strong emotion: 'despair/anxiety' (ἀγών/*magna agonia*). Both emotions were directed to the Father, but while the first aimed to stay in communion with the Father, the second came as a result of an awareness of the 'incomprehensible' (ἀκατάληπτος) Father. Her perplexity leads to a lack of stability in her movements. Her actions become chaotic and, now unbalanced, she starts the process of creation of the lower reality. As a consequence, that new creation is far from perfection. Irenaeus' summary of the myth ascribes four main passions to Sophia/Wisdom: being in 'distress' (λυπέω), 'fear' (φοβέω), 'feeling of displacement' (ἐξίστημι) and 'being lost' (ἀπορέω)⁴⁸. Her imperfection, now a state of turmoil, causes her to fall outside the previous realm of perfection. That dramatic change even alters her name, now only echoing the Hebrew term for Wisdom. She is ensnared with passions. But here comes the second stage of the myth: the story of the salvation of Wisdom and the therapy of her emotions. Another being is descending from the realm of perfection in order to save her. This is the Saviour, her partner. The Saviour heals her uncontrolled passions and is even able to turn them into matter⁴⁹. Saved and liberated, Sophia is overwhelmed by joy and produces a spiritual offspring.

Whether or not Irenaeus' version preserved the original plot, we don't know. However, his synopsis suggests that some Christians, in order to prescribe 'therapy' of emotions, linked the cosmological events (Sophia's emotions as the cause of her fall) with the status of the human soul and they argued for the hope of salvation or the possibility of healing. As in

⁴⁵ Irenaeus, *Adversus Haereses* I 2, 2. We have also another version in Hippolytus, *Refutatio* 6, 36, 3. In my reconstruction of the myth, I follow Irenaeus' account with commentary from E. Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed. The Church of the 'Valentinians'*, Leiden 2006, various pages and I. Dunderberg, *Beyond Gnosticism. Myth, Life Style, and Society in the School of Valentinus*, New York 2008, p. 97-107. The Greek and Latin text follows the French edition from A. Rousseau and L. Doutreleau (SChr 264, Paris 2008).

⁴⁶ Thomassen, *The Spiritual Seed*, p. 288-291.

⁴⁷ Irenaeus, *Adversus Haereses* I 2, 2.

⁴⁸ Irenaeus, *Adversus Haereses* I 2, 3.

⁴⁹ Irenaeus, *Adversus Haereses* I 4, 5.

the case of Sophia/Wisdom, also in relation to the human soul, redemption is possible by the divine Redeemer. What seems to be the current stage of separation can be repaired with help from the Divine. The myth, criticised by Irenaeus as a product of heresy, still addressed the current stage of history as not ruled by fate, a dark and depressing abyss without hope, but rather as a temporary experience of chaos with its end in sight. The myth brought together cosmology and anthropology, connecting the journey of the spiritual being Sophia with the one the human soul.

To sum up this part, I wish to highlight that, for some Christians of the early second-century, the struggle with emotion received a new cosmic context. Still, it offered hope of liberation from the rule of the emotions.

4. The emotions and Christian revelation – good or bad? Tolerate or eradicate? Anthropology

Having sketched out the cosmic struggle with the emotions represented in the myth of the fallen and rescued Sophia/Wisdom (a metaphor for the human soul?), I now turn to various examples of Christian anthropologies and different responses to the nature of the emotions. Clement of Alexandria and his ‘therapy’ of emotions has drawn significant attention among modern scholars⁵⁰. They highlight various philosophical elements (Stoic, Middle Platonic, Pythagorean, Philonic) which influenced Clement’s views on the passions. However, in my approach I have also underlined a combination of the Stoic notion of a Sage/Tutor with the Scriptural examples of Christ as a Healer/Tutor in Clement’s Christology⁵¹.

⁵⁰ Among many studies, which directly discuss Clement’s views on emotions, see S.R.C. Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria. A Study in Christian Platonism and Gnosticism*, Rome 1971, p. 60-117; E. Osborn, *Clement of Alexandria*, Cambridge 2005, p. 238-224; P. Ashwin-Siejkowski, *Clement of Alexandria. A Project of Christian perfection*, London – New York 2008, p. 94-100; R. Finn, *Asceticism in the Graeco-Roman World*, Cambridge 2009, p. 94-97; J.L. Kovacs, *Saint Paul as Apostle of Apatheia: Stromateis VII, Chapter 14*, in: *The Seventh Book of the Stromateis*, ed. M. Havrda – V. Hušek – J. Plátová, Leiden – Boston 2012, p. 199-216; K. Gibbons, *The Moral Psychology of Clement of Alexandria. Mosaic Philosophy*, London – New York 2017, p. 103-104; M. Havrda, *Clement of Alexandria*, in: *The Routledge Handbook of Early Christian Philosophy*, ed. M. Edwards, London – New York 2021, especially p. 359-361.

⁵¹ Ashwin-Siejkowski, *Clement of Alexandria*, p. 94 and p. 211-213. In the past I have placed Clement’s views on Christ as the healer alongside Clement’s ecclesiology as a community of learning and receiving healing.

In the current context my short reference to Clement of Alexandria points out that, in the case of Clement, we find an example of an author whose project of therapy was centred on Christ as the healer of the human soul⁵². This motif is unknown to Philo in whose theory of the divine Logos there is no intervention from the Logos into the realm of the human passion, nor any form of guidance. Divine intervention is absent from all schools of Graeco-Roman philosophies. However, in Clement's view, under Christ's education, the mature Christian is able to reach a total eradication of the passions (ἀπάθεια). This is the freedom from distractions, which enables the stage of contemplation⁵³. Now, I wish to turn to two less well-known examples which illustrate two other trajectories of dealing with the emotions in a Christian context.

The first example, demonstrating yet another way of dealing with the passions closely related to anthropology and the role of Christ, can be found in the Coptic document from the Nag Hammadi, the *Teachings of Silvanus*⁵⁴. Like Clement of Alexandria, the *Teachings of Silvanus* is also not a systematic treatise on ethics or the passions, but a Christian exhortation to a certain way of life. In a similar way to Clement, the document assimilates various elements from its philosophical Graeco-Roman background in order to strengthen the value of its proposal. In the centre of that proposal is the role of 'the guiding principle' (ἡγεμονικόν)⁵⁵. The role of the mind as the inner guide is vital in the process of transformation from the earlier 'animal-like' existence to the Platonic postulate of the assimilation to God (*Doctrina Silvani* 108, 26-27: εἴτοντῆ ἡμοῦ ἐπινοῦτε). To *Silvanus* the Christian mature life is ruled by the reason/mind, which is continuously illuminated by the divine Guide: Christ. That sort of life totally differs from the one ruled by the passions symbolised by 'animals' or the 'animal nature' of other people. The document presents a clear dichotomy: life according to the mind, which leads to God, as opposed to mere existence submerged in the passions, with disastrous consequences. *Silvanus* describes the passions as 'robbers' (Coptic: ἄληστες or Greek: ληστής) or 'wild, savage beasts' (Coptic: θηριον or Greek: θηρίον). The didactic

⁵² Havrda, *Clement of Alexandria*, p. 358.

⁵³ I endorse Lilla's observation, in *Clement of Alexandria*, p. 103.

⁵⁴ I have introduced and discussed the ethics of this document recently in my paper *The Teachings of Silvanus (NHC VII, 4) and the Education of the Christian Mind*, "Gnosis: The Journal of Gnostic Studies" 3/2 (2018) p. 177-200. Here, I wish to offer some adaptation of my previous discussion to the current context.

⁵⁵ *Doctrina Silvani* 87, 12.

of the document clearly warns its readers against the destructive power of the ‘animal nature’⁵⁶. The passions are mighty powers: uncontrolled affections, wrong intentions and barren ambitions. These vivid images are not an original invention of *Silvanus*. This document continues the Alexandrian allegorical tradition originated by the Jewish exegete: Philo. In Philo’s didactic any evil act reduces human beings and transforms their souls into wild animals. One of Philo’s ethical paradigms states that human beings, through correct or incorrect affiliation, become either better or worse. *Silvanus* depicts the intense tension between two poles: the human mind *versus* the fierce passions or ‘beasts’⁵⁷. In the outlook presented by *Silvanus* Christians face two opposite ways of life: one ruled by evil spirits/beasts (darkness/κακῆ), and the second the realm of God (light/ποῦοειν)⁵⁸. It is not, however, a static observation; on the contrary, it is a military battle and *Silvanus* argues that people participate in the warfare between ‘wisdom’ (σοφία) and ‘folly’ (τῆντᾶτῶντ). The Christian has freedom of choice. *Silvanus* warns against a number of attitudes which unveil certain weaknesses of his Christian milieu, among them are: ‘love of praise’, ‘fondness of contention’, ‘tiresome jealousy’ and ‘desire of avarice’ – all suggesting rather well-to-do, educated and cultured people. *Silvanus* refers to classical Stoic passions: lust/ἡδονή⁵⁹, desire/ἐπιθυμία⁶⁰, λύπη/grief⁶¹ and fear/φοβή⁶². *Silvanus* remains an important witness to a parallel argument/world? to Clement of Alexandria’s assimilation of the Graeco-Roman and Philonic legacies into the Christian tapestry on which the passions are presented as a serious obstacle to the achievement of perfection. Both Christian authors,

⁵⁶ *Doctrina Silvani* 87, 28-29; 89, 3; 93, 19-21; 94, 2-3; 105, 7.

⁵⁷ *Doctrina Silvani* 84, 19-26: “[...] intensify the struggle against every folly (τῆντᾶτῶντ) of the passions of love (ἡγάθος ἡπερῶς) and base wickedness (τιπονηρία) and love of praise (τῆντῆμαεἰσοῦ) and fondness of contention (τῆντῆμαεἰψῆτων) and tiresome jealousy (εἰρηοε) and wrath (πῶωντ) and anger (τορη) and the desire of avarice (τεποθυμία ἡντῆμαεἰρημα)”, tr. M. Peel – J. Zandee, in: *The Coptic Gnostic Library. Nag Hammadi Codex VII*, ed. B.A. Pearson, Leiden – New York 1996, p. 278-369. Cf. *Doctrina Silvani* 108, 6-8; 110, 12-14.

⁵⁸ *Doctrina Silvani* 93, 34-94, 4: “It is good for you, o man, to turn yourself towards the human (εἰρεκακῆτῆ ἐπρωμε) rather than towards the animal nature (εἰφύσις ἡτῆβνη) – I mean towards the fleshly (nature). You will take on the likeness of the part towards which you will turn yourself.”

⁵⁹ *Doctrina Silvani* 105, 25 and 108, 6.

⁶⁰ *Doctrina Silvani* 84, 25; 90, 4-5; 105, 23.

⁶¹ *Doctrina Silvani* 92, 1.

⁶² *Doctrina Silvani* 87, 1; 88, 10; 108, 19-20; 114, 19.

although in different ways⁶³, will appeal to the Saviour Christ, both will highlight the role of the mind in the process of controlling the passions. Although Clement and *Silvanus* belong to two different Christian milieus, their ‘therapies’ are in dialogue.

Before I discuss the third selected example of a proposed Christian therapy of the passions from the *Gospel of Thomas*, I would like to consider the following two questions. In the light of literary evidence such as the New Testament documents, the Apostolic Fathers and other sources, can we assume that anxiety about the passions was a growing trend among Early Christian authors and communities? Or, on the contrary, was a radical way of dealing with the passions a very strong feature of the earliest Early Christian life, which was later during the second century tamed by a more balanced, rational approach? Recently my examination of the *Gospel of the Egyptians*⁶⁴, with its very encratic tendencies, suggested the former trajectory: the blend of various philosophical ideas prompted some Christians to compete with the asceticism of their neighbours. However, we have to keep in mind that, during the first and the second centuries, various communities developed their ethical teaching in different direction and there was no one pattern. Some started with an encratic and docetic stance (e.g. Marcion in Rome), others were more libertine (e.g. Carpocrates), while yet another group searched for a form of moderation (e.g. Clement of Alexandria). Having said that, I wish to move to the third and last document of the *Gospel of Thomas*⁶⁵. The seventh Saying in the *Gospel of Thomas* has the following warning: “Jesus said, ‘Blessed is the lion which becomes man when consumed by man; and cursed is the man whom the lion consumes, and the lion becomes man’”⁶⁶. This is a very intriguing statement, which first has to be assessed within the framework of the *Gospel of Thomas*.

⁶³ The important differences between Clement and *Silvanus*’ Christologies are that Clement uses more Scriptural material to discuss the role of Christ, here the Tutor and the ‘healer’, while *Silvanus* focuses on his direct impact on the Christian mind without any references to the Christian Scriptures. Also, in Clement’s Christology, or rather Logos-theology we find more Middle Platonic mindset, while *Silvanus* is happy with the Roman-Stoic background without any metaphysical interests.

⁶⁴ P. Ashwin-Siejkowski, *Clement of Alexandria and the riddle of the Gospel of the Egyptians*, “Studia Patristica” 2022 (forthcoming).

⁶⁵ For further details on the text, discovery, and the content of this document, see and S. Gathercole, *The Gospel of Thomas. Introduction and Commentary*, Leiden 2014, p. 62-90.

⁶⁶ My translation follows Lambdin. The similar and in my view original statement is preserved in the Papyrus Oxyrhynchus, 654, 40-42, however this text is seriously damaged and reconstructed.

Recently April D. DeConick proposed a chronological structure of this document and placed our Logion in the latest stage of the development of the text (80-120 CE)⁶⁷. For modern Biblical studies related to the canonical Gospels, it is evident that each one of them shows stages of development and of composition of the material: they were written over some time, in different areas, for different audiences and assimilated the earlier oral traditions as well as written sources in various ways. DeConick argues that a similar development can be traced in the *Gospel of Thomas*. Some of Sayings come from an earlier stage of the composition of the Gospel (30-50 CE), they preserve oral traditions, finding some parallels with the sources known to the Synoptic traditions. Other Sayings were included later (50-60 CE): those which reflect eschatological material come further in time (60-100 CE), while the Christological motifs as well some ethical debates came in the final stage of reduction (80-120 CE)⁶⁸. Our seventh Saying echoes that final phase. Howard M. Jackson's valuable study on this Saying places it with the development of the Platonic tradition that influences some early Christian material⁶⁹. In the light of Jackson's commentary, the seventh Saying deals with the power of the passions and expresses a warning to the listeners or readers of the Gospel not to give in to their strength. First, the passions are compared to wild beasts (here: a lion); this motif is also echoed in the *Teachings of Silvanus*⁷⁰, which has the power to devour the Christian (here: the man). However, in the Gospel we may find a more vivid echo of the passage from Plato's *Republic* (436 A-441 C and 588 B-589 B). In the Platonic context the human soul has many images of Greek mythological monsters, which stand for various powers of the soul. If the soul is not under the rule of the mind, 'many-headed beasts' spring forth⁷¹. Jackson suggests that the Saying exhorts the Christian to a transformation from the earlier animal-like way of life under the control of the passions (here: beasts/lion) to the most noble way of life 'like a man', that

⁶⁷ A.D. DeConick, *The Original Gospel of Thomas in Translation*, London – New York 2007, p. 10.

⁶⁸ This proposal is still open to a critical discussion as the clarity about the content of some Sayings is not so convincing to allocate them within the proposed frame, still a general guidance, this attempt is very helpful.

⁶⁹ To my knowledge Jackson's study is one of the best engagements with the metaphor of this Saying and it is still highly valuable commentary, see his *The Lion Becomes Man. The Gnostic Leontomorphic Creator and the Platonic Tradition*, Atlanta 1985, especially p. 175-213.

⁷⁰ See my earlier discussion of this metaphor in the *Teachings of Silvanus* in this paper.

⁷¹ See discussion of the examples in Jackson, *The Lion Becomes Man*, p. 184-203.

is ruled by the mind. It is therefore possible that the Christian community would be familiar with some Platonic metaphors, which they would find attractive and valuable. With this metaphor in the *Gospel of Thomas*, we are, in my view, dealing with the larger phenomenon somewhere later during the second century. Some Christian communities and their asceticism became captivated with the eradication of the passions and they searched for various metaphors to explain the necessity of that inner struggle, the danger of compliance and the ultimate reward: the return to the original stage in Paradise: life with God without stain of sin and passions⁷². Within the theological context of the *Gospel of Thomas* this Saying underlines the importance of the current moment of time: a call (of the Saviour) to change from one type of existence to another, this transformation must be done now in order to conquer the power of the inner beasts, that is the passions.

To sum up, Clement of Alexandria, *Silvanus* and the *Gospel of Thomas* show a clear concern about the life of the Christian. He or she needs to respond to the revelation not only in terms of faith and a new theological outlook, but also with an emphasis on anthropology: the human soul must be, in some cases, liberated (*Silvanus*, the *Gospel of Thomas*) or strengthened (Clement of Alexandria) against the passions which not only distract, but also overwhelm, the soul and endanger its salvation.

5. Conclusions

The emerging Christian didactic did not invent one of its chief enemies: the passions *πάθος*. Rather, as I have argued, there continued to be a diversity of emotions, afflictions and cravings presenting obstacles to the fulfilment of Christ's message. In the new context, the passions received a great deal of attention, however with an awareness of previous Jewish and Graeco-Roman 'therapies'. Christianity added the central role of the Saviour as the divine Healer; various Christian groups put different emphases on grace or self-transformation, yet during the first and the second century, the struggle against the passions was one of the central

⁷² I have pointed out that in the context of the Nag Hammadi, yet another Coptic document which expressed that kind of interested in assimilation of Greek ideas into a new didactic frame is the fragment of Plato's treatise badly translated into Coptic, see P. Ashwin-Siejkowski, *Plato in Bad Company? Plato's Republic (588b–589b) in the Nag Hammadi Collection: A Re-Examination of Its Background*, "Gnosis: the Journal of Gnostic Studies" 5/2 (2020) p. 172-187.

motifs of its teachings. In some cases a cosmological myth was involved: ('Sophia/Wisdom'), in others rational arguments (Clement of Alexandria, *Silvanus*), or metaphorical images ('lion' in the *Gospel of Thomas* or beasts in *Silvanus*). Various didactics used different tools to address their audiences: cosmological (myth) for some, anthropological (the mind – emotions relation) argument for others, while theological (salvation) was the main concern for all Christian authors. This diversity of 'therapies' came along with the unity of purpose (here: salvation). That combination of diversity and unity will continue in centuries to come, while the new elements such as Egyptian and Syriac monasticism, Origen and Cappadocians in the East, and Augustine in the West, will all add new features.

The Second Century Debate about the Therapy of Passions – Various Christian Remedies

(summary)

The disturbing power of the passions or affections, collectively known as *πάθος*, was the subject of a remarkable debate in Graeco-Roman philosophical schools, as well as in Philo of Alexandria and soon among various early Christian authors. This paper contributes to the recent approach to this subject but also explores new contexts. It examines cosmological (myth), anthropological (the mind – emotions relation) and theological (salvation) ways of addressing that problematic supremacy of emotions. Although it summarises earlier philosophical views, it focuses on Christian documents from the second century and their witness to that ancient debate. By comparison with the diversity of Christian views on the passions, the paper highlights the diverse 'therapies' proposed by Christian authors. In conclusion, it points out common motifs among Christian responses to the passions, as well as the differences in their remedies.

Keyword: allegory; cataclysm; Clement of Alexandria; the *Gospel of Thomas*; Middle Platonism; Neopythagoreism; Nag Hammadi; myth; passions/emotions; Philo of Alexandria; Roman Stoicism; *Teachings of Silvanus*

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Rev. Mariusz Szram¹

Theatrical Visualization of Human Emotions as a Rhetorical Mean of Persuasion in the Homilies of Basil the Great on Human Vices

1. Preliminary issues

Basil the Great (died 379) belongs to the group of early Christian authors who had excellent rhetorical education and used it abundantly in their preaching work². From his youth, he was introduced to the oratorical art. In his native Caesarea of Cappadocia, he studied grammar under the guidance of his father (346-348), and there he began his rhetorical studies, which he continued first in Constantinople (348-349) and then in Athens (350-355) with his friend Gregory of Nazianzus³. After his studies, he took over

¹ Rev. Prof. Dr habil. Mariusz Szram, head of the Chair of Greek and Latin Patrology in the Section of the Church History and Patrology of the Institute of Theological Sciences at the Faculty of Theology of the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin; e-mail: m.szram@wp.pl; ORCID: 0000-0002-8646-6295.

² Cf. E. Staniek, *Wielcy mówcy starożytnego Kościoła. Antologia*, Kraków 2007, p. 165-175; S.M. Hildebrand, *Basil of Caesarea*, Grand Rapids 2014, p. 7. On rhetoric in the patristic era see: H.T. Kerr, *Preaching in the Early Church*, New York 1942; A. Wilder, *Early Christian Rhetoric: The Language of the Gospel*, London 1964; J. Bernardi, *La prédication des Pères Cappadociens. Le prédicateur et son auditoire*, Paris 1968; A. Cameron, *Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: The Development of Christian Discourse*, Berkeley 1991; S.M. Oberhelman, *Rhetoric and Homilies in Fourth-Century Christian Literature. Prose Rhythm, Oratorical Style, and Preaching in the Works of Ambrose, Jerome and Augustine*, American Philological Association: American Classical Studies 26, Atlanta 1991.

³ Cf. P.J. Fedwick, *A Chronology of the Life and Works of Basil of Caesarea*, in: *Basil of Caesarea – Christian, Humanist, Ascetic. A Sixteen-Hundredth Anniversary*

the chair of rhetoric in Caesarea after his father (355-356)⁴. He probably remained in touch with the most eminent Hellenic rhetorician of the time – Libanius, whom he met in Constantinople, Nicomedia or Antioch⁵. It is obvious that the theoretical and practical experience of the orator Basil used in his later life as a monk, preacher, priest, and charity organizer⁶. A testimony to his positive attitude towards ancient culture, including philosophy and rhetoric, which can be described as “Christian humanism”, referring to the attitude of Clement of Alexandria and Origen, is the oration to the youth about the usefulness of reading the works of ancient authors⁷. Basil emphasized in it that young people should prepare themselves to understand Sacred Scripture by getting to know the carefully selected works of ancient Greek philosophers, poets, historians and orators⁸.

An oratorical talent and knowledge of rhetoric were reflected primarily in Basil’s homilies. In addition to exegetical homilies and dogmatic sermons, an important place in his pastoral work is occupied by homilies on

Symposium, v. 1, ed. P.J. Fedwick, Toronto 1981, p. 5-6; Cameron, *Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire*, p. 143-144; C.L. Riley, *The Rhetoric of Homiletics: Preaching, Persuasion and the Cappadocian Fathers*, Texas A&M University 2015, p. 27, 57 (doctoral dissertation); M. Wysocki, *Basil the Great*, in: *Encyclopedia of Christian Education*, v. 1, ed. G.T. Kurian – M.A. Lampert, Lanham – Boulder – New York – London 2015, p. 115; N. Dumitrascu, *Basil the Great. Faith, Mission and Diplomacy in the Shaping of Christian Doctrine*, London – New York 2018, p. 145-148.

⁴ Cf. P.J. Fedwick, *The Church and the Charisma of Leadership in Basil of Caesarea*, Eugene 2001, p. 135. Due to the ambiguity of the sources, Jean Gribomont suspects that Basil could not perform this function. Cf. J. Gribomont, *Eustathe le philosophe et les voyages du jeune Basile de Césarée*, RHE 54 (1959) p. 121.

⁵ Cf. Riley, *The Rhetoric of Homiletics*, p. 57. The publisher of Basil’s letters Yves Courtonne considers the authenticity of Basil’s correspondence with Libanius for dubious. Cf. Basil, *Lettres*, v. 3, ed. Y. Courtonne, Paris 1966, p. 202.

⁶ Cf. Riley, *The Rhetoric of Homiletics*, p. 61; B.E. Daley, *Building a New City: The Cappadocian Fathers and the Rhetoric of Philanthropy*, JECS 7 (1999) p. 431-461.

⁷ Cf. S. Longosz, *Wstęp. Mowa Bazylego do młodych*, in: *Święty Bazyli Wielki, Do młodzieńców o korzyściach z czytania książek pogańskich*, VoxP 57 (2012) p. 899.

⁸ Cf. Basilus Caesariensis, *De legendibus gentium libris*. See: N.G. Wilson, *St. Basil on the Value of Greek Literature*, London 1975; E.L. Fortin, *Christianity and Hellenism in Basil the Great’s Address “Ad Adulescentes”*, in: *Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought*, ed. H. Blumenthal – R.A. Markus, London 1981, p. 189-203; M. Lech, *Znaczenie antycznej literatury greckiej w edukacji młodych chrześcijan (na podstawie „Mowy do młodzieży” Bazylego Wielkiego)*, “Meander” 52 (1997) p. 141-153; T. Boura, *The Relationship between Hellenism and Christianity in St. Basil’s “Speech to the Young...”*, VoxP 57 (2012) p. 53-57.

Christian morality, delivered in the years 363-378⁹. An interesting phenomenon is the fact that a decisive minority among them are praises of virtues. The only homily on Christian virtue is the one on humility¹⁰. Most moral homilies, on the other hand, are those that condemn various moral flaws. From the review of the topics discussed in them, it can be concluded that a special problem in the time of Basil in Caesarea were misers, usurers, drunkards, adventurers and jealous people. Basil devoted separate homilies to the vices related to the aforementioned attitudes.

The common element linking Basil's homilies on vices is the use of the topos of moral flaw as a spiritual disease, popular in both ancient and early Christian literature¹¹. The behavior of a greedy man was described by Basil as a disease of the soul (πάθος τῆς ψυχῆς), similar to the disease of gluttons (τῶν γαστριμάργων), who prefer to burst from gluttony than to share leftovers with the needy¹². He called jealousy (φθόνος) a fatal illness (νόσος), consisting in contradicting God (ἐναντίωσις πρὸς Θεόν). Satan has succumbed to it and now causes it in man, provoking him to fight against God and other people¹³.

People with a sickness of soul, addicted to the vices stigmatized by Basil, were often accompanied by negative emotions. The preacher described their character and behavior, depriving man of the distinguishing feature of rationality among creatures, when discussing the defect of anger:

Since [...] this affect (πάθος), having once pushed aside caution, will itself take over the rulership of the soul, it turns a person completely into an animal

⁹ Cf. Fedwick, *A Chronology of the Life and Works*, p. 9-10; J. Gribomont, *Notes biographiques sur s. Basile le Grand*, in: *Basil of Caesarea – Christian, Humanist, Ascetic*, p. 27-34; T. Sinko, *Wstęp. Życie i pisma św. Bazylego W.*, in: *Św. Bazyli Wielki, Wybór homilij i kazań*, Kraków 1947, p. 24-28; Staniek, *Wielcy mówcy*, p. 171-175. All fragments of Basil's moral homilies, quoted in this article, are in my own translation.

¹⁰ Cf. Basilus Caesariensis, *De humilitate*. See: M. Szram, *Cnota pokory w nauczaniu greckich Ojców Kościoła IV wieku*, Lublin 2014, p. 95.

¹¹ Cf. Staniek, *Wielcy mówcy*, p. 171-173. About comparisons taken from medicine, occurring in the preaching of Basil, see: Riley, *The Rhetoric of Homiletics*, p. 97-99.

¹² Cf. Basilus Caesariensis, *Homilia in illud: Destruam horrea mea 2*. In the characteristics of the attitude of a rich and greedy man, you can see the references to the Greek moralist Plutarch, as well as to the Cynic diatribe, stigmatizing with a high dose of malignant irony different kinds of luxury beyond natural needs. See: Sinko, *Wstęp*, p. 24-26.

¹³ Cf. Basilus Caesariensis, *Homilia de invidia 3*.

(ἀποθηριοῦ παντελῶς τὸν ἄνθρωπον) and does not allow him to be a human, because there is no help from reason (ἐκ τοῦ λόγου)¹⁴.

Basil mentioned extreme emotions that can engulf human soul when describing the behavior of drunk people:

They fall into opposite affects (εἰς τὰ ἐναντία περιάγονται πάθη). [Some] are despairing and depressed and sorrowful and anxious. [The wine, on the other hand,] makes others cheerful and pleasant and joyful¹⁵.

The strength and disastrous influence of emotions on a person subject to vices and on the people around him were emphasized by Basil using invective and comparisons to the worst mental diseases. He considered those suffering from jealousy (νοσοῦντες τὴν βασκανίαν) worse than poisonous animals (τῶν ἰοβόλων αὐτῶν ὀλεθριώτεροι)¹⁶. He described the defect of anger (θυμός) as a short-term madness (μανία τίς [...] ὀλιγοχρόνιος)¹⁷. On the other hand, he called drunkenness (μέθη) departing from the senses (παρὰφρονία) and taking the mind away (ἀλογία)¹⁸.

Negative emotions accompanying these vices, disturbing not only the inner peace of the person characterized by a specific defect but also the surrounding environment, were – in Basil's opinion – an important warning which could discourage listeners from succumbing to these defects. Thus, it became a frequent practice of a Cappadocian preacher to present emotional states in a pictorial way, referring to visual impressions characteristic of a theatrical performance¹⁹. This manner of conduct enlivening the preacher's statements, can be treated as an acceptable for Christians

¹⁴ Basilus Caesariensis, *Homilia adversus eos qui irascuntur* 1. Despite the emphasis on the role of the reason, Basil did not consider deprived of feelings stoic sage to be the ideal of a man, on the contrary – he considered affections as an important component of human nature. However, he recommended moderation in their showing, in reference to the ancient principle μεσότης. Cf. L. Małunowiczówna, *Konsolacyjne listy św. Bazylego Wielkiego*, RH 24/3 (1976) p. 70-71; A. Jasiewicz, „Argumenta consolatoria” w pismach św. Bazylego Wielkiego, SW 47 (2010) p. 74.

¹⁵ Basilus Caesariensis, *In ebriosos* 3.

¹⁶ Cf. Basilus, *Homilia de invidia* 4.

¹⁷ Cf. Basilus, *Homilia adversus eos qui irascuntur* 1. See: Dumitrescu, *Basil the Great*, p. 170-172.

¹⁸ Cf. Basilus, *In ebriosos* 2-4.

¹⁹ Augustine of Hippo spoke about “Christian spectacles” (*spectacula christiana*), which could be invoked throughout the preaching of the Word of God during the liturgy.

kind of substitute for secular theatrical performances, which were negatively assessed by the Fathers of the Church as a vehicle of immorality and idolatry²⁰. The analysis of selected homilies by Basil the Great about the vices of anger, jealousy, getting rich and drunkenness made it possible to extract from these texts three presented below specific rhetorical means of persuasion, which were used by the preacher to illustrate various human emotions.

2. Introducing dialogue scenes with the participation of characters embodying the criticized flaws and showing various emotions

In order to illustrate the consequences of the criticized moral flaws, Basil introduced into his homilies fictitious figures of people who were under their influence and attributed specific statements to them. They were presented in the form of a short monologue or – more often – a dialogue with people from their backgrounds, as well as with the preacher himself²¹. It is a special combination of two types of thought figures – fiction and introducing the speaker, described in Greek textbooks of ancient rhetoric as εἰδολοποιία and διαλογισμός, and in Latin as *fictio* and *sermocinatio*²².

Cf. Augustinus, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 39, 9; 80, 23. Cf. S. Longosz, *Chrześcijańskie widowiska zastępcze w propozycji Ojców Kościoła*, VoxP 67 (2017) p. 334-352.

²⁰ Cf. H. Jürgens, *Pompa diaboli. Die lateinischen Kirchenväter und das antike Theater*, Stuttgart 1972; O. Pasquato, *Gli spettacoli in S. Giovanni Crisostomo. Paganesimo e cristianesimo ad Antiochia e Constantinopoli nel IV secolo*, Roma 1976; J. Śrutwa, *Widowiska epoki klasycznej w ocenie Kościoła afrykańskiego II-V wieku*, RTK 27/4 (1980) p. 43-56; W. Myszor, *Teatr i widowiska w ocenie greckich pisarzy kościelnych*, in: *Chrześcijaństwo a życie publiczne w Cesarstwie Rzymskim III-IV wieku*, red. J. Śrutwa, Lublin 1988, p. 123-134; E. Stanula, *Widowiska w ocenie Ojców Kościoła*, SaeCh 2/1 (1995) p. 7-16; L. Lugaresi, *Il teatro di Dio. Il problema degli spettacoli nel cristianesimo antico (II-V secolo)*, Brescia 2008; S. Longosz, *Teatr miejscem kultu bóstw pogańskich w opinii autorów wczesnochrześcijańskich*, "Acta Universitatis Nicolai Copernici. Nauki Humanistyczno-Społeczne. Historia" 27/254 (1992) p. 135-149; Longosz, *Chrześcijańskie widowiska zastępcze*, p. 303-360.

²¹ Cf. Basilius Caesariensis, *Homilia in Psalmum 14* 4, 6-8; Basilius Caesariensis, *Homilia in divites* 2-3. The conversational character of Basil's homilies drew Riley's attention (*The Rhetoric of Homiletics*, p. 94).

²² Cf. M. Korolko, *Sztuka retoryki. Przewodnik encyklopedyczny*, Warszawa 1990, p. 116; H. Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric. A Foundation for Literary Study*, tr. M.T. Bliss – A. Jansen – D.E. Orton, Leiden – Boston – Köln 1998, p. 246-247, 365-371.

The words of evil people, as well as of people with whom they are in dialogue, appear in the homilies, expressed in emotions, emphasized with rhetorical exaggeration by the preacher. An example is the dramatized dialogue between the greedy and the poor in the homily against usurers. The greedy man initially denies being able to make the loan. Basil emphasized his stubbornness by using a number of synonymous phrases (Greek συνουνομία, Latin *congregatio*)²³, reinforced by the repetition of the negative particle “no” at the beginning of each period (Greek ἀνάφορα, Latin *repetitio*)²⁴. In this way, the whole situation becomes dynamic and the accompanying emotions increase:

The greedy man, seeing this [poor and needy] man, does not take pity on him, he does not take nature into account, he is not moved by his entreaties, but stands adamant and implacable, does not yield to requests, does not bow to tears, persists in refusal. He swears and, wishing himself badly, swears that he has no money at all and that he is looking around to see if he could find a creditor himself, and he certifies a lie with oaths, acquiring perjury as a bad addition to inhumanity²⁵.

However, when a loan seeker, also torn by emotions caused by the fear of poverty (“pressed by necessity, bends and lowers”), mentions that he could take out a loan at interest, then the emotions of the moneylender undergo an unexpected change and stubbornness gives way to the undisguised joy of finding a naive client:

Lowering his eyebrows, he smiles, perhaps remembers his friendship with his father, and calls the applicant a good acquaintance and friend. Finally, he adds: We’ll see if there is any money lying there somewhere. It is a deposit of a friend who has placed it with us for trading. But he marked heavy percentages for it, and we will in any way reduce something and give it a lower percentage²⁶.

²³ Cf. Korolko, *Sztuka retoryki*, p. 109; Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*, p. 292-295.

²⁴ Cf. Korolko, *Sztuka retoryki*, p. 108; Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*, p. 281-283.

²⁵ Basiliius Caesariensis, *Homilia in Psalmum 14* 1. All underlines in the text come from the author of the article.

²⁶ Basiliius Caesariensis, *Homilia in Psalmum 14* 1.

This fictional dialogue, full of emotions accompanying the interlocutors, emphasized by the preacher, has the features of a theatrical performance, affecting both the sense of hearing and sight. In the summary, Basil described the moneylender's behavior with the verb κατασχηματίζω – “change the figure”, “adapt to the situation”, which the Polish translator Tadeusz Sinko translated as “odgrywanie komedii” (“playing a comedy”)²⁷. Although this translation differs from literal text of the original, it reflects well the theatricality of the entire scene described by the Cappadocian preacher. This scene fulfills, like other similar dialogues in Basil's homilies, one of the main criteria for recognizing a literary text as a theatrical drama, formulated after Aristotle by Origen in the Commentary on the Song of Songs:

A drama [...] is a piece played on stage by various characters: some enter the stage, others leave, and the text of the play is spoken by different people and addressed to different people (*aliis etiam discendentibus a diversis et ad diversos textus narrationis expletur*)²⁸.

3. A plastic way of presenting the characters' feelings with the use of stage movement and elements of the scenery

Apart from the dialogue with characters embodying the criticized vices, Basil often used a rhetorical figure of thought, known in Greek as ὑποτύπσις, and in Latin *descriptio*²⁹. It consists in a plastic presentation

²⁷ Cf. Basilius Caesariensis, *Homilia in Psalmum 14* 1, Polish translation: T. Sinko, *Homilia na Psalm 14 i przeciw lichwiarzom*, in: Św. Bazyli Wielki, *Wybór homilij i kazań*, Kraków 1947, p. 50.

²⁸ Origenes, *Commentarii in Canticum canticorum*, Prologus 1. Cf. Origenes, *Commentarii in Canticum canticorum* I, 1. See: L. Perrone, “The Bride at the Crossroads”. *Origen's Dramatic Interpretation of the Song of Songs*, EThL 82 (2006) p. 81-85; S. Longosz, *Teoria dramatu w pismach autorów wczesnochrześcijańskich. Wstęp, wybór tekstów, opracowanie i noty, w: O dramacie. Wybór źródeł do teorii dramatycznych*, v. 1: *Od Arystotelesa do Goethego. Poetyki – Manifesty – Komentarze*, red. E. Udalska, Warszawa 1989, s. 134; S. Longosz, *I germi del dramma cristiano nella letteratura patristica*, StPatr 31 (1997) p. 59-69; S. Longosz, *Dramatyzowane homilie patrystyczne załączkiem dramatu chrześcijańskiego*, VoxP 65 (2016) p. 423-424.

²⁹ Cf. Korolko, *Sztuka retoryki*, p. 118-119; Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*, p. 365, 496.

of the behavior of these characters, especially the accompanying emotions. Elements borrowed from theater play an important role in these descriptions, which adds drama and enriches them with a visual dimension³⁰. This is most clearly visible in homilies on anger and drunkenness, where the negative emotions accompanying these vices demand even such an illustrative presentation. The way in which it is carried out by the preacher resembles theatrical stage directions, containing precise instructions on the actor's behavior on stage.

The description of an angry man, presented in the homily against the defect of anger, is extremely vivid and presents to the eyes of the audience an almost living figure whose emotions have a drastic influence on his appearance and behavior:

He gnashed his teeth in anger, like pigs bound together, his face turned blue and filled with blood; body weight swelled, veins burst as breath is disturbed by an inner storm; the voice is rough and too intense, speech inarticulate and incoherent comes out disorderly and indistinctly³¹.

The state of a drunk person was also an opportunity for the preacher to evoke strong visual impressions, influencing the listener's imagination. Basil presents a drunkard very vividly as a caricature of human emotions, using the popular figure of thought, which is similarity or imaging (Greek εἰκῶν, Latin *imago*)³², with a certain amount of exaggeration, characteristic of a rhetorical trope, called hyperbole (Greek ὑπερβολή, Latin *superlatio*)³³:

Drunken are more foolish than cattle, since all quadrupeds and cattle and wild animals have set oestrus seasons, and those whose souls are overwhelmed by

³⁰ Cf. J. Kecskemeti, *Personnages tragiques et personnages comiques dans les homélies dramatisées des prédicateurs grecs*, "Euphrosyne" 22 (1994) p. 45-61; J. Kecskemeti, *L'homélie dramatisée dans la prédication grecque*, CPE 74 (1999) p. 20-34.

³¹ Basiliius Caesariensis, *Homilia adversus eos qui irascuntur* 2. A similar illustrative description of the appearance of a man torn by emotions appears in the homily on jealousy. Cf. Basiliius Caesariensis, *Homilia de invidia* 5: "And one can recognize the jealous somehow from the very face. Their eyes are dry and dim, their cheeks are sunken, their eyebrows are drawn together, their soul is entwined with passion, with no measure of truth in conduct".

³² Cf. Korolko, *Sztuka retoryki*, p. 119; Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*, p. 201, 361.

³³ Cf. Korolko, *Sztuka retoryki*, p. 106; Lausberg, *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric*, p. 263-264.

drunkenness and their bodies are overflowed with heat against nature, converge on impure and disgusting embraces and pleasures at every opportunity and at every time. And not only does this situation instill in them a lack of rationality, but also the delusion of the senses makes the drunk inferior to any beast. For which beast sees so badly and hears badly, like a drunkard? [...] Any frenzy among male cattle is smaller than the audacious lust of drunkards, because animals know the limits of nature, and drunk people look for the female in the male and look for the male in the female³⁴.

The means of dynamizing the description and influencing the audience's sense of sight is the element of movement, reminiscent of the actor's behavior on stage. The characters presented by the preacher move against the background of a precisely defined scenery, also evoking associations with a theatrical performance. It is precisely such a movement in a specific environment that reflects the emotions that a person terrified of having to pay off an accumulating debt undergoes: "If you knock on the door, the debtor is immediately under the bed; when someone runs violently, his heart beats; the dog barks, and he sweats and, taken in by fear, looks at where to run"³⁵. Basil also used the element of movement to show convincingly the emotions caused by the vice of anger, which – in his opinion – is by its nature associated with excessive mobility³⁶: "hands raised on knees and falling on all parts of the body, legs jumping tirelessly on the most important parts of the body, anything that catches the eye, used as a tool of madness"³⁷. The above-mentioned examples of the visualization of the negative emotions of the heroes of the homily about flaws, caused by showing them in motion in a specific environment, clearly refer to patterns taken from theater plays, which is confirmed by the preacher himself in his homily against people who get angry: "And since the anger from excitement has flared up to incurability, like a flame from the abundance of wood,

³⁴ Basilius Caesariensis, *In ebriosos* 3, 4.

³⁵ Basilius Caesariensis, *Homilia in Psalmum 14* 3.

³⁶ Cf. Basilius Caesariensis, *Homilia adversus eos qui irascuntur* 1: "[People angry] in a quivering and jumping affect (σφαδάζοντος αὐτοῖς τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ πηδῶντος) will not first calm down until they either do something bad to the man who irritated them, or if it happens so, they will hurt themselves". Bazyli notes that increased movement is also associated with emotions caused by excessive drunkenness. Cf. Basilius Caesariensis, *In ebriosos* 5: "when the excess wine strains the breath and weakens the tension in the tendons [...] your body, not knowing the natural support, necessarily spins and is jolted".

³⁷ Basilius Caesariensis, *Homilia adversus eos qui irascuntur* 2.

then one can indeed watch a spectacle that cannot be [...] utterly spoken (τὰ οὐτε λόγῳ ῥητὰ [...] θεάματα)³⁸. Basil emphasized this reference to the theatrical performance by comparing the change in the appearance of an overcome by emotions caused by excessive anger man, to putting on a mask on stage (ὡσπερ τι προσωπεῖον ἐπὶ σκηνῆς)³⁹.

4. Appealing to listeners as viewers and evoking their emotions through visual impressions

The fact that the theatrical character of depictions of human emotions in homilies on moral vices is the most conscious practice of Basil is evidenced by his direct signaling by the preacher himself. By presenting the poor man's emotions caused by the fear of the effects of extreme poverty, the Cappadocian used a rhetorical figure of thought in the form of a speaker directing himself to the audience (Greek ἀποστροφή, Latin *aversio*)⁴⁰. He addressed the listeners directly, announcing a visualization of the situation, similar to the action taking place on a theater stage:

How can I present to your eyes the suffering of a poor man (ὅπ' ὄψιν ἀγάγω τὰ πάθη τοῦ πένητος)? Here, after examining carefully his belongings, he sees that he has neither gold, nor will he ever have [...]. So what is he to do? Finally, he looks to his sons to put them on the market for sale and save himself from starvation. Now take a look at the struggle (Νόησον ἐνταῦθα μάχην) between the compulsion of hunger and paternal love: Hunger threatens with the most mournful death; natural affection draws away from it and encourages him to die with his sons. He has already moved forward several times, and restrained himself several times, and finally succumbed, raped by the necessity of inexorable poverty. [...] having shed tears, he goes to sell his beloved son⁴¹.

With similar phrases, referring to the sense of sight of the recipients of the homily⁴², Basil also began a description of the emotions accompanying

³⁸ Basilus Caesariensis, *Homilia adversus eos qui irascuntur* 2.

³⁹ Cf. Basilus Caesariensis, *Homilia adversus eos qui irascuntur* 2.

⁴⁰ Cf. Korolko, *Sztuka retoryki*, p. 115; Lausberg, *Retoryka*, p. 162-163.

⁴¹ Basilus Caesariensis, *Homilia in illud: Destruam horrea mea* 4.

⁴² Riley (*The Rhetoric of Homiletics*, p. 192) drew attention to their frequent occurrence in the homilies of Basil.

an unjust rich man during the final judgment (“how can I present these horrors to your eyes”)⁴³ and a full of irony and sarcasm depiction of the image of a drunk soldier who was supposed to arouse fear in his enemies, but who cannot stand on his own feet (“it is a pitiful sight to Christian eyes”)⁴⁴. The above-mentioned exhortations of the preacher addressed to the listeners of the homily to follow it not only by the sense of hearing, but also by sight, combined two goals: on the one hand – increasing the image of feelings experienced by the presented characters, on the other – evoking stronger emotions also in the faithful. In this way, the theatricality of the message turns out to be an excellent means of rhetorical persuasion, fully engaging the listener and enabling him to avoid the vices stigmatized in the homilies and the negative emotions associated with them.

5. Conclusions

Basil’s use of the rhetorical means of persuasion discussed above, influencing the audience’s sense of sight, was intended by the preacher to more effectively deter the audience from imitating the attitudes criticized in his homilies. The subject of this visualization were various negative emotional states accompanying vices. Referring to very vivid imagery, the Cappadocian preacher endowed his statements with the value of theatricality. He presented a specific *spectaculum Christianum* to the audience. The director of this spectacle was the orator himself

⁴³ Cf. Basilus Caesariensis, *Homilia in divites* 6.

⁴⁴ Cf. Basilus Caesariensis, *In ebriosos* 7. A similar practice can be seen in Augustine of Hippo. Cf. Augustinus, *In Joannis evangelium tractatus CXXIV* 49, 2. See: Longosz, *Chrześcijańskie widowiska zastępcze*, p. 341: “Zadaniem [...] komentatora w przepowiadaniu homiletycznym jest [...] według Augustyna «uwidowiskowanie» lub «uscenawianie» słowa Bożego lub wydarzeń biblijnych tak, żeby każdy mógł je zrozumieć i przyjąć w swoim wewnętrznym teatrze; kaznodzieja używa przy tym nierzadko terminologii widowiskowej, posługując się czasownikami: *spectare, videre, intueri*, albo też nazywając komentowane wydarzenie biblijne wprost widowiskiem czy przedstawieniem (*spectaculum*) lub teatrem, a występujące w nim postacie – aktorami” (“The task [...] of the commentator in homiletic preaching is [...] according to Augustine, to “visualize” or “stage” the word of God or biblical events so that everyone can understand and receive them in their inner theater; the preacher often uses the terminology of spectacles, using the verbs: *spectare, videre, intueri*, or calling the biblical event in question directly a spectacle (*spectaculum*) or theater, and the characters appearing in it – actors”. My own translation into English).

and the actors were stigmatized bearers of the vices, tormented by various emotions. Negative emotional behavior of people under their influence appeared before the eyes of the listeners, and in them also aroused emotions in the form of fear of falling into a similar state. In this way, equipped with a visual element, Basil's homiletic teachings, like the ancient Greek tragedy, played the role of a kind of purification of the soul (κάθαρσις) of bad emotions, which were a manifestation of addiction to moral flaws.

Theatrical Visualization of Human Emotions as a Rhetorical Mean of Persuasion in the Homilies of Basil the Great on Human Vices

(summary)

The presentation of various emotional states in a pictorial way, referring to visual impressions, characteristic of a theatrical performance, is a common practice of Basil the Great (d. 379) in his homilies on the vices of anger, jealousy, getting rich and drunkenness. The analysis of the homilies makes it possible to extract and discuss in this article three specific rhetorical means of persuasion that were used by the preacher to present human passions in a pictorial manner: (1) introducing dialogue scenes with the participation of characters embodying the criticized vices and displaying various feelings; (2) a plastic way of presenting the characters' passions with the use of stage movement and elements of the scenery; (3) appealing to listeners as viewers and evoking emotions in them through visual impressions. With the help of these rhetorical means, Basil presented a kind of theatrical spectacle to his listeners, arousing in them a feeling of fear of falling into the slavery of the vices criticized by the preacher. As in the ancient Greek tragedy, Basil's homiletic teachings, thanks to their visual elements, played the role of a kind of purification of the soul from bad sentiments related to addiction to moral vices.

Keywords: Basil the Great; emotions; moral vices; early Christian preaching; rhetoric; theatre; visualization of message

Teatralna wizualizacja ludzkich emocji jako retoryczny środek perswazji w homiliach Bazylego Wielkiego o ludzkich wadach

(streszczenie)

Przedstawianie różnych stanów emocjonalnych w sposób obrazowy, odwołujący się do wrażeń wzrokowych, charakterystyczny dla spektaklu teatralnego, jest częstą praktyką Bazylego Wielkiego (zm. 379 rok) w jego homiliach o wadach gniewu, zazdrości, bogacenia się i pijaństwa. Przeprowadzona analiza homilii moralnych pozwoliła na wydobycie i omówienie w niniejszym artykule trzech szczególnych retorycznych środków perswazji,

które posłużyły kaznodziei do ukazania w sposób obrazowy ludzkich emocji. Są to (1) wprowadzanie scen dialogowych z udziałem postaci uosabiających krytykowane wady i przejawiających różne emocje, (2) plastyczny sposób prezentowania uczuć postaci z zastosowaniem ruchu scenicznego i wykorzystaniem elementów scenografii, (3) odwoływanie się do słuchaczy jako widzów i wywoływanie u nich emocji przez wrażenia wizualne. Za pomocą tych środków retorycznych Bazyli prezentował swojemu audytorium rodzaj teatralnego spektaklu, wzbudzając także u słuchaczy emocje w postaci lęku przed popadnięciem w niewolę wad krytykowanych przez kaznodzieję. Podobnie jak w antycznej tragedii greckiej pouczenia homiletyczne Bazylego dzięki elementom wizualnym pełniły rolę swoistego oczyszczenia duszy ze złych emocji związanych z uzależnieniem od moralnych wad.

Słowa kluczowe: Bazyli Wielki; emocje; wady moralne; kaznodziejstwo wczesnochrześcijańskie; retoryka; teatr; wizualizacja przekazu

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Monica Tobon¹

Separation, Loss, Confinement, and Change: How Evagrius Can Speak to the Experience of Lockdown

1. Introduction

Separation, loss, and confinement have been imposed upon whole populations during the Covid-19 pandemic through government-mandated lockdowns. People have been confined to their homes and separated from family and friends, suffered bereavements made all the more bitter by that separation, lost their way of life and livelihood, and had to navigate the resulting changes. The experience of separation, loss, confinement, and change is also integral to the monastic life. The monk is separated from their former life, endures the attendant losses, and remains confined to the monastery, the crucible for the change nurtured by monastic formation. This paper examines the role of separation, loss, and confinement, and the nature of the change they support, in one of monasticism's most demanding forms, that of the fourth century Egyptian desert as represented by Evagrius. The first part lays the paper's groundwork by introducing the anthropology presupposed by Evagrius' curriculum of the monastic life. Part Two focuses on the role of separation, loss, and confinement in Evagrian asceticism, and Part Three on the spiritual change to which they contribute. Finally, Part Four considers how Evagrius can speak to the experience of

¹ Monica Tobon PhD, University College London, Honorary Research Fellow, Department of Greek and Latin, Faculty of Humanities; e-mail: m.tobon@ucl.ac.uk; ORCID: 0000-0002-0486-9972. I would like to express my gratitude to Pablo Irizar Carillo for organising the symposium "The Passions in the Platonic Tradition, Patristics, and Late Antiquity".

lockdown. We shall see that while he offers no easy consolations, he can show us how to find meaning and freedom in lockdown and can act as both our guide and our companion.

2. The human condition according to Evagrius

To appreciate the role of separation, loss, confinement, and change in Evagrius we must first acquaint ourselves with the main contours of his anthropology.

2.1. The primary nature

Evagrius' anthropology is rooted in an Origenian protology according to which humans, along with angels and demons, were originally created as rational beings comprising a nous with an immortal and immaterial body². In the original state of creation, which Evagrius calls the primary nature, the rational beings were fully united to God in burning love, the image and reciprocation of his burning love for them³. Although the *Kephalaia Gnostika*, the third and most advanced volume of Evagrius' trilogy on the monastic life, begins by defining God as essential goodness⁴, Evagrius more usually describes God as essential gnosis to highlight the centrality of relationship to the divine nature, γνῶσις bearing its biblical sense of spiritual knowledge of God enjoyed through relationship with him and inseparable from love, and by extension spiritual knowledge of creation enjoyed through such knowledge of God⁵. The nous is a faculty of gnosis in this sense. It images God

² In Evagrius' technical usage this is strictly speaking not a body (σῶμα) but an instrument which becomes a body in the fall, but this detail need not concern us here. Cf. M. Tobon, *Apatheia and Anthropology in Evagrius of Pontus*, London, forthcoming, 2, 3.1-2, 4.4; 5, 2.

³ Like much of Evagrius' system this is not stated explicitly in his writings but can be inferred from them; cf. Tobon, *Apatheia and Anthropology in Evagrius of Pontus*, 2, 1.

⁴ Evagrius, *Kephalaia Gnostika* 1, 1. The first two volumes of the trilogy are the *Praktikos* and *Gnostikos*.

⁵ More precisely, Evagrius distinguishes between spiritual and secular gnosis, the former received from God through grace by those who have attained apatheia, the latter acquired from human beings by those prepared to study regardless of the state of their soul. Cf. Evagrius, *Gnostikos* 4, 45; Tobon, *Apatheia and Anthropology in*

by receiving him into itself, and in doing so it is received into him and participates in him. Since God is the source of all goods, the rational beings' enjoyment of any good, starting with their own existence, depends upon such participation. In the primary nature they were fully united to God and accordingly enjoyed all goods as fully as their creaturely nature permitted.

2.2. Pathos and the secondary nature

Being endowed with freedom and possessing the vulnerability intrinsic to creaturely nature, the nous has a tendency to wander, and in virtue of this tendency the rational beings weakened in their love for God and turned away from him in what Evagrius refers to as the movement, a reference to the fact that in exercising its power of choice the nous moves⁶. Deprived of the stability they enjoyed through union with God, they fell into privation. To break their fall God created a secondary nature in which the state of each rational being depends upon the extent of its deflection from him. Since the weakening of the creatures' love for God is a cooling, the nous in the secondary nature has cooled and thickened and, deprived of unity, fragmented into a tripartite soul comprising epithumetikon, thumos, and logistikon⁷, and its immortal and immaterial body has congealed into

Evagrius of Pontus, 4, 2.1-2; J. Konstantinovsky, *Evagrius Ponticus: The Making of a Gnostic*, Farnham 2009, p. 42-44. On the biblical meaning of γνῶσις, cf. L. Bouyer, *The Spirituality of the New Testament and the Fathers*, History of Christian Spirituality 1, Paris 1963, p. 15-20.

⁶ Cf. Evagrius, *Scholion* 10, Eccl. 2:11; *Scholion* 23, Prov. 2:17. Here and below, the numbering of Evagrius' scholia follows Géhin.

⁷ The three parts of the soul according to Plato. The epithumetikon is the seat of the appetites or ἐπιθυμίαι and for both Plato and Evagrius the part of the soul closest to the body – according to Evagrius, *Kephalaia Gnostika* 6, 84, it is “joined to the flesh and blood” – while the logistikon is the seat of reason or λόγος and thus the highest part of the soul. The thumos is the middle part of the soul, and according to Plato the seat of courage and of the sense of honour and shame. For Evagrius it is the seat of a wide range of virtues including courage, perseverance, humility, and love. The word θυμός is especially difficult to translate. According to M. Clarke, *Flesh and Spirit in the Songs of Homer: A Study of Words and Myths*, Oxford 1999, p. 79-80, etymology indicates its basic meaning to be ‘billowing, gaseous breath’, while the cognate verb θύ(ν)ω ‘denotes the violent surging of wind and water, air and fluid’. Latin writers translated it as *irascibilitas* and Sinkewicz, *Evagrius of Pontus*, follows them in translating it as “irascibility”. Cf. Plato, *Respublica*

a mortal and material body⁸. For Evagrius all these changes are subsumed under the concept of pathos (pl. pathe) according to its meanings as defined in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* of an actualised change, a harmful change or movement, or an extreme of misfortune and distress⁹. The fall was from spiritual health to spiritual malaise, and pathos is the defining characteristic of the secondary nature, present in the nous as ignorance, thickness, and fragmentation; in the soul as the disposition to sin, and in the body as its mortality and other vulnerabilities¹⁰. Although Evagrius never explicitly makes the connection, we recall Plato's likening of the human soul to the sea God Glaucus whose true nature is hidden by the "rocks and barnacles", the "pathe and forms", that cling to him¹¹. The fall, in sum, is from the heat of love into the chill of pathos, from unity into fragmentation, and from expansiveness and lightness into contraction and heaviness¹².

2.3. The pathe and the logismoi

The pathe of the soul are the guise in which pathos intersects with the will¹³. While some coincide with states we would call emotions, a pathos is not strictly speaking an emotion but, echoing the Stoics, the affective aspect of a false value judgment; more precisely, of an evaluation which, implicitly if not explicitly, values something more highly than God. In other words, the pathe are the affective aspect of idolatry, and since to value something more highly than God is to value it excessively, excess is intrinsic to pathos and reflected in both its physiological and psychological manifestations. The false value judgments associated with the pathe take the form of lo-

435b-441b; Evagrius, *Praktikos* 89; Tobon, *Apatheia and Anthropology in Evagrius of Pontus* 5, 1.3.2; 5, 1.3.4.

⁸ Cf. Tobon, *Apatheia and Anthropology in Evagrius of Pontus* 2, 3, 1. In the context of Evagrius "mind" and "intellect" as we ordinarily understand them equate with the logistikon rather than the nous.

⁹ Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysica* 1022b15-21.

¹⁰ Evagrius' characterisation of the fall in terms of pathos is never made explicit but can be inferred and reflects both Paul's association of sin with death and Plato's association of death with composite natures; cf. Rom. 6:23; Plato, *Phaedo* 78bc; Tobon, *Apatheia and Anthropology in Evagrius of Pontus*, 2, 3.

¹¹ Plato, *Respublica* 611d-612a.

¹² Cf. Evagrius, *Kephalaia Gnostika* 2, 68; 3, 50; 6, 25; Tobon, *Apatheia and Anthropology in Evagrius of Pontus* 2, 3, 2-4.

¹³ More precisely, with the voluntative and desiderative aspects of the nous.

gismoι, conventionally rendered as “thoughts” or “evil thoughts” but in Evagrius having the more specific sense of defective reasoning reflecting the gnoseological privation resulting from the fall¹⁴. Evagrius divides the logismoι into eight generic categories: gluttony, fornication, avarice, anger, distress, acedia, vainglory, and pride. Pathos is intrinsic to all of them¹⁵ and together the pathe and logismoι are the malaise of the nous. While we cannot control whether or not logismoι arise within us, we can control how we respond to them: “Whether or not all these logismoι trouble the soul does not depend on us (τῶν οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἐστὶ), but whether or not they linger and arouse pathe does depend on us (τῶν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν)”¹⁶.

The formula τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν / τὸ οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν is Stoic¹⁷ but in Evagrius refers to the power of choice belonging to the nous. The fact that our response to the logismoι depends upon us enables us to choose the existential orientation of our lives: whether we direct ourselves towards or away from God, nourish the new self or the old self¹⁸. To choose the latter is to choose futility and enslavement. All logismoι centre on misdirected desire: in our fallen state our desire for God remains intact, but in our ignorance we no longer know that it is he whom we desire, nor how to recognise him. Instead, convinced by the intensity of bodily sensation that material reality is more real than anything else¹⁹, we seek to satisfy what is in reality our longing for God with material objects understood in the broad sense of any object of the logismoι (and so including, for example, human esteem, an object of vainglory). In the form of the pathe, our misdirected desire binds us to such objects²⁰, but since they

¹⁴ Only rarely does Evagrius use the word λογισμός in its neutral sense, an example being Evagrius, *De malignis cogitationibus* 8.

¹⁵ Evagrius provides four definitions of λογισμός, three of which – *De malignis cogitationibus* 25, 52-6, *Skemmata* 13, and *Capita discipulorum Evagrii* 65, 2 – make direct reference to pathos while the fourth, *Skemmata* supplement 2 (the numbering is that of Sinkewicz, *Evagrius of Pontus*) alludes to it by stating that the logismoι move the thumos or epithumetikon contrary to nature. Cf. Tobon, *Apatheia and Anthropology in Evagrius of Pontus* 5, 4, 2.

¹⁶ Evagrius, *Praktikos* 6 (tr. MT).

¹⁷ For a detailed discussion, cf. S. Bobzien, *Determination and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy*, Oxford 1998, especially p. 280-286, 330-338.

¹⁸ Cf. Evagrius, *De malignis cogitationibus* 39; Evagrius, *Kephalaia Gnostika* 6, 39-40.

¹⁹ Cf. Plato, *Phaedo* 83c. Tobon, *Apatheia and Anthropology in Evagrius of Pontus* 2, 3, 1, argues that this is part of the meaning of Evagrius’ reference at Evagrius, *Ad Melaniam* 26 to the fallen nous being named a body.

²⁰ Cf. Evagrius, *Scholion* 2, Ps. 145:7; Evagrius, *De malignis cogitationibus* 40, 3-5; Evagrius, *Skemmata* 23; Evagrius, *Epistula* 4, 3; Evagrius, *Historia Lausiaca* 38, 3.

are not what we truly desire, they can never satisfy us, and precisely because they cannot, they hold us in thrall as we pursue them ever more desperately in the hope that if only we have enough of them, or the right ones, we shall find fulfilment. Assent to the logismoi thus enslaves us to the pursuit of false goods and thus futility. The plight of the old self resembles that of the watercarriers in Plato's *Gorgias* who try to collect water in leaky vessels²¹, or that of drug addicts whose lives revolve around their next fix. But unlike drug addicts, we are oblivious to our addiction because it operates below the threshold of consciousness, and the very fact that our attention is focussed on servicing it prevents us from seeing it; Evagrius notes that when we are engaged in the warfare of the pathe, we cannot see its logoi, its underlying dynamics, but are like those who fight in the dark²².

3. Healing pathos through the practical life

Pathos is remedied through cooperating with Christ, the physician of souls, and in the present life the monastic state provides the optimal arena for doing so. According to Evagrius the monastic life comprises two phases: the ascetic or practical life which forms its foundation and is patterned on Christ's sufferings and death, and the contemplative or gnostic life onto which the practical life opens and which is patterned on Christ's resurrection. The healing of the pathe belongs to the practical life. Conceived on the model of a medical regime, it comprises a number of disciplines including fasting, manual labour, keeping vigil, reading scripture, and prayer²³. It is to the practical life that separation, loss, and confinement belong as the necessary conditions for the change at which it aims. To heal pathos means to cultivate virtue by redirecting our desire away from false or merely contingent goods to the true good; that is, to starve the old self in order to nourish the new self. The idea recalls Plato's observation that when our desires incline strongly in one direction they are weakened in another, as when a channel is diverted²⁴, but for Evagrius it is Paul who gives it authoritative force. Explaining the symbolism of the monk's habit, Evagrius declares that the sheepskin (μηλωτή) means that its wearer "always [bears]

²¹ Cf. Plato, *Gorgias* 493ac.

²² Cf. Evagrius, *Praktikos* 83.

²³ Cf., e.g., Evagrius, *Praktikos* 15, 49.

²⁴ Cf. Plato, *Respublica* 485d.

in the body the dying of Jesus”²⁵; he leaves his reader to supply the rest of 2 Cor. 4:10: “so that the life of Jesus may also be made manifest in our mortal flesh”²⁶. Continuing our analogy of drug addiction, the monastic life is a programme of withdrawal and rehabilitation. First the addict who wishes to regain their health must separate themselves from their supply of drugs, then they must accept and assimilate their loss, and until this has been securely achieved, they must confine themselves to a place of safety.

3.1. Separation

The monastic life begins with renunciation of the secular world, embodied in the first instance in physical withdrawal from secular society and symbolised by clothing in the monastic habit, both of which separate the monk from his former life and identity.

3.1.1. Evagrius’ embrace of the monastic life

Although we noted in the Introduction that the monastic life is undertaken voluntarily, this must now be qualified by the fact that a vocation to the monastic life is not necessarily welcomed by the person who receives it. Such was the case with Evagrius. Of the three “Cappadocian Fathers” with whom he received his pre-monastic formation – Basil of Caesarea, Gregory Nazianzus, and, we can assume from the many affinities in their thought, Gregory of Nyssa²⁷ – only Basil was a monk, and both he and the two Gregories pursued the life of Christian asceticism and contemplation in their homeland. We can assume that the young Evagrius did likewise. But that phase of his life came to an end when, in his mid-thirties, he joined Gregory Nazianzus in Constantinople to serve him as a deacon²⁸. He soon gained a reputation for his zeal and eloquence in defending Nicene ortho-

²⁵ Cf. Evagrius, *Praktikos* Prologue 6.

²⁶ Tr. Bentley Hart.

²⁷ Cf. Tobon, *Apatheia and Anthropology in Evagrius of Pontus*, 2, 4.6; 10, 1.3; 10.2; K. Corrigan, *Evagrius and Gregory. Mind, Soul, and Body in the 4th Century*, Farnham 2009; I.L.E. Ramelli, *Evagrius and Gregory. Nazianzen or Nyssen? Cappadocian (and Origenian) Influence on Evagrius*, “Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies” 53 (2013) p. 117-137.

²⁸ The remainder of this paragraph is based on Palladius, *Historia Lausiaca* 38, 1-7.

doxy, and following Gregory's departure remained to serve his successor as Bishop, Nectarius. But then catastrophe struck: Evagrius fell in love with the wife of a high-ranking imperial official and she with him. Years later he described to his disciple Palladius how he found himself "held fast in bonds of servitude (δεσμοῖς τῆς θεραπείας ταύτης κατεχόμενος)" to his desire²⁹. Feeling powerless to extricate himself, yet desperate to avoid a scandal, he prayed for deliverance and received a dream in which an angel instructed him to leave without delay. He obeyed and left for Jerusalem.

In Jerusalem he was received by Melania and Rufinus at their monastery on the Mount of Olives. He would have been an emotional wreck when he arrived: broken-hearted, ashamed, and with his sense of his own integrity shattered. But before long he relapsed into his worldly ways, dressing in fine clothes and enjoying city life. Then Providence intervened a second time, striking him down with a wasting sickness which no doctor was able to diagnose. When it had continued for six months with no sign of improvement, it occurred to Melania that it might have a spiritual cause and so she invited Evagrius to make a full confession to her. Only now did he reveal to her the true reason for his departure from Constantinople. In response she urged him to embrace the monastic life, assuring him that if he did so, she would pray for his recovery. He agreed, and proceeded to make a swift recovery. Having received the habit he departed for Egypt and spent two years living in community at Nitria before retiring to the interior desert to pursue a semi-anchorite life³⁰.

The monastic life as Evagrius lived it was unrelentingly harsh, his admonitions to moderation notwithstanding³¹. He describes the monk's exile from the world as an "illustrious contest" in which he goes abroad "like an athlete stripped of homeland, family, and possessions" to stand alone in the "wrestling school of the desert"³². As an athlete leaves home to compete in foreign lands³³, so the monk must "take flight from his familiar haunts"³⁴, and as the athlete strips off his clothes before a contest lest they be hindered

²⁹ Palladius, *Historia Lausiaca* 38, 3.

³⁰ Cf. Palladius, *Historia Lausiaca* 38, 8-9.

³¹ Cf. Evagrius, *De malignis cogitationibus* 35.

³² Evagrius, *Tractatus ad Eulogium* 1, 1-17 (tr. Sinkewicz). The *Tractatus ad Eulogium* is cited according to Fogielman. For the role of exile in Evagrian asceticism, cf. Tobon, *Apatheia and Anthropology in Evagrius of Pontus*, 8, 2.1.

³³ Cf. R.L. Sinkewicz, *Evagrius of Pontus: The Greek Ascetic Corpus*, Oxford 2003, p. 236, n. 5.

³⁴ Evagrius, *Tractatus ad Eulogium* 1, 7 (tr. Sinkewicz).

by their tunic and readily dragged about³⁵, so the monk must strip off all worldly ties. Especially when his body is weakened by illness, the devil enjoins upon him the hardship of such a life and tries to persuade him that virtue can just as well be cultivated at home:

“Go away” [says the devil], “Carry yourself off you who are the joy and glory of your family! – to these you have without compassion left behind an unbearable sorrow, for most people have lighted upon the virtues in the midst of their family, without having fled their homeland”³⁶.

At home, with the consolation of family, continues the devil, he could pursue virtue with less weariness and without the “misery and painful dependency” he now endures³⁷. But for Evagrius the reality was that, for him at least, that way was not a possibility; to attempt to cultivate virtue at home with his family would be but “a pleasant service for his weakness”³⁸. Yet at the same time as blaming himself for what happened in Constantinople, he was tormented by guilt and anguish for abandoning his family. His exile was motivated not by zeal but by trauma.

3.2.2. Apharesis in the practical life

Evagrius’ renunciation of secular life and embrace of exile are but the initial manifestations of an aphairetic structure that characterises the monastic life throughout, expressed in different ways in different contexts. Evagrius summarises that structure in terms of three renunciations necessary for the acquisition of gnosis: first, of the things of this world, meaning material objects in the broad sense noted above³⁹ viewed through the lens of the *pathe*; second, of evil, meaning the *pathe* themselves and by extension the sins to which they dispose us, and third, of “ignorance of the things that are naturally manifest to human beings in proportion to their state”, meaning ignorance of God and of reality, “the nature of beings”⁴⁰.

³⁵ Cf. Evagrius, *De malignis cogitationibus* 6, 21-9.

³⁶ Evagrius, *Tractatus ad Eulogium* 1, 25-28 (tr. Sinkewicz).

³⁷ Evagrius, *Tractatus ad Eulogium* 1, 23-24 (tr. Sinkewicz).

³⁸ Evagrius, *Tractatus ad Eulogium* 1, 23 (tr. Sinkewicz).

³⁹ See above, 1, 3.

⁴⁰ Cf. Evagrius, *De malignis cogitationibus* 26, 17-25; Evagrius, *Kephalaia Gnostika* 178-180; Tobon, *Apatheia and Anthropology in Evagrius of Pontus*, 8, 2.5.

However, for reasons which will emerge in the course of our discussion of change, only the first two renunciations are experienced as separations in a privative sense and both are associated with the practical life. The *praktikos*, the monk engaged in the practical life of asceticism, is the “servant of separation”⁴¹ and the alpha-privative of *apatheia*, the goal of the practical life, reflects both the aphairctic nature of *apatheia* itself and the aphairctic emphasis of the practical life. Further examples of that emphasis include Evagrius’ reference in the *Praktikos* to separating soul from body, his exhortation to Eulogius to “strip off (ἐπαποδύω) the weight of his flesh”, and his concept of “noetic circumcision”⁴². The separation of soul from body is a Platonic motif for cultivating distance from bodily pleasures, pains, and desires, and according to Evagrius should be practised by those who long for virtue⁴³. The image of stripping off the weight of the flesh recalls the athlete stripping for a contest and can be read on two levels, both relating to the fact that, as Evagrius tells Eulogius, “the matter of the flesh constitutes the nourishment of logismoi”⁴⁴. The “matter of the flesh” understood literally is the physical flesh: pathos is associated with the flesh such that to weaken the flesh is to weaken pathos and to strengthen the flesh is to nourish pathos. Understood metaphorically, it is all that pertains to the old self, so likewise, to weaken the old self is to weaken pathos while to strengthen it is to nourish pathos. The motif of noetic circumcision recalls the biblical metaphor of circumcising the heart⁴⁵ and for Evagrius refers to “a voluntary distancing from the pathe which (takes place) thanks to the gnosis of God”⁴⁶.

⁴¹ Evagrius, *Kephalaia Gnostika* 5, 65.

⁴² Evagrius, *Tractatus ad Eulogium* 1, 9; Evagrius, *Kephalaia Gnostika* 4, 12; cf. Tobon, *Apatheia and Anthropology in Evagrius of Pontus*, 8, 2.1, 3, 4.

⁴³ Cf. Evagrius, *Praktikos* 52; Plato *Phaedo* 81a-84b.

⁴⁴ Evagrius, *Tractatus ad Eulogium* Prologue 1-10 (tr. Sinkewicz).

⁴⁵ Cf. Deut. 30:6; Rom. 2:29.

⁴⁶ Cf. Evagrius, *Kephalaia Gnostika* 4, 12. Evagrius continues the symbolic association of circumcision with *apatheia* at Evagrius, *Kephalaia Gnostika* 6, 6 and 6, 66. I.L.E. Ramelli, *Evagrius’ Kephalaia Gnostika. A New Translation of the Unreformed Text from the Syriac*, Atlanta 2015, p. 412, notes that the allegorising of circumcision in terms of rejecting pathos goes back to Philo of Alexandria. Cf. also Evagrius, *Kephalaia Gnostika* 5, 83; Evagrius, *De malignis cogitationibus* 18, 19-20; 35, 18-21.

3.2. Loss and confinement

Both loss and confinement follow upon the separation that characterises the practical life: loss as its direct consequence and confinement as the condition under which separation and loss are endured as the basis for change.

3.1.1. Loss

All the separations of the practical life entail loss. In Evagrius' case the loss of his career, reputation, psychological equilibrium, and sense of his own integrity was followed by the loss of family, homeland, and every physical comfort. His *Antirrhētikos* lists almost five hundred individual logismoi classified according to his eightfold scheme and, I believe, affords us glimpses of the thoughts that assailed him⁴⁷, and while only a few relate directly to personal losses, they are poignant. Palladius' description of him as having enjoyed a luxurious and refined life prior to entering the desert allows us to impute to him the logismos of gluttony that recalls the delicate foods and pleasant wines he used to enjoy and the cups he held as he reclined at table⁴⁸. Certain logismoi of fornication suggest memories of the affair that prompted his departure from Constantinople, one evoking the image of a married woman, another featuring a married woman with whom he wishes to linger in conversation, and a third reminding him of the house in which he "gave many fruits to Satan"⁴⁹. But it is above his generic description of the logismos of distress that lays bare the emotional toll of his losses:

When certain logismoi gain the advantage, they bring the soul to remember home and parents and one's former life. And when they observe that the soul does not resist but rather follows right along and disperses itself among thoughts of pleasures, then with a hold on it they plunge it into distress with the realisation that former things are no more and cannot be again because of the present way of life⁵⁰.

⁴⁷ Since we have no way of ascertaining which, if any, of the logismoi described in the *Antirrhētikos* were Evagrius' own, any attribution of particular logismoi to him must remain conjectural.

⁴⁸ Cf. Evagrius, *Antirrhētikos* 1, 30; Palladius, *Historia Lausiaca* 38, 10.

⁴⁹ Cf. Evagrius, *Antirrhētikos* 2, 1; 2, 35; 2, 40.

⁵⁰ Evagrius, *Praktikos* 10 (tr. Sinkewicz).

Praktikos 95 recounts how, when a certain monk was informed of the death of his father, he replied, “Stop blaspheming, my Father is immortal”, and Palladius indicates that the monk in question was Evagrius himself⁵¹. But that Evagrius’ attachment to his family remained undiminished throughout his life in Egypt is apparent from an episode recounted by John Cassian, who spent time in Egypt as his disciple. Cassian tells how, one day, Evagrius received fifteen years’ worth of letters from his parents and many friends in Pontus. Holding the bundle of correspondence, he reflected at length:

How many thoughts, which will drive me either to empty joy or to fruitless sadness, will come to me as a result of reading these? For how many days will the recollection of those who wrote them turn the concentration of my heart away from the contemplation that I have set myself? How long will it take for the mental confusion that has been generated by this to be calmed and with what effort will a tranquil condition be regained once my spirit has been shaken by the feelings occasioned by this correspondence and, by recalling the words and faces of those whom it left so long ago, has begun to see them again, to live with them, and to be involved with them in mind and thought? It would be of no use whatsoever to have left them in body if in heart I begin to gaze upon them and to revive and readmit into myself the memory that everyone who renounces the world has rejected as though he were dead⁵².

Having deliberated thus, says Cassian, he decided that not only would he not open a single letter but he would not even untie them, lest “seeing the names of those who had written and recalling their faces”, his resolve fail. Instead he took the bundle and threw it into the fire. Harsh though this seems to us, for Evagrius his attachment to his family belonged to his old self and included pathos, meaning that his abandonment of them was part of the “renunciation of material things” required for the acquisition of gnosis. The problem was not the family ties but his own pathos; the *Chapters of the Disciples of Evagrius* record him as teaching that the biblical patriarchs suffered no harm from loving their wives (or possessing wealth) because they did so without pathos⁵³.

⁵¹ Cf. Palladius, *Historia Lausiaca* 38, 13.

⁵² Cf. Ioannes Cassianus, *De coenobiorum institutis* 5, 32 (tr. Ramsey).

⁵³ Cf. *Capita discipulorum Evagrii* 112.

3.2.2. Confinement

At the most basic level, confinement remedies the tendency of the nous to wander by training it in a habit of stability and perseverance, but it also ensures perseverance in the monastic life. Far from diminishing the monk's attachments to secular life, separation from the world throws them into sharp relief so that he is tormented by longing for the things he left behind. Other thoughts conspire with this longing to weaken his resolve to remain in the desert. Evagrius' generic description of gluttony concerns worries about the effects of monastic asceticism upon his health⁵⁴, the demon of fornication tries to convince the monk that his efforts to be chaste are futile⁵⁵, logismoi of avarice include fear of poverty and un-met needs⁵⁶, while as we have seen, distress evokes nostalgia for the monk's former life. But it is above all the demon of acedia who specialises in trying to persuade him to abandon the monastic life:

The demon of acedia [...] is the most oppressive of all the demons. [...] [He instils in the monk] a dislike for the place [where he lives] and for his state of life itself, for manual labour, and also the idea that love has disappeared from among the brothers and there is no one to console him. And should there be someone during those days who has offended him, this too the demon uses to add further to his dislike. He leads him on to a desire for other places where he can easily find the wherewithal to meet his needs and pursue a trade that is easier and more productive; he adds that pleasing the Lord is not a question of being in a particular place: for scripture says that the divinity can be worshipped everywhere⁵⁷. He joins to these suggestions the memory of his close relations and of his former life; he depicts for him the long course of his lifetime, while bringing the burdens of asceticism before his eyes; and, as the saying has it, deploys every device in order to have the monk leave his cell and flee the stadium⁵⁸.

Evagrius stresses the importance of standing one's ground against the demons:

⁵⁴ Cf. Evagrius, *Praktikos* 7.

⁵⁵ Cf., e.g., Evagrius, *Antirrhētikos* 2, 2; 2, 4; 2, 8.

⁵⁶ Cf. Evagrius, *Antirrhētikos* 3, 2.

⁵⁷ Cf. John 4:21-24.

⁵⁸ Evagrius, *Praktikos* 12 (tr. Sinkewicz).

You must not abandon the cell in the time of temptations, fashioning excuses seemingly reasonable. Rather, you must remain seated inside, exercise perseverance, and valiantly welcome all attackers, especially the demon of acedia, who is the most oppressive of all but leaves the soul proven to the highest degree. Fleeing and circumventing such contests teaches the nous to be unskilled (ἄτεχνον), cowardly, and evasive⁵⁹.

For the monk to leave his cell while under attack would not only be to capitulate to the demons but would reinforce both the particular pathos itself and the weakness of the nous; it would not only nourish our fallen nature but recapitulate the primal deflection and fall of the nous. Nor was it only the demons who sought to weaken Evagrius' resolve. Friends likewise tried to entice him out of the desert, among them John of Jerusalem, in a letter to whom Evagrius explains, "Because of the great number of my sins I have been thrown into the desert [...] and since I am full of numerous ulcers, it behoves me remain here"⁶⁰. He tells another correspondent that it is dangerous for a monk who is not yet perfect to leave his cell. "You know what miserable conduct was mine", he says, "but the Lord sent me an angel and delivered me from the hands of King Herod [...] Now therefore I have resolved not to quite my cell"⁶¹.

4. Summary: separation, loss, and confinement in Evagrius

For Evagrius, separation, loss, and confinement weaken the old self and nourish the new self. In secular life the nous is bound to material objects in the broad sense of that term noted above, a state of affairs that nourishes the old self and starves the new self. Weighed down by its flesh in both the literal sense of its body and the metaphorical sense of its attachment to material objects, the nous resembles a drug addict, material objects its drugs, and the pathos its cravings for them. This is not to say that all regard for the body and materiality is problematic; the problem lies not with material ob-

⁵⁹ Evagrius, *Praktikos* 28 (tr. Sinkewicz).

⁶⁰ Evagrius, *Epistula* 50, 1.

⁶¹ Evagrius, *Epistula* 58, 2. A. Guillaumont, *Un philosophe au désert. Évagre le Pontique*, Paris 2004, p. 66, rightly notes that Evagrius' commitment to remaining in the desert was motivated not simply by the desire to expiate his sins but above all to purify his soul and attain to the gnostic life, since only then would he be able to contribute effectively to the salvation of others.

jects *per se* but with the *pathe*. Separation, loss, and confinement free the *nous* from the grip of material objects and afford it the space in which to overcome its *pathe* and redirect itself towards God.

5. Change

The change at which the practical life aims is to begin to reverse the effects of the fall and establish the foundation for further progress. Separation from secular life, from the objects of the *pathe*, and from the *pathe* themselves, and the losses attendant upon such separation, mirror our primal separation from God, while confinement to the desert, and especially to the cell, mirrors the confinement of the *nous* to a mortal body and the straitened perspective to which it disposes it. In our present state, thickened and fragmented by *pathos*, we experience reality itself as fragmented and ourselves as alienated from God, from each other, and from the rest of creation. We suppose knowledge to be distinct from love and experience our appetites as conflicting with reason. Because the *pathe* constrain us to see objects in terms of their potential to gratify our appetites, we do not see the objects themselves but rather the shadows of them formed by the *logismoi*⁶², thus our grasp of reality is itself shadowy. Our view resembles that of the prisoners in Plato's cave⁶³, and because the shadows formed by the *logismoi* are idols⁶⁴, to entertain the *logismoi* is to commit idolatry and thereby reinforce our alienation from reality and bondage to unreality. But Evagrius agrees with Antony that virtue is present within us, working to restore us to health, and only needs us to cooperate with it⁶⁵, and separation, loss, and confinement play their part within his curriculum of the monastic life to help us do so. The health that, together with the other disciplines of the practical life they foster, is that of the soul, and Evagrius' technical term for it is *apatheia*, freedom from *pathe*⁶⁶. In freeing the *nous* from thralldom

⁶² Cf. Evagrius, *De malignis cogitationibus* 25, 52-6; Tobon, *Apatheia and Anthropology in Evagrius of Pontus*, 5, 4.2.1.

⁶³ Cf. Plato, *Republica* 514a-517a. While Evagrius does not explicitly refer to the allegory of the Cave, it is implicit in his understanding of our thralldom to *pathos* and liberation from it through the practical life.

⁶⁴ Cf. Evagrius, *Skemmata* 13; Tobon, *Apatheia and Anthropology in Evagrius of Pontus*, 5, 4.2.2.

⁶⁵ Cf. Athanasius, *Vita Antonii* 20, 3-5.

⁶⁶ Cf. Evagrius, *Praktikos* 56.

to pathos apatheia frees it from attachment to false goods and enslavement to futility. While logismoi will still arise in the nous, their affective power has been defused, making them easier to resist (although Evagrius warns against complacency)⁶⁷, thus apatheia is like a harbour or protective wall⁶⁸.

It was noted above that, of the three renunciations required for the acquisition of gnosis, only the first two – renunciation of material objects *qua* objects of pathos and renunciation of the pathe themselves – are experienced as privative and both belong to the practical life. We are now ready to see why this is so. Complementing the aphairctic structure of the monastic life throughout is a structure of plerosis reflecting the fact that as pathos is diminished the nous regains its innate receptivity to grace, enabling it to be “filled by God” and divinised⁶⁹. At least in formal terms (the reality is less clear cut)⁷⁰, attainment of apatheia is the point at which the sense of privative renunciation and loss starts to give way to the sense of being filled; the emigration of the practical life to the homecoming of the gnostic life⁷¹. In other words, attainment of apatheia is the point at which the monk who has sown in tears begins to reap in joy⁷². Love becoming the soul’s stable disposition reflects this, as do its concomitants: the stabilising of virtue in the soul⁷³, the harmonising of the soul’s three powers in orientation to the true good⁷⁴, and the enabling of the capacity for contemplation⁷⁵. The monk who attains apatheia no longer supposes love to be separate from

⁶⁷ Cf., e.g., Evagrius, *De octo spiritibus malitiae* 2, 18; Evagrius, *Tractatus ad Eulogium* 32, 25; Evagrius, *De malignis cogitationibus* 20, 1-5.

⁶⁸ Harbour, Evagrius, *Praktikos* 91, 4-6; Evagrius, *Scholion* 16, Ps.106:30; protective wall, Evagrius, *Scholion* 293, Prov. 24:31; Evagrius, *Scholion* 343, Prov. 28:4; cf. also Evagrius, *Scholion* 17, Prov. 1:9; Evagrius, *De octo spiritibus malitiae* 5, 12-14.

⁶⁹ Cf. Evagrius, *Scholion* Ps. 80:11; Evagrius, *Scholion* 12, 1-8, Prov. 1:20, cf. 2 Cor. 6:13; *Kephalaia Gnostika* 4, 51; Tobon, *Apatheia and Anthropology in Evagrius of Pontus*, 10, 2.

⁷⁰ Partly because plerosis will sometimes make its presence felt in the practical life and partly because aphairesis continues into the gnostic life, not only in the continued perseverance in the practical life that underwrites the gnostic life, but also in new forms, most obviously the phenomenological relinquishing of noetic content in preparation for imageless prayer; cf. Evagrius, *De oratione* 55-58, cited according to Géhin.

⁷¹ Cf. Evagrius, *Tractatus ad Eulogium* 24, 15; 2 Cor. 5:8.

⁷² Cf. Evagrius, *Scholion* 3, Ps.125:5.

⁷³ According to Evagrius, *Scholion* 290, Prov. 24:11, apatheia is “constituted by the practical virtues” (tr. MT).

⁷⁴ Cf. Evagrius, *Praktikos* 85; Evagrius, *Kephalaia Gnostika* 4, 73; Tobon, *Apatheia and Anthropology in Evagrius of Pontus*, 5, 1.3.1.

⁷⁵ Cf. Evagrius, *Praktikos* Prologue 8.

true gnosis but recognises it as integral to it, and his appetitive desire no longer conflicts with reason but conforms to it in desiring the true good. No longer experiencing himself as alienated from God, from other human beings, and from the rest of creation, he lives in God's presence, senses God's indwelling within him, and sees the whole of creation as theophany. It is this graced perspective in which all of reality is seen through the eyes of love that above all characterises *apatheia*. Evagrius explains that it is not when we no longer become angry or sad or vain in relation to some object that we have become free from anger or sadness or vainglory, nor is it when we no longer desire this object or that person that we have risen above all desire. Rather, it is when we see all people as messengers of God and love them as we love ourselves that we have truly acquired *apatheia*⁷⁶. In sum, as the fall was from the heat of love into the chill of privation, from unity into fragmentation, and from expansiveness and lightness into contraction and heaviness, so all of these changes, these *pathe*, are reversed in the ascent.

The prologue to the *Praktikos* maps the practical life in terms which expand upon the virtues of faith, hope, and love⁷⁷, and Evagrius has no doubt that, its rigours notwithstanding, each of us will sooner or later prevail such that faith will be rewarded and hope fulfilled for all: "I confess that I have not yet reached the perfection of this state, but I persevere boldly and have confidence that I shall attain to it because that is what he who called me from the shadows to the holy and blessed light has promised me"⁷⁸. That all rational beings will attain to divinisation⁷⁹ follows from the facts that God implanted indestructible seeds of virtue in us at our creation⁸⁰ and the Good Shepherd will never cease searching for his lost sheep until all are rescued,⁸¹ and this certainty finds reflection in Evagrius' exegesis of 1 Cor. 15:27: "Christ's feet are practical virtue and contemplation. Now if he 'puts all his enemies under his feet', all of them will know practical virtue and contemplation"⁸². Meanwhile success in the practical life transforms reality from a place of alienation and meaningless suffering to a place of belong-

⁷⁶ Cf. *Capita discipulorum Evagrii* 163; Gal. 4:14; Lev. 19:18; Matt. 19:19.

⁷⁷ Cf. Evagrius, *Praktikos* Prologue 8, 1 Cor. 13:13; Tobon, *Apatheia and Anthropology in Evagrius of Pontus*, 8, 1.2.

⁷⁸ Evagrius, *Epistula* 58, 12-14 (tr. MT from Bunge's German).

⁷⁹ Cf. Evagrius, *Praktikos* 3; Evagrius, *Kephalaia Gnostika* 4, 51; cf. Tobon, *Apatheia and Anthropology in Evagrius of Pontus*, 2, 4.6.

⁸⁰ Cf. Evagrius, *Kephalaia Gnostika* 1, 39-40.

⁸¹ Cf. Evagrius, *Epistula fidei* 17; Luke 15:4.

⁸² Evagrius, *Kephalaia Gnostika* 6, 15 (tr. Ramelli).

ing where, although suffering still exists, it is imbued with meaning, sanctified by love, and points beyond itself to its final cessation.

6. How can Evagrius speak to the experience of lockdown?

The differences between the two contexts notwithstanding, Evagrius can speak to the experience of lockdown in several ways. In the first place, he endows separation, loss, and confinement with meaning and purpose by situating them on a roadmap of spiritual progress validated by Christian tradition⁸³. For Evagrius our everyday consciousness arises from and presupposes a deeper level of subjectivity that we ordinarily have little or no awareness of. This deeper level of subjectivity, the *nous*, is our true self, the core of our being, and connects us to the ground of our being, since through it we participate in God. But it is only by disengaging from our everyday preoccupations and habitual ways of thinking that we start to awaken to it, and Evagrius shows us how separation, loss, and confinement can help us do so; how, that is, they can help us break loose from the constraints of our old self and discover and cultivate our new self. In turn, viewing them as meaningful and purposive is likely to make them easier to endure. Victor Frankl, drawing on his three-year experience of internment in Nazi concentration camps, affirms the importance to mental health of believing that our lives have meaning and purpose and notes in particular the vital role of such a belief in fostering resilience. Citing Nietzsche, “He who has a *why* to live can bear with almost any *how*”, he describes how any attempt to restore the inner strength of his fellow prisoners had to begin by presenting them with a future goal⁸⁴.

The second way in which Evagrius can speak to the experience of lockdown is by highlighting our freedom to choose how we respond to it, and thus our freedom to view it as meaningful. A freedom equivalent in its attitude to things beyond our control and expressed in similar terms to the

⁸³ For Evagrius’ influence on Christian tradition, cf., e.g., G. Collins, *The Evagrian Heritage in Late Byzantine Monasticism*, in: *Evagrius and His Legacy*, ed. J. Kalvesmaki – R. Darling Young, Notre Dame 2016, p. 317-331, 318-319.

⁸⁴ V.E. Frankl, *Man’s Search for Meaning*, Ebury Digital 2013, p. 102. The original Nietzsche quote reads, “If we have our own why in life, we shall get along with almost any how”. F. Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, tr. W. Kaufman – R.J. Hollingdale, Scotts Valley, 2018, p. 6. I do not mean to suggest or imply any equivalence or commensurability between the Nazi concentration camps and other forms of adversity.

formula Evagrius uses in relation to the *logismoi* is given powerful voice by Epictetus:

What aid must we have ready to hand [...]? Why, what else than [knowledge of] what is mine and what is not mine and what is permitted me and what is not permitted me (τί ἐμὸν καὶ τί οὐκ ἐμὸν καὶ τί μοι ἔξεστιν καὶ τί μοι οὐκ ἔξεστιν)? I must die: must I then die groaning too? I must be fettered: and wailing too? I must go into exile: does anyone, then, keep my going with a smile and cheerful and serene? “Tell me your secrets”. I say not a word, for this is under my control. “But I will fetter you”. What is that you say, man? Fetter *me*? My leg you will fetter, but my will (προαίρεσις) not even Zeus himself can overcome⁸⁵.

Frankl attests to the inviolability of our inner freedom, declaring: “Everything can be taken from a man but one thing: the last of human freedoms - to choose one’s attitude in any set of circumstances”⁸⁶. He is cited and echoed by a survivor of the Siege of Leningrad who told Caroline Walton that the one thing that the *blokadniki*, the besieged, did not lose during their 872 day ordeal was their freedom⁸⁷. For Evagrius, to allow our circumstances to dominate us is to locate our existential centre of gravity in our old self, whereas to recognise and accept that we can choose our attitude to them is to invest in our new self. Even when we feel most powerless we are free to pray for help, as he did in Constantinople⁸⁸.

As both Evagrius and Frankl testify, however, to see suffering as meaningful and take responsibility for our attitude to it does not necessarily diminish it and can on the contrary intensify it. Frankl writes:

Once the meaning of suffering had been revealed to us, we refused to minimise or alleviate the camp’s tortures by ignoring them or harbouring false illusions and entertaining artificial optimism. Suffering had become a task on which we did not want to turn our backs [...] Therefore it was necessary to face up to the full amount of suffering⁸⁹.

⁸⁵ Cf. Epictetus, *Dissertationes ab Arriano digestae* 1, 1, 21-25 (tr. Oldfather, with slight amendment).

⁸⁶ Frankl, *Man’s Search for Meaning*, p. 88.

⁸⁷ Cf. C. Walton, *Te, kto vyzhil 900 dnei blokady*, St Petersburg 2021, p. 46-47.

⁸⁸ Cf. Palladius, *Historia Lausiaca* 38, 3; see above, 3.1.1.

⁸⁹ Frankl, *Man’s Search for Meaning*, p. 104-106.

For Evagrius, as we have seen, the ascetic dimension of the monastic life has its paradigm in the suffering and death of Christ, meaning that its rigours are not to be avoided or diminished but embraced as integral to the dynamic of transformation. In order to rise with Christ the monk must first die with him by mortifying their old self⁹⁰, and Evagrius' suffering is the means by which he carries in his body the death of Jesus in order that the life of Jesus might be made manifest in that same body⁹¹. This brings us to the third way in which he can speak to the experience of lockdown, namely by accompanying us as compassionate fellow sufferer and guide. As our fellow sufferer he validates our pain by accepting his own pain. But there is a difference between accepting necessary pain and courting unnecessary pain, and as our guide Evagrius provides us with a range of resources to help us navigate our own journey. In his curriculum of the monastic life separation, loss, and confinement are supported by its other disciplines, above all prayer⁹², and he describes practices and offer maxims that as well as being what we would call "coping mechanisms" are aids to spiritual growth, reflecting the fact that for him the desert is not simply or even primarily a place of suffering but rather a place of blossoming: perhaps responding to Athanasius' statement that under the influence of Antony, "the desert was made a city by monks (ἡ ἔρημος ἐπολίσθη μοναχῶν)",⁹³ he describes apatheia as "the flower of the practical life (ἀπάθεια δέ ἐστὶν ἄνθος τῆς πρακτικῆς)", implying that monks make the desert a garden.

Finally, while there are many differences between lockdown and Evagrius' experience of separation, loss, and confinement, we have seen that the voluntary nature of the monastic life is not a straightforward instance of them. While Evagrius did indeed embrace his vocation freely, he did so only when he believed both his physical life and his spiritual health to be at stake. His story therefore erodes any clear-cut distinction between the monastic life as voluntary and lockdown as involuntary and in doing so highlights another way in which he can accompany us. It is one thing to philosophise about our freedom to choose our attitude to adversity but quite another to exercise it when the time comes. The historian Socrates Scholasticus states that it was only when Evagrius entered the desert that he became a philosopher of deeds rather than of words alone⁹⁴, and certainly

⁹⁰ Cf. Evagrius, *Kephalaia Gnostika* 6, 39-40.

⁹¹ Cf. 2 Cor. 4:10; see above, 2.

⁹² Cf. Evagrius, *Praktikos* 49.

⁹³ Athanasius, *Vita Antonii* 14, 7 (tr. T. Vivian – A.N. Athanassakis).

⁹⁴ Socrates Scholasticus, *Historia Ecclesiastica* 4, 23.

when he found himself in trouble in Constantinople he was not ready fully to exercise his freedom, in that while he was able to pray for deliverance and flee the city, he then faltered, and it was only the experience of serious illness combined with the counsel of Melania that finally elicited his assent to his monastic vocation⁹⁵. He can, therefore, accompany us in our prevarication and backsliding as well as in our resolve.

7. Conclusion

Separation, loss, and confinement play a prominent role in Evagrius' asceticism by supporting the changes that begin to reverse the effects of the fall and restore the nous to health. Separation from the objects of the pathos, acceptance of the loss of those objects and of the pathos that bind us to them, and confinement to the cell and the desert, are all necessary to attain apatheia. Apatheia establishes love as the soul's stable disposition and opens the door to contemplation, enabling the monk to embark on the changes associated with the gnostic life, culminating in divinisation. Despite the differences between monastic asceticism and lockdown, Evagrius can speak to our experience of separation, loss, and confinement by endowing them with meaning and purpose as facilitators of spiritual awakening and growth, emphasising our freedom to choose our attitude to them, and, while he offers no easy consolations, showing us by his teachings and example how we can make our deserts into gardens.

Separation, Loss, Confinement, and Change: How Evagrius Can Speak to the Experience of Lockdown

(summary)

Separation, loss, confinement, and change have been imposed on entire populations during the Covid-19 pandemic in the form of lockdowns aimed at limiting the spread of the virus. They are also central to Evagrius' asceticism, where they establish the conditions for the change at which the monastic life aims, namely to begin to reverse the effects of the fall by restoring the soul to health. This paper examines how they do so in order to gain an understanding of their ascetic function. Following the Introduction, it outlines Evagrius' anthropology in order to lay the groundwork for its main theme, the healing of pathos through the practical life. Separation, loss, and confinement are each considered in turn by referencing Evagrius' descriptions of their ascetic function and his own experience of

⁹⁵ Cf. Palladius, *Historia Lausiaca* 38, 3-9.

them. Next, the change at which they aim is described, again drawing upon a range of Evagrius material. The final section of the paper considers how Evagrius can speak to the experience of lockdown by endowing separation, loss, confinement with meaning and purpose in relation to spiritual awakening and growth, highlighting our freedom to choose our attitude to them, and acting as both our guide and our companion.

Keywords: Evagrius; separation; loss; confinement; change; lockdown; asceticism; apatheia; spiritual growth; freedom; transformation; nous; old self; new self; pathos; pathē; logismoi; Plato; Epictetus; Frankl

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Matthew W. Knotts¹

God and Self in *Confessiones* IV and Beyond: *Therapeia*, Self-Presence, and Ontological Contingency in Augustine, Seneca, and Heidegger

1. Introduction

This article examines the account of the death of Augustine's close friend recounted in the fourth book of the *Confessiones* from the perspective of classical philosophy as a form of therapy. In the first section, I provide an overview of this therapeutic approach to philosophy, beginning with some of the earliest Greek philosophers and moving into Latin antiquity. Then I turn to the central focus of this study, namely the relevant passage of *Confessiones* 4. After summarising this passage, I analyse three key themes in Augustine's narrative. First, I investigate how Augustine's misery and his attempts to avoid it reveal to him the truth that he is always present to himself. Secondly, Augustine is able to identify in retrospect the subjective features of his experience that caused him such suffering, in particular the improper love of worldly things. In ontological terms, Augustine had failed to understand the finite and contingent nature of mundane reality. I consider the psychological effects of this position on Augustine's own state. In exploring these two points, I relate Augustine's treatment of these themes to his classical predecessors and philosophical posterity, in particular Seneca and Heidegger, respectively. Finally, I turn to a distinctively Christian theme, bringing to light a less

¹ Loyola Academy, Theology Department, Wilmette, Illinois, USA; e-mail: matthew.w.knotts@gmail.com; ORCID: 0000-0003-2486-2652.

obvious aspect of this passage, namely the interplay of divine presence and absence. The events of Augustine's life bespeak God's activity and presence therein.

The upshot of this research is an exercise in *cogitare cum Augustino*, a philosophical meditation on metaphysical truths lying hidden in plain sight. Though open to observation, these truths are often only recognised in light of an exceptional event. Such intense "contrast experiences" are not aberrations, but rather represent more intense realisations of being which one has overlooked or forgotten. The reflection on lived experience constitutes a therapeutic pedagogical programme whereby the soul arrives at a proper understanding of the world.

Before proceeding to the text of the *Confessiones* itself, let us briefly consider Augustine's place in the broader scope of the history of philosophy. This will allow both allow us better to understand the content of the relevant location and to situate it within its appropriate intellectual context, namely philosophy as *therapeia*.

2. Classical Philosophy as Therapy

The first task of this article is to situate Augustine within the context of classical philosophy. Through a consideration of scholarly experts, I shall demonstrate not only that classical philosophy understood itself in therapeutic terms, but also that Augustine himself should be situated in this tradition. On this basis, I shall argue that the relevant portion of *Confessiones* 4 should be read as an instance of such *therapeia*.

Thanks to the research of Pierre Hadot, it has become clear how classical philosophy, at least as early as Socrates (469-399 BCE), was construed primarily as a way of life². Robert Cushman, former Research Professor of Systematic Theology at Duke University's Divinity School, confirms this interpretation of early philosophy, in particular in Plato's corpus³. Indeed,

² D. Praet, *Augustine of Hippo and Michel Foucault's History of Sexuality*, in: *Nos sumus tempora: Studies on Augustine and his Reception Offered to Mathijs Lamberigts*, ed. A. Dupont – W. François – J. Leemans, Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium 316, Leuven – Paris – Bristol 2020, p. 213-235, here p. 225. See also W. Löhr, *Christianity as Philosophy: Problems and Perspectives of an Ancient Intellectual Project*, "Vigiliae Christianae" 64/2 (2010) p. 160-188.

³ R. Cushman, *Therapeia: Plato's Conception of Philosophy*, New Brunswick – London 2002.

as the title of his monograph suggests, Cushman construes Plato's philosophy as a form of *therapeia*. He explains how Plato understood the human soul as trapped in a disordered state, with the desire for inferior, material reality dominating. Plato realised that to convince others of their error, he needed more than mere intellectual argument⁴. According to Cushman, Plato articulates his philosophical-therapeutic model to address the challenge presented by the confused state of human nature⁵. In other words, Plato called for a renovation, indeed, a *conversion (metastrophe)* of the self, which involved ethical and affective transformation.

As Cushman explains, Platonic philosophy – in particular dialectic – is *therapeutic* to the extent that it disabuses one of false beliefs and leads one to truth⁶. For Plato, philosophy is the therapy necessary to correct one's incorrect perception of reality. This comprehensive therapeutic process can be described as conversion⁷. Plato recognises that proper knowledge requires a full renovation and reorientation of the mind. Hence philosophical education is without exaggeration a form of *therapeia*⁸.

According to Plato, one grows in knowledge, and indeed, knowledge of self, by engaging in a full reflection on one's experience and the implications thereof⁹. Ultimately, introspective philosophical investigation leads one to realise one's errors and brings one to a crossroads: either one will remain in intolerable contradiction with oneself, or one will renounce one's quondam false beliefs and open oneself to growth. This latter step, continues Cushman, involves an *ethical* choice and requires humility¹⁰. I contend that in locations such as *Confessiones* 4, Augustine is doing precisely this, namely drawing out the implications of his experience through a reflective narration.

Before continuing, I would like to note two further links between Cushman's discussion of Plato and Augustine. According to Plato, writes Cushman, knowledge depends upon the mind's correct disposition towards reality¹¹. As Augustine relates concerning his mental state ca. 375/376, he held a flawed understanding of the world, which was only corrected

⁴ Cushman, *Therapeia*, p. 71, 144, 150, 298.

⁵ Cushman, *Therapeia*, p. 298.

⁶ Cushman, *Therapeia*, p. 300.

⁷ Cushman, *Therapeia*, p. 147.

⁸ Cushman, *Therapeia*, p. xxi.

⁹ Cushman, *Therapeia*, p. 236.

¹⁰ Cushman, *Therapeia*, p. 71, 147, 233, 235, 236, 298, 299.

¹¹ Cushman, *Therapeia*, p. 147.

through a confrontation with the phenomenon of loss and grief. In addition, Plato himself acknowledges the limitations of his own philosophical pedagogy. This focus on philosophy as therapy involving conversion, as well as the apparent necessity of extrinsic assistance, further motivate a consideration of Augustine. Indeed, in the final section of this article, I shall consider Augustine's understanding of the rôle of *conuersio* in his own life, especially in the *Confessiones*.

As Dany Praet states, through a programme of ethical and intellectual praxis, philosophers of antiquity addressed not only life's various challenges, but also the challenge constituted by life itself¹². According to Cicero – who was a key figure in mediating Greek philosophy to the Latin world in general and Augustine in particular¹³ – the soul may experience great suffering in this life. Unlike physical ailments, the causes of and solutions to which originate outside of the body, the soul is the source of its own suffering. However, as Johannes Brachtendorf writes, the capacity to counteract such pain also lies within the soul's power, namely the *therapy of philosophy*¹⁴.

Other philosophers in the Latin tradition engaged in introspection and dialogue to deal with the challenges posed by the fleeting and unstable nature of human existence¹⁵. One of these was Seneca, who, according to Christopher Star, devoted significant attention to the problem of the self and even developed a unique vocabulary to discuss it¹⁶. Notably, John Rist claims that Seneca was a source for Augustine's conception of self-care¹⁷, although the connection of these two thinkers remains relatively unexplored¹⁸. In any case, Seneca's philosophy focused extensively on the self. He advocated a life of contemplation and introspection¹⁹. Furthermore, Seneca was active during a period in which the lived experience of philos-

¹² Praet, *Augustine of Hippo and Michel Foucault's History of Sexuality*, p. 225.

¹³ M. Foley, *Cicero, Augustine, and the Philosophical Roots of the Cassiciacum Dialogues*, "Revue des Études Augustiniennes" 43 (1999) p. 51-77, here p. 53.

¹⁴ J. Brachtendorf, *Cicero and Augustine on the Passions*, "Revue des Études Augustiniennes" 43 (1997) p. 289-308, here p. 289-290, 295.

¹⁵ A. Michel, *Dialogue philosophique et vie intérieure: Cicéron, Sénèque, Saint Augustin*, "Helmantica" 28 (1977) p. 353-376, here p. 365.

¹⁶ C. Star, *Seneca*, London 2017, p. 33.

¹⁷ J. Rist, *What is a Person? Realities, Constructs, Illusions*, Cambridge 2019, p. 47.

¹⁸ J. Lagouanère, *Agustin lector de Séneca: el caso de la bona uoluntas*, "Augustinus" 64/252-253 (2019) p. 193-202, here p. 193. However, Stock is less certain of this connection. See B. Stock, *The Integrated Self: Augustine, the Bible, and Ancient Thought*, Philadelphia 2017, n. 21 to the Introduction.

¹⁹ Star, *Seneca*, p. 32, 33, 56.

ophy was paramount²⁰. As Star writes, “The practice of philosophy itself came to be not only a process of self-discovery, but also a continual process of *therapy* and self-creation. For the Stoics, philosophy was not simply confined to the lecture halls, but a lived experience”²¹.

This survey of classical philosophy is relevant to the present task because it illustrates the understanding of philosophy that Augustine inherited and in some ways transformed. What I want to suggest is that insofar as one is talking about the *Confessiones*, one is speaking of Augustine’s own attempts at philosophical therapy. Indeed, according to Charlotte Köckert, in his early career, Augustine deliberately operated within the classical philosophical tradition of seeking happiness through various practises, a tradition which even in his time was truly ancient²². According to Cushman, Augustine inherits the Platonic tradition of philosophy, in particular in virtue of his emphasis on the necessity of moral transformation for the attainment of knowledge²³. The psychologist Philip Woollcott interprets the *Confessiones* as a form of therapy²⁴. He describes Augustine’s work as a “great therapeutic effort” and identifies therein a certain playful spontaneity which, in my estimation, is consistent with contemporary therapeutic methods²⁵. In his comparative study of Augustine and Freud, William B. Parsons also characterises Augustine’s *Confessiones* as a form of therapy (I return to Parsons’ treatment of the *Confessiones* in Section 5b *infra*)²⁶. These insights indicate, I argue, that the (or at least a) proper hermeneutical framework for the interpretation of *Confessiones* 4 is that of philosophy as *therapeia*.

To summarise the foregoing section, a consideration of secondary literature has demonstrated that classical philosophy was a holistic form of therapy that one could apply to oneself. It served not only to address *ad hoc* concerns arising throughout one’s life, but more fundamentally to help one to deal with life itself. This contextual background informed Augustine’s

²⁰ Star, *Seneca*, p. 32.

²¹ Star, *Seneca*, p. 33; emphasis mine.

²² C. Köckert, *Augustine and Nebridius (Augustine, epp. 3–14): Two Christian Intellectuals and Their Project of a Philosophical Life*, “Revue d’études augustiniennes et patristiques” 62 (2016) p. 235-262, here p. 239-240.

²³ Cushman, *Therapeia*, p. 52-54.

²⁴ Parsons, *Freud and Augustine in Dialogue*, 15.

²⁵ P. Woollcott, *Some Considerations of Creativity and Religious Experience in St. Augustine of Hippo*, “Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion” 5/2 (1966) p. 273-283, here p. 283.

²⁶ Parsons, *Freud and Augustine in Dialogue*, p. 4-5, 25.

own thought. These observations will provide a framework for my reading and interpretation of *Confessiones* 4 as a paradigmatic instance of Augustine performing philosophical therapy.

3. The Death of Augustine's Friend

The account of the death of Augustine's close friend, which occurred ca. 375/376, and thus at least two decades prior to the composition of the *Confessiones*, appears in the fourth book. This book, writes James O'Donnell, is the one most concerned with death²⁷. When his friend – whom Augustine leaves anonymous in his account – fell severely ill, Augustine had hastened to see him. Initially he lay unconscious, during which time he was baptised. Afterwards he recovered briefly, enough to speak with Augustine, who attempted to joke with him about his baptism. However, Augustine's friend rebuked him severely, leaving Augustine utterly astonished and discomfited. In his retrospective account, Augustine believes that his friend ultimately died so that he could be safe from the "heretical" Augustine²⁸.

Shortly thereafter, the friend's condition deteriorated, and he soon expired²⁹. As a result, Augustine describes his heart as being "completely darkened" ("contenebratum") with grief ("dolore")³⁰. Augustine provides a haunting account of how his entire lived experience was transfigured, resulting in tremendous pain ("cruciatum immanem")³¹. Now everything reminds him of his loss. Whatever he sees becomes hateful to him; it is like "death" because his friend is no longer there. Even his home no longer provides any comfort³². (I shall return to this point about God's absence in Section 5 *infra*, for I believe it provides an insight into the deeper theological stakes of this particular passage of the *Confessiones*).

²⁷ Augustyn, *Confessiones*, ed. J.J. O'Donnell, Oxford 1992, at 4, 4, 9. Hereafter, when citing O'Donnell's commentary, I use his name and the location in *conf.* on which he is commenting. I have consulted the edition of the text available at <https://www.stoa.org/hippo/> (accessed: 31.03.2022).

²⁸ Augustine, *Confessiones*, tr. F.J. Sheed, ed. M. Foley, Indianapolis – Cambridge 2006, at 4, 4, 8 (hereafter referenced as *conf.* with localisation).

²⁹ Augustinus, *Confessiones* 4, 4, 8.

³⁰ Augustinus, *Confessiones* 4, 4, 9.

³¹ Augustinus, *Confessiones* 4, 4, 9. The translation "tremendous pain" is mine. Translations are my own, unless otherwise noted.

³² Augustinus, *Confessiones* 4, 4, 9.

Continuing with the narrative of Book IV, Augustine recounts how at that time he believed in a false God (“phantasma”), and thus his soul would not obey the psalmist’s command to hope in God³³. What one can observe here, I argue, is a deeply traumatic experience of grief which begins to disabuse Augustine of certain false notions he had, for instance about the impermanence of human life and his understanding of God. Furthermore, in combination with his narrative reflection in the *Confessiones*, Augustine came to realise the truth of the immediacy of self-presence. In performing this reflection on his experience, it seems to me that Augustine is engaging in precisely the form of philosophical therapy described above. Indeed, Augustine’s own observations support this claim, in particular how his grief and its aftermath led him to become a question to himself³⁴.

As Augustine’s narrative reflection continues, it discloses further psychological insights, which, when properly interpreted and applied, I argue, can have a therapeutic effect. At 4, 5, 10, Augustine considers his own (apparently natural) response to his friend’s death, namely weeping. Among other things, he notices that weeping replaced the friend in bringing him any kind of delight. Why, Augustine wonders, did he cry so much? What point did it serve? And why did he cry out to God in particular? According to O’Donnell, Augustine raises several possibilities for why his tears may have been pleasant, but the conclusion appears to be that although they are sweet in relation to the pain one is experiencing, tears are actually bitter³⁵. That is, his tears were comforting only to the extent that he was otherwise miserable. Perhaps weeping, Augustine suggests, is, so to speak, *bittersweet*³⁶. Augustine ultimately concludes that he resorted to tears because he had not yet learned the appropriate way of loving his friend³⁷.

In the wake of his loss, Augustine realised other notable aspects of his psychological state. He felt that his deceased friend was his counterpart. O’Donnell notes that the Augustine of 375/376 would have looked at his grief in terms of classical myth³⁸. That is, Augustine was afraid to live (as half a person) and afraid to die (lest his friend too be utterly destroyed).

³³ Augustinus, *Confessiones* 4, 4, 9.

³⁴ Augustinus, *Confessiones* 4, 4, 9.

³⁵ Augustinus, *Confessiones*, 4, 5, 10.

³⁶ Augustinus, *Confessiones* 4, 5, 10.

³⁷ Augustinus, *Confessiones* 4, 5, 10.

³⁸ Augustinus, *Confessiones* 4, 6, 11. However, Augustine suggests in his *Retractationes* 2, 6, 2 that even this reference is more sentimental than expressive of Christian love.

Thus he reached an impasse: he was afraid to die, yet hated living³⁹. In my estimation, this passage shows that Augustine's false beliefs about the nature of created being, combined with the death of his friend, led him to an unbearable inner state, in particular wanting neither to live nor to die. Because of this incoherence, Augustine tries to escape from himself, rather than confront his inner turmoil. Notably, this reflects the critical point to which Platonic *therapeia* is designed to lead the soul (cf. section 1, *supra*). When one reaches this fork in the road, one has the opportunity to renounce one's false opinions and grow in truth⁴⁰. In Augustine's case, however, he had to await comprehensive moral transformation.

Despite his various attempts to flee from himself and his own unbearable state, Augustine was unsuccessful. It remained the case that he was constantly reminded of his loss by the absence of his friend, and only groaning and tears could provide any relief, however partial. Ultimately, Augustine changed his surroundings and moved to Carthage, for at least in this new place his eyes were not accustomed to seeking his friend⁴¹. In the following section, I shall discuss the work of Seneca on self-presence, the purpose of which is to illuminate how in fleeing to Carthage, Augustine is still engaged in the misguided and ultimately unattainable desire to escape himself.

4. Immediacy of Self-Presence

*The mind is its own place, and in itself
Can make a Heav'n of Hell, a Hell of Heav'n.*

Milton, *Paradise Lost* I, 254-255

The sudden and irrevocable rupture in Augustine's relationship with his friend reveals to him what was always already the case, namely that he is ineluctably with and present to himself. In *Confessiones* 4, Augustine carries his wounded soul like a burden ("portabam enim concisam et cruentem animam meam impatientem portari a me, et ubi eam ponerem non inueniebam")⁴². Augustine tries to place his soul somewhere where it can find rest, but it only falls down upon him again⁴³. He could neither stand to

³⁹ Augustinus, *Confessiones* 4, 6, 11.

⁴⁰ Cushman, *Therapeia*, p. 71, 147, 233, 235, 236, 298.

⁴¹ Augustinus, *Confessiones* 4, 7, 12.

⁴² Augustinus, *Confessiones* 4, 7, 12.

⁴³ Augustinus, *Confessiones* 4, 7, 12.

be with himself, nor could he escape from himself⁴⁴. Augustine relates his unsuccessful attempts to find refuge in sense pleasures, with which he was already familiar⁴⁵. As O'Donnell states in his commentary on *Confessiones* 4, 7, 12, Augustine had rested in the “concupiscentia carnis” and subsequently the “concupiscentia oculorum”⁴⁶. However, when confronted with the death of his friend, these distractions no longer sufficed as an escape from life's challenges⁴⁷. Thus Augustine becomes for himself an “infelix locus”: No matter what he did, he could find no rest, no peace. Indeed, where could one go, Augustine wonders, to escape from oneself?⁴⁸ In this negative way, I argue, Augustine is confronted with the truth of the immediacy of self-presence.

4.1. The Immediacy of Self-Presence in Seneca's *Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium*

Seneca discusses this theme of immediate self-presence in one of his two philosophical *opera magna*, the *Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium*. According to Star, though Seneca's philosophical works are generally difficult to date with any precision, it is fairly clear that these letters, which are mostly extant, were composed between 62 and 65 CE⁴⁹. They may seem autobiographical, but as Star writes, the *Epistulae* are “conscious literary and philosophical constructions”⁵⁰ intended as a model for others to emulate⁵¹. They are also an example of spiritual exercises⁵². As Alain Michel observes, in his missives to Lucilius, Seneca is teaching his friend how to manage the vicissitudes of life, and indeed, how to die⁵³.

⁴⁴ Augustinus, *Confessiones* 4, 7, 12: “ego mihi remanseram infelix locus, ubi nec esse possem nec inde recedere. quo enim cor meum fugeret a corde meo? quo a me ipso fugerem? quo non me sequerem?”.

⁴⁵ Augustinus, *Confessiones* 4, 7, 12.

⁴⁶ Augustinus, *Confessiones* 4, 7, 12.

⁴⁷ Augustinus, *Confessiones* 4, 7, 12.

⁴⁸ Augustinus, *Confessiones* 4, 7, 12.

⁴⁹ Star, *Seneca*, p. 55, 56.

⁵⁰ Star, *Seneca*, p. 60.

⁵¹ Star, *Seneca*, p. 60-61.

⁵² Star, *Seneca*, p. 61.

⁵³ Michel, *Dialogue philosophique et vie intérieure*, p. 368.

Seneca directly addresses self-presence in two of his *Epistulae Morales*, numbers 28 and 104. He opens the former with a rebuke of Lucilius, stating that in the attempt to flee from oneself, one is nonetheless present⁵⁴:

Do you think you are the only one this has happened to? Are you amazed to find that even with such extensive travel, to so many varied locales, you have not managed to shake off gloom and heaviness from your mind? As if that were a new experience! You must change the mind, not the venue. Though you cross the sea, though “lands and cities drop away,” as our poet Virgil says, still your faults will follow you wherever you go⁵⁵.

In other words, no amount of movement will make any difference until one addresses the source of one’s turmoil, one’s own self. One must acquire knowledge and skills for the mind, and this cannot be accomplished through travel⁵⁶. In both *epistola* 28 and *epistola* 104, Seneca quotes Socrates to the effect that one always travels with oneself, and indeed, all of one’s spiritual and mental burdens⁵⁷. One overcomes one’s inner problems not by local motion but by changing oneself and one’s character⁵⁸. Seneca, I contend, has here presented a therapeutic lesson for his readers.

In these letters, Seneca takes a further step, arguing that travel undertaken for the sake of escaping one’s problems may actually make matters worse. He likens the burdens of the mind to the cargo of a ship, which is tossed around and may cause a ship to capsize⁵⁹. In addition, he suggests that such movement from place to place is harmful because it is like “jostling someone who is sick”⁶⁰. The various trips one takes are vain attempts to distract oneself from difficulties one is experiencing, and their success becomes increasingly ephemeral⁶¹. Indeed, the novelty simply irritates one further and makes one want to leave the new place as soon

⁵⁴ For a further discussion of *Confessiones* IV in light of Latin literature, see Augustinus, *Confessiones* 4, 7, 12.

⁵⁵ Lucius Annaeus Seneca, *Epistulae Morales ad Lucilium*, ed. R. Gummere, London 1917-1925; Lucius Annaeus Seneca, *Letters on Ethics to Lucilius*, tr. M. Graver – A.A. Long, The Complete Works of Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Chicago – London 2015, *ep.* 28, 1, p. 96-97 (hereafter cited with localisation and page numbers in the translation).

⁵⁶ Seneca, *Epistulae* 104, 19, p. 415.

⁵⁷ Seneca, *Epistulae* 28, 2; 104, 7; 17-18, p. 96-97; 413; 415.

⁵⁸ Seneca, *Epistulae* 104, 8, p. 413.

⁵⁹ Seneca, *Epistulae* 28, 3, p. 97.

⁶⁰ Seneca, *Epistulae* 28, 3, tr. Graver – Long, p. 97.

⁶¹ Seneca, *Epistulae* 104, 13, p. 414.

as one arrives⁶². Seneca's text suggests that this continuous avoidance, though present in the form of movement from place to place, can also be realised in the form of a constant shift in one's attention. Even in calm places, one finds a way to distract oneself⁶³. In my estimation, Seneca's observation in this context is noteworthy, insofar as it radicalises the presence of self to self. Moreover, he continues the therapeutic emphasis on relieving one's inner turmoil.

Furthermore, one can locate in Seneca's text a distinction between proper travel on the one hand and wandering on the other⁶⁴. When one's soul is in turmoil, one is really searching for happiness, but this is not a place, but a state of mind⁶⁵. I would argue that one sees a similar dynamic in Augustine's restless and frantic search for security and peace in the various distractions and pleasures of the flesh, and ultimately his movement to Carthage. In doing this, Augustine intensified his *auersio* from himself and from God (for more on *auersio*, cf. section 5a *infra*), yielding only greater unhappiness. I interpret Seneca as arguing that wandering becomes a form of avoidance, in particular the ineluctable aspects of the human condition. No movement in space, he counsels, can remove the burden of anxiety that comes from the improper approach to human existence⁶⁶.

4.1.1. Qualifications of Seneca's Position

Seneca's argument therefore is that through travel one may learn and perceive interesting things in the world, yet "it will not improve [one], either in body or in mind"⁶⁷. In light of Seneca's claims, I would like to play "devil's advocate". Any reader, but especially a contemporary one, may question Seneca's account in the following manner. Seneca seems to speak like a radical dualist, as if the mind and the body were entirely separate. Yet the Stoics acknowledged that human persons are somehow a unity of body and mind⁶⁸. If that is the case, then how can Seneca maintain strictly

⁶² Seneca, *Epistulae* 104, 14, p. 415.

⁶³ Seneca, *Epistulae* 104, 7, p. 413.

⁶⁴ Seneca, *Epistulae* 104, 16, p. 415.

⁶⁵ Seneca, *Epistulae* 28, 5, p. 97.

⁶⁶ Seneca, *Epistulae* 104, 19, p. 415-16.

⁶⁷ Seneca, *Epistulae* 104, 15, tr. Graver – Long, p. 415.

⁶⁸ See, *inter alia*, C. Gill, *The Ancient Self: Issues and Approaches*, in: *Ancient Philosophy of the Self*, ed. P. Remes – J. Sihvola, Springer 2008, p. 35-56, here p. 52.

that one's location has no bearing on one's mental state? It seems fairly intuitive and unobjectionable to suppose that going to different places has a salubrious effect on the mind. In the midst of the day, one leaves one's home or one's office to "get some fresh air", and ideally one takes a holiday from time to time to escape the stresses of one's daily life and recharge. The spiritual benefit of changing one's location seems so obvious that it hardly requires argument. In general terms, how can one account for the apparently counterintuitive claim that one's mental state can and should be regulated apart from one's spatial location?

I contend that the foregoing observations – some of which Seneca himself seems to anticipate – help to clarify the true sense of his argument. Seneca is certainly aware of and even acknowledges the importance of one's environment. In this context, however, he himself adds some qualifications which I would like to emphasise. For one, the individual development of the person must be taken into consideration. While some souls are strong and able to manage in difficult situations, others are weak, and require greater serenity in their surroundings⁶⁹. Though external factors, such as the company one keeps, can cause one harm or move one to evil, in such a case the vice already has established a place in one's soul⁷⁰. Moreover, even a sound mind should not go in search of distraction. The wise person does not seek the tumult of political life, but endures it if necessary⁷¹. Nonetheless, one can and indeed must preserve some mental quietude even in the midst of the frenetic activity of the city⁷².

On the basis of the foregoing observations from Seneca's text, I interpret him as arguing that one's happiness is a state of the soul, and thus to achieve it the soul itself must be treated. Seneca himself suggests that in certain cases, local motion could be foreseen as practically necessary, though always as a means to the end of philosophical-psychological therapy: "Where you go matters less than who you are when you go"⁷³. The more one acknowledges this truth, the more one is able to maintain one's peace of mind in a variety of circumstances, even very difficult ones⁷⁴. This acknowledgement also opens one to a greater contact with one's fellow human beings and the world as a whole, allowing one to embrace a tru-

⁶⁹ Seneca, *Epistulae* 28, 6, p. 97.

⁷⁰ Seneca, *Epistulae* 104, 21, p. 416.

⁷¹ Seneca, *Epistulae* 28, 7, p. 98.

⁷² Seneca, *Epistulae* 104, 7, p. 413.

⁷³ Seneca, *Epistulae* 28, 4, tr. Graver – Long, p. 97.

⁷⁴ Seneca, *Epistulae* 28, 4, p. 97.

ly cosmopolitan spirit, according to which one's "homeland is the entire world"⁷⁵.

4.1.2. Seneca's Suggested Programme

If one reads Seneca's account as a form of therapy, his diagnosis of one's condition has been clarified. From this the question of treatment naturally arises. Quoting Epicurus, Seneca states that the first step to healing is the acknowledgement of one's faults. Only then can one even consider improvement⁷⁶. Furthermore, Seneca suggests that a major fault is the failure to regulate one's desires⁷⁷. In particular, one must free oneself from the love of wealth and pleasure, which continue to burden the soul by making it vulnerable to the changes in the world⁷⁸. (I argue that this point in particular, namely the suffering caused by one's concern about life's vicissitudes, is also reflected in Heidegger's understanding of the fear-structure in *Dasein*.) Instead, one must value the goods of the soul above everything else⁷⁹, the accomplishment of which requires careful training. Seneca recommends the disciplined study of classical authorities on *sapientia*, which will gradually liberate the soul⁸⁰. Such a programme will provide the necessary lessons in what is intrinsically good, just, and desirable⁸¹. The most valuable lesson for one's studies is how to be resilient in the face of the tribulations of human life: "There is only one haven for this stormy and turbulent life of ours: to rise above future events, to stand firm, ready to receive the blows of fortune head-on, out in the open and unflinchingly"⁸².

This is by no means an easy task, but Seneca believes it is entirely possible. He looks to the precedent of historical figures, namely Socrates and Cato, to substantiate his claims. Both of these men maintained their equanimity of soul in the midst of political upheaval and personal suffering⁸³. As Plato suggests through the character of Socrates in the *Apology*, Seneca

⁷⁵ Seneca, *Epistulae* 28, 4, tr. Graver – Long, p. 97.

⁷⁶ Seneca, *Epistulae* 28, 9-10, p. 98.

⁷⁷ Seneca, *Epistulae* 104, 20, p. 416.

⁷⁸ Seneca, *Epistulae* 104, 34, p. 419.

⁷⁹ Seneca, *Epistulae* 104, 34, p. 419.

⁸⁰ Seneca, *Epistulae* 104, 16, p. 415.

⁸¹ Seneca, *Epistulae* 104, 16, p. 415.

⁸² Seneca, *Epistulae* 104, 22, tr. Graver – Long, p. 416.

⁸³ Seneca, *Epistulae* 104, 27-33, p. 417-19.

states that there is a certain freedom of soul, even when one is bound⁸⁴. Socrates and Cato demonstrate that when one ceases to fear misfortune, one can become resilient in the face of all kinds of external trouble⁸⁵. These paradigmatic figures of classical history, according to Seneca, are extraordinary precisely in the sense that they are fully human. It is proper to human nature not to seek the safest condition in terms of bodily needs, but rather to live in an honourable manner⁸⁶. Seneca believes that anyone can achieve great things, overcome hardships, and complete apparently impossible missions. The question is whether one is willing⁸⁷.

4.2. Heidegger's Reception of Augustine concerning Immediate Self-Presence

The approach to philosophy as a form of therapy, described *supra*, which integrates the ethical, the intellectual, and the experiential, is central to Augustine, who in turn has become a source for numerous subsequent philosophers. One of these is Heidegger, who, according to Sophie-Jan Arrien, understands philosophy as possessed of an enormous "practical" significance⁸⁸. Through philosophical praxis, one can address and deal with the condition of one's existence⁸⁹. In due course we shall see how this "therapeutic" (my gloss) conception of philosophy occupies a central place in Heidegger's thought and is informed by Augustine.

In this section, I shall spend a moment focusing on Ryan Coyne's treatment of Heidegger in the former's 2015 monograph from the University of Chicago Press, the published version of his dissertation. According to Coyne, Associate Professor of the Philosophy of Religions and Theology at the University of Chicago and former doctoral student of Jean-Luc Marion, Heidegger revisits the ontological identity of the self for the first time in modern philosophy⁹⁰.

⁸⁴ Seneca, *Epistulae* 28, 8, p. 98.

⁸⁵ Seneca, *Epistulae* 104, 34, p. 419.

⁸⁶ Seneca, *Epistulae* 104, 23, p. 416.

⁸⁷ Seneca, *Epistulae* 104, 25-26, p. 417.

⁸⁸ S.-J. Arrien, *Penser sans Dieu, vivre avec Dieu: Heidegger lecteur d'Augustin*, "Esprit" 1 (2013) p. 68-80, here p. 71.

⁸⁹ Arrien, *Penser sans Dieu, vivre avec Dieu*, p. 71.

⁹⁰ R. Coyne, *Heidegger's Confessions: The Remains of Being and Time in St. Augustine and Beyond*, Chicago – London 2015, p. 54.

I closely focus on Coyne's treatment of Heidegger for three particular reasons. First, he closely connects Augustine's thought – in particular in the *Confessiones* – with that of Heidegger, especially on factual life. Secondly, he shows how Augustine informs Heidegger's own understanding of Dasein as inherently reflexive; in other words, under Augustine's influence, Heidegger articulates the fundamental truth of immediate self-presence. It will become clear that the apparent truism that one is always with oneself is possessed of profound philosophical significance. Finally, and following from the second point, Heidegger proceeds to identify the nature of Dasein as a question to itself, the very idea that we find in Book IV of the *Confessiones* (“factus eram ipse mihi magna quaestio”)⁹¹.

As Coyne explains, Heidegger wishes to acknowledge the fundamental insights of Descartes while also correcting what he sees as the latter's errors. According to Heidegger, argues Coyne, Descartes correctly identifies the presence to self that is inherent in human life. However, Heidegger holds that Descartes fails to distinguish conscious or rational life as a distinct form of being from that of things in the world, mere objects. For Heidegger, the insight of Descartes' *cogito* is that thinking is always reflexive⁹². In his own work, Heidegger argues that Dasein is characterised by an inherent self-presence⁹³. However, Heidegger thinks that Descartes conflates human existence (“Dasein”) with thinghood (“object at hand”)⁹⁴. As Coyne writes, Heidegger wishes to revise Descartes' *cogito*, a task which leads him in 1921 to a sustained study of Augustine⁹⁵.

The upshot of Coyne's analysis is to demonstrate that while Descartes' self is characterised by “Vorhandensein,” Augustine's is “aus der Hand gegeben”⁹⁶. Whereas the Cartesian subject attempts to eliminate uncertainty and the concomitant anxiety, the fact of *having-* or *being-a-self* implies that anxiety is a constant part of one's existence. Confronted with the disturbing implications of its condition, factual life may flee from its own insecurity, for instance by “caring” for worldly objects in an attempt to escape from itself⁹⁷. In so doing, Dasein falsely thinks of itself as a product,

⁹¹ Augustinus, *Confessiones* 4, 4, 9.

⁹² Coyne, *Heidegger's Confessions*, p. 58-59.

⁹³ Coyne, *Heidegger's Confessions*, p. 83.

⁹⁴ Coyne, *Heidegger's Confessions*, p. 56.

⁹⁵ Coyne, *Heidegger's Confessions*, p. 53.

⁹⁶ Coyne, *Heidegger's Confessions*, p. 77.

⁹⁷ Coyne, *Heidegger's Confessions*, p. 80, 84.

which exerts a tranquilising effect on the self⁹⁸. When it ceases to hide from itself, according to Heidegger, Dasein encounters the burden of *having-to-be*, and encounters the uncanny feeling of not being at home in this world, “Unheimlichkeit”⁹⁹. Through anxiety, Dasein confronts its being immediately¹⁰⁰. Through similar challenging emotions, both Augustine and Seneca realise how the self is confronted with its own presence, even though this is a more fundamental reality that often goes unnoticed.

In my estimation, Augustine was rudely summoned from his erstwhile hiding place in the familiarity of sense pleasures. In Heideggerian terms, I would argue that Augustine’s flight from the unbearable pain of his existence represents an attempt to treat himself as an object, a mere thing. However, according to Heidegger, life never fully escapes itself; it still encounters itself even and especially in its disguises¹⁰¹. This encounter with self, I believe, is precisely what one sees in the respective texts of Augustine and Seneca *supra*.

Ultimately one experiences oneself as a question, to which there is no final answer¹⁰². Thus Heidegger concludes that Dasein is essentially “Fraglichsein”¹⁰³. Here Coyne makes a point crucial for this study: Augustine’s influence on Heidegger can be seen especially in the latter’s understanding of Dasein as inherently *fraglich*. This influence arises in particular from Augustine’s unique approach to self-interrogation found in the *Confessiones*. Augustinian questioning expresses the “fact” of having a self. The upshot is a critique of the Cartesian preoccupation with certainty. Questioning becomes the way of expressing a primordial mode of existence in which one is confronted with one’s own existence in the world¹⁰⁴. Because the soul possesses itself to the extent that it relinquishes itself, it must learn to appreciate its nothingness and thus avoid collapsing on itself¹⁰⁵. In this attempt to prevent Dasein’s downfall, I believe that we see a further aspect to Heidegger’s therapeutic philosophical praxis.

⁹⁸ Coyne, *Heidegger’s Confessions*, p. 94.

⁹⁹ Coyne, *Heidegger’s Confessions*, p. 84.

¹⁰⁰ Coyne, *Heidegger’s Confessions*, p. 84.

¹⁰¹ Coyne, *Heidegger’s Confessions*, p. 83.

¹⁰² Coyne, *Heidegger’s Confessions*, p. 78-79.

¹⁰³ Coyne, *Heidegger’s Confessions*, p. 61.

¹⁰⁴ Coyne, *Heidegger’s Confessions*, p. 61.

¹⁰⁵ Coyne, *Heidegger’s Confessions*, p. 76.

5. The Contingency of Being

Augustine's intense grief at the loss of his friend, followed by being plunged into darkness concerning himself, compels him to reflect on the source of his bitterness. In this respect, he provides further insights pertinent both to antiquity and to contemporary philosophy, in particular on the inherently fleeting nature of reality. Augustine had succumbed to the immoderate love of earthly things, as if they were permanent, and thus he was devastated at their loss. In other words, he treated created things as if they were uncreated, as if they could never perish, including his friend. "O madness that knows not how to love men as men!" exclaims Augustine, continuing, "O foolish man to bear the lot of man so rebelliously!"¹⁰⁶. Moreover, Augustine makes explicit in striking fashion a tendency within human nature to cling to things that one has from the fear of losing them. In his own case, Augustine became especially fearful of death, which could apparently seize one's life at any moment¹⁰⁷. The particularly disturbing insight from this reflection is that the death of Augustine's friend reveals what is always true of human life, although usually easier to ignore, namely its utter contingency. A major event reveals – at the personal level as well as the global level, and others still – that the world only masquerades as permanent and stable¹⁰⁸. This insight leads one to a consideration of how Heidegger grapples with this feature of human life.

5.1. Heidegger on the Impermanence of Factual Life

Arrien notes the link between Heidegger's conception of factual life and Book X of the *Confessiones*¹⁰⁹. Similarly, I contend that the foregoing themes from *Confessiones* 4 anticipate Heidegger's own understanding of "Faktizität". In this section, I would like further to explore a topic pertinent to the concept of factual life, namely the impermanence of human life, or more specifically, Dasein's disposition towards this fundamental truth. A prime example of this idea in Heidegger's thought is located in §30 of *Sein und Zeit* (1927), in which Heidegger treats of the fear-structure of Dasein. In this passage, Heidegger articulates how the complex experi-

¹⁰⁶ Augustinus, *Confessiones* 4, 7, 12, tr. Sheed, p. 61.

¹⁰⁷ Augustinus, *Confessiones* 4, 6, 11.

¹⁰⁸ Coyne, *Heidegger's Confessions*, p. 80, 85.

¹⁰⁹ Arrien, *Penser sans Dieu, vivre avec Dieu*, p. 72.

ence of fear bespeaks the precarious nature of human life. Heidegger distinguishes three aspects of the phenomenon of fear: (1) the fearsome, or the thing in the world that causes fear; (2) the act/experience of fearing; and (3) that about which or on behalf of which we fear, namely Dasein itself. In virtue of being-in-the-world, fearing is always a possible state-of-mind for Dasein¹¹⁰.

In fact, as Heidegger writes, “Dasein as Being-in-the-world is ‘fearful’ [“furchtsam”]”¹¹¹. The entire complex of fear bespeaks the nature of Dasein as Being-in¹¹², and more specifically that through fear, Dasein experiences itself as lacking and needy¹¹³. By its very nature, Dasein is bound to things and expresses its being in the form of concern. When a thing is placed in jeopardy, one’s own being is affected¹¹⁴. When one fears about another, one is ultimately afraid about oneself, more specifically the loss of one’s opportunity for Being-with another¹¹⁵.

As I see it, Heidegger’s discussion of fear reflects Augustine’s phenomenological reflection on this theme in *Confessiones* 4, in particular the way in which fear occurs even if the potential loss or event one fears does not actually occur. As Heidegger explains, one identifies the fearsome even before it draws close¹¹⁶. The matter which one finds threatening is not yet in one’s immediate vicinity. However, it draws nearer, and in so doing acquires a threatening character¹¹⁷. As Heidegger writes, “it can reach us, but it may not. As it draws close, this ‘it can, and yet in the end it may not’ becomes aggravated”¹¹⁸. In other words, that which is feared may continue to approach, yet it may just as well recede and cause no harm. Nonetheless, this constant uncertainty exacerbates one’s anxiety: “This implies that what is detrimental as coming-close close by carries with it the patent possibility that it may stay away and pass us by; but instead of lessening or extinguishing our fearing, this enhances it”¹¹⁹.

¹¹⁰ M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, tr. J. Macquarie – E. Robinson, Oxford – Cambridge 2001, §30, p. 180.

¹¹¹ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §30, tr. Macquarie – Robinson, p. 182.

¹¹² Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §30, p. 181.

¹¹³ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §30, p. 181: “Fear discloses Dasein predominantly in a privative way”.

¹¹⁴ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §30, p. 180-181.

¹¹⁵ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §30, tr. Macquarie – Robinson, p. 181.

¹¹⁶ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §30, tr. Macquarie – Robinson, p. 180.

¹¹⁷ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §30, tr. Macquarie – Robinson, p. 179-180.

¹¹⁸ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §30, tr. Macquarie – Robinson, p. 179-180.

¹¹⁹ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §30, tr. Macquarie – Robinson, p. 180.

According to Heidegger, Augustine recognises the crucial truth that human being is characterised by *priuatio/carentia*¹²⁰. As a result, one can never rest in the joys of this life¹²¹. The happy life remains a “transcendental” horizon for the believer, beyond one’s reach¹²². As “metaphysical straddlers” (Kenyon’s term), humans exist in a constant tension between the world of time and space on the one hand and that of eternity on the other¹²³. One is beset by the constant temptation to fix constituents of the former as if they belonged to the latter, hence the suffering caused by *molestia* is realised both in fear of difficulty and desire for happiness¹²⁴. I argue that Heidegger captures this very dynamic in §30 of *Sein und Zeit*. As Arrien continues, such an analysis discloses the temporal and ephemeral element of each moment of life, revealing facticity’s mode as one of waiting or expectation with respect to the future¹²⁵. However, Heidegger stresses that the real danger of factual life consists not in the care itself but in the tendency to dispersion¹²⁶. Heidegger’s advice is not to cling to things, but rather to allow them to appear and disappear according to the ebb and flow proper to the natural world. In this way, one can preserve oneself from unnecessary suffering. In Sean Hannan’s words, “As shepherds of Being, not of beings, it is not our role to preserve beings in their particularity (thus risking *adikia*), but to instead remember the rhythm in which they arise and pass away”¹²⁷.

5.2. The Classical Approach to Contingency in Seneca

In a recent article, James I. Porter traces a line of enquiry concerning the self, which begins with Heraclitus and carries through to Augustine. According to this anthropology, which Porter argues is paradigmatic for classical philosophy, especially Stoicism, the self appears as an insoluble if ineluctable conundrum¹²⁸. Similarly, Porter sees an appreciation of the

¹²⁰ Coyne, *Heidegger’s Confessions*, p. 80.

¹²¹ Arrien, *Penser sans Dieu, vivre avec Dieu*, p. 77.

¹²² Arrien, *Penser sans Dieu, vivre avec Dieu*, p. 73.

¹²³ E. Kenyon, *Augustine and the Dialogue*, Cambridge 2018, p. 156.

¹²⁴ Arrien, *Penser sans Dieu, vivre avec Dieu*, p. 75.

¹²⁵ Arrien, *Penser sans Dieu, vivre avec Dieu*, p. 75.

¹²⁶ Arrien, *Penser sans Dieu, vivre avec Dieu*, p. 75.

¹²⁷ S. Hannan, *To See Coming: Augustine and Heidegger on the Arising and Passing Away of Things*, “Medieval Mystical Theology” 21/1 (2012) p. 75-91, here p. 84.

¹²⁸ J.I. Porter, *Time for Foucault? Reflections on the Roman Self from Seneca to Augustine*, “Foucault Studies” 22 (2017) p. 113-133, here p. 113, 114.

fleeting character of human life as a unifying feature of Roman accounts of the self¹²⁹.

In locations such as *Dialogues* 6, 11, 3 and *Quaestiones Naturales* 6, 2, 3, Seneca gestures towards the utter nothingness of the self lying hidden in plain sight¹³⁰. He does so through his analysis of an “abyssal object”, that is, a negation of something, and indeed, one that pushes one to the limits of reason and experience and confronts one with one’s nothingness¹³¹. For example, Seneca’s account of the fluid nature of time – which reflects Augustine’s thoughts on the same theme in *Confessiones* 11 – pushes him into the abyss¹³². Of course, as Augustine has suggested, death is the abyssal object *par excellence*. Seneca too recognises how the question of death overwhelms one and pushes one beyond the bounds of reason. One is forced to reckon with the fact that human life appears to hover precariously between being and nothingness¹³³.

5.2.1. Contingency and Finitude Revealed through the Experience of Nature

Elsewhere, Seneca continues his discussion of the impermanence of human life, and in so doing, I argue, continues to sketch a therapeutic treatment for the human soul. In addition to time and death, Seneca’s observation of the natural world bespeaks the unstable and precarious nature of human existence. In light of the sheer force of nature, we humans are reduced from subjects to objects, losing the capacity for self-determination¹³⁴. Seneca expounds upon this topic at the beginning of the sixth book of his *Quaestiones Naturales*, which deals with earthquakes. He begins by referring to an actual earthquake that had recently struck the region of Campania¹³⁵. In this respect, Seneca notes how an earthquake is an appar-

¹²⁹ Porter, *Time for Foucault?*, p. 130.

¹³⁰ Porter, *Time for Foucault?*, p. 122.

¹³¹ Porter, *Time for Foucault?*, p. 122.

¹³² On this point in Seneca, see Porter, *Time for Foucault?*, p. 122, 123.

¹³³ Porter, *Time for Foucault?*, p. 124.

¹³⁴ Porter, *Time for Foucault?*, p. 122.

¹³⁵ Lucius Annaeus Seneca, *Naturales quaestiones*, tr. H. Hine, Lucius Annaeus Seneca, *Natural Questions*, The Complete Works of Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Chicago – London 2010, 6, 1, 1, p. 87 (Hereafter with localisation and page numbers from the Hine translation).

ently distinct form of disaster. Other catastrophes, such as fires, plagues, or wars, are escapable and have a defined scope. Yet the destructive force of an earthquake seems far more fundamental and comprehensive than anything else humans may experience¹³⁶.

Seneca uses this event to reflect on the contingent nature not merely of human existence, but of the natural world as well. In the wake of such destruction in Campania, many people fled to live elsewhere. Yet what makes them think, Seneca wonders, that any other place will not meet the same fate?¹³⁷ In addition to the sheer destructive force of this event, the time of year it occurred was also significant, as it happened during winter, a season traditionally considered safe from such natural disasters¹³⁸. One deludes oneself into believing that one can permanently secure happiness¹³⁹. Seneca sees in one's flight a vain search for certainty and stability in a world that ultimately lacks such¹⁴⁰. "Everywhere shares the same condition, and, if not yet shaken by an earthquake, still it can be shaken. Perhaps this spot on which you are standing too confidently will be torn apart tonight, or today before nightfall"¹⁴¹. All parts of the world are susceptible to destruction at any moment¹⁴². Crucially, the extreme case of the earthquake allows one to perceive the utter contingency and finitude at the root of being. It is not a qualitatively different kind of event, but simply a less common instance of an abiding truth. Thus, the very nature of reality at its foundation is like that of the ground during an earthquake¹⁴³.

This insight, rather than cause despair, can actually be a source of hope, according to Seneca¹⁴⁴. We are very frail and susceptible to harm from many sources, including familiar ones¹⁴⁵. Why be terrified of earthquakes or other disasters when familiar things can cause death as well?¹⁴⁶. "How foolish", Seneca thinks, "to tremble at the sea when you know you could be killed by a drop of water!"¹⁴⁷. We fear large-scale events of nature when the same

¹³⁶ Seneca, *Naturales quaestiones* 6, 1, 6-7, p. 88.

¹³⁷ Seneca, *Naturales quaestiones* 6, 1, 10, p. 89.

¹³⁸ Seneca, *Naturales quaestiones* 6, 1, 1, p. 87.

¹³⁹ Seneca, *Naturales quaestiones* 6, 1, 14, p. 89.

¹⁴⁰ Seneca, *Naturales quaestiones* 6, 1, 15, p. 89.

¹⁴¹ Seneca, *Naturales quaestiones* 6, 1, 11, tr. Hine, p. 89.

¹⁴² Seneca, *Naturales quaestiones* 6, 1, 12, p. 89.

¹⁴³ Cf. Porter, *Time for Foucault?*, p. 122.

¹⁴⁴ Seneca, *Naturales quaestiones* 6, 2, 1-2, p. 89-90.

¹⁴⁵ Seneca, *Naturales quaestiones* 6, 2, 3, p. 90.

¹⁴⁶ Seneca, *Naturales quaestiones* 6, 2, 3-5, p. 90.

¹⁴⁷ Seneca, *Naturales quaestiones* 6, 2, 5, tr. Hine, p. 90.

result can come from something close to us¹⁴⁸. “What is more foolish than being afraid of [the earth’s] swaying or of the sudden collapse of mountainsides and invasions of the sea as it races beyond the shoreline, when death is present everywhere and can attack from anywhere, and nothing is too tiny to be able to bring destruction to humankind?”¹⁴⁹. Regardless of how it happens, death is inevitable for all. A death by one cause is no better or worse than a death by another¹⁵⁰. One eradicates fear by realising that one should be wary of all things¹⁵¹. When one acquires appropriate knowledge about the nature of things, one is able to mollify one’s fear and live free of such troubles¹⁵². I contend that through his critical investigation of the natural world and one’s experience of it, one can apply a therapeutic balm to the apprehensive heart.

5.2.2. Time and Flux as Constitutive of Human Life

In *epistola* 104, Seneca addresses the reality of loss in ways which, in my estimation, are congenial both to Heidegger’s conception of factical life and to the conclusions Augustine draws in *Confessiones* 4. Seneca writes to Lucilius that one erroneously considers the loss of a loved one a terrible tragedy, when in fact it is like mourning a leaf that inevitably falls from a tree¹⁵³. In this respect, Seneca anticipates an objection from Lucilius, namely that those who are lost are permanently changed. This insight, while true, provides an opportunity to bring to light a more fundamental if less obvious truth, namely the fact that one is constantly in flux oneself. The failure to acknowledge this fact will cause one only greater suffering: “You will not be conscious of these changes, nor will you be able to remedy the afflictions, but you will nonetheless make trouble for yourself by hoping for some things and despairing of others”¹⁵⁴. The self is slipping away and changing at every moment, though this is easy to overlook, in contrast to the loss of a loved one, which occurs outside of oneself. Thus the loss of another person represents a more conspicuous instance of a con-

¹⁴⁸ Seneca, *Naturales quaestiones* 6, 2, 6, p. 90.

¹⁴⁹ Seneca, *Naturales quaestiones* 6, 2, 6, tr. Hine, p. 90.

¹⁵⁰ Seneca, *Naturales quaestiones* 6, 2, 7, p. 90.

¹⁵¹ Seneca, *Naturales quaestiones* 6, 2, 3, p. 90.

¹⁵² Seneca, *Naturales quaestiones* 6, 3, 2, p. 91.

¹⁵³ Seneca, *Epistulae* 104, 11, p. 414.

¹⁵⁴ Seneca, *Epistulae* 104, 12, tr. Graver – Long, p. 414.

stant reality¹⁵⁵. The lesson Seneca draws is that all things move and change, they come and go in their due season. One must learn to enjoy things as they are but not cling to them as if they are or could be permanent¹⁵⁶. If one can appropriate Seneca's insights, I think, one can reduce or even prevent trouble for oneself.

I want to suggest that Seneca's observations also yield the following insights concerning the previous discussion of the *Confessiones*. In his *aversio* from God, Augustine failed to perceive this fundamental truth about the ephemeral nature of things, the ignorance of which caused him great pain. It is to this topic that we now turn.

6. Encountering God in *Confessiones* IV: Divine Presence-in-Absence

In this final section, I would like to come full-circle, returning to the central text of this article. In *Confessiones* 4, Augustine suffers acutely from the bitterness of God's absence¹⁵⁷. Augustine's soul should have been healed by God, but he lacked both the desire and the strength¹⁵⁸. Indeed, in describing the darkening effects of grief, Augustine suggests the opposite of God's inner presence in the form of divine illumination ("quo dolore contenebratum est cor meum")¹⁵⁹. According to O'Donnell, grief has an inherently restless character throughout the *Confessiones*, which stands in opposition to the *requies* of, e.g., *Confessiones* 1, 1, 1¹⁶⁰. We have seen how after the death of his friend, everything is transfigured in Augustine's sight, becoming a constant torment¹⁶¹. As Marie-Anne Vannier notes, in *Confessiones* 4, 10, 15, Augustine writes that one feels pain in all things that are not God, even in good things when they are not enjoyed in relation to God¹⁶². O'Donnell characterises Augustine's description of his grief at 4, 4, 9 as "almost literally God-less"¹⁶³. He still believed in a pseudo-god,

¹⁵⁵ Seneca, *Epistulae* 104, 12, p. 414.

¹⁵⁶ Seneca, *Epistulae* 104, 11, p. 414.

¹⁵⁷ Augustinus, *Confessiones* 4, 6, 11.

¹⁵⁸ Augustinus, *Confessiones* 4, 7, 12.

¹⁵⁹ Augustinus, *Confessiones* 4, 4, 9; emphasis mine.

¹⁶⁰ Augustinus, *Confessiones* 4, 6, 11.

¹⁶¹ Augustinus, *Confessiones* 4, 4, 9.

¹⁶² M.-A. Vannier, *Aversion and Conversion*, in: *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine's 'Confessions'*, ed. T. Toom, Cambridge 2020, p. 63-74, here p. 64.

¹⁶³ Augustinus, *Confessiones* 4, 4, 9.

a “phantasma”, merely imaginary and completely lacking in substance¹⁶⁴. Thus not even prayer could provide any relief for Augustine; a false god was no source of consolation in the face of a true loss¹⁶⁵.

6.1. The Dialectic of *auersio* and *conuersio*

As O’Donnell suggests, the Augustine of this location in *Confessiones* 4 – i.e. 375/376 – remained in a state of restless wandering from God¹⁶⁶. In addition, he had not yet encountered the *libri platoniorum*, which taught him of God’s incorporeality, a truth crucial to his conversion¹⁶⁷. Augustine’s bitterness, coupled with his inability to find any relief from God, invites one to consider a theme of fundamental significance not only for the *Confessiones* but for Augustine’s entire life and thought, namely the dialectic of *auersio a Deo* and *conuersio ad Deum*¹⁶⁸. According to Vannier, this original theme appears first in *De Genesi contra Manichaeos* (388/389), is developed in the final three books of the *Confessiones*, and is also present in *De Genesi ad litteram*¹⁶⁹. In the earlier *Soliloquia*, *auersio a Deo* results in foolishness and misery¹⁷⁰. As Vannier writes, in *Confessiones* 4, *auersio* is “synonymous with dispersion, suffering, and precariousness”¹⁷¹. Later in the *Confessiones*, *auersio* is interpreted in terms of *distentio*, a kind of disintegration and distance from God¹⁷². The thematic interplay of aversion and conversion represents “the result of [Augustine’s] personal experience of first painfully facing his separation from God and, after that, finding in his conversion”¹⁷³.

Above we saw how various classical philosophers presented their thought in terms of *therapeia*, not least of all Plato. However, as Cushman argues, Plato himself recognised the inherent limitations of his therapeutic

¹⁶⁴ Augustinus, *Confessiones* 4, 7, 12.

¹⁶⁵ Augustinus, *Confessiones* 4, 4, 9.

¹⁶⁶ Cf. Augustinus, *Confessiones* 4, 7, 12.

¹⁶⁷ Vannier, *Aversion and Conversion*, p. 66.

¹⁶⁸ Vannier, *Aversion and Conversion*, p. 63, 65.

¹⁶⁹ Vannier, *Aversion and Conversion*, p. 64.

¹⁷⁰ C. Tornau, *Ratio in subiecto? The Sources of Augustine’s Proof for the Immortality of the Soul in the Soliloquia and its Defense in De immortalitate animae*, “Phronesis” 62 (2017) p. 319-354, here p. 344.

¹⁷¹ Vannier, *Aversion and Conversion*, p. 65.

¹⁷² Vannier, *Aversion and Conversion*, p. 73.

¹⁷³ Vannier, *Aversion and Conversion*, p. 64.

approach to philosophy: Philosophy endeavours to make people good, but only people who are already morally good will be open to doing philosophy¹⁷⁴. In light of this observation, Cushman suggests that the Platonic theory of philosophy as therapy eventuates in the need for some sort of divine help or grace. Indeed, Augustine himself appropriates Platonic elements and incorporates them into his theological conception of one's personal interaction with the divine. God supplies the necessary aid to complete Plato's philosophical-therapeutic programme; God draws the soul in a way that dialectic cannot¹⁷⁵. This idea – namely that God is the *sine qua non* of successful philosophical therapy – was, as Cushman writes, “the impulse and the ground for [Augustine's] own *Confessiones*”¹⁷⁶. Following Cushman, I would like to suggest that the portion of the *Confessiones* under consideration constitutes just such an example of early Christianity's distinctive addition to classical philosophy, namely that God is always implicated in one's pursuit of philosophical therapy, completing the conversion process.

The (re)turn to God, writes Vannier, the essential activity of human life, combines ethical, intellectual, and ontological aspects¹⁷⁷. In Augustine's case, conversion “required his intellectual and volitional transformation and his acceptance of God's plan for his life – a ‘full’ renovation, which was both *epistrophe* [intellectual conversion] and *metanoia* [moral conversion]”¹⁷⁸. Indeed, Plato understood his *therapeia* as involving a *metastrophe*, or conversion¹⁷⁹. As Vannier continues, the activity of conversion is essentially a cooperative activity between the soul and God, or more specifically, the free human response to the initiative of divine grace¹⁸⁰. The importance of *gratia* is present even in the early works of Augustine, including the Cassiciacum works. It also recurs throughout the *Confessiones*, e.g., 8, 12, 30¹⁸¹. Essential to Augustine's conversion was the encounter with Christ, which cleansed him of his pride, leading him to humility¹⁸².

¹⁷⁴ Cushman, *Therapeia*, p. 150, 301.

¹⁷⁵ Cushman, *Therapeia*, p. 301.

¹⁷⁶ Cushman, *Therapeia*, p. 301.

¹⁷⁷ Vannier, *Aversion and Conversion*, p. 63, 68.

¹⁷⁸ Vannier, *Aversion and Conversion*, p. 70.

¹⁷⁹ Cushman, *Therapeia*, p. 301. See also G. Stroumsa, *The New Self and Reading Practices in Late Antique Christianity*, “Church History and Religious Culture” 95 (2015) p. 1-18, here p. 6.

¹⁸⁰ Vannier, *Aversion and Conversion*, p. 63-64.

¹⁸¹ Vannier, *Aversion and Conversion*, p. 70.

¹⁸² Vannier, *Aversion and Conversion*, p. 66.

6.2. The “Apophatic” Dimension to *Confessiones* IV

Furthermore, I argue that if *auersio* and *conuersio* obtain in a dialectical relationship, then present within the text of *Confessiones* 4 lies an indication of divine presence, even in Augustine’s *auersio a Deo*. One finds some warrant for my claim in the previously quoted passage from O’Donnell, in which he continues to suggest that God is still present in some sense in this experience: “The depiction of grief [at 4, 4, 9] is almost literally God-less: only in a vain attempt to enjoin hope does God appear”¹⁸³. Norbert Fischer presents a similar observation, stating that this painful event, to the extent that it moves Augustine to look for God, becomes a kind of contact with God, albeit oblique: “Die schmerzhaftige Erfahrung des Todes eines Freundes wird ihm zur Berührung Gottes, zur Anregung (‘excitatio’), auf Gott hinzudenken”¹⁸⁴. My claim is that through such experiences recounted in the *Confessiones*, Augustine experiences a faint and fleeting contact with the divine, which invites him to continue to search for it ever more vigorously¹⁸⁵.

Recent scholarship has acknowledged a similar dynamic at work in another part of the *Confessiones*. In the Ostia vision, Augustine attains a fleeting glimpse of God, but he cannot sustain this due to his carnal habit¹⁸⁶. According to Parsons,

we can detect a distinct *therapeutic* effect of the visionary experience on Augustine’s life, understood as an ancient form of therapeia. This effect, mediated through and shaped by the language of Neoplatonism and Christianity, instilled discernible shifts in Augustine’s character and helped cultivate specific dispositions, virtues, and capacities, as well as occasional insights into the nature of the soul that anticipated psychoanalytic theory¹⁸⁷.

As Parsons argues, Augustine had glimpsed the divine, yet he needed to train himself to return to and maintain such a vision, something like psychology or therapy over the course of his life¹⁸⁸. It is precisely this form of

¹⁸³ Augustinus, *Confessiones* 4, 4, 9.

¹⁸⁴ N. Fischer, *Vom Berühren der ewigen Wahrheit zu Augustins christlicher Umdeutung der neuplatonischen Mystik*, “Acta Universitatis Carolinae Theologica” 3/1 (2013) p. 37-64, here p. 60.

¹⁸⁵ Fischer, *Vom Berühren der ewigen Wahrheit*, p. 61.

¹⁸⁶ Parsons, *Freud and Augustine in Dialogue*, p. 4.

¹⁸⁷ Parsons, *Freud and Augustine in Dialogue*, p. 25; emphasis mine.

¹⁸⁸ Parsons, *Freud and Augustine in Dialogue*, p. 4-5.

therapy, I contend, that Augustine is practising throughout the *Confessiones*, not least of all in Book IV.

I would further argue that the foregoing analysis reveals that Augustine's thought suggests a nuanced approach to divine presence and absence, which can be discussed in at least two distinct senses. First, as Vannier observes, one's flight from or return to God in this life is always provisional. In the *Confessiones*, *aversio* and *conuersio* enjoy a dialectical relationship, in that one cannot be discussed without the other¹⁸⁹. Thus the interplay of these two moments is a constant process throughout all of one's life¹⁹⁰. Secondly, as scholars such as Georgiana Huian note, apart from the consideration of sin, evil, and one's (potentially) voluntary separation from God, the divine nature itself challenges human conventions and demands an apophatic theological method¹⁹¹. Indeed, Huian characterises Augustine's theological anthropology as essentially "apophatic"¹⁹². Apophaticism is not a matter of negating cataphatic pronouncements. It is a comprehensive way of thinking which attunes one to one's own unknowability¹⁹³. Augustine does not have a systematic negative anthropology; rather, certain fundamental commitments imbue his entire thought¹⁹⁴. As Huian argues, Augustine suggests a view according to which "binary patterns [...] have little to no relevance at all"¹⁹⁵. Thus one can say, "The superlative of hiddenness is the mode of manifestation of God, even in his most intense presence"¹⁹⁶.

In my estimation, the foregoing observations suggest that the question is not so much *God's* presence or absence, but rather the human perspective or disposition with respect to the divine summons. In this case, God simply *is*, but due to the finite and fallible nature of humanity, one projects

¹⁸⁹ Vannier, *Aversion and Conversion*, p. 64.

¹⁹⁰ Vannier, *Aversion and Conversion*, p. 64.

¹⁹¹ Fischer, *Vom Berühren der ewigen Wahrheit*, p. 63; Huian, *The Mystery of the Human Being in Augustine*, 55, 60.

¹⁹² G. Huian, *The Mystery of the Human Being in Augustine: In Quest of the Foundations of an Apophatic Anthropology*, in: *New Europe College Ștefan Odobleja Program Yearbook 2015–2016*, ed. A. Pleșu – V. Sandu-Dediu – A. Oroveanu – I. Vainovski-Mihai, Bucharest 2017, p. 53–78, here p. 54. For more on this topic in Augustine, see S. Ticciati, *A New Apophaticism: Augustine and the Redemption of Signs*, *Studies in Systematic Theology* 14, Leiden 2013.

¹⁹³ Huian, *The Mystery of the Human Being in Augustine*, p. 77.

¹⁹⁴ Huian, *The Mystery of the Human Being in Augustine*, p. 77.

¹⁹⁵ Huian, *The Mystery of the Human Being in Augustine*, p. 73.

¹⁹⁶ Huian, *The Mystery of the Human Being in Augustine*, p. 60.

an inner dynamic experience onto the divine. My “transcendental” gloss on an Augustinian theme can also be expressed in eschatological terms. As Vannier writes, one’s conversion to God is always a continuous process and is only completed in the afterlife¹⁹⁷.

7. Conclusion

I have argued that the relatively brief account of the death of Augustine’s friend in *Confessiones* 4 opens the possibility of extended reflection on key themes of philosophical significance. As this article draws to a close, let us reflect on the major results of this research and the lessons learned from the investigation of Augustine, Seneca, and Heidegger.

All three of the philosophical figures considered above seem to agree that a major error of human life is to flee from oneself, whether by caring excessively for sense pleasures or other worldly delights, or moving from place to place in the hopes of forgetting one’s troubles. Such efforts are not only destined to fail, but moreover to exacerbate the suffering one may be experiencing. The solution to the distress that causes one to want to run and hide is philosophical therapy. Through learning truths, such as that of one’s immediate presence to oneself, one can begin to overcome one’s troubles, such as grief.

The same pattern can be seen in the realisation of human finitude, flux, and contingency. Augustine realised that he had caused himself suffering by failing to appreciate that all things come and go in their due season. His failure to acknowledge this fundamental truth led him to engage in vain actions, such as fearing the loss of possessions, over which he ultimately had no control. One finds peace and first and foremost by accepting the basic truth of the world, that one is often at the mercy of processes beyond oneself. When one ceases to fight a hopeless and losing battle against the inevitability of natural change, one can learn to live in harmony with the world of time and space.

The crucial truth which relates to both of the foregoing points is that even though they may be realised as the result of an intense and exceptional experience – such as a death or an earthquake – they are not unique, but constant facets of quotidian life. One is just as much immediately present to oneself in pleasant times as unpleasant ones. But if one has not learned to accept and live with this basic truth, one risks intense suffering, grief, and misery. Likewise, permanence, safety, and stability are always provisional

¹⁹⁷ Vannier, *Aversion and Conversion*, p. 65, 73.

and illusory. Such truths are constant but difficult to perceive for those who are not philosophically attuned.

In the final section of this article, we returned to the death of Augustine's friend with new eyes. To speak of philosophy as therapy is to speak of a conversion of the mind; however, it seems that such a conversion cannot be accomplished with one's own resources. Rather, it results from divine activity. Finally, in a specifically Christian theological sense, we have seen how *Confessiones* 4 subtly discloses the transcendent(al) mystery of the divine. Augustine experiences suffering most acutely in God's absence. However, as the dialectic of *auersio* and *conuersio* helps us to understand, God can be said to be present, even and especially in absence. Such an interruption of binary categories places Augustine's thoughts within the context of apophatic and mystical theology. (Juan de la Cruz, for example, suggests that one may experience darkness as a result of being blinded by the most intense radiance of the divine countenance.)

Augustine's own therapeutic philosophical-pedagogical exercises, in tandem with the thought of Seneca and Heidegger, provides a model for critical reflection on the way in which the foregoing themes are treated throughout the history of philosophy, and indeed, how they may be realised in our own lives.

God and Self in *Confessiones* IV and Beyond: *Therapeia*, Self-Presence, and Ontological Contingency in Augustine, Seneca, and Heidegger

(summary)

This article investigates Augustine's reflection on the death of his friend in *Confessiones* IV. A critical treatment of this passage discloses the three key themes which will form the main substance of the analysis: self-presence, the contingency of being, and divine absence. Integrating philosophical and theological methodologies with an historical-critical treatment of Augustine's work, this article relates Augustine's insights to his foregoing classical context and his reception in posterity, with particular attention to Lucius Annaeus Seneca (ca. 4 BCE-65 CE) and Martin Heidegger (1889-1976). This investigation shows that these three figures are connected by an appreciation of how self-presence and ontological instability are constant facets of human life, though easily neglected. Each advocates a curriculum of philosophical training, whereby one learns to pacify the mind by an awareness of the true nature of mundane reality. This research contributes to the renewed appreciation of how the therapeutic aspects of classical philosophy influenced early Christian authors; illuminates a key episode in Augustine's life en route to his conversion to Christianity; and raises questions about the "apophatic" dimensions of Augustine's theology and anthropology.

Keywords: Augustine; *Confessiones*; *Therapeia*; Facticity; Death; Seneca; Heidegger

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Matthew Drever¹

Augustine on Hope in Times of Suffering

1. Hope in Times of Suffering

Chan Hellman, a researcher at the University of Oklahoma, with joint appointments in Social Work and the Medical School, has developed a body of research that argues that for those who face trauma and suffering hope is a lead indicating factor for recovery². This has led Hellman to found the Hope Institute, which offers training, especially to poor and adversely affected communities, that promotes the development of practices that cultivate hope. In a world of war and pandemic, I would like to consider what Augustine might offer us on the topic of hope. Known as the doctor of grace, Augustine is not often associated with hope. Indeed, of the three theological virtues – faith, hope, and love – his views on faith and love receive the most attention within secondary scholarship³. This may in part be a function of where and how hope and its related concepts (e.g., *spes*, *sperare*, *expectare*) show up in Augustine’s writings. Though present, his discussion of hope is less directly evident in the writings that have tradi-

¹ Prof. Matthew Drever, University of Tulsa, USA, Bell Associate Professor of Anglican and Ecumenical Studies, Department of Philosophy and Religion; email: matthew-drever@utulsa.edu; ORCID: 0000-0003-4780-3794.

² C. Gwinn – C. Hellman, *Hope Rising: How the Science of Hope Can Change Your Life*, New York 2019.

³ A good example of this is found in the popular and well-written: *Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia*, ed. A. Fitzgerald, Grand Rapids 1999. Though comprehensive in its coverage of topics and themes in Augustine, it lacks any heading on ‘hope’. Studor is a notable exception here. B. Studor, *Hope*, in: *Encyclopedia of Ancient Christianity*, ed. A. Berardino, Downers Grove 2014, p. 288-295.

tionally garnered the most scholarly attention (e.g., *Confessions*, *City of God*, *On the Trinity*)⁴. The only work systematically dedicated to an analysis of hope, at least ostensibly, is Augustine's *Enchiridion*, a late work on the virtues of faith, hope, and love. This text, however, is oddly weighted with only 3 paragraphs out of 121 devoted to hope⁵. Beyond this, the theme of hope appears widely in certain writings, though often as a sub-theme within a wider discussion (e.g., resurrection, immortality) or in conjunction with certain Bible verses (e.g., Jeremiah 17:5, Romans 8:24, Romans 12:12, 1 Timothy 6:17)⁶. These discussions of hope are most prevalent in Augustine's *Narrations on the Psalms* and in his *Sermons* on the Old and New Testaments, especially those that cluster around Easter⁷.

At times contemporary scholarship has been skeptical and dismissive of Augustine on the topic of hope. Often the criticism goes something like this: Augustine's references to hope throughout his corpus reduce to an avoidance strategy of enduring suffering and repressing emotions in the hope of future reward, coalescing into an otherworldly prescriptive and unhelpful approach to human suffering. For those who would bring Augustine's account of hope into a contemporary context, such a critique should not be ignored. It is part of a wider contemporary suspicion of the perceived otherworldly focus of traditional Christian eschatology. In his work *Theology of Hope*, Jürgen Moltmann identifies this critique as a cen-

⁴ Augustine's political theology, especially as it emerges from *De civitate Dei*, is one area that draws some contemporary scholarship on the theme of hope. See, for example: M. Lamb, *Between Presumption and Despair: Augustine's Hope for the Commonwealth*, "American Political Science Review" 112/4 (2018) p. 1036-1049; A. Mittleman, *Hope in a Democratic Age*, Oxford 2009; D. Billings, *Nativity or Advent: Hannah Arendt and Jürgen Moltmann on Hope and Politics*, in: *The Future of Hope: Christian Tradition amid Modernity and Postmodernity*, ed. M. Volf – W. Katerberg, Grand Rapids 2004, p. 125-145.

⁵ The connection between faith, hope, and love is one cluster that has drawn some contemporary scholarship. See, for example: M. Jackson, *Faith, Hope and Charity and Prayer in St. Augustine*, "Studia Patristica" 22 (1989) p. 265-270; J. Pieper, *Faith, Hope, Love*, San Francisco 1997.

⁶ On the role of Pauline passages in the formation of Augustine's views on hope, see: B. Studor, *Augustine and the Pauline Theme of Hope*, in: *Paul and the Legacies of Paul*, ed. W. Babcock, University Park 1990, p. 201-225.

⁷ For examples from Augustine's sermons (*Sermo*), see: 198, 2-3 (PL, 1024-1026); 213, 5-9 (PL 38, 1062-1065); 232, 5-8 (PL 38, 1110-1112); 255, 2-5 (PL 38, 1186-1188); 261, 1 (PL 38, 1203-1204). Augustine's discussions of hope are scattered throughout his expositions on the Psalms. For a study on expositions 1-91, see: L. Ballay, *Der Hoffnungsbegriff bei Augustinus*, Munich 1964.

tral difficulty for modern audiences and their reception of Christian eschatology⁸.

Vincent Lloyd's recent work, *The Problem with Grace*, provides a provocative take on how contemporary suspicion against Christian eschatology can be brought to bear against Augustine. When he turns to hope, Lloyd begins with the general claim that hope is not a virtue but rather a rhetorical technique⁹. For Lloyd, this is not necessarily bad, and it does not inevitably lead to a rejection of hope. It depends on the object of hope and how hope is deployed to reach one's goals. Here, Lloyd finds Augustine troubling and potentially dangerous. He develops his critique of Augustine in part through the work of Gillian Rose, a 20th century scholar writing at the intersection of social thought (sociology) and philosophy (Hegel), who reflected a great deal on human suffering while she was dying of terminal brain cancer¹⁰. Lloyd notes that Rose had much to say about faith but little about hope because: "the object of hope, Rose seems to suggest, is to be free from laws, free from social norms – and so hope must be resisted. Faith, in contrast, is commended by Rose because it grapples with both good and evil; it grapples with the realities of the world without solace in any fantasy of escape"¹¹. Lloyd traces Rose's reticence to speak about hope back to Augustine's contention that hope seeks only the good and never the bad, while faith wrestles with both the good and bad. On this account, Lloyd seems to agree with Rose that Augustinian hope is an avoidance strategy that ignores the existential and moral challenges of suffering. Against this, he cites a saying from the Russian monk Staretz Silouan that Rose was fond of repeating – "keep your mind in hell and despair not" – which she drew on amid her own struggle with cancer as the way human suffering ought to be approached¹².

Perspicuous as Lloyd's work is in its wider discussions, it mischaracterizes Augustine's account of hope. In so doing, it misses the resources it might offer to contemporary scholars like Hellman who draw on hope to help treat trauma and the wide-spread suffering of our current context. To glimpse these resources, I will analyze Augustine in a thematic rather than

⁸ J. Moltmann, *Theology of Hope*, Minneapolis 1993.

⁹ V.W. Lloyd, *The Problem with Grace: Reconfiguring Political Theology*, Stanford 2011, p. 70.

¹⁰ G. Rose, *The Broken Middle: Out of Our Ancient Society*, Blackwell 1992; G. Rose, *Mourning Becomes the Law: Philosophy and Representation*, Cambridge 1996.

¹¹ Lloyd, *The Problem with Grace*, p. 71-72.

¹² Lloyd, *The Problem with Grace*, p. 65.

chronological manner. That is, I will begin with Augustine's *Enchiridion*, a late work, which will provide a framework and overview of his approach to hope that allows us to recognize and organize themes present in his other writings. From there, I will turn to a few of his Letters and Sermons that concisely raise key moral and spiritual themes prevalent in his wider discussions of hope, and that highlight biblical texts – 1 Tim. 6:17, Romans 12:12, Jeremiah 17:5 – central to his wider interpretation of hope. Here we can also glimpse how the Bishop of Hippo drew on the virtue of hope to counsel those within his community and beyond who sought answers amidst life's suffering.

2. Hope in the *Enchiridion*

We can begin with Augustine's short treatise, the *Enchiridion*, which is a late work he composed at the request for a short handbook on Christian education¹³. As I have indicated, Augustine's handling of faith, hope, and love is uneven, but it gives us a baseline from which to work. He opens with the claim that wisdom is the aim of Christian catechesis¹⁴. This leads to a refrain common in his writings that wisdom is piety, and piety is the worship of God (Job 28:28)¹⁵. From there, Augustine grounds worship in faith, hope, and love, thereby connecting the triad of virtues to wisdom and the Christian liturgy. Both connections are worth underscoring, and we will examine further the way Augustine anchors hope to Christian sacramental and liturgical practices. But first we should note the intimate connection between faith, hope, and love that Augustine advances: "faith believes, hope and charity pray. But hope and charity cannot be without faith, and so faith prays as well [...]. What is there that we can hope for without believing in it?"¹⁶. Beyond this, hope and love are closely related in that hope is grounded in love not fear: "So love cannot exist without hope nor

¹³ Augustinus, *Enchiridion de Fide, Spe et Charitate* 1, 6, CCL 46, 50-51.

¹⁴ Augustinus, *Enchiridion de Fide, Spe et Charitate* 1, 1-3, CCL 46, 49.

¹⁵ For example, see: Augustine, *Confessiones* 5, 5, 8, CSEL 33, 94; 8, 1, 2, CSEL 33, 171; Augustine, *De spiritu et littera* 11, 18, CSEL 60, 170.

¹⁶ Augustinus, *Enchiridion de Fide, Spe et Charitate* 2, 7-8, CCL 46, 51, tr. B. Harbert, *On Christian Belief*, in: *The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century*, New York 2005, p. 275-276. "fides credit, spes et caritas orant. sed sine fide esse non possunt, ac per hoc et fides orat [...] quid autem sperari potest quod non creditur?".

hope without love”¹⁷. Additionally, faith and hope share common ground in that both are oriented toward things unseen – God, heaven, and the like. Each of the three, however, is also irreducible to the other two. Hope and love are different in that love can be for things seen (neighbor) and unseen (God), while hope is always for things unseen. Hope and faith are distinguished in three ways¹⁸. First, we can have faith in good and bad things – there is a heaven and a hell – but we hope only for good things. Second, faith applies to past, present, and future: Christ was crucified, Christ is in heaven, Christ will return. Hope applies only to things in the future. Third, faith can pertain to us or to others: I believe things about my own origin, and I believe things about the origin of angels. But hope has an irreducible personal, existential component – it is always a claim about my existence. Thus, hope is always about good things, the future, and me.

In saying this, we should not mistake such hope for a myopic, solipsistic vision of naïve bliss. Such a vision is well on the road to what Lloyd terms enchantment: “This is the language of enchantment. It smoothes. The failure of every practice to match a norm is hidden. Everything makes sense: everything happens because it was supposed to happen [...]. In other words, enchantment fills the gap between practices and norms”¹⁹. Lloyd argues that such enchantment can be theistic or atheistic, sacred or secular, but that they both reduce to the same problem: in refusing to examine critically the gap between practice and norm, between what is and what should be, enchantment ignores or rationalizes away the real emotions, struggles, and suffering of human life. In the end, he concludes both forms of enchantment collapse into a singular idolatrous vision that:

makes us feel comfortable in our world. It makes us feel as if everything fits together nicely, as if we will always do the right thing, or have an explanation for why we did not [...]. And this is idolatrous. An idol captures and fills the gaze. It dazzles. But it ultimately mirrors rather than reveals. It mirrors the desires of the viewer, mirrors with an ‘invisible mirror’. The mirror is invisible because sight has been saturated with the idolatrous reflection. Everything is seen, there is no need to see more. Enchantment is the hegemony of the visible²⁰.

¹⁷ Augustinus, *Enchiridion de Fide, Spe et Charitate* 2, 8, CCL 46, 51-52, tr. B. Harbert, *On Christian Belief*, in: *The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century*, New York 2005, p. 276: “proinde nec amor sine spe est nec sine amore spes”.

¹⁸ Augustinus, *Enchiridion de Fide, Spe et Charitate* 2, 8, CCL 46, 51-52.

¹⁹ Lloyd, *The Problem with Grace*, p. 213.

²⁰ Lloyd, *The Problem with Grace*, p. 214.

Lloyd is critical of the Augustinian account of hope in part because he thinks it is an accomplice to the crime of enchantment on a theological and psychological level. Theologically, hope ends in idolatry and so fails the first great commandment to love God. For Augustine, this would lead inevitably to the failure to honor the second great commandment to love others, given his view that true love of other people forms properly through our love for God²¹. The cascading failure would also be felt at the level of self-knowledge and love, given the intimate role that God and others play in the formation of our selfhood²². On Lloyd's critique, this would presage the psychological trauma that hope inflicts as it dilutes the hard work of critically confronting and addressing human suffering with a morphine drip that feeds into a naïve panacea of peaceful delusion.

At this point, we seem far afield from a serious engagement with suffering, that is, from Rose's cry for: "the mind to be in hell and not despair". Can Augustinian hope voice such anguish and not crumble in despair or retreat into illusory enchantment? I think the answer is yes, but we must be careful not to mistake the Augustinian good with anodyne elevator music that blissfully carries us upward out of misery. For Augustine, the good things hope seeks are ultimately connected to the Good, which renders hope's vision more akin to Moses on Sinai than a child on Santa's lap. The existential entanglement hope entails shakes, challenges, and convicts us to the core. But the vision of hope is also of one's inclusion within the Good rather than exclusion from it, and it is precisely this inclusion that allows one to face and endure suffering.

To see more precisely the way this vision of hope unfolds, we can begin by looking more closely at the *Enchiridion*. Here, Augustine correlates

²¹ Modern commentators sometimes worry that Augustine's reading of our love of neighbor through our love of God within the *uti/ frui* framework of *De Doctrina Christiana* reduces the neighbor to a utilitarian means for our own return to God that violates the neighbor's integrity. Such criticism, however, is misguided and unfortunate since Augustine shares the same basic concern of his modern critics to preserve the integrity of the neighbor, which Augustine thinks can only be done when human love is elevated through the divine love of the Spirit. Canning provides a prophylactic against contemporary misreads in his excellent account of the reciprocity between divine and human love. R. Canning, *The Unity of Love for God and Neighbor in St. Augustine*, Leuven 1993.

²² This is one of the lessons I draw from the way Augustine weaves the influence of God and other people into his own spiritual formation in *Confessiones*. M. Drever, *Creation and Recreation*, in: *The Cambridge Companion to Augustine's Confessions*, ed. T. Toom, Cambridge 2020, p. 75-91.

faith, hope, and love to Christian liturgical practice: we learn about faith from the creed, and hope and love from the Lord's Prayer²³. In this, we see foremost the proper orientation of hope, namely, toward God: "of all those things that must be faithfully believed, the only ones that concern hope are those that are contained in the Lord's Prayer, since, as the word of God attests, *cursed are those who trust in mere mortals* (Jer. 17:5)"²⁴. One can sense an anti-Pelagian undertone to Augustine's remark, which is underscored as he goes on to emphasize that God alone is the proper source of hope for both good deeds and good rewards. Augustine's opening claim that the unseen provides the shared orientation of faith and hope returns now to voice a warning that true hope does not look toward us – the visible, the historical, the mutable, the idol.

We should also note that the future orientation of hope straddles the juncture of the historical (good deeds) and eschatological (good rewards) future. True hope does not reduce to an otherworldly escapism but rather sees the connections between the historical and eschatological. Augustine drives this point home in *Enchiridion* when he turns to the seven petitions of the Lord's Prayer in Matthew as a guide to understanding Christian hope²⁵. He argues that the first three petitions refer to eternal goods but are also temporal in the sense that they begin here and are perfected in the future. For example, in the second petition – *hallowed be thy name* – we honor God's name now, but this comes to perfection in eternity. In the third petition – *thy kingdom come* – God begins to establish his kingdom through the historical church, but this also comes to perfection in eternity. The final four petitions refer to temporal goods because they are problems that concern us now that will not be present in heaven. For example, the fifth petition seeks forgiveness for sins, a problem that will not exist in heaven. Augustine also argues that these petitions strike a balance between, on one hand, the material and spiritual, and on the other hand, the individual and communal. For example, the fourth petition – *give us today our daily bread* – can be taken literally to refer to the material needs of the body – ours and others – or spiritually to the Eucharist.

²³ Augustinus, *Enchiridion de Fide, Spe et Charitate* 2, 7, CCL 46, 51.

²⁴ Augustinus, *Enchiridion de Fide, Spe et Charitate* 30, 114, CCL 46, 110, tr. B. Harbert, *On Christian Belief*, in: *The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century*, New York 2005, p. 339: "Sed de his omnibus quae fideliter sunt credenda, ea tantum ad spem pertinent quae in oratione dominica continentur. *Maledictus enim omnis, sicut divina testantur eloquia, qui spem ponit in homine*".

²⁵ Augustinus, *Enchiridion de Fide, Spe et Charitate* 30, 115, CCL 46, 110-111.

Augustine further underscores the historical/ eschatological connection he derives from the Lord's Prayer in Letter 157, written in 414-415 during the Pelagian controversy. Here, Augustine begins with the contention that the petitions of the Lord's Prayer all presuppose grace: for example, *lead us not into temptation* is grounded on divine aid²⁶. More generally, Augustine argues that grace helps (*adiuvetur*) free will (*liberum arbitrium*), and if God abandons free will we fall into pride. While much could and has been said on the later Augustine's account of human will, I would note here how it illustrates the way Augustine treats divine agency as inclusive of, rather than exclusive to, human agency. God's love enables and perfects human free will rather than limits and destroys it. When we place God ahead of self, we do so not to the exclusion, neglect, or detriment of self, but rather to achieve the full potential and well-being of the self. This is also to say, then, that hope in God is about embracing rather than abandoning self, history, and temporality. The beacon of hope calls us to God, and the divine shadow of providence cast over human affairs is one of light not darkness, guiding us to the fullness of being.

Within the seven petitions, the hard work of hope emerges at a complex, multivalent intersection that looks within the anguish of suffering to voice the desire for healing. The Lord's Prayer acknowledges the hardships of physical and spiritual life, and guides us to hope and seek after the material well-being of adequate food and shelter while also pursuing the spiritual well-being of forgiveness and renewal. The Lord's Prayer also recognizes that such forgiveness and renewal involve the individual, community, and God. It is the hope of every individual to be reconciled to God – *forgive us our sins* – even as there is a communal hope for reconciliation with others – *as we forgive those who sin against us*. This is the hope of every individual who prays, but it is also the prayer of the community expressed within liturgy and sacrament. The Lord's Prayer acknowledges such layers of suffering and renewal within an overarching and anchoring voice of optimism. We pray and hope for a future, one that represents material and spiritual betterment within historical life, but one that is also oriented toward the eschatological future when suffering and sin will be no more.

²⁶ Augustine, *Epistola* 157, 2, 5, CSEL 44, 451-452.

3. The Spiritual Lessons of Hope

We can see, then, that the *Enchiridion* offers important lessons on hope, even if in truncated fashion. In looking beyond this text, I would like to turn to a couple of letters where Augustine addressees how hope intersects, guides, and transforms human life. The overarching twofold theme I wish to underscore is that hope does not represent either an anesthetizing, otherworldly vision that neglects suffering or an extreme ascetic embrace of suffering in search of a better tomorrow. We can begin by returning to Letter 157 and Augustine's exegesis of Matthew 19:21, and Jesus' command to the rich man – *Go, sell all that you have, and give it to the poor; and you will have a treasure in heaven, and come follow me*. Augustine rejects a literal reading of the passage that would have Christians sell their material possessions in hope of attaining salvation. Such a reading suggests a spiritual/material dualism with an attendant ascetic rejection of material wealth in favor of spiritual wealth. Instead, Augustine interprets Jesus' command as a demonstration that the rich man was dishonest in his prior claim that he had kept all of God's commandments (Matthew 19:20)²⁷. The point of Matthew 19:21 is not to establish a narrow spiritual precedent of rigorous asceticism but rather to set a broader spiritual principle that God must be honored above all other things. To underscore this claim, Augustine raises the example of the patriarchs who did not sell all they owned in order to follow God, but rather were people of wealth and faith²⁸. Augustine drives this point home by reading the passage in Matthew 19 in conjunction with 1 Timothy 6:17 – *do not place hope in the uncertainty of riches*²⁹. He argues that the rich man's failure was not in his refusal to sell all that he had, but rather in a prior, more fundamental failure of placing his hopes in his wealth rather than in God. The point is not to reject the material world but rather to embrace God as the center of one's life. In this, Augustine draws on hope to moderate the potentially strong ascetic passage in Matthew 19, intimating that hope offers an inclusive vision of spiritual life in the world and does not reduce to an exclusivist, either/or account of God and world. Stated differently, hope signals that we are not to despise the world but rather to love God – hope is about love not fear. We might see the example

²⁷ Augustinus, *Epistola* 157, 4, 25, CSEL 44, 474-475.

²⁸ Augustinus, *Epistola* 157, 4, 24, CSEL 44, 473-474.

²⁹ Augustinus, *Epistola* 157, 4, 26, CSEL 44, 475; 157, 4, 30, CSEL 44, 478; 157, 4, 33, CSEL 44, 480.

of the rich man as a failure in love and hope grounded in the fear that he has not fulfilled the requirements of the spiritual life.

When hope is aligned to God, we follow the commandments to love God and neighbor. Regarding the latter commandment, Augustine notes Paul's counsel on maintaining a Christian household, which is aided by material wealth (e.g., a home, family property)³⁰. Here again, the point is not to reject the world, but rather to use it in service to the love of God and neighbor. Augustine's claims about the household and neighbor also point us toward the broader socio-historical ramifications of his understanding of hope. In Letter 155, written between 413-414, Augustine takes up an ongoing fight he is waging, most notably in *City of God*, with various Greco-Roman philosophies on the nature of the good life in relation to human suffering. In Letter 155, the Epicureans are in Augustine's crosshairs:

But those who in this painful life, in these dying members, under this burden of the corruptible flesh, wanted to be the source and the creators, as it were, of their own happiness, seeking after it and retaining it as if by their own powers, not asking and hoping for it from that fountain of virtues, were unable to grasp God, who resists their pride. For this reason, they fell into the most absurd error. When they claim that the wise man is happy even in the bull of Phalaris, they are forced to admit that at times we should flee from the happy life³¹.

Augustine is referring to a supposed ancient ritual practice in which victims were roasted alive inside a bronze bull, and to Epicurus' claim that the wise person who has conquered the fear of death can remain happy even within the bull. Augustine rejects this idea as absurd. He also rejects Cicero's argument that suicide is justified under such circumstances of extreme suffering. Augustine goes on to draw on Cicero's argument and its wider philosophical use as evidence of contradiction in those who advocate the twofold claim: the wise person can achieve happiness even in extreme

³⁰ Augustinus, *Epistola* 157, 4, 30, CSEL 44, 478.

³¹ Augustinus, *Epistola* 155, 1, 2, CSEL 44, 431-432, tr. R. Teske, *Letters 100—155*, in: *The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century*, New York 2003, p. 408. "Illi vero qui in hac aerumnosa vita, in his moribundis membris, sub hac sarcina corruptibilis carnis, auctores suae beatæ vitæ et quasi conditores esse voluerunt, vel propriis eam virtutibus appetentes, iamque retinentes, non ab illo fonte virtutum petentes atque sperantes, Deum superbiæ suæ resistentem sentire minime potuerunt. Unde in errore absurdissimum lapsi sunt; ut cum asseverant etiam in Phalaridis tauro beatum esse sapientem, cogantur fateri vitam beatam aliquando esse fugiendam".

suffering; and the wise person is justified in committing suicide in cases of extreme suffering. How is suicide justified if the person is happy?³² I do not wish to dwell on the logic or details of this argument, which Augustine adjudicates here and elsewhere³³. Rather, I raise it to illustrate how Augustine draws on hope as an alternate model of human happiness amid suffering. Echoing the *Enchiridion*, Augustine connects wisdom and happiness to piety and the worship of God, and positions hope as a guide to this vision of happiness. Those who fail to hope in God and seek happiness instead in the world commit a form of idolatry, positioning goodness and happiness within their own (material) powers rather than the (immaterial) power of God, leading to a vision of happiness that maximizes pleasure in this world but ultimately fails on the crucible of human suffering. Grounded in the proper worship of God, hope offers a vision of a transcendent good that guards against such idolatry by refusing to reduce happiness to any form of pleasure in this world we might achieve through our own power. In this, hope reframes our understanding of happiness in relation to suffering, offering a vision of ultimate happiness that transcends suffering rather than one forged within and despite suffering.

To many a modern eye, from Nietzsche forward, such a vision of hope might seem deeply misguided. Within a secular model, it is sometimes viewed as a tragic, even cowardly vision that sacrifices the only real opportunity for happiness in this world for the false promise of eternal happiness³⁴. Even within theistic models, however, such a vision can receive withering criticism from thinkers such as Lloyd who argue that it amounts to what he terms “enchantment”: an immoral and spiritually bankrupt vision that refuses to address life’s sufferings. In seeking the good and never the bad, as Augustine would have it, critics worry that hope’s vision becomes a grand, ephemeral illusion of human wish-fulfillment to avoid suffering. Such a vision is not of the true God but rather of the God we would wish. Consequently, this vision deconstructs itself in ironic fashion, falling into idolatry as we become beholden to it in an ever vainer and more vig-

³² Augustinus, *Epistola* 155, 1, 3, CSEL 44, 432-434.

³³ Augustinus, *De civitate Dei* 1, 23-27, CSEL 40/1, 42-49.

³⁴ Here, I am less concerned with such a critique, not because it is less serious, but rather because it is grounded on the assumption of atheistic secularism, which is a debate that would take us afield from the topic of this article. Suffice to say, if one assumes atheistic secularism, any religious model of hope that promises happiness beyond this life would de facto fail. The only religious model of hope that might be endorsed is one that could also maximize happiness in this world.

orous attempt to avoid and ignore suffering with the same misguided gusto as those who argue that happiness can be found even while roasting alive inside a bronze bull.

In addressing such criticisms, it is important to keep a few things in mind. Foremost, it bears repeating that Augustine's claim that hope seeks only the good is not a form of wish-fulfillment that beckons toward some trivial, superficial good like that hocked by contemporary televangelists and prosperity gospel gurus: that we should try and feel good and avoid bad feelings, or that the spiritually good amounts to little more than material goods. Hope's vision for the good is ultimately a call to seek the universal good, namely God, and so one that resists the reduction to any limited, temporal pleasure³⁵. In seeking this good, hope does not propagate a grand avoidance strategy that refuses to take seriously suffering and evil. Rather, the opposite is the case. Hope refuses to trivialize suffering by covering it over with false illusions of pleasure, as if we could and should be happy amidst suffering if we just tried harder. In offering a vision of the transcendent good, hope acknowledges the profound depth of suffering in maintaining that it is irreconcilable with the achievement of true happiness in this life. Here, Augustine recalls and affirms Cicero's claim: "That statement of the same Cicero is certainly sounder where he says, 'for this life is indeed a death that I could lament if I wanted'. How, then, if this life is rightly lamented, is it shown to be happy? And is it not rather proven to be miserable because it is rightly lamented?'"³⁶. In the contemporary parlance of a terminal cancer patient, we might return to Rose's epigraph to "keep your mind in hell and despair not" and recognize in the symbolism of hell the irreconcilable conflict between happiness and suffering in this life.

The latter half of Rose's epigraph – "despair not" – also reminds us that we cannot give suffering too much power or it will overwhelm us. Augustine argues that we must reframe suffering and view it through the lens of endurance rather than pleasure as we seek for happiness beyond suffering³⁷. This takes suffering seriously, but not as the final word. Here, Augustine reads Paul's exhortation in Romans 12:12 – *Rejoice in hope*;

³⁵ Augustinus, *Sermo* 4, 2, CCL 41, 21; 4, 7, CCL 41, 23-24; 41, 3, CCL 41, 496-497; 255, 5, PL 38, 1188.

³⁶ Augustinus, *Epistola* 155, 1, 4, CSEL 44, 435, tr. R. Teske, *Letters 100-155*, p. 409-410: "Sanior quippe est eiusdem Ciceronis illa sententia, ubi ait: Nam haec vita quidem mors est, quam lamentari possem, si liberet. Quomodo ergo si recte lamentatur, beata comprobatur; ac non potius quoniam recte lamentatur, misera esse convincitur?"

³⁷ Augustinus, *Epistola* 155, 1, 4, CSEL 44, 434-435.

be patient in tribulation – through his own Christology to elaborate on the details of this framework³⁸. Augustine draws on the hidden/revealed (invisible/visible) dynamic of the incarnation to argue that in Christ’s suffering we see an example of patience and endurance, while in Christ’s resurrection we find hope for happiness in the unseen life to come. Noting the connection between hope and faith, Augustine argues that our faith in God’s promise in Christ leads to our hopeful expectation of happiness to come. Augustine’s Christological claims lend context to his model of hope in a few respects. His play on the visible (suffering)/invisible (resurrection) in Christ returns us to the claim that hope is in the unseen. If we take this in conjunction with his reading of Matthew 5:8³⁹, that only the pure in heart will see God, it means that the vision of the divine Christ toward which hope points is reserved for the fully purified at the eschaton⁴⁰. This process of purification reminds us of the soteriological and moral dimensions that accompany Augustine’s model of hope. Hope calls us to a patience and endurance that does not passively accept or blissfully ignore the reality of suffering. Rather, true hope must grapple with the evil, injustice, and tragedy in suffering as part of our spiritual and moral reconciliation with God if we are to achieve the promised vision of God. This process of reconciliation does not leave us bereft of all happiness. Augustine points to Paul’s claim to “rejoice in hope” as a type of happiness we experience now in hope – “*beatus esse interim spe*”⁴¹. Augustine is trying to work between the extreme ends of hedonism and the mortification of the flesh. Hope does not leave us unhappy in this life, but neither does it reduce to a temporal form of happiness. Rather, hope gives us happiness now as a proleptic vision of Christ’s resurrection, which is to say a happiness in time that also points beyond the times – the *saeculum* – toward true happiness. We should also notice a reciprocity within Augustine’s hope-patience pairing: patience leads us to the promise of hope even as hope gives us courage to endure suffering in patience. Or, we might say that Christ’s patience in suffering informs and transforms our understanding of the world as it prepares us for the promise of happiness glimpsed in hope’s vision, even as Christ’s resurrection gives

³⁸ Augustinus, *Epistola* 155, 1, 4, CSEL 44, 434-435.

³⁹ M.R. Barnes, *The Visible Christ and the Invisible Trinity: Mt. 5:8 in Augustine’s Trinitarian Theology of 400*, “Modern Theology” 19/3 (2003) p. 329-355.

⁴⁰ M. Drever, *De Genesi ad litteram 12: Paul and the Vision of God*, in: *Augustinus: De Genesi ad litteram. Ein kooperativer Kommentar*, ed., J. Brachtendorf – V.H. Drecoll, Augustinus – Werk und Wirkung 13, Paderborn 2021, p. 313-329.

⁴¹ Augustinus, *Epistola* 155, 1, 4, CSEL 44, 434-435.

hope vision of this promise that lends us the courage to confront the reality of suffering and not despair. Finally, we experience this vision and its transformative effects in rejoicing, that is, within the worship and liturgy of the church. This returns us to the *Enchiridion* and Augustine's claims that hope connects with wisdom and the worship of God, even as it reminds us that true hope, like true worship, is always of the good because it is the worship of God and never of the bad, lest one fall into idolatry.

4. The Moral Lessons of Hope

At various points, I have indicated that Augustine connects hope with virtue. In the quote above, for example, Augustine comments that hope, in orienting us to God, opens us to virtue. In connection with this, he cites Psalm 18:2 – *I shall love you, O Lord, my virtue* – and Psalm 40:5 – *Happy is the man for whom the name of the Lord is his hope and who has not search after vanities and insane lies* – and argues that the “vanities and lies” of sin disclose the necessity of hope's vision of God, which opens us to the divine aid necessary to achieve happiness and virtue⁴². Augustine also quotes Jeremiah 17:5 – *cursed is everyone who put his hope in a human being* – as evidence that happiness is not grounded in any human capacity or dimension of finite existence: the visible and bodily (e.g., material wealth) or the invisible and intellectual (e.g., human knowledge)⁴³. Here again, hope does not issue in a rejection of human life, but rather in the affirmation that God is the source of meaning and value. As in the *Enchiridion*, we do not abnegate moral responsibility on the hope that providential divine grace will save us by divine fiat. Hope reorients rather than rejects virtue.

Importantly, Augustine identifies an individual and communal dimension within this process of reorientation. We should seek our own happiness and the happiness of the city (*civitas*)⁴⁴. This leads Augustine into a discussion of the cardinal political virtues of courage, prudence, temperance, and justice⁴⁵. These virtues too must be transformed through hope's vision of

⁴² Augustinus, *Epistola* 155, 2, 6, CSEL 44, 436-437.

⁴³ Augustinus, *Epistola* 155, 2, 8, CSEL 44, 438-439.

⁴⁴ Augustinus, *Epistola* 155, 3, 9, CSEL 44, 439.

⁴⁵ Augustinus, *Epistola* 155, 3, 10, CSEL 44, 440-441. Dodaro provides an excellent analysis of Augustine's characterization of the virtues in Letter 155. R. Dodaro, *Political and Theological Virtues in Augustine, Letter 155 to Macedonius*, “Augustiniana” 54 (2004) p. 431-474.

God: “And those virtues will be true virtues and, by the help of him by whose bounty they were given, they will grow and become perfect so that they will without any doubt bring you to the truly happy life, which is none other than eternal life”⁴⁶. This transformation in God leads to the end of the four virtues, viewed as both their perfection and cessation: prudence will no longer distinguish evil (cessation), but it will unite with divine foresight (perfection); courage will not endure adversity (cessation), but it will cling eternally to the good (perfection); temperance will not wrestle with desire (cessation), but it will control it (perfection); and justice will not aid the poor (cessation), but it will possess full righteousness (perfection)⁴⁷. In saying this, Augustine is careful to identify a connection between hope’s vision of the happy life and virtue without reducing the former to the latter. The life of virtue lived now is not identical to the happy life to come:

with these virtues given by God we now live a good life (*bona vita*), and afterwards we will be given its reward, the happy life (*beata vita*), which can only be eternal life. For the same virtues are practiced here and will have their results there. Here they involve work; there they will be our reward. Here they are our duty (*officio*); there they will be the end (*fine*) we attain⁴⁸.

This is part of Augustine’s wider endeavor to maintain a transcendental foundation for the good irreducible to any finite goods, but one that, nonetheless, does not leave us bereft of hope and beholden to despair: “And so all good and holy people, even amid torments of every sort, supported by God’s help, are called happy because of the hope for that end, the end in which they will be happy. For if they were always in the same torments and the fiercest pains, no sound mind would doubt that they were miserable no matter what virtues they had”⁴⁹. The proleptic vision hope offers of a happiness to come, which we have seen is grounded in Christ, is glimpsed now

⁴⁶ Augustinus, *Epistola* 155, 3, 12, CSEL 44, 442, tr. R. Teske, *Letters 100-155*, p. 413: “et verae illae virtutes erunt, et illius opitulatione, cuius largitate donatae sunt, ita crescent et perficientur, ut te ad vitam vere beatam, quae non nisi aeterna est, sine ulla dubitatione perducant”.

⁴⁷ Augustinus, *Epistola* 155, 3, 12, CSEL 44, 442-443.

⁴⁸ Augustinus, *Epistola* 155, 4, 16, CSEL 44, 446, tr. R. Teske, *Letters 100-155*, p. 415: “his, inquam, virtutibus divinitus impertitis, et bona vita nunc agitur, et postea praemium eius, quae nisi aeterna esse non potest, beata vita persolvitur. Hic enim sunt eadem virtutes in actu, ibi in effectu; hic in opere, ibi in mercede; hic in officio, ibi in fine”.

⁴⁹ Augustinus, *Epistola* 155, 4, 16, CSEL 44, 446-447, tr. R. Teske, *Letters 100-155*, p. 415: “Itaque omnes boni et sancti, etiam in tormentis quibuslibet divino fulti adiutorio, spe

in support of virtue. It is such hope that, in Rose's words, allows us to dwell within the hell of life's suffering, despair not, and seek a virtuous engagement with and transformation of the world.

This process of transformation is completed upon the eschaton, but it begins now in the love that connects us with God: "yet even in this life there is no virtue but to love what one should love. To choose it is prudence; to be turned away from it by no difficulties is courage; to be turned away from it by no enticement is temperance; to be turned away from it by no pride is justice"⁵⁰. Drawing on the connection between hope and love, Augustine argues that love enacts hope's reorientation of the virtues. This leads back to the two great commandments to love God and neighbor, which encapsulate virtue⁵¹. The love of God must come first in an inclusive rather than exclusive sense, enabling and not denigrating the love of neighbor. That is, hope's vision of the good (and not the bad) is also that of the true and just, and love's enactment of this vision allows us to love others and ourselves in a just manner: "there is no other love by which one loves himself but that by which he loves God. For one who loves himself in another way should rather be said to hate himself. He, of course, becomes unjust and is deprived of the light of justice when he turns away from the better and higher good"⁵². Here again, in the connection between hope and love we see that hope's vision of God is not wish-fulfillment that leads one to ignore the suffering of others, but rather a vision engaged in the difficult work of aiding the unjust and suffering. Even more, in this context Augustine defines the neighbor in universal terms: our neighbors are not simply those with whom we share a "blood relationship" but rather includes all who belong to the "*rationalis societate*"⁵³. The mandate to love others includes all of humanity⁵⁴.

illius finis beati vocantur, quo fine beati erunt: nam si in eisdem tormentis et atrocissimis doloribus semper essent, cum quibuslibet virtutibus eos esse miseros nulla sana ratio dubitaret".

⁵⁰ Augustinus, *Epistola* 155, 4, 13, CSEL 44, 443, tr. R. Teske, *Letters 100-155*, p. 413: "Quamquam et in hac vita virtus non est, nisi diligere quod diligendum est: id eligere, prudentia est: nullis inde averti molestiis, fortitudo est; nullis illecebris, temperantia est: nulla superbia, iustitia est".

⁵¹ Augustinus, *Epistola* 155, 4, 14, CSEL 44, 444.

⁵² Augustinus, *Epistola* 155, 4, 15, CSEL 44, 445, tr. R. Teske, *Letters 100-155*, p. 414: "nullam esse aliam dilectionem qua quisque diligit seipsum, nisi quod diligit Deum. Qui enim aliter se diligit, potius se odisse dicendus est: fit quippe iniquus, privaturque luce iustitiae, cum a potiore ac praestantiore bono aversus".

⁵³ Augustinus, *Epistola* 155, 4, 14, CSEL 44, 444.

⁵⁴ Building on Augustine's reading the neighbor through the language of Matthew 25:40 – "the least of these" – Canning argues that Augustine extends the love we are

5. Perishing from Hope

Augustine opens *Sermon 4*, dated between 410-419, with a reference to Romans 8:6 – *to have a materialist understanding is death* – and a caution against “fleshly (*carnaliter*) understandings” that oppose the Spirit of truth⁵⁵. He goes on to cite the trio of faith, hope, and love as the path to avoid such error: “hoping for what we do not yet possess, believing what we do not yet see, loving what we do not yet embrace”⁵⁶. All three are oriented toward the future, the unseen, and what is not possessed. But they also position us within the present: “Let us go forward then, walking in hope”⁵⁷. Hope lives at the tension between present and future, standing against both the flight of fantasy from suffering and an idolatrous reduction of virtue to the secular and material. This is how one ought to approach a life of uncertainty and suffering, which Augustine reads through the *peregrinatio* theme that is prevalent in this sermon – “*in peregrinatione se vivere, patriam desiderare* (living as travelers, desiring their homeland)”⁵⁸. Here, Augustine connects hope to baptism, returning us to the liturgical role of hope in guiding the proper worship of God. He maintains that baptism elevates one to the spiritual through the material, taking the element of water to signify the spiritual forgiveness for sins and the promise of eternal life, which gives sacramental voice to hope’s calling to live now in patience for the future (unseen) divine promise. This is not an avoidance strategy, as Augustine reflects on the fact that Christians do not immediately receive the salvation promised in baptism, but rather must live in hope amidst suffering while journeying as pilgrims toward the homeland.

In *Sermon 20*, dated to around 419, Augustine turns to the question of how Christians, having been baptized, should live in hope while surrounded by suffering and sin. He argues there are two basic dangers, one in

to give to our neighbor beyond impoverished Christians to the poor generally (*minimi mei*). Similarly, O’Donovan contends that Augustine’s ethics universalize the ‘neighbor’. Canning, *The Unity of Love for God and Neighbor*, p. 383-394. O. O’Donovan, *The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine*, Eugene 1980, p. 121-122.

⁵⁵ Augustinus, *Sermo 4*, 1, CCL 41, 20.

⁵⁶ Augustinus, *Sermo 4*, 1, CCL 41, 20, tr. E. Hill, *Sermons*, in: *The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century*, New York 1992, p. 21: “sperans quod nondum tenet, credens quod nondum videt, amans cui nondum haeret”.

⁵⁷ Augustinus, *Sermo 4*, 1, CCL 41, 20, tr. E. Hill, *Sermons*, p. 21: “Intendat ergo ambulans in spe”.

⁵⁸ Augustinus, *Sermo 4*, 9, CCL 41, 26.

a deficient and the other in an excessive kind of hope⁵⁹. The former weighs sin and suffering too strongly, the latter too lightly. The former is trapped in the past, the latter in the future. To return to Rose's epigraph, the former is unable to "despair not" and the latter does not take seriously the need to "keep your mind in hell".

The first type of false hope Augustine argues is a deficient hope, or a lack of hope. It leads to despair (*desperatio*) because one thinks there is nothing that can be done about sin or a life filled with suffering. This causes one to give into sin and embrace suffering in nihilistic fashion. Augustine calls this the "gladiator mentality" and argues it breeds false courage that is nothing more than a primitive hedonism of living for the moment because one is unable to see beyond the immediacy of suffering and death⁶⁰. This puts on tragic and vivid display Augustine's warning against "materialist (*carnaliter*) understandings" that have reduced the transcendental good to temporal goods, casting Romans 8:6 – *to have a materialist understanding is death* – as a harbinger of spiritual and moral ruin. Against this, and tracking the transformation of virtue that occurs in hope, Augustine contrasts the gladiator with the Christian martyr who also faces immanent death but lives in hope and exhibits genuine courage: "this was the kind of confidence that filled all the martyrs. Holding fast to right faith, not dying and suffering for a false belief, a vain illusion, an empty hope or any uncertainty, but for the promise made by Truth"⁶¹.

The second type of false hope Augustine details is an excessive hope that cuts in two directions⁶². Excessive hope can lead one to expect that the promise and pardon for sin means that heaven is at-hand and that there will be no more suffering and temptation. Alternatively, excessive hope can lead one to expect that God will easily and totally forgive sin whenever one desires it. Hope makes sin light here; repentance is put off into the indefinite future. Both versions of excessive hope are false in their failure to weigh properly sin and suffering. While they are a hope in the good and not the bad, they are bad forms of hope – "*male sperantes*" – because they are visions of a false good⁶³. Augustine cautions that one can perish from such

⁵⁹ Augustinus, *Sermo* 20, 3-4, CCL 41, 264-267.

⁶⁰ Augustinus, *Sermo* 20, 3, CCL 41, 264-265.

⁶¹ Augustinus, *Sermo* 4, 2, CCL 41, 21, tr. E. Hill, *Sermons*, p. 22: "Hac fiducia repleti omnes martyres, tenentes rectam fidem, non morientes nec patientes pro falsa fide, pro vano phantasmate, pro spe inani, pro re incerta, sed pro veritatis pollicitatione".

⁶² Augustinus, *Sermo* 20, 4, CCL 41, 265-267.

⁶³ Augustinus, *Sermo* 20, 4, CCL 41, 265.

hope – “*spe perit*” – underscoring again that hope’s vision of the good and not the bad does not reduce to psychological wish-fulfillment, but rather opens one to the difficult road of reconciliation with the Good⁶⁴.

6. Conclusion

Augustine may not give us a systematic account of hope, but he does have much to say on the topic that he intended to help those suffering in his own time and that can continue to offer us guidance today. Augustine develops nuanced stances on hope, using it to bridge the historical and eschatological without a reduction to either. Here, he draws on hope to maintain a tension between temporal and eternal life, between the present reality of suffering and the future hope of happiness. We can see also a close connection between hope and its compatriots of faith and love, a connection Augustine utilizes to explore how hope epistemically and affectively transforms the moral and spiritual principles that guide our actions in the world. Reading Augustine’s views on hope as superficially otherworldly, mistakenly reduces the historical-eschatological tension in such way that the hope of eternal life eclipses and neglects the reality of temporal sufferings. This misses the way Augustine treats hope as a bridge to the promise of eschatological happiness in a transformative manner that realigns and reevaluates both spiritual practice and civic (public) virtue without reducing either to a purely otherworldly end.

Augustine on Hope in Times of Suffering

(summary)

This article examines the way Augustine draws on the theological virtue of hope to address how people should live in times of suffering. Of the three theological virtues – faith, hope, and love – hope is the least explored theme in contemporary Augustinian scholarship. This article develops a framework for Augustine’s model of hope from his *Enchiridion* and then applies it to select *Sermons* and *Letters*. Through this, we see that for Augustine hope does not represent either an anesthetizing, otherworldly vision that neglects suffering or an extreme ascetic embrace of suffering. Rather, hope seeks the transcendent good that acknowledges the profound depth of suffering while also maintaining a vision of happiness to come. Here, Augustine draws on hope to maintain a tension between temporal and eternal life, between the present reality of suffering and the future hope of happiness.

⁶⁴ Augustinus, *Sermo* 20, 4, CCL 41, 264.

We will also see a close connection between hope and its compatriots of faith and love, a connection Augustine utilizes to explore how hope transforms the moral and spiritual principles that guide our actions in the world.

Keywords: Augustine; Hope; Suffering; Theological Virtues; Sermons; Letters; Enchiridion

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Adrien Bresson¹

Claudian's *Gigantomachia*: Coping with Reality and Dealing with Loss

Claudian, described by Augustine as an “adversary of Christ” in his *City of God*², and as a “very obstinated Pagan” by Orosius³, was born in 370 AD in Alexandria. His mother tongue was Greek, and he learnt Latin by studying the Classics, which explains why he was a “Pagan⁴”, insofar as he reproduced the religious way of thinking he had read in the classical texts he was familiar with⁵.

He was a very important poet in his time, and he even became the official poet for Emperor Honorius in 395 AD in a very troubled political context as⁶, at the death of Emperor Theodosius in the same year, the Roman

¹ Adrien Bresson, Université de Lyon, Saint-Étienne, France, PhD Candidate at the Département des Lettres, Université Jean Monnet de Saint-Étienne, Laboratoire HiSoMA; e-mail: adrien.bresson@ac-lyon.fr; ORCID: 0000-0003-1130-4424.

² Augustinus, *De Civitate Dei* V 26.

³ Orosius, *Adversus Paganos Historiarum* VII 55.

⁴ J.-L. Charlet, *Claudian, chanteur païen de Roma aeterna*, “Koinonia” 37 (2013) p. 255-269. Charlet explains that if Claudian sometimes refers to Christianity, it remains rather rare and it only appears as a token of respect towards the official religion of the Empire. Claudian, as an Alexandrian poet, born and raised in Egypt, is nothing but a non-Christian, that is to say a Pagan, a believer in the traditional Roman religion.

⁵ About Claudian's life, cf. C. Coombe, *Claudian the Poet*, Cambridge 2018, p. 1-32. Cf. J.-L. Charlet, *Claudian. Œuvres. T. I, Le Rapt de Proserpine*, Paris 1991, p. IX-XIX. Also cf. P.G. Christiansen, *Claudian: A Greek or a Latin?*, “Scholia” 6 (1997) p. 79-95.

⁶ D. Viellard (*Les préface des traducteurs de Claudien entre 1650 et 1800*, in: *L'art de la préface au siècle des Lumières*, ed. I. Galleron, Rennes 2007, p. 229-239) reminds us that Claudian presented his *Panegyric on the Consuls Probinus and Olybrius* on the 1st of January 395. It was a very successful reading which led to his being chosen to become the official poet of Honorius.

Empire had been split in two parts, the western one and the eastern one⁷. The military context was also quite complex, marked by many conflicts with Africa and the Barbarians⁸, and the religious context was not any simpler, as the Christianisation of the Empire created a number of disruptions⁹.

Thus, Claudian's role as an official poet was a difficult one, as his work was meant to glorify the Empire, its agents and their actions in a world turned upside down with which he probably disagreed, given his origins and his beliefs¹⁰. However, Claudian remained loyal to his role and wrote several panegyrics to glorify Emperor Honorius. Some of his epic poems

⁷ J.-L. Charlet (*Claudien. Œuvres. T. 2, Poèmes politiques: 395-398*, Paris 2000, p. XVII) states that according to Stilico, Theodosius' general in chief, the Emperor himself, before his death, let the Roman Empire for Stilico to rule as his sons were not old enough to do so by themselves. Honorius and Arcadius disagreed on this matter as there was no real material will, whereas Stilico seemed to say otherwise. This quarrel finally led to the official partition of the Roman Empire in two parts. On Theodosius' will, also cf. A. Cameron, *Claudian. Poetry and Propaganda at the Court of Honorius*, Oxford 1970, p. 42-44.

⁸ Two main events must be remembered. The first one is the war against Gildo which took place in 397. Gildo oversaw the province of Africa on behalf of the Western Roman Empire. He finally decided to secede from this part of the Empire and to become allies with the Eastern Roman Empire. Stilico led a war against Gildo and won it quite rapidly. The second event is the war against the Goths between 398 and 402. The Goths had previously been trying to invade the Roman Empire, and in 398, they succeeded under the leadership of the infamous Alaric. Eventually, in 402, Stilico was able to win the war, but not for long since the Barbarians took back control of Rome in 410. About the military context in Claudian's time, cf. B. Lançon, *Le monde romain tardif*, Paris 1992, p. 31-34. See also B. Dumézil, *Les Barbares*, Paris 2016, ch 3.

⁹ At first, at the beginning of the Christianisation of the Roman Empire, in the fourth century, Pagans and Christians coexisted rather peacefully. However, throughout the fourth century, Christians became more and more numerous, surpassing the number of Pagans, which led to Christian abuses towards Pagans, such as the destruction of temples. Furthermore, at the end of the fourth century, Christians were given very important responsibilities in the Empire, while Pagans often were not. This is also why the Roman Empire stopped financing Pagan temples, leading to the decay of many of them. These examples show that, throughout the fourth century, the traditional Roman religion underwent many changes. Cf. H. Inglebert, *Les Historiens et les clairs-obscur de l'Antiquité tardive*, in: *Une Antiquité tardive noire ou heureuse*, ed. S. Ratti, Besançon 2015, p. 43-61.

¹⁰ Reading some of his panegyrics, it is possible to interpret Claudian's apparent belittling of Emperor Honorius' authority as proof that the poet did not get along with the man who incarnated the power of the Western Empire. In the *Panegyric on the Sixth Consulship*, dedicated to Honorius, Claudian compares Honorius' youth to that of the assembly gathered in Rome at the time, implying that Honorius is too young to rule the

take on a historical value – which makes them valuable for the modern historians as they deal with historical events – and praise the great military actions of the Emperor and his general in chief, Stilico. Besides the numerous epigrams he wrote, Claudian is also famous for two mythological epic poems, the *Rape of Proserpina*, written in three books, and the *Gigantomachia*, a 128-lines poem.

The main theme of the *Gigantomachia*¹¹, which narrates the great war between the gods and the Giants, is vividly felt at that time, given the historical context during which it was written. This piece, besides being mythological in a Christian world, remains unfinished, and this incompleteness raises some questions: did Claudian do it voluntarily? Was he forced to do so? Was the end lost?¹² And more generally, why would an official poet choose to write on a non-Christian subject, while rewriting a myth which tends to echo the military and the political context he was living in?

To provide an answer to these questions and to study this perspective in depth, it may be interesting to observe Claudian's adaptations in rewriting the myth, in order to grasp the different aspects of the context he was living in and that he was trying to mirror, and also to question the function of such a narration for Claudian himself, between pessimism towards loss and hope for a brighter future.

Empire and not fit for the role. Cf. Claudius Claudianus, *Panegyricus de sexto consulatu Honorii Augusti*, 547-551.

¹¹ For some recent editions of the *Gigantomachia*, cf. J.-L. Charlet, *Claudian. Œuvres. T. 4, Petits poèmes*, Paris 2018. Also cf. *Claudianii Carmina*, ed. J.-B. Hall, Leipzig 1985. For some studies, cf. W. Kirsch, *Claudians Gigantomachie als politisches Gedicht*, in: *Rom und Germanien. Dem Wirken Werner Hartkes gewidmet*, Berlin 1982, p. 92-98. Also cf. D. Meunier, *Claudian. Une poétique de l'épopée*, Paris 2019, p. 179-182.

¹² According to J.-B. Hall (*Claudianii Carmina*, p. 409), the incomplete nature of the poem is not voluntary, which would mean that someone forced the poet to stop writing. Cameron (*Claudian. Poetry and Propaganda*, p. 467-469) states that the poem was incomplete because of the death of the poet. However, J.-L. Charlet (*Claudian. Œuvres. T. 4, Petits poèmes*, p. 189) reminds us that several of Claudian's poems are incomplete, which would point at a pattern and indicate that Claudian may have had very good personal reasons to stop writing his *Gigantomachia*. It may be that the writing of a mythological poem was not a priority for an official poet, but this study offers to go further and question this assertion by analysing other possibilities, which could be linked to his personal beliefs and convictions and mirror a deeper meaning for the interruption of the writing.

1. Claudian's *Gigantomachia*: an official poet appropriating a myth

1.1. Narrative outline of the myth

The history of the myth of *Gigantomachia* is quite complicated, as the myth evolved and was transformed throughout Antiquity, even if it constantly remained about violence and passions: this myth was first tackled by Hesiod in his *Theogony*¹³, and then rewritten by Pindar in the *Pythian odes*¹⁴. The two narratives I have just mentioned were slightly different from one another, and these differences continued to develop when the myth first appeared in the Latin era with Ovid's *Metamorphoses*¹⁵. The first author to systematize the narrative was Apollodorus¹⁶. His version is probably the most thorough, as he tried to establish a canon for the myth. To achieve this aim, he read all the authors who had previously tackled it. One may suppose that Claudian, in the fourth century, had read – or maybe heard of – Apollodorus' version of the myth since the compiler was renowned for giving complete views of the myths he studied¹⁷. It is thus interesting to first observe the narrative of the myth of *Gigantomachia* according to Apollodorus, and later compare this full version to Claudian's and study the specific choices of Claudian in order to interpret them.

According to Apollodorus, the myth opens with the Muses honouring the gods by chanting. Then, the Earth's wrath is unleashed on Ouranos. This wrath gives birth to the Giants, who throw themselves into a battle

¹³ Hesiodus, *Theogonia* 617 and following.

¹⁴ Pindarus, *Pythica* I 15-20.

¹⁵ Ovidius, *Metamorphoseon libri* V 315-361.

¹⁶ Apollodorus, *Bibliotheca* I 6, 1-3. Apollodorus may have chosen to establish a canon for the myth, apparently for two main reasons. First, such a work did not exist, and Apollodorus, in his great mythographic compilation, may have judged this myth as an important one, which leads to the second reason: the myth of *Gigantomachia* may have been important and well-known enough at the time to catch Apollodorus' attention. The fact that several versions of the myth exist may also be an indicator of the necessity to formalise the narrative.

¹⁷ Claudian, as an Alexandrian poet, was educated quite traditionally at school and was well aware of classical references. Either Claudian read Apollodorus, which is not certain, or he read authors writing about Apollodorus' *Bibliotheca*. However, his knowledge of the myth of *Gigantomachia* may also only depend on his readings of ancient poets.

against the gods in order to avenge their mother, the Earth. A prediction is then revealed to the gods: the only way to kill a Giant is to request the help of a human. This is when Herakles intervenes. Then, the gods need to get rid of Porphyrio, the King of the Giants: he is tricked by the gods into desiring Hera and dies. The gods – mostly Zeus and Athena, with her shield adorned with Medusa's head – kill the Giants, who are then imprisoned in Tartarus. The gods finally face Typhon, an even stronger enemy, who is defeated by Zeus after a raging battle in which the King of gods almost succumbs to his wounds. The basis of this narrative generally offers a specific interpretation which mirrors the political context to which it is linked.

1.2. A general interpretation of the myth of Gigantomachia

Myths are usually understood as bearing a specific meaning. In his article *From Myth to Reason*, Glenn Most underlines that myths are not only fictional narratives, since they feature some meaning¹⁸. The idea is that myths, working as apologues, express an opinion on the context in which they were written.

The specific meaning of the myth of Gigantomachia is generally a political one, according to the Greek tradition in which it was born¹⁹, and this interpretation was also, to a certain extent, that of Ovid. If one thinks about the outline of the myth, it appears that Mount Olympus is threatened by enemies who want to overthrow the organisation of the world they live in, an attempt in which they almost succeed. However, even if these enemies al-

¹⁸ G. Most, *From Muthos to Logos*, in: *From Myth to Reason? Studies in the Development of Greek Thought*, ed. R. Buxton, Oxford 1999, p. 25-47: "Muthos refers to mythic imagination. It creates and forms, on the basis of the unconscious, a fictional narrative which transposes a specific meaning onto reality". For another definition of myth and a study of its implications in Antiquity, cf. Y. Lafond, *Le mythe, référence identitaire pour les cités grecques d'époque impériale*, "Kernos" 18 (2005) p. 329-346. Cf. also R. Borderie, *Sur la panique: mythe, figures, savoirs*, "Poétique" 166/2 (2011) p. 215-227.

¹⁹ In the Greek world and in the Ovidian tradition, the victory of Zeus/Jupiter against the Giants – among them Typhon – is a means to assert the superiority of the leader – the King in Hesiod's time and the Emperor in Ovid's – and to express confidence in the stability of the world, as shown at the end of the myth since the narration traditionally seems to illustrate a victory of order over chaos. Thus, the political meaning may aim at supporting the political organisation at the time of writing. Cf. F. Blaise, *L'épisode de Typhée dans la Théogonie d'Hésiode (v. 820-885): la stabilisation du monde*, "Revue des Études Grecques" 105 (1992) p. 349-370.

most achieve their ends, Zeus illustrates supremacy, through his being able to resist the assaults and even to plan some himself. The narrative therefore puts forth the superiority of Zeus, the ancient monarch, and this appears to be an obvious praising of the King. Indeed, the general meaning of the myth of Gigantomachia, at least in the works of the authors who follow the common narrative of the myth, is to honour the monarch and to extol the worth of the monarchic system. However, Claudian's example makes it clear that the myth of Gigantomachia does not have a unique narrative and a single interpretation.

1.3. The particularities of Claudian's adaptation

Claudian adapted the myth according to his own reading of its narrative, which is why his way of telling the story is slightly different from the others. First of all, Claudian's narration begins with the Earth exhorting her children²⁰, the Giants, to defend their mother and to diminish the power of the Olympus gods in order for the Earth to recover her supreme leadership. The gods are first attacked by the Giants, and they manage to answer the assault quickly and honourably. In Claudian's narration, two gods are presented as the main heroes: Minerva and Mars.

Minerva, who also appeared in the original narration as well as in Claudian's version, carries her distinctive weapon, a shield adorned with Medusa's head. As an extremely brave protagonist, she competes in bravery with Mars, who did not appear in the classic narrative but to whom Claudian gives a specific importance to illustrate his heroism.

However, despite the strength of the Olympian gods, Claudian's narration ends in a very pessimistic tone: Delos, Apollo's homeland, is about to be destroyed. Claudian's narration ends without tackling the usual end of the myth. It may be involuntary: the manuscript may have suffered from the passing of time and the end may have been lost²¹, but maybe Claudian

²⁰ The abrupt beginning of Claudian's *Gigantomachia*, with the Earth's exhortation, gives a prominent role to this character, which is not very surprising given that Claudian puts particular emphasis on telluric forces in his works. The seventeenth poem of Claudian's *Carmina minora*, for instance, celebrates the Etna for having spared two very virtuous brothers. It thus seems that, according to Claudian, even if *Terra* is an enemy of the gods in the *Gigantomachia*, there is some truth in her quest and something righteous about her calling to war.

²¹ Cod. Sang. 273, f. 49, Saint Gall Stiftsbibliothek.

deliberately chose to leave his narration unfinished in order to attract the reader's attention and to add a layer of meaning to his narration, a meaning which would be different from the classical signification²².

2. Claudian's personal choices in rewriting the myth of Gigantomachia: a means of mirroring reality, difficulties and loss?

2.1. Mirroring the military context

It is very common, and even more so since Plato²³, to think that when an author chooses to write a myth, he wants to illustrate a specific meaning which is meant to become more obvious as the myth unravels. It is therefore important to question the meaning of Claudian's version of the myth and to confront his narration to the military context of his time, since Claudian's epic teems with martial references, as can be seen in lines 73-74: "a **horrific roar** resonates from all parts and mist **separates the battlefields**"²⁴.

This martial atmosphere is present all through the poem, which, if one tries to link Claudian's narration to the period in which he is writing, conveys the idea that Claudian is indirectly describing the omnipresent military context he and his contemporaries were living in²⁵.

The first important military event Claudian may be evoking is the war against Gildo, which took place between 397 and 398 AD. Gildo was re-

²² On the incompleteness of some ancient poems, cf. A. Novara, *Les vers inachevés d'Illionée ou le travail de Virgile en cours*, "Bulletin de l'Association Guillaume Budé" 3 (1996) p. 261-288. One of the hypotheses of the author is that Virgil deliberately chose not to finish his poem, in order for the reader to make suppositions freely and to try and guess the poet's intention. This means that the reader had to be involved in the creative thought process. One of the hypotheses of this paper is to see Claudian's poem in the same light.

²³ On Plato's conception of myths, cf. F. Fischer, *Intuition et prédication dans la dialectique platonicienne*, Lille 2002. Indeed, according to the Greek philosopher, myths – when they are not fallacious, that is to say when they are philosophical – have a didactic dimension and have been forged to develop the mind. To that extent, one may choose to read Claudian's *Gigantomachia* as a philosophical myth.

²⁴ All the translations featured in this article are mine.

²⁵ About Claudian's poetic of war, cf. D. Meunier, *Claudian. Une poésie de l'épopée*, p. 13-26. Also cf. F. Garambois-Vasquez, *Les invectives de Claudien: une poésie de la violence*, Bruxelles 2007.

sponsible for a part of Africa on behalf of Rome and decided to break with Rome. Even if it appeared to be the end of an alliance, Stilico, the general in chief, managed to maintain Gildo's territories under Roman domination.

The second important military event is the series of Barbaric attacks that Rome suffered from 398 to 402 AD²⁶. The city managed to resist these assaults, and as Claudian wrote his *Gigantomachia* before the end of the confrontation²⁷, he was not aware of the victorious outcome for Rome, which could explain the passionately expressed pessimistic overtones of his work, also impacted by political dissents inside the Empire.

2.2. Mirroring the political context

Claudian wrote his *Gigantomachia* in a chaotic political context. The Roman Empire had been split in two parts since the death of the Emperor Theodosius in 395 AD: the western part had been given to Honorius, and the eastern part to Arcadius. One of the many issues with Honorius was that he was very young when he accessed the throne, and as such, he was incapable of ruling the Empire all by himself. To answer this problem, Stilico, his general in chief, took the role of a regent. However, the two parts of the Empire were drifting apart, this explains why Honorius and Stilico attempted to weaken their counterpart²⁸. This whole context, in which the two parts of the Empire were separated away from one another for good, emphasizes how vividly the Romans felt the break: it was the end of an era, and Claudian's contemporaries now had to adapt to a new way of life and to a new organisation of the world they lived in.

Claudian, in his *Gigantomachia*, may well mirror this very troubled political context which may have had an influence on his perception of

²⁶ About the military context in Claudian's time, cf. B. Lançon, *Le monde romain tardif*, p. 31-34. See also B. Dumézil, *Les Barbares*, ch 3.

²⁷ There are a lot of debates about the date of composition of Claudian's *Gigantomachia*. According to the more recent and more reliable analyses, it may have been written between 397 and 402, but certainly before the end of the war against the Goths in 402. Cf. J.-L. Charlet's introduction in Claudien, *Œuvres. T. 4, Petits poèmes*, ed. J.-L. Charlet, Paris 2018, p. VIII-XX. Cf. also D. Meunier, *Claudian. Une poétique de l'épopée*, p. 179-182.

²⁸ One cannot but ignore the fact that Stilico was, for example, implied in the assassination of Rufinus and then of Eutropius, two regents of the Eastern Roman Empire, who were not perceived positively. Claudian reminds us of this in his *In Rufinum* and *In Eutropium*.

the world and might be difficult to cope with. In Claudian's version of the myth, this separation appears through the fact that the children and grandchildren of the Earth, on one side the Giants, and on the other side, the gods, are fighting for domination of the world. The Giants may symbolise the eastern part of the Roman Empire²⁹, and the gods the western part.

2.3. Mirroring a loss in beliefs

Finally, it is possible to find a spiritual interpretation for Claudian's rewriting of the myth of Gigantomachia, as important changes in beliefs took place during the fourth century and drastically transformed the old way of thinking, causing Claudian to express, to a certain extent, a feeling of loss towards the great Roman civilization he was familiar with³⁰.

Even if in 313 AD it was legal to be a Christian in the Roman Empire thanks to Emperor Constantine, one must remember that in 380, Theodosius took an active part in a dogmatic feud between Christians³¹, showing that, at this point, Christianity had become the state's religion. At that time, Claudian was ten years old, and he could probably see a huge discrepancy between what he had been used to see in the classical literature he was very familiar with, which is not surprising for an Alexandrian, and what

²⁹ According to a more traditional interpretation, the Giants in Claudian's oeuvre usually stand for non-Roman invaders, such as Goths. Cf. Coombe, *Claudian the Poet*, p. 108-111. However, according to our hypothesis, there might be more than one reading of the allegorical dimension of the Giants. It is indeed possible to read the Giants as a representation of the Eastern Roman Empire.

³⁰ Claudian is mainly known for his panegyrics and for their glorification of Stilico and the situation of the Empire he is ruling on behalf of Honorius. However, Claudian very often refers to the Roman tradition and expresses great pride in the great period when Rome ruled the world. Cf. Charlet, *Claudian, chantre païen de Roma aeterna*, p. 255-269. Hence there may be a discrepancy between Claudian's writing and its meaning, a breach which could support the hypothesis of the expression of a feeling of loss regarding the past of Rome.

³¹ On the 27th of February 380, the edict of Thessalonica, ordered by Theodosius, made the Catholicism of Nicene Christianity the state religion of the Roman Empire. This means that, once again, Theodosius stated that the Christian religion was the official religion of the Roman Empire, and that Theodosius chose a branch of Christianity among others, such as Arianism. This evidences the complete Christianisation of the Empire and of the Emperor. Cf. P. Maraval, *Le Christianisme de Constantin à la conquête arabe*, Paris 2005, p. 5-34.

composed the new world he needed to adapt to³². His *Gigantomachia* seems to underline this peculiar feeling of loss and change, a feeling that turns into a religious fight inside the head of this Pagan author who could not overtly express his beliefs in a Christian world in which the last Pagans needed to abide by Christian prescriptions³³. In his version of the myth, the gods, representing Paganism, suffer a fight orchestrated by Mother Earth in order to replace her first children by her second litter, the Giants, representing Christianity³⁴. Claudian does not settle this ideological fight – which also reminds us of Prudentius' *Psychomachia*³⁵ – since at the time, he could not know for sure what the outcome of the ideological inflexion of the Empire would be. However, at the end of the narration, hope is getting thin. Delos, ruined by the Giants, cries out in line 128: “I am destroyed, I have fallen apart anew”. This exclamation

³² This does not speak for the hypothesis of *Gigantomachia* being an early work: it does not seem relevant to conclude that Claudian necessarily agreed, in his panegyrics, with the world he was describing just because he was the official poet of the Western Roman Empire and described it positively in his official poems. This study aims at evidencing the contrary.

³³ One cannot but remark that whereas the fight *per se* is described at length by Claudian, there is also an important intellection and reflection of the fight. It is first possible to observe this dimension in the Earth's monologue in lines 14-35, and then in Jupiter's, in lines 53-59. Furthermore, along the fight, the feelings of the dying Giants are sometimes expressed, as in line 101: “he was now what he was afraid to be”. There is thus a spiritual dimension in Claudian's text and the fight happens as much in the mind as on the field. This aspect might put forth the fact that the latent opposition between Pagans and Christians in Claudian's time is not that visible and does not show through great repressions but rather manifests itself in different parts of society, as through the fact that Pagan cults are not funded by the Empire anymore and their temples are left to decay. Cf. Inglebert, *Les Historiens et les clairs-obscur de l'Antiquité tardive*, p. 43-61.

³⁴ As said above in note 29, according to a traditional interpretation, the Giants in Claudian's work usually stand for non-Roman invaders, such as Goths. Cf. Coombe, *Claudian the Poet*, p. 108-111. According to our hypothesis, there might be more than one reading of the allegorical dimension of the Giants. It is possible to interpret the Giants as a representation of Christianity as a form of oppression on Pagans. One of the major signs of Claudian's feeling of oppression towards Christianity lies in his poem *The Savior*, which would apparently be a celebration of Christianity. However, in this poem and in comparison to other poems, Claudian does not seem particularly joyful, although he is supposed to be celebrating. Cf. J. Vanderspoel, *Claudian, Christ and the Cult of the Saints*, “The Classical Quarterly” 36/1 (1986) p. 244-255.

³⁵ Prudentius, *Psychomachia*. In his poem, Prudentius develops the ideological fight that seems to occur in the mind of an individual. The struggle opposes vices and virtues.

may testify to the general feeling of the end of an era, to which the author did not remain indifferent³⁶.

3. Claudian's *Gigantomachia*: the cathartic value of a work crystallising the author's passions

3.1. A myth testifying to the loss of an era

In Claudian's text, the end of the world is drawing near, and the general atmosphere seems to testify to the general impression of the end of an era. The ambient sentiment of loss can be seen in the following excerpt, in lines 62-73:

The powerful **cohort** disturbs the order of things, the island abandons the sea and the rocks hide in the waters. **So many** desolated shores! **So many** rivers withdrawing from their ancient banks! **One of them**, with vigorous strength, diverts the Oeta towards the Hemonia, **another**, his hands joined, shakes the summit of Mount Pangea, **another** seizes the frozen Athos river **to arm himself**, **another** disturbs the Ossa and lifts it up, **another** rips off the Rhodope river from the Hebrus spring and breaks the allied waters, as the Enipeas, pulled from its high ravine, floods the Giants' shoulders. The Earth, now deprived of her summits, is lowered into long stretches of plains divided between her sons.

It is difficult to overlook the importance of the military semantic field with "cohort" or "to arm himself". Nevertheless, the whole excerpt is ruled by the idea of general disruption, creating *adunata*, as natural elements move in ways opposed to their nature, for example with rivers leaving their banks. This upside-down world appears even more obvious thanks to the multiple exclamations in "so many" or the several parallelisms with "one of them [...] another [...] another". The reader's mind is thus turned to many different directions, mirroring the disturbed dimen-

³⁶ Our hypothesis is that this feeling is not only expressed in the *Gigantomachia* but also in other poems, such as the *Panegyric on the Sixth Consulship on Honorius* as will be later explained. One of the aspects of our incoming thesis, entitled *Scribere de me. L'écriture de soi au IV^e siècle de notre ère dans la poésie d'Ausone et de Claudien* will further develop this aspect in commenting on other poems.

sion of the world. This results in the estrangement of the Earth from her previous nature, which preceded the several fights between the Giants and the gods. She is now deprived of everything that used to make her a wonderful place. Would it be possible to interpret this general atmosphere and the perturbation of the Earth as a mirror for the emotions of Claudian's contemporaries? Not exactly, for Claudian is the official poet for the Emperor. But Claudian is nevertheless keen on historical epic poetry, as can be seen in his *War against Gildo*, and it would thus not be very surprising for Claudian to choose to reflect the general opinion of his contemporaries into his work³⁷. However, even if one may not be entirely certain of the general meaning of the *Gigantomachia*, it is possible to question Claudian's implication in the expression of the emotions of his contemporaries and wonder if the poet's text may feature his own personal opinion.

3.2. Pessimistic personal undertones

It is not always easy for a poet to truly speak about himself in the Ancient times since speaking about oneself is, at that time, considered as a very minor part of literature, so much so that it was almost not considered as literature³⁸. It is even more difficult for Claudian to share his intimate thoughts since he was the official poet for the Emperor: his duty was to stick to the Emperor's opinion, and especially to the one the Emperor wanted to broadcast in his Empire and beyond.

However, the more Claudian writes, the more he seems to express his personal opinion. Indeed, as Alan Cameron reminds us in *Claudian. Poetry*

³⁷ Cf. other works by Claudianus such as *Bellum Geticum* or *In Rufinem* or *In Eutropium*. In these works, according to certain studies (such as F. Garambois-Vasquez, *Les invectives de Claudien*), Claudian seems to express the general opinion of his contemporaries – that is to say those the poet mixes with at the Court of Honorius, even if, as the official poet of the Emperor, his written opinion may also tend to be an official one.

³⁸ Cf. E. Raymond, *Vox poetae. Manifestations auctoriales dans l'épopée gréco-latine*, Paris 2011, p. 11. If a *vox poetae* exists in the antic texts, it is very different from the voice of the author and does not really express subjectivity. See also W. Anderson (*Essays on Roman Satire*, Princeton 1982) who explains that a poet who says "I" in Ancient texts creates a literary *persona*, which forbids, as it seems, to read the "I" as that of the author. However, since Claudian was a contemporary of Augustine, who developed the expression of the self, one may think that the fourth century acted as catalyst for autobiography. This aspect will be explored in my future research projects.

and propaganda at the court of Honorius³⁹, there is no trace of the official poet after his *Panegyric on the Sixth Consulship of the Emperor Honorius* written in 404 and in which Claudian honoured Honorius, stating that he was the greatest Emperor of Rome⁴⁰. The fact that Claudian should specify such an opinion in this *Panegyric*, while he could also have expressed it in his previous panegyrics but did not, could hint at the fact that, before his final panegyric, Honorius was not fit for the throne, which is a reminder that, when Honorius was too young to reign, his general in chief Stilico, was regent. In that respect, the *Panegyric on the Sixth Consulship* may be considered as a *eulogium* in honour of Honorius, now old enough to reign, and of the previous glorious regency of Stilico. To that extent, it is easy enough to understand why Claudian's work seems not to have been positively received, as Cameron thinks. This example shows that Claudian disseminated some of his personal opinions in his works⁴¹.

To that extent it is interesting to interpret the incomplete nature of the *Gigantomachia* which seems even more voluntary if we remember that Claudian wrote another *Gigantomachia*, in Greek, and which also remains unfinished⁴². Why would an author write two poems about the same theme, in two different languages, if not to express two different ideas?⁴³ Claudian

³⁹ Cf. Cameron, *Claudian. Poetry and Propaganda*, p. 59: "Claudian was Stilico's official propagandist. It means that Claudian poems can be used to reconstruct Stilico's policies or how Stilico wished his aims and actions to appear to his contemporaries".

⁴⁰ For some studies about this poem, cf. C. Tournier, *La mémoire des figures impériales chez Claudien*, "Interférences" 9 (2016). See also B. Bureau, *Construire l'image du prince en Occident entre 395 et 404: les Panégyriques impériaux de Claudien et le miroir du prince*, "Interférences" 11 (2018).

⁴¹ Regarding this aspect, it is important to bear in mind that in the *Panegyric on the Third Consulship of Honorius*, Claudian compares Honorius to Theodosius and Stilico and gives pieces of advice in order for Honorius to reign properly. Claudian's texts thus highlight a latent expression of the personal conviction that Honorius is not fit for the throne.

⁴² About Hellenism among the Roman elite in the fourth century AD, cf. C. Hoët-Van Cauwenberghe, *Empire romain et hellénisme: bilan historiographique*, "Dialogues d'histoire ancienne" 5 (2011) p. 141-178.

⁴³ Thinking that Claudian would have written the same poem twice in order to answer the popularity of his topic or to challenge himself in two different languages would be far-fetched. Indeed, the changes regarding the language and the narration obviously show that Claudian, while he refers to the same topic, does not present the same narration. Indeed, in the Greek version he describes Jupiter on the battlefield, whereas in the Latin one, there is no such description. Moreover, the Greek version features a prologue, while the Latin one doesn't, hence our interpretation of the two *Gigantomachias* as being two poems expressing two different ideas.

could also have used one version to transcribe a fictional projection and another to describe a more realistic approach. Thus, the pessimistic undertone scattered throughout the whole narration, and which reaches its acme in the final lines with Delos' exclamation, may have a cathartic value and crystallise Claudian's passions. The *Gigantomachia* could therefore be considered as a catalyst for the author's doubts and negative opinion, maybe in order to open another path for a brighter future.

3.3. Praising political figures: hoping for a brighter future and overcoming loss?

Whereas a general pessimistic feeling appears in Claudian's *Gigantomachia*, some elements seem to help both the reader and the author get over the sentiment of loss and concentrate on brighter perspectives. One of the only positive outcomes in the Latin version of the *Gigantomachia* shows through the depiction of Mars, one of the two Olympic heroes, in lines 75-80:

Against the terrible hord, Mars is the first to ardently set off his Thracian horses, with which he used to trouble the Gelos or the Goths: **his golden shield, brighter than fire, was glowing, and shiny plumes adorned his helmet.** Then, he impetuously ran his deadly sword through Pelorus.

This description of the god, with his "plumes", is almost the same as the one that Claudian made of Stilico in his *War against the Goths*⁴⁴, which could make us think that Claudian's *eulogium* of Mars in the *Gigantomachia* is a way to honour Stilico and to place his last hopes in the capacities of the general in chief⁴⁵, who could well be the only protagonist capable of saving the declining western Roman Empire.

⁴⁴ Claudianus, *Bellum Geticum* 459: "Stilico's plumed helmet shines bright". Some resemblances appear in the use of vocabulary in both texts ("shines", "shiny", "bright", "brighter") which illustrates the parallel that Claudian draws between Stilico fighting the Goths and Mars against the Giants. Therefore, a more traditional reading of the allegory of the Giants is to consider them as a representation of the non-Roman invaders, the Goths. This parallel is also a means for the poet to compare Stilico with a god and therefore to glorify him.

⁴⁵ The idea that this reading of the *Gigantomachia* would contradict the interpretation of the Giants as Christianity, together with the expression of a loss of traditional

However, in his Greek version of the myth of Gigantomachia – which is also incomplete, maybe willingly – the final lines, lines 73-76, read:

The son of Cronos does not stop, and he places a rock taken from the earth on the whole body of the giant, exerting his almighty wrath, and he threw on the Giant the island that had been raised against the heavens.

The formula “the son of Cronos” directly refers to Jupiter and illustrates the King as a mighty figure able to save the world. If one accepts that the Greek version was written after the Latin one⁴⁶, this may hint at Claudian’s confidence in his Emperor, who, now that he has come of age, is restored, and at his opinion towards the future of the Western Empire, which is more optimistic. The cathartic value linked to the Latin version of the *Gigantomachia* would therefore have proven useful to overcome the difficulties triggered by a feeling of loss.

As this reflection comes to an end, it seems that Claudian significantly adapted the myth of Gigantomachia and did not follow the main narrative path, but rather changed it to mirror the general context he lived in, and to reflect his own opinion on this context. Writing the myth could be understood

religious beliefs – as Stilico and Honorius rather stand for the Christian future of the Empire – does not seem plausible. Whereas Theodosius was a fervent Christian, Stilico and Honorius rather composed with this religion and did not try to impose it. On this historical aspect, cf. Lançon, *Le monde romain tardif*, p. 31-34.

⁴⁶ It is very difficult to draw a conclusion from this, since the common opinion is to consider the Greek *Gigantomachia* as a work written in Claudian’s youth, and the Latin *Gigantomachia* as contemporary to the *Rape of Propserpina*. Cf. Meunier, *Claudien. Une poétique de l'épopée*, p. 179-182. Concluding that the Greek version occurred before the Latin one is logical since Claudian spoke Greek before he spoke Latin. However, Greek was popular among the Roman elite, and since one may see hints of a personal opinion in Claudian’s *Gigantomachias*, why would the Greek *Gigantomachia* not have been written after the Latin one, with the use of Greek as a proof of a more personal meaning? For further developments on this aspect, cf. A. Bresson, *La Gigantomachie de Claudien: la réécriture d'un mythe à l'aune d'une poétique de la colère*, in: *Genres et Formes poétiques de la colère, de l'Antiquité au XXI^e siècle*, ed. Hélène Vial, Paris, Classiques Garnier, to be published. On Greek being popular among the Roman elite, cf. A. Cameron, *The Last Pagans of Rome*, New York 2011, p. 527-566. Also cf. J. Geiger, *Some Latin Authors from the Greek East*, “The Classical Quarterly” 49/2 (1999) p. 606-617.

as a means to overcome loss and separation, in a cathartic way. It is therefore interesting to observe the morale value of the myth for its author.

This value attached to the myth takes on personal undertones, with Claudian illustrating the difficulties an author can have to cope with reality. In that sense, there is, in Claudian's *Gigantomachia*, an autobiographical perspective which would require further investigation through the analysis of his other poems, in order to question the autobiographical value of Claudian's text, to grasp the autobiographical hints and to observe the birth of autobiography in the fourth century, apparently caused by a deep feeling of incompatibility with the world the author lived in. Would poetry then appear as a personal means to overcome loss and change?

Claudian's *Gigantomachia*: Coping with Reality and Dealing with Loss

(summary)

The subject of Claudian's *Gigantomachia*, narrating the great war between the Gods and the Giants, is vividly felt in the fourth century AD, given the historical context during which it was written. This piece, besides being mythological in a Christian world, remains unfinished, and the perspective of the incomplete end raises some questions: did Claudian do it voluntarily? Was he forced to do so? Was the end lost? And more generally, why would an official poet choose to write on a subject which does not align with the new way of thinking of a Christian Roman Empire, while rewriting a myth which tends to echo the military and the political context he was living in? In order to see through this perspective, it may be interesting to observe Claudian's adaptations in rewriting the myth in order to grasp the different aspects of the context he was living in and that he was trying to mirror, and also to question the function of such a narration for Claudian himself, between pessimism towards loss and hope for a brighter future. This study, which focuses on the difficult adaptation of Pagans to the Christian era, allows to see, through a thorough study of Claudian's *Gigantomachia*, the expression of a personal belief in an epic poem. Late Christian Antiquity poetry therefore appears both as a means to express one's feelings and to overcome them.

Keywords: Claudian; *Gigantomachia*; loss; coping; dealing; Christianity; Stilico; mythology; Honorius; Pagans

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Rev. Piotr Szczur¹

Anger in Homiletic Teaching of Saint John Chrysostom. The Analysis of *Homilies on Matthew*²

The teaching of St. John Chrysostom on man's emotional reaction called anger has aroused interest for a long time. This is expressed in a collection edited by an outstanding Byzantine compiler Theodore Daphnopates (890/900 – after 963)³ of more than 30 eclogues⁴ on what he considered important issues and what are a compilation of Chrysostom's words taken from his speeches and homilies⁵. The latter includes a homily concerned

¹ Rev. Piotr Szczur, dr habil. Assistant professor at the Chair of Church History in the Institute of Theological Science of the Faculty of Theology of the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin; e-mail: piotr.szczur@kul.lublin.pl; ORCID: 0000-0003-3011-3404.

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³ More on Theodore Daphnopates, see: A. Kazhdan, *Daphnopates Theodore*, in: *The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*, v. 1, ed. A. Kazhdan, Oxford – New York 1991, p. 588; G. Fatouros, *Theodoros Daphnopates*, in: *Biographisch-Bibliographisches Kirchenlexikon*, v. 11, ed. F.W. Bautz, Herzberg 1996, col. 968-970.

⁴ The oldest preserved manuscript from the 1070s (Parisinus Coislinianus gr. 79) includes 33 eclogues (attributed to hardly known Theodore Magister, and not to Theodore Daphnopates). The dating of the manuscript: I. Spatharakis, *The Portrait in Byzantine Illuminated Manuscripts*, Leiden 1976, p. 301. Nowadays 48 eclogues have been included within the collection since at the beginning of the 17th century. H. Savile added 15 which were not attributed to Theodore Daphnopates and did not appear in the oldest manuscripts. Cf. *Clavis Patrum Graecorum*, v. 2: *Ab Athanasio ad Chrysostomum*, ed. M. Geerard, Turnhout 1974, p. 594, no. 4684.

⁵ On the circumstances of editing this selection, cf. J. Iluk, *Bizantyjskie eklogi z homilii św. Jana Chryzostoma i ich nowożytny losy*, in: *Magia Książki. Księgi Magii. Księga Jubileuszowa poświęcona Profesor Irenie Fijałkowskiej*, ed. D. Oboleńska – U. Patocka-Sigłowy, Gdańsk 2017, p. 41-43.

with anger. It is an eclogue published by W J.-P. Migne in *Patrologia Graeca* as the 20th entitled Περὶ ὀργῆς καὶ θυμοῦ (*De ira et furore*)⁶. In the contemporary literature the subject of emotions in the teaching of John Chrysostom also arouses lively interest of researchers⁷. Therefore, the present paper is a contribution to studies conducted on emotions and anger in the teaching of St. John Chrysostom. Blake Leyerle indicates that although Chrysostom did not write a treatise on anger, he speaks most of it in his homilies. For this reason, it was decided to choose as the source a collection of 90 *Homilies on the Gospel of Saint Matthew* said in Antioch⁸, which are a representative sample of his homiletic works. Therefore the ideas captured here in the teaching of Chrysostom on anger will be present in his other works. The present article will analyze what Chrysostom said about man's anger, completely omitting the problem of "God's anger"

⁶ PG 63, 689-694. Different kinds of numbering are used in different editions of eclogues. CPG gives a concordance of the two basic editions of eclogues: H. Savile and J.-P. Migne (PG).

⁷ Among the more important studies on his subject the following monograph should be mentioned: B. Leyerle, *The Narrative Shape of Emotion in the Preaching of John Chrysostom*, Christianity in Late Antiquity 10, Oakland 2021 – the author broadly discussed four questions: Anger (p. 21-62), Grief (p. 63-111), Fear (p. 112-149) and Chrysostom's Goal Stimulating Zeal (p. 150-182); P.C. Moore, *Bound Together for Heaven: Mutual Emotions in Chrysostom's Homilies on Matthew for Well-Ordered and Fruitful Community in Anxious Times*, in: *Revisioning John Chrysostom: New Approaches, New Perspectives*, ed. C.L. de Wet – W. Mayer, Critical Approaches to Early Christianity 1, Leiden 2019, p. 334-360 (in the article, the author does not refer to anger; turning his attention to the idea of mutual emotions in Chrysostom, Moore first defines "a community of emotional mutuality". He then offers a sketch of Chrysostom's attitudes to emotions overall, including his stance towards the stronger emotions or "passions". Next he explores the motivating power of emotions and then Chrysostom's ambitions for emotion in creating communities of emotional mutuality. Finally, Moore raises the possibility of a contemporary application for Chrysostom's pastoral strategy in our own complex and uncertain times). The following articles should also be mentioned: M.G. de Durand, *La colère chez S. Jean Chrysostome*, RevSR 67/1 (1993) p. 61-77 (although the title suggests a complex analysis of anger in the teaching of John Chrysostom, the author focuses on 20th eclogue on anger and *De inani gloria et de educandis liberis*), and F. Leduc, *Gérer l'agressivité et la colère d'après l'oeuvre de saint Jean Chrysostome*, POC 38 (1988) p. 31-63, as well as a special volume "Studia Patristica" 83 (2017), which was devoted to the teaching of the Fathers of the Church (mainly John Chrysostom) on emotions.

⁸ Scholars dealing with Chrysostom's homilies background since the 17th century point to Antioch as the place where they were given. Cf. W. Mayer, *The Homilies of St John Chrysostom: Provenance. Reshaping the Foundations*, OCA 273, Rome 2005, p. 258 and 267.

(which Chrysostom also refers to), which is a separate research problem. Therefore, the present paper will discuss the preacher's admonishments above all significant for the Christian asceticism.

1. The Question of John Chrysostom's emotions

An analytical approach to Chrysostom's statements on anger is also important because the preacher himself was a man openly expressing his positive and negative emotions. On the one hand, he knew how to sympathise⁹ and call for gentleness¹⁰, on the other he was impulsive and intransigent¹¹. He was rather hot-tempered. Although Chrysostom was assessed differently even by his contemporaries, arousing admiration and respect or disapproval and criticism, most of the opinions which seem honest point to straightforwardness and hot temper. Theophilus of Alexandria – one of the main enemies of Chrysostom, characterizes him as a man of many negative character flaws, to advance John's condemnation. He describes Chrysostom as violent by nature, reckless, insolent, and argumentative like no other. He also says that Chrysostom is easy-carried away by an irrational impulse and moves on thoughtlessly to get an approval of his point of view. He insists on what he has decided, he becomes violently angry with anyone with a different opinion¹². This statement by Theophilus seems to be partially correct, as Chrysostom himself admits to this type of flaw. In the *Dialogue on the Priesthood*, despite his criticism of a desire for ecclesiastical offices¹³, he admits that,

⁹ Chrysostom sympathized with Stagirus and Theodore, experiencing spiritual difficulties (cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *Ad Stagirium a daemone vexatum*, PG 47, 423-494; Iohannes Chrysostomus, *Ad Theodorum lapsum*, ed. J. Dumortier, SCh 117, Paris 1966), and with poor whose poverty he understood perfectly (this theme appears in many homilies) (cf. e.g. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *De Lazaro con.* 1-7, PG 48, 963-1054; Iohannes Chrysostomus, *De eleemosyna*, PG 51, 261-272).

¹⁰ Cf. e.g. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Genesim ser.* 3, 1, ed. L. Brottier, SCh 433, Paris 1966, p. 204-208.

¹¹ Cf. L. Brottier, *L'appel des demi-chrétiens à la vie angélique: Jean Chrysostome prédicateur, entre idéal monastique et réalité mondaine*, Patrimoines. Christianisme, Paris 2005, p. 210.

¹² Cf. Palladius, *Dialogus de vita s. Joannis Chrysostomi* 9, ed. A.-M. Malingrey – P. Leclercq, SCh 341, Paris 1988, p. 182.

¹³ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *De sacerdotio* 3, 10, ed. A.-M. Malingrey, SCh 272, Paris 1980, p. 166.

to a large extent, he falls under that desire¹⁴. he clearly says that he lacks many priestly virtues¹⁵. He confesses that as far as he almost contained the desire for vain glory, he cannot refer the same to the other ambitions, especially the anger¹⁶, which could be compounded by the power over the community of believers (for this reason, he was initially afraid of receiving priestly ordination)¹⁷. For this reason he expresses a desire to achieve the gentleness of King David¹⁸.

Chrysostom was aware of how much the priests needed the ability to control anger. He claimed that a priest who succumbs to this passion “will not live peacefully and will bring countless misfortunes to the souls entrusted to him”¹⁹. However, he was prone to this. Some of his character flaws were shown in his first sermon when he obtained priestly ordination. Speaking about of love for the community for which he was appointed presbyter, he emphasized that this was so strong, violent (βιαιότερον) and despotic(τυραννικώτερον)²⁰. These words indicate that in a ministry John is radical, uncompromising and intransigent. Socrates Scholasticus, who does not seem very fond of Chrysostom, characterizes him in the following way: “John is said to have been rather a rough man (πικρότερος)²¹ due to his eagerness in mortification and, as was said by someone who was very close to him since the early years, he devoted a lot of heart to angry fits (θυμῶ μᾶλλον) rather than to the spirit of forgiveness (ἢ αἰδοῖ)”²². In this opinion, Socrates introduces a very distinct opposition between a lack of self-control expressed by anger (θυμός) and complete composure expressed by forgiveness (αἰδώς)²³.

¹⁴ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *De sacerdotio* 3, 10, Sch 272, p. 172.

¹⁵ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *De sacerdotio* 3, 10, Sch 272, p. 166.

¹⁶ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *De sacerdotio* 6, 12, Sch 272, p. 342-344.

¹⁷ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *De sacerdotio* 3, 10, Sch 272, p. 176-178.

¹⁸ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *De Davide et Saule* 1, 1, PG 54, 677.

¹⁹ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *De sacerdotio* 3, 10, Sch 272, p. 342-344.

²⁰ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *Sermo cum presbyter fuit ordinatus* 1, ed. A.-M. Malinrey, Sch 272, p. 392.

²¹ It deserves to be remarked that Socrates used the comparative form of adjective πικρός, while πικρία (bitterness) is a sign of anger (cf. Eph 4:31). Cf. G.W.H. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, Oxford 1961, p. 1082, s.v. πικρία and πικρός; *Greek-English Lexicon*, ed. H.G. Liddell – R. Scott, Oxford 1961, p. 1403-1404, s.v. πικρία and πικρός.

²² Socrates, *Historia ecclesiastica* 6, 3, 13, ed. G.C. Hansen, GCS NF 1, Berlin 1995, p. 315. All ancient source texts are in the author’s own translation.

²³ Cf. *Greek-English Lexicon*, p. 36, s.v. αἰδώς. It is worth mentioning that αἰδώς is a classical Greek virtue.

When Chrysostom was appointed bishop, he started by reforming the customs of the bishop's court and raising the level of the moral life of the Constantinople clergy. Despite his good intentions and his doings being reasonable, his decisions were considered negative as an expression of arrogance and pride²⁴, thereby alienating the clergy of the capital. Socrates notices that when Chrysostom became the bishop of Constantinople "at the very beginning he seemed to the people of the Church a rough man and he attracted their highest aversion and more than one started to hate him and avoid him as an impulsive crosspatch (ὀργίλον ἐξέκλινον)"²⁵. On the other hand, a historian Sozomenos says that "critically inclined out of nature and justifiably outraged by the wrong-doers, while performing his duties as bishop he gave way to this kind of inclinations and feelings (παθήμασιν). After all the inborn disposition together with the freedom to act easily made the tongue argue and even faster released a wave of anger (τὴν ὀργὴν) against those who sinned"²⁶. Hence a thesis can be put forwards that John Chrysostom perfectly knew the feeling of anger from his own experience.

2. The essence of anger

The title of the aforementioned 20th eclogue on anger and the analyses conducted clearly indicate that to refer to it Chrysostom uses two Greek nouns²⁷,

²⁴ However, Chrysostom was a strong supporter of humility, which he often glorified (cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 15, 2, PG 57, 224-225; 47, 3, PG 58, 485; 58, 2, PG 58, 568). Cf. Brottier, *L'appel des demi-chrétiens à la vie angélique*, p. 215-216.

²⁵ Socrates, *Historia ecclesiastica* 6, 4, 2, GCS NF 1, p. 315. Sozomen also claims that the Constantinople clergy and monks hated Chrysostom because of his violent anger; cf. Sozomenus, *Historia ecclesiastica* 8, 9, 5, ed. J. Bidez – G.C. Hansen, GCS 50, Berlin 1960, p. 362.

²⁶ Sozomenus, *Historia ecclesiastica* 8, 3, 1-2, ed. J. Bidez – G.C. Hansen, GCS 50, Berlin 1960, p. 353.

²⁷ Chrysostom uses two nouns to describe anger: ἡ μῆνις and ὁ χόλος, however, the first of them does not appear at all *In Matthaëum homiliae*, and the second only in medical meaning. Cf. also P. Moore, *Deploying Emotional Intelligence: John Chrysostom's Relational Emotional Vocabulary in his Beatitude Homilies*, StPatr 83 (2017) p. 134-136 (The author outlines Chrysostom's treatment of emotion and vocabulary of emotion in his expositions on Matthew 5:1-12 and 10:1-4).

namely ἡ ὀργή²⁸ and ὁ θυμός²⁹, which are in principle used interchangeably as synonyms, without emphasizing any special nuances in the meaning that would distinguish them. However, a thorough analysis of his words leads to the observation that ὁ θυμός is shown in a more positive light than ἡ ὀργή³⁰.

Although in *Homilies on the Gospel of Saint Matthew* Chrysostom does not give a definition of anger, he defines it as passion – τὸ πάθος³¹. This conclusion can be drawn from the preacher's following words: "[Christ] having begun by anger (τῆς ὀργῆς), and having cut out on every side the sinews of this passion (τοῦ πάθους); having said «he that is angry (ὁ ὀργιζόμενος) with his brother» (Mt 5:22) and he that calleth fool or Raca (cf. Mt 5:22) let him be punished"³². In his other homilies Chrysostom also clearly speaks both of anger and passion³³. Two fragments deserve to be quoted:

For he that is humbled, and bruised in heart, will not be vainglorious (οὐ κενοδοξήσει), will not be wrathful (οὐκ ὀργιέται), will not envy his neighbor (οὐ φθονήσει τὸν πλησίον), will not harbor any other passion (πάθος)³⁴; Again, the lowly man is seized by no passion (πάθους), no anger (οὐκ ὀργή) can much trouble this man, no love of glory (οὐ δόξης ἔρωσ), no envy (οὐ βασκανία), no jealousy (οὐ ζηλοτυπία): and what can be higher than the soul that is delivered from these things (ἀπηλλαγμένης)? But the boastful man is

²⁸ Cf. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, p. 970, s.v. ὀργή; *Greek-English Lexicon*, p. 1246, s.v. ὀργή.

²⁹ Cf. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, p. 657, s.v. θυμός; *Greek-English Lexicon*, p. 810, s.v. θυμός.

³⁰ Cf. M.G. de Durand, *La colère chez S. Jean Chrysostome*, p. 62, n. 3; Leyerle, *The Narrative Shape of Emotion*, p. 21. Noun ὁ θυμός reflects emotional state, and ἡ ὀργή leads to action; cf. W.V. Harris, *Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity*, Cambridge 2001, p. 57.

³¹ Cf. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, p. 992-995, s.v. πάθος; *Greek-English Lexicon*, p. 1285-1286, s.v. πάθος.

³² Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 18, 5, PG 57, 271.

³³ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 16, 7, PG 57, 248; 16, 11, PG 57, 254; 33, 6, PG 57, 395: "Also you follow them [the wrestlers preparing for the fight] and exercise in the struggles of virtue. Many arouse our anger (θυμόν), passion (ἐπιθυμίαν ἐμβάλλουσι) and great fire (πολλὴν ἀνάπτουσι φλόγα). Resist the passions then (τῶν παθῶν), bravely bear the sufferings of the soul so that you will also bear the sufferings of the body"; 54, 4, PG 58, 537: "So when you make the sign of the cross, remember the whole content of the cross, quench your anger (θυμόν) and all other passions (πάντα πάθη)"; 55, 5, PG 58, 546.

³⁴ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 3, 5, PG 57, 38.

held in subjection by all these things, like any worm crawling in the mire, for jealousy ζηλοτυπία), and envy (βασκανία) and anger (θυμὸς) are forever troubling his soul³⁵.

In the first of the fragments quoted above wrath was mentioned by Chrysostom beside vanity (κενοδοξία)³⁶ and jealousy (φθόνος)³⁷, whereas in the second of the homilies quoted above the preacher placed it next to the desire for glory (δόξη³⁸ ἔρως), envy (βασκανία)³⁹ and jealousy (ζηλοτυπία)⁴⁰. It deserves to be remarked that in accordance with the classification by Plato, Chrysostom includes wrath and other vices within passions, which clearly points out that he places it with them among the passions of wrathful (hot-tempered) soul⁴¹. It should be added that in another place he calls these passions tyrannical (πάθος τυραννικὸν)⁴², thus indicating that they arouse in man as a consequence of the action of the evil spirit and its inspiration. He also emphasizes that wrath, next to impudence, is the worst vice and he says: “For nothing is worse than wrath (ὀργῆς) and arrogance”⁴³.

A man possessed by wrath is called ill by Chrysostom and this means that wrath is an illness⁴⁴. Chrysostom also personifies wrath saying that wrath is the devil⁴⁵.

³⁵ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 65, 5, PG 58, 624.

³⁶ Cf. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, p. 741-742, s.v. κενοδοξία; *Greek-English Lexicon*, p. 938, s.v. κενοδοξέω (κενοδοξία).

³⁷ Cf. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, p. 1474, s.v. φθόνος; *Greek-English Lexicon*, p. 1930, s.v. φθόνος.

³⁸ Cf. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, p. 380-381, s.v. δόξα; *Greek-English Lexicon*, p. 444, s.v. δόξα.

³⁹ Cf. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, p. 293, s.v. βασκανία; *Greek-English Lexicon*, p. 310, s.v. βασκαίνω (βασκανία).

⁴⁰ Cf. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, p. 591, s.v. ζηλοτυπία; *Greek-English Lexicon*, p. 755, s.v. ζηλοτυπέω (ζηλοτυπία).

⁴¹ Cf. Plato, *Phaedrus* 246a-254e, ed. H.N. Fowler, Plato, *Phaedrus*, in: LCL 36, London – New York 1913, p. 470-498; Plato, *Timaeus* 69d, ed. R.G. Bury, in: Plato, *Timaeus*, LCL 234, London – Cambridge 1961, p. 180. Cf. K. Bosinis, *Two Platonic Images in the Rhetoric of John Chrysostom: ‘The Wings of Love’ and the ‘Charioteer of the Soul’*, *StPatr* 41 (2006) p. 433-438.

⁴² Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 16, 11, PG 57, 254.

⁴³ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 10, 6, PG 57, 191.

⁴⁴ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 18, 4, PG 57, 270.

⁴⁵ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 18, 4, PG 57, 270: “Free him the from heavy evil and make him give up wrath (τὴν ὀργήν), free him from the formidable devil (δαίμονος), from wrath (τοῦ θυμοῦ)”.

3. Causes of wrath

Chrysostom points to several causes of wrath⁴⁶. He corresponds with Aristotle's thought, who told a contempt for ourselves and others as a cause of wrath in his teaching. In general, wrath is aimed towards a particular person and a group of people – in such situations, it is more hatred than anger⁴⁷. Following the biblical text, he teaches that wrath is born of jealousy [ζήλος⁴⁸ (ζήλοσύνη), ζήλοτυπία] (cf. Prov 6:34)⁴⁹. Another time he expresses his conviction that power can induce evil⁵⁰. He also points to hunger and a need to satisfy it quickly⁵¹ and drunkenness as the cause of wrath⁵². He emphasizes that the situations in which a man feels threatened, for example because of groundless accusations, can also arouse anger. That is why the preacher speaks of the need to protect oneself in order not to yield to emotions and not to get angry⁵³. Chrysostom also points out that anger is incited and fanned by the devil⁵⁴, and a person conquered by anger is trapped by Satans⁵⁵. Comparing people possessed by Satan and those

⁴⁶ Cf. Aristoteles, *Rhetorica* 2, 2, 1-4 (1378a-b), ed. J.H. Freese: Aristotle, *The "Art" of Rhetoric*, LCL 193, Cambridge 1926, pp. 172-174. Cf. D. Konstan, *Aristotle on Anger and the Emotions: The Strategies of Status*, in: *Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen*, ed. S. Braund – G. Most, Cambridge 2003, p. 108.

⁴⁷ Cf. B. Leyerle, *The Narrative Shape of Emotion*, p. 22-31 (*The Origin of Rage*).

⁴⁸ Cf. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, p. 591, s.v. ζήλος; *Greek-English Lexicon*, p. 755, s.v. ζήλος.

⁴⁹ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 4, 4, PG 57, 44.

⁵⁰ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 40, 4, PG 57, 444: "Such is power. That is why it drove many, even against their will, to insult, and aroused to anger (θυμὸν)".

⁵¹ Por. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 35, 5, PG 57, 411 – where Chrysostom says, that during the Lent the delay in setting the table or too slow service by slaves, the owners perceive as deliberate insolence. Cf. Aristoteles *Rhetorica* 2, 2, 9-10 (1379a), LCL 193, p. 178 – when the author says that people are prone to anger because of some shortage, e.g. hunger or thirst.

⁵² Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 70, 3, PG 58, 659: "A lot of heads sticking out from drunkenness can be seen: here, prostitution, there, anger (ὀργήν), still somewhere else, tardiness, or disgraceful satisfaction of lust".

⁵³ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 33, 2, PG 57, 390: "Can you see that it is necessary to protect oneself from each side in order not to fall and not to get angry (θυμὸν) in the face of dangers?"

⁵⁴ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 16, 10, PG 57, 251; 18, 1, PG 57, 265.

⁵⁵ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 15, 11, PG 57, 237.

conquered by anger he says that both should be bemoaned; however, the latter are more unhappy since their madness is conscious⁵⁶.

Referring to human activities, on the other hand, Chrysostom expresses his conviction that anger as a negative emotional reaction is a result of human tardiness. He specifies his standpoint in the context of some people excusing themselves and claiming that “evil things do not come from us”⁵⁷. He explains that if somebody gets angry with a servant, wife, children or villains, then by “reproaches and insults” he/she expresses their own emotions, which after all depend on him. Those who heard such words take offence at him who said those words. If anger did not depend on man, nobody would take offence having heard such words spoken in anger⁵⁸. To confirm this state of affairs, the preacher refers to how the possessed are treated while even when the latter beat others, they do not arouse anger but pity since the harmed ones do know that this behaviour does not follow from evil will⁵⁹.

Others, on the other hand, attributed their anger to the inner build of the body⁶⁰ and they justified it with a certain kind of pressure following from the weakness of their nature. That is the reason why the preacher warned against such an excuse and pointed out that actually each broken commandment could be justified in such a way. While formulating the possible content of the excuse expressed by somebody possessed by anger, Chrysostom says: “of our anger (ὀργῆς) against a brother [will you say], «what if I be hasty, and not able to govern my tongue»? and in general, all His sayings you may on this wise trample under foot”⁶¹. There were also those who put the blame for their own anger on people they were angry with, saying: “Such an one provoked me (ὀργῆς)”⁶². That is why the preacher explained to them that they could restrain being pro-

⁵⁶ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 18, 4, PG 57, 270: “Yea, for if we see persons possessed by devils, we weep for them; we do not seek to be ourselves also possessed. Now let us do this too likewise with respect to them that are angry (τῶν ὀργιζομένων); for in truth the enraged (οἱ θυμούμενοι) are like the possessed; yea rather, are more wretched than they, being mad with consciousness of it. Wherefore also their frenzy is without excuse”.

⁵⁷ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 59, 3, PG 58, 577.

⁵⁸ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 59, 3, PG 58, 577.

⁵⁹ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 87, 4, PG 58, 773.

⁶⁰ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 81, 5, PG 58, 736: “Many attribute lust, anger and impetuosity (καὶ ὀργῆς καὶ θυμοῦ) to the [inner] build of the body”.

⁶¹ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 17, 5, PG 57, 261.

⁶² Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 42, 3, PG 57, 455.

voked thus quelling their negative emotions⁶³. Thus Chrysostom rejects all attempts to justify anger⁶⁴.

Chrysostom, as an attentive observer of everyday life, notices that anger is such a widespread flaw that people succumb to it daily⁶⁵, while the matters that cause anger are mostly trivial and insignificant⁶⁶. Therefore, the anger caused by them does not have to last forever. Chrysostom remarks that “it happens you get angry without a cause (εἰκῆ ὀργίζεσθαι)”⁶⁷. This is how misers behave who get angry both with their household members and strangers⁶⁸, with the poor and the rich: with the poor because they come asking for support, and with the rich because they have not yet captured their property⁶⁹. This attitude of the greedy makes them a laughing stock for others and they give “countless occasions for anger (μυρίας ὀργῆς) against themselves”⁷⁰. Anger has the most pernicious influence on family and friendly relations. No one should get angry with a person who has done them some harm but with the devil that made that person do an evil thing⁷¹. One should not belittle the evil of anger since having anger in the heart one cannot say “Father” to God⁷² and one cannot receive forgive-

⁶³ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 42, 3, PG 57, 455.

⁶⁴ Cf. Leyerle, *The Narrative Shape of Emotion*, p. 29-30.

⁶⁵ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 19, 7, PG 57, 283: “Which [...] has not remembered things with hostile feeling, even till he made his heart swell?”.

⁶⁶ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 87, 3, PG 58, 772-773: “What hardship have you suffered? Have you been robbed? For this self-same reason should you endure it, so as to gain more amply. But were you deprived of character? And what is this? Your condition is in no way worsened by this, if you practice self-command. But if you suffer no grievance, whence are you angry (ὀργίζῃ) with him that has done you no harm, but has even benefited you?”.

⁶⁷ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 17, 2, PG 57, 257; cf. 41, 4, PG 57, 450: “Who has not got angry (οὐκ ὀργίσθη) with his brother without a cause? And a man angry without a cause should be tried by court”.

⁶⁸ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 81, 4, PG 58, 736.

⁶⁹ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 80, 4, PG 58, 728-729.

⁷⁰ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 83, 3, PG 58, 749.

⁷¹ It should be remarked that the preacher’s moral admonitions were sometimes based on the example of suffering Jesus. Shifting responsibility for an evil deed onto the devil also occurs in Chrysostom’s other homilies. Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In epistulam ad Romanos hom.* 8, 8, PG 60, 466; Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In epistulam ad Ephesios hom.* 2, 4, PG 62, 21; 14, 2, PG 62, 101.

⁷² Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 19, 7, PG 57, 283: “For this same cause again in every one of the clauses He commands us to make our prayers common, saying, «Our Father», and «Your will be done in earth as it is in heaven», and «Give

ness of guilt⁷³. The more so because in this way one insults God, who after all did not insult anybody.

The cause of anger among the inhabitants of Antioch could also be the subject of homilies said by Chrysostom. Wishing to bring up the subject which was not too pleasant to the listeners and which concerned profligacy and excess (specifically in footwear), the preacher said: “Will ye then that I let loose my tongue upon it, and show its unseemliness, how great it is? And will you not be angry (οὐκ ὀργιέσθε)? Or rather, though ye be angry (ὀργίζεσθε), I care not much”⁷⁴. Not only the listeners to his homilies, but also the preacher himself could submit themselves to anger. Speaking on the necessity of moderation in reproaching others, especially women inclined to excess, he admits unnecessary anger and says: “But stay: I have been led on unobserving, I know not how, into these expressions; and while admonishing another to teach with gentleness, I have been myself hurried away into wrath (ὀργήν)”⁷⁵.

It should also be mentioned that Chrysostom, following Aristotle, claims that the utterance of truth – even an unpleasant one – should not be a cause for anger. This attitude makes his comments on the Syrophoenician woman whom he praises. When Christ answered her request by calling her a dog, she was not upset by this offensive term, nor was she discouraged by the loftiness of his answer. Instead, she objectively assessed her situation, accepted the comparison, and submitted her request⁷⁶. Because her wrath was relieved by humility, Chrysostom suggests that everyone – considering the condition of one’s nature – can accept even the most humiliating insults by refraining from anger. Therefore Chrysostom’s listeners should follow it. When being insulted, they should think about what caused such accusation, and instead of planning retaliation, be grateful for pointing out the error⁷⁷.

us the bread», and «forgive us our debts», and «lead us not into temptation», and «deliver us»; everywhere commanding us to use this plural word, that we may not retain so much as a vestige of anger (ὀργή) against our neighbor”.

⁷³ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 19, 6, PG 57, 281.

⁷⁴ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 49, 4, PG 58, 501; cf. 61, 2, PG 58, 590: “Don’t get angry at my turning against sinners as I will accuse not only you but also me myself”.

⁷⁵ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 30, 6, PG 57, 369. Cf. Leduc, *Gérer l’agressivité et la colère*, p. 37.

⁷⁶ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 52, 2, PG 58, 520.

⁷⁷ Cf. Leyerle, *The Narrative Shape of Emotion*, p. 37-38. On Chrysostom’s role in prescribing acceptable emotions for his congregation see Y. Papadogiannakis, *Homiletics*

4. The consequence of anger

Chrysostom expresses his conviction that anger has a very negative effect in man since while governing the latter, it deprives them of the possibility to objectively perceive the surrounding reality⁷⁸. A man possessed with anger loses the sharpness and clarity of seeing both visible⁷⁹, and invisible things⁸⁰. That is why the preacher compares such a person to a drunkard dazed with excessive consumption of alcohol and he emphasizes that “For there is a drunkenness of wrath (ὀργῆς) too, and that more grievous than the drunkenness of wine”⁸¹ since “For anger (θυμὸς) and sin is a more frantic thing than any drunkenness, and puts the soul in greater distraction”⁸². A man seized with anger is not able to do anything good⁸³.

Anger destroys human relations⁸⁴. A man seized with anger magnifies the harms suffered from the enemy and the insults he heard from his mouth.

and the History of Emotions: The Case of John Chrysostom, in: *Revisioning John Chrysostom: New Approaches, New Perspectives*, ed. C.L. de Wet – W. Mayer, *Critical Approaches to Early Christianity 1*, Leiden 2019, p. 312-316 (part 4: *Emotional Regime*).

⁷⁸ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 60, 1, PG 58, 585.

⁷⁹ Chrysostom supports this statement, referring to medical knowledge, which indicated that anger is the source of various physical ailments, such as blurred vision, fever, convulsions, or insanity. Cf. Leyerle, *The Narrative Shape of Emotion*, p. 32.

⁸⁰ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 13, 5, PG 57, 215: “For whereas the eyes are often deceived, not in the things unseen only (for of those they do not so much as take cognizance), but even in those which men think they actually see, distance and atmosphere, and absence of mind, and anger (θυμῶν), and care, and ten thousand other things impeding their accuracy”. Early Christian thinkers fairly frequently point out that Christians have two “sets” of senses: bodily senses and spiritual senses. On the role of “spiritual sights” in patristic theology, see: M. Canévet, *Sens spirituel*, in: *Dictionnaire de spiritualité: ascétique et mystique, doctrine et histoire*, v. 14, ed. A. Derville – P. Lamarche – A. Solignac, Paris 1990, col. 599-617; B. Fraigneau-Julien, *Les sens spirituels et la vision de Dieu selon Syméon le Nouveau Théologien*, Paris 1985, passim; P. Szczur, *Rola „zmysłów wiary” w rozumieniu sakramentów inicjacji chrześcijańskiej według Cyryla Jerozolimskiego*, *VoxP* 61 (2014) p. 297-308; P. Szczur, *Rola postrzegania duchowego w nauczaniu katechetycznym Jana Chryzostoma*, *VoxP* 62 (2014) p. 493-504.

⁸¹ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 15, 10, PG 57, 236.

⁸² Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 60, 1, PG 58, 585.

⁸³ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 4, 9, PG 57, 50; 15, 10, PG 57, 236.

⁸⁴ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 15, 11, PG 57, 237-238: “And do you not think that you are yourself rather disgraced, imitating the violent passions of the brutes; nay rather, becoming even worse than they? For they have all things in common; they herd one with another, and go about together: but we have nothing in common, but all in confusion: fightings, strifes, revilings, and enmities, and insults. And we neither

Chrysostom says “that in the season of enmity, when wrath (τῆς ὀργῆς) is inflamed, and the soul kindled, even the least thing appears great, and what is not very reproachful is counted intolerable? [...] For just as where friendship is, even grievous things are light, so where enmity lies beneath, very trifles appear intolerable”⁸⁵. In this context Chrysostom compares the words uttered in anger to a spark which causes a formidable fire of quarrel and enmity⁸⁶, because the memory of insults can cause pain and indignation⁸⁷.

Moreover, anger leads to misunderstandings that frequently end with fisticuffs⁸⁸ and serious sins like murder⁸⁹ or perjury⁹⁰, which leads to hell. That is why the preacher recommends not to pass people possessed by anger indifferently but to help them with the voice of reason⁹¹.

It is interesting how Chrysostom describes the destructive effect of anger, which destroys not only the bonds between people (including the marital ones) but also the soul of the man submitting to it. In this description anger is compared to a wicked adulterer who can perfidiously seize man: “And like some wicked adulterer (πονηρός τις μοιχός), wrath (ὁ θυμὸς) dallies with us in great delight, casting into us deadly seed, and making us give birth to diabolical enmity, and doing all things in a way opposite to marriage. For whereas marriage causes the two to become one flesh (cf. Gen 2:2 = Mt 19:5), wrath (θυμὸς) severs into many parts them that were united, and cleaves and cuts in pieces the very soul”⁹².

reverence the heaven, unto which we are called all of us in common; nor the earth, which He has left free to us all in common; nor our very nature; but wrath (θυμὸς) and the love of money sweeps all away”.

⁸⁵ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 16, 8, PG 57, 249.

⁸⁶ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 16, 8, PG 57, 249: “And as in fire: if there be but a small spark, though thousands of planks lie by, it does not easily lay hold of them; but if the flame have waxed strong and high, it readily seizes not planks only, but stones, and all materials that fall in its way [...]; so is it also with anger (τῆς ὀργῆς); whatever any one may say, becomes food in a moment for this evil conflagration”.

⁸⁷ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 79, 5, PG 58, 722.

⁸⁸ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 15, 10, PG 57, 236.

⁸⁹ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 16, 5, PG 57, 246: “For wrath is the root of murder (θυμὸς)”; 16, 8, PG 57, 249; 39, 1, PG 57, 433: “For he that studies to avoid murder will not refrain from it equally with him that has put away even anger (τὸν θυμὸν)”; this latter being further removed from the crime”.

⁹⁰ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 15, 10, PG 57, 237: “He forswears himself under the sway of his wrath, and that way falls into hell”.

⁹¹ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 15, 10, PG 57, 236-237.

⁹² Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 51, 5, PG 58, 516.

Chrysostom speaks in a similar spirit in the homily where he compared anger and other passions to a wild beast (θηρίον)⁹³, which “has grievous teeth and talons”⁹⁴ able to destroy everything, and the soul of such a person is “dragged down to the earth, and torn by so many wild beasts”⁹⁵. But in these words the preacher first of all draws attention to the harm done by anger to a concrete man who is angry because “it mars, we see, not the body only, but the very health likewise of the soul is corrupted by it, devouring, rending, tearing to pieces all its strength, and making it useless for everything”⁹⁶, thereby experiences different spiritual torments⁹⁷. Moreover, anger is the reason for bringing God’s punishment⁹⁸. While continuing his thought, a little further on the preacher compares anger to a serpent (ὄφις)⁹⁹ which lives inside a man making the latter incapable of good actions¹⁰⁰.

Chrysostom is confident that, regarding the medical knowledge of that time, wrath causes excessive bile production, which leads to even more agitation. For this reason, he suggests to his listeners that they should see people who are enraged as suffering from the disease of excess bile and that instead of insults and violence, they should be compassionate to them¹⁰¹. In his recommendations, he does not stop at the need to sympathize with people who are overcome by anger but goes further by recommending helping them, just as you help people who are sick¹⁰².

⁹³ Cf. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, p. 651-652, s.v. θηρίον; *Greek-English Lexicon*, p. 800, s.v. θηρίον. Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 4, 9, PG 57, 50: “Thus, imagine, if you will, your wrath (θυμὸν) to be a kind of wild beast (θηρίον)”; 87, 4, PG 58, 773. Cf. B. Leyerle, *Animal Passions. Chrysostom’s Use of Animal Imagery*, *StPatr* 83 (2017) p. 193.

⁹⁴ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 4, 9, PG 57, 50.

⁹⁵ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 59, 6, PG 58, 582.

⁹⁶ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 4, 9, PG 57, 50.

⁹⁷ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 38, 4, PG 57, 534.

⁹⁸ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 61, 5, PG 58, 594.

⁹⁹ Cf. Lampe, *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, p. 989, s.v. ὄφις; *Greek-English Lexicon*, p. 1279, s.v. ὄφις.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 4, 9, PG 57, 50: “[...] how shall we, having so large a serpent (ὄφιν), eating up all within us (it is wrath (θυμὸν), I mean), how, I say, shall we be able to produce anything noble?”

¹⁰¹ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 87, 4, PG 58, 773.

¹⁰² Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 18, 5, PG 57, 270.

5. A prohibition against anger and the necessity to fight anger

While speaking of a prohibition against anger and the necessity to fight it, Chrysostom¹⁰³ refers to the teaching in the Holy Scripture. Quoting the words of Christ: “But I say unto you. Be not angry (Μηδὲ ὀργίζεσθε) (cf. Mt 5:22)”¹⁰⁴, he emphasizes that the Saviour forbids anger. Whereas referring to the words of Christ concerning a prohibition against vengeance and even offering the other cheek to the wrongdoer (cf. Mt 5:39; Lk 6:29), he emphasizes that He orders to quench anger¹⁰⁵ since “to turn the cheek is, to him that gives heed, a less grievous thing than to smite another; for from this the contest has beginning, in that termination: and whereas by the former you have kindled the other’s pile too, by the latter you have quenched even your own flames”¹⁰⁶. That is the reason why the preacher encourages the listeners to his homilies to restrain anger¹⁰⁷ and dismiss it from human relations¹⁰⁸. Even if somebody is guilty of blasphemy against God, one should restrain anger and treat that person with calm¹⁰⁹. Chrysostom also sees a prohibition on anger in Christ’s indications included in the blessings from the Sermon on the

¹⁰³ Cf. Leduc, *Gérer l’agressivité et la colère*, p. 49-52; Leyerle, *The Narrative Shape of Emotion*, p. 31-47 (*Quelling Anger*).

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 16, 1, PG 57, 239; 16, 3, PG 57, 241; 16, 6, PG 57, 246; 16, 10, PG 57, 252. It should be remarked that the words of Christ quoted by Chrysostom are not present in the contemporary critical edition of the Gospel according to St. Matthew. This shows that Chrysostom used a different text. This is not a new problem. Cf. J. Krystyniacki, *Wstęp*, in: Św. Jan Chryzostom, *Wykład Ewangelii św. Mateusza*, v. 1, Lwów 1903, p. XI.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 18, 2, PG 57, 266: “He requires yet more entire self-restraint (μη ὀργίζεσθαι), commanding him that suffers ill not merely to be quiet, but even to be more exceedingly earnest in his turn, by offering the other cheek”.

¹⁰⁶ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 38, 4, PG 57, 432.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 41, 4, PG 57, 451-452: “Let us then attend, and let us every way cleanse out our wounds, showing mercy (cf. Mt 5:5); remitting our anger (ὀργήν) against them that have displeased us, giving thanks for all things to God (cf. Eph 5:20)”.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. B. Dunkle, *John Chrysostom’s Community of Anger Management*, StPatr 83 (2017) p. 223-230; D. Tonia, *Facing Down Fear: John Chrysostom’s Answer to Violence*, in: *The (De)Legitimization of Violence in Sacred and Human Contexts*, ed. M. Shafiq – T. Donlin-Smith, Cham 2021, p. 32.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 29, 3, PG 57, 361: “[...] entreat, advise, admonish, with meekness, not angry (ὀργιζομένου). For no harm at all ensues unto God by their blasphemy, that you should be angered (θυμωθῆς), but he who blas-

Mount (cf. Mt 5:3-11) and he ties one with this prohibition explaining that the words “Thus, Blessed are the poor, is the same as that we are not to be angry (μὴ ὀργίζεσθαι)”¹¹⁰ express the same as the commandment not to get angry. Summing up, he states that the aim of all blessings is in fact to root out human vices, anger including¹¹¹ since “a poor, quiet or mourning man deprives themselves of anger (τὴν ὀργήν)”¹¹².

Chrysostom relates the prohibition on anger to the commandment of not to kill and he expresses his conviction that when Christ spoke about the prohibition on anger he did not annul the commandment “You shall not kill” (cf. Ex 20:13; Deut 5:17) but He confirmed it¹¹³ and complemented it indicating that anger could also be “murderous”¹¹⁴: “Let us now ask those who reject the law, is, «Be not angry» (μὴ ὀργίζεσθαι), contrary to «Do no murder»? Or is not the one commandment the completion and the development of the other? Clearly the one is the fulfilling of the other”¹¹⁵. The preacher expresses the same thought in another homily where he emphasizes that “he who is not stirred up to anger (ὀργήν), will much more refrain from murder”¹¹⁶.

Therefore, one should restrain anger and fight it as Christ appeals to restrain anger and He promises a reward to those who will keep the commandment given by Him¹¹⁷. The preacher also sees a need to fight against anger encouraging the listeners of his homilies: “let us arm our-

phemed has himself also received the wound. Wherefore groan, bewail, for the calamity indeed deserves tears”.

¹¹⁰ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 16, 3, PG 57, 242.

¹¹¹ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 18, 5, PG 57, 271: “Can you see Him rooting out anger (τὸν θυμὸν), lust, greed for earth and care for earthly things?”.

¹¹² Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 18, 5, PG 57, 271.

¹¹³ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 16, 6, PG 57, 246: “But if He does not suffer one even to be angry (μηδὲ ὀργίζεσθαι), the mind of the law is established by Him more completely”.

¹¹⁴ Cf. A. Kubiś, *Morderczy gniew. Intertekstualna lektura Mt 5,21-22*, VV 34 (2018) p. 249-287.

¹¹⁵ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 16, 3, PG 57, 241.

¹¹⁶ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 16, 5, PG 57, 246; cf. 16, 6, PG 57, 246: „For he that studies to avoid murder will not refrain from it equally with him that has put away even anger (τὴν ὀργήν); this latter being further removed from the crime”; 16, 11, PG 57, 253: “For he who neither reviles, nor goes to law, nor prolongs enmity (ἔχθραν)?, how will he ever commit murder (ἔχθραν)?”.

¹¹⁷ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 19, 9, PG 57, 286: “Let us, considering our own case, and the reward appointed us for this commandment, soften our anger (τὴν ὀργήν)”.

selves against all rage (κατὰ παντὸς θυμοῦ), against all anger (κατὰ πάσης ὀργῆς)¹¹⁸.

A ban on anger also follows from the fact that Christians are supposed to be more perfect than Jews and this is why Christ orders that the fairness of His disciples should exceed that of the Jews. For this reason he also forbids not only murder but even anger¹¹⁹: “But of what kind was the required «excess»? Not to be angry (μὴ ὀργισθῆναι) (cf. Mt 5:22)”¹²⁰. On the other hand, when he emphasizes how perfect, noble and superior Christ’s indications are in comparison to the Jewish law, he says: “Then murder was the destruction of him that committed it, but now even to be angry (τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι) (cf. Mt 5:21-22)”¹²¹. In this context the preacher explains that “Clearly the one [the commandment not to get angry] is the fulfilling of the other [the commandment not to kill], and that is greater on this very account”¹²².

Chrysostom understands Christian self-improvement as inner freedom from any passions, and not as mortification of one’s body¹²³. That is why controlling one’s passions, anger including, is one of the elements of the ideal promoted by Chrysostom, which he calls “angelic life”¹²⁴ and appeals to the faithful for its realization: “in whatsoever things we may have been injured, let us, considering our own case, and the reward appointed us for this commandment, soften our anger (τὴν ὀργὴν)”¹²⁵. Realizing this ideal in everyday life also has the evangelization dimension as pagans will admire Christians “when they see us gentle, pure from wrath (ὀργῆς), from evil desire, from envy, from covetousness, rightly fulfilling all our other duties, they will say, «If the Christians have become angels here, what will they be after their departure hence?»”¹²⁶. An important role is also played by

¹¹⁸ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 87, 2, PG 58, 771.

¹¹⁹ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 17, 4, PG 57, 259: “He [Christ] had taken away all wrath, having forbidden not murder only, but even the mere feeling of anger (θυμοῦσθαι)”.

¹²⁰ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 16, 3, PG 57, 243.

¹²¹ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 36, 3, PG 58, 417.

¹²² Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 16, 5, PG 57, 245.

¹²³ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 46, 4, PG 58, 480: “By practice I mean, not your fasting, nor yet your strewing sackcloth and ashes under you, but if you despise wealth, as it ought to be despised; if you be kindly affectioned, if you give your bread (cf. Mt 25:35) to the hungry, if you control anger (θυμοῦ), if you cast out vainglory, if you put away envy”.

¹²⁴ Cf. Brottier, *L’appel des demi-chrétiens à la vie angélique*, passim.

¹²⁵ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 19, 9, PG 57, 286.

¹²⁶ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 43, 5, PG 57, 463.

struggling against haughtiness and by meekness Since humble people do not get angry¹²⁷, while the haughty ones “easily fall into anger (ὀργήν)”¹²⁸.

Chrysostom advises that nobody should let anger get close to themselves; however, when under the effect of some excitement it seizes somebody, then it should be driven away like a dangerous “mad dog (κύνα λυττωντα)”¹²⁹. Calling anger a “rabid dog” is a rejection of the conventional association of anger with a wild animal and meant a rejection of the heroic code, according to which the citizen was obliged to retaliate for the insult he had suffered. The more powerful he was, the more vulnerable he was to insults. So the taunts were the prelude to the fight. Moreover, dogs were considered two-faced creatures. Although some of them, like Odysseus’ faithful hound Argus, had a heroic perfection like their masters, mostly they were figures of shame and shamelessness¹³⁰. The reason for their bad reputation is still discussed. The willingness of dogs to copulate in public places is often cited. Still, it is more likely that dogs’ partial savagery manifested in the fact that the same dogs that bravely fought alongside the heroes could fiercely turn against their owners. This potential hostility of the dog made him a figure of duplicity¹³¹.

In another place the preacher uses the opposition between wild animals, which can be easily tamed by man, and human nature – relatively gentle but distorted by anger. Comparing anger to a wild beast he recommends that it must be controlled. He says that like tamers properly train dangerous lions and make them meek, so anger can be controlled through work on oneself and one’s mind can be made gentle and quiet¹³².

It is interesting how Chrysostom interprets the words of St. Paul in his Epistle to the Ephesians: “let not the sun go down upon your wrath

¹²⁷ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 3, 5, PG 57, 38.

¹²⁸ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 65, 6, PG 58, 625.

¹²⁹ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 51, 5, PG 58, 516: “That you may therefore with confidence draw near to God, receive not wrath (θυμὸν), when it comes in upon you, and desires to be with you, but drive it away like a mad dog. For so Paul too commanded: his phrase being, «lifting up holy hands without wrath (ὀργῆς) and disputing» (1Tim 2:8)”. Cf. Leyerle, *Animal Passions*, p. 198-200.

¹³⁰ Cf. S. Braund–G. Gilbert, *The ABC of Epic „Ira”: Anger, Beasts, and Cannibalism*, in: *Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen*, ed. S. Braund–G. Most, Cambridge 2003, p. 256-257; C. Franco, *Shameless: The Canine and the Feminine in Ancient Greece*, tr. M. Fox, Berkeley 2014, p. 75-120 and 37-40 (for Argus).

¹³¹ Por. Leyerle, *The Narrative Shape of Emotion*, p. 34.

¹³² Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 4, 9, PG 57, 50.

(παροργισμῶ)” (4:26). The preacher ties this recommendation with Christ’s indication that a person angry with their neighbour should be reconciled before the offering (cf. Mt 6:23-24) and he arrives at the conclusion that both appeal for the same. In the further analysis Chrysostom returns to St. Paul’s words and he emphasizes that his recommendations result from the fear of the night since at night, when “in the night, when he is alone, and is thinking it over by himself, the waves swell, and the storm becomes greater”¹³³. That is the reason why it is important for St. Paul that a man should go for a rest reconciled with his neighbour so that “the devil may after that have no opportunity, from his solitude, to rekindle the furnace of his wrath (τῆς ὀργῆς), and make it fiercer”¹³⁴.

Chrysostom knows perfectly well that anger is a very strong passion which is similar to the desire of the flesh. Although man can restrain blasphemy in the form of making blood offerings of sheep and calves to deities of stone or gold, it is difficult for him to restrain anger and in his weakness he can even make an offering of his soul to wrath¹³⁵. However, those who cannot control the desire for material goods will not be able to restrain any passion – including anger¹³⁶. This happens because man does not attach proper importance to guarding their souls against being sullied by passions and allows the latter to conquer them¹³⁷.

Chrysostom expresses his conviction that one of the effective methods to fight anger and other passions is turning to Christ for help. Even if a man is seized by lot of vices, He always gives help to those who ask Him for it. The preacher presents his viewpoint in the following words: “though thou approach Him angry (ὀργιζομένῳ), though much displeased; be willing only to pray, and to return, and you shall receive all, and shall quickly extinguish the wrath (τὴν ὀργὴν)”¹³⁸.

¹³³ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaem hom.* 16, 10, PG 57, 251.

¹³⁴ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaem hom.* 16, 10, PG 57, 251.

¹³⁵ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaem hom.* 55, 5, PG 58, 546: “For though thou sacrifice not to stone nor to gold, either sheep or bullocks, see lest to wrath (θυμῶ) thou sacrifice your own soul, lest to whoredom or other like passions (πάθεισι), thou sacrifice your own salvation”.

¹³⁶ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaem hom.* 81, 5, PG 58, 736. Cf. Leduc, *Gérer l’agressivité et la colère*, p. 33-34.

¹³⁷ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaem hom.* 42, 4, PG 27, 456: “And whether it be the love of covetousness, or that of luxury, or that of fair persons, or that of wrath (τοῦ θυμοῦ), or be it what you will else that is minded to come in, we throw open the doors, and attract and invite it, and help it to defile our soul at its leisure”.

¹³⁸ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaem hom.* 22, 5, PG 57, 306.

Another effective method to fight anger which is connected with the expression of faith in Christ's power is recollection of His Passion. Despite Christ having suffered much from His tormentors, He bore everything meekly and was not angry with them¹³⁹. That is why, in the context of commenting the events associated with the Lord's Passion, the preacher advises the following: "Call to mind some one of the things that then took place, and you will cast out as dust (θυσμὸν) all rage by the recollection of the things that were done"¹⁴⁰. The example of the humble attitude of Christ has great power and is an essential help in the fight against anger. Even the greatest public insult, mockery, and even a blow are nothing compared to Christ's suffering without ever reacting with anger¹⁴¹.

The sign of the cross on the chest is also recommended by the preacher as an effective way to fight anger¹⁴². This action reminds the content included in this sign of salvation and leads to soothing anger¹⁴³. An indication that the sign of the cross should be made "on the chest" could have followed from Chrysostom's conviction expressed in one of his *Homilies on the Epistle to the Hebrews* (also resulting from the belief of ancient philosophers) that God placed anger in the heart, which lies in the chest – like in a cage built of bones almost as hard as stone so that man could not be torn with the claws of this cruel wild beast. The preacher also adds that no other part of man would bear the violence and fire of anger¹⁴⁴.

An effective method to "fight" with a man seized by anger is humbly accepting unjust insult¹⁴⁵, and even blows by him¹⁴⁶, bearing misdemeanours and showing generosity in case of captured property¹⁴⁷. Such

¹³⁹ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 15, 10, PG 57, 236; 18, 4, PG 57, 270; 61, 5, PG 58, 595; 87, 2-3, PG 58, 771-772.

¹⁴⁰ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 87, 2, PG 58, 771.

¹⁴¹ Cf. Leyerle, *The Narrative Shape of Emotion*, p. 43.

¹⁴² Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 87, 2, PG 58, 771: "Should thou perceive your heart swelling, seal your breast setting upon it the cross".

¹⁴³ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 54, 4, PG 58, 537; 87, 3, PG 58, 773: "«And how is it possible, one will say, not to get angry?». Did anybody insult you? Place the sign of the cross on your breast; recall everything what happened then and all anger will go out".

¹⁴⁴ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In epistulam ad Hebraeos hom.* 5, 5, PG 63, 53.

¹⁴⁵ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 87, 3, PG 58, 773: "For indeed it is more worthy of admiration to see a man insulted, and not moved, than beaten and smitten, and not falling".

¹⁴⁶ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 18, 2, PG 57, 267.

¹⁴⁷ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 18, 2, PG 57, 267.

an attitude means “smiting a greater blow than smiting with your hand”, and he will be put to shame and will become more gentle¹⁴⁸, and as a consequence freed from anger¹⁴⁹. What is more, the preacher emphasizes that when somebody suffers unjustly and gets enraged, they provoke the suspicion that they suffer rightly, but first of all they succumb to impetuosity and – as Chrysostom says – are “dragged captive by his anger (τῆς ὀργῆς), and losing his own nobility”¹⁵⁰.

Chrysostom wanted to reach everyone, especially the average Christian, not just a few educated elites, with his message of anger management. Therefore, in his proposed methods of fighting anger, there are references to the teaching of the Bible and simple psychology, not the achievements of ancient pagan thinkers. For example, he does not recommend a longer delay in response to an insult nor provides for the advice of a friend (except for children who should use the advice of those who educate them). However, given his fondness for asceticism, it is surprising that he does not usually recommend a temperamental lifestyle as a way to avoid anger.

Besides the formative values connected with self-improvement, controlling anger also has the evangelization dimension. Chrysostom expresses his conviction that when heathens see the Christians resist passions, anger including, they will not admire them but “they will look upon the very face of the kingdom of Heaven”¹⁵¹.

The model of how anger is quenched is Jesus Christ, who was sitting next to Judas – His traitor – during the Last Supper and though He knew that Judas would betray Him to the Jews (due to which he deserved “the largest anger”), He was not angry with him but he spoke to him with exceptional mildness. In this context the preacher relates to human behaviours and reactions, and asks: “who [...] would not put away all venom of wrath and anger?”¹⁵². Jesus, however, did not do so. Therefore, if man bears in mind the gentleness of Jesus, “wrath (θυμός) would find no place at any time”¹⁵³. On the other hand, he reminds all those who react to insult with anger that

¹⁴⁸ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 18, 2, PG 57, 266: “For thus, lost as he may be to shame, you will be able to smite him with a mortal blow, rather than if you had smitten him with your hand; or if his shamelessness be still greater, you will make him gentle in proportion”. Cf. Leyerle, *The Narrative Shape of Emotion*, p. 35-36.

¹⁴⁹ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 18, 4, PG 57, 270.

¹⁵⁰ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 87, 3, PG 58, 772.

¹⁵¹ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 43, 5, PG 57, 463.

¹⁵² Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 81, 2, PG 58, 732.

¹⁵³ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 81, 2, PG 58, 732.

their wrath has no justification since Christ, having suffered a lot, bore everything patiently and was not angry with His oppressors¹⁵⁴. The preacher also draws attention to the monks living in hermitages in the vicinity of Antioch and he gives them as an example to follow in restraining anger¹⁵⁵.

6. The fruit of freedom from anger

Chrysostom expresses his conviction that dismissing anger is not in fact difficult but very easy – it is easier than persisting in anger¹⁵⁶. It also brings spiritual fruit in the form of peace of the heart¹⁵⁷ and obtaining absolution of sins from God¹⁵⁸. At the same time Chrysostom doubts whether those who get angry, especially for trivial reasons, will be able to get forgiveness¹⁵⁹. The preacher emphasizes that freedom from anger is a condition of trustful approach to God¹⁶⁰. Following the teaching of St. Paul (cf. 1Tim 2:8), he notices that it is also a condition of a good and effective¹⁶¹ prayer¹⁶². In this context the preacher regards it as extremely bad to turn to

¹⁵⁴ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 87, 1, PG 58, 769: “What plea shall we have after this for being moved by injuries, after Christ suffered these things?”.

¹⁵⁵ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 70, 5, PG 58, 662.

¹⁵⁶ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 19, 7, PG 57, 284: “For what sort of toil is it to forgive him that has grieved us? Nay, it is a toil not to forgive, but to keep up our enmity”; 42, 4, PG 27, 456: “What sort of toil is it not to curse, not to lie, not to swear, given up (τὴν ὀργήν) against your brother? But to do otherwise is something difficult and requires great effort”.

¹⁵⁷ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 19, 7, PG 57, 284: “[...] to be delivered from the anger (τοῦ θυμοῦ), both works in us a great refreshment, and is very easy to him that is willing”.

¹⁵⁸ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 61, 5, PG 58, 596: “And having considered all these things, cast away all anger (ὀργήν), that God may forgive us also all our trespasses”.

¹⁵⁹ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 87, 3, PG 58, 772: “For tell me if you will get forgiveness if you get mad and angry?”.

¹⁶⁰ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 51, 5, PG 58, 516.

¹⁶¹ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 23, 4, PG 57, 313: “To seek the things spiritual, all of them; to forgive them that have trespassed (cf. Mt 6:12), and so to draw near asking forgiveness; to lift up holy hands without wrath (ὀργῆς) and doubting (cf. 1Tim 2:8). If we thus ask, we shall receive”.

¹⁶² Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 19, 8, PG 57, 284: “Wherefore Paul also, making mention of prayer, required nothing so much as the observance of this commandment; for He says, lifting up holy hands without wrath (ὀργῆς) and doubting

God in a prayer against enemies, and to ask Him to direct His anger against them¹⁶³, while considering prayers for them to be spiritually useful¹⁶⁴.

Drawing attention to the fruit brought by patiently suffering harm and restraining anger with the perpetrators, the preacher enumerates those effects and says:

See then how much you gain, bearing meekly the spiteful acts of your enemies. First and greatest, deliverance from sins; secondly, fortitude and patience; thirdly, mildness and benevolence; for he that knows not how to be angry (οὐκ ὀργίζεσθαι) with them that grieve him, much more will he be ready to serve them that love him. Fourthly, to be free from anger (ὀργῆς) continually, to which nothing can be equal. For of him that is free from anger (ὀργῆς), it is quite clear that he is delivered also from the despondency hence arising, and will not spend his life on vain labors and sorrows. For he that knows not how to hate, neither does he know how to grieve, but will enjoy pleasure, and ten thousand blessings. So that we punish ourselves by hating others, even as on the other hand we benefit ourselves by loving them¹⁶⁵.

(1Tim 2:8). And if when you have need of mercy, not even then will you let go your anger (τὴν ὀργὴν), but art rather exceedingly mindful of it, [...] when will it be possible for you to become merciful, and to spew out the evil venom of this wickedness?"; 19, 9, PG 57, 286.

¹⁶³ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaem hom.* 19, 8, PG 57, 284: "As thus: should one approach you who are a man, seeking to obtain mercy, and then, in the midst of his lying on the ground, should see an enemy, and leaving off to supplicate you, begin to beat him; would you not make yourself more angry (τὴν ὀργὴν) with him? This do thou consider as taking place with regard to God also. For so thou likewise, making supplication unto God, leavest your supplication in the midst, and smitest your enemy with your words, and insultest the laws of God. Him who made a law to dismiss all anger (ὀργὴν), you are summoning against those that have vexed you, and requiring Him to do things contrary to His own commandments. [...] Yet some there are, who have come to such a point of brutishness, as not only to make intercession against their enemies, but even to curse their children, and to taste, if only it might be, of their very flesh; or rather they are even tasting thereof. For tell me not this, that you have not fixed your teeth in the body of him that vexed you; since you have done, at least as far as concerned you, what is much more grievous; in claiming that wrath (ὀργὴν) from above should fall upon him, and that he should be delivered over to undying punishment, and be overthrown with his whole house".

¹⁶⁴ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaem hom.* 24, 3, PG 57, 324: "But does he speak evil? Nay, from this pain also Christ has delivered you, by promising you without toil a great reward for the endurance of evil, and making you so clear from the anger (ὀργῆς) and vexation hence arising, as even to command you to pray for them (cf. Mt 5:44)".

¹⁶⁵ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaem hom.* 61, 5, PG 58, 594-595.

7. Justified anger

John Chrysostom was not only a moralist but an exegete as well and that is why the Holy Bible was the foundation of his teaching. He found certain texts in the Bible which made him restrict his criticism of anger. In *Homilies on St. Matthew* he refers to three of them: Ps 4:5 (LXX)¹⁶⁶, Mt 5:22a¹⁶⁷ and Eph 4:26¹⁶⁸. However, it is the words of Christ which are the crucial starting point for his teaching: “But I tell unto you, anyone whosoever is angry (ὁ ὀργιζόμενος) with a brother or sister without a cause (εἰκῆ)¹⁶⁹ shall be in danger of the judgment” (cf. Mt 5:22a)¹⁷⁰. The adverb εἰκῆ, which is of key importance in interpreting this text does not appear in the modern critical edition of the Gospel according to St. Matthew. Nevertheless, it does appear in the version of the Bible that Chrysostom used. The analysis of the patristic content shows that this version of the Gospel was also used by Eusebius of Caesarea¹⁷¹ Basil of Caesarea¹⁷², Gregory of Nyssa¹⁷³, Theodoret of Cyrus¹⁷⁴ and Cyril of Alexandria¹⁷⁵. Besides, the adverb εἰκῆ occurs in Romans 13:4, which verse was quoted by Chrysostom in homily number 16¹⁷⁶.

Chrysostom comments on the above quoted text of the Gospel (Mt 5:22a) and says that Christ

¹⁶⁶ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 16, 7, PG 57, 248.

¹⁶⁷ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 16, 5, PG 57, 245; 16, 7, PG 57, 248; 16, 8, PG 57, 249; 17, 4, PG 57, 259; 18, 5, PG 57, 271.

¹⁶⁸ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 16, 10, PG 57, 251; 16, 10, PG 53, 252.

¹⁶⁹ Cf. *Greek-English Lexicon*, p. 484, s.v. εἰκῆ.

¹⁷⁰ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 16, 5, PG 57, 245; cf. 16, 1, PG 57, 239; 16, 3, PG 57, 241; 16, 6, PG 57, 246; 16, 10, PG 57, 252; 18, 2, PG 57, 267.

¹⁷¹ Cf. Eusebius Caesariensis, *Demonstratio evangelica* 9, PG 22, 692A.

¹⁷² Cf. Basilius Caesariensis, *Regulae morales* 43, 1, PG 31, 761C.

¹⁷³ Cf. Gregorius Nyssenus, *Orationes de beatitudinibus* 6, PG 44, 1276A.

¹⁷⁴ Cf. Theodoretus Cyrensis, *Graecarum affectionum curatio* 9, PG 83, 1056C; Theodoretus Cyrensis, *De theologia sanctae Trinitatis et de oeconomia* (sub nomine Cyrilli) 7, PG 75, 1156A; Theodoretus Cyrensis, *Interpretatio in Psalmos* 9, 20-21, PG 80, 929C.

¹⁷⁵ Cf. Cyrillus Alexandrinus, *Commentarius in xii prophetas minores (In Zachariam prophetam)* 4, 83, PG 72, 197D; Cyrillus Alexandrinus, *Expositio in Psalmos* 36, 27, PG 69, 941D.

¹⁷⁶ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 16, 11, PG 57, 253.

has not altogether taken the thing away [anger]: first, because it is not possible, being a man, to be freed from passions: we may indeed get the dominion over them (παθῶν), but to be altogether without them is out of the question. Next, because this passion is even useful, if we know how to use it at the suitable time (καιροῦ)¹⁷⁷.

In the text quoted above Chrysostom expresses two important truths concerning the passion of anger. The first refers to the impossibility of removing passions from man's life since "Yet surely both are naturally implanted, and both are set in us for our profit; both anger (ὀργή), and desire"¹⁷⁸, which is in agreement with the philosophical thought on any human passions. Although anger can be controlled, it cannot be dismissed completely. The other refers to the benefit that can be brought by anger expressed at the right moment¹⁷⁹. In this context Chrysostom emphasizes the good following from justified anger and refers to the attitude of St. Paul, who got angry with Corinthians and Galatians and reproached them, thanks to which he brought them back from the track of errors and sins¹⁸⁰. The interesting fact is, that while commenting Mt 21:12-13 (cf. Mk 11:15-17; Lk 19:45-46; J 2:13-16) about the expulsion of the money changers from the Temple, Chrysostom does not refer to the righteous anger with which Jesus exalted himself for the purity of the temple, but only speaks of the anger of the Jews, who were indignant at him, not because of the expulsion of the merchants, but because of the miracles performed in the temple¹⁸¹.

¹⁷⁷ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 16, 7, PG 57, 248. Cf. Leduc, *Gérer l'agressivité et la colère*, p. 46-47.

¹⁷⁸ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 17, 1, PG 57, 256.

¹⁷⁹ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 17, 1, PG 57, 256: "[...] both are naturally implanted, and both are set in us for our profit; both anger (ὀργή), and desire". The statement that anger is useful reflects the influence of ancient philosophers, e.g. Aristotle; cf. J. Korwin-Łopuszański, *Gniew i strach w etyce Arystotelesa*, RF 29/2 (1981) p. 51; Brottier, *L'appel des demi-chrétiens à la vie angélique*, p. 213-214; Leyerle, *The Narrative Shape of Emotion*, p. 49.

¹⁸⁰ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 16, 7, PG 57, 248: "See, for instance, what great good was wrought by that anger (ὀργή) of Paul, which he felt against the Corinthians (cf. 1Cor 3:1f; 5:1f), on that well-known occasion; and how, as it delivered them from a grievous pest, so by the same means again he recovered the people of the Galatians (cf. Gal 1:6-9), likewise, which had fallen aside and others too beside these".

¹⁸¹ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 67, 1, PG 58, 632-633. Chrysostom briefly discusses this episode only in *In Joannem hom.* 23, 2, PG 59, 140.

While pointing to the right time (καιρός)¹⁸² for anger, he emphasizes that it occurs “When we are not avenging ourselves, but checking others in their lawless freaks, or forcing them to attend in their negligence”¹⁸³. At the same time the preacher explains that the unsuitable moment for anger is “When we do so as avenging ourselves”¹⁸⁴, which “makes them [adversaries] worse, and their anger (τὴν ὀργὴν) heightens into a greater flame; yea, often no less than death itself is the end of it”¹⁸⁵. Expressing this thought, he refers both to Aristotle, who held that anger is a desire¹⁸⁶ for revenge, and to the teaching of St. Paul, who advises, saying: “Avenge not yourselves, beloved, but give place unto the wrath (τῆ ὀργῆ) of God” (Rom 12:19)¹⁸⁷. For as this last sort is superfluous, so “is the first necessary and profitable” while anger expressed at the unsuitable time is “superfluous”¹⁸⁸. Chrysostom, as a careful observer of the surrounding reality and at the same time a splendid moralist, notices that among the Antioch Christians

most men do the contrary; becoming like wild beasts when they are injured themselves, but remiss and cowardly when they see despite done to another: both which are just opposite to the laws of the Gospel. Being angry (τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι) then is not a transgression, but being so [angry] (ὀργίζεσθε) unseasonably. For this cause the prophet also said, “Be angry (ὀργίζεσθε, and sin not” (Ps 4:5)¹⁸⁹.

The preacher emphasizes that anger was given to man not to sin but to oppose the sins of others so that “we may chastise the evil, and correct those who walk disorderly”¹⁹⁰. Righteous anger should not provoke the anger of the person who has experienced it, because, as Aristotle says, what is just does not provoke anger¹⁹¹. That is why although Christ does not forbid

¹⁸² More on the meaning of the term καιρός in Chrysostom’s lecture, cf. Brottier, *L’appel des demi-chrétiens à la vie angélique*, p. 66.

¹⁸³ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 16, 7, PG 57, 248.

¹⁸⁴ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 16, 7, PG 57, 248.

¹⁸⁵ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 18, 2, PG 57, 266.

¹⁸⁶ Cf. Aristoteles, *Rhetorica* 2, 2, 1 (1378a), LCL 193, p. 172.

¹⁸⁷ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 16, 7, PG 57, 248.

¹⁸⁸ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 16, 7, PG 57, 248.

¹⁸⁹ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 16, 7, PG 57, 248.

¹⁹⁰ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 17, 1, PG 57, 256. Cf. Leduc, *Gérer l’agressivité et la colère*, p. 52-56.

¹⁹¹ Cf. Aristoteles, *Rhetorica* 2, 3, 15 (1380b), LCL 193, p. 190; Harris, *Restraining Rage*, p. 61.

anger, “in the case of anger (τῆς ὀργῆς) He laid down a certain distinction, saying, «without a cause» (εἰκῆ), and for «nought» (μάτην)”¹⁹². Therefore, only anger without a reason is forbidden, what Aristotle clearly said¹⁹³, while justified anger is not only allowed but even recommended¹⁹⁴, which is confirmed for example by the reactions of St. Paul and St. Peter. Paul got angry with Elymas (cf. Acts 1:9-11), John called Mark (cf. Acts 15:38), high priest Ananias (cf. Acts 23:3), Imeneus (cf. 1Tim 1:20), Alexander (cf. 1Tim 1:20; 2Tim 4:14-15), Corinthian (cf. 1Cor 5:1-5; 2Cor 2:4-8) and Galatians (cf. Gal 1:6-9), while Peter got angry with Ananias and Sapphira (cf. Acts 5:1-11). Paul’s and Peter’s anger did not result from wrath but from their concern about those who sinned. It is just like a loving father, angry with his son, does not express his wrath but cares about his son. This is what Christ did. He “also was justly angered (ὀργίζετο) with us, yet nevertheless He gave Himself for us to be slain, not imputing those trespasses”¹⁹⁵. It follows from what Chrysostom says that Christ showing “great anger (τὴν ὀργὴν)”¹⁹⁶ with people who are angry with their brothers recommends the quickest possible reconciliation (cf. Mt 6:23-24) “by all these methods destroying both the root and the produce [of anger]”¹⁹⁷. While saying in the parable about a hypocrite who wanted to take out a speck of dust from the eye of a brother (cf. Mt 7:1-5), He showed “great wrath (τὴν ὀργὴν), which He has against them that do such things. For so, wheresoever He would indicate that the sin is great, and the punishment and wrath in store for it grievous, He begins with a reproach”¹⁹⁸. Although Chrysostom considers justified anger admissible, he points out that it would be better to do this – naturally, for justified reasons – gently and without anger, which is much easier and wiser¹⁹⁹.

¹⁹² Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 17, 1, PG 57, 256. The word μάτην appears in Mt 15:9 and in Mk 7:7. The phrase εἰκῆ καὶ μάτην appears once more in: *In Matthaeum hom.* 1, 1, PG 57, 15; 2, 2, PG 57, 26; 10, 4, PG 57, 188; 13, 3, PG 57, 211; 16, 6, PG 57, 247; 17, 1, PG 57, 256; 33, 2, PG 57, 389; 35, 3, PG 57, 409; 38, 7, PG 57, 428; 53, 5, PG 58, 532; 59, 7, PG 58, 583; 62, 3, PG 58, 600; 65, 3, PG 58, 621; 77, 3, PG 58, 706; 78, 3, PG 58, 714; 87, 4, PG 58, 774; 89, 4, PG 58, 786; 90, 1, PG 58, 787.

¹⁹³ Cf. Aristoteles, *Rhetorica* 2, 2, 1-2 (1378a), LCL 193, p. 172.

¹⁹⁴ Cf. Brottier, *L'appel des demi-chrétiens à la vie angélique*, p. 212-213.

¹⁹⁵ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 16, 9, PG 57, 259.

¹⁹⁶ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 16, 10, PG 57, 252.

¹⁹⁷ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 16, 10, PG 57, 252.

¹⁹⁸ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 23, 2, PG 57, 309.

¹⁹⁹ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 87, 4, PG 58, 774: “For though it be necessary to retaliate, it is possible to do this without anger (χωρίς ὀργῆς), and it were more easy and more wise than with anger (ἢ μετ’ ὀργῆς) and to have no painful feeling”.

In the context of the words about justified anger, Chrysostom remarks that it follows from Christ's teaching that He threatens those who get angry for nought with judgment: "For observe: I bade you, says He, not be angry for nought (τὸν μὲν ὀργιζόμενον), (this is why He said: he who gets angry [ὁ ὀργιζόμενος] is in danger of the judgment [cf. Mt 5:22a]), [...] you have called your brother «Raca», again, I set another punishment, the council"²⁰⁰. Although Chrysostom speaks so decisively on the prohibition on unjust anger, he sums up his arguments, stating that "as yet these are no great things; for the punishments are here"²⁰¹. He also emphasized that Christ grades the infliction of punishment so that the sinner will come to their senses and lest they will commit a greater sin which could be punished with "an undying penalty of hell". At the same time Chrysostom indicates a certain chain of human improper attitudes: a person is first angry with their neighbour, next – by a spoken word²⁰² – they insult the latter and later on – if they cannot restrain anger – can even commit a murder²⁰³. Interestingly, Chrysostom is convinced that those who get unjustifiably angry are aware of doing the wrong thing, and they even themselves condemn their improper attitude, whereas those who do not get angry are conscious of good con-

²⁰⁰ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 16, 8, PG 57, 249. It should be noted that the unclear Aramaic term "raka" was primarily an expression of humiliation and contempt.

²⁰¹ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 16, 8, PG 57, 249.

²⁰² When Chrysostom draws attention to the words spoken in anger, he speaks of "angry words (ὀργίλα ῥήματα)", which – he says – are "the filth of the mouth". Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 51, 4, PG 58, 516: "For the filth of the mouth is evil speaking, blasphemy, reviling, angry words, filthy talking, laughter, jesting".

²⁰³ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaëum hom.* 16, 8, PG 57, 249: "And see how He proceeds little by little in His punishments, all but excusing Himself unto you, and signifying that His desire indeed is to threaten nothing of the kind, but that we drag Him on to such denunciations. For observe: «I bade you, says He, not be angry for nought (μὴ ὀργίσθῃς), because you are in danger of the judgment. You have despised the former commandment: see what anger (ἡ ὀργή) has produced; it has led you on straight-way to insult, for you have called your brother 'Raca'. Again, I set another punishment, 'the council'. If you overlook even this, and proceed to that which is more grievous, I visit you no longer with these finite punishments, but with the undying penalty of hell, lest after this you should break forth even to murder»; 16, 10, PG 57, 252: "That is why He mentions judgment, the Council and hell"; 16, 11, PG 57, 253: "Wherefore Christ also made mention, not of hell only, but also of a court of justice, and of being dragged there, and of the prison, and of all the suffering there; by all these means destroying the roots of murder"; 18, 2, PG 57, 266.

duct²⁰⁴. Anger, therefore, is most harmful to the one who has succumbed to it²⁰⁵.

John Chrysostom emphasizes that a Christian cannot get justifiably angry with people who aroused his anger, although it is them who directly caused a fit of anger²⁰⁶, but he can only – and even should – be angry with the devil²⁰⁷ since it is as a result of the latter’s scheming that people were provoked to act badly and to cause negative emotions in others by doing harm to them and upsetting them²⁰⁸.

Undertaking a struggle against Satan is a guarantee of getting support from Christ, who – having seen a man prepared for the war with the evil spirit – arrives immediately with rescue and – as Chrysostom says – “He by Himself brings all the war to an end”²⁰⁹. It should be noticed in this context that the preacher is of the opinion that passions, including anger, are born in man under the influence of the evil spirit. That is why Chrysostom calls them tyrannical passions (πάθος τυραννικόν):

He [Christ] requires of you one thing alone, that you show forth a sincere hatred against that foe. And if you contribute this to Him, He by Himself brings all the war to an end. Though thou burn with anger (ὀργή), with desire of riches, with any tyrannical passion (πάθος τυραννικόν) whatever; if He see you only stripping yourself and prepared against it, He comes quickly to you, and makes all things easy, and sets you above the flame, as He did those children of old in the Babylonian furnace: for they too carried in with them nought but their good will (cf. Dan 3:8f)²¹⁰.

²⁰⁴ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 87, 4, PG 58, 774: “For it is impossible that a man, who is angry (ἄνθρωπον ὀργιζόμενον), should not utterly condemn himself, even as on the other hand it is impossible for one who is not angry (μὴ ὀργιζόμενον) to be self-condemned”.

²⁰⁵ Cf. Brottier, *L’appel des demi-chrétiens à la vie angélique*, p. 212.

²⁰⁶ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 33, 6, PG 57, 395.

²⁰⁷ Cf. Brottier, *L’appel des demi-chrétiens à la vie angélique*, p. 212.

²⁰⁸ Cf. Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 18, 1, PG 57, 265: “Having therefore mentioned the ancient law, and recognized it all, He [Christ] signifies again, that it is not our brother who has done these deeds, but the evil one. For this cause he has also subjoined, But I say unto you, that you resist not the evil one. He did not say, resist not your brother, but the evil one, signifying that on his motion men dare so to act; and in this way relaxing and secretly removing most of our anger (τῆς ὀργῆς) against the aggressor, by transferring the blame to another”.

²⁰⁹ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 16, 11, PG 57, 254.

²¹⁰ Iohannes Chrysostomus, *In Matthaeum hom.* 16, 11, PG 57, 254.

Thus, anger is indicated and useful in three situations, when it is necessary to stand up for the injured person, when it is undertaken to fight against the attacking demons (in the form of internal voices encouraging wicked thoughts, sinful impulses, or submission to defects), and when efforts are made to correct the behavior of sinners.

8. Conclusions

It needs to be noticed in the conclusions that in his *Homilies on Matthew* John Chrysostom showed man's emotional reaction called anger with remarkable accuracy and mastery. In his homilies the preacher gave a multitude of examples to show the many aspects of anger, at the same time criticizing those of his listeners who behaved in an improper manner. This extraordinary knowledge of the problem was a result of a number of reasons. One of them was Chrysostom's knowledge of classical philosophy²¹¹, especially the philosophy of Aristotle (he drew abundantly from) and the stoic and epicurean systems, which he used in pointing out therapeutic remedies for anger. The second was the character of the preacher himself.

It follows from the analysis of what he said about anger that he did not try to show it in an original and systematic way but speaking about this subject he referred to the generally familiar content which he transferred but occasionally. That is why his statements on this subject are above all of moral character. As a moralist, he condemned anger and appealed to the faithful to suppress and control it since the effects may be serious, including a murder. Therefore, he pointed out methods (both behavioral and cognitive) to suppress one's own anger and to calm the anger of others. He also stressed that anger can be properly used to protect society from evil. Although he knew the teachings of the philosophers on this subject he

²¹¹ Little is known about Chrysostom's philosophical education. It is only known that he received such an education and his teacher was Andragathios; cf. Socrates, *Historia ecclesiastica* 6, 3, 1, GCS NF 1, p. 313. The scope of this education is still under discussion. A.-M. Malingrey (*Résonances stoïciennes dans l'oeuvre de Jean Chrysostome*, „Revue de Recherche Philosophique” 7 (1979) p. 116-121) suggests that it was quite good, P.-W. Lai (*John Chrysostom and the Hermeneutics of Exemplar Portraits*, Durham 2010, p. 47), G. Roskam (*Plutarch's Influence on John Chrysostom*, „Byzantion” 85 (2015) p. 341-363) and B. Leyerle (*The Narrative Shape of Emotion*, p. 22, n. 4), they suggest that it was superficial and did not result from the study of the works of ancient philosophers. Nevertheless, it is noticeable in the works of Chrysostom; cf. J.N.D. Kelly, *Golden Mouth. The Story of John Chrysostom: Ascetic, Preacher, Bishop*, Ithaca 1998, p. 7.

used primarily biblical arguments, not philosophical ones in persuading the faithful to fight it. For him, anger was primarily a reaction to certain situations that provoked it. This approach to the question of anger leads to the conclusion that most of the listeners of Chrysostom's homily did not belong to the intellectual elite. Chrysostom appeals not only to the emotions of angry people, but also to viewers of the angry confrontations of others clearly indicates that his homiletic teaching was aimed at a wider group of rather simple citizens²¹². His teaching on anger, especially indicating a need for constant self-improvement and control over any emotions, is a sign of courage and foresight as he places the Christian message of gentleness, forgiveness and love in the first place. The social program he proposed was deliberately very broad, because the preacher wanted to reform all his listeners, not just a few elites.

Anger in Homiletic Teaching of Saint John Chrysostom. The Analysis of *Homilies on Matthew*

(summary)

The article is a case study of Saint John Chrysostom's teaching on anger in his *Homilies on Matthew*. The author discusses only the wrath of a man, the question of God's anger as a different research problem was omitted. Saint John Chrysostom uses two Greek nouns while describing anger: ἡ ὀργή and ὁ θυμός, which are used as synonyms without distinguishing any semantic differences between them. The preacher does not give a definition of anger, but describes it as a passion (τὸ πάθος) and places it among other flaws – according to Plato's classification – to passion of the spiritual part of soul (*thymoeides*). He also describes anger as an illness, and by personalizing it, he says that anger is the devil. The preacher specifies many reasons for anger (jealousy, power, situation of a threat, tardiness, and devil's action). He also says about the fatal effects of anger, which above all destroys human relations, harms spirituality, and leads to more serious misdemeanors (i.e. perjury, enmity, insult, fist-cuff, and even murder). Because of that Chrysostom points out anger prohibition expressed by Christ and Saint Paul, as well as the necessity of combating anger, which is a crucial

²¹² Cf. Leyerle, *The Narrative Shape of Emotion*, p. 48. For an analysis of the diversity of Chrysostom's various congregations, see W. Mayer, *John Chrysostom: Extraordinary Preacher, Ordinary Audience*, in: *Preacher and Audience: Studies in Early Christian and Byzantine Homiletics*, ed. P. Allen – M. Cunningham, Leiden 1998, p. 105-137; W. Mayer, *Who Came to Hear John Chrysostom Preach?* EThL 76 (2000) p. 73-87; P. Szczur, *Problematyka społeczna w późnoantycznej Antiochii na podstawie nauczania homiletycznego Jana Chryzostoma*, Lublin 2008, p. 101-123; W. Mayer, *Audience(s) for Patristic Social Teaching: A Case Study*, in: *Reading Patristic Texts on Social Ethics: Issues and Challenges for Twenty-first Century Christian Social Thought*, ed. J. Leemans – B.J. Matz – J. Verstraeten, Washington 2011, p. 89-94.

element of the Christian self-improvement. These efforts give spiritual fruits in the form of peace of heart and absolution of sins. The final part of the article represents an issue of justified anger which is not prohibited but also advisable against sinners to improve their actions.

Keywords: John Chrysostom; Preaching; Emotions; Anger; Justified anger; Christian self-improvement

Gniew w nauczaniu homiletycznym św. Jana Chryzostoma. Analiza Homilii na Ewangelię według św. Mateusza

(streszczenie)

W artykule zajęto się opracowaniem nauczania Jana Chryzostoma na temat gniewu zawartego w jego *Homiliach na Ewangelię według św. Mateusza*. Omówiono jedynie gniew człowieka, całkowicie pomijając zagadnienie gniewu Boga, które stanowi zupełnie odrębny problem badawczy. Na określenie gniewu Chryzostom używa dwóch rzeczowników greckich: ἡ ὀργή i ὁ θυμός, które w zasadzie stosuje zamiennie jako synonimy, nie podkreślając żadnych szczególnych niuansów znaczeniowych wyraźnie odróżniających je od siebie. Chociaż kaznodzieja nie podaje definicji gniewu, to jednak określa go jako namiętność (τὸ πάθος) i umieszcza go wśród innych wad, tym samym zaliczając go – zgodnie z klasyfikacją Platona – do namiętności gniewliwej części duszy. Gniew określa też jako chorobę, a personifikując go, mówi, że gniew to diabeł. Kaznodzieja podaje wiele przyczyn gniewu (zazdrość, posiadana władza, sytuacje zagrożenia lub tematyka głoszonych kazań, a przede wszystkim ludzka opieszałość i działanie diabła). Mówi też o zgubnych skutkach gniewu, który przede wszystkim niszczy relacje międzyludzkie, ale też szkodzi duchowości człowieka i prowadzi go do poważniejszych wykroczeń (np. krzywoprzysięstwo, nieprzyjaźń, obelgi, rękoczyni, a nawet zabójstwo). Z tego też powodu Chryzostom zwraca uwagę na zakaz gniewu wyrażony przez Chrystusa i św. Pawła oraz konieczność walki z nim, co jest istotnym elementem doskonalenia chrześcijańskiego. Podjęcie tych wysiłków przynosi duchowe owoce w postaci pokoju serca i uzyskania odpuszczenia grzechów. W końcowej partii artykułu poruszone zostało zagadnienie słusznego gniewu, który jest nie tylko dozwolony, ale też wskazany wobec tych, którzy grzeszą, aby dzięki gniewnemu upomnieniu poprawili się.

Słowa kluczowe: Jan Chryzostom; kaznodziejstwo; emocje; gniew; słuszny gniew; doskonalenie chrześcijańskie

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Rev. Marcin Wysocki¹

“Shall I show joy or sorrow?” (Poem 31). Pain of Loss – a Study of Paulinus of Nola’s Works²

In the life of Pontius Meropius Anicius Paulinus (ca. 354-431), known more as Paulinus of Nola, there were at least two painful losses of loved ones that left an imprint on his life and marked his work, preserved in the form of 52 letters and 33 poems³. These losses changed Paulinus’ life and certainly influenced his answer to the question “Shall I show joy or sorrow?”. At first glance, it sounds bizarre, but he also asked this question in the face of the loss of close people he corresponded with and who he comforted through his letters⁴. At the moment of his baptism, Paulinus, educat-

¹ Rev. Dr. hab. Marcin Wysocki, a university professor at the Department of Greek and Latin Patrology in the Section of Church History and Patrology at the Faculty of Theology of the John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Poland; e-mail: mwysocki@kul.lublin.pl; ORCID: 0000-0001-5448-5566.

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³ See S. Costanza, *Aspetti autobiografici nell’opera poetica di Paolino di Nola*, in: *Forma Futuri. Studi in onore del Card. M. Pellegrino*, Torino 1975, p. 454-471 = *Aspetti autobiografici nell’opera poetica di Paolino di Nola*, „Giornale Italiano di filologia” 27/6 (1975) p. 265-277.

⁴ Generally on the topic of Christian *consolatio* in Paulinus’ writings, see L.F. Pizzolato, *La „consolatio” cristiana per la morte nel sec. IV. Riflessioni metodologiche e tematiche*, „Civiltà Classica e Cristiana” 6 (1985) p. 441-474; L.F. Pizzolato, *Morir giovani. Il pensiero antico di fronte allo scandalo della morte prematura. Letture cristiane del Primo Millennio XXII*, Milano 1996 (on Paulinus see p. 174-182); J.-M. Vercausse, *Le chrétien face à la mort d’après Paulin de Nole (Epistula 13 et Carmen 31)*, „Connaissance des Pères de l’Église” 123 (2011) p. 50-60; J.-M. Vercausse, *Quand la consolation latine se drapait dans un voile chrétien... chez Paulin de Nole*, in: *Littérature narrative et consolation. Approches historiques et théoriques*, ed. E. Poulain-Gautret, Arras 2012, p. 75-87;

ed on good classical models and thus familiar with the Stoic philosophy, entered a world where, on the one hand, there was purely human grief over the passing and death of relatives, and on the other, the joy of their passage to God, to a better world, filled with Christian hope.

Unfortunately, we do not have any sources about Paulinus' experiencing pain of loss from the years before his conversion, so we can only rely on his Christian experience of parting with others. It is worth seeing how the writings of this promising statesman, poet, and finally priest, bishop, and monk living at the tomb of St. Felix, show the loss and passing away of another person and what advice he gives to those who experience such loss. This is all the more so since the fame and voice of Paulinus spread throughout the world at that time and found recipients and followers, and he was repeatedly praised as a master of the spiritual life⁵.

1. My passions

The first of these losses, perhaps around 392, was the death of his eight-day-old son, Celsus, in Spain, where Paulinus lived for a while with his wife Therasia. We do not know much about this event, but Celsus is mentioned in the poetic *consolatio* addressed to Pneumatius and his wife Fidelis on the death of their child whose name was Celsus as well. A few years after his death, the pain of the loss of their firstborn son surely being enormous, all the more so as the baby was a long-anticipated child. In invoking words to the deceased Celsus, Paulinus portrayed the sadness related to the death of his Celsus: "[...] like our own boy who bore your blessed name and who was summoned the moment he was bestowed. He was a child long desired

M. Wysocki, *Chrześcijańska nadzieja w listach konsolacyjnych (św. Ambroży, św. Augustyn, św. Hieronim, św. Paulin)*, in: *Nadzieje upadającego świata. Nadzieja w chrześcijańskiej epistolografii łacińskiej IV i V wieku (Ambroży, Augustyn, Hieronim, Paulin z Noli)*, ed. M. Wysocki – J. Pałucki – M. Pyzik-Turska, Lublin 2019, p. 217-234.

⁵ See Augustinus, *Ep.* 26, 5; Augustinus, *De civitate Dei* I 10, 53; Ambrosius, *Ep.* 27, 1-3; Sulpicius Severus, *Vita sancti Martini Turonensis* 25, 4. Cf. A. Ruggiero, *San Paolino maestro di fede e di vita*, Napoli – Roma 1994; S. Costanza, *I rapporti tra Ambrogio e Paolino di Nola*, in: *Ambrosius Episcopus, Atti del Congresso internazionale di Studi ambrosiani nel XVI centenario della elevazione di Sant'Ambrogio alla cattedra episcopale*, v. 2, ed. G. Lazzati, Milano 1976, p. 220-232.

but not awarded to us, since we were unworthy to rejoice in the devotion of progeny”⁶.

He explains the loss of the desired child due to his unworthiness, because offspring are a reward that Paulinus and Therasia did not deserve to have. Perhaps it is worth looking at these words in the broader context of Paulinus’ life. The poem to console Pneumatius and Fidelis was probably written in Nola, where Paulinus, after his conversion, settled down with his wife, leading a monastic life. It is commonly admitted that the death of Celsus was one of the reasons for the complete transformation of Paulinus, his conversion and the decision to abandon his goods and settle in a small town near Naples at the tomb of the martyr Felix. Paulinus writes *Consolatio* from the position of a converted Christian, but remembers the times when he did not yet follow the path of Christ and did not serve his spiritual father Felix. Perhaps, therefore, this unworthiness and hopelessness are related precisely to yet incomplete conversion and a weak faith at the time when they were given a son, it is before the beginning of their monastic life at the tomb of St. Felix. They buried him in Complutum, alongside the martyrs Justus and Pastor, “so that with the blood of the saints close by he may sprinkle our souls when they are in the fire after death”⁷.

These words still show sadness and a kind of bitterness, leading to fear for their salvation. However, from the point of view after conversion, words full of hope come from Paulinus: “We believe that he shares your joyful life, sporting with you in eternal glades”⁸ or “It is certain that the kingdom of heaven belongs to children such as you were in age, purpose, and faith, like our own boy”⁹. Here it seems that Paulinus poetically divides time as before and after his conversion, and only this gives him hope and joy.

The second loss, mentioned in the writings of Paulinus, was the loss of his brother, about whom we learn from two of Paulinus’ letters (*Ep.* 35 and 36), which he surely sends shortly after his brother’s death to his spiritual father, Bishop Delphinus, and to a friend, at that time the priest Amandus,

⁶ Paulinus Nolanus, *Carm.* 31, 600-604, tr. P.G. Walsh, *The Poems of St. Paulinus of Nola*, Ancient Christian Writers 40, New York – Ramsey 1975, p. 328.

⁷ Paulinus Nolanus, *Carm.* 31, 609-610, Walsh, *Poems*, p. 329.

⁸ Paulinus Nolanus, *Carm.* 31, 605-606, Walsh, *Poems*, p. 328.

⁹ Paulinus Nolanus, *Carm.* 31, 599-601, Walsh, *Poems*, p. 328.

the later Bishop of Bordeaux and successor of Delphinus¹⁰. Both are from around 390-392. The tragedy to the death of the unknown by name brother of Paulinus is added by the theory adopted by researchers about the tragic death of his brother, the result of murder¹¹, as evidenced by the words of Paulinus in *Natalicium* of 407 AD, several years after the tragic events:

When I was troubled by the bloody slaughter of my own brother, and this case of my brother was bringing hazard to me as a blood relation, and a purchaser was already laying hands on my property, you, my father, removed the sword from my throat and the treasury officials from my estate. You kept me and my possessions in trust for Christ the Lord¹².

The letters that were written, as Paulinus says when “my fresh grief at being sundered from my brother causes me deep anxiety”¹³, show a man mourning the loss of a loved one and concerned for his salvation. It should be mentioned that both Paulinus and his brother were baptized by Delphinus¹⁴. Paulinus gratefully accepts the bishop’s letter, which is “full of great affection”¹⁵ that he awaits in this difficult time, a time of pain¹⁶. Yet, he does not want to talk about the experienced drama, thus shortening the letter to the most important words, because, as he writes, “Yet ‘all things have their season’, and since this is a time of mourning, it seems also a time for saying little”¹⁷. In the face of his brother’s death, of mourning and a letter from a friend, the most important thing for Paulinus is to care for his brother’s salvation:

I earnestly confess that I am grieved not so much at my brother’s bodily death as at his spiritual indifference. He was more mindful of the anxieties which

¹⁰ The theory is that this second letter was written at a later time, after the death of his next brother.

¹¹ V. Moricca, *La morte violenta di un fratello di Paolino di Nola*, „Didaskaleion” 4 (1926) p. 85-90; H. Sivan, *The Death of Paulinus’ brother*, „Rheinisches Museum für Philologie” 139/2 (1996) p. 170-179.

¹² Paulinus Nolanus, *Carm.* 21, 416-420, Walsh, *Poems*, p. 186.

¹³ Paulinus Nolanus, *Ep.* 36, 2, Walsh, *Letters of St. Paulinus of Nola*, v. 2, Ancient Christian Writers 36, New York – Ramsey 1967, p. 174.

¹⁴ See Paulinus Nolanus, *Ep.* 35.

¹⁵ Paulinus Nolanus, *Ep.* 35, Walsh, *Letters*, v. 2, p. 172.

¹⁶ See Paulinus Nolanus, *Ep.* 35.

¹⁷ Paulinus Nolanus, *Ep.* 35, Walsh, *Letters*, v. 2, p. 172.

he had to abandon here than of the cures to which he could look forward in heaven; he advanced the secondary things and relegated the primary”¹⁸.

That is why in his pain he asks Delphinus to pray with fatherly affection for the deceased and thus beg for mercy and refreshment. In the second letter to his friend Amandus, Paulinus also describes his state of mind as “fresh grief [...] and deep anxiety”¹⁹. The former is of course caused by the loss of his brother, but the latter, like in the letter to Delphinus, is primarily due to concern for his brother’s salvation. Paulinus writes:

I know that he has been taken only from this world and only for a time, and that I must soon join him in the next world. The more genuine reason why I mourn his death is the realisation that all his acts and arrangements up to his death were in accordance with my sins rather than with my prayers, so that he preferred to pass over to his Lord as a debtor rather than as a free man²⁰.

On the one hand, there is a gleam of hope in these words that death is only temporary, but on the other hand, Paulinus’ words are full of regret and reveal some internal pain and guilt. Paulinus constantly returned to his “sinful” life before his conversion and here we also find his reminiscences: Paulinus’ regret, because his brother died not as a free man, that is, fully converted, but as a debtor to God, living like Paulinus before his conversion. Therefore, Paulinus asks Amandus: “share my suffering endured on his behalf, combine with me in the toil of prayer, that the pitying and merciful God [...] may through your prayers refresh his soul with the drops of His mercy”²¹.

Similarly to the letter to Delphinus, in his letter to Amandus, Paulinus also wants to maintain stoic restraint, but only in the sense of the words, meaning the subject he is faithful to, because he remains on the issue of death in the letter, also talking about his own death, above all that for sin. At the same time, however, he does not exercise restraint in what can bring his brother salvation, so he asks for prayer and mercy.

Thus, we see the whole spectrum of feelings related to the death of loved ones in these three writings. They touch the deepest inner part of a person, where in the face of pain and grief there is only silence, or at least

¹⁸ Paulinus Nolanus, *Ep. 35*, Walsh, *Letters*, v. 2, p. 172.

¹⁹ Paulinus Nolanus, *Ep. 36, 2*, Walsh, *Letters*, v. 2, p. 174.

²⁰ Paulinus Nolanus, *Ep. 36, 2*, Walsh, *Letters*, v. 2, p. 174-175.

²¹ Paulinus Nolanus, *Ep. 36, 2*, Walsh, *Letters*, v. 2, p. 175.

the limitation of words, because both letters concerning his brother's death are among the shortest in Paulinus' epistolography. The situation is different in the consolation letters that Paulinus sent to his friends in connection with the death of their relatives. Among Paulinus' works, two such letters have survived, one in the form of prose and the other in the form of poetry. Both contain a wealth of feelings related to the loss of loved ones, feelings that must confront the feelings of those who have lost their loved ones. Interestingly, no reminiscences have survived in Paulinus' works after the death of his beloved wife Therasia, who probably died a few years before her husband²².

2. Your passions

A few months after the death of Pammachius' wife Paulina²³, Paulinus wrote him a long letter in which he assured him about "personal feelings of love" and sharing in his grief²⁴. He also recalled the words of St. Paul: "to rejoice with them that rejoice, to weep with them that weep" (Rom 12:15), all in order "to show sympathy towards each other and «bear each other's burdens» (Ga 6:2), so that by mutual consolation we might strengthen our common faith and warm our wearied hearts"²⁵. Paulinus of Nola, speaking of consolation, which is to flow from the love of Christ, points out that it strengthens the common faith and comforts tormented hearts. This is because "brotherly sympathy fortifies the struggling soul, and like a wall resists the various buffets on the oppressed mind"²⁶. Nolanus emphasizes above all the spiritual and community dimensions as well as the practical dimension of comforting and participating in the

²² A. Ruggiero, *I rapporti tra Paolino di Nola e Terasia negli Scritti di Paolino e nella testimonianza di Ambrogio, Agostino, Girolamo e Gregorio di Tours*, „Impegno e Dialogo” 15 (2006) p. 147-165.

²³ See J. Pałucki, *Epistolografia Paulina z Noli (355-430). Adresaci oraz okoliczności powstawania listów*, in: *Fructus Spiritus est Caritas. Księga jubileuszowa ofiarowana ks. prof. F. Drączkowskiemu*, ed. M. Wysocki, Lublin 2011, p. 305-314; J. Pałucki, *Świeccy adresaci listów Paulina z Noli*, *VoxP* 42-43 (2002) p. 253-260.

²⁴ This letter is not only an expression of compassion and mourning, but also a praise of conjugal love, Cf. A. Ruggiero, *Paolino di Nola, cantore della famiglia*, Nola 1999; J. Pałucki, *Małżeństwo drogą doskonalenia chrześcijańskiego na podstawie epistolografii św. Paulina z Noli*, *VoxP* 57 (2012) p. 469-481.

²⁵ Paulinus Nolanus, *Ep.* 13, 1, Walsh, *Letters*, v. 1, p. 117.

²⁶ Paulinus Nolanus, *Ep.* 13, 1, Walsh, *Letters*, v. 1, p. 118.

feelings of other people: they are to protect the consoled person from making careless decisions under the influence of emotions. What connects Paulinus’ and Pammachius’ feelings is Christian love. In this letter, Paulinus shows a beautiful example of participating in the feelings of a man who mourns the death of his wife:

Therefore, I embrace you in this love, and reverence you as Christ’s member. I love you as my fellow member. For those who have one faith must have one mind also, and those who have one God have a single spirit. So, since our bodies are one in the harness of belief, how can our hearts be divided as we bear with each other? I speak the truth and no lie when I say that in reflecting on your emotions I feel my own heart torn by your sighs, and the limbs which truly belong to both of us pierced by the pain of your wound²⁷.

Paulinus talks about his emotions related to Paulina’s death that he shares with Pammachius and presents himself as completely united with his pain, which flows from a faith they both share. It also keeps them united in thoughts and feelings. Paulinus then shows the various symptoms of mourning and the feelings that accompanied Pammachius and, in a way, Paulinus as well. He mentions the funeral when Pammachius escorted the deceased to the grave:

[...] unlike most men you accompanied her to burial with her tribute of tears, and unlike those deprived of Christian hope, without empty pomp and honour. Instead, you first fittingly performed the proper rites for her dear body, sprinkling and bedewing it with affectionate and copious tears of love, and then in more religious fashion you honoured her burial by attending her with remedies which bring salvation and works which live-in other words, with almsgiving²⁸.

Thus, Paulinus shows a special way of experiencing mourning. It emphasizes pain and regret, but at the same time points to Christian faith and hope, which should influence the way of experiencing grief. Therefore, in the rest of the letter, he straightforwardly expresses: “Granted our love may weep for a time, but our faith must ever rejoice. We should long for those who have been sent before us, but we should not lose hope of gaining

²⁷ Paulinus Nolanus, *Ep.* 13, 3, Walsh, *Letters*, v. 1, p. 119.

²⁸ Paulinus Nolanus, *Ep.* 13, 3, Walsh, *Letters*, v. 1, p. 120.

them back”²⁹. Paulinus distinguishes between different states and behaviors related to experiencing the death of a loved one. He speaks of tears and longing, lamentations and mourning, pointing out that the former are more worthy of a believer and more suitable for consolation³⁰. In the same letter, Nolanus, referring to all the virtues possessed by the deceased Paulina, including meditation and praise on them, pointing to the healing effect of such a procedure, which at first, however, seems difficult, states: “Thus, those very causes which inflame your heart’s wound can bring you a greater consolation”³¹. Considering her merits, virtues and goodness, although they sadden the widower, they should give him as a believer abundant comfort³². For Paulinus, the essential issue in experiencing mourning is not the loss of a loved one, but rather the fact that she existed, that she was with us, that she endowed us with her goodness³³, and for that she should be mourning properly in gratitude and joy.

Such a mourning experience results from the fact that Paulinus of Nola sees death as a sleep and emphasizes its temporality³⁴. Since death is a sleep, then in loving those dear to us, Paulinus writes, “let us show the longing of intimate friendship, but let us console ourselves by that confidence in the resurrection which is afforded by our faith”³⁵. He clearly emphasizes the difference between pagans and Christians. The former are guided by human opinions, the unbelievable dreams of poets or the imaginations of philosophers, and therefore they have no hope and “delude themselves with the lies of poets”³⁶. The lack of hope and despair is precisely the lack of faith in the resurrection, which Christians draw “from the very fount of truth”³⁷. That is why he writes:

But we have no need of such desperate remedies, for we have Truth Itself. This Truth, which is God and the word of God, has promised by Its teaching, and proved by Its rising again, the resurrection of the flesh unto eternal life

²⁹ Paulinus Nolanus, *Ep.* 13, 9, Walsh, *Letters*, v. 1, p. 125.

³⁰ See Paulinus Nolanus, *Ep.* 13, 5.

³¹ Paulinus Nolanus, *Ep.* 13, 6, Walsh, *Letters*, v. 1, p. 123.

³² See Paulinus Nolanus, *Ep.* 13, 5.

³³ See Paulinus Nolanus, *Ep.* 13, 6.

³⁴ See Paulinus Nolanus, *Ep.* 13, 9.

³⁵ Paulinus Nolanus, *Ep.* 13, 9, Walsh, *Letters*, v. 1, p. 125.

³⁶ Paulinus Nolanus, *Ep.* 13, 25, Walsh, *Letters*, v. 1, p. 140.

³⁷ Paulinus Nolanus, *Ep.* 13, 25, Walsh, *Letters*, v. 1, p. 140.

[...]. He showed to His disciples His own person, in whom all men are taken up, raised from the dead, and He instilled in them belief in His risen³⁸.

When experiencing grief over the loss of a loved one, it is important not only to refer and show specific care for that person, the one we mourn and prepare a funeral service, but also to care for ourselves, our feelings and our lives. That is Paulinus teaches Pammachius:

I think that this king and prophet [David] has given us sufficient instruction on the anxiety which we are to assume after our loved ones have gone. We are to concern ourselves with the journey by which we ourselves follow, rather than with the journey of them who have already gone before us and arrived. It is a loving act to show sadness when our dear ones are torn from us, but it is a holy act to be joyful through hope and trust in the promises of God [...]. Thankful joy is more acceptable to God than long and querulous grief³⁹.

Paulinus clearly emphasizes that sadness and crying cannot last long. It is God himself who, on the one hand, orders us to shed tears over the deceased, but at the same time “restricts our bitter weeping to a single day. He allows us to weep the tears which dissolve our grief and relieve our souls, but He cuts short the sorrow which oppresses our minds with uncontrolled and unreasonable torture, and which our frailty cannot longer endure”⁴⁰. Paulinus turns out to be an excellent expert on human feelings and a therapist. He emphasizes human weakness, because bodily sadness is caused by human weakness⁴¹, but at the same time, he shows the greatness of God’s help in bearing loss and the greatness of Pammachius’ faith and wisdom:

this grief of yours and this fear of mine are balanced by my awareness of your strength and wisdom, the light from which is too abundant in you to be buried in the darkness of grief. Rather, your strength conceals your sadness and swallows up death itself and the onset of baneful grief⁴².

After showing feelings, sufferings, tears and longing, Paulinus goes on to describe the deeds and works that Pammachius did throughout his life

³⁸ Paulinus Nolanus, *Ep.* 13, 25, Walsh, *Letters*, v. 1, p. 140-141.

³⁹ Paulinus Nolanus, *Ep.* 13, 8, Walsh, *Letters*, v. 1, p. 124-125.

⁴⁰ Paulinus Nolanus, *Ep.* 13, 10, Walsh, *Letters*, v. 1, p. 126.

⁴¹ See Paulinus Nolanus, *Ep.* 13, 10.

⁴² Paulinus Nolanus, *Ep.* 13, 11, Walsh, *Letters*, v. 1, p. 127.

as a good husband and faithful Christian. In the following fragments of his letter, Paulinus also emanates feelings, but quite different than in the first part of the letter. Now he is praising his friend's works and, as he points out, he is moving from the holiness of tears to pious works⁴³. Good is to come out of Paulina's death, not sorrow, but the joy of doing good, because it is through Pammachius' actions that he wins salvation for his wife. Feelings of regret and sadness should turn into joy, because:

She now obtains honour through your deserving deeds. Now she feasts on your bread and is enriched by your wealth. [...] She needs no refreshment from the tip of another's finger, for she is sprinkled with the water from her own fingers, that is, from the works of your right hand⁴⁴.

Another letter of consoles is the above-mentioned poem 31, addressed to Pneumatius and Fidelis, the parents of an eight-year-old boy Celsus⁴⁵, after his death⁴⁶. It is in this work that the question that is the essence of the title of this article is directly asked. In the face of death of a boy, who was "transported to God, for he was doubly a child, both in span of age and through the water of the font", Paulinus asks a question and answers it immediately: "Shall I show joy or sorrow? The boy is worthy of both. My love for him urges tears, yet also joy, for faith bids me be glad and affection bids me weep"⁴⁷. So, on the one hand, that what is heavenly – faith (*fides*), that guarantees joy, and on

⁴³ See Paulinus Nolanus, *Ep.* 13, 11.

⁴⁴ Paulinus Nolanus, *Ep.* 13, 28, Walsh, *Letters*, v. 1, p. 142.

⁴⁵ About fatherhood in the works of Paulinus see M. Wysocki, *To be a father is it only "looking after possessions and sons" (cfr. Epist. 39,2)? Paulinus of Nola's view on the figure and the role of the father*, w: *La figura e il ruolo del padre nell'antichità classica e cristiana*, ed. C. Cheung – P. Mbote Mbote, *Flumina ex Fontibus* 22, Roma 2021, p. 293-304.

⁴⁶ Ch. Favez, *À propos des 'consolations'. Note sur la composition du carmen 31 de Paulin de Nole*, „*Revue de Études Latines*” 13 (1935) p. 266-268; A. Mencucci, *Consolatio: Carmen XXI. Traduzione, commento e note*, Senigallia 1972; G. Guttilla, *Una nuova lettura del Carme 31 di S. Paolino di Nola*, „*Koinonia*” 11 (1987) p. 69-97; A. Quacquarelli, *Una consolatio cristiana (Paul. Nol. Carm. 31)*, in: *Atti del Convegno. XXXI Cinquantenario della morte di S. Paolino di Nola (431-1981)*, Roma 1983, p. 121-141. Generally about consolation in Paulinus' poems see G. Guttilla, *Osservazioni su alcuni motivi consolatori presenti nei Carmi di Paolino di Nola*, „*Messana*” 16 (1995) p. 29-39.

⁴⁷ Paulinus Nolanus, *Carm.* 31, 8-10, Walsh, *Poems*, p. 309.

the other what is earthly – affection (*pietas*) that guarantees sorrow. In such categories Paulinus presents the feelings associated with the death of Celsus. He says:

I mourn that so little reward from so sweet a treasure was granted to his parents for so short time. On the other hand, when I think of the eternal blessings of everlasting life which God prepares for the innocent in heaven, I rejoice that he has completed his span in so short a time⁴⁸.

Paulinus uses an interesting procedure in his *consolatio*: he does not initially refer directly to the boy’s parents, but first, he shows the virtues and advantages of little Celsus and the reward he already enjoys in heaven. Only later does he turn to his parents: “Dutiful parents, I would not have you sin through copious weeping. Let not your love turn to blame. For it is a wicked love which laments a soul in blessedness, and a baneful affection which bewails one who takes joy in God”⁴⁹. Therefore, the real love, that should characterize Christians, does not allow to lament over the dead one. In the following verses, Paulinus shows what true grief should consist of, obviously from the Christian point of view. It is supposed to be sorrow for sins, one has “to grieve this darkness of mankind”. Then, in a long poetic story, he shows the greatness of the salvation brought about by Christ, with an emphasis above all on the resurrection in which believers also participate, ending with an appeal to Celsus’ parents: “So, dear brethren so close to my heart, bring gladness to your grieving hearts with this faith”⁵⁰. He means faith in the resurrection. One thing remains from such faith: “Dispel your sadness [...]. Trust in God and wear the garb of gladness”⁵¹.

People who do not share this faith do not recognize the resurrection, that is, they do not have hope, living only according to this world, showing unhappy grief and crazed sorrow, but not so with Christians who hope in God. Of all those who are dear to Paulinus’ heart, only Celsus already fully experiences the fullness of life and that is why at the end of his poem Paulinus addresses his prayers for help and intercession. Celsus is already happy and joyful, “sporting [...] in eternal glades”⁵². We, here on earth, still

⁴⁸ Paulinus Nolanus, *Carm.* 31, 11-15, Walsh, *Poems*, p. 309.

⁴⁹ Paulinus Nolanus, *Carm.* 31, 43-46, Walsh, *Poems*, p. 310.

⁵⁰ Paulinus Nolanus, *Carm.* 31, 381-382, Walsh, *Poems*, p. 321.

⁵¹ Paulinus Nolanus, *Carm.* 31, 383-384, Walsh, *Poems*, p. 321.

⁵² Paulinus Nolanus, *Carm.* 31, 606, Walsh, *Poems*, p. 328.

have sadness and hope “that we can follow you [Celsus] with like ingenuousness”⁵³. This is a reason for comfort and joy for everyone.

Thus, in the works that exemplify the ancient *consolatio*, Paulinus presents a new, Christian approach to the death of relatives, which is expressed in the title of this paper as a question: “Shall I show joy or sorrow?”. Paulinus, as it is evidenced by his surviving works, recognizes that the weakness of his body, mind and feelings are caused by sin. He constantly experiences “fleshly weakness”⁵⁴ on his spiritual path, which also touches his interior, his feelings⁵⁵. It is the cause of sadness in the face of the loss of loved ones, but there is a physician- Jesus Christ⁵⁶, who causes us to feel joy from the hope of their salvation. In letter 39, Paulinus refers to four fundamental stoic *passiones*, *spes – metus – gaudium – dolor*, “which give rise to as many vices, and which most greatly disturb the human race”⁵⁷. In the context of life-death and joy-sorrow dichotomy outlined above, especially important and showing the Christian re-evaluation of these stoic *passiones*, are Paulinus’ further words: “Two of them, mental grief and joy, are concerned with the present, the others, fear and hope, with the future”⁵⁸. This is also Paulinus’ answer to the title’s question. Both realities concern the future of the deceased relatives and therefore both should be present in the life of a Christian, as Paulinus of Nola presents to us: joy from the hope of salvation, sorrow from the fear of damnation.

“Shall I show joy or sorrow?” (Poem 31). Pain of Loss – a Study of Paulinus of Nola’s Works

(summary)

Unfortunately, Paulinus of Nola is not a very appreciated Father of the Church today, because he did not contribute much to the development of the dogmas of the early Church, and yet his contemporaries respected him and indicated him as an example and referred to his conversion and spiritual path. He was regarded as a spiritual master. Therefore, when discussing the issue of *passiones*, and above all the pain after the loss of loved ones, it is worth and should refer to the preserved works of Paulinus: his letters and poems. He himself experienced the tragic death of his brother, the premature death of his only son,

⁵³ Paulinus Nolanus, *Carm.* 31, 629-630, Walsh, *Poems*, p. 329.

⁵⁴ See Paulinus Nolanus, *Ep.* 26, 3; 40, 10.

⁵⁵ See Paulinus Nolanus, *Ep.* 32, 25.

⁵⁶ See Paulinus Nolanus, *Ep.* 23, 5.7.

⁵⁷ Paulinus Nolanus, *Ep.* 39, 6, Walsh, *Letters*, v. 2, p. 200.

⁵⁸ Paulinus Nolanus, *Ep.* 39, 6, Walsh, *Letters*, v. 2, p. 200.

and finally the death of his wife Therasia. All this allows us to find in his works an answer to the question of how to deal with emotions after the departure of a loved one and about a Christian interpretation of experiencing death and mourning. Thanks to the analyzes of the surviving Paulinus’ texts and their results, presented in this article, we can see that Paulinus, although educated on the classical models, shows the Christian understanding of mourning contained in the title question: on the one hand, he emphasizes its human side and the sadness over the passing of a loved one, on the other hand, he emphasizes the supernatural joy of salvation and being with God. In his works, Paulinus also shows other aspects of experiencing death, which together create a rich phenomenon expressed by four Stoic *passiones*: *spes – metus – gaudium – dolor*.

Keywords: Paulinus of Nola; Death; Consolatio; Passions; Letter; Poem

„Mam okazywać radość czy smutek?” (Pieśń 31). Ból utraty – studium twórczości Paulina z Noli

(streszczenie)

Paulin z Noli nie jest, niestety, współcześnie docenianym Ojcem Kościoła, gdyż nie wniósł nic wielkiego w rozwój dogmatów wczesnego Kościoła. Jednak współcześni mu ludzie poważali go, wskazywali jako wzór i odwoływali się do jego nawrócenia i duchowej drogi. Był on traktowany jako mistrz duchowy. Dlatego też omawiając zagadnienie namiętności, a przede wszystkim bólu po stracie najbliższych, warto i powinniśmy sięgnąć do zachowanej twórczości Paulina: listów oraz pieśni. On sam przeżył przecież tragiczną śmierć brata, przedwczesne odejście jedyne go syna czy wreszcie śmierć swej żony Terazji. To wszystko pozwala doszukiwać się w jego dziełach odpowiedzi na pytanie o sposób radzenia sobie z emocjami po odejściu ukochanej osoby oraz o chrześcijańską interpretację przeżywania śmierci i żałoby. Dzięki przeprowadzonym analizom zachowanych tekstów Paulina i ich wynikom ukazany w niniejszym artykule możemy dostrzec, że Paulin, choć wykształcony na klasycznych wzorcach, ukazuje chrześcijański wymiar żałoby zawarty w tytułowym pytaniu: z jednej strony podkreśla ludzki jej wymiar i smutek z powodu odejścia bliskiej osoby, a z drugiej akcentuje nadprzyrodzoną radość ze zbawienia i przebywania u Boga. Paulin w swych dziełach ukazuje także inne wymiary przeżywania śmierci, które tworzą razem bogaty fenomen oddawany przez cztery stoickie *passiones*: *spes – metus – gaudium – dolor*.

Słowa kluczowe: Paulin z Noli; śmierć; konsolacja; namiętności; list; pieśń

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Corentin Tresnie¹

Emotions that Foster Learning: Wonder and Shock in Proclus

1. Introduction

Ancient philosophy from the Hellenistic period onwards is commonly associated with the goal of absolute freedom from all kinds of emotions. While this might be regarded as a respectable personal ideal, such an endeavour may seem out of place for ordinary educational practices from today's perspective. Indeed, there is an ongoing debate in educational sciences about the exact role of violent emotions in the process of learning. The empirical evidence is complex: while pleasant feelings are well documented to increase motivation and thus cognitive performance, negative emotions like stress are found to impair learning, except when they are mild enough². In particular, surprise, usually considered a positive emotion³, has been found to efficiently prepare the mind to assimilate new content, as it consists in a violation of existing expectations⁴. On the other hand, the

¹ Corentin Tresnie – Aspirant FNRS – PhD Candidate at Université Libre de Bruxelles (Faculty of Philosophy and Social Sciences, Centre PHI) and KU Leuven (Institute of Philosophy, De Wulf Mansion Center); e-mail: corentin.tresnie@ulb.be; ORCID: 0000-0002-1446-3001.

² See the meta-analysis of C.M. Tyng – H.U. Amin – M.N.M Saad – A.S. Malik, *The Influences of Emotion on Learning and Memory*, “Frontiers in Psychology” 8 (2017) p. 14-54.

³ D.L. Robinson, *Brain function, mental experience and personality*, “The Netherlands Journal of Psychology” 64 (2009) p. 152-167.

⁴ P.-Y. Oudeyer – J. Gottlieb – M. Lopes, *Intrinsic motivation, curiosity, and learning: theory and applications in educational technologies*, “Progress in Brain Research” 229 (2016) p. 257-284.

fearful uncertainty we describe as anxiety is long known to foster learned helplessness and its cognitive impairments⁵. Modern psychology has more than enough tools to weigh the influence of each of these internal forces. How to theoretically articulate them is, however, a much wider question.

One contribution to this question can nonetheless be found in the tradition of ancient commentators on Plato. By taking very seriously each and every line of the dialogues, they are led to develop sustained reflection on the details of the various characters' interactions. This includes rhetorical devices and expressions of feelings that most recent exegetes would discard as decorative⁶. A good example is provided by the following passage, the opening lines of Plato's *First Alcibiades*:

Son of Cleinias, I think it must surprise you that I, the first of all your lovers, am the only one of them who has not given up his suit and thrown you over, and whereas they have all pestered you with their conversation I have not spoken one word to you for so many years. The cause of this has been nothing human, but a certain daemonic opposition, of whose power you shall be informed at some later time⁷.

The explanation of these lines runs through sixty-eight pages of Proclus' commentary, covering various topics, from the nature of Love to the hierarchies of daemons. Here we shall focus on one layer of exegesis proposed by Proclus, namely, the strategic use of Alcibiades' emotions that the commentator attributes to Socrates. Though it may seem to be a mere playful elaboration on the psychology of characters in a mostly fictionalized encounter, it does have philosophical relevance.

There is in ancient philosophy a general defiance towards strong emotions: the aim of philosophical practice usually consists in purging or at

⁵ L.I.S. Giel *et al.*, *Fear of failure: A polynomial regression analysis of the joint impact of the perceived learning environment and personal achievement goal orientation*, "Anxiety, Stress & Coping" 33/2 (2020) p. 123-139.

⁶ P. Hoffman, *What was Commentary in Late Antiquity? The Example of the Neoplatonic Commentators*, in: *A Companion to Ancient Philosophy*, ed. M.L. Gill – P. Pellegrin, Oxford 2006, p. 597-622.

⁷ Plato, *Alcibiades Maior* 103a1-6: "ὦ παῖ Κλεινίου, οἷμά σε θαυμάζειν ὅτι πρῶτος ἐραστής σου γενόμενος τῶν ἄλλων πεπαυμένων μόνος οὐκ ἀπαλλάττομαι, καὶ ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι δι' ὄχλου ἐγένοντό σοι διαλεγόμενοι, ἐγὼ δὲ τοσοῦτων ἐτῶν οὐδὲ προσεῖπον. τούτου δὲ τὸ αἴτιον γέγονεν οὐκ ἀνθρώπειον, ἀλλὰ τι δαιμόνιον ἐναντίωμα, οὗ σὺ τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ὕστερον πεύσῃ" (tr. Lamb slightly modified).

least in moderating them⁸. Proclus himself is often very critical of emotions or “passions” as he rather names them. The whole point of his philosophy is to help the soul revert towards that which is “remaining” in being and unity, and *away* from the world of generation and emotional attachment. Passions are treated negatively in most cases, typically as irrational desires or impulses that reason needs to dominate in order to ensure knowledge and psychic balance⁹. There is of course one important exception: love. In the Platonic tradition of the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus*, love is the driving force through which beauty sets the soul on the quest for intelligible knowledge. But while love itself is celebrated, its concomitant passions seldom are. In Plotinus, even the highest kind of love is a fascination for intelligible beauty, precious at first but ultimately a distraction, as it provides a pleasure mixed with pain and provokes astonishment and shock (θάμβος καὶ ἔκπληξις), likely to cause error and in any case to divert from the serenity of the Good¹⁰. According to him, love is necessary for intellectual contemplation, but also dangerous in its effects. Proclus stands out as he appears ready to consider not only love itself, but also the emotional shock it causes, to be instrumental in the process of assimilation to the divine. It translates to his intriguing stance concerning the love of the superior for the inferior. Taking very seriously the Socratic madness of the *Phaedrus*, he holds that even the accomplished philosopher keeps progressing through his love not only for the Forms, but also for less accomplished souls¹¹. The

⁸ On the goals of ἀπάθεια and μετριοπάθεια, see e.g. M.C. Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics*, Princeton 1994. There is of course the exception of some hedonistic schools as the Cyrenaics, but their influence on the extant texts seems minimal.

⁹ Proclus, *In Platonis Rempublicam commentarii* I 22, 3-23, 8.

¹⁰ Compare *Enneads* V 5 [32], 12, 30-37 and V 8 [31], 10, 5-44. The latter passage is studied by P. Hadot, *L'union de l'âme avec l'intellect divin dans l'expérience mystique plotinienne*, in: *Proclus et son influence (Actes du Colloque de Neuchâtel, juin 1985)*, ed. G. Boss – G. Seel, Zürich 1987, p. 3-27. While one could certainly agree with him that such a state transcends ordinary consciousness and is already “mystical” in that sense, it would be going too far to ascribe the exact same quality to the union with the Good, which the former passage depicts as experienced very differently as far as serenity is concerned. This being said, intellectual love is still described as more stable and serene than the “lower”, cosmic love with which it is contrasted throughout treatise III 5 [50].

¹¹ Proclus, *In Platonis Alcibiadem primum* 34, 12-37, 18. The originality of Proclus' take on love is noted by J.M. Ambury, *Socratic Character: Proclus on the Function of the Erotic Intellect*, in: *The Neoplatonic Socrates*, ed. D.A. Layne – H. Tarrant, Philadelphia 2014, p. 109-117.

status of love in Proclus would deserve an extensive study in itself¹². Such a study would benefit from an elucidation of how the more passionate correlates of love are considered by Proclus as sufficiently harmless or even useful to allow him to depart from Plotinian (and more generally ancient philosophy's) position on the subject.

I will here try to contribute to this elucidation, on the basis of Proclus' *Commentary on the First Alcibiades*, in which the themes of love, passions and education are mainly developed. For Proclus in this commentary, as we shall see below, both Socrates (as a character) and Plato (as a writer) should be conceived as daemonic guides who, as such, do nothing in vain. Alcibiades and Socrates (as well as Parmenides) are also considered as paradigms of what should be ideal pupils and teachers¹³. As a matter of consequence, the Proclean reading of their interaction carries some implications for a Neoplatonic theory of education.

What does Proclus say about Socrates' use of emotions? In a nutshell: not only positive emotions like surprise, but also rather negative ones, like a frightening shock, can be, in the proper context, important tools for preparing one's soul to make moral and cognitive progress, that is, to learn. Before examining more closely how this argument works and assessing its significance, let us see how it fits into the frame of Proclus' metaphysics and psychology.

2. Trouble in the soul

Let us first consider passions in general. For the majority of them, Proclus shares the defiance of most ancient thinkers, on ethical and epistemic grounds. Passions cause false beliefs which may conflict with true beliefs held thanks to the activity of reason, they may even blind reason and enslave it altogether so as to serve them and fulfill their every whim. It is true that the absence of such perturbation only prevents the emergence of false beliefs, without guarantying superior (i.e. dianoetic) kinds of cogni-

¹² The book of N. D'Andrès (*Socrate néoplatonicien: Une science de l'amour dans le commentaire de Proclus sur le Premier Alcibiade*, Paris 2020) is a first step, focused on intertextuality, in this direction. It discusses the double direction of love (p. 83-90), but passes very briefly (p. 76) on the passionate consequences we are here interested in.

¹³ See e.g. Proclus, *In Platonis Alcibiadem primum* 94, 9-96, 22; 129, 7-11; 132, 3-11; Proclus, *In Platonis Parmenidem commentaria* IV 926, 9-928, 17; 976, 14-20.

tion¹⁴. Moreover, passions, when completely dominant, can actually bring a certain kind of peace to the soul precisely by reducing reason to a lenient tool of desire, though this “peace” causes the soul to be “at war” with its own constitutive notions¹⁵. Despite these qualifications, Proclus repeatedly characterizes passions as the troublemakers of the soul, they are the foes to overcome.

How does the soul come to generate emotions which tend to trouble it or blind its rational faculty? Before it is ready to form sufficiently stable and consistent beliefs (to say nothing of knowing oneself and the universe through proper use of dialectics), the soul must rely on its more readily available faculties: sensation and imagination¹⁶. But contrary to opinion and actual knowledge, the reliability of sensation is heavily dependent on the intensity of the external stimuli it receives. It may easily be tossed about should its object be inappropriate for what it is currently ready to bear, as its organs are material and, as such, subject to overload or damage, which results in confusion or inaccurate impressions¹⁷. Imagination faces its own challenges, but as far as passions are concerned, its flaws come from the fact that its material is drawn from sensory experience¹⁸. One telling case of this overload of sensation is to be found in the experience of young children, who are very prone to experience intense emotions on any occasion. This “trouble” (ταραχή), as Proclus calls it, has two causes. The first is purely physiological: the nutritive faculty of the soul naturally produces vast quantities of wetness in the body it animates, it just needs some time to

¹⁴ On the way in which reason produces or allows various kinds of cognition, be it dianoetic grasp, true or false belief, see e.g. C. Helmig, *Proclus on Epistemology, Language, and Logic*, in: *All From One: A Guide to Proclus*, ed. P. d’Hoine – M. Martijn, Oxford 2017, p. 183-206.

¹⁵ Proclus, *In Platonis Rempublicam commentarii* I 23, 9-15. Cognitive conflict is still preferable to this wicked peace, see Proclus, *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria* III 341, 7-18 and C. Tresnie, *Conflict and Violence in Neoplatonism: From Cosmic Justice to Cognitive Step*, “Philosophical Journal of Conflict and Violence” 5/2 (2021) p. 71-84.

¹⁶ Proclus, *In Platonis Alcibiadem primum* 43, 6-44, 1 and Proclus, *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria* III 286, 30-31. On the hierarchy of cognitive faculties in Proclus, see C. Helmig, *Forms and Concepts: Concept Formation in the Platonic Tradition*, Berlin 2012, p. 223-261.

¹⁷ Proclus, *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria* I 248, 23-26 and III 331, 29-332, 17.

¹⁸ Proclus, *In Platonis Parmenidem commentaria* IV 892, 40-893, 27. On imagination in Neoplatonism, see A. Sheppard, *The Poetics of Phantasia. Imagination in Ancient Aesthetics*, London, 2014.

regulate the flow¹⁹. The second is cognitive: the sensitive faculty receives a lot of information from the world of becoming, in the form of corporeal impressions. But it is at first fresh and inexperienced, so that each and every one of these impressions deeply affects children. A candle is for them what a blaze would be for adults, a pebble is like a mountain, a breeze like a hurricane. Such powerful a stimulation is a stroke (*πλαγά*) rather than a mere informative impression, it paralyzes cognition and brings trouble to the soul²⁰. This trouble is what we call emotions. More precisely, the soul itself is not really affected by such strokes, because it is erroneously that it identifies with the structural abilities it provides to the body and which are actually affected by the objects of sensation²¹. Still, as long as the soul believes that the affections of the body are its own, it feels and is troubled in proportion to the intensity of these affections.

Such trouble is erroneous and even dangerous: it impedes reason and thus the ability of a soul to make sound decisions or substantial cognitive progress. Therefore, according to Proclus inspired by Plato's *Laws*, the whole point of traditional education (*παιδεία*) should be to moderate the natural impulses of children (or people in general) through good habits, and to give them sufficient experience to mitigate the trouble caused by sensory impressions²². Physical as well as musical training are important parts of this programme: the former to impose order on the soul's impulses, the latter to gradually soften them²³. Sensation itself can't be educated by such means, but the soul can and should, as it is its trouble that is responsible for emotional instability and subsequent cognitive deficiencies²⁴. A portion of classical poetry and myths also contributes to the ordering of the soul and the cleansing of its trouble²⁵.

¹⁹ Proclus, *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria* III 329, 20-24.

²⁰ Proclus, *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria* III 329, 24-330, 9.

²¹ Proclus, *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria* III 330, 9-331, 1.

²² Proclus, *De providentia et fato et eo quod in nobis ad Theodorum mechanicum* 27, 8-16; Proclus, *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria* III 349, 30-350, 8; Proclus, *In Platonis Alcibiadem primum* 14, 6-10 and 224, 16-225, 11.

²³ Proclus, *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria* I 40, 24-42, 9; Proclus, *In Platonis Alcibiadem primum* 197, 13-198, 1; Proclus, *In Platonis Rempublicam commentarii* I 55, 27-56, 20; 61, 2-62, 7; 84, 12-26 and 219, 1-4.

²⁴ Proclus, *De providentia et fato et eo quod in nobis ad Theodorum mechanicum* 17; Proclus, *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria* I 250, 19-26; Proclus, *In Platonis Rempublicam commentarii* I 222, 12-24 and 292, 25-293, 21.

²⁵ The main relevant passages on this topic are the fifth and sixth dissertations on Plato's Republic, i.e. Proclus, *In Platonis Rempublicam commentarii* I 42-205. See in particular the commentary of A. Sheppard, *Studies on the 5th and 6th essays of*

It does so by presenting edifying examples of good conduct, as well as displaying a variety of possible behaviours with their consequences²⁶. Παιδεία is a slow process that aims to discipline the irrational part (or “circle”) of the soul and to give basic instruction to the rational part in order to fight back against the irrational trouble²⁷. None of this implies any appeal to rational demonstration or philosophical work: passion has first to be moderated according to its own logic in order to prepare the soul for later philosophical and scientific training. It is through irrational and thus potentially troublesome means that the affections are to be kept under control and subdued to reason. Παιδεία so defined is the first of three (sometimes overlapping) steps of cognitive and moral improvement²⁸, it is focused on calming the irrational impulses.

Passionate trouble, however, is not always the enemy of cognitive ascent. From the highest grades of reality, Beauty is the principle of all love, a force that awakens everyone through desire and emotional shock (διὰ πόθου καὶ ἐκπλήξεως)²⁹. Beauty is the first impression that reveals itself as one is making progress towards intelligible insight (the true knowledge according to Platonists), it is the gateway towards wisdom and union with the divine, which are inseparable from the shocks it provokes³⁰. We might wish to value knowledge in itself, Neoplatonists do not: everything, even intellection, draws its worth from the Good, which alone is, properly speaking,

Proclus' Commentary on the Republic, Göttingen 1980, as well as P. St-Germain, *Mythe et éducation: Proclus et la critique platonicienne de la poésie*, “Laval théologique et philosophique” 62/2 (2006) p. 301-318. Proclus' commentary on Hesiod's *Works and Days* is probably the clearest example, see the analysis by R.M. van den Berg, *Proclus on Hesiod's Works and Days and 'Didactic' Poetry*, “Classical Quarterly” 64/1 (2014) p. 383-397.

²⁶ Proclus, *In Platonis Rempublicam commentarii* I 47, 20-49, 12; 201, 4-14 and II 107, 14-110, 21.

²⁷ Proclus, *In primum Euclidis elementorum librum commentarii* 8-21, 24; Proclus, *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria* III 351, 19-352, 9.

²⁸ These three steps are listed at Proclus, *In Platonis Alcibiadem primum* 224, 1-225, 9; on their articulation and especially the role of the second one, see R. M. van den Berg, *Proclus and Iamblichus on Moral Education*, “Phronesis” 59/3 (2014) p. 272-296. In this passage (as well as in van den Berg's paper), παιδεία denotes all of the three levels, while in most other texts, Proclus rather uses it only for the first one, see for example the passages quoted in the previous notes.

²⁹ Proclus, *Theologia Platonica* I 24, p. 108, 7-11. It might be an echo of the aforementioned passage of Plotinus (V 5 [32], 12, 30-37): Proclus agrees on the description of the experience, although he draws different practical conclusions from it.

³⁰ Proclus, *Theologia Platonica* I 24, p. 108, 23-109, 2.

valuable in itself, and of which there is no knowledge, but only union, once wisdom is reached, as they conceive of no other driving force³¹. Moreover, they argue, nothing is ever valued by anyone unless perceived as beautiful, and this perception occurs with violence and trouble, for its object, Truth, is grander than blazes or hurricanes. Love aroused by this beauty, with all its violence, is the necessary driving force of philosophical learning. It is the recognition of the presence of the Good in the universe, which implies that it is both possible and desirable to know its structure³². In other words, to learn is first to love, namely to be troubled and set in motion by beauty. It is because Alcibiades is proud and ambitious, because he loves honour and power, that Socrates deems him a promising pupil: he already has the necessary drive towards divine beauty, which is the true source of ambition and power, and only needs to be corrected³³. So much for moderation, in that regard. Now the importance of erotics in Platonic and Neoplatonic recollection is well known and documented³⁴; I won't elaborate any longer on this topic. What matters here is that a violent and troubling emotion is not only tolerated in the process of learning but also a necessary condition thereof. It certainly does not mean that passionate love is unambiguously a good thing for the soul and its progress³⁵, but rather that *some* form of love is required to launch and sustain the cognitive ascent. It is likewise reasonable to postulate that other emotions could perhaps fulfill a comparable role, or at least that emotional trouble, however dangerous it might be, can find its usefulness if properly exploited.

³¹ Proclus, *De malorum subsistentia* 2; Proclus, *Elementatio Theologica* 8 and 12. The core of the whole Neoplatonic system consists in the equation One = Good = Supreme principle = God, which is argued for in the propositions 1-24 of the *Elementatio Theologica*.

³² See W. Beierwaltes, *Proklos' Begriff des Guten aus der Perspektive seiner Platon-Deutung*, in: *Being or Good? Metamorphoses of Neoplatonism*, ed. A. Kijewska, Lublin 2004, p. 99-120 and C. Tornau, *Der Eros und das Gute bei Plotin und Proklos*, in: *Proklos: Methode, Seelenlehre, Metaphysik*, ed. M. Perkams – R.-M. Piccione, Leiden 2006, p. 206-229.

³³ Proclus, *In Platonis Alcibiadem primum* 99, 9-100, 1 and 148, 10-149, 12. See C. Tresnie, *Orgueil et enseignement: À propos de quelques remarques du Commentaire au Premier Alcibiade de Proclus*, "Philosophie Antique" 20 (2020) p. 237-261.

³⁴ See for example the recent work and extensive bibliography by d'Andrès, *Socrate néoplatonicien*.

³⁵ On the contrary, Proclus repeatedly insists on the difference with inferior love, see e.g. Proclus, *In Platonis Alcibiadem primum* 53, 12-17 and 115, 13-119, 6. The reference text on this question is Plotinus' treatise III 5 [50].

3. Teaching is providence

Emotions, as we have seen, can have ambiguous or even explosive manifestations: on the one hand, they can be useful or even required for triggering the drive to learn; on the other, they are definitely a source of violent and perilous trouble in the soul. Before playing sorcerer's apprentices and looking into how to put into practice this ambiguous potential, there is at least one question to ask and answer. How reasonable and legitimate is it to purposely make use of a pupil's emotions to motivate him or to improve his understanding? Proclus' system also provides us with some answers.

If the ultimate and sole principle of all reality is the divine Good, everything in the universe (and all the more so the whole itself) must be good. Then, how does it come that the very same emotions that can bring us closer to the Good through wisdom also plunge our soul into confusion and unrest? That is but an instance of the more general problem of the existence of (albeit necessary) evils in reality, and Proclus' famous treatment of this question is twofold. First, evil does not have an existence of its own; it is a *παρρησίασις*, a degree of reality lacking positivity, a side-product of the Good, an inevitable yet unessential consequence of its action. It is a subcontrary of the Good, a partial privation only: to harm, it needs to somehow exist, to exist it needs to be good; evil is but a parasitic aspect within the realm of goodness³⁶. According to this first answer, we could say that the troublesome aspect of emotions is inevitable but unessential: their true nature lies in their good, namely, their capacity to motivate one's reversion³⁷. Second, even this side-being is not gratuitous nor vain: the divine order of things – Providence – uses evils as tools to improve the goodness of the whole and advance the cognitive and moral progress of everything, as these deficiencies either destroy themselves in the process, or result in a net benefit for every soul involved³⁸.

In the case of the various passions of the soul, they are privations of good indeed, as they often impede the rule of reason and intellect by which a soul can be good. This is related to the particular nature of human souls:

³⁶ The whole treatise *De Malorum Subsistentia* is dedicated to this question.

³⁷ In support of this interpretation, let us mention that Proclus praises Socrates for being able to address his interlocutors according to their own character and passions, choosing his approach and set of arguments appropriately, see Proclus, *In Platonis Alcibiadem primum* 3, 11-13; 28, 12-29, 1; 151, 12-154, 16.

³⁸ For an analysis of these two aspects of Proclus' theodicy and how they are linked, see Steel, *Providence and Evil*, p. 240-257.

there are “descended” souls, insofar as they have a faculty of choice, which is actually more of a propensity for mistake than a positive capacity³⁹. They may be led to follow their impulses and in so doing dig further into confusion; this is why they can use providential guidance to restore reason to its proper place. But reason itself can only find its full perfection through a complete deployment in the corporeal world; it is better for it to organize the body and to give structure to inferior faculties like sensation, even if it means getting temporarily blinded in the process. Its knowledge is more complete, more perfect after the soul has descended into the body, has been troubled by its impressions and passions, and has regulated them. Passion itself is instrumental in the realization of reason’s potential⁴⁰. Providence, like an omniscient physician, makes use of apparently harmful means and of the diseases themselves to cure more efficiently our souls⁴¹. Like an omniscient educator, it distributes hardships and prosperity according to the current needs of each soul⁴².

It is all well and good, but how is that relevant to *our* teaching purposes? Neoplatonic “Providence” is a well-defined but very abstract and general concept. It denotes the sum of all forces in the universe and the coherent picture formed by those forces, oriented by and toward the divine Good. As they all proceed from the Good, Providence is its action, the way in which it creates and sustains reality. That means that it constitutes no supernatural power magically solving problems from above: Providence acts by means of each and every one. Now, some beings are better disposed to smoothly conduct the ways of Providence than others. Through their attitude and their actions, they contribute more than others to the harmonious structure

³⁹ Proclus, *De providentia et fato et eo quod in nobis ad Theodorum mechanicum* 61. It is the well-studied protestation on Iamblichus’ and Proclus’ part against Plotinus’ doctrine of the undescended (rational) soul: compare *Enneads* IV 7 [2], 14, 9-14 and IV 8 [6], 8, 1-12 with Iamblichus’ *Commentary on the Timaeus*, fr. 87 (= Proclus, *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria* III 334, 3-8) as well as Proclus’ *Elementatio Theologica* 211 and Proclus, *In Platonis Alcibiadem primum* 226, 9-228, 7. For the details of this disagreement within Neoplatonism, see J.M. Rist, *Integration and the Undescended Soul in Plotinus*, “The American Journal of Philology” 88/4 (1967) p. 410-422; C. Steel, *The Changing Self. A Study on the Soul in Later Neoplatonism: Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus*, Brussels 1978, p. 38-42 and D.G. MacIsaac, *The Nous of the Partial Soul in Proclus’ Commentary on the First Alcibiades of Plato*, “Dionysius” 29 (2011) p. 29-60.

⁴⁰ Proclus, *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam* 29-31.

⁴¹ Proclus, *De malorum subsistentia* 59, 13-22; Proclus, *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam* 51-54.

⁴² Proclus, *De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam* 35.

of the whole. More often than not, they do so by leading other beings, especially other souls, to align themselves with the divine order. Such guides are called daemons, either because they actually are the semi-divine beings that guide souls toward perfection according to Platonic tradition, or simply because they play a similar role. In the first case, they are daemons “by essence” (τῆ οὐσίᾳ), in the second, they are daemons “by relation” (κατὰ σχέσιν)⁴³. Human teachers like Socrates fall into this latter category. Like actual daemons, they dispense good influence to those ready to receive it, and guide them according to their capacity, giving the impulsion that is necessary to bring these souls to συμπάθεια with the Good⁴⁴. By so doing, they contribute much more to the actual progress of the soul than by any other didactic device, and most of Proclus’ reading of Socrates’ behaviour towards Alcibiades concerns this protreptic role. But it does not fall outside the range of providential action: gods, daemons and wise souls like Socrates’ all participate in the teaching design of Providence. Providence is not said to be an educator only because the whole sequence of events provides edifying examples, but also because guardian daemons and teaching souls are particularly salient agents of its benevolent influence. They carry Providence more than anything else, for they are themselves, by their more advanced knowledge of the structure of reality, particularly well aligned with its logic⁴⁵.

Agents *par excellence* of divine Providence are likely to make use of its tools, especially as its action is mostly mediated by those agents. Just like Providence, they might need to provoke and exploit other souls’ emotions

⁴³ Proclus, *In Platonis Alcibiadem primum* 73, 18-75, 13 and 158, 2-159, 1. On this question, see A. Timotin, *La démonologie platonicienne: Histoire de la notion de daimōn de Platon aux derniers néoplatoniciens*, Leiden – Boston 2012, p. 228-237 and C. Addey, *The Daimonion of Socrates: Daimones and Divination in Neoplatonism*, in: *The Neoplatonic Socrates*, ed. D.A. Layne – H. Tarrant, Philadelphia 2014, p. 51-72.

⁴⁴ Proclus, *In Platonis Alcibiadem primum* 41, 15-42, 4; 59, 10-62, 2 and 141, 25-144, 1.

⁴⁵ Proclus, *In Platonis Rempubicam commentarii* II 254, 5-23; Proclus, *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria* III 324, 5-24; Proclus, *In Platonis Alcibiadem primum* 32, 15-33, 9 and 62, 24-63, 8. This doctrine comes from Iamblichus (*De Anima*, fr. 21, 26, 28, 29 and 35), as Proclus himself reports: Proclus, *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria* III 234, 32-235, 9. On its philosophical implications, see M. Erler, *Hilfe der Götter und Erkenntnis der Selbst: Sokrates als Göttergeschenk bei Platon und den Platonikern*, in: *Metaphysik und Religion: Zur Signatur des spätantiken Denkens*, ed. T. Kobusch – M. Erler, Leipzig 2002, p. 387-413 and J. Trouillard, *Le sens des médiations proclusiennes*, “Revue philosophique de Louvain” 47 (1957) p. 331-342.

in order to foster these souls' moral and cognitive progress. The teacher or educator operates like a smaller providence and may arrange the course of events so as to trigger the right (that is: appropriate or situationally useful) emotions in the pupil's soul. For example, Socrates might make absurdly grand promises or compliments in order to work on Alcibiades' existent state of mind and make him more accessible to philosophical reversion in the long run⁴⁶. It should not strike us that the emotions thus triggered seem to cloud either moral or intellectual judgment: teachers, like Providence, often have to use convoluted ways to achieve the goal of leading souls to greater perfection. Provided the benefit for the guided soul turns out to be greater autonomy and clearer perception, passions and their associated trouble are acceptable educational tools⁴⁷. This does not mean that any emotion will do; Proclus maintains some of Plato's serious defiance towards the feelings unleashed by uncensored tragedy and poetry⁴⁸. But the problem resides less in the emotions themselves than in their uncritical and irresponsible use. How exactly the teacher should proceed is to be handled on a case-by-case basis; we can still draw some general principles from Proclus' remarks on wonder and shock.

4. An easy case: surprise

We are now better prepared to examine Proclus' commentary on the beginning of the *First Alcibiades*. Socrates affirms that his own behaviour is likely to have surprised the young Alcibiades. He had been observing him from a distance, without uttering a word in years, while several pretenders were trying to win the favour of the son of Cleinias, the noble Alcmeonid. It is only now, just as his beauty begins to fade and the pre-

⁴⁶ Proclus, *In Platonis Alcibiadem primum* 100, 24-102, 5 and 154, 17-155, 16.

⁴⁷ One might still be wary of such a slippery slope. Doesn't this line of thought allow the use of absolutely any tool, however questionable, by the teacher? It does. However, the "teacher" is defined not by his social role, but rather by his own progress and alignment with divine Providence, which is, for Proclus, the deepest ground of morality. In recent terminology, he adheres both to virtue ethics and virtue epistemology, even merging the two. Accordingly, anyone wise enough to know and teach can't possibly lack morality, since his will is supposedly aligned with divine Providence.

⁴⁸ Proclus, *In Platonis Rempublicam commentarii* I 46, 7-47, 19 and 144, 15-146, 6: mimetic poetry is like some pleasant yet harmful medicine. In addition to Sheppard's studies cited above, see the essay "Types of Poetry" of R.M. van den Berg, *Proclus' Hymns: Essays, Translations, Commentary*, Leiden 2001, p. 112-142.

tenders to disappear, that the philosopher approaches him and actually speaks. Proclus gives a handful of reasons for this attitude. Socrates does not need any reciprocity from Alcibiades, his interest is in the soul of his pupil rather than in his body, he represents a higher level of cause whose effect lasts longer⁴⁹. Furthermore, he plays the role of a good and provident daemon for Alcibiades, watching over him, invisible and silent, before and after anyone else⁵⁰. But his quite disturbing stalking of the young man also serves another purpose: to surprise him, to make him wonder, for surprise or wonder (θαῦμα) is the beginning of philosophy and motivation to learn⁵¹.

The claim that surprise and wonder are an excellent starting point for curiosity and motivation to learn is relatively unproblematic⁵². But before moving on to another, less easy claim, let us stop to see how precisely wonder is supposed to properly incline the soul to cognitive reversion and why it is needed. Souls naturally tend to form beliefs or opinions (δόξαι) based on their experiences. These are a first attempt to organize sensitive confusion into a reliable discourse, relatively consistent with the soul's innate notions⁵³. Such tentative modellings of reality often blatantly contradict each other, revealing their shortcomings after a quick examination. Sometimes, however, they seem to cohere to the point of discouraging further examination, although they carry hidden false (and actually inconsistent) implications⁵⁴. Such is common sense, usually so pragmatically efficient that it is oblivious to its own contradictions until something or someone makes them no longer bearable. This is the point of philosophical refutation. Now the problem is that such an exercise requires honest and prolonged discussion: Plato's Callicles might be formally refuted, but he shows no intention of reforming his ways or learning anything new about philosophy, for he wasn't taking

⁴⁹ These themes recur throughout the commentary but are summarized at Proclus, *In Platonis Alcibiadem primum* 33, 15-39, 5.

⁵⁰ Proclus, *In Platonis Alcibiadem primum* 40, 17-42, 4; 53, 19-56, 19; 60, 1-63, 12.

⁵¹ Proclus, *In Platonis Alcibiadem primum* 42, 5-43, 5, quoting Aristotle's *Metaphysics* A2, 982b12 and 983a13.

⁵² See for example C. L'Ecuyer, *The Wonder Approach to Learning*, "Frontiers in Human Neuroscience" 8 (2014), in: <https://doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2014.00764> (accessed: 15.03.2022).

⁵³ C. Helmig, *What is the systematic place of abstraction and concept formation in Plato's philosophy? Ancient and modern readings of Phaedrus 249b-c*, in: *Platonic ideas and concept formation in ancient and medieval thought*, ed. A. Macé – G. Van Riel, Leuven 2004, p. 94-96.

⁵⁴ Proclus, *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria* III 341, 6-346, 8.

Socrates' questions seriously to begin with⁵⁵. As a matter of fact, Alcibiades is proud and ambitious, which is precious a drive for further learning, but may constitute an obstacle to constructive discussion. Ambitious people are often fond of strife (φιλόνεικος), they are likely to take any argument or refutation as a provocation, a challenge to their prestige, that calls for an impressive display of skill rather than a genuine investigation⁵⁶.

So here is the challenge: to bypass this fierce defiance without undermining the promising pride that caused it. It is in response to this challenge that Socrates resorts to surprise. His strange attitude is a discrepancy in Alcibiades' worldview: older men are supposed to court him, to seek pleasure, admiration or reciprocal love, unless perhaps they are too weak or shy to do so at all. Nobody uninterested spends so much time merely stalking a youth. But here comes a famous local figure, without an *eromenos*, he doesn't say a word and just observes; it isn't even some kind of seduction technique, as he waits long enough for the young man to lose much of his physical appeal. This oddity is such a break in the expected course of action that it can't be ignored, but calls for an explanation. Neither can proud Alcibiades help but wonder about this new kind of love that is so patient yet cares so little about physical attractiveness, and look after the causes that motivate Socrates to so behave⁵⁷. His unexpected behaviour is a better and less confrontational refutation of the young man's worldview than any argument or ironic question. It also preserves his future pupil's autonomy: although Socrates is the one approaching him, all curiosity and desire for further discussion will arise from Alcibiades. "For to crave to learn why Socrates acts this way, is to become a lover of the science which is pre-existent in him"⁵⁸. Wonder is the beginning of philos-

⁵⁵ One precision about characters: Proclus appears to be more optimistic about the progress of Callicles, as he considers him to actually be conscious of his contradictions and in a state of intimate hesitation between true and false opinions, see Proclus, *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria* III 341, 7-15. In other passages, however, he still treats him as a misguided and misleading influence, see e. g. Proclus, *In Platonis Rempublicam commentarii* I 159, 25-160, 10; II 176, 4-9; Proclus, *In Platonis Alcibiadem primum* 295, 11-14 and 322, 23-323, 2. Likewise, Alcibiades is described as quite ready to admit his own contradictions compared to other interlocutors encountered by Socrates: Proclus, *In Platonis Alcibiadem primum* 218, 3-219, 13.

⁵⁶ Proclus, *In Platonis Alcibiadem primum* 23, 16-25; Proclus, *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria* III 288, 3-6.

⁵⁷ Proclus, *In Platonis Alcibiadem primum* 19, 18-20, 1 and 46, 14-47, 15.

⁵⁸ Proclus, *In Platonis Alcibiadem primum* 21, 7-9: "τὸ γὰρ τὴν αἰτίαν ποθῆσαι μαθεῖν ὧν πράττει Σωκράτης, ἐραστὴν ἔστι γενέσθαι τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ προὔπαρχούσης ἐπιστήμης".

ophy because the surprise provoked by the unexpected leads to a curiosity which is a first kind of love (in the full sense of the term) of knowledge.

There is more to this argument than elaboration on individual (and fictional) contingencies. Socrates and Alcibiades are characters, they are also archetypes. The former is the perfect philosopher: ideal pupil in the *Parmenides*⁵⁹, ideal teacher in the *Alcibiades*. The latter is not just any promising pupil; he is, according to Proclus, an example of Plato's philosopher by nature⁶⁰. Their didactic relationship itself might be read as paradigmatic. In fact, the psychological dynamics illustrated by this encounter can be found in more ordinary teacher-pupil relationships. The underlying problem is the question of double ignorance. It is commonly (and rightly) assumed that learning effort is much more efficient when it comes from the pupil's initiative, but how can it be triggered when the pupil does not know what is at stake and has no reason to willingly make any substantial effort? Proclus actually suggests a creative solution, which complements more classical answers based on recollection. It consists of displaying something impossible to explain within the pupil's current worldview (and as disturbing as possible), though meaningful once the relevant knowledge is acquired. The bet is that the pupil's soul will try to bridge the newfound gap in its opinions, as is its natural tendency. In order to do so, it will need to understand the explanation of the oddity, which happens quite coincidentally to be identical with the content it is supposed to learn. Such a soul thus proceeds on its own initiative and circumvents most incidental sources of reluctance, for it is puzzled, which allows curiosity and love. Wonder, in itself an irrational emotion, contains the germs of a cognitive movement that can end up in rational investigation.

⁵⁹ See e.g. Proclus, *In Platonis Parmenidem commentaria* IV 926, 9-927, 10, where the good disposition (ἐπιτηδειότης) of the pupil is detailed on the basis of Socrates' example. More precisely, he is a paradigmatic case of an advanced pupil, who only lacks dialectical preparation, while Alcibiades would rather be a very promising but still unrefined pupil.

⁶⁰ As argued in Tresnie, *Orgueil et enseignement*, p. 252; compare for example Proclus, *In Platonis Parmenidem commentaria* IV 854, 20-24 and Proclus, *In Platonis Alcibiadem primum* 134, 7-11 with the Plato, *Res Publica* 374e-377b and 487a.

5. A more difficult case: shock

Being surprised stimulates curiosity. Yet, surprises come in many forms, with various degrees of intensity and pleasantness. Wonder, as previously described, is a mild (if perhaps slightly disturbing) perplexity; it puzzles and stimulates quite harmlessly. But there are “surprises” we would rather avoid and certainly not consider likely to help us learn. Such is the case with profound disgust, with fright and terror, and more generally with anything violent enough to shake us up. It would appear to generate stress, anxiety, stupefaction maybe, or restlessness, but not a genuine desire for knowledge comparable to what wonder provides. Still, Proclus claims (perhaps surprisingly as far as Plato’s text is concerned) that the mention by Socrates of his daemon serves the purpose of deliberately shocking and frightening Alcibiades. Let us quote the passage at length:

It is suitable for Socrates to do this, for such shocks often draw us towards affinity with the Good. As in the holiest initiations, some stupefaction precedes the rites, either through words or through what is shown, in order to submit the soul to the divine, thus at the threshold of philosophy, the master arouses in the young man wonder and emotional shock about himself, so that the words coming to him may have an effect and encourage him to live a philosophical life⁶¹.

Socrates hints at the explanation of his unusual attitude, confirming that there is one but also that it is nothing trivial: neither a quirk of character nor conflicting commitments, but the intervention of a daemon. One might think that it is only the continuation of his strategy aimed at producing wonder and curiosity: a daemon, really? According to Proclus, it

⁶¹ Proclus, *In Platonis Alcibiadem primum* 61, 10-62, 2: “Καὶ τοῦτο εἰκότως ὁ Σωκράτης ποιεῖ· πολλαχοῦ γὰρ αἱ τοιαῦται ἐκπλήξεις εἰς τὴν περὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡμᾶς ἐπισπῶνται συμπάθειαν. ὥσπερ οὖν ἐν ταῖς ἀγιωτάταις τῶν τελετῶν προηγοῦνται τῶν δρωμένων καταπλήξεις τινές, αἱ μὲν διὰ τῶν λεγομένων, αἱ δὲ διὰ τῶν δεικνυμένων ὑποκατακλίνουσαι τῷ θεῷ τὴν ψυχὴν, οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐν τοῖς τῆς φιλοσοφίας προθύροις ἀνεγείρει θαῦμα τῷ νεανίσκῳ καὶ ἐκπληξιν περὶ ἑαυτὸν ὁ καθηγούμενος, ἵνα δράσωσιν εἰς αὐτὸν οἱ λόγοι προϊόντες καὶ ἐκκαλέσονται πρὸς τὴν φιλόσοφον ζωὴν”. Here, “shock” (ἐκπληξίς) and “stupefaction” (καταπλήξις) are etymologically related, along with the stroke (πλάγᾳ) we had encounter earlier with Proclus, *In Platonis Timaeum commentaria* III 330, 9. Their respective entries in the Liddel-Scott-Jones Lexicon show how close they are: amazement, consternation (καταπλήξις); consternation, terror, mental disturbance (ἐκπληξίς); blow, stroke, shock (πλάγᾳ, s.v. πληγή).

is not so, or not the whole story. There is wonder indeed, there is also an emotional shock (ἔκπληξις), which is arguably something else than the mild perplexity following surprise. The context clearly suggests that the evocation of a supernatural power is supposed to startle the young man at the very least, maybe to frighten him. Moreover, the word is the same as we have encountered about the force that arises in the presence of Beauty, it is characteristic of love in its noblest form, the erotic impetus toward wisdom and goodness⁶². Two elements can help clarify the nature of this shock.

First, there is the goal ascribed by the commentator: to draw us towards affinity (συμπάθεια) with the Good. This is consistent with the connection between shock and love: the point is to orient the soul in the direction of the most beautiful realities, which culminate in the Good as the principle and final cause of everything. But this orientation is passive, at least in its starting moment, perhaps as well in its continuation⁶³. Automotricity and autonomous learning are paramount, the whole point of using wonder rather than dogmatic predication is to preserve them. Still, it seems that they can only be fostered after a phase of passivity that seems to negate them⁶⁴. We might note here that one can willingly accept passivity or even choose to be shocked, for example in the hope of reaching a higher insight by so doing. But it would not solve the issue: it is not Alcibiades who is exposing himself to some thrilling content, but Socrates who undertakes to startle him without being asked to do so. It appears that intrigued curiosity is not strong enough a result for the philosopher's tastes: one needs to be shaken and deeply moved by emotion, from without, to autonomous rationality. This incongruity at least highlights some shortcomings of mere curiosity: one may wonder about an explanation in a very detached and mundane way, without any serious commitment, as you would ask yourself what your neighbours are celebrating tonight. That is not what philosophical reversion is about. Wonder must be complemented by something more powerful in order to have an effect.

⁶² Proclus, *Theologia Platonica* I 24, p. 108, 7-109, 2.

⁶³ Proclus, *In Platonis Alcibiadem primum* 153, 6-8 is troubling: "the learner should surrender to the teacher and be led quietly toward the truth" (τὸν δὲ παιδευόμενον ἑαυτὸν ἐπιιδόναι προσήκει τῷ παιδεύοντι καὶ ἡρέμα περιάγεσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἀληθές).

⁶⁴ See the broader commentary of M. Erler, *Hilfe der Götter und Erkenntnis der Selbst*, p. 387-413. I would however be much less affirmative than he is concerning the alleged pessimism of Neoplatonic philosophers (especially Proclus) regarding the possibility of the preservation of a soul's autonomy throughout learning, and I hope the present study may contribute to somewhat qualify that claim.

We may thus better understand the second point of interest: the comparison with the Mysteries, to which the “holiest initiations” are likely to refer⁶⁵. Just before embarking on truly autonomous research by the means of philosophy, one needs a shock analogous to the stupefaction (κατάπληξις) experienced during initiation just before the sacred rites. A lively depiction of this part of the ritual can be found in a fragment of Plutarch or Themistios preserved by Stobaeus:

There are at first wanderings and wearying walks, worried and aimless roaming in the gloom, then just before the end came the most terrible things, with chills, quivering, sweat and amazement. But after that, some wonderful light presents itself, meadows and pure grounds appear, with songs and dances, and the most venerable of sacred words and holy apparitions⁶⁶.

We can leave aside the details of the mixed symbolic legacy here to focus on the point of the comparison. The rite of initiation involves disconcerting practices where the initiates are expected to lose their bearings. The strange words and displays are not only intriguing, they are also scary. This confusion translates into feelings and signs of fear, of anxiety, preparing and magnifying the final release of *epopteia*⁶⁷. The whole ritual would lose much of its strength without this emotional adventure: in Proclus’ words, the stupefaction aims to first submit the soul to the divine, before the rite may have an effect. Likewise, philosophy has little power over a soul that is too firmly rooted in its comfortable certainties. It takes more than curiosity to accomplish meaningful learning: Socrates might have remained a fancy oddity, admittedly intriguing, but not worth a deep self-reassessment. It

⁶⁵ It is not the first time that Proclus evokes the Mysteries in relation to the encounter he is commenting on, as is pointed out by the editor *ad loc.*: see Proclus, *In Platonis Alcibiadem primum* 9, 1-7 and 39, 7-40, 21. However, the former passage is quite vague, while the second rather compares the apparition of (evil) daemons to the irrational lures of sophistry and sensible matter.

⁶⁶ Stobaeus, *Anthologium* IV 52, 49, 8-13: “Πλάναι τὰ πρῶτα καὶ περιδρομαὶ κοπώδεις καὶ διὰ σκότους τινὲς ὑποποιοὶ πορεῖαι καὶ ἀτέλεστοι, εἶτα πρὸ τοῦ τέλους αὐτοῦ τὰ δεινὰ πάντα, φρίκη καὶ τρόμος καὶ ἰδρῶς καὶ θάμβος· ἐκ δὲ τούτου φῶς τι θαυμάσιον ἀπήντησεν καὶ τόποι καθαροὶ καὶ λειμῶνες ἐδέξαντο, φωνὰς καὶ χορείας καὶ σεμνότητος ἀκουσμάτων ἱερῶν καὶ φασμάτων ἀγίων ἔχοντες”. On the disputed authority of the fragment see F. Graf, *Eleusis und die orphische Dichtung Athens in vorhellenistischer Zeit*, Berlin 1974, p. 132-138.

⁶⁷ For a summary of the proceedings of such ceremonies, see for example H. Bowden, *Mystery Cults of the Ancient World*, Princeton 2010.

requires to have been at a loss, to have quivered and shivered, if the later lesson is to be taken seriously. Let us insist on Proclus' choice of words: the strategy of shock is aimed at preparing Alcibiades not to learn more *about* philosophy (wonder might have sufficed), but to live a philosophical life. That is by far more demanding a change than asking for attention.

What about the philosophical analogon of "submitting to the divine"? Is there, after all, no need or hope for autonomy? That is certainly one of the trickiest aspects of the problem. If we recall section 3, we know that in Neoplatonism, and in any case in Proclus, the divine is in practice none other than Providence. Now Providence is the order, intelligible and rational, of all reality, the structure of the universe. Submitting to it is little else than acknowledging that there is order in the world and that it can be grasped through our higher intellectual faculties. This is indeed an important break from ordinary common sense, but certainly not a withdrawal from rationality. On the other hand, we have seen that the teacher is the instantiation of Providence in the teaching relationship. This should lead us to conclude that, in some sense at least, there is a need for the submission of the pupil to the providential care of the teacher, in a quasi-religious way. This is closer to faith than to reasonable trust. But it is a philosophically (albeit later on) grounded faith: it is inasmuch as the teacher embodies the rational order of reality that submission of the soul is warranted⁶⁸. Irrational states like shock, as far as they prepare the soul to reach this condition of agreement with reason, are themselves part of a broader, rational order. The somewhat counter-intuitive, but nonetheless defensible, result is that violent passions, although in themselves irrational and impeding reason, may, in some cir-

⁶⁸ An important question lies outside the scope of this paper: how could anyone be convinced of the conformity of a teacher's will with the divine order before gaining some knowledge of this order? A likely answer would use the concept of *ἐννοιαί*, the innate notions present in every soul, which serve as the ultimate subjective criterion of truth and the necessary basis of any learning. On how recognition of a teaching's value may be grounded in these notions (and its illustration in Proclus), see D.J. O'Meara, *La science métaphysique (ou théologique) de Proclus comme exercice spirituel*, in: *Proclus et la théologie platonicienne: Actes du Colloque international de Louvain, 13-16 mai 1998, en l'honneur de H.D. Saffrey et L.G. Westerink*, ed. A.P. Segonds – C. Steel, Louvain – Paris 2000, p. 279-290. While his claim that the *Elementatio Theologica* served as a kind of "spiritual exercise" for actual students is unverifiable, it is in any case consistent with Proclean psychology. Another solution is proposed by the later Platonist Olympiodorus: the ultimate criterion of trust is our "allotted daemon", which is to be identified by the summit of our soul, i.e. our consciousness (*συνειδός*), "he" refers to Proclus, so we have to remove either the expression "his own", or the word "Proclus" 23, 1-10.

cumstances and under the right supervision, foster it. They can be steps in the development of rational autonomy, they are even more likely to permit its growth than the undisturbed spontaneity of the individual, which runs the risk of stagnating at the level of opinion and common sense.

The appeal to fear or at least shock is no argument from authority: even according to Proclus, Socrates nowhere says that his teaching is worth listening to *because* a daemon (or a god) said so or revealed it. Neither is it a threat: at no point is there mention of any kind of retribution should the young man walk away. Such an understanding would actually be contrary to Proclus' point: proud and wealthy Alcibiades would have laughed at so exuberant a provocation, but it would have stayed at a very down-to-earth and, in a way, predictable level, failing to confront him with something really unsettling. Here is the key role of shock, of convoking daemons, gods or faeries: to introduce, without being too easily dismissed, the existence of a grade of understanding far beyond ordinary experience.

6. Are there two distinct emotions?

At this point, one might have the impression that wonder and shock are two different, maybe successive, states of the soul of the learner, who would first have to be perplexed in order to awaken its curiosity, then shaken him in order to deepen its level of commitment. But this would be an oversystematization. Those two didactic devices are, in any case, different in their function. Still, isn't an old man silently stalking for years his prospective pupil at least unsettling? Should Alcibiades only be shocked and not also intrigued by Socrates' stories about daemons? There is wonder and shock in both these unusual situations, as Proclus actually suggests when he says that the mention of the daemon serves to cause θαῦμα as well as ἔκπληξις. Yet if the same actions trigger both reactions, why bother distinguishing them?

Let us remember how wonder was caused. It is a kind of surprise, revealing a break in ordinary expectations. In the case of Socrates' silent attitude, it was indeed odd, as older men usually pursue charming Alcibiades. But unless struck by some neurosis, the son of Cleinias should not be overly disturbed: there are eccentric men after all. When the original is a war hero and a local celebrity, it is certainly tempting to try to understand the cause of his behaviour, hence the curiosity. But

when suddenly he speaks of a daemon giving specific instructions concerning young Alcibiades, and does so with enough credibility to be taken seriously, wonder becomes something more. It is one thing to know that, of course, gods and daemons exist, quite another to have them directly involved in one's daily life. The stakes are higher: it is no longer only about Socrates' own motivations, as there is a whole new dimension of experience revealing itself. Without a doubt, anyone will be curious about it. But if we are to call it wonder, for it is wonderful indeed, it is in a different sense than the mild perplexity of the young man who wonders what the reason for Socrates' silence is. We would certainly be justified in calling this strengthened wonder "shock", "amazement" or even "awe", which might here be, or so I argue on the basis of all that has been said, an appropriate alternative translation of ἐκπληξίς.

Awe is no mere curiosity. There is stupefaction in the confused stare of the initiate, in the glance one takes at a transcending presence, though it is not a disgusted fright but rather a bewildered astonishment. Such is the state of "shock" that Proclus deems instrumental in the preparation of the pupil, in conjunction with milder wonder. Both are perplexities in front of something new, alien and surprising. Wonder and awe are two sides, two degrees of intensity of this feeling. Each of them has nonetheless its own utility for the providential structuring of the pupil's soul by the teacher. Wonder, thanks to its softness, subtly catches the interest, without alienating any susceptibility, sometimes at the cost of a more superficial commitment. Awe works way deeper on the soul, it moves it to take learning and reversion seriously, although it is on the verge of jeopardizing the soul's autonomy in aiming to reinforce it. Both are thus complementary and contribute to the delicate balance between providential guidance according to the order of the universe and authentic self-discovery through intrinsic motivation. They are aspects of the subjective side of the love of knowledge, the necessary drive to actually commit to intellectual progress, the starting point of philosophy.

7. Some conclusions

Recent research on Proclus often focuses either on his powerful account of the functioning of rational cognitive faculties, or on his quasi-religious way to approach philosophical *eros*. The point of this paper was to show that he also considers the cognitive role played by emo-

tions, their importance for subjective commitment to learning. He also incorporates them into the broader evolution and self-exploration of a rational soul. What is specific to his approach is the link between his psychological characterization of emotions and their metaphysical and epistemological groundings. Motivation is not just a welcome mood that can help to learn, it is an instance of the cosmic drive of Love that binds reality together. Producing it is not just a teacher's trick, it is a providential endeavour, in which the teacher participates in divine Providence. Through wonder, the soul is led out of his usual worldview structured by opinion, to a spontaneous inquiry that may culminate in the love of loftier objects of knowledge. Through shock or rather awe, it is moved to seriously and personally engage in the task. In that way, according to Proclus, can a soul be best motivated to discover earnestly and efficiently the rational and intellectual structures of both itself and reality, that is, to experience philosophical reversion. Wonder and awe are not as random affections as it may appear: they are also components of love, even of our ordinary understanding of it, if there is such a thing. But Love is also the way of the gods and of philosophy, by way of the wonder and awe that come with it, there is an affinity, συμπάθεια, with the divine, comparable to the transformation that happens in sacred initiations. Learning and communion are different faces of a complex psychic motion of assimilation to the divine, they are unified by a common logic and share some emotional experiences.

There is in Neoplatonism, as in some other great schools of thought, an underlying unified conception of passions that is lacking in the intuitive definitions of various individual emotions used by most of empirical research. It allows Proclus to offer a consistent, if sometimes disconcerting, picture of how curiosity and ardour emerge in the soul. There are, of course, some presuppositions in his narrative: that there is something to be known; that it is by nature supremely lovable, so that it is one and the same to know and love it; that our interior life is somehow already organized by such love. This general Neoplatonic background might be, for many of us, too much to accept without qualification. Still, even the most critical reader may find some value in the Proclean account of wonder and awe, in the continuity between these feelings and erotic drive, didactic charisma, and diligent study.

I would like to mention one more thing about the opening lines of the *First Alcibiades*. In the Neoplatonic school of Proclus, a strict progression seems to have been followed concerning the study of canon-

cal texts. After an ethical preparation which seems to have involved the Pythagorean Golden Verses and a glimpse of Stoic writings, some of Aristotle was deemed necessary as propaedeutics before the actual reading of Plato's texts⁶⁹. The latter were apparently considered as sufficiently contained in twelve dialogs, beginning with the *Alcibiades* and culminating in the *Timaeus* and the *Parmenides*⁷⁰. Accordingly, the passage with which we have begun this inquiry constitutes the first two *lemmata* of the first Platonic dialogue in the curriculum. Wonder and awe: surely there are worse ways to embark on a self-transforming philosophical journey.

Emotions that Foster Learning: Wonder and Shock in Proclus

(summary)

In his *Commentaries*, Proclus (Neoplatonic philosopher, 5th century A.D.) describes the ways in which a teacher can awaken the desire for knowledge and philosophy in a given soul, and help this soul to make cognitive and moral progress. He considers such an intervention to be a case of providence, analogous to both the action of divine *Pronoia* and the care of one's personal daemon. As the soul being thus educated is still unaware of the merits of rational thought, the teacher needs to use the emotions of his student to stimulate him; he might even want to generate desirable emotions in his soul. I focus here on two emotions: wonder and shock. The first serves to stimulate interest while preserving autonomy. The second allows deeper commitment at the price of reduced autonomy of the pupil. Both are complementary aspects of philosophical perplexity.

Keywords: Proclus; Neoplatonism; Emotion; Surprise; Fear; Anxiety; Wonder; Fright; Thaumata; Learning; Teaching; Autonomy; Mysteries; Reversion; Philosophy; Reason; Passion

⁶⁹ This is what we can infer from the various allusions throughout Olympiodorus' *Prolegomena to Aristotle's Logic*, which are admittedly one century posterior to Proclus' time. However, Marinus' *Life of Proclus* (13-14) seems to indicate that Proclus himself followed a comparable curriculum under the guidance of Plutarch and Syrianus.

⁷⁰ This is at least the curriculum usually deduced from the *Anonymous Prolegomena to the Platonic Philosophy*, 26, which appear to describe the standard procedure of the school shortly after Proclus' time. This would be consistent with the fact that Proclus wrote complete commentaries to these three dialogs. Marinus also suggests that each step correspond to one of the levels of virtues in Iamblichus' scale, although this might be a later projection. On this question, see the evidence gathered by A.J. Festugière, *L'ordre de lecture des dialogues de Platon aux Ve/VIe siècles*, "Museum Helveticum" 26/4 (1969) p. 281-296 and D.J. O'Meara, *Platonopolis: Political Philosophy in Late Antiquity*, Oxford 2003, p. 40-68.

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Tłumaczenia

Galen z Pergamonu, O porządku moich własnych ksiąg dla Eugenianosa

(*De ordine librorum suorum ad Eugenianum*)

(Περὶ τῆς τάξεως τῶν ἰδίων βιβλίων πρὸς Εὐγενιανόν)

1. Wprowadzenie

Spoglądając na zbiorowe wydanie dzieł Galena po dziś dzień trudno oprzeć się podziwowi – wydanie C.G. Kühna obejmuje 22 opasłe tomy, w których oprócz tekstów greckich znajdziemy tłumaczenia łacińskie. Z dwóch pism medyka dowiadujemy się jednak, iż to nie wszystko, co zdołał napisać. Mamy do czynienia tylko z tym, co się zachowało do naszych czasów¹.

Jeden z najwybitniejszych i najbardziej wpływowych lekarzy starożytności i poza nią – jak napisał Vincenzo Damiani – Galen z Pergamonu ma w swoim niezwykle bogatym dorobku literackim (wydanie Kühna² liczy około 20 tys. stron) imponującą różnorodność tekstów medycznych (nie zawsze spójnych ze sobą) ze szczegółami autorskim dotyczącymi jego biografii. Powoduje to, że badacze twórczości Galena muszą zmierzyć się z wyzwaniem selekcji z tak obszernego materiału dotyczącego starożytnego medyka³. Vivian Nutton, komentując ilość dzieł napisanych przez niego, napisał, że: „[...] jest zawsze zdumiewająca i zastanawiająca”⁴. Galen

¹ A. Pacewicz, *Galen o naturze wiedzy medycznej*, „Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensis” 4 (2009) s. 119.

² *Claudii Galeni opera omnia*, t. 1-20, ed. K.G. Kühn, Lipsiae 1821-1833.

³ Por. V. Damiani, *Protreptic and Medicine: Galen*, w: *Philosophical Protreptic in Antiquity*, red. O. Alieva – A. Kotzé – S. van der Meeren, Turnhout 2018, s. 299.

⁴ Por. R. Rosen, *Review of Vivian Nutton, ed., Galen. On My Own Opinions. Corpus Medicorum Graecorum 5.3.2 Galeni De Propriis Placitis*, w: http://repository.upenn.edu/classics_papers/ (dostęp: 27.02.2021).

był jednym z najbardziej płodnych intelektualistów zachodniej starożytności. Jego prace w wydaniu Kühna obejmują 22 tomy po około 1000 stron każdy w standardowym wydaniu greckim (z kilkoma dodatkowymi dziełami zachowanymi tylko w tłumaczeniach na arabski, syryjski, hebrajski lub łaciński) – łącznie ponad 4 miliony słów⁵.

Zachowane w tradycji rękopiśmiennej dzieła Galena uważane za autentyczne są wyjątkowe pod względem ilościowym nie tylko dla tamtych czasów. Stanowią bowiem prawie 1/8 zachowanej literatury od VI wieku przed Chrystusem do końca II wieku po Chrystusie. Był przede wszystkim autorem medycznym, ale napisał również wiele prac z zakresu logiki i etyki, a także zajął kwestiami filozoficznymi, zwłaszcza epistemologią, przyczynami zjawisk w świecie przyrody i filozofią umysłu. Jego praca medyczna, w niektórych kontekstach filozoficzna, miała ogromny wpływ na edukację w okresie średniowiecza, a nawet później, zarówno w Europie, jak i (poprzez przekaz arabsko-islamski) poza nią. W dużej mierze ignorowany przez świat intelektualny od czasu rewolucji naukowej ostatnio zaczął wzbudzać coraz większe zainteresowanie świata nauki⁶.

Biografia Galena jest szeroko znana z wielu wskazań autobiograficznych zawartych w jego twórczości, problematyczne i nieustalone natomiast są daty jego narodzin i śmierci, jak również niepewne jest datowanie jego podróży. Powszechnie przyjmuje się, że urodził się w 129 roku po Chrystusie, zmarł, jak się przyjmuje, między 199 a 216 rokiem po Chrystusie.

Według Paula Moraux, autora *Galien de Pergame. Souvenirs d'une médecin*, Galen to postać z niezwykle ujmującą osobowością, człowiek, który bez wahania próbował rozwiązywać wiele problemów wynikających z jego pracy i zainteresowań. Zdaniem Moraux z taką samą łatwością bezproblemowo zajmował się medycyną, filozofią, farmakologią, jak etyką, retoryką, a także poezją i teatrem⁷. Interdyscyplinarność zainteresowań od wczesnych lat życia wzbudzał w nim ojciec Eliusz Nikon, matematyk, architekt i astronom.

Mój ojciec nieustannie szkolił mnie w posiadanej przez siebie wiedzy w dziedzinach, w których kształci się młodzież – geometria, arytmetyka i dyscypliny przygotowawcze – aż do ukończenia piętnastego roku życia. Następnie

⁵ W rzeczywistości jest 20 tomów, przy czym tomy nr 17 i 18 są podwójne a tom nr 20 jest indeksem.

⁶ Por. P.N. Singer, *Galen*, in: *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, w: <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/galen/> (dostęp: 10.04.2021).

⁷ Por. P. Moraux, *Galien de Pergame. Souvenirs d'une médecin*, Paris 1985, s. 197.

wysłał mnie, żebym nauczył się logiki, bym już zaczął samodzielnie studiować filozofię. Miał wtedy sen, który nakierował go, aby poinstruować mnie o medycynie i wysłał mnie, abym ją studiował, kiedy osiągnąłem siedemnasty rok mojego życia”⁸.

Efektem tego snu było rozpoczęcie przez Galena nauki sztuki lekarskiej w sanktuarium Asklepiosa w Pergamonie. Już jako praktykujący medyk zajęty pogłębianiem wiedzy oraz praktycznie nieustannym pisaniem licznych dzieł wdał się w polemikę z reprezentantami szkół medycznych w Rzymie, ale zgodnie z sugestią ojca nie akcentował przynależności do żadnej z nich. Było to w jego przypadku bardzo trudne, sam bowiem wierzył przede wszystkim w siłę i potęgę rozumu⁹, a filozofia sama w sobie nie była zdaniem Galena tylko „sztuką dla sztuki”. Jest to wyraźnie widoczne u cytowanych przez niego wielkich greckich filozofów: Platonia i Arystotelesie¹⁰.

Korpus Galena niewątpliwie gromadzi sumę wiedzy, której nie da się przypisać jednemu uczonemu. Dlatego zawsze warto zadać sobie pytanie, w jakich granicach Galen wykorzystuje prace swoich poprzedników, lekarzy czy filozofów. Bez wątpliwości na twórczość medyczną Galena największy wpływ miała spuścizna po Hippokratesie (ok. 460-377), „ojcu medycyny zachodniej”, który „[...] był bardziej zainteresowany zapisywaniem swoich obserwacji klinicznych niż filozofowaniem”¹¹. Tylko w wyjątkowych przypadkach Galen ośmielał się krytykować swojego wielkie-

⁸ Moraux, *Galien de Pergame*, s. 197 (tł. własne).

⁹ Podczas gdy dla dogmatyków medycznych (lub racjonalistów) tylko rozum pozwalała na identyfikację ogólnych reguł i jest zainteresowany przyczynami, dla empirystów cała sztuka uzdrawiania wywodzi się tylko z doświadczenia. Podkreślali znaczenie praktyki i eksperymentów, czyli „aktywnej nauki” w studiach medycznych. Metodyści, obawiając się zbytnich uproszczeń, podzielili choroby na trzy duże grupy i zaproponowali odpowiednio trzy rodzaje leczenia.

¹⁰ Więcej na ten temat w: Moraux, *Galien de Pergame*, s. 197.

¹¹ Sam Hipokrates, który był bardziej zainteresowany zapisywaniem swoich obserwacji klinicznych niż filozofowaniem, w dziełach *Aforismi* i *Ius iurandum* nie różnicuje myśli refleksyjnego filozofa i mądrości doświadczonego praktyka. Niektóre traktaty wykazują dominację jednego filozofa, w innych widać niespójne, wręcz eklektyczne połączenie wielu poglądów zaspokajających potrzebę wyjaśnienia konkretnego przypadku. W pozostałych, mimo że nie da się zauważyć żadnej konkretnej teorii filozoficznej, widać jednak znaczący wpływ pojęć i kategorii filozofii przedsokratejskiej. Por. J. Krajewska, *Nie tylko „o sztuce lekarskiej” w wybranych pismach Corpus Hippocraticum*, „Saeculum Christianum” 25 (2018) s. 56.

go poprzednika. Cytując mistrza, prawdopodobnie dostosowywał tekst Hippokratesa do współczesnej sobie wiedzy medycznej i wykorzystywał jego autorytet do dysputy ze swoimi antagonistami.

Pisząc o wielkich poprzednikach Galena, nie można również pominąć postaci Praksagorasa z Kos (ok. 340 rok przed Chrystusem), Herofilosa (ok. 335-280) i Eratistratosa (ok. 304-250), medyków aleksandryjskich, którzy prawdopodobnie rozbudzili i zapoczątkowali w nim zainteresowanie anatomią człowieka, a przede wszystkim przyczynami chorób i ich leczeniem.

Prawdopodobnie jeszcze za życia Pergamończyka rozpoczął się proces narzucania jego wiedzy i sposobu uprawiania medycyny bez możliwości jej negowania, nazwany „galenizmem”. Pisząc swoje trakty medyczne, autorzy późnoantyczni i bizantyjscy inspirowali się pośrednio lub bezpośrednio dziełami Galena, tworząc kompilacje często całych treści medycznych jego traktatów. Największe tego typu dzieło, zatytułowane *Collectiones medicae* (gr. Ἱατρικαὶ Συναγγαί), skompilował w IV wieku po Chrystusie osobisty lekarz rzymskiego cesarza Juliana Apostaty, Orybazjusz (320-403). Na skonstruowaną w ten sposób encyklopedię składały się prawdopodobnie 70 lub 72 księgi¹².

Podobne kompilacje autorstwa Aecjusza z Amidy i Aleksandra z Tralles powstały prawdopodobnie w V lub VI wieku¹³. W VII wieku powstało, jak napisała Emilie Savage-Smith, uosobienie greckiej medycyny, dzieło, którego kompilatorem był Paweł z Eginy. Faktycznie nie jest znany oryginalny tytuł tego dzieła. Peter E. Pormann uważa, że prawidłowy tytuł dzieła to *Pragmateia* (gr. Πραγματεία)¹⁴, a Emilia Savage-Smith używa tytułu *Siedem ksiąg Pawła z Eginy* (gr. Ἐπιτομῆς Ἱατρικῆς βιβλία ἑπτὰ)¹⁵. Sam autor określił swoją pracę jako „skrótowy zbiór pism starożytnych autorów” z zaginionym streszczeniem dzieł Galena ze zbioru *Collectiones me-*

¹² G. Miller, *The Earliest (?) Description of a String Figure*, „American Anthropologist. New Series” 47/3 (1945) s. 461-462.

¹³ Datowanie jest przybliżone.

¹⁴ Ze względu na brak oryginalnego tytułu pierwotnego tytuł dzieła Pawła z Eginy jest przyjmowany umownie jako *De Re Medica Libri Septem*. Por. W. Smith, *A Dictionary of Greek and Roman biography and mythology*. By various writers, London 1890, s. 152. Por. P.E. Pormann, *The Oriental Tradition of Paul of Aegina's Pragmateia*, Leiden – Boston 2004, s. 1. Peter E. Pormann, proponuje zaś tytuł *Pragmateia* (Πραγματεία), podkreślając, że sam Paweł również używa tego terminu. Por. Pormann, *The Oriental Tradition of Paul of Aegina's*, s. 1. Sam Paweł w przedmowie (Προοίμιον) do swojego dzieła używa nazwy ἑβδομηκοντάβιβλος. Por. CMG 9/1, s. 3-5.

¹⁵ Por. E. Savage-Smith, *Historia nauki arabskiej – technika, alchemia, nauki przyrodnicze i medycyna*, t. 3, tł. J. Kozłowska – K. Pachniak, Warszawa 2005, s. 152.

dicae Orybazjusza. Według wspomnianej Savage-Smith twórczość Pawła z Eginy jest ogniwem łączącym późną medycynę hellenistyczną z wczesną medycyną islamską¹⁶, Vivian Nutton zaś wspomnianych wyżej medyków i ich prace określił jako „medyczne lodówki starożytności”¹⁷.

2. Ḥunain ibn Ishāq Al-’Ibadi. Galen i medycyna arabska

Powszechnie uważa się, że zachowanie starożytnej wiedzy medycznej dla przyszłych pokoleń historia medycyny zawdzięcza jednej z kluczowych postaci w ruchu translatorskim „Domu Mądrości” (*Bayt al-Hikma*)¹⁸, Ḥunainowi ibn Ishāqowi (809-873). Czy faktycznie? Według legendarnej opowieści kalif al-Ma’ mūn sponsorował korpus tłumaczy, uczestnicząc również w dyskusjach nad przetłumaczonymi tekstami. Niedawno wykazano, że „Dom Mądrości” faktycznie był związany z działalnością tłumaczeniową, przede wszystkim z tłumaczeniem imperialnych dokumentów perskich. Prawdopodobnie istniało kilka szkół zajmujących się tłumaczeniami starożytnych tekstów medycznych, z których dwie najważniejsze ukształtowały się wokół Ḥunayna ibn Ishāqa i filozofa al-Kindī¹⁹.

Glen M. Cooper uważa, że nazwanie Ḥunayna ibn Ishāqa „outsiderem” znacznie ułatwia współczesnym badaczom zrozumienie jego kariery. Jako chrześcijański Arab z al-Ḥīra, stolicy dawnego królestwa Lachmidów w południowo-środkowym Iraku, nie należał ani do chrześcijańsko-syryjskich lekarzy, ani do dominującej na tamtych terenach grupy arabskich mużulmanów. Został przyjęty na naukę przez jednego z czołowych lekarzy syryjskich, ale na skutek niespójnych poglądów pożegnał mentora i udał się w podróż na dawne ziemie Cesarstwa Bizantyjskiego. Prawdopodobnie w trakcie podróży nauczył się biegle posługiwać się językiem greckim oraz zaczął gromadzić greckie manuskrypty medyczne²⁰.

¹⁶ Savage-Smith, *Historia nauki arabskiej*, s. 152.

¹⁷ Por. V. Nutton. *From Galen to Alexander, aspects of medicine and medical practice in late antiquity*, „Dumbarton Oaks Papers” 38 (1984) s. 1-14.

¹⁸ „Dom Mądrości” (*Bayt al-Hikma*) był postrzegany jako jedna z wiodących bibliotek w historii islamu, która pojawiła się w jego złotym wieku. Zobacz więcej: M. Mohadi, *The House of Wisdom (Bayt al-Hikmah) and Its Civilizational Impact on Islamic libraries: A Historical Perspective*, „Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences” 8/5 (2017) s. 186.

¹⁹ Zob. G.M. Cooper, *Ḥunain ibn Ishāq and the Creation of an Arabic Galen*, w: *Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Galen*, Leiden – Boston 2012, s. 180-181.

²⁰ Cooper, *Ḥunain ibn Ishāq and the Creation of an Arabic Galen*, s. 180.

Znajomość języków syryjskiego, arabskiego, perskiego i greckiego pozwoliła mu przetłumaczyć na arabski dzieła głównych greckich medyków, takich jak Galen i Hipokrates. Podczas jednej z podróży w celu odnalezienia oryginalnych tekstów Galena napisał: „Szukałem go szczerze i podróżowałem, szukając na ziemiach Mezopotamii, Syrii, Palestyny i Egiptu, aż dotarłem do Aleksandrii, ale nie mogłem nic znaleźć”²¹.

Celem jego pracy było dążenie do przetłumaczenia greckiego tekstu na syryjski i arabski bez utraty istoty tekstu oryginalnego, co wymuszało opracowanie przez niego nowej leksyki arabskiej. W wieku 46 lat zrewidował również własne tłumaczenia tekstu Galena:

Przetłumaczyłem to, kiedy byłem młodym mężczyzną [...] z bardzo wadliwego greckiego rękopisu. Później, kiedy miałem 46 lat, mój uczeń Hubashish poprosił mnie, abym go poprawił po zebraniu pewnej liczby greckich rękopisów. Następnie zestawilem je tak, aby uzyskać rękopis z tekstem syryjskim i poprawione [zostało to] w ten sposób we wszystkich moich pracach tłumaczeniowych²².

Gotthelf Bergsträsser, niemiecki językoznawca, badając technikę pracy Hunaina, napisał, że jego tłumaczenia nie są efektem ciężkiej pracy, ale swobodnego i pewnego opanowania języka przez tłumacza²³. Pod koniec IX wieku prawie cały korpus Galena był już przetłumaczony przez Hanayna i jego współpracowników lub uczniów. Prawdopodobnie zapoczątkował wtedy tworzenie skrótów przetłumaczonych dzieł i systematyczne prace nad podręcznikami dla studentów medycyny oparte na pracach Galena.

Galen był niekwestionowanym autorytetem w kulturze medycznej świata arabsko-islamskiego, nie tylko jako lekarz, ale także jako filozof. Pierwszym, który ośmielił się podważać jego teorie medyczne i dyskutować z Galenem, był perski lekarz, Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Zakariyyā' ar-Rāzī (854-925), znany pod zlatynizowaną formą jako Rhazes. W książce *Wątpliwości co do Galena*²⁴ al-Razi odrzucił między innymi twier-

²¹ Por. M. Meyerhof. *The book of the ten treatises on the eye ascribed to Hunain ibn Ishāq (809-877 A.D.): the earliest existing systematic text-book of ophthalmology*, Cairo 1928, s. 2.

²² Meyerhof. *The book of the ten treatises on the eye ascribed to Hunain ibn Ishāq*, s. 4.

²³ Zob. A. Hady, *Hunain ibn Ishāq*, w: <https://www.aspetar.com/journal/viewarticle.aspx?id=320> (dostęp: 11.03.2020).

²⁴ Zob. P. Koetschet, *Galen, Al-Razi, and the eternity of the world. The fragments of the treatise On Demonstration, IV, in the Doubts About Galen*, „Arabic Sciences and Philosophy” 7 (2015) s. 41.

dzenia Galena o wyższości języka greckiego nad innymi językami. Zakwestionował opisy Galena dotyczące przebiegu niektórych gorączek, twierdząc, że ma do tego podstawy, jego doświadczenie kliniczne bowiem przewyższa doświadczenie Galena. Próbował podważyć również teorię Galena o czterech humorach, których równowaga miała być warunkiem dobrego zdrowia. Wyzwanie al-Raziego dla podstaw teorii medycznej obowiązujących w ówczesnym świecie było dość kontrowersyjne. Wielu oskarżyło go o ignorancję i arogancję, mimo że wielokrotnie wyrażał swoje pochwały i wdzięczność Galenowi, pisząc:

Modliłem się do Boga, aby kierował i prowadził mnie do prawdy, pisząc tę książkę. Smuci mnie sprzeciw i krytyka Galena, człowieka, z którego morza wiedzy wyciągnąłem wiele. Rzeczywiście, on jest Mistrzem, a ja jestem uczniem. Chociaż ten szacunek i uznanie będzie i nie powinno przeszkadzać mi wątpić w to, co jest błędne w jego teoriach. Wyobrażam sobie i czuję głęboko w moim sercu, że Galen wybrał mnie do podjęcia tego zadania, a gdyby żył, pogratulowałby mi tego, co robię. Mówię to, ponieważ celem Galena było poszukiwanie i znajdowanie prawdy i wyprowadzenie światła z ciemności. Żałuję, że nie żyje i nie może przeczytać tego, co napisałem²⁵.

Inni islamscy medycy, w tym 'Ali ibn al-Abbas al-Majusi (ok. 930-984), Abū al-Qāsim Khalaf ibn al-'Abbās al-Zahrāwī al-Ansari (ok. 936-1013), Ibn Sina, zwany przez łacinników Avicenną (980-1037), Abū Marwān 'Abd al-Malik ibn Zuhr (1094-1162) konfrontowali i łączyli swoje badania z badaniami Galena, jednak mniej ostentacyjnie w przypadku odkrytych nieścisłości, jak miało to miejsce w przypadku al-Raziego. Dopiero wyniki badań i odkrycie krążenia płucnego (małego) przez Ibn al-Nafisa wymusiły zakwestionowanie galenowej fizjologii układu krążenia.

Omawiając epokową transformację kulturową spowodowaną przez grecko-arabski ruch tłumaczeń w Bagdadzie w IX, X i XI wieku i pomijając jednocześnie sam proces tworzenia tego ruchu, należy mocno podkreślić jego skutki. Epokową konsekwencją tych tłumaczeń było to, że prawie wszystkie prace filozoficzne i naukowe, które były wówczas dostępne dla tłumaczy, zostały przetłumaczone na język arabski, czyniąc cywilizację islamską jednym ze spadkobierców cywilizacji grecko-rzymskiej.

²⁵ Por. B. Saad – O. Said, *Greco-Arab and Islamic Herbal Medicine: Traditional System, Ethics, Safety, Efficacy, and Regulatory Issues*, New York 2011, s. 23.

3. Galen w łacińskiej Europie

Jedną z najbardziej niezwykłych cech europejskiego średniowiecza jest proces, w wyniku którego w XII i XIII wieku Europa Zachodnia opracowała łacińskie wersje większości arabskich przekładów greckich dzieł. Były to między innymi dzieła Arystotelesa, Euklidesa, Ptolemeusza i Galena, które zostały pierwotnie napisane w języku greckim, a następnie przetłumaczone na arabski, a także dzieła napisane w języku arabskim przez chrześcijańskich, muzułmańskich i żydowskich uczonych, takich jak wspomniany już Awicenna, Awerroes, czyli ibn Rushd, i Majmonides, czyli Moses ben Maimon. Twierdzono, że prześledzenie wpływu Galena na łacińskim Zachodzie byłoby jak spisanie pełnej historii medycyny²⁶.

Tłumaczenie arabskich prac medycznych na łacinę zainicjował Konstantyn Afrykańczyk (1020-1087), który podobnie jak Ḥunan ibn Ishāq posługiwał się kilkoma językami, w tym greckim, łacińskim, arabskim oraz innymi nabytymi podczas jego rozległych podróży do Syrii, Indii, Etiopii, Egiptu i Persji. Przetłumaczone przez niego arabskie wydania prac Hipokratesa i Galena były pierwszymi dziełami²⁷, które dały średniowiecz-

²⁶ Zob. M.P. Donato, *Galen in an Age of Change (1650-1820)*, w: *Brill's Companion to the Reception of Galen*, s. 487.

²⁷ Łacińskie dzieło *De medicina* Aureliusza Korneliusza Celsusa które zyskało dużą popularność już w czasach, w których być może jeszcze żył autor, niestety nie zostało zauważone nie tylko przez Galena, ale również całą późną starożytność. „Nawet dla medycyny arabskiej imię Celsusa nie istnieje, mimo że, jak napisała Emillie Savage-Smith, pierwsi muzułmańscy medycy interesowali się życiem swoich poprzedników, których nazywali «Starożytnymi», szczególnie Greków. Do dodatkowej refleksji skłaniają również przyczyny oficjalnego niebytu imienia Celsusa i *De medicina* od II do IX w. po Chr. Na IX wiek datowane są bowiem najstarsze odnalezione łacińskie manuskrypty z tekstem dzieła: F, Codex Florent., Laurentian Library, 73, I. IX wiek, V, Codex Romanus, Vatican Library, 5951. IX wiek, P, Codex Parisinus, National Library, 7928. X wiek. Kopię manuskryptu florenckiego wykonał w XV wieku Niccolò Niccolou, florencki badacz greckich i łacińskich tekstów starożytnych. Wykonana przez niego kopia stała się podstawą do zapisu, który sporządził Niccolò Fonta dla Franciscusa Saxettusa (Francesco Sassettiego), włoskiego bankiera, który był jednocześnie kolekcjonerem manuskryptów. W gromadzeniu kolekcji pomagał mu brat Niccolò, Bartholomeus Fontius (Bartolomeo della Fonte), humanista, poeta i tłumacz. Bartholomeus poprawił i opisał kopię wykonaną przez brata, korzystając z wersji oryginalnej manuskryptu pochodzącej z IX wieku. Skorygowaną przez siebie kopię wykorzystał w 1478 roku do wydrukowania *De medicina* przez Nicolausa Laurentii (Niccolò di Lorenzo), znanego także jako Niccolò Todesco (Mikołaj z Niemiec). W swoim liście dedykującym Sassettiemu wydrukowane dzieło napisał: «Celsus, uprzednio nędzny i zdeformowany, jest teraz odnowiony i przywrócony niemal do swego pier-

nemu Zachodowi pełniejszy obraz medycyny greckiej i przyczyniły się jednocześnie do rozkwitu medycznej szkoły w Salerno²⁸. Medyczne teksty Galena i Awicenny tłumaczył również Gerard z Cremony (1114-1187) oraz Burgundio z Pizy (XII wiek), który przetłumaczył *De complexionibus* Galena bezpośrednio z języka greckiego.

Jednym z najbardziej znaczących tłumaczy dzieł Galena na łacinę był Niccolò di Deoprepio da Reggio. Lynn Thorndike wysunęła hipotezę, jakoby Niccolò tłumaczył uzupełnienia niedokończonych dzieł Galena lub niekompletne teksty przetłumaczone już na język arabski. Podała przykład pochodzącego z XII wieku tłumaczenia łacińskiego *De juvamentis membrorum*, które było faktycznie tłumaczeniem skróconej wersji arabskiej. Dzieło to zostało przetłumaczone później przez Niccolò i ukazało się w 1317 roku pod tytułem *De utilitate specificum*²⁹.

Tłumaczenia jego szybko zyskały uznanie, jednak nie zastąpiły tłumaczeń poprzedników, które nadal były cytowane i regularnie wykorzystywane przez lekarzy późnego średniowiecza. Mimo że wiele tekstów przetłumaczonych przez Niccolò zachowało się tylko w jednym egzemplarzu, to włączenie ich do kompilacji renesansowych doprowadziło do zwiększenia nakładu tekstów, których grecki oryginał został w niektórych przypadkach zagubiony.

4. Wydania dzieł Galena

Pierwsze wydanie dzieł Galena³⁰, z 1525 roku, w Wenecji w oficynie Aldo Manucjusza³¹ według Vivian Nuttona zostało przygotowane pod kierunkiem Giovanniego Baptisty Opizzoniego, profesora medycyny na Uniwersytecie w Pawii (1485-1532). W większości do edycji wykorzystano rękopisy, które, jak to określił Nutton, „prawie wszystkie zostały odkry-

wotnego wyglądu, i za to daję ci największy kredyt»” (J. Krajewska, „*Artifex medicinae*”, czyli o Celsusie i „*De Medicina*”, „*Saeculum Christianum*” 26 (2019) s. 11-12).

²⁸ Por. M. Stefan, *Christianity*, w: <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Constantine-the-African> (dostęp: 23.04.2021).

²⁹ Zob. L. Thorndike, *Translations of works of Galen from the Greek by N. da R. (ca. 1308-1345)*, „*Byzantina Metabyzantina*” 1 (1946) s. 213-235.

³⁰ Zob. V. Mani, *Die griechische Editio „princeps” des Galenos (1525), ihre Entstehung und ihre Wirkung*, „*Gesnerus*” 13 (1956) s. 29-52.

³¹ Aldo Manucjusz (łac. *Aldus Manutius*) odegrał fundamentalną rolę w upowszechnianiu literatury greckiej na Półwyspie Apenińskim. W 1494 roku Manucjusz otworzył drukarnię w Wenecji.

te w promieniu kilku kilometrów wokół Rialto”³². Tak zredagowany (bez tłumaczenia) tekst grecki wypełnił wydawcy pięć tomów folio. Niestety, wydanie to jest obarczone dużą ilością błędów typograficznych i pominięć nawet kilku słów w akapicie³³.

Konkurencje wydanie Andréasa Cratandera w Bazylei z 1538 roku, mimo wszechstronnego zespołu redakcyjnego, który zgromadził Leonhard Fuchs (1501-1566), odpowiedzialny za przygotowanie wydania profesor medycyny w Tybindze, również nie uniknęło wielu pomyłek. Niestety, znajduje się w nim niewiele poprawek w stosunku do wydania Aldo Mancjusza, a przy odwoływaniu się do rękopisów nie uzupełniono żadnego istotnego pominięcia³⁴.

W XVII wieku została wydana trzynastotomowa grecko-łacińska wersja *Hippocratis Coi et Claudii Galeni Pergameni archiatron opera*. René Chartier, wydając dzieła Galena w 1639 roku, twierdził, że jest ono kompletne, korzystał bowiem z wielu wypożyczonych rękopisów z głównych bibliotek europejskich³⁵. Niestety, zmiany w stosunku do poprzednich dwóch wydań są niewielkie³⁶.

W latach 1650-1820 pisma Galena cały czas znajdowały się w programie nauczania każdego lekarza, a każda biblioteka uważała za konieczne posiadanie ich w swoich zasobach. Starsze wydania były zawsze w obiegu, tym bardziej, że wiek XVII i XVIII to okres kwestionowania dziedzictwa galenowego, co spowodowało wstrzymanie liczby publikacji poświęconych lekarzowi z Pergamonu i wydawania jego dzieł. Pojedyncze lub zbiorowe prace i komentarze Galena tłumaczone między 1650 a 1820 rokiem były często wydawane pojedynczo i w ramach zapotrzebowania na opracowanie jakiegoś medycznego problemu. Dopiero w XIX wieku, szczególnie w przypadku prac Victora Daremberga, historyka medycyny, lekarza i tłumacza dzieł Hippokratesa i Galena, ponownie wzrosło zainteresowanie medycyną galenową, tym razem traktowaną już jako przedmiot badań

³² Por. V. Nutton, *John Caius and the manuscripts of Galen*, „Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society” 13 (1987) s. 40-41.

³³ Edycja *princeps* jest pierwszym drukowanym wydaniem dzieła, które wcześniej istniało tylko w rękopisach i mogło być rozpowszechniane dopiero po skopiowaniu ręcznym.

³⁴ Zob. J. Jouanna – V. Budon-Millot, *Présentation du projet d'édition de Galien dans la Collection des Universités de France*, „Bulletin de l'Association Guillaume Budé” 2 (1993) s. 102.

³⁵ Por. J. Kollesch, *René Chartier, Herausgeber und Falscher der Werke Galens*, „Klio” 48 (1967) s. 185.

³⁶ Jouanna – Budon-Millot, *Présentation du projet d'édition de Galien*, s. 103.

i studiów, a nie nauczania obowiązkowego w programie studiów medycznych. We wstępie do pierwszego tomu dzieł medycznych i filozoficznych Galena Daremberg wyjaśnił, że trudno jest zrozumieć dawne teksty naukowe, a tym bardziej je przetłumaczyć. Argumentował problem zainteresowaniem starożytnymi tekstami medycznymi przede wszystkim wśród lekarzy, redagowaniem przez nich tekstów i do użytku innych lekarzy. W tych wymuszonych takim zapotrzebowaniem warunkach zastosowanie krytycznych metod filologii klasycznej zostało poważnie ograniczone.

W latach 1821-1833 Karl Gottlob Kühn, niemiecki lekarz i historyk medycyny z Lipska (1754-1840) opublikował 122 pisma Galena. Edycja składała się z greckiego tekstu oraz łacińskiego przekładu. Do XX wieku było to najbardziej kompletne wydanie dzieł Galena i, jak zauważyli Jacques Juanna i Veonique Boudon-Millot, mimo że wydawca twierdził, że będzie się opierało tylko na rękopisach, tekst jest bardzo często taki sam jak w wydaniu Chartiera. Co więcej, tłumaczenia łacińskie proponowane pod tekstem greckim, zapożyczone z różnych poprzednich wydań, bardzo często nie odpowiadają tekstowi greckiemu, który mają tłumaczyć³⁷.

W opinii wspomnianego już Daremberga wydanie Kühna „[...] odtwarza, ogólnie rzecz biorąc, tekst Chartiera ze wszystkimi jego wadami [...]”³⁸. Mimo tych wad na stronie *Corpus Medicorum Graecorum* (CMG) znajduje się informacja, że „Jeśli chodzi o Galena, wydanie Kühna jest dzisiaj, pomimo swoich niedociągnięć, nadal w dużej mierze pełnym wydaniem”³⁹.

Od końca XIX wieku wydanie Kühna jest powoli zastępowane wydaniami filologicznymi traktatów. W 1899 roku traktaty ukazały się w serii Teubnera, *Galenī scripta minora*, a od 1905 roku – w *Corpus Medicorum Graecorum*.

Redaktorzy starożytnego korpusu medycznego napotykali na trudności przy jego tworzeniu ze względu na to, że na świecie jest stosunkowo niewiele filologów klasycznych i historyków posiadających wiedzę niezbędną do redagowania tekstów medycznych. *Corpus Medicorum Graecorum* jest pierwszym projektem, który doskonale poradził sobie z problemem, zakładając z góry interdyscyplinarną współpracę naukową przy współredagowaniu tekstów. Od samego początku zamiarem twórców CMG było, aby teksty źródłowe docierały dla czytelników nieposiadających znajomo-

³⁷ Jouanna – Budon-Millot, *Présentation du projet d'édition de Galien*, s. 103.

³⁸ Por. Ch. Daremberg, *Wstęp*, w: *Oeuvres d'Oribase*, Paris 1851, s. XXII.

³⁹ Zob. *Task of the Project. Galen of Pergamum: The Transmission, Interpretation and Completion of Ancient Medicine*, w: <http://cmg.bbaw.de/project-office> (dostęp: 27.02.2021).

ści języków, w których zostały napisane. Podjęto decyzję o publikowaniu tekstów wraz z tłumaczeniami w językach niemieckim, angielskim, francuskim i włoskim i tym samym umożliwiono dostęp do starożytnych tekstów medycznych (przede wszystkim Galena) możliwie największej grupie potencjalnych czytelników.

Korpus Galena jest zdecydowanie największym zbiorem zachowanych pism jednego greckiego autora. Niestety, w przeciwieństwie do innych starożytnych tekstów medycznych znaczna część dorobku Galena nie została jeszcze opublikowana w wydaniach krytycznych.

5. Autobibliografia Galena

Większość dzieł Galena zwiera elementy autobiograficzne, ale kilka traktatów jest wyłącznie skoncentrowanych na jego własnych pismach i karierze. Pod koniec II wieku po Chrystusie napisał dwie bibliografie własnych pism: *Περὶ τῶν ἰδίων βιβλίων* (łac. *De Libris propriis*) i zachowaną tylko fragmentarycznie *Περὶ τῆς τάξεως τῶν ἰδίων βιβλίων πρὸς Εὐγενιανόν* (łac. *De ordine librorum suorum liber*). Są to prawdopodobnie pierwsze prace autobiograficzne i najstarsze bibliografie ze zbioru biblioteki aleksandryjskiej sporządzonego przez Kallimachosa⁴⁰, uważanego za pierwszy w historii katalog biblioteczny.

De Libris propriis powstało, jak to sam napisał, aby spośród dzieł krążących pod jego nazwiskiem wymienić tylko dzieła jego autorstwa, ponieważ „[...] moje książki są wydawane przez ludzi pod ich nazwiskami”. Tłumaczył, dlaczego na rynku księgarskim w Cesarstwie Rzymskim krążyło wiele fałszywych traktatów medycznych jemu przypisywanych. Wymienił swoje autentyczne dzieła z krótkim opisem każdego z nich, wraz z informacją, do kogo jest adresowane. Na księgę składają się również informacje dotyczące jego dzieciństwa, dwóch okresów jego życia w Rzymie, pożaru, jaki miał miejsce w Świątyni Pokoju w Rzymie w 192 roku po Chrystusie. *De Libris propriis* stanowi bardzo istotne źródło dla poznania historii starożytnej filozofii i medycyny ze względu na zawarte w nim tytuły i streszczenia wielu utraconych dzieł własnych, słynnych poprzedników Galena, a także

⁴⁰ Według Rudolfa Bluma podzielił autorów na klasy, uporządkował autorów według klas alfabetycznie, dodał do nazwiska każdego autora (w miarę możliwości dane biograficzne, wymienił pod nazwiskiem autora tytuły jego prac, zacytował również słowa rozpoczynające tekst danego autora, podał liczbę wierszy tekstu). Zob. R. Blum, *Kallimachos. The Alexandrian Library and the Origins of Bibliography*, Wisconsin 1991, s. 152.

mu współczesnych filozofów i lekarzy. Traktat *De ordine librorum suorum ad Eugenianum* jest jednym z najczęściej cytowanych dzieł Galena i dotyczy kolejności, w jakiej kandydat na lekarza powinien czytać jego księgi⁴¹.

Iwan Von Müller w przedmowie do swojego wydania z 1893 roku wspomnianych ksiąg przyznał, że rękopis *Ambrosianus graecus 659*, na którym pracował, miał wiele braków i zachowały się na nim tylko fragmenty ksiąg⁴². Faktycznie kilka bezspornie autorskich tekstów nie jest wymienionych przez Galena. Jedną z przyczyn może być fakt, że powstały już po napisaniu *De Libris propriis*, ewentualnie Galen sam z nieznanymi powodów zrezygnował ze wzmiankowania o nich.

Luki w tekście zostały uzupełnione przez Véronique Boudon-Millot w: *Galien: Introduction générale; Sur l'ordre de ses propres livres; Sur ses propres livres; Que l'excellent médecin est aussi philosophe* dzięki tłumaczeniu na język arabski Ḥunaina ibn Ishāq'a z rękopisu datowanego na IX wiek oraz manuskryptowi *Vlatadon 14* odkrytego przypadkowo przez Antoine'a Pietrobellogo w greckim klasztorze w 2005 roku. Odkryty manuskrypt zawiera cztery pozycje z nowym tekstem Galena, w tym dwie bardzo istotne dla ksiąg autobiograficznych, które zdaniem Paula Singera doskonale wypełniają te luki⁴³. Są to: (1) pełny grecki tekst dzieła, które było dostępne w języku greckim tylko w niewielkiej części, która prawdopodobnie pochodziła z tłumaczenia arabsko-łacińskiego i grecko-łacińskiego *De Libris propriis* i *De ordine librorum suorum ad Eugenianum* oraz (2) dodatkowa wersja greckiego tekstu dwóch istniejących już dzieł znanego wcześniej greckiego rękopisu *De Libris propriis* i *De ordine librorum suorum ad Eugenianum*.

Z tekstu księgi *De ordine librorum suorum ad Eugenianum*: „Charakter i liczba ich propozycji są zapisane w każdej pracy indywidualnej i zostaną wyjaśnione w pracy, w której podam pełną listę moich książek”⁴⁴ wynika, że powstała wcześniej niż księga *De Libris propriis*. Jest to prawdopodobne przy założeniu, że tłumaczony tekst grecki nie jest tekstem wtórnym oryginału greckiego.

⁴¹ Por. I.V. Prolygina, *Galen. On my own books*, „Scholē” 11/2 (2017) s. 636-677; Pacewicz, *Galen o naturze wiedzy medycznej*, s. 119.

⁴² Zob. I. Müller, *Claudii Galeni Pergameni Scripta minora*, t. 2, Leipzig 1891, s. LVI.

⁴³ P.N. Singer, *Note on MS Vlatadon 14: a Summary of the Main Findings and Problems*, w: *Galen's Treatise Περὶ Ἀλμπίας (De indolentia) in Context*, Leiden – Boston, s. 23.

⁴⁴ τὴν γραφὴν ποιήσομαι (‘sporządzą pisemną relację’) odnosi się do Galena. Forma futurum (indicativus futuri medii – ποιήσομαι) czasownika ποιέω wskazuje, że dzieło *De libris propriis liber* jest chronologicznie późniejsze. Por. przypis 126.

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10. Przekład⁴⁵

[Galen wyjaśnia potrzebę sporządzenia podręcznika porządkującego jego dzieła]⁴⁶

[s. 49] 1. Masz rację, Eugeniosie⁴⁷, wskazując na potrzebę jakiegoś podręcznika⁴⁸, który objaśniłby porządek moich ksiąg. Albowiem nie

⁴⁵ Przekładu dokonano z greckiego tekstu krytycznego *Claudii Galeni opera omnia*, t. XIX, ed. C.G. Kühn, Leipzig – Knobloch 1821, s. 49-61. Uzupełniono brakujące fragmenty tekstu greckiego o tekst zachowany tylko w języku arabskim z: *Ḥunan ibn Ishāq on His Galen Translation*, ed. J.C. Lamoreaux, Provo 2016 oraz wydaniem *Ḥunan ibn Ishāq’a (Über die syrischen und arabischen Galen-Übersetzungen*, ed. G. Bergsträsser, Leipzig 1925).

⁴⁶ Tam, gdzie w tłumaczeniu nie podano tytułu łacińskiego oraz wydania, Galen wspomina swoje dzieła, które są trudne lub niemożliwe do identyfikacji. Tytuły rozdziałów stanowią uzupełnienie sporządzone według wydania: Galen, *Three Treatises: On the order of My Own Books*, ed. E. Hayes – S. Nimis, Warwick 2014, s. 82-109.

⁴⁷ ὦ Εὐγενιανέ/ὁ Εὐγενιανός, również w formie ὁ Εὐγενηανός – adresat tego dzieła, bliżej niezany, jest wspominany głównie w *De Methodi medendi* Galena. *Ḥunan ibn Ishāq*, opisując dzieło Galena pt. *O metodach terapeutycznych* (arab. *Kitāb Ḥīlat al-bur’*, gr. Θεραπευτικὴ μέθοδος, łac. *Methodo medendi*, w: *Claudii Galeni opera omnia*, t. 10, ed. C.G. Kühn, s. 1-1021) wspomina Eugenianosa. Por. *Ḥunan ibn Ishāq on His Galen Translation*, ed. J.C. Lamoreaux – G. Kessel, Provo 2016, § 22, s. 34 (tekst ang.) i s. 35 (tekst arab): „Sporządził to dzieło w czterdziestu *maqālāt* (artykułach/tomach). [...] Napisał sześć *maqālāt* dla człowieka imieniem Hieron (arab. الیارن) [...]. Następnie Hieron zmarł, a Galen nie skończył tej książki. Podczas gdy tak wyglądały sprawy, Eugenianus zapytał go czy może dokończyć książkę. Ten [Galen] następnie napisał dla niego [Eugenianusa] osiem *maqālāt*”. Słowa *Ḥunan ibn Ishāq*, odnoszące się do Eugenianosa, pochodzą z przedmowy do księgi VII *Methodo medendi*, gdzie Galen wyjaśnia dokończenie swojej pracy. Por. Galen, *Methodo medendi*, s. 456: „[Dzieła] *Metody Terapeutyczne*, o [mój] przyjacielu Eugenianiosie (Τῆν θεραπευτικὴν μέθοδον, ὦ Εὐγενιανέ φίλτατε), niegdyś umiłowanemu Hieronowi (Ἰέρωνι χαριζόμενος) podjąłem się sporządzić. Jednakże, po jego śmierci, o której w niedawnym czasie się dowiedziałem, i ja odłożyłem napisanie jej”.

⁴⁸ Βιβλίον/τό βιβλίον – w znaczeniu podstawowym ‘księga, dokument, zwój’. W niniejszym tłumaczeniu termin oddany jako „podręcznik”.

wszystkie mają ten sam cel, funkcje lub temat przewodni⁴⁹. Jak wiecie, niektóre zostały napisane na prośbę przyjaciół i są dostosowane wyłącznie do ich konkretnego poziomu⁵⁰. Inne zaś były skierowane dla młodych początkujących [adeptów medycyny]. [s. 50] W żadnym przypadku nie było moim zamiarem przekazanie ich lub zachowanie dla potomności, ponieważ zauważyłem, że nawet książki napisane w poprzednich epokach⁵¹ są rozumiane przez bardzo małą liczbę osób. Lekarze i filozofowie są [przedmiotem] podziwu dla innych lekarzy i filozofów bez zapoznania się z ich doktrynami i bez praktykowania tej samej logicznej metody, która pozwoliłaby im oddzielić fałszywe argumenty od prawdziwych. Jest tak, ponieważ ich nauczyciele, przyjaciele lub [też] jakaś osoba, która zyskała zwolenników w ich mieście, okazała się empirykiem, dogmatykiem lub metodykiem⁵². Podobnie jest z sektami filozoficznymi⁵³. Zatem niegdyś istniało wiele powodów, dla których jeden człowiek został platonikiem, drugi – stoikiem lub zwolennikiem Epikura. Ale obecnie w każdej sekcji są tylko następcy⁵⁴, w ten sam sposób wielu ludzi po prostu nazywa siebie na cześć sekty, w której się wychowali, zwłaszcza ludzie, którzy nie potrafią wymyślić żadnej innej podstawy dla swojego podejścia do życia.

[Znaczenie logicznej demonstracji w dążeniu do prawdy]

Już dawno zdałem sobie sprawę, że gdyby same Muzy napisały jakąś książkę, [s. 51] nie zyskałaby ona większej renomy niż wyrażone na piśmie⁵⁵ [pamflety] kompletnych głupców⁵⁶, nigdy więc nie miałem ambicji, aby moje prace były komentowane przez ludzi. Ponieważ jednak, jak wiadomo, były szeroko rozpowszechniane wbrew mojej woli, byłem bardzo niespokojny o pomysł dawania⁵⁷ moim przyjaciołom pisemnej wersjii któregośkolwiek z pozostałych⁵⁸ [moich pism]. Mając to wszystko na uwa-

⁴⁹ Tekst grecki: οὔτε γὰρ εἰς αὐτῶν ἀπάντων ὁ σκοπὸς οὔτε δύναμις οὔτ' ἐπαγγελία.

⁵⁰ Tekst grecki: τῆς ἐκείνων μόνον ἔξωστος στοχαζόμενα. Dosłownie 'skierowany wyłącznie na ich stan umysłu'.

⁵¹ τῶ μετ' ἐμὲ χρόνῳ – 'w czasach przede mną'.

⁵² Galen wspomina tutaj o trzech głównych szkołach praktykowania medycyny.

⁵³ τῆς αἰρέσεως/ἢ αἵρεσις. Por. H.G. Liddell – R. Scott – H.S., Jones, *A Greek and English Lexicon*, Oxford 1940, s. 41.

⁵⁴ διαδοχαί/ἢ διαδοχή. Por. Liddell – Scott – Jones, *A Greek and English Lexicon*, s. 41.

⁵⁵ γεγραμμένων.

⁵⁶ τοῖς ἀμαθεστάτοις/ἀμαθῆς – inne tłumaczenie 'ignorant'. Por. Liddell – Scott – Jones, *A Greek and English Lexicon*, s. 76.

⁵⁷ τὸ διδόναι – 'o dawanie', Por. Liddell – Scott – Jones, *A Greek and English Lexicon*, s. 422-423.

⁵⁸ Tekst grecki: τι τοῦ λοιποῦ – 'czegośkolwiek z pozostałych'.

dze, poczułem się nawet zmuszony napisać książkę *O najlepszej sekcie*⁵⁹ – nie takiej, jaką napisało wcześniej wielu lekarzy i filozofów, w której wychwalają po imieniu własną sektę, ale dają tylko niejasne wskazanie na temat faktyczny sposób, w jaki powinna zostać utworzona najlepsza sekta w medycynie lub w jakiegokolwiek innej sztuce. W pracy tej stwierdziłem i pokazałem powyższą tezę, że trzeba zrozumieć logiczne argumenty, zanim zostanie się wiarygodnym sędzią sekt. Jednak ten wymóg nie jest sam w sobie wystarczający. Konieczne jest także uwolnienie się od uczucia, które często powoduje ślepą miłość lub nienawiść do sekty. Tylko ten, kto jest pozbawiony takiego uczucia, ten, kto jest skłonny również zastosować metodę naukową, aby znaleźć dla siebie prawdę lub [s. 52] osądzić wypowiedzi innych, będzie w stanie odkryć najlepszą sektę.

[Większość lekarzy i filozofów stawia na logiczną demonstrację]

Sam wiesz, że większość lekarzy i filozofów na egzaminach nie ma przygotowania [metodycznego]. Ich praktyki są całkowicie sprzeczne. Inni po prostu zaprzeczają istnieniu metody demonstracji. Inni to przyznają, ale dodają, że jest to naturalnie oczywiste dla każdego, co całkowicie eliminuje potrzebę edukacji lub kształcenia. Nie ma argumentów przeciwko tak skrajnej głupocie. A jednak niektóre z tych osób mają niezwykle zaufanie do swoich umiejętności wypowiedzenia się na temat mistrzów, których są ignorantami. Powie niewątpliwie, że to ja jestem arogancki. Cóż zatem, aby uniknąć takich epitetów i uniknąć odwzajemniania ich wobec innych, postanowiłem nie publikować żadnej księgi.

[Punkt wyjścia dla prac Galena]

Jednak te książki, które przekazałem przyjaciołom, przechodziły przez wiele [rąk] i z tego względu zostałem zmuszony, aby napisać również [dzieło] *O najlepszej sekcie*⁶⁰, a powód jej powstania podany został w samej treści utworu. Ten kto zdecyduje się przeczytać najpierw tą moją pracę, dobrze uczyni. A jeśli ponad to jest przekonany przez jej argumenty do tego stopnia, że zapragnie stać się ekspertem w dziedzinie logiki [s. 53], zanim zwróci się do zrozumienia i osądzania wszystkich sekt, ma do dyspozycji moją główną pracę o tej tematyce – *O demonstracji logiki*⁶¹. A jeśli nauczy

⁵⁹ περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης αἰρέσεως, περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης αἰρέσεως – być może chodzi tu o dzieło *De optima secta ad Thrasybulum* (gr. Πρὸς Θρασύβουλον περὶ ἀρίστης αἰρέσεως). Por. Galen, *De optima secta ad Thrasybulum, Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia*, t. 1, ed. C.G. Kühn, Lipsiae 1821, s. 106-223.

⁶⁰ τὴν ἀρίστην αἴρεσιν.

⁶¹ τὴν περὶ ἀποδείξεως – o próbach rekonstrukcji tego dzieła, zob. M. Ullmann, *Die Medizin im Islam*, w: *Handbuch der Orientalistik, Abteilung I*, Leiden – Boston 1970, s. 62-63.

się ustalonych tam metod, a także wyćwicz się ich w nich, będzie w stanie dowiedzieć się prawdy w każdym przedmiocie dociekań, to znaczy, że jest miłośnikiem prawdy, a nie kimś, kto godzi się z opinią przez jakieś irracjonalne uczucie, niczym zwolennicy wyścigów różnych barw [na hipodromie]. W kontekście powyższego argumentu osoba taka byłaby w stanie rozróżnić pomiędzy prawdziwym a fałszywym założeniem innej osoby.

[Różnica między prawdą a prawidłową opinią]

2. To jest zatem punkt wyjścia dla moich prac i [jest] to dla wszystkich, którzy są z natury inteligentni i oddani prawdzie. Niezależnie od tego, czy ktoś odnosi się z szacunkiem do mojego życia i wykonywanej sztuki [medycznej] (być może ktoś ocalony z zarazy)⁶², ktoś, kto zdał sobie sprawę, że natura mojej duszy jest taka, że wszystkie moje działania są wykonywane bez wrogości, rywalizacji czy irracjonalnej miłości do sekt, [ten], który zdaje sobie ponadto sprawę, że fakty sztuki świadczą o prawdziwości moich [s. 54] opinii – taka osoba będzie mogła czerpać pożytek z moich pism nawet bez teorii logicznej, choć tylko na tyle, na ile uzyska prawidłowy pogląd, ale nie tak dokładną znajomość faktów, [która jest] dostępna tylko dla osób praktykujących logikę. Prawidłowa opinia została całkiem bezstronnie charakteryzowana przez starożytnych jako równa wartości wiedzy w kontekście praktycznym, ale brakowało jej stabilnego, wiarygodnego charakteru⁶³. Ten typ osoby niech rozpocznie od przeczytania moich prac „dla początkujących”: odnosi się do *O sektach*⁶⁴ (co właściwie nosi tytuł *O Sektach dla początkujących*)⁶⁵, *O pulsie* (podobnie zatytułowany [dla początkujących])⁶⁶ i trzecie *O kościach dla początkujących*⁶⁷, które jest pierwszym moim [pismem] o anatomii. Ten, kto jest zainteresowany kontynuowaniem tego [zagadnienia],

⁶² *τάχα ἐπ’ αὐτῶν τῶν νοσοῦντων* – ten fragment występuje jedynie w edycji Kühna.

⁶³ Ostatni fragment odnosi się do różnic pomiędzy stanowczą (mocną) opinią, rzetelną wiedzą, która jest oparta na zrozumieniu podstawowych zasad, a opinią, która akurat okazała się być poprawna. Zob. P.N. Singer, *Galen, Selected works, The Worlds Classic*, Oxford – New York 2001, s. 403, przyp. 25.

⁶⁴ Tytuł grecki: *περὶ τῶν αἰρέσεων*.

⁶⁵ Galen, *De sectis ad eos qui introducuntur*, w: *Claudi Galeni Opera Omnia* t. 1, ed. C.G. Kühn, Lipsiae 1821, s. 64-105. W tym traktacie Galen wymienia i opisuje szkoły medyczne starożytnej Grecji: Dogmatykówdogmatyków, Empiryków empiryków i Metodykówmetodyków.

⁶⁶ Tytuł grecki *περὶ χρείας σφυγμῶν τοῖς εἰσαγομένοις*. Zob. Galen, *De pulsibus ad tirones*, w: *Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia*, t. 8, ed. C.G. Kühn, Lipsiae 1821, s. 453-492.

⁶⁷ Dotyczy dzieła: *περὶ τῶν ὀστέων τοῖς εἰσαγομένοις*. Por. Galen, *De ossibus ad tirones*, w: *Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia*, t. 2, ed. C.G. Kühn, Lipsiae 1821, s. 732-738.

powinien zapoznać się przede wszystkim z [dziełem] *O procedurach anatomicznych*⁶⁸. Praca ta zawiera instrukcje dotyczące części ciała, które są widoczne podczas sekcji, ich wielkości, pozycji, budowy, formacji [s. 55] i wzajemnych relacji. Po nauczaniu się obserwacji tych części w sekcjach, należy następnie poznać ich działania, [to znaczy] te rzeczy odnoszące się do ich natury, które zostały omówione w trzech tomach zatytułowanych *O naturalnych zdolnościach*⁶⁹ oraz w tych [pismach], które znane są jako *O duszach*⁷⁰, jak również w kilku innych. Na ich czele znajduje się *O anatomii zwłok*⁷¹, po którym następują dwa inne [pisma]

⁶⁸ Tytuł grecki: *ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνατομικῶν ἐγχειρήσεων*. Galen, *De anatomicis Administrationibus*, t. 2, ks. I-IX, ed. C.G. Kühn, Lipsiae 1821, s. 215-731. Księgi od IX-XV zachowały się jedynie w języku arabskim. Pełna edycja znajduje się w: Galen, *Sieben Bücher Anatomie des Galen, zum Ersten Male Veröffentlicht, übersetzung des 9 Jahre N.*, t. 1-2, tł. M. Simon, Leipzig 1906.

⁶⁹ Tytuł grecki: *περὶ φυσικῶν δυνάμεων*. Galen, *De facultatibus naturalibus*, w: *Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia*, t. 2, ed. C.G. Kühn, Lipsiae 1825, s. 1-214. Jest dzieło traktujące o fizjologii. Galen wyjaśnia w nim ruch substancji w organizmie. Przeciwstawia się w nim teorii „mechanistycznej”, a bazuje na kategoriach zdolności organów pod względem „zdolności” i „mocy” organizmu w przemieszczaniu substancji. Por. P.N. Singer, *Galen, Selected works*, s. 403, przyp. 25.

⁷⁰ τὰς ψυχικὰς δ' ὀνομαζομένας – fraza ta dotyczy traktatu: Galen *Quod animi mores corporis temperamenta sequantur*, w: *Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia*, t. 4, ed. C.G. Kühn, Lipsiae 1821, s. 767-822. Tytuł grecki: *τι ταῖς τοῦ σώματος κράσεσιν αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεις ἔπονται*.

⁷¹ Traktat *περὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τῶν τεθνεώτων ἀνατομῆς* (łac. *De anatomia mortuorum*) nie zachował się w języku greckim. Cytuje je ar-Rāzī w swoim *Kitāb al-Hāwī fī al-ṭibb* (por. M. Ullmann, *Die Medizin im Islam*, s. 53, nr 74). Ḥunan ibn Ishāq wzmiankuje je jako *Księga o anatomii martwych zwierząt (Kitāb Taṣriḥ al-ḥayawān al-maiyit)*. Ḥunan ibn Ishāq *on His Galen Translation*, § 28, s. 44 i 45: „(1) Ta książka również składa się z jednego *maqāla*. (2) [Galen] opisuje w nim, czego można się nauczyć z sekcji martwych zwierząt, to znaczy rzeczy które tam [w ich ciałach] są. (3) [Pierwszy] przetłumaczył ją Hiob. (4) Ja przetłumaczyłem ją na nowo, na [język] syryjski, razem z poprzednią książką. Ḥubaysh przełożył ją na [język] arabski dla Abū Ğafara”. Kiedy Ḥunan wspomina, że przetłumaczył ją wraz z poprzednią książką (punkt 2), ma prawdopodobnie na myśli dzieło *De anatomia dissentione*. Wynikałoby to z układu, w jakim podaje dzieła Galena w swoim *Pinax* (tj. katalogu przetłumaczonych na język arabski przez Ḥunana ibn Ishāqa dzieł Galena). W punkcie 3 Ḥunan mówi o Hiobie (Job) z Edessy (zmarły około 835 roku po Chrystusie). Ḥubaysh ibn al-Ḥasan al-A'sam al-Dimashqī (IX wiek po Chrystusie) to siostrzeniec i uczeń Ḥunana ibn Ishāqa. Abū Ğafar (wymieniany w punkcie 4) to Abu Ğafar Muḥammed ibn Mūsā (zmarły w 873 roku po Chrystusie), był patronem wielu przekładów dzieł greckich, min. tych dokonanych przez Ḥunana, który dedykuje mu wiele swoich pism.

*O sekcji żywych zwierząt*⁷² oraz dwie inne *O niezgodności w anatomii*⁷³. Po nich są trzy książki *O ruchu klatki piersiowej i płucu*⁷⁴. [Następnie] dwie *O przyczynach oddychania*⁷⁵ oraz cztery [księgi] *O głosie*⁷⁶. Książki *O ruchach mięśni*⁷⁷ również należą to tego rodzaju. Zasada dowodzenia i wszelkie inne pytania dotyczące każdego działania wywodzącego się z natur fizycznych lub duchowych są omówione w kilkutomowym dziele

⁷² Dotyczy traktatu τὰ <περὶ> τῆς ἐπὶ τῶν ζώντων (łac. *De anatomia vivorum*). Częściowe wzmianki i cytaty tego dzieła znajdują się w tekstach arabskich medyków. Por. Ullmann, *Die Medizin im Islam*, s. 54. Ḥunan ibn Ishāq wymienia je w swoim *Pinax* (zestawieniu dzieł Galena) jako *Księga o anatomii żywych zwierząt* (*Kitāb Taṣrīḥ al-haiyā. Ḥunan ibn Ishāq on His Galen Translation*, § 28, s. 44-45): „(1) [Galen] skomponował tę książkę w dwóch *maqālāt*. (2) Opisał w nim, czego można się nauczyć z sekcji martwych zwierząt oraz jakiego rodzaju są to rzeczy. (3) Również Hiob ją przetłumaczył. (4) Ḥubaysh przełożył ją na [język] arabski dla Abū Ğafara.

⁷³ Dotyczy traktatu Galena τὰ περὶ τῆς ἀνατομικῆς διαφωνίας (łac. *De anatomia dissentione*). Więcej na temat tego traktatu, zob. F. Sezgin, *Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums*, t. 3: *Medizin-Pharmazie-Zoologie-Tierheilkunde bis ca 430 H.*, Leiden 1970, s. 133. Zobacz również: R. Degen, *Galen im Sirishen: Eine Überschrift über die siri-sche Überlieferung der Werke Galen*, w: *Galen: Problems and Prospects*, red. V. Nutton, London 1981, s. 157. Z tym dziełem zapoznać można się jedynie na podstawie krótkich tekstów u pisarzy arabskich. Ḥunan ibn Ishāq wzmiankuje je pod tym samym tytułem jak grecki, czyli *Księga o różnicach w anatomii*. Por. *Ḥunan ibn Ishāq on His Galen Translation*, § 27, s. 44 i 45: „(1) [Galen] skomponował tę książkę w dwóch *maqālāt*. (2) Jego celem jest zaprezentowanie różnicy zdań wcześniejszych mistrzów (*‘aṣḥāb*) anatomii (*at-taṣrīḥi*), jakie można znaleźć w książkach anatomicznych (*at-taṣrīḥ*), które były [prezentowane] w słowie (*fī al-kalām*), a które w treści [tzn. merytoryczne – *fī al-ma‘nā*], oraz czym były podyktowane. (3) Przetłumaczył ją <Hiob z Edessy>. Poprawiłem to [tłumaczenie] i ponownie przełożyłem na język syryjski dla Yuhannā ibn Māsawayha i tak sporządziłem poprawione wydanie. Ḥubaysh przełożył je na [język] arabski dla Abū Ğafara”. Yuhannā ibn Māsawayh, o którym wspomina Ḥunan, związany z Akademią w Gundiszapur żył w latach 777-857.

⁷⁴ Tytuł grecki: *περὶ θώρακος καὶ πνεύμονος <κινήσεως>*. [Galen], *De motu thoracis et pulmonis*, w: *Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia*, t. 18, ed. C.G. Kühn, Lipsiae 1822, s. 727-741.

⁷⁵ Tytuł grecki: *περὶ τῶν τῆς ἀναπνοῆς αἰτίων*. Galen, *De usu respirationis*, w: *Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia*, t. 4, ed. C.G. Kühn, Lipsiae 1822, s. 470-511.

⁷⁶ *περὶ φωνῆς* – łac. *De voce*. Edycja tego dzieła: Galen, „*Über die Stimme*” *Testimonien d. verlorenen Schrift Peri phōnēs, Pseudo-Galen de voce et hanelitu. Kommentar*, ed. H. Baumgarten, Göttingen 1963. Ḥunan ibn Ishāq opisuje je jako dzieło niesłusznie przypisywane Galenowi. Por. *Ḥunan ibn Ishāq on His Galen Translation*, § 35, s. 50-51.

⁷⁷ *τὰ περὶ μῶν κινήσεως* – Galen sporządził kilka prac na ten temat.

zatytułowanym *Opinie Hipokratesa i Platona*⁷⁸. Do tej kategorii badań należą także traktaty poświęcone *Spermie*⁷⁹ i książki *O Anatomii [według] Hipokratesa* oraz wszystkie dzieła *O używaniu części ciała*⁸⁰.

[Książki o czterech elementach i ich mieszaninach]

Zasadami powstawania wszystkich istot posiadających materię są cztery żywioły⁸¹, które mają taką naturę, że ulegają ze sobą całkowitemu zmieszaniu i wzajemnie na siebie oddziałują. Temat ten jest omawiany w pierwszej książce *O nazwach medycznych*⁸² oraz *O elementach według Hippokratesa*⁸³.

⁷⁸ Tytuł grecki: *Ἱπποκράτους καὶ Πλάτωνος δογμάτων*. Galen, *De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis*, w: *Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia*, t. 5, ed. C.G. Kühn, Lipsiae 1825, s. 181-805.

⁷⁹ Tytuł grecki traktatu: *τὰ περὶ σπέρματος*. [Galen] *De semine*, w: *Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia*, t. 4, C.G. Kühn, Lipsiae 1822, s. 512-651.

⁸⁰ *οἷς ἄπασιν ἢ περὶ χρείας μοριῶν ἔπεται πραγματεία* jest dziełem, które jest trudne do zidentyfikowania. Zob. więcej: Galen, *Three Treatises: On the order of My Own Books*, ed. E. Hayes – S. Nimis, Warwick 2014, s. 96. Prawdopodobnie dotyczy największego dzieła Galena z zakresu anatomii, jakim jest: [Galen] *De usu partium*, w: *Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia*, t. 3, C.G. Kühn, Lipsiae 1822, s. 1-939 oraz t. 4, Lipsiae 1822, s. 1-336. (gr. *Περὶ χρείας τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώπων σώματι μοριῶν*).

⁸¹ *τὰ τέτταρα στοιχεῖα* – „to cztery podstawowe elementy”.

⁸² Tytuł grecki: *περὶ τῶν <ιατρικῶν> ὀνομάτων*. Galen, *De nominibus medicis*. Traktat zachował się jedynie w języku arabskim: *Galen über die medizinischen namen, arabisch und deutsch*, w: *Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin*, ed. M. Meyerhof – J. Schacht, Berlin 1931. Hunan ibn Ishāq wzmiankuje to dzieło jako *O nazwach medycznych*, arabskie *Kitāb al-Asmā at-ṭibbīya*. Hunan ibn Ishāq on His Galen Translation, § 124, s. 116, 117: „(1) Ta książka składa z pięciu *maqālāt* (ksiąg). (2) Jego celem jest wyjaśnienie nazw, których używali lekarze, i w jakim sensie ich używali. (3) Jej kopia po grecku znajduje się wśród moich ksiąg, ale ani ja, ani nikt inny jej nie przetłumaczył. (4) Później przetłumaczyłem na język syryjski trzy *maqālāt*. (5) Ḥubaysh przełożył na język arabski jeden *maqāla*”.

⁸³ Dotyczy traktatu *Περὶ τῶν καθ' Ἱπποκράτην στοιχείων*. Por. Galen, *De elementis ex Hippocratis sententia*, w: *Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia*, t. 1, ed. C.G. Kühn, Lipsiae 1821, s. 413-508. Hunan ibn Ishāq wzmiankuje je jako *Kitāba fī al-Uṣṭaqssāt 'alā ra'y Abuqrāt*. Dzieło to składa się z jednego *maqāla*. Celem jest zaprezentowanie, że wszystkie substancje służące do powstawania i rozkładu (ciała zwierząt, roślin oraz substancji znajdujących się w ziemi oraz minerałów) składają się jedynie z czterech elementów: wody, ziemi, powietrza i ognia. Te elementy mają być podstawowe, rozumiane jako najmniejsze elementy, które tworzą ciało człowieka i wszystkich innych urodzonych zwierząt (narodzonych istot żywych). One właśnie mają być czterema podstawowymi humorami (krwią, flegmą oraz dwoma rodzajami żółci). Według Hunana dzieło to należy przeczytać przed przystąpieniem do lektury *O metodach terapeutycznych*. Jako pierwszy z greckiego na język syryjski przełożył je Sergius (Sergiusz) z Rēsha'ina. Następnie doczekało się ono poprawionego przekładu samego Hunana ibn Ishāqa na syryjski, następnie przekładu na język arabski. Por. *Hunan ibn*

Rzeczywista demonstracja dotycząca elementów nie pojawia się w całości w tym dziele, co ogranicza się raczej do tej jego części, z której korzystał Hippokrates. Dla doskonalszego zrozumienia elementów ciała należy sięgnąć do trzynastego rozdziału *Demonstracji logicznej*⁸⁴ oraz do piątej i szóstej księgi *O opiniach Asklepiadesa*⁸⁵. W rzeczywistości pewne kwestie dotyczące siły środków przeczyszczających⁸⁶ [s. 56] pojawiają się także w *O elementach według Hippokratesa*, mimo że temat ten jest omówiony w osobnej monografii. Po *O elementach według Hippokratesa* następują trzy księgi *O mieszaninach*⁸⁷ oraz te <trzy> główne prace *O właściwościach prostych leków*⁸⁸, po którym na-

Ishāq on His Galen Translation, § 13, s. 20, 21. Edycja tego dzieła w języku arabskim, wraz ze wstępem i omówieniem: *An Epitome of Galen's On the Elements ascribed to Hunan ibn Ishāq*, ed. G. Bos – T. Langermann, w: *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 25 (2015), s. 33-78. Zobacz również: Ullmann, *Die Medizin im Islam*, s. 38-39.

⁸⁴ Więcej na temat tego traktatu: *Hunan ibn Ishāq on His Galen Translation*, § 126, s. 116, 117; Ullmann, *Die Medizin im Islam*, s. 51; Degen, *Galen im Sirischen: Eine Überschrift über die sirische Überlieferung der Werke Galen*, s. 153.

⁸⁵ περί τῶν Ἀσκληπιάδου δογμάτων. Wzmianka na ten temat znajduje się u Hunana ibn Ishāqa w § 115. Fragment ten nie posiada tytułu. Wydawca wyodrębnił go z dzieła dotyczącego terminologii używanej przez Hippokratesa. Por. Galen, *De captionibus penes dictionem*, w: *Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia*, t. 14, C.G. Kühn, Lipsiae 1827, s. 582-598 (grecki tytuł *Περὶ τῶν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν σοφισμάτων*; *Hunan ibn Ishāq on His Galen Translation*, § 113, s. 110 i 111), którego stanowi część odnoszącą się do osoby Asklepiadesa. *Hunan ibn Ishāq on His Galen Translation*, § 115, s. 110 i 111: „Jeśli chodzi o książki, które jak powiedział, napisał na wzór Asklepiadesa, znalazłem tylko jedną, małą, o której teraz wspomnę”. Dzieło Asklepiadesa, o którym wspomina Hunan ibn Ishāq, dotyczy zagadnienia substancji/esencji – *ḡawhar*) oraz duszy/ducha/tchnienia (*nafs*). Dzieło to nosi tytuł: *K. fī ḡawhar al-nafs mā hiya 'alā ra'y Asqalībiyādas*. Por. *Hunan ibn Ishāq on His Galen Translation*, § 116, s. 112 i 113: „Przełożyłem tę księgę (*maqālāt*) na język syryjski dla Ğibrila ibn Buḥtīshū. Byłem wtedy młody i nie jestem pewien co do jego dokładności, zresztą przetłumaczyłem ją z jednej niedokładnej kopii”.

⁸⁶ Grecki tytuł dzieła: *περὶ τῆς τῶν καθαιρόντων φαρμάκων δυνάμεως*. [Galen] *De purgantium medicamentorum facultate*, w: *Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia*, t. 11, C.G. Kühn, s. 323-342.

⁸⁷ Dotyczy traktatu z zakresu prognostyki chorób: Galen, *De temperamentis*, w: *Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia*, t. 1, ed. C.G. Kühn, Lipsiae 1821, s. 509-694 (grecki tytuł *περὶ κράσεων*). Hunan ibn Ishāq wymienia je jako *K. al-Buḥrān*, które jest zawarte w trzech *maqālāt*. Por. *Hunan ibn Ishāq on His Galen Translation*, § 20, s. 32 i 33.

⁸⁸ ἢ περὶ τῆς τῶν ἀπλῶν φαρμάκων δυνάμεως, łac. *De simplicium medicamentorum temperamentis et facultatibus* (gr. *Περὶ κράσεως καὶ δυνάμεως τῶν ἀπλῶν φαρμάκων*), t. 11, ed. C.G. Kühn, Lipsiae 1826, s. 379-892 oraz t. 12, Lipsiae 1826, s. 1-377. Hunan ibn Ishāq wymienia to dzieło *K. al-Adwaya al-basiṭa*. Por. *Hunan ibn Ishāq on His Galen Translation*, § 56, s. 66-68.

stępuje *O kompozycji leków*⁸⁹. W pierwszej księdze <*O mieszaninach*> opisano <mieszanki> u istot żywych wraz ze szczególnym wskazaniem każdej z nich. Trzecia książka natomiast zawiera omówienie mieszaniny leków. Zatem najlepszą kolejnością do przeczytania jest: *O poznaniu najlepszej budowy ciała*⁹⁰, *O dobrej kondycji*⁹¹ oraz *O nieregularnym stanie równowagi mieszanin*⁹², albo po pierwszych dwóch księgach [*O mieszaninach*], albo po wszystkich trzech. Są to trzy bardzo krótkie książki skomponowane dla przyjaciół na ich prośbę, a następnie przez nich opublikowane. Obecnie ich funkcja jest zawarta w dużej pracy *O kwestiach zdrowia*, gdzie są [zaprezentowane] poszczególne stany naszego zdrowia [*lacuna*]⁹³.

⁸⁹ ἡ περὶ συνθέσεως φαρμάκων można odnieść do dwóch znanych dzieł Galena: (1) łac. *De compositione medicamentorum secundum locos*, w: *Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia*, t. 12, ed. C.G. Kühn, Lipsiae 1826, s. 378-1007 (tytuł grecki Περὶ συνθέσεως φαρμάκων τῶν κατὰ τόπους) oraz (2) Galen, *De compositione medicamentorum per genera*, w: *Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia*, ed. C.G. Kühn, Lipsiae 1827, s. 362-1058 (gr. Περὶ συνθέσεως φαρμάκων τῶν κατὰ γένη). Dzieło nr 2 posiada przekład na język arabski. Por. Ullmann, *Die Medizin im Islam*, s. 48-49, nr. 50. Por. Ḥunan ibn Ishāq on His Galen Translation, § 84, s. 86-88 i 87-89.

⁹⁰ *De optima corporis nostri constitutione*, w: *Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia*, t. 4, ed. C.G. Kühn, Lipsiae 1822, s. 737-749 (gr. Περὶ ἀρίστης κατασκευῆς τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν). Ḥunan ibn Ishāq wspomina to dzieło jako *K. al-badan al-aḏī fī afdal hai'āt*. Relacjonuje, że dzieło to składa się z jednego *maqāla*, a cel tego pisma jasno wynika z tytułu. Por. Ḥunan ibn Ishāq on His Galen Translation, § 54, s. 64, 65.

⁹¹ Galen, *De bono habitu*, w: *Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia*, t. 4, ed. C.G. Kühn, Lipsiae 1822 (gr. Περὶ εὐεξίας). Ḥunan ibn Ishāq wymienia jako *K. fī Ḥiṣb al-badan*. Por. Ḥunan ibn Ishāq on His Galen Translation, § 55, s. 64 i 65.

⁹² τὸ περὶ ἀνωμάλου δυσκρασίας – Galen, *De inaequali intemperie*, w: *Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia*, t. 7, ed. C.G. Kühn, Lipsiae 1823, s. 753-752 (gr. Περὶ ἀνωμάλου δυσκρασίας). Ḥunan ibn Ishāq wymienia jako *K. sū' al-mizāğ al-muḥtalif*. Relacjonuje, że składa się z jednego *maqāla*, a tytuł oddaje tematykę poruszaną w tym dziele. Następnie opisuje zawartość oraz historię problemu związane z zdobyciem tego dzieła. Por. Ḥunan ibn Ishāq on His Galen Translation, § 55, s. 66, 67: „(2) [...] to znaczy opisał, jakie rodzaje złej mieszaniny [złego humoru lub temperamentu – *saw' al-mizāğ*] są jednakowo [obecne] w całym ciele i tendencję, jakim każdy z nich jest scharakteryzowany, i jakie różnorodne (*muḥtalif*) złe mieszaniny (*saw' al-mizāğ*) obecne w części (*'a'dā'*) ciała. (3) [Dzieło to] przetłumaczył Hiob [z Edessy]. (4) Posiadałem jej kopię w języku greckim, lecz nie miałem czasu na przełożenie jej. (5) Później dokonałem jej przekładu na język arabski dla Abū al-Ḥasana Aḥmad ibn Mūsā”. Abū al-Ḥasana Aḥmad ibn Mūsā żył w IX wieku ery chrześcijańskiej.

⁹³ W tym miejscu występuje luka w tekście [*lacuna*] κατασκευῆς ***. Luka ta wymaga pewnych uzupełnień dla zobrazowań możliwych strat tekstu. (I) Edycja tekstu Galena według Boudon-Millota (V. Boudon-Millot, *Galien: Introduction générale; Sur*

3. [*lacuna*] to, czy wyjaśnienie⁹⁴ to jest poprawne, czy też nie, wobec tego, kto został wcześniej wyszkolony w naszych pismach. Do niektórych prac Hippokratesa istnieją nawet moje komentarze. [s. 57] Są to te, które napisałem do tej pory. [Lecz] spróbuję uzupełnić to, co pozostało, jeśli tylko będę żył. Jeśli umrę, zanim skomentuję najważniejsze traktaty Hippokratesa, ci, którzy chcą poznać jego poglądy, mogą zapoznać się z moimi głównymi dziełami. A jak zostało powiedziane wyżej, również z ukończonymi dotychczas komentarzami, a także wśród poprzednich komentatorów Hippokratesa prace mojego nauczyciela Pelopsa i jeśli to możliwe Numisianusa, [których] zachowało się bardzo niewiele. A ponad to dzieła Sabinusa oraz Rufusa z Efezu⁹⁵. Kwintus i jego zwolennicy nie zro-

l'ordre de ses propres livres; Sur ses propres livres; Que l'excellent médecin est aussi philosophe, Paris 2007) proponuje, aby dokonać uzupełnienia następującymi tekstami Galena o *Terapeutyce*. W *De libris propriis liber* jednak Galen wspomina wiele innych dzieł dotyczących tej tematyki. Można tutaj wspomnieć dzieła w *Claudii Galeni Opera Omnia* jak: (1) *De differentiis febrium* (Περὶ διαφορᾶς πυρετῶν), t. 7, s. 272-405. (2) *De symptomatum causis*, *Claudii Galeni opera omnia*, t. 7, s. 43-105. (3) *De differentiis morborum*, t. 6, s. 836-880. (4) *De tumoribus praeter naturam*, t. 7, s. 705-732. (5) *In Hippocratis De natura hominis commentaria*, t. 15, s. 1-223. (II) Z grupy pism o tej tematyce, może również zaliczyć takie pisma, jak (1) Galeni, *De venesectione adversus Erasistratum*, t. 11, s. 147-186; *De curandi ratione per venae sectionem*, t. 11, s. 250-316. (2) *De urinis*, t. 19, s. 574-601; (2a) *De urinis compendium*, t. 19, s. 602-608; (2b) *De urinis ex Hippocrate, Galeno aliisque quibusdam*, t. 6, s. 609-628. (3) Dzieło Asklepiadesa o substancji duszy (por. wyżej). (4) *De sectis, ad eos qui introducuntur*, t. 1, s. 64-105. Innym rodzajem dzieł są pisma o naturze nauk, które zawierają pewne elementy z zakresu terapii chorób: (1) *De partibus philosophiae Galeni qui fertur De partibus philosophiae libellus*, ed. E. Wellmann, Berlin 1882. (2) *De constitutione artis medicae ad Patrophilum*, t. 1, s. 223-304. (3) *Thrasylbulus sive utrum medicinae sit an gymnasticae hygiene*, t. 5, s. 806-898. (4) *Ars medica*, t. 1, s. 305-412. (III) Prace dotyczące *semoityki* (znaków) chorób: (1) *De diebus decretoriis*, t. 9, s. 769-941. (2) *De pulsuum differentiis*, t. 8, s. 493-765. (3a) *De pulsibus ad tirones*, t. 8, s. 453-492 oraz w pewnym zakresie pozostałe pisma Galena o pulsie. (4) Pisma Galena o diagnozie. (IV) Pisma obejmujące niektóre komentarze do dzieł Hippokratesa: (1) Zob. Ullmann, *Die Medizin im Islam*, s. 54, nr. 76. (2) *O elementach według Hippokratesa* (por. wyżej). Na temat uzupełnień w tej luce, patrz: Galen, *Three Treatises: On the order of My Own Books*, ed. E. Hayes – S. Nimis, s. 114.

⁹⁴ (3) *** τῶν ἐξηγήσεων [*lacuna*]. Od tego momentu jest kontynuowany tekst Galena.

⁹⁵ Spośród wymienionych tutaj imion: Numisianus (ὁ Νομισιανός), Sabinus (ὁ Σαβίνος) oraz Rufus z Efezu (żył na przełomie I i II wieku po Chrystusie) tylko ten ostatni może być badany na podstawie swoich własnych dzieł. Jednakże nie jest znane żadne jego oddzielne dzieło z zakresu komentarza do pism Hippokratesa. Por. Galen, *Selected works*, s. 404, przyp. 27. Jednakże należy zwrócić uwagę, że Rufus powoływał się wielokrotnie w swoich pracach na autorytet Hippokratesa, przytaczając jego metody terapii różnych

zumieli poprawnie Hippokratesa i z tego powodu popełniają wiele błędów w wyjaśnieniach. Tymczasem Lykus faktycznie skrytykował Hippokratesa i oskarżył tego człowieka o błędy, nie rozumiejąc go. Ale wszystkie dzieła Lykusa zostały ujawnione⁹⁶. Mój nauczyciel Satyrus, u którego studiowałem, zanim przeniosłem się do Pelopsa, nie przedstawił takich samych wykładów tekstu Hippokratesa, jak Lykus. [s. 58] I ogólnie zgodził się, że Satyrus zachowuje doktrynę Kwintusa najdokładniej, bez dodawania do nich lub usuwania z nich [niczego]. Z drugiej strony Aifikanus⁹⁷ nadał im nieco stoicką postawę. Miałem dwa różne doświadczenia: najpierw usłyszałem interpretację Kwintusa od Satyrusa, a potem, jakiś czas później, przeczytałem niektóre dzieła Lykusa. Przekonałem się o błędnej interpretacji ich obu. Zwolennicy Sabinusa i Rufusa mają lepsze zrozumienie [zagadnień Hippokratesa]. Ale każdy, kto wykształcił się w moich pismach, będzie mógł również ocenić ich prace i dowiedzieć się, jakie są poprawne ich stwierdzenia, a także [zobaczyć] wszelkie błędy, które mogli popełnić.

[Pozostałe teksty z dziedziny logiki, dla zainteresowanych filozofią]

4. Lecz wystarczy już o komentarzu do Hippokratesa. Przejdźmy do pozostałej części moich pism na temat logiki. Wśród nich, Eugeniusie, [są] książki *O dowodzeniu logicznym*⁹⁸, [które] powinny wystarczyć tobie i każdemu, kogo interesuje tylko medycyna. Ci, którzy chcą spędzić czas na studiowaniu filozofii, powinni przeczytać także inne prace. Jest to dopuszczalne, by ktoś [s. 59] był w stanie oddać słuszność zarówno studiom medycyny, jak i filozofii. Ale taka osoba musiałaby być obdarzona bystrym intelektem, dobrą pamięcią i chęcią do ciężkiej pracy. Poza tym musiałby mieć takie samo szczęście jak ja, kiedy to otrzymałem od ojca wykształce-

schorzeń w zestawieniu z własnymi spostrzeżeniami. Dla przykładu można tutaj podać komentarz do dzieła Hippokratesa *De aëre aquis et locis* zawarty w piśmie Rufusa *Quaestiones medicinales*. Por. H. Gärtner, *Rufus von Ephesos. Die Fragen des Arztes an den Kranken*, w: *Corpus medicorum Graecorum suppl. 4*, Berlin 1962, s. 24-46. Zobacz również teksty w języku syryjski i język arabski. Zobacz więcej na ten temat: Ullmann, *Die Medizin im Islam*, s. 71-76. *Epitome* Rufusa z Efezu w języku syryjskim: [Rufus z Efezu] *Die syrischen Fragmente des Rufus von Ephesos*, ed. M. Wernhard, München 1972. Fragmenty arabskie: Rufus von Ephesos, *Krankenjournalale*, ed. M. Ullmann, Weisbaden 1978.

⁹⁶ W zdaniu tym występuje luka, którą trudno uwypuklić w przekładzie polskim, nie zaburzając sensu zdania (καίτοι τὰ γε τοῦ Λύκου βιβλία φανερώς πάντα [...] γέγονεν).

⁹⁷ ὁ Αἰφικιανός.

⁹⁸ <τὰ> περὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως αὐτάρκτη, *Galenī Institutio logica*, ed. K. Kalbfleisch, Leipzig 1896. Ullmann, *Die Medizin im Islam*, s. 51, 63. G. Fichtner, *Corpus Galenicum: Verzeichnis der galenischen und pseudogalenischen Schriften*, Tübingen 2004, s. 138. Zobacz także: *Ḥuman ibn Ishāq on His Galen Translation*, § 117 oraz § 126, s. 116-118 i s. 117-119.

nie. Mój ojciec sam był kompetentny w dziedzinie matematyki, arytmetyki i gramatyki⁹⁹ i wychował mnie w tych, a także w innych przedmiotach niezbędnych do kształcenia młodzieży. W moim piętnastym roku [życia] poprowadził mnie w kierunku dialektyki, z myślą o mojej koncentracji wyłącznie na filozofii. W [moim] w siedemnastym roku życia przekonały go jasne sny, abym jednocześnie studiował medycynę i filozofię. A jednak nawet mając takie wielkie szczęście i fakt, że byłem w stanie nauczyć się wszystkiego, czego mnie nauczono, dogłębniej i szybciej niż ktokolwiek inny, i tak nie uzyskałbym bardzo niewielkiego zrozumienia, gdybym nie poświęcił całego życia kultywowaniu medycyny i filozofii. Nic więc dziwnego, że zdecydowana większość ludzi studiujących zarówno medycynę, jak i filozofię nie osiąga niczego dobrego: albo [s. 60] brakuje im odpowiednich naturalnych zdolności lub niezbędnego wykształcenia, albo porzucają studia na rzecz działalności politycznej.

Cóż, pozwólmy sobie na tym zakończyć tę dygresję, która w rzeczywistości jest bardzo istotna. Moje prace filozoficzne należy zatem przeczytać po traktacie *O demonstracji logicznej*. Charakter i liczba ich propozycji są zapisane w każdej pracy indywidualnej i zostaną wyjaśnione¹⁰⁰ w pracy, w której podam pełną listę moich książek.

[Słowniki i inne książki Galena na temat języka]

Teraz słyszałeś również ode mnie o moim dużym słowniku, w którym wymienione są w porządku alfabetycznym słowa używane przez attyckich pisarzy prozaików. Dobrze będzie powtórzyć tutaj odpowiedź, której udzieliłem wcześniej. Albowiem jest jasne, że wielu innych jest zainteresowanych poznaniem argumentów [zawartych we wspomnianym dziele]. Nie podzielam opinii niektórych dzisiejszych pisarzy, którzy domagają się w języku uniwersalnego attycyzmu¹⁰¹, niezależnie od tego, czy człowiek jest leka-

⁹⁹ γραμματικός – ‘gramatycznej poprawności’. W tym wypadku chodzi również o wychowanie wczesnoszkolne, a nie jedynie o podstawy nauki alfabetu, pisanie i czytania. Por. Galen: *Selected works*, s. 404, przyp. 27.

¹⁰⁰ τὴν γραφὴν ποιήσομαι – ‘sporządzą pisemną relację’, odnosząc się do Galena. Forma futurum (indicativus futuri medii – ποιήσομαι) czasownika ποιέω wskazuje, że dzieło *De libris propriis liber* jest chronologicznie późniejsze.

¹⁰¹ ἅπαντας ἀττικίζειν τῇ φωνῇ [...]. Galen ma tu na grecki język ponaddialektalny, który był używany na terenie całego *Imperium Romanum* w formie tak zwanej greki *koine* przez warstwy wykształcone. *Koine*, czyli mowa wspólna, pospolita, wyparła klasyczną grekę. Attycyzm był tendencją retoryczną, która z czasem przeobraziła się w dążenie do mówienia językiem attyckim (IV wiek przed Chrystusem). Attycyzm związany był z najlepszym okresem rozwoju ateńskiej prozy literackiej (Demostenes czy Platon). Galen słusznie zatem wskazuje, że taki język byłby niedorzecznością w przypadku trak-

rzem, filozofem, geometrą, muzykiem, prawnikiem, czy też żadnym z powyższych, a jedynie bogaczem z dużymi środkami, albo po prostu jest dobrze zaopatrzony. [s. 61] Wręcz przeciwnie, uważam za niegodne obwinianie lub potępienie tych, którzy dopuszczają się solecyzmu [językowego]¹⁰². Albowiem solecyzm i barbarzyństwo życia są znacznie gorsze¹⁰³ niż sam język. I napisałem kiedyś traktat przeciwko tym, którzy potępiają sprawców solecyzmu językowego – na razie nie uważam attycyzmu za część prawidłowej edukacji. Było to spowodowane liczbą lekarzy i filozofów, którzy nadali nowe znaczenie greckim słowom [*lacuna*]¹⁰⁴, z tego powodu skomentowałem słowa, które zebrałem w czterdziestu sześciu książkach prozaików attyckich oraz jeszcze innych komedii. Praca ta jest, jak wyjaśniłem, napisana ze względu na wskazanie znaczenia [nowych słów]¹⁰⁵. Jednocześnie czytelnik zdobywa znajomość znaczenia słownictwa attyckiego, chociaż nie jest to wielka wartość sama w sobie. Jednak ze względu na tych, którzy źle używają słów, skomponowałem kolejną pracę, dotyczącą ich poprawności, właściwie utwór, który byłby najlepszy [do przeczytania] przed wszystkimi.

Z języka greckiego przetłumaczyli,
komentarzem i przypisami opatrzyli
Łukasz Karczewski, Judyta Krajewska¹⁰⁶

tatów naukowych. Por. Galen, *Selected works*, s. 404, przyp. 28. Jej pierwszym teoretykiem i propagatorem był Cecyliusz z Kaleakte (żył w czasach Oktawiana Augusta). Por. *Attycyzm*, w: R. Kulesza, *Słownik kultury antycznej*, Warszawa 2012, s. 82; *Cecyliusz*, w: R. Kulesza, *Słownik kultury antycznej*, Warszawa 2012, s. 104.

¹⁰² τῶν σολοικιζόντων τῆ φωνῆ [...] – σολοικίζω (*soloikidzo*). Łączenie ze sobą poprawnych wyrazów w błędnie zbudowaną składnię językową.

¹⁰³ Tekst grecki: ἄμεινον γάρ ἐστι τῆ φωνῆ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ βίῳ σολοικίζειν τε καὶ βαρβαρίζειν / ἄμεινον [...] σολοικίζειν – infinitivus epxegeticum σολοικίζειν po ἄμεινον – ‘lepiej jest popełniać solecyzm [językowy]’.

¹⁰⁴ Luka w tekście od: ἐν τούτοις ἑτέροις ***, [*lacuna*] do: διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων [...].

¹⁰⁵ Można też oddać jako: διὰ τὰ σημανόμενα – ‘ze względu na (nowe) znaczenie słów’, mając na uwadze słowa Galena o nadaniu, przez przedstawicieli pewnych zawodów, nowych znaczeń dla niektórych terminów.

¹⁰⁶ Mgr Łukasz Karczewski, doktorant w Instytucie Historii na Wydziale Nauk Historycznych Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie; e-mail: karczewski-lukasz@wp.pl; ORCID: 0000-0001-5654-040X. Dr Judyta Krajewska, doktor nauk humanistycznych w zakresie historii, nauczyciel akademicki na Wydziale Nauk Historycznych oraz Wydziale Medycznym Collegium Medicum Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie; e-mail: j.iwanska@uksw.edu.pl; ORCID: 0000-0002-3070-1663.

Piotr z Cluny,
Kazanie o świętym Marcelim, papieżu i męczenniku

(Domnus Petrus Cluniensis Abbas,
Sermo de sancto Marcello papa et martyre)

1. Wstęp do przekładu

Wśród różnego rodzaju pism, jakie pozostawił po sobie Piotr z Cluny (ur. w 1092 lub 1094, zm. natomiast 25 grudnia 1156 roku), dla swoich zasług nazywany Czcigodnym, jeden z fundatorów czy ojców monastycyzmu średniowiecznego, dziewiąty z opatów kluniackich, zaliczany do grona tzw. opatów kluniackich wielkich, kierujący słynną kongregacją benedyktyńską od 22 sierpnia 1122 roku aż do swojej śmierci¹, mamy także

¹ Na temat Piotra z Cluny (najczęstsze łacińskie wersje jego imienia to *Petrus Cluniacensis*, *Petrus Venerabilis*, *Petrus Mauricius*, *Petrus Monboisierius*) zob. m.in. J.M. Marszalska, *Piotr Czcigodny*, EK XV 639; M. Pacaut, *Dzieje Cluny*, tł. A. Ziernicki, red. M.T. Gronowski, ŻM 54, Tyniec – Kraków 2010, s. 289-322; D. Iogna-Prat, *Ład i wykluczenie. Cluny i społeczność chrześcijańska wobec herezji, judaizmu i islamu (100-1150)*, tł. W. Kosiorek, red. M.P. Chojnacki – M.T. Gronowski, Tyniec 2013, s. 171; G.M. Cantarella, *Piotr Czcigodny, klasztory kluniackie w północnych Włoszech – inny aspekt kryzysu monastycyzmu w XII wieku?*, tł. O. Styczeń, w: G.M. Cantarella, „*Comites aulae coelestis*”. *Studia z historii, kultury i duchowości Cluny w średniowieczu*, red. M.T. Gronowski – K. Skwierczyński, ŻM 47, Tyniec 2009, s. 49-107; J.J. Sanford, *Peter the Venerable*, w: *A companion to philosophy in the Middle Ages*, red. J.B. Gracia – T.B. Noone, Oxford 2003, s. 532-533; J. Leclercq, *Pierre le Vénérable*, St. Wandrille 1946; J. Kritzeck, *Peter the Venerable and Islam*, Princeton 1964; J.-P. Torrell – D. Bouthillier, *Pierre le Vénérable, abbé de Cluny. Le courage et la mesure*, Chambray-lès-Tours 1988; J.-P. Torrell – D. Bouthillier, *Pierre le Vénérable et sa vision du monde. Sa vie, son oeuvre: l'homme et le démon*, Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense 42, Leuven 1986.

cztery² kazania³, „przeznaczone – zdaniem Dominique’a Iogna-Prata – do użytku wewnętrznego – to znaczy dla potrzeb liturgicznych *Ecclesia cluniacensis* [...]”⁴. Kazania te to: *De transfiguratione Domini*⁵, *In laudem*

² Stwierdziwszy, że Piotr Czcigodny ułożył cztery kazania, D. Iogna-Prat pisze: „Również dla potrzeb liturgicznych ułożył kazanie i sekwencje maryjne, a także mowę na cześć Hugona z Semur [...]”, w przypisie odnosząc czytelnika do: *Analecta hymnica medii aevi*, red. C. Blume – G.M. Dreves, t. 48, Leipzig 1905, s. 237-239 oraz 240 (opis tomu: *Hymnographi Latini. Lateinische Hymnendichter des Mittelalters*, red. G.M. Dreves, cz. 1); Iogna-Prat, *Ład i wykluczenie*, s. 173. Tymczasem we wskazanym miejscu znajdujemy trzy sekwencje maryjne – wszystkie opatrzone są tym samym tytułem *Prosa de sancta Maria* – oraz sekwencję poświęconą świętemu Hugonowi pt. *Prosa de sancto Hugone*.

³ Łac. *sermones: Petri Venerabilis Abbatis Cluniacensis noni sermones*, PL 189, 953-1006; G. Constable, *Petri Venerabilis sermones tres*, RBen 64 (1954) s. 224-272. Słowo *sermo*, w znaczeniu, w jakim tutaj występuje, ma zakres szeroki: posługiwano się nim w celu oznaczenia „[...] wszelkiego rodzaju kaznodziejstwa, czy to katechetycznego, czy egzegetycznego, czy parenetycznego” (K. Panuś, *Sztuka głoszenia kazań*, Kraków 2008, s. 23). Zob. w tym kontekście: M. Díaz y Díaz, „*Sermo*”. *Sus valores lingüísticos y retóricos*, „*Helmantica*” 11/34-36 (1960) s. 79-101; C. Moussy, *Oratio, sermo, contentio*, w: *Le structures de l’oralité en latin*, red. J. Dangel – C. Moussy, Paris 1996, s. 35-44; S. Roesch, *Le emploi de verbum et sermo dans les expressions a verbe support verba facere, verba habere et sermonem habere*, w: *De Lingua Latina novae quaestiones*, red. C. Moussy, Louvain 2001, s. 859-874; L. Gavoille, *Lettre et „sermo”*, w: *Epistulae antiquae III, actes du IIIe colloque international „L’épistolaire antique et ses prolongements européens” (Tours, 25-27 sept. 2002)*, red. L. Nadjo – E. Gavoille, Louvain 2004, s. 33-52; L. Gavoille, „*Sermo*”, *nom du „texte”*, w: *Autour du lexique latin: Communications faites lors du XIIIe Colloque international de Linguistique latine, Bruxelles, 4 au 9 avril 2005*, red. G. Viré, Brussels 2008, s. 232-243; W.M. Short, *Mercury in the Middle: The Many Meanings of (medius) sermo in Latin*, „*The Classical Journal*” 108/2 (2012/2013) s. 189-217. Zasygnalizowany problem tego, czym był średniowieczny *sermo*, pozostawiając na boku, pojęć „kazanie”, „homilia”, „mowa”, „perora” itp. będziemy tu używać zamiennie.

⁴ Iogna-Prat, *Ład i wykluczenie*, s. 172.

⁵ Edycja ostatnia: Petrus Venerabilis, *Sermo primus. De transfiguratione Domini*, PL 189, 953-972; Migne odnotowuje, że tekst tej perory bierze od Martinusa Marriera i Andreasa Quercetanus: *Bibliotheca Cluniacensis*, Parisiis 1614, c. 1231-1248. Zob. ponadto: K. Stevenson, *The Transfiguration Sermon of Peter the Venerable, Abbot of Cluny*, w: *The Serious Business of Worship*, red. M. Ross – S. Jones, London 2010, s. 78-87. Z kolei 23 czerwca 2021 roku na Katolickim Uniwersytecie Lubelskim Jana Pawła II ks. Dariusz Snochowski, absolwent tamtejszej filologii klasycznej, obronił pracę magisterską, którą poświęcił tejże właśnie Piotrowej mowie: *Petrus Cluniacensis, „Sermo primus. De transfiguratione Domini”*. *Wstęp, przekład, komentarz* (praca powstała pod kierunkiem ks. dr. hab. Tadeusza Gaci, prof. KUL).

*sepulcri Domini*⁶, *De sancto Marcello papa et martyre*⁷ oraz *In veneratione quarumlibet reliquiarum*⁸. Chcąc wyliczyć właśnie owe cztery homilie Piotrowe, François de Rivo, sporządzając w drugiej połowie stulecia XV listę dzieł wszystkich Piotra, którą to listę włączał do żywota tego opata, komponowanego po to, aby zamieścić go w kronice swojego klasztoru⁹, zapisał w tymże wykazie w stosownym miejscu, pozwalając sobie na krótką, a dość uroczą, trzeba jednak przyznać, frazę wartościującą: „Scripsit idem

⁶ Edycja najnowsza: Constable, *Petri Venerabilis sermões tres*, s. 224-272 – tekst kazania o grobie Pańskim znajduje się tam, opatrzony nagłówkiem *Sermo Domni Petri Abbatis Cluniacensis de laude dominici sepulchri*, na s. 232-254. Edycja wcześniejsza, pierwsza: Petrus Venerabilis, *Sermo II. In laudem sepulcri Domini*, PL 189, 973-992; w nocie, którą poprzedza Migne drukowane przez siebie teksty trzech kolejnych kazań Piotra (PL 189, 971-972), zaznacza on, iż teksty te zaczerpnął od Edmunda Martène'a: *Thesaurus Novus Anecdotorum*, t. 5, Parisiis 1717, c. 1418-1452. Kazanie o grobie Pańskim wydaje się być interesujące dlatego, że naświetla, jaki był stosunek Piotra do krucjat i, by tak rzec, ideologii krucjatowej pierwszej połowy XII stulecia. Zob. Constable, *Petri Venerabilis sermões tres*, s. 228.

⁷ Edycja najnowsza: Constable, *Petri Venerabilis sermões tres*, s. 224-272 – tekst kazania o świętym Marcelim pomieszczono, pt. *Incipit sermo Domni Petri Cluniensis Abbatis de sancto Marcello papa et martyre*, na s. 255-265. Edycja wcześniejsza, pierwsza: Petrus Venerabilis, *Sermo III. De sancto Marcello papa et martyre*, PL 189, 993-998.

⁸ Edycja najnowsza: Constable, *Petri Venerabilis sermões tres*, s. 224-272 – tekst kazania ku czci świętych relikwii, noszący tytuł *Sermo cuius supra in honore sancti illius cuius reliquiae sunt in presenti*, mamy tam na s. 265-272. Edycja wcześniejsza, pierwsza: Petrus Venerabilis, *Sermo IV. In veneratione quarumlibet reliquiarum*, PL 189, 998-1006. Możliwe, że chodzi w kazaniu tym o relikwie św. Marcelego. Zob. Constable, *Petri Venerabilis sermões tres*, s. 225, 231. Że homilia ta wygłoszona została ku czci szczątków doczesnych św. Marcelego, przekonany jest natomiast Iogna-Prat, przy czym nie formułuje on żadnych argumentów za taką tezą. Zob. Iogna-Prat, *Lad i wykluczenie*, s. 172. Niezależnie od tego odnośną mowę traktować można jako dokument prezentujący XII-wieczne rozumienie kultu relikwii. Zob. Constable, *Petri Venerabilis sermões tres*, s. 231.

⁹ Tekst tej kroniki mamy w *Bibliotece kluniackiej*: Franciscus de Rivo, *Chronicon aliud Cluniacense, Reverendissimi Patris, Domni Iacobi de Ambasia, Cluniacensis Abbatis iussu conscriptum*, w: *Bibliotheca Cluniacensis*, c. 1627-1687; biografia Piotra (tytuł: *De Petro Venerabili I. Abbate Cluniacensi nono*) wypełnia kolumny 1647-1651 (taż sama biografia – ale pt. *S. Petri Venerabilis Abbatis Cluniacensis vita. Ex „Chronico Cluniacensi”* – umieszczona jest w całości jeszcze w jednym miejscu *Biblioteki kluniackiej*, mianowicie na kolumnach 589-593). Na temat rzezonej kroniki, zob. M.T. Gronowski, *Spór o tradycję. Cluny oczyma swoich i obcych: pomiędzy pochwałą a negacją*, Kraków 2013, s. 41, przyp. 55 oraz – przede wszystkim – D. Riche, *Un témoin de l'historiographie clunisienne à la fin du Moyen Age: le „Chronicon” de François de Rivo*, „Revue Mabillon” 11 (2000) s. 89-114.

Petrus sermones quatuor valde utiles et elegantissimos [...]”¹⁰. Oczywiście, fraza ta jest zapewne przesadzona i nieobiektywna, aczkolwiek przyznajmy, iż w swoim czasie niewątpliwie odzwierciedlać ona musiała, jak postrzegano kaznodziejską twórczość literacką Piotra, tym bardziej, że odnośnie do owych *utilitatis atque elegantiae*, którymi odznaczać się miały w opinii de Rivo homilie Piotrowe, przytoczyć jesteśmy w stanie jedno jeszcze świadectwo, średniowieczne, pochodzące z czasów naszego kluuiaty. Oto bowiem Piotr z Poitiers, sekretarz Piotra Czcigodnego¹¹ – siebie przedstawiając nader skromnie jako „peccator et infirmus monachus”¹² – pisał doń w liście, będącym istnym panegirkiem ku jego czci: „Verum ex quo praefatum codicem vidi, non modo istis, quia parum est, vestram excellentiam praefero, sed et quibusque anteriorum temporum perfectissimis eam comparare non dubito”¹³. Po czym pytał m.in. – rozumie się, że retorycznie: „[Q]uis Cicero pulchrius aut copiosius aliquando quidquam disseruit? [...] [Q]uis rhetoricus ornatior [...]?”¹⁴; i cytował wtóry, jasno i wyraźnie wyświetlający, iż przepowiadanie Piotrowe uznawano ongiś za wielce pożyteczne:

Expergiscimini ergo, vir eloquentissime, et fidelibus conservis doctrinae cibaria, quibus certe cunctis decessoribus vestris plenius abundatis, non solum loquendo, sed etiam scribendo, erogare studete. Ita quippe non nobis solummodo, verum quibusque remotissimis nec praesentibus tantum, sed et futuri temporis Christianis multum prodesse valebitis, si more Patrum vestrorum, prout vobis Spiritus divinus suggererit, in sermonibus, in epistolis diversisque tractatibus, tam praeclari monumenta ingenii posterorum memoriae relinquantis¹⁵.

Otóż na jednym z tych to *sermonum*, w mniemaniu dziejopisa benedyktyńskiego de Rivo, *valde utilium et elegantissimorum*, którym, po

¹⁰ De Rivo, *Chronicon aliud Cluniacense*, c. 1649 (także kolumna 591). Tak do oceny wyrażonej w tym zdaniu ustosunkowuje się Constable: „[...] [I]t may be going too far to assert with the chronicler of Cluny that they are ‘valde utiles et elegantissimos’ [...]” (Constable, *Petri Venerabilis sermones tres*, s. 228).

¹¹ Iogna-Prat, *Ład i wykluczenie*, s. 194, 499, 508; Constable, *Petri Venerabilis sermones tres*, s. 228.

¹² Petrus Pictaviensis, *Epistola ad Petrum Venerabilem*, PL 189, 59.

¹³ Petrus Pictaviensis, *Epistola ad Petrum Venerabilem*, PL 189, 59.

¹⁴ Petrus Pictaviensis, *Epistola ad Petrum Venerabilem*, PL 189, 59-60.

¹⁵ Petrus Pictaviensis, *Epistola ad Petrum Venerabilem*, PL 189, 60.

prawdzie, niewiele poświęca się chyba w piśmiennictwie specjalistycznym uwagi¹⁶, pragniemy się tutaj skoncentrować, to jest na kazaniu hagiograficznym, traktującym o postaci, owszem, historycznej, ale zarazem w jakiś mierze legendarnej, jak to z postaciami jej zamierzchłej epoki bywa, papieża Marcelego (jego pontyfikat – przyjmuje się najczęściej – trwał od listopada/grudnia 306 do 16 stycznia 308 roku)¹⁷. Parafrazując powściągliwą, wyważoną, negatywnie wyrażoną opinię Edmunda Martène’a, pierwszego ich wydawcy, na temat mów Piotra Czcigodnego¹⁸, rzec możemy: bynajmniej nie jest to homilia na polskiej ziemi ujrzenia światła dziennego niegodna, podobnie jak niegodne tego nie są i na to nie zasługują i pozostałe trzy homilie opata kluniackiego dziewiątego¹⁹. Pomijając wszystko inne, winni jesteśmy im pewne zainteresowanie chociażby już z tego powodu, iż są to jedyne kazania, jakie mamy po jednej z najważniejszych osobistości kościelnych i literackich XII wieku²⁰. Odnotujmy tu – ma wszak ów drobiazg jakąś swoją subtelną wymowę, choć może nie ma on większego, by

¹⁶ Prócz wspomnianych w przyp. 5 prac poświęconych kazaniu *De transfiguratione Domini* wskazać można jeszcze studium z 1938 roku, którego autorem był J.J. Hodnett z uniwersytetu w St. Louis, o słownictwie i gramatyce Piotrowych kazań i wierszy. Napomyka o tym studium Constable, *Petri Venerabilis sermones tres*, s. 228.

¹⁷ Na temat papieża Marcelego, zob. np. J.P. Kirsch, *Pope St. Marcellus I*, w: *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, red. C.G. Herbermann *et al.*, t. 9, New York 1910, w: <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09640b.htm> (dostęp: 22.06.2021); E. Caspar, *Die römischen Bischöfe der diokletianischen Verfolgung, Marcellinus und Marcellus*, ZKG 46 (1927) s. 321-333; E.H. Röttges, *Marcellinus – Marcellus: Papstgeschichte der diokletianischen Verfolgungszeit*, ZKTh 78/4 (1956) s. 385-420; A. Amore, *È esistito papa Marcello?*, „Antoniano” 33 (1958) s. 57-75; J.N.D. Kelly, *Marcellus I, St.*, w: J.N.D. Kelly, *The Oxford Dictionary of Popes*, Oxford – New York 1986, s. 25-26; P. Szczur, *Marceli I*, EK XI 1220-1221. Nie potrzeba tu chyba streszczać biografii Marcelego, ponieważ czytelnik zapozna się z nią, z różnymi jej wersjami, dość – można mieć nadzieję – dobrze, oddając się lekturze drukowanego na dalszych stronach kazania wraz z niektórymi z towarzyszących mu w przypisach komentarzy, tymi mianowicie, które do owej biografii się odnoszą, w których przedstawia się pokrótce dyskusje wokół biografii Marcelego toczone.

¹⁸ Oto ta wypowiedź: „Ex quatuor hisce sermonibus unicum *De transfiguratione Domini* habes in *Bibliotheca Cluniacensi*, aliis ab Andrea Duchesne frustra quaesitis, relictos tres publica luce haudquaquam indignos reperimus inter schedas Mabillonii [...]” (E. Martène, *Admonitio in sermones tres sequentes*, PL 189, 971-972).

¹⁹ Por. Constable, *Petri Venerabilis sermones tres*, s. 228: „[...] [I]t seems fair to agree with Dom Martène that they are ‘publica luce haudquaquam indignas’”.

²⁰ Constable, *Petri Venerabilis sermones tres*, s. 228: „They are [...] the only known surviving sermons from the pen of one of the most influential ecclesiastical and literary figures of the twelfth century”.

nie powiedzieć, że żadnego, znaczenia merytorycznego – iż przystępując do przedstawienia *operum* Piotra, Iogna-Prat nimi właśnie prezentację swą otwiera: „Na dzieło Piotra składają się najpierw cztery kazania [...]”²¹.

Niniejsze uwagi na temat perory *De sancto Marcello papa et martyre* zacząć wypada od faktu, że dwa jej teksty, jakie przekazują nam dwie jej edycje – tj. pierwsza, opracowana przez rzeczonoego Martène’a, opublikowana w 1717 roku, którą przedrukował potem, w 1890 roku, w 189. tomie swojej *Patrologii łacińskiej* Jacques Paul Migne, oraz druga, wydana w 1954 roku przez Gilesa Constable’a²² – gdy idzie o objętość, to znacznie się pomiędzy sobą różnią. Tekst Martène’a/Migne’a jest sporo, bo mniej więcej o połowę krótszy od tekstu Constable’a: składają się nań wyłącznie początkowa i końcowa część tekstu ogłoszonego przez Constable’a. Skąd ta różnica?

Owóż – nie wikłając się już w manuskryptowe szczegóły, gdyż nie jest to w tym miejscu konieczne chyba potrzebne²³ – rzecz, co niezmiernie ciekawe, ma swój początek – prawdopodobnie, wszystko bowiem na to wskazuje – w niedopatrzaniu, a być nawet może, że w omyłce, Martène’a. Skoro bowiem badacz ów postanowił włączyć do redagowanego przez się woluminu *Thesaurus Novus Anecdotorum* trzy kazania Piotra, mianowicie *In laudem sepulcri Domini*, *De sancto Marcello papa et martyre* oraz *In veneratione quarumlibet reliquiarum* – homilia *De transfiguratione Domini* od stu lat była już wówczas dostępna w druku²⁴, więc nią się nie zajmował – zdecydować musiał, z jakiego źródła zaczerpnie teksty tychże kazań. Wszak z tego, co sam przyznaje w adnotacji, którą poprzedził swoją edycję²⁵, wynika, że miał dwie możliwości. Boć dysponował dwoma źródłami. Jedno otrzymał wraz z schedą, jaką przypadła mu w udziale po jego nauczycielu i przyjacielu Jeanie Mabillonie, kiedy ten zmarł. Źródło to podawało teksty trzech kazań, którymi zainteresowany był Martène. Co dla naszej opowieści relewantne, w źródle owym Mabillonowym kazanie o Marcelim było w wersji dłuższej. Lecz, jak ustalić zdołał Constable, skrypt tego źródła był mały i zły, a tekst zawierał wiele poprawek i kilka lakun²⁶. Źródło Martène’a drugie stanowił natomiast odpis starego kodeksu kluniackiego, rodzaj homiliarza czy

²¹ Iogna-Prat, *Ład i wykluczenie*, s. 172.

²² Zob. przyp. 7.

²³ Szczegóły te przedstawia obszernie, oczywiście, Constable we wprowadzeniu do swojej edycji kazań Piotrowych: Constable, *Petri Venerabilis sermone tres*, s. 224-228.

²⁴ Zob. przyp. 5.

²⁵ Martène, *Admonitio in sermone tres sequentes*, PL 189, 971-972.

²⁶ Constable, *Petri Venerabilis sermone tres*, s. 225: „The script is small and evil, with many corrections and several lacunae [...]”.

lekcjonarza, w którym znajdowały się różne teksty *officii divini*²⁷. W tym źródle wtórym miał Martène perory Piotra trzecią – a więc Marcelową, naszą – i czwartą, z tym że mowa trzecia była tu w wersji krótszej. Fakt ten wydaje się zrozumiały, ponieważ księga pomieniona zawierała teksty stosowane na liturgii – musiały być to więc teksty przystosowane do kontekstu liturgicznego. Odnośnego skrócenia dokonać mógł albo sam Piotr, albo skryba, kompilator lekcjonarza²⁸. A zatem: jak to się stało, że w *Thesaurus Novo Anecdotorum* mamy homilię Marcelową krótszą? Scenariusz przyjmowany przez Constable'a przedstawia się następująco: tekst homilii *In laudem sepulcri Domini* odesłał Martène do druku w wersji jedynej, jaką w tamtej chwili miał, a więc w wersji ze źródła pierwszego, oracje *De sancto Marcello papa et martyre* oraz *In veneratione quarumlibet reliquiarum* wydrukował natomiast ze źródła swojego drugiego, nadesłanego mu z Cluny, zapominając o porównaniu wersji teksów, jakie w tamtym momencie posiadał, czy też zaniedbując, czy wykonując pośpiesznie, niechlujnie to porównanie albo – bo istnieje i taka możliwość – ze względu na ich niedostatki odrzucając wersje tekstów ze źródła pierwszego, nie spostrzegając, iż homilia *De sancto Marcello papa et martyre* w źródle tym jest znacznie dłuższa od tej samej homilii w źródle drugim²⁹. Tyle *à propos* edycji Martène'a. Łatwo będzie nam teraz odpowiedzieć na postawione pytanie, wyjaśniając, skąd różnica, której zaistnienia przyczyny tu dociekamy. Oto bowiem skonstatować wystarczy to jedno: różnica rzeczona powstała dlatego, że Constable w swojej edycji podaje tekst kazania Marcelowego w tej wersji, którą przedkładało także źródło Martène'owe pierwsze – za manuskryptem z francuskiej Biblioteki Narodowej, któremu przydzielono numer 12410³⁰.

²⁷ Martène, *Admonitio in sermone tres sequentes*, PL 189, 971-972: „[...] [T]ertium uero et quartum in veteri codice Cluniacensi auctoris aetate exarato, in quo lectiones ad nocturnas uigilias recitandae continentur. Hinc colligimus sermone illos olim Cluniaci in divinis officiis decantatos fuisse”.

²⁸ Constable, *Petri Venerabilis sermone tres*, s. 229: „The version in the *Thesaurus Nouus Anecdotorum* omits a large section from the middle; presumably it was abbreviated either by Peter himself, or by the compiler of the lectionary used by Martène, in order to make it more suitable for regular use”.

²⁹ Por. Constable, *Petri Venerabilis sermone tres*, s. 225: „Possibly he sent the copy of the former sermon, for which he had no other manuscript, directly to the printers, whereas the other two he had printed from the superior copies sent to him from Cluny and neglected to collate with the bad copies already in his possession”; „[...] [I]t is not therefore surprising that Martène seems to have failed to notice that these copies contained a different version of the sermons from that which he printed in his *Thesaurus*”.

³⁰ Constable, *Petri Venerabilis sermone tres*, s. 231-232.

Wy tłumaczywszy, oczywiście, pobieżnie tylko, skąd różna objętość zajmującego nas tu tekstu w dwu jego edycjach, a zatem, powiedzieć można, przypatrzwszy się – oględnie – jego stronie zewnętrznej, zajrzeć możemy do jego wnętrza. I tak homilia Piotra z Cluny *De sancto Marcello papa et martyre* okazuje się ciekawą – nasuwa się – z dwóch przynajmniej powodów.

Po pierwsze dlatego, jak stwierdza po wielokroć już tutaj przywoływany XX-wieczny wydawca kazań Piotra Czcigodnego, Constable – co w przypadku wydawcy w ogóle nie zaskakuje – że daje ona wgląd w, by tak rzec, bibliotekę Piotrową; to znaczy: dlatego, że pozwala ona zidentyfikować teksty, na których, redagując ją, dziewiąty opat kluniacki się opierał, z których czerpał³¹. Jakie były to teksty? Po pierwsze, dwa listy, jakie mamy po pontyfikacie papieża Marcelego: jeden, jaki miał on wysłać do biskupów prowincji Antiochia³², i drugi, jaki posłał cesarzowi Maksencjuszowi³³; oba te pisma autor nasz cytuje. Drugim tekstem, który obecny jest w kazaniu Piotra o Marcellim, jest *vita* i *passio* tego świętego papieża. Stwierdzamy to na tej podstawie, iż wplecione przez Piotra do homilii fragmenty owych *vitae et passionis* odpowiadają temu, co znajdujemy w Marcelowym zbiorze pomieszczonym w *Actis Sanctorum*³⁴ – chociaż jest bardzo możliwe,

³¹ Constable, *Petri Venerabilis sermones tres*, s. 229: „This sermon is particularly interesting because it is possible to identify the sources used by Peter in its composition”.

³² Marcellus papa, *Epistola prima. Ad episcopos Anthiochenae provinciae*, PL 7, 1091-1096.

³³ Marcellus papa, *Epistola II. Ad Maxentium tyrannum*, PL 7, 1096-1100.

³⁴ Pierwsze wydanie: *De S. Marcello papa, martyre*, w: *Acta sanctorum. Januarii tomus II*, red. J. Bollandus, Antverpiae 1643, s. 3-14; wydanie drugie: *De S. Marcello papa, martyre*, w: *ASanc II*, s. 367-378. Co składa się na ów materiał Marcelowy pomieszczony w *Actis sanctorum*? Oto spis treści (za wydaniem drugim) – mamy tu pięć jednostek, pięć elementów: (1) nota o świętym – s. 367-369; (2) *Epitome vitae S. Marcelli ex libro de Romanibus Pontificibus* – s. 369; (3) *Epitaphium S. Marcelli auctore S. Damaso Papa* – s. 369; (4) *Acta ex variis veteribus MSS* – s. 369-373 (*acta* te mają pięć rozdziałów: [1] *SS. Cyriaci et Sisinnii comprehensio. S. Aproniani martyrium* – s. 369-370; [2] *SS. Sisinnii, Saturnini, Popiae, Mauri martyrium* – s. 370-371; [3] *Artemiae et Jobiae regiae virgines a daemone per S. Cyriacum liberatae* – s. 371-372; [4] *SS. Cyriaci, Crescentiani, Artemiae, et aliorum caedes. Marcelli constantia* – s. 372-373; [5] *S. Lucinae pietas. Marcelli labores, martyrium* – s. 373); (5) *Alia acta auctore Ursione Abbate Altimontensi ex tribus veteribus MSS* – s. 373-378 (na owe *acta* składają się z kolei prolog i dwie księgi: [1] *Prologus auctoris* – s. 373-374; [2] *Liber I. Acta S. Marcelli* – s. 374-376 [oto tytuły kolejnych rozdziałów: <a> *S. Marcelli opera ac decreta*, *Sanctorum labores. Aproniani martyrium*, <c> *SS. Popiae, Mauri, Cyriaci, etc. Caedes. Marcelli constantia*, <d> *S. Marcelli in catabulo labores, mors*]; [3] *Liber II. Narratio manifestationis et itine-*

że Piotr korzystał z innych wersji owych *vitae et passionis*, dla nas zaginionych. Wreszcie, po trzecie, Piotr włączył do swojej mowy o, jak się liczy, trzydziestej głowie Kościoła katolickiego niemalże cały tekst o tym męczenniku, jaki mamy w *Libro pontificali*³⁵. Zanotujmy, iż Constable nie tylko wskazuje teksty, z których korzystał Piotr przy komponowaniu swej mowy hagiograficznej, ale próbuje także ustalić, które dokładnie manuskrypty leżeć musiały przy jego pulpicie, kiedy nad nią pracował³⁶.

Homilią o świętym Marcelim, która wyszła spod pióra Piotra Kluniackiego, interesować się można, jak wspomniano, z drugiego jeszcze powodu, mianowicie jako świadectwem kultu św. Marcelego w opactwie w Cluny. Gdyby przyjąć – a istnieją przesłanki, które można by wziąć za fundament pod budowę gmachu uzasadnienia dla takiego ruchu – iż w kazaniu *In veneratione quarumlibet reliquiarum* chodzi o relikwie św. Marcelego³⁷, to owo Piotrowe świadectwo kluniackiej czci dla Marcelego byłoby obszerniejsze. Co się tyczy tegoż kultu: otóż wiemy skądinąd, że opactwo w Cluny miało na stanie relikwie św. Marcelego. Miały zostać one przekazane kongregacji kluniackiej 6 stycznia – rok tego przekazu nie jest natomiast znany, na pewno było to przed 1109 rokiem³⁸, w którym to roku opat Hugon, umierając, poprosił, aby okazano mu kapsułę z tymi właśnie relikwiami³⁹. Samorzutnie właściwie pojawia się w tym kontekście pytanie, dlaczego Marcelli. Trudno, szczerze mówiąc, na to pytanie odpowiedzieć. Wcale zresztą nie musi istnieć na to pytanie żadna konkretna, wyraźna odpowiedź: Marcelli to przecież stary i znany święty i być może jego kult trwał w Cluny bez specjalnego jakiegoś powodu – mógł być tam Marcelli czczony po prostu tak jak święty każdy inny. Niewykluczone jednak, że można by wiązać kult Marcelego w kongregacji kluniackiej z przenosina-

ratio S. Marcelli – s. 376-378 [oto tytuły kolejnych rozdziałów: <a> *Reliquiae S. Marcelli diu absconditae*, *Repertae ornataeque reliquiae*, <c> *Miracula ad reliquias facta*, <d> *Reliquiae circumlatae, Sonegias usque*, <e> *Namurcum deportatae reliquiae*]).

³⁵ *Liber Pontificalis. I-XCVI (usque ad annum 772)*, tł. P. Szweczyk – M. Jesiotr, opr. M. Ożóg – H. Pietras, Synodi Collectiones Legum 9, Kraków 2014, s. 55-57.

³⁶ Zob. Constable, *Petri Venerabilis sermones tres*, s. 229-231.

³⁷ Por. Iogna-Prat, *Lad i wykluczenie*, s. 172; zob. także przyp. 8.

³⁸ Constable, *Petri Venerabilis sermones tres*, s. 231.

³⁹ *Vita sanctissimi patris Hugonis abbatis Cluniacensis ab Hildeberto Cenomanensi episcopo conscripta, ms.*, w: *Bibliotheca Cluniacensis*, c. 436: „Poro exiturus ex hac Aegypto Dei famulus, B. Marcelli capsam sibi iubet praesentari, piu lachrymis interpellans advocatu, ut eius conductu, post exilium, patriae redderetur”. Constable zaznacza ostrożnie, że być może chodzi o innego Marcelego: *Petri Venerabilis sermones tres*, s. 231, przyp. 3.

mi jego szczątków w IX wieku, ponieważ, jak pokazuje i poucza historia, przenosiny takie stanowiły zawsze okazję do odnowy kultu danego błogosławionego. Marceli pochowany bowiem został w 308 roku – niektórzy jego zgon datują na 309 rok – na cmentarzu Pryscylli, gdzie spoczywało jego ciało do, najprawdopodobniej, IX wieku, kiedy to pozostałości po nim, aby ochronić je przed najeżdżającymi potencjas Rzym Lombardami, przeniesiono pod ołtarz główny do kościoła św. Sylwestra *in Capite*⁴⁰. Wreszcie byłaby być może do uargumentowania i obrony, nie unieważniając poprzedniej, również taka odpowiedź, najbardziej chyba ryzykowna: dlatego mieli benedyktyni z Cluny nabożeństwo do Marcelego, że podejmowali działalność reformatorską, a więc działalność, o której śmiało można rzec, iż jest kreowaniem, nowym organizowaniem rzeczywistości, w nim, Marcelim, którego postrzegali jako organizatora Kościoła, widząc swojego patrona – patrona zaprowadzania porządku, patrona organizacji i, w konsekwencji, reformy. Za dowód owego patrzenia na Marcelego jako na gospodarza, rządcę czy fundatora Kościoła, właściwego niekoniecznie może jedynie benedyktynom z Cluny, wziąć się z pewnością daje przedkładana niniejszym w polskim tłumaczeniu homilia Piotra.

Gdy chodzi o okoliczności powstania *Sermonis de sancto Marcello papa et martyre*, to zanotujmy tylko krótko: kiedy analizuje się toż kazanie, narzuca się, że pomyślane ono zostało do odczytania czy wygłoszenia w dzień wspomnienia św. Marcelego, czyli 16 stycznia. Wątek śmierci, która jest zarazem narodzinami człowieka dla nieba, dla życia wiecznego, pojawiający się zaraz na jego początku, a potem powracający, jest w nim wszakże dosyć rozbudowany, a poważyc można by się chyba nawet na stwierdzenie, iż stanowi jakby oś całej oracji.

Kończąc związane owo wprowadzenie do lektury, dodajmy jedną jeszcze uwagę: aczkolwiek, jak orzekliśmy za Inga-Pratem, przeznaczona była ona dla potrzeb liturgicznych benedyktyńskiej jedynie społeczności kluniackiej, niewątpliwie czytać daje się homilię *O świętym Marcelim, papieżu i męczenniku* również jako egzemplifikację tego, co nazywamy – by posłużyć się zgrabnym, cokolwiek poetyckim wyrażeniem Jeana Leclercqa – apostołstwem piórem⁴¹. Owo apostołstwo piórem było bowiem ideałem, było programem szeroko w średniowieczu pośród stanu mniszego rozpowszechnionym, ku wypełnieniu, ku zrealizowaniu w swoim życiu którego

⁴⁰ W.J. Reardon, *The Deaths of the Popes. Comprehensive Accounts, Including Funerals, Burial Places and Epitaphs*, Jefferson – London 2004, s. 32.

⁴¹ J. Leclercq, *Miłość nauki a pragnienie Boga*, tł. M. Borkowska, Tyniec – Kraków 1997, s. 150.

dążyć winien był zarówno mnich autor, mnich literat, mnich pisarz, jak i mnich skryba, mnich – szerzej powiedzmy – oddelegowany do pracy pośród ksiąg, zajmujący się księgami. Chodziło o to, aby wszelką pracę przy tekście i książce, aby cały mozół tworzenia – pisania i tworzenia – przepisywania traktować jak aktywność pastoralną, duszpasterską i wykonywać ją z należnym tej aktywności oddaniem, zaangażowaniem i gorliwością. Ideał czy program ten doskonale znany był Piotrowi Czcigodnemu, człowiekowi – nie ulega wątpliwości – księgi i pióra, pióra i księgi⁴². Dał mu on pierwszorzędną, wyśmienitą wyraz w jednej ze swoich epistoł, w słynnym mianowicie, adresowanym do pustelnika reklubu Gilberta liście dwudziestym, w którym, opiewając zalety życia eremickiego, zachęca on owego z własnej woli żyjącego w odosobnieniu męża do podjęcia wielkiego dzieła przepisywania kolejnych utworów⁴³. Oto fragment tegoż obszernego, będącego *de facto* nieobszernym traktatem pisma⁴⁴:

Nie można nasadzać drzewek i nie wolno podlewać zasiewów? Ani też, ponieważ wieczyste wyłączenie ze świata tego wzbrania, żadnego z zadań wieśniaków nie przystoi się mieć? Niech więc ręka, zamiast przyłożoną być do pługa – co jest pożyteczniejsze – chwyci za pióro; niechże, zamiast pól, boskimi literami przeorane będą kolejne stronice; niechaj w karcie posiane zostanie nasienie słowa Bożego, które, kiedy siew dojrzeje, to jest kiedy księgi zostaną wykończone, pomnożonymi płonami nakarmi głodnych czytelników – i w ten sposób zaspokoi chleb niebieski śmierć niosący głód duszy! Obyś tak, właśnie tak, stał się milczącym głosicielem Bożego słowa – a wówczas, choć język twój zachowywał będzie ciszę, ręka twoja donośnym głosem rozbrzmiewać będzie w uszach wielu ludów! I pomimo, że tkwisz zamknięty w ciemnościach swojej groty, w swoich kodeksach podróżował będziesz wtedy po ziemiach i morzach; na zgromadzeniach publicznych Kościoła ustami lektora – z miejsca podwyższonego, jak stróż – głosić będziesz słowo Boże; i to samo słowo szeptał będziesz milczącym sługom Bożym w zakątkach

⁴² Benedykt XVI, *Św. Piotr Czcigodny. Audiencja generalna – 14 października 2009 r.*, w: https://opoka.org.pl/biblioteka/W/WP/benedykt_xvi/audiencje/ag_14102009.html (dostęp: 21.06.2021): „Piotr Czcigodny miał też zamiłowanie do pisarstwa i był obdarzony talentem literackim. Zapisywał swoje myśli w przekonaniu o ważności używania pióra jako swoistego pługa, by «rozsiewać na papierze ziarno Słowa» (*Ep.* 20, s. 38)”.

⁴³ Iogna-Prat, *Ład i wykluczenie*, s. 98, 101, 173. Zob. w tym kontekście: G. Chachuat, *L'érémisme à Cluny sous l'abbatiat du Pierre le Vénérable*, „Annales de l'Académie de Mâcon” 58 (1982) s. 89-96.

⁴⁴ Iogna-Prat, *Ład i wykluczenie*, s. 173.

odległych klasztorów i domów. Tak, ślub uczynił cię pustelnikiem, lecz poświęcenie zmieni cię w ewangelistę: abyś dzięki trudowi swojemu przeistoczył się w tego, kim stać się nie możesz. Zechciejże podjąć się tego dzieła! Przez wzgląd na niemałą nagrodę, jaką otrzymasz za swoje wysiłki i za tych wszystkich, którym tą chwalebłą pracą przyjść zdołasz z pomocą⁴⁵.

2. Przekład⁴⁶

Zechcieliście, bracia, ze czcią i radością obchodzić dziś⁴⁷ narodziny chwalebnego męczennika i najwyższego kapłana Bożego, Marcelego⁴⁸. I słusznie, że ze czcią i radością, abyście pojęli, iż w tych swoich narodzinach dotarł on do czci najwyższej i do radości wieczystej. Lecz w oparciu o co to przyjmujemy? W jaki sposób – pytam się – tego dowodzimy? Jakże wykażemy, że dzień śmierci Marcelego jest zarazem dniem jego narodzin i że w tych narodzinach dotarł on do czci najwyższej i do radości wieczystej?⁴⁹

Otóż, najdrożsi, dniem narodzin nazywany jest w Piśmie Świętym ten dzień, w którym ze śmierci – niczym z łona – przechodzi się do życia. Stąd Pan, dając w Ewangelii duchową naukę o tym, iż każdy człowiek odrodzić winien się do życia, mówi do Nikodema: „Jeśli kto nie narodzi się raz wtóry, nie może ujrzeć królestwa Bożego”⁵⁰. A gdzie indziej, nowym stworzeniem nazywając owo także ciała obejmujące zmartwychwstanie, które nastąpi, kiedy wiek nasz się dopełni, rzecze znowuż uczniom: „Kiedy w czas nowego stworzenia Syn Człowieczy zasiądzie na tronie swej chwa-

⁴⁵ Petrus Abbas Cluniacensis, *Epistula 20: Ad servum Dei Gislebertum Silvanectis inclusum*, in: *The Letters of Peter the Venerable*, ed. G. Constable, t. 1, Cambridge 1967, s. 38-39 (tł. własne).

⁴⁶ Przekład niniejszy sporządzono na podstawie ostatniej edycji tekstu kazania, raz jeden wyłącznie – co, oczywiście, zostało zaznaczone – korzystając z lekcji podawanej przez Martène’a/Migne’a (zob. przyp. 7). Przypisami opatrzone również miejsca, w których, odpowiednio, kończy, a potem zaczyna się tekst Martène’owski/Migne’owski, jeśli zestawić go z tekstem Constable’owym. Na temat różnicy pomiędzy tekstem Constable’a a Martène’a/Migne’a, zob. *Wstęp do przekładu*, akapity trzeci i czwarty.

⁴⁷ Chodzi najpewniej o 16 stycznia. Zob. przyp. 119.

⁴⁸ Zob. przyp. 17.

⁴⁹ Podział tekstu na akapity pochodzi od tłumacza.

⁵⁰ J 3,3. Pomieszczone w tekście kazania cytaty biblijne przełożono samodzielnie. Sigła biblijne podaje się tu za Biblią Tysiąclecia.

ły, zasiądziecie i wy na tronach dwunastu”⁵¹. Jak więc ludzi przez wodę i Ducha wyprowadzonych ze śmierci grzechu i wprowadzonych do życia sprawiedliwości nazywa się odrodzonymi i jak ciała powstające z grobów do życia nieśmiertelnego uznaje się za nowo stwarzane, tak świętych Bożych, dzięki łasce Bożej uwolnionych z ciała takiejże śmierci i przeniesionych do życia, które udzielane jest im po śmierci, słusznie uważa się za narodzonych. Stąd zaś i dzień ów, w którym święci przeprowadzani są z nieszczęścia do szczęścia, z ciemności do światła, ze śmierci do życia, obchodzimy nie – jak dzień pogrzebu – ze smutkiem, lecz – jak dzień narodzin – z radością. One bowiem narodziny świętych daleko prawdziwsze są od ich narodzin pierwszych, cielesnych, dlatego, że w nich nie z łona matczynego do życia nędznego i szybko się kończącego oni wychodzą, lecz z ograniczonych ciemności tego świata wstępują do światła niczym nieograniczonego i do życia wiecznego. O życiu tym Pan powiada: „Ja jestem zmartwychwstaniem i życiem. Kto przeto wierzy we mnie, chociażby umarł, żyć będzie”⁵². Takim to więc sposobem szczęśliwą przeprawę błogosławionego Marceliego z ziemi do nieba nazywamy dniem jego narodzenia.

Jakże zaś w tych to swoich narodzinach dotarł on do czci najwyższej i do radości wieczystej, usłyszeć możemy od Pana, który mówi: „Jeśli ktoś mi usłuży, uczci go mój Ojciec”⁵³. Potrzeba wtedy zobaczyć, jak błogosławiony Marceli służył Chrystusowi – a jednocześnie, że dobrze Mu służąc, zasłużył na to, by uczczonym być przez Ojca.

Służył on wszak Chrystusowi, spełniając każdą czynność kapłańską, służył, piastując urząd najwyższego pasterza, służył, podejmując wielorakie męczeństwo. Nie było mu bowiem dane służyć w pokoju, lecz – ponieważ zaistniała taka konieczność – dla Chrystusa musiał również walczyć. Nie tylko zatem jako rządcy roztropnemu i wiernemu polecono mu troszczyć się o dobro wspólne, ale także, gdyż żołnierzem był wypróbowanym i w bojach doświadczonym, w zmaganiach wielkich i niebezpiecznych wodzem został wojska niebieskiego⁵⁴. A że był człekiem dzielnym i bitnym,

⁵¹ Mt 19,28.

⁵² J 11,25.

⁵³ J 12,26.

⁵⁴ Tekst Constable’a przedstawia się w tym miejscu tak oto: „Nec tantum rei familiari providere, sed ut probatus miles et peritus bellorum, dux coelestis militiae in magnis praeliorum periculis factus est”. U Martène’a/Migne’a natomiast czytamy: „Nec tantum rei familiari providere ut sapiens et fidelis dispensator iussus est, sed ut probatus miles et peritus bellorum, dux coelestis militiae in magnis praeliorum periculis factus est”. Lekcja

objawia to straszliwe okrucieństwo prześladowców, srożące się w jego czasie. Ukazuje to krew męczenników, strumieniami wszędzie się rozlewająca. Potwierdza to świat cały, wszystkimi swoimi siłami sprzeciwiający się Chrystusowi. Zaprawdę, z dawien dawna zasadał się już bowiem Szatan na Kościół Boży i, poczynając od czasów Nerona⁵⁵, rozpętywał liczne zawieruchy⁵⁶. Poznając jednakowoż, iż niczego dotąd nie wskórał, za dni owego męża błogosławionego okazał wszystką moc swego szaleństwa i, z nabrzmiałego brzuszyska wyrzygując siejącą niewyobrażalne wręcz spustoszenie zarzę, wzburzył każde królestwo: pierwszymi zaś spośród Rzymian, którzy prawie wszędzie wtedy panowali, tak chytrze pokierował, że całą ziemię – czyniąc wszystko, co będą mogli – zapragnęli uwolnić oni od tego pomoru. Jako że w przeciągu trzydziestu tylko dni kwiecieści pół niebieskich odesłali siedemnaście tysięcy obleczonych w purpurę, która ubarwiona została krwią przelaną dla wyznania Chrystusa⁵⁷, aby mnogie ogniska śmierci nie rozszerzały się, aby nieprzeliczone rzesze zmarłych, dzięki owym prześladowaniom chrześcijan, już się nie powiększały.

Wówczas to i błogosławiony Marcellin, biskup najpierwszej z apostoelskich stolic i znamienity pasterz owiec Chrystusowych, skoro tylko owce te mu poruczono, poprzez męczeństwo osiągnął wieńca zwycięstwa⁵⁸. W jego to czasie błogosławiony Marcelli, którego męką dzień

druga wydaje się pełniejsza, a więc w konsekwencji bardziej zrozumiała i lepsza, dlatego też w przekładzie idziemy za nią.

⁵⁵ Łac. *Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus*, później, po adopcji, *Nero Claudius Caesar Drusus Germanicus*, ur. 15 grudnia 37, zm. 9 czerwca 68 roku, cesarz rzymski w latach 54-68.

⁵⁶ W 64 roku wybuchł w Rzymie pożar. Ponieważ strawił on sporą część miasta, Neron zrealizować mógł swoje plany budowlane i rozbudował pałac cesarski, skutkiem czego jego polityczni przeciwnicy rozpowszechniać poczęli pogłoskę, jakoby to on nakazał wzniecić ogień. Aby obronić się przed tym oskarżeniem, Neron jako odpowiedzialnych za pożar wskazał rzymskich chrześcijan, co spowodowało ich prześladowania. Piszą o tych wypadkach Tacyt oraz Swetoniusz.

⁵⁷ Chodzi o prześladowanie Dioklecjańskie. Zob. przypis 66.

⁵⁸ Na temat papieża Marcellina zob. m.in. V. de Castro Romano, *Difesa della causa di S. Marcellino, I, Pont. Rom.*, Roma 1819; O. Marucchi, *Il sepolcro del papa Marcellino nel cimitero di Priscilla*, „Nuovo bullettino di archeologia cristiana” 13 (1907) s. 115-146; J.P. Kirsch, *Pope Saint Marcellinus*, w: *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, red. C.G. Herbermann et al., t. 9, New York 1910, w: <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09637d.htm> (dostęp: 22.06.2021); Caspar, *Die römischen Bischöfe der diokletianischen Verfolgung*, s. 321-333; A. Amore, *Il preteso „lapsus” di papa Marcellino*, „Antoniano” 32 (1955) s. 411-426; Röttges, *Marcellinus – Marcellus*, s. 385-420; J.N.D. Kelly, *Marcellinus, St.*, w: J.N.D. Kelly, *The Oxford Dictionary of Popes*, s. 24-25; Reardon, *The Deaths of the*

dzisiejszy jaśniej, szanowny przez całe prezbiterium, po Marcellinie obarczony największą troską o Boży Kościół, dokładał starań, aby nic nie zostało zaniedbane, a o ile wyraźniej widział, że nadciąga niebezpieczeństwo, o tyle pośpieszniej gotował duszę swoją, aby była ona w stanie znieść wszystko⁵⁹. Papież tymczasem Marcellin prowadzony jest na ofiarę – podąża więc za nim po wieniec zwycięstwa i kapłan Marcelli. Razem z nauczycielem cierpieć pragnie uczeń, lecz od jakiegoś już czasu⁶⁰ odwleka się go od tego i zachęca do walki. Nie pozwala mu się wraz z mistrzem iść do odpocznienia, ponieważ ma on ocaleć i podjąć trud większy. Bieży przeto wraz z Marcellinem tak samo jak on umrzeć chcący Marcelli, z woli Bożej Opatrzności nie umiera jednak, zastąpić mając biskupa. Tak

Popes, s. 31-32; P. Szczur, *Marcellin*, EK XI 1224. Warto zaznaczyć tu zwięźle, iż osoba papieża Marcellina i jego pontyfikat (przyjmuje się, że trwał on od 30 czerwca 296 do 304 roku) – jako że źródła, którymi dysponujemy, są w tym względzie otwarte na rozmaite odczytania i interpretacje – ciągle pozostają przedmiotem sporów i dyskusji. Jeden z problemów ewokuje pytanie, czy jako papież Marcellin upadł w czas prześladowania wszczętego przez Dioklecjana (miało ono miejsce w latach 284-305), wydając urzędnikom cesarskim święte księgi i paląc kadzidło dla uczczenia bożków pogańskich. Ta jego zdrada nastąpić miała w maju 303 roku. Wydaje się, że większość badaczy odpowiada dziś na to pytanie twierdząco. W związku zaś z takim, a nie innym aktualnym rozstrzygnięciem kwestii apostazji Marcellina – dodajmy jeszcze w tym miejscu – różnie zwykle się obecnie przedstawia koniec jego życia – istnieje co najmniej kilka scenariuszy jego przebiegu. Wedle jednych Marcellin okazał się zaprzańcem. Ci byli zdania, że wskutek jego zdrady pamięć o nim należy pogrzebać. Drudzy uważali, iż dokonawszy apostazji, Marcellin miał w kilka dni później pożałować tego, co uczynił, miał zawstydić się słabością, której uległ, a w konsekwencji cesarz wraz z trzema innymi wyznawcami Chrystusa miał go kazać ściąć. Zwolennicy takiego scenariusza uznawali Marcellina za męczennika. Wreszcie inni jeszcze sądzą – to opinia raczej historyków – że dopuściwszy się zdrady, Marcellin musiał abdykować i uchodzić z Rzymu i że na wygnaniu właśnie, nie bynajmniej jako męczennik, a naturalnie, dopełnił swoich ziemskich dni. Wiemy, że Marcellin zmarł 24 lub 25 października 304 roku.

⁵⁹ Piotr przyjmuje, iż Marcellin i Marcelli byli kolejnymi, następującymi po sobie papieżami. Godzi się to odnotować, ponieważ, począwszy od XIX wieku, są wśród historyków tacy, którzy uważają, iż Marcellin i Marcelli to ta sama postać. Są też tacy uczeni, którzy sądzą, że Marcelli wcale nie był papieżem, a tylko kapłanem sprawującym funkcje papieskie w czasie ówczesnego długiego wakatu na stolicy Piotrowej. Dla zbicia dwóch tych opinii – jak pisze Piotr Szczur – wskazuje się na fakt, iż „[...] obaj [Marcellin i Marcelli] są wymieniani jako papieże w *Katalogu Liberiusza* z 354 [...]”, oraz na „[...] użycie przez pap. Damazego I w epitafium M. [Marcelego] słowa *rector*, które zarezerwowane jest u niego dla biskupów” (Szczur, *Marcelli I*, 1221). Rzeczony epitafium znajdzie czytelnik w całości przytoczone w przyp. 92.

⁶⁰ Łac. *diutius*.

sposobi Chrystus swojemu Kościołowi odpowiedniego rządcę⁶¹. Nawie swojej, miotanej straszliwie wielkimi falami, dostarcza najbieglejszego sternika. Pośród krwawej jatki zachowuje niezmiernie dzielnego wojownika. Do kołczanu swego chowa strzałę, ażeby niebawem już przeszyć nią okrutnego wroga. Przed swoją męką zaprzysięga więc błogosławiony papież swego kapłana, ażeby nigdy nie podporządkował się bezbożnym rozkazom władców. Być może święty męczennik, skoro Duch go prowadził, zrozumiał, iż przełożonym Kościoła Chrystusowego ma zostać po nim ten, którego – jakże przejmująco – na chwilę tylko przed przelaniem swojej krwi rozpoznał jako godnego pouczenia. A wygłaszając swoje pouczenie, przepowiedział, że trzoda Pańska smagana będzie ciężkimi razami, i gorąco ją wezwał, aby nie opuszczała w ów czas pasterza. Tak i Chrystus, pasterz najdoskonalszy, tuż przed swoją męką mówił Piotrowi o trzodzie, którą – stroskany – jakby opuszczał: „Szymonie, oto Szatan pożądał was, aby przesiać was jak pszenicę. Ja zaś prosiłem za tobą, aby nie zbrakło ci wiary. Kiedy więc już się nawrócisz, umacniaj swoich braci”⁶². Tak to zatem błogosławiony Marcelein, zajmując miejsce Piotra i pozostawiając je błogosławionemu Marcelemu, napomniał go, aby nie odstąpił od wiary, przygotowując go do spokojnego zniesienia zła, które nadciągało. A niech nikt nie waży się sądzić, że tak bardzo bał się Marcelein o błogosławionego męża Marcelego, po wielokroć już przecież wypróbowanego, jak bardzo – zwracając się do niego, który sprawował nad nimi pieczę – słowy swoimi pouczał tych, o których trzeba mu było się bać. Bo nie musiał się on niczego obawiać ze strony świadka Chrystusa, Marcelego, męża dzielnego. Byli natomiast i słabi, o których z pewnością trzeba mu było się lękać. Zdjęty zatem ojcowskim o nich staraniem, z wielką czułością powierzył ich następującemu po sobie pasterzowi. I zakończył żywot biskup święty chwalebny męczeństwem – i pozostał Marcelein, lecz stoi teraz wyżej niż przed prześladowaniem. Jego bowiem obowiązkiem jest myśleć o stadzie, które, pozbawione dotychczasowego swojego pasterza, przejmuje⁶³.

⁶¹ Łac. *rectorem*. Zob. przyp. 59.

⁶² Łk 22,31-32.

⁶³ W kontekście tego, co powiedzieliśmy o Marcelinie powyżej, w przyp. 58, odnotujmy tylko, że obraz jego, jaki wylania się z niniejszego kazania Piotra Czcigodnego, jest jednoznacznie pozytywny, nie znajdujemy na nim ani jednej, najmniejszej nawet rysy – Marcelein jawi się nam w snutej przez Piotra opowieści jako postać świetlana, jako po ostatnie swoje tchnienie wierny sługa Boży, bez reszty zatroskanym o swój lud. Fakt ten jest znamienny, zwłaszcza jeśli zważy się, co stwierdza Kelly, że mianowicie wraz z koń-

Zobaczcie, bracia, jak bardzo był u Boga męczennik nasz, którego święto dziś obchodzicie! Zobaczcie – powiadam – jaki wyrok niebieski o nim zapadł, a w ten sposób zobaczycie, jaki był. Chcąc poznać dzielność żołnierza, spytajcie o opinię dowódcę.

Oto natarł gwałtownie na wojsko Chrystusowe ucisk prześladowania, sprzysięga się świat w swojej mocy, szemrają narody i ludy rozwodzą się po próżnicy, powstają królowie ziemi i możni schodzą się przeciwko Panu i przeciwko jego Pomazańcowi⁶⁴, dobywają mieczy, wyniszczają wojsko, zabijają jego wodza, wszystkim pozostałym zaś każą uciekać gdzie bądź. Lecz żołnierz nasz rozgonionych przywołuje, przywołanych scala⁶⁵, tworzy bojowy szyk, zachęca do bitwy, rozprasza wrogów, walczy zaciekle, odnosi zwycięstwo, a zwyciężając, raduje się. W ten to sposób, walcząc w potyczce duchowej, błogosławiony Marceli jako znamienity bojownik zajął w wojsku Chrystusa męstwem swego ducha. Kiedy bowiem zewsząd miecz błyskał, kiedy zewsząd nacierał prześladowca, kiedy Dioklecjan⁶⁶ i Maksymian⁶⁷ zapamiętali napierali, kiedy żołnierze wyrzynali zastęp cały

cem stulecia V i początkiem wieku VI apostazja Marcelina była czymś oczywistym i że w związku z tym wówczas to zaczęto podejmować wysiłki, aby w miarę możliwości przedstawić ją w przychylniejszym świetle. Zob. Kelly, *The Oxford Dictionary of Popes*, s. 24. W takim zaś układzie stwierdzić byłoby można, iż tłumaczona tu homilia Piotra z Cluny stanowi dokument poświadczający, że owa wielka – by tak ją nazwać – operacja rehabilitacji Marcelina powiodła się.

⁶⁴ Por. Ps 2,1-2; Dz 4,25-26.

⁶⁵ Łac. *congregat*. Zob. Cantarella, *Piotr Czcigodny, klasztory kluniackie w północnych Włoszech...*, s. 105 i 106.

⁶⁶ Łac. *Gaius Aurelius Valerius Diocletianus*, ur. ok. 244, zm. 3 grudnia 313 lub 316 roku, cesarz rzymski od 20 listopada 284 do 1 maja 305 roku. Pod koniec lutego 303 roku wszczął prześladowanie chrześcijan, które – tradycyjnie – nazywa się wielkim, uznając je za największe i najcięższe z prześladowań chrześcijan w cesarstwie rzymskim. Aby zorientować się w naszej wiedzy o prześladowaniu Dioklecjańskim, sięgnąć można po: N.H. Baynes, *Two Notes on the Great Persecution*, CQ 18/3-4 (1924) s. 189-194; G.E.M. de Sainte-Croix, *Aspects of the Great Persecution*, „Harvard Theological Review” 47/2 (1954) s. 75-113; T.D. Barnes, *Sossianus Hierocles and the Antecedents of the „Great Persecution”*, JRS 80 (1976) s. 239-252; P. Keresztes, *From the Great Persecution To the Peace of Galerius*, VigCh 37/4 (1983) s. 379-399; W.H.C. Frend, *Prelude to the Great Persecution: The Propaganda War*, JEH 38/1 (1987) s. 1-18; P.S. Davies, *The Origin and Purpose of the Persecution of AD 303*, JTS 40/1 (1989) s. 66-94; T. Wnętrzak, *Wykonywanie edyktów o prześladowaniu chrześcijan na terenie Palestyny w relacji Euzebiusza z Cezarei „O męczennikach palestyńskich”*, „Res Gestae. Czasopismo Historyczne” 4 (2005) s. 15-36.

⁶⁷ Łac. *Marcus Aurelius Valerius Maximianus*, ur. ok. 250, zm. w 310 roku, cesarz rzymski, współrządcą Dioklecjana (od 285 roku).

świętych, on jeden – jak powiedzieliśmy – aż do tej chwili został zachowany, aby bronił Kościoła, przez długi czas pozbawionego pasterza i drżącego o swoich walczących, ażeby słowem zachęty Kościół wzmacniał i trudem swoim go podtrzymał.

Zwróćcie, bracia, uwagę i rozważcie, jak wielkim zniszczeniem doświadczył wówczas ogień prześladowania Kościół Boży. Wówczas, kiedy przez siedem lat, sześć miesięcy i dwadzieścia pięć dni – powiada się, że nigdy wcześniej i nigdy później coś takiego się nie przydarzyło – rzymska stolica nie mogła mieć biskupa, a zarazem powszechny Kościół apostolski nie mógł mieć swojego najwyższego kapłana. Ponieważ szalała zawierucha prześladowania, duchowieństwu i ludowi, który się ostał, nie dana była bowiem ani możliwość gromadzenia się, ani też sposobność wybrania papieża. Lecz przez cały ów czas błogosławiony Marcele – choć nie przejmując jeszcze władzy pasterskiej, to jednak sprawując już obowiązek pasterski, zadanie najwyższego kapłana – śpieszył niestrudzenie, aby pouczać niewiedzących, pokrzepiać bojących się, szafować sakramentami Chrystusowymi i dostarczać tego wszystkiego, co potrzebne jest w tak wielkim niebezpieczeństwie śmierci. Zmarłych zaś za wiarę, których każdego niemal dnia spiętrzały się całe stopy, skwapliwie ich szukając i zbierając, grzebał⁶⁸. Dlatego to, wraz z kapłanami i diakonami idąc po nie pod osłoną nocy, porwał ciała zarówno błogosławionego papieża Marcelina, jak i świętych męczenników Klaudiusza i Cyryniusza⁶⁹, które z rozkazu Dioklecjana, dla zastraszenia

⁶⁸ Koniec życia Marcelina datuje się na końcówkę października 304 roku (zob. przyp. 58). Potem na stolicy Piotrowej był wakat. Za początek pontyfikatu Marcelego przyjmuje się albo listopad/grudzień 306, albo 27 maja lub 26 czerwca 308 roku. Za panowania Marcelina Marcele był pierwszym z prezbiterów, a po jego śmierci przez dłuższy czas, choć nie został wybrany papieżem, pełnił papieskie obowiązki. Jako przyczyny odwołania elekcji wskazuje się z jednej strony trwające wówczas prześladowanie Dioklecjańskie, z drugiej natomiast – wewnętrzkościelne spory i podziały. Zob. Szczur, *Marcele I*, s. 1220; por. Kelly, *The Oxford Dictionary of Popes*, s. 25.

⁶⁹ Łac. *Claudius et Cyrinus*, święci Klaudiusz i Cyryniusz (drugi znany jest także jako *Quirinus*, Kwiryniusz – taką formę jego imienia mamy w pierwszej edycji *Liber pontificalis*). Alojzy Jougan (*Słownik kościelny łacińsko-polski*, Sandomierz 2013, s. 113 i 171, s.v. *S. Claudius* i *S. Cyrinus*) podaje, że dwaj ci mężowie byli towarzyszami w męczeństwie papieża Marcelina. Mieli ponieść śmierć siódmego dnia przed kalendami majowymi, a więc 25 kwietnia 304 roku (zob. J. Wikarjak, *Gramatyka opisowa języka łacińskiego*, Warszawa 1978, s. 159), choć Jougan jako dzień ich śmierci wskazuje 26 kwietnia. Śmierć Klaudiusza i Cyryniusza, dołączając do nich jeszcze osobę Antoninusza (łac. *Antoninus*), wzmiankuje *Księga papieży (Liber Pontificalis*, s. 53-54*): „Et post paucos dies, penitentiam ductus, ab eodem Dioclitiano pro fide Christi cum Claudio et Quirino et

chrześcijan, przez trzydzieści sześć dni leżały na ulicy⁷⁰, i chwając Boga, pochował je w znanej krypcie przy Drodze Solnej⁷¹. A krótko po tym, jak uspokoił się wir prześladowania, wybrany został Marcelli na najwyższego kapłana. I cieszył się Kościół, że oto ma wreszcie wspaniałego pasterza, zaprawionego w znoszeniu wszelkich prowadzonych przeciwko niemu natarć, i nadzwyczaj dzielnego obrońcę. A wypełniając zadania najwyższego kapłana, jeszcze tylko dobitniej Marcelli okazał, że starał się on zwłaszcza o dwie

Antonio capite sunt truncati et martyrio coronantur” – ‘I po paru dniach, pokutując, razem z Klaudiuszem, Kwiryniuszem i Antoniuszem za wiarę w Chrystusa został święty przez Dioklecjana i ukoronowany męczeństwem’ (redakcja pierwsza, wersja pierwsza); „Et post paucos dies, penitentiam ductus, ab eodem Diocletiano pro fide Christi cum Claudio et Cyrino et Antonino capite sunt truncati et martyrio coronantur” – ‘I po paru dniach, pokutując, razem z Klaudiuszem, Cyryniuszem i Antoniuszem za wiarę w Chrystusa został święty przez Dioklecjana i ukoronowany męczeństwem’ (redakcja druga).

⁷⁰ Informuje o tym nota poświęcona papieżowi Marcellinowi w *Libro pontificali*. Czytamy w niej wszak (s. 53, 54): „Iacuerunt corpora sancta [Marcellini, Claudii, Quirini et Antonii] in platea dies XXVI ex iussu Diocletiani” (redakcja pierwsza, wersja pierwsza); „Et iacuit [Diocletianus] corpus eius [Marcellini] in platea una cum alios martyres ad exemplum christianorum dies XXVI” (redakcja pierwsza, wersja druga); „Et post hoc factum iacuerunt corpora sancta [Marcellini, Claudii, Cyrini et Antonini] in platea ad exemplum christianorum dies XXV ex iussu Diocletiani” (redakcja druga).

⁷¹ Chodzi o cmentarz (katakumby) św. Pryscylli znajdujący się w Rzymie przy *via Salaria*. Jak tłumaczy Kelly, dlatego pogrzebano Marcelina na cmentarzu Pryscylli, że stanowiąc własność prywatną możnej rodziny Acyliuszów Glabryonów (łac. *Acilii Glabryoni*), jako jedyny był on dostępny w okresie prześladowań, kiedy wszystkie oficjalne kościelne cmentarze zostały przez władzę przejęte i zamknięte. Zob. Kelly, *The Oxford Dictionary of Popes*, s. 25. Dokładniej miejsce pochówku ciała Marcelina, Klaudiusza i Cyryniusza opisał autor *Księgi papieży* (s. 53, 54): „Ubi Marcellus presbiter noctu collegit corpora sanctorum [Marcellini, Claudii, Quirini et Antonii] et sepelivit in via Salaria, in cimiterio Priscillae, in cubiculum qui patet usque in odiernum diem, quod ipse praeceperat paenitens dum traheretur ad occisionem, in cripta iuxta corpus sancti Criscentionis [...]” (redakcja pierwsza, wersja pierwsza); „Et exinde Marcellus presbiter collegit noctu corpora [Marcellini, Claudii, Cyrini et Antonini] [...] et sepelivit in via Salaria, in cimiterio Priscillae, in cubiculum qui patet usque in hodiernum diem, quod ipse praeceperat paenitens dum traheretur ad occisionem, in crypta iuxta corpus sancti Criscentionis [...]” (redakcja druga). Dlaczego – nasuwa się, naturalnie, pytanie – kryptę, w której złożono szczątki doczesne Marcelina, Klaudiusza i Cyryniusza, opatruje Piotr przymiotnikiem „znana”, „sławna” (bo chyba nie „jasna”) – *cripta clara*? Trudno wyrokować cokolwiek z pewnością. Być może dlatego, że cmentarz św. Pryscylli, stąd, iż pochowano na nim wielu męczenników, w tym siedmiu papieży, od starożytności nazywany bywa *regina catacubarum*, królową katakumb. Zob. np. S. Carletti, *Guida delle catacombe di Priscilla*, Città del Vaticano 1981; F. Bisconti – B. Mazzei – R. Giuliani, *La catacomba di Priscilla. Il complesso, i restauri, il museo*, Todi 2013.

sprawy, aby mianowicie dobrze wywiązać się z obowiązków, które mu zlecono, oraz aby wrogom stawić mocny opór. Wiele bowiem zbawiennych jego postanowień i rozporządzeń, powziętych stosownie do tego, na co czas pozwalał, ujawnia, iż w zawiadywaniu czy też zarządzaniu Kościołem był bardzo rozsądny i przewidujący. W *Księdze papieży*⁷² czytamy o nim między innymi takie słowa⁷³:

On to założył cmentarz przy Drodze Solnej⁷⁴, a także wyznaczył w mieście Rzymie dwadzieścia pięć kościołów tytularnych⁷⁵ oraz tyleż okręgów duszpasterskich⁷⁶, mając na uwadze, że wielu, którzy nawracali się spośród po-

⁷² Łac. *in gestis pontificalibus*. Na temat tytułu *Księgi papieży*, zob. np. M. Ożóg – H. Pietras, *Wprowadzenie*, w: *Liber Pontificalis*, s. VII. Na temat znowuż w ogóle *Liber pontificalis*, zob. m.in. H. Leclercq, *Liber Pontificalis*, w: *Dictionnaire d'archéologie chrétienne et de liturgie*, red. F. Cabrol – H. Leclercq, t. 9, Paris 1930, s. 354-459; W. Berschin, *Der Liber Pontificalis*, w: *Liber ad magistrum. Festgabe Herrn Universitätsprofessor Dr. Johannes Spörl zu seinem 60. Geburtstag dargebracht*, red. W. Fröhlich, München 1964, s. 33-39; O. Bertolini, *Il 'Liber Pontificalis'*, w: *La storiografia altomedievale*, Spoleto 1970, s. 387-455; T.F. Noble, *A new look at the „Liber Pontificalis”*, „Archivum Historiae Pontificiae” 23 (1985) s. 347-358.

⁷³ Por. *Liber Pontificalis*, s. 55-55* i 56-56*.

⁷⁴ *Księga papieży* w redakcji swojej drugiej jest precyzyjniejsza i podaje, że chodzi o *cimiterium Novellae*, „cmentarz Nowelli”. Zob. *Liber Pontificalis*, s. 56-56*.

⁷⁵ Łac. *titulus* (także: *domus ecclesiae*, *ecclesia domestica*, *domus Dei*, *dominicum*), przy czym zwykle używa się tego rzeczownika w liczbie mnogiej: *tituli*, czyli – z takimi polskimi odpowiednikami spotykamy się w piśmiennictwie polskim – tytuły, kościoły tytularne, kościoły domowe. Były to prywatne budynki, w których, w epoce, kiedy chrześcijaństwo w Rzymie nie było legalne, używając ich jako oratoriów czy kościołów, modląc się i sprawując w nich sakramenty, gromadzili się chrześcijanie. Każdy z owych kościołów tytularnych brał swoją nazwę od imienia albo właściciela budynku, albo jakiegoś zamożnego ofiarodawcy, który łożył na utrzymanie budynku, albo tego, kto budynkiem się opiekował, albo wreszcie kapłana, który będąc do danej swoistej świątyni przypisany czy przyporządkowany, posługiwał w niej. Z czasem owe kościoły domowe służyły chrześcijanom nie tylko jako miejsca modlitwy i sprawowania liturgii, ale również jako całe swoiste centra życia chrześcijańskiego. Zob. A. Cossio, *Titulus*, w: *Catholic Encyclopedia*, C.G. Herbermann *et al.*, t. 14, New York 1913, w: [https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Catholic_Encyclopedia_\(1913\)/Titulus](https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Catholic_Encyclopedia_(1913)/Titulus) (dostęp: 23.06.2021); J.P. Kirsch, *Die römischen Titelkirchen im Altertum*, Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums 9/1-2, Paderborn 1918; F. Lanzoni, *I titoli presbiteriali di Roma antica nella storia e nella leggenda*, RivAC 2 (1925) s. 195-257; D.L. Balch, *Roman Domestic Art and Early House Churches*, Tübingen 2008.

⁷⁶ Łac. *dioecesis* (od gr. ἡ διοίκησις – ‘gospodarzenie, zarząd, administracja’ i, w konsekwencji, ‘władza nad prowincją, prowincja’) – jednostka administracyjna póź-

gan, przyjmowało chrzest i podejmowało pokutę oraz to, gdzie znajdowały się groby męczenników. W miesiącu grudniu dla miasta Rzymu wyświęcił on również dwudziestu pięciu kapłanów i dwóch diakonów⁷⁷.

Zaprawdę, wielki był to kierownik, zaprawdę, zapobiegliwy był to porządkodawca rodziny Chrystusowej, który nie zważał na zwieszoność nad swoim karkiem miecze nieprzyjaciół ani też nie baczył na nadciągające niebezpieczeństwa, lecz – podobnie jak człowiek niezmaconego spokoju – nie zaprzestawał troszczyć się o wszystko. I tą swoją postawą przyczynił się do własnej śmierci. Żeby bowiem w tak rozległym mieście odpowiednia była liczba – jakże często odwiedzanych przez lud – miejsc modlitwy, w których rzesza wierzących mogłaby i przyjmować sakramenty, i prośby swoje przedkładać Bogu, ustanowił tyle kościołów, że mogły one pomieścić bardzo wielu wiernych, i wyświęcił tylu posługujących, że byli oni w stanie zaspokoić potrzeby rozlicznej wspólnoty⁷⁸. Jak zaś zabiegał o ocalenie jeszcze żywych, tak nie zaniedbywał starań o pochówek każdego dnia umierających świętych. Przysłało wszak, by wskutek

nego cesarstwa rzymskiego składająca się na prowincję, a obejmująca kilka okręgów (łac. *paroeciae, parochiae*; od gr. ἡ παροικία – w pierwszym znaczeniu to czasowy pobyt w obcej ziemi, dopiero potem słowo owo oznacza wspólnotę żyjącą na jakimś konkretnym obszarze; zob. *A Patristic Greek Lexicon*, red. G.W.H. Lampe, Oxford 1961, s. 1042, s.v. παροικία), które to okręgi tworzyły miasta wraz z przylegającymi do nich terenami podmiejskimi. Kościół starożytny, kiedy zaczął tworzyć własne struktury, skorzystał z rozwiązań wypracowanych przez Rzymian. W naszym przypadku przez ową *dioecesis* rozumieć należy, najprawdopodobniej, rzeczywistość zbliżoną do tego, co współcześnie nazywa się parafią. Zob. H. Rybczyński, *Diecezja*, EK III 1307-1308.

⁷⁷ Również *Liber pontificalis* podaje, że Marcelem wyświęcił dla samego Rzymu dwudziestu pięciu prezbiterów i dwóch diakonów. Dodaje jednak jeszcze, iż dla innych miast konsekrował dwudziestu jeden biskupów. Autorzy komentarza zamieszczonego w *Księdze papieża* zwracają uwagę na liczbę wyświęconych przez Marcelego dla Rzymu księży: „Jeśli przez cztery lata nie było biskupa w Rzymie z powodu prześladowań, jest prawdopodobne, iż zginęło też tak wielu prezbiterów, że teraz należało dla samego Rzymu wyświęcić ich 25” (*Liber Pontificalis*, s. 56*, przyp. C). Jakies wyobrażenie o ordynacji prezbiterów w czasach Marcelego można sobie wyrobić, czytając np. tekst następujący: D. Kwiatkowski, *Struktura i teologia obrzędu święceń prezbiteratu w posoborowych pontyfikalach*, PzST 11 (2001) s. 167-170, tj. paragraf pt. *Ordynacja prezbitera w dawnych „Ordines Romani”*. Swoją drogą: intryguje, że autor notki z *Księgi papieża* o Marcelem zaznacza, iż święcił on, Marcelem, w grudniu.

⁷⁸ Zdaniem tym zaczyna się fragment, którego nie mamy w edycji Martène’a/Migne’a (koniec tego fragmentu sygnalizuje przyp. 127). Na temat tej różnicy, zob. *Wstęp do przekładu*, akapit trzeci i czwarty.

dbałości najlepszego pasterza całej trzody zarówno życie wieczne wlewane było w dusze, jak i aby ciała nie pozostawały pozbawione pogrzebu. A chociaż wyżej już o tym wspomniano, to jednak tu to powtarzamy, gdyż tego, co w pierwz czynił Marcelli jako prezbiter, nie zaprzestał czynić później jako najwyższy kapłan. Był zapewne świadomy, że piastuje godność tego, który powiedział: „Ja jestem pośród was jako ten, który służy”⁷⁹ – i jeszcze: „Kto większym jest między wami, niech się stanie jako mniejszy”⁸⁰. Ponieważ wtedy znał Marcelli te słowa swojego Pana, stał się Jego naśladowcą i poddał się swoim poddanym. A choć przewyższał ich pod względem tak zasług, jak pełnionego urzędu, to jednak jako pierwszy szedł, ażeby usłużyć mniejszym.

Że zaś otoczył on swą pasterską opieką nawet bardzo odległe miejsca, zaświadcza jego list, jaki wysłał do Antiocheńczyków⁸¹. Napisał w nim⁸²:

Troszcząc się – zgodnie ze wskazaniem Apostoła⁸³ – o wszystkie Kościoły, winniśmy pamiętać o towarzyszącej nam łasce Boga, który przez wielkie swoje miłosierdzie włączył nas do stanu kapłańskiego, abyśmy – trzymając się Jego przykazań, będąc wyznaczonymi do stróżowania, które jest obowiązkiem Jego kapłanów – powściągali bezbożność, a nauczali tego, co należy czynić. Stąd też, korzystając z pośrednictwa Bonifacego, naszego diakona⁸⁴, napominamy was prostym pismem, aby zło, które wszędy się pleni, zostało wycięte, a z kolei złe czyny, do których już doszło, aby zostały naprawione: żeby wszyscy wzrastali w dobrym i żeby wszyscy – we wszystkim – naśladowali przykład naszych ojców i słuchali się ich rozporządzeń.

A dalej znajdujemy takie słowa⁸⁵:

⁷⁹ Łk 22,27.

⁸⁰ Łk 22,26.

⁸¹ Imieniu Marcelego papieża *Patrologia łacińska* przypisuje trzy pisma, to jest dwa listy, wskazane już przez nas w przyp. 32 i 33, oraz dekret: *Decretum Marcelli papae I, desumptum ex Gratiano*, PL 7, 1100. Pierwsza z rzeczonych epistoł, którą Piotr tutaj cytuje, adresowana jest do biskupów prowincji Antiochia.

⁸² Marcellus papa, *Epistola prima*, PL 7, 1091-1092.

⁸³ Por. 2Kor 11,28.

⁸⁴ Łac. *Bonefacium*. Trudno zidentyfikować owego diakona Bonifacego. Zob. np. V. De Vit, *Totius latinitatis onomasticon*, t. 1, Prati 1859, s. 741-742 (czyli: E. Forcellini, *Totius latinitatis lexicon*, t. 7).

⁸⁵ Marcellus papa, *Epistola prima*, PL 7, 1093-1094.

Pasterska przeto troska przestrzega nas, żebyśmy biegli z pomocą opuszczonym oraz byśmy tego, co zaniedbane, doglądali, a to wszystko, co źle uczynione, naprawiali – tak, aby ogień, który Pan przyniósł na ziemię wraz ze swoim przyjściem, wzbudzony, wskutek częstego wzmagania się tak rozgorzał, by zawrzał, i tak się rozpałił, by jaśniał. Należy bowiem często nauczać i przystępować do działania, ponieważ rozkrzewiające się zło przycinać potrzeba bratnią miłością, iżby dobro znaleźć mogło jak najlepsze miejsce do wzrostu i owocowania.

W taki to sposób – a siły jego w dziele tym nie słabły – mąż nasz błogosławiony i w Rzymie mieszkających pielęgnował, i daleko od stolicy żyjących, do których nie mógł dotrzeć, wzmacniał listami. Przystań więc na opinię, że ten, który otrzymał godność urzędu apostołskiego, tak postępując, rzeczywiście okazał się apostołskim biskupem. Bo również tych spoza Rzymu pouczał, z wielką pilnością – jako że nie mógł przemawiać do nich osobiście – śląc do nich listy.

Tak to on, zdając sobie sprawę z tego, że – po Chrystusie – jest na ziemi głową pośród członków Chrystusowych, jakby z podwyższonego miejsca przyglądał się wszystkim będącym poniżej i, ponieważ poznawał, co dla kogo korzystne, nie przeznaczając żadnego czasu na odpoczynek, uwijał się, aby o wszystkich zadbać. Najdrożsi, słyszeliście już, jak troszczył się o to, co zostało mu poruczone. Posłuchajcie więc teraz, jak opierał się przeciwnościom. Słyszeliście o zatroskaniu pasterza. Posłuchajcie więc o męstwie wodza. Słyszeliście, jak czuwając, ustrzegł owczarni. Posłuchajcie, z jakąż mocą natarł na obóz wroga.

Zapragnął bowiem, podług prorockiej mowy, rozprawić się z przeciwnościami⁸⁶. Podjął zatem wysiłek i okolił murem dom Izraela, a w dzień Pański stanął do bitwy. Spełniła się wtedy w błogosławionym mężu Marcelim stara opowieść o budowniczych murów Jerozolimy, którą przekazuje nam księga Ezdrasza⁸⁷. Czytamy tam: „A książę w domu

⁸⁶ Zob. Ez 13,5.

⁸⁷ Chodzi o księgę Nehemiasza. We wstępie do Ksiąg Ezdrasza i Nehemiasza, jaki mamy w Biblii Tysiąclecia, czytamy: „Obie te księgi, stanowiące jedną całość, mieściły się pierwotnie w jednym tomie. Stan ten jest widoczny jeszcze w LXX. Ma ona wprowadzić dwie Księgi Ezdrasza, lecz grecka 1Ezd jest apokryfem, który Włg umieszcza w dodatkach na końcu jako 3Ezd. Natomiast grecka 2Ezd obejmuje obie te kanoniczne księgi – Ezd i Ne – razem połączone, jak miał pierwotny tekst hebrajski. Wulgata Księgę Nehemiasza nazywa też Drugą Księgą Ezdrasza” (*Pismo Święte Starego i Nowego Testamentu w przekładzie z języków oryginalnych*, Poznań 2015, s. 492).

judzkim, budującym mur, noszącym i dźwigającym ciężary, jedną swoją ręką pracował, w drugiej zaś dzierżył miecz⁸⁸. Poznacie przeto wszyscy, iż Jerozolima, będąc wyobrażeniem pokoju, oznacza Kościół, w którym – jak w zwierciadle, w sposób niejasny – Bóg, którego zobaczymy kiedyś twarzą w twarz⁸⁹, ukazuje nam prawdziwy pokój. I zauważacie – jak sądzimy – że mur Jerozolimy wskazuje na obwarowanie wzniesione z wiary i dobrych uczynków. Rozumiecie też, że budujący to ci, którzy dokładają starań, aby ufortyfikować wiarę, spełniającą się przez miłość. Kogóż zaś uznacie za księcia budujących, jeśli nie tego, który jest księciem trujących się przy wznoszeniu Kościoła Chrystusowego? Tego, który, istotnie, księciem jest budowniczych, księciem wojska Pańskiego, księciem pocących się pośród bojów obecnego czasu, księciem ustanowionym przez samego Pana w sprawach nie tylko ziemskich, ale i niebieskich, skoro w Apostole Piotrze, którego godność piastuje, usłyszał on: „Cokolwiek zwiążesz na ziemi, związane będzie i w niebie, a cokolwiek na ziemi rozwiążesz, także i w niebie będzie rozwiązane”⁹⁰. Bez wątpienia księciem tym jest błogosławiony Marcei, papież i męczennik, którego dzień uroczysty święcicie. On to, przewodząc duchowym budowniczym Jerozolimy, jedną swoją ręką pracował, a w drugiej trzymał miecz. Z jednej bowiem strony wiarą swoją i obyczajami wielce gorliwie budował powierzony sobie Kościół Boży, ze strony zaś wtórej z niezachwianą stałością zwalczał tych, którzy trującym się przy budowie stawali na przeszkodzie. Z jednej strony potrafił odradzać synów do życia wiecznego, z drugiej natomiast strony bił nieprzyjaciół. Z jednej strony pilnie zajmował się zarządem nad sprawami wewnętrznymi Kościoła, z drugiej strony – obroną przed tym, co powzięte zostało przez wrogów. Obroną nazywamy zaś nie wszczynanie walki, ale znoszenie znoju walki, nie unikanie cierpienia, ale przyjmowanie cierpienia, nie zabijanie innych, ale mężne poddawanie zabójcom ciał. Tym wszakże sposobem święci, będąc pokonanymi, zwyciężają, będąc podbitymi, panują i jako upadli powstają, a jako umarli żyją. Nowego tego zwycięstwa nauczył nas Chrystus. W tej niespotykanej sztuce walki wyćwiczył król niebieski swoje wojsko, ażeby pokazywało ono, że złość zwycięża się cierpliwością, pychę – pokorą, a nieprawość – niewinnością. Stąd to powiedział Pan uczniom: „Ufajcie! Jam zwyciężył świat”⁹¹. Zwyciężył

⁸⁸ Ne 4,10-11.

⁸⁹ Por. 1Kor 13,12.

⁹⁰ Mt 16,19.

⁹¹ J 16,33.

go On jednak nie dzielnością, bronią czy wojskiem, ale słabością, krzyżem i śmiercią. Tak to – o czym była już mowa – król swoich żołnierzy, nauczyciel swoich uczniów, Pan swoje sługi nauczył walczyć i wrogów okiełznywać. Z taką to zatem drużyną i tym to właśnie rodzajem wojny błogosławiony Marceli, zaatakowawszy wrogie szranki, zwałił swoich nieprzyjaciół⁹².

⁹² Odnotujmy w tym może momencie za Kellym, iż niektórzy badacze uważają, że Marceli bardzo surowo obchodził się z tymi, którzy w czasie prześladowań byli upadli, czyli z tzw. *lapsis*, co wywoływać miało oburzenie i podziały wśród chrześcijan. Zob. Kelly, *The Oxford Dictionary of Popes*, s. 25. Por. B. Kriegbaum, *Die Religionspolitik des Kaisers Maxentius*, „Archivum Historiae Pontificiae” 30 (1992) s. 40. O tym, że Marceli był w odnośnej kwestii rygorystą, miałyby świadczyć następująca inskrypcja, ułożona przez papieża Damazego I, którą nakazał on, przy ich przeniesieniu z katakumb św. Pryscylli do znajdującej się w pobliżu bazyliki San Silvestro in Capite, umieścić w miejscu złożenia szczątków Marcelego – inskrypcja następującej treści: „VERIDICVS RECTOR LABSOS QVIA CRIMINA FLERE / PRAEDIXIT MISERIS FVIT OMNIBUS HOSTIS AMARVS / HINC FVROR HINC ODIVM SEQVITVR DISCORDIA LITES / SEDITIO CAEDES SOLVVNTVR FOEDERA PACIS / CRIMEN OB ALTERIVS CHRISTVM QVI IN PACE NEGAVIT / FINIBUS EXPVLSVS PATRIAE EST FERITATE TYRANNI / HAEC BREVITER DAMASVS VOLUIT COMPERTA REFERRE / MARCELLI VT POPULUS MERITVM COGNOSCERE POSSIT” (cyt. za: Reardon, *The Deaths of the Popes*, s. 32), co się tłumaczy: ‘Prawdziwy rządca, ponieważ nakazał, aby upadli oplakiwali swoje przestępstwa, okazując się zagorzałym wrogiem wszystkich tych nieszczęśników. Stąd wściekłość, stąd nienawiść nastąpiła – niezgoda, kłótnie, powstanie i rzeź: zerwane zostało przymierze pokoju. Z powodu przestępstwa człowieka, który w czas pokoju zaparł się Chrystusa [Marcelego zadenuncjować miał do Maksencjusza jakiś apostata; zob. Kelly, *The Oxford Dictionary of Popes*, s. 25], okrucieństwo tyrana wyгнаło go poza granice ojczyzny. Skoro dowiedział się o tym Damazy, zechciał krótko o tym wspomnieć, aby lud poznać mógł zasługę Marcelego” (tł. własne). Rygoryzm Marcelego, powodując w Rzymie niepokoje, doprowadzić miał do interwencji cesarza Maksencjusza. Skazał miał on więc Marcelego, jako burzyciela porządku społecznego, na banicję – oto inna wersja żywota naszego bohatera, całą ją właściwie przedstawioną mamy w inskrypcji Damazowej – na której to przebywając, nie wiadomo gdzie, miał on umrzeć, ciało zaś jego niezwłocznie przytransportowane zostać miało do Rzymu i pochowane na cmentarzu Pryscylli. Za niemęczeńską śmiercią Marcelego przemawia fakt – wskazują badacze – iż *Martyrologium Hieronymianum* wspomina go nie jako męczennika, ale jako wyznawcę. Zob. *Martyrologium Hieronymianum*, ed. J.B. de Rossi, L. Duchesne, w: ASanc LXXXII, s. [9]. Owo *curriculum vitae* Marcelego uważa się dziś dość powszechnie chyba za prawdziwe, to, co przekazuje na jego temat *Liber pontificalis*, a w efekcie Piotr, nasz kaznodzieja, uznając za legendę. Zob. w tym kontekście: Kelly, *The Oxford Dictionary of Popes*, s. 25; Kriegbaum, *Die Religionspolitik des Kaisers Maxentius*, s. 40.

Opowiada o tym list, skierowany przezeń do Maksencjusza, tyrana miasta Rzymu⁹³. Czytamy w nim między innymi te słowa⁹⁴:

Prawda świadczy o sobie sama, mówiąc: „Błogosławieni, którzy przez wzgląd na sprawiedliwość znoszą prześladowanie”⁹⁵ – i jeszcze: „Jeśli Mnie prześladowali, to i was będą prześladować”⁹⁶. Lepiej więc, żebyśmy my i kapłani Pańscy, którzy są – rozumie się – prawdziwymi kapłanami Pana, wybierali, ze względu na sprawiedliwość i prawdziwą wiarę, znoszenie prześladowania niż żebyśmy obrastali w liczne bogactwa, opływali w przynoszące wielkie intraty zaszczyty, a pozbawieni byli królestwa niebieskiego. Pierwsze bowiem to dobra przemijające, wtóre zaś dobro jest wieczne. Pierwsze dobra są znikome i trwają do czasu, drugie natomiast dobro jest wieczne i trwa bez końca. Ty przeto, który przymuszasz nas do tego, abyśmy porzucili kult Boży i odstąpili od słusznej wiary, składając ofiary bogom, wiedz, iż byłoby dla ciebie lepiej, gdybyś, dając przykład takiej postawy, zachęcił wszystkich, aby tak trzymali się świadectw wiary i obrzędów kultu Bożego, jak ojcowie nasi, święci apostołowie, to głosili i jak tego uczyli, przekazując, co im samym przekazano. Godzi się bowiem, aby dobry książę i król odnawiał zniszczone i zburzone kościoły oraz by wznosił nowe, a także aby okazywał szacunek kapłanom Bożym i nimi się opiekował.

A nieco dalej Marcellus dodaje⁹⁷:

Uczymy was, którzy ciężko doświadczacie nas złowrogim prześladowaniem, tego, co winniście wiedzieć, abyście się strzegli i abyście zaprzestali prześladować tych, którzy służą Bogu, mocą których modlitw zarówno wygaszane są ziemskie wojny, jak i Bóg jedna się z grzesznikami. A jeśli nielitościwie dalej jeszcze chcecie nas prześladować, nie podobając się Bogu, to my jeszcze dzielniej wytrzymywać chcemy wasze prześladowanie, stosując się do kościelnych zasad, tym bardziej, że zachęca nas do tego owo słowo prawdy, tak oznajmiając: „Nie bójcie się tych, którzy wprawdzie zabijają ciało, ale

⁹³ Łac. *Marcus Aurelius Valerius Maxentius*, ur. ok. 280, zm. 28 października 312 roku, cesarz rzymski od 28 października 306 roku. Na temat w ogóle polityki religijnej Maksencjusza pisze znakomicie: Kriegbaum, *Die Religionspolitik des Kaisers Maxentius*, s. 7-54. Na temat tejże jego polityki za pontyfikatu Marcelego, zob. s. 39.

⁹⁴ Marcellus papa, *Epistola II*, PL 7, 1097.

⁹⁵ Mt 5,10.

⁹⁶ J 15,20.

⁹⁷ Marcellus papa, *Epistola II*, PL 7, 1098.

duszy zabić nie mogą⁹⁸ – i znów: „Jeśli kto chce pójść za Mną, niech zaprzę się samego siebie, niechże weźmie krzyż swój i niech Mnie naśladuje⁹⁹”.

Wreszcie zaś, skreśliwszy parę innych jeszcze słów, dołożył Marcelli słowa następujące¹⁰⁰:

Dlatego więc piszemy do was niniejsze, ponieważ jesteście waszymi dłużnikami, czyż wszakże Pan: „Miłujcie waszych nieprzyjaciół i wyświadczajcie dobro tym, którzy was nienawidzą¹⁰¹”. A gdzie indziej mówi Pismo: „Jeśli nieprzyjaciel twój głoduje, nakarm go. Jeśli jest spragniony, daj mu pić. To bowiem czyniąc, ściągniesz na jego głowę deszcz ognistych węgli¹⁰²”. Ufając tym poręką, jako że Pańska prawica aż dotąd szczęśliwie nas chroni i za nas walczy, w pokoju znosić pragniemy wojnę, którą toczycie przeciwko nam, aby wraz z triumfem Chrystusa nastąpiło jedno zwycięstwo wszystkich prawdziwych kapłanów i aby ciemności błędu wraz z jego autorami rozpedzone zostały przez słońce, przez rozbłyskujące¹⁰³ światło prawdy, gdyż nie leży w zasięgu mocy ludzkiej zamiar Boży.

Oto słowa godne Pańskiego kapłana, godne męczennika Chrystusowego, godne prawdziwego pasterza! Toż przystało, aby tak właśnie kapłan bronił ludu, męczennik – składanego świadectwa, pasterz – trzody. Skoro zaś nie zdołał jej pomóc, wystosowawszy list, to – co istotniejsze – sam jako pasterz wystąpił, aby walczyć z wilkami. Nie był bowiem najemnikiem, by uciekać, lecz dobrym pasterzem, który życie swoje daje za owce. O takim pasterzu Pan rzecze w Ewangelii: „Dobry pasterz życie swoje oddaje za swoje owce¹⁰⁴”. Jako pierwszy uczynił to Chrystus – a w tym Chrystusa naśladując, dla Chrystusa uczynił to także Marcelli. Chrystus oddał życie swoje za owce swoje, i Marcelli życie swoje oddał za powierzonych sobie ludzi. Bo były owe owce własnością Pana, lecz poruczone zostały Marcelemu, aby je wypasał. A poruczone mu one zostały nie tylko po to, aby je wypasał – ale także po to mu je przekazano, ażeby ich bronił. Dlatego to biedził się on, by owce te, które pierwiej wypasał, zabezpieczyć

⁹⁸ Mt 10,28.

⁹⁹ Mt 16,24.

¹⁰⁰ Marcellus papa, *Epistola II*, PL 7, 1099-1100.

¹⁰¹ Mt 5,44; Łk 6,27.

¹⁰² Rz 12,20.

¹⁰³ Łac. *chorus cante*, co czyta się tu jako *coruscante*.

¹⁰⁴ J 10,11.

teraz przed wilkami. I jak wcześniej dla nich żył, tak teraz nie odmówił dla nich umrzeć. I własną śmiercią okupił teraz ocalenie tych, którym swoje życie uprzednio już ofiarował. Albowiem oznajmia Apostoł: „Dla mnie żyć – to Chrystus, a umrzeć – to zysk”¹⁰⁵.

Stąd to, przez wzgląd na owce, pasterz nasz – jak powiedziano – choć go nie zawezwano, wystąpił przeciwko wilkom, to jest prześladowcom, wychodząc na plac publiczny; mimo że nie został przesłuchany, złożył w ofierze samego siebie; dobrowolnie oddał się rozsierzdzonemu tyranowi, mówiąc: „Powierzam się twojej łaskawości. Czemu mordujesz sługi Boże, które modlą się za twoje królestwo i za rzeczpospolitą?”¹⁰⁶. Nie wydarzyło się to w dzień, którego nie znamy, ale w dzień sławny, w dzień uroczysty, w dzień wystąpienia Marcelego, który zgromadził nieprzeliczone tłumy, kroczące w długim orszaku więźniów chrześcijańskich i ludzi zmiażdżonych rozmaitymi cierpieniami. Tego to dnia – jak już wspomniano – wystąpił Marceli; tego to dnia, nieprzymuszony, wydał się on na śmierć; i tego to dnia władcę, który szalał, doprowadził do tego, że skazał go na śmierć – i w tym naśladując Pana, który, świadom będąc wszystkiego, co miało na niego przyjść, wyszedł naprzeciw szukających Go, lecz niemogących Go znaleźć i zapytał: „Kogo szukacie?”¹⁰⁷. A kiedy Mu odpowiedzieli: „Jezusa z Nazaretu!”¹⁰⁸, rzekł: „Oto jestem”¹⁰⁹. Ponieważ zaś i w następnym swoim zdaniu podobny był Marceli do Chrystusa, który rzekł: „Jeśli przeto Mnie szukacie, pozwólcie tym odejść”¹¹⁰, pokazał, że nie chce, aby inni cierpieli, ale że sam chce cierpieć; i że nie chce, aby inni umierali, ale że sam jeden chce umrzeć. Tak, samego siebie przeznaczając na śmierć za siebie poruczonych, błogosławiony męczennik wybrał pojmanie, aby ci, za których był odpowiedzialny – jeśli to być może – zostali uwolnieni; wybrał udreki, aby jemu powierzonym udrek oszczędzono.

A prowadzonego na mękę Pana, kiedy uczniom Jego pozwolono odejść, ubiczowano – i tak samo męczennik nasz, dla upragnionego przezeń ocalenia chrześcijan, skazany został na wysmaganie batami. Toteż w opisie¹¹¹ jego męki czytamy: „Wtedy to august Maksymian, rozgniewany, nakazał, aby wymierzono biskupowi Marcelemu razy i by go odesłano”¹¹². A przyczyną

¹⁰⁵ Flp 1,21.

¹⁰⁶ ASanc II, 8.

¹⁰⁷ J 18,4.

¹⁰⁸ J 18,5.

¹⁰⁹ J 18,5.

¹¹⁰ J 18,8.

¹¹¹ Łac. *in Scriptura*.

¹¹² ASanc II, 8.

jego kaźni okazało się z całą pewnością to, iż żaden strach nie odciągał go od troskania się o ocalenie tych, których jego pieczy oddano. Albowiem na tym mu jedynie zależało, iżby chwała wiary, przez przyczynę, dla której cierpiał, była większa. Lecz nie mniej drażniło jego przeciwników, że kierował ludem chrześcijańskim. Ponieważ więc publicznie wyznał, że Chrystus jest Bogiem, to nieprzyjaciół jego ogarnął skierowany przeciw niemu szal. Ale daleko więcej jeszcze ich podżegnał, kiedy, znalazłszy się pośrodku ujadających pogan, nie przestał zawiadywać Kościołem Chrystusowym. Z tej przeto racji w *Księdze papieży*¹¹³ napisano o nim tak¹¹⁴:

Pochwycony on został i zatrzymany dlatego, że zarządzał Kościołem. Pojmał go Maksencjusz, aby zaprzeczył temu, że jest biskupem, i żeby ugiął się i złożył ofiary demonom. Lecz nieodmiennie za nic mając i wyśmiewając słowa tudzież polecenia Maksencjusza, skazany został na roboty w stajni. A kiedy tak – przez wiele dni – służył jako stajenny, traktował tę służbę jako służbę dla Pana, nie zaprzestając modlitw i postów. W miesiącu zaś dziewiątym, pewnej nocy, przyszli wszyscy jego duchowni i wyprowadzili go ze stajni. Męża błogosławionego przyjęła wówczas w swoim domu matrona imieniem Lucyna, wdowa, która z mężem swoim Markiem przeżyła lat piętnaście, a w swoim wdowieństwie przepędziła już lat dziewiętnaście¹¹⁵ – i dom swój przeznaczyła na kościół tytularny¹¹⁶ imienia błogosławionego Marcelego. Tam to dniem i nocą do Pana Jezusa Chrystusa wznoszono hymny i modły. Usłyszawszy

¹¹³ Łac. *in gestis pontificalibus*. Zob. przyp. 72.

¹¹⁴ Por. *Liber Pontificalis*, s. 55-57*.

¹¹⁵ Lucyna to jedna z przedstawicielek arystokracji, nobliwych matron, które pojawiają się na kratach *Libri pontificalis*. Wspomina się ją w biogramach papieży Korneliusza oraz właśnie naszego Marcelego. Jest to postać, jak ustalili historycy, fikcyjna. M. Ludewicz stwierdza: „[...] [Lucyna] jest najbardziej eksponowaną z kobiet wspomnianych w zbiorze papieskich biografii. Choć informacje o niej pozbawione są oparcia w wiarygodnych źródłach, jej postać może być przyczynkiem do historii mentalności członków wspólnoty Kościoła rzymskiego okresu późniejszej starożytności. Gdy w VI wieku spisywano *Liber Pontificalis*, panowało przekonanie o istotnej roli odgrywanej przez kobiety we wczesnej działalności Kościoła w stolicy cesarstwa. Warto też zauważyć, że postać niewiasty troszczącej się o godne pogrzebanie umarłych ma długi rodowód w tradycji antycznej” (M. Ludewicz, „*Pontifices et eae*”. *Wizerunki kobiet na kartach „Liber Pontificalis”*, w: *My, Wy, Oni: co i jak Starożytni myśleli o sobie i innych. Materiały pokonferencyjne*, red. W. Kopce – M. Nowak – Ł. Libowski, Kraków 2020, s. 67-69). Por. K. Cooper, *The Martyr, the Matrona and the Bishop: The Matron Lucina and the Politics of Martyr Cult in Fifth- and Sixth-century Rome*, „*Early Medieval Europe*” 8/3 (1999) s. 297-317.

¹¹⁶ Łac. *titulum*. Zob. przyp. 75.

o tym, Maksencjusz posłał i powtórnie zatrzymał błogosławionego Marcelgo. I rozkazał, aby w tym właśnie kościele rozłożyć deski, żeby móc zebrać¹¹⁷ tam i trzymać zwierzęta ze stajni¹¹⁸, i aby błogosławiony Marceli je oporządzał. Tak to, nagi, odziany w kawałek jedynie sierści, umarł on w służbie dla zwierząt. Ciało jego wzięła błogosławiona Lucyna, siedemnastego dnia przed kalendami lutowymi¹¹⁹ chowając je na cmentarzu Pryscylli przy Drodze Solnej¹²⁰.

¹¹⁷ Łac. *congregata*. Zob. Cantarella, *Piotr Czcigodny, klasztory kluniackie w północnych Włoszech*, s. 106.

¹¹⁸ Przyjmuje się, że były to konie poczty cesarskiej. Zob. Kelly, *The Oxford Dictionary of Popes*, s. 25. Dalej – zob. przyp. 128 – powie o nich Piotr „zwierzęta publiczne”, *animalia publica*. Tutaj zwierzęta te dookreśla przydawka dopełniaczowa *catabuli*. Odnotujmy, iż autor *Liber pontificalis* w odniesieniu do stodoły, na pracę w której skazany został Marceli, używa słowa *catabulum*. Komentatorzy *Księgi papieża* zauważają więc: „*Catabulum* określa stajnię dla zwierząt pociągowych używanych w transporcie publicznym, a również stację zmiany zaprzęgów” (*Liber Pontificalis*, s. 56*, przyp. D).

¹¹⁹ Czyli 16 stycznia. Zob. np. Wikarjak, *Gramatyka opisowa języka łacińskiego*, s. 159. W wypadku męczennika starożytnego dzień jego śmierci tożsamy jest najczęściej z dniem złożenia jego ciała do grobu oraz z dniem obchodu jego liturgicznego wspomnienia: „Gminy chrześcijańskie z pierwszych wieków naszej ery – gnębione ustawicznie szykanami ze strony cesarstwa rzymskiego i społeczności pogańskiej – chlubiły się tymi spośród swoich członków, którzy oddali życie za wiarę. Wielką czią otaczano również biskupów, będących niejako ojcami i przewodnikami tych społeczności. A ponieważ jednostki owe podtrzymywały niejednokrotnie wiarę całej gminy, przeto starano się na trwałe zachować pamięć o nich. Stąd też już od II stulecia powstawały spisy zmarłych hierarchów oraz miejscowych męczenników, przyporządkowujące każdemu z nich dzień, w którym dana postać miała być w sposób szczególny wspominana w trakcie celebracji liturgicznych. Przy czym dzień kommemoracji pokrywał się najczęściej z datą złożenia do grobu ciała tej osoby – *depositio* – co też [z] kolei następowało zwykle w tym samym dniu co jej śmierć (rozumianym tu jako *dies natalis* – dzień narodzin dla nieba)” (J. Małocha, *Ewolucja adnotacji we wczesnośredniowiecznych łacińskich kalendarzach liturgicznych i martyrologiach na przykładzie elogii św. Eulalii*, w: *Interdyscyplinarny charakter badań językowych*, red. J. Małocha, Kraków 2017, s. 55). Świadectwem antycznym, jakie można w tym kontekście przywołać, jest dwunasty z listów Cypriana, napisany w 250 roku w czasie prześladowań za cesarza Decjusza, w którym czytamy: „Wreszcie zapisujcie też dzień ich zgonu, abyśmy mogli uroczystie obchodzić ich pamiętkę między wspomnieniami o męczennikach. Wprawdzie nasz najwierniejszy i najoddańszy brat Tertullus między innymi objawami swej troski i opieki, jaką otacza braci we wszystkich ich potrzebach, okazuje to i względem ich zwłok, zapisując [daty ich męczeństwa]; niech więc je dalej zapisuje i donosi mi dni, kiedy nasi błogosławieni bracia przeszli w więzieniu przez chwalebłą śmierć do nieśmiertelności. Będziemy tu, czcąc ich pamięć, składać dary i sprawować ofiary, a już wkrótce z pomocą Pana będziemy to czynić razem z wami” (Cyprian, *Listy*, tł. O. Szoldrski, red. E. Stanuła, PSP I, Warszawa 1969, s. 56).

¹²⁰ Zob. przyp. 71.

A takie same informacje znajdujemy również w opisie męki Marcelego¹²¹.

Teraz więc, bracia, rozważcie, czy pociąga was znakomitość tego męczeństwa. Przyjrzyjcie się chwale tego wyznania. Zobaczcie najwyższego kapłana Boga, jak składa w ofierze najpierw wiele różnych utrapień, a w końcu samego siebie. Wcześniej składał Bogu ofiarę miłą, lecz teraz złożył Mu całopalenie znacznie miłsze. Całopalenie – powiadam – tłuste, całopalenie przyjemne, całopalenie wyborne – według słów psalmisty. Rzecz on wszelako: „Złożę Ci całopalenie wyborne”¹²².

Szpik buduje kości, kości zaś podtrzymują ciało. I ciało nie może istnieć bez kości, kości zaś pozbawione szpiku wnet się wysuszają. Ciało oznacza ludzi słabych, kości oznaczają ludzi mocnych, szpik natomiast symbolizuje obfitość miłości. Tak więc Chrystus męstwem mocnych wspiera w Kościele słabość słabych, a siłę mocnych tuczy z kolei żyzną swoją miłością. Błogosławiony Marcelego zatem, utuczony tą obfитоścią, męstwem swojej duszy i słabych podtrzymał, i na ostatek złożył Bogu ofiarę przyjemną z samego siebie. Pojmany – mówię – przymuszany był, aby wyparł się tego, że jest biskupem, i aby złamał się, składając ofiary demonom. O bezbożności, czemuż to przymuszasz świętego naszego męczennika, aby zaprzeczył temu, co jest prawdą, i wyznał, co prawdą nie jest? Dlaczego cieszy cię wyznanie fałszu, a przeraża cię wyznanie prawdy? Dlaczego przynaglasz tego człeka, aby zapał się dóbr prawdziwych – ty, która męczarniami skłaniać nawykłaś do tego, co bezwzględnie złe? Albowiem oskarżonych zdręczasz, chociaż nie dopuścili się tego, co najgorsze, i świętych rozszarpujesz, chociaż pokazują to, co najlepsze. Dlaczegoż – pytam się – nie jesteś w stanie wysłuchać świadectwa świętości – ty, która tak skrzętnie wydobywasz z człowieka dowód nieprawości? Lecz bardzo słusznie, że przymuszasz do kłamstwa, wszak zadajesz ty się ze sprawcą kłamstwa, z tym, który, jak mówi Ewangelia, „kłamcą jest i ojcem kłamstwa”¹²³. Przy czym, pozostając zakłamaną, nieprawość nie rozumie, że uczeń prawdy nie jest sługą kłamstwa.

Stąd to błogosławiony Marcelego pogardza, wyśmiewa i drwi sobie z poleceń prześladowcy; wyznaje Chrystusa, wyznaje, iż jest uczniem Chrystusa i z przykazu Chrystusa biskupem ludu chrześcijańskiego. Z tego powodu zamykają go w stajni i bacznie pilnują, aby nie zdołał z niej wyjść. Ale nie jest władna srogość ludzka uwięzić tego, którego boska łagodność postanawia uwolnić. I jak przez anioła wyprowadził

¹²¹ ASanc II, 9.

¹²² Ps 66,15. Por. Ps 20,4.

¹²³ J 8,44.

niegdyś Bóg z więzienia Piotra¹²⁴, tak przez duchowieństwo wyprowadza teraz ze stajni Marcelego. I oby nikt nie śmiał twierdzić, że nie jest to cud tak jawny, jak tamten, bo nie stało się to przez anioła! Jakże bowiem ludzie nieuzbrojeni zdołaliby wydostać Marcelego spod tak czujnej straży, gdyby nie wyrwała go stamtąd moc Boża? Ale dlaczego dał się on wyprowadzić, godząc się odwlec chwilę przyjęcia przygotowanej już dlań korony męczeństwa? Otóż bynajmniej nie dlatego, iż bał się on śmierci, gdyż później chętnie ją przyjął; lecz przez wzgląd na lud Boży postanowił on do czasu ocalić samego siebie, widząc, że w tak wielkiej zawierusze jest on wiernym bardzo jeszcze potrzebny. Kapłan nasz apostołski i w tym poszedł śladami ksiąg apostołskich: Piotra, który – o czym już napomknęliśmy – uwolniony został z więzienia, i Pawła, którego w Damaszku spuszczone z muru w koszu¹²⁵. Ani jeden, ani drugi nie porzucił Kościoła; ani jeden, ani drugi nie uciekł przed śmiercią, ale obydwoj szukali tego, co pożyteczniejsze. Tak i męczennik dzisiejszy, skoro opuszcza więzienie, pokazuje, czego poza więzieniem szuka. Wszelako dom błogosławionej Lucyny – na jej prośbę – konsekrując na kościół, w środku miasta, przy Drodze Łacińskiej¹²⁶, odprawia Msze, w których każdy może uczestniczyć, przepowiadaniem swoim naucza lud chrześcijański, szafuje sakramentami i wieloma zachętami umacnia wiernych. Codziennie, pozyskując ich dla wiary, do wspólnoty wierzących włącza także niezmiernie wielu pogan. Wszystkie dni wypełnia głosem Bożego słowa, a noce – modlitwą¹²⁷. I to jest racja, dla której błogosławiony męczennik znów zostaje przez tyrana zaaresztowany. Oto kościół zamienia się w stajnię i gromadzi się w nim zwierzęta publiczne¹²⁸, a papież, dozorowany przez czujne straże, zostaje stajennym. Szmat czasu para się on tym jakże trudnym i jakże niesprawiedliwym zadaniem: nagi, okryty jeno włosienicą, z wielką cierpliwością służy zwierzętom. Nie zgładzono go mieczem, nie rzucono go w ogień, nie zatopiono go też ani nie strącono w przepaść, iżby umierając, znoju nie zamienił zbyt szybko w odpoczynek, a cierpienia – w radość; lecz oddelegowano go do takiej właśnie posługi, aby nie przez ogień, ale przez niegodność tejże posługi

¹²⁴ Por. Dz 12,1-11.

¹²⁵ Por. Dz 9,20-25.

¹²⁶ Łac. *via Latina*.

¹²⁷ Wraz z tym zdaniem kończy się fragment, którego nie mamy w edycji Martène'a/Migne'a (początek tego fragmentu sygnalizuje przyp. 78). Na temat różnicy w tekstach kolejnych edycji, zob. *Wstęp do przekładu*, akapit trzeci i czwarty.

¹²⁸ Łac. *animalia publica*. Zob. przyp. 118.

doszczętnie strawiony został jego duch i aby ciało jego, utrudzone ponad miarę, zostało starte – aby jak najwięcej czasu upłynęło, nim skona. Żeby przebywając w straszliwym smrodzie, nie mógł go zdzierżyć; żeby widok nieczystości przyprawiał go o mdłości; żeby regularne i ciężkie roboty wyniszczały jego ciało; żeby zarówno głód mocno mu doskwierał, jak i nagość zwiększała jego nędzę; żeby zaznając wielorakich trudności, będąc coraz słabszym, ale żadnym sposobem nie mogąc umrzeć, powoli dogorywał.

Tak to, nie tyle zwierzętom, co Chrystusowi służąc, wspaniały nasz męczennik dotarł do tej chwały sług, o której na początku kazania powiedzieliśmy, a o której sam Chrystus Pan mówi: „Gdzie Ja jestem, tam i sługa Mój będzie”¹²⁹. Do tej to więc chwały, dzięki dobrej swojej służbie, wyniesiony został mąż błogosławiony, by wstąpił tam, gdzie przebywa Boży Syn. Jaką zaś – po tylu mozołach – posiadzie on radość, poucza Pan, zwracając się do uczniów tymi słowami: „I was także spotykają teraz jakieś smutki, ale zobaczę was znowu i podówczas serce wasze się uraduje i radości waszej nikt wam nie zabierze”¹³⁰. Spotykają przeto teraz świętych smutki: nie dlatego, że niechętnie znoszą oni zło świata, ale dlatego, że choć unikają oni – co naturalne – owych trosk uczuciowych, to one jednak ich dopadają i niepokoją. Sam nawet Pan zechciał przyjąć owe troski czy smutki, rzecze wszak w Ewangelii: „Zmieszana jest teraz Moja dusza”¹³¹ – i jeszcze: „Smutna jest dusza Moja aż do śmierci”¹³². Tego samego doświadczają święci mężowie, niewolni przecież – jak wspomniano – od uczuć cielesnych, jak czytamy w psalmie: „Idąc, szli i płakali, niosąc swoje ziarna”¹³³. To samo dotknęło Apostoła Piotra, któremu powiedziano: „Wyciągniesz swoje ramiona, a inny cię przepasze i poprowadzi, dokąd nie chcesz”¹³⁴. I, rzeczywiście, chciał Piotr cierpieć dla Chrystusa; bo gdyby tego nie chciał, nie cierpiałby. Chciał on – powiadam – cierpieć dla Chrystusa, lecz woli ducha opierała się słabość ciała, o czym uczy Pan: „Duch wprawdzie jest stanowczy, ale ciało – słabe”¹³⁵. Tego rodzaju smutek jak na wszystkich uczniów Chrystusowych, tak spadł i na błogosławionego Marcelego, następcę błogosławionego Apostoła Piotra, a przezeń zasłużył on na to, by

¹²⁹ J 12,26.

¹³⁰ J 16,22.

¹³¹ J 12,27.

¹³² Mk 14,34.

¹³³ Ps 126,6.

¹³⁴ J 21,18.

¹³⁵ Mt 26,41.

zażywać następującej po nim radości. „Zobaczę was – oznajmia Chrystus – i serce wasze się uraduje”¹³⁶. Spojrzę na was łaskawymi oczyma mojej życzliwości; będę patrzył na was, nie odwracając już więcej twarzy swojej od was; przyjrzę się wam i rozpoznam w was swoich domowników; zobaczę was i wypłacę wam nagrodę za minione trudy, i pielęgnować was będę na moim łonie jako synów moich. Rozraduje się wasze serce i nie będzie mogło znaleźć w sobie żadnego smutku; rozraduje się wasze serce nie połowicznie, ale zupełnie; rozraduje się serce, to jest cały człowiek nasz wewnętrzny¹³⁷; rozraduje się serce, które jedno może się cieszyć; rozraduje

¹³⁶ J 16,22.

¹³⁷ Człowiek wewnętrzny i człowiek zewnętrzny to z jednej strony przeciwstawiające się sobie nawzajem, z drugiej zaś strony uzupełniające, dopełniające się kategorie Pawłowe. Zob. Rz 7,22-23: „Albowiem wewnętrzny człowiek [τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον, *interiorem hominem*] [we mnie] ma upodobanie zgodne z Prawem Bożym. W członkach zaś moich spostrzegam prawo inne, które toczy walkę z prawem mojego umysłu i podbija mnie w niewolę pod prawo grzechu mieszkającego w moich członkach”; 2Kor 4,16: „Dlatego to nie poddajemy się zwątpieniu, chociaż bowiem niszczyje nasz człowiek zewnętrzny [ὁ ἔξω ἡμῶν ἄνθρωπος, *is qui foris est noster homo*], to jednak ten, który jest wewnątrz [ὁ ἔσω ἡμῶν, *is qui intus est*], odnawia się z dnia na dzień”; Ef 3,14-16: „Dlatego zginam kolana moje przed Ojcem, od którego bierze nazwę wszelki ród na niebie i na ziemi, aby według bogactwa swej chwały sprawił w was przez Ducha swego wzmocnienie siły wewnętrznego człowieka [τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον, *interiore homine*]”. Skonstatować chyba można, iż każdy późniejszy autor odwołujący się do owych dwóch kategorii i szafujący nimi w swoich wywodach rozumie je w jakiejś mierze tak samo, jak wszyscy inni sięgający po nie i używający ich myśliciele, a zarazem inaczej, oryginalnie, na sposób sobie właściwy. Co do tego rozumienia interesujących nas tu kategorii przez autorów chrześcijańskich osobliwego, to albo nadają im autorzy ci ogólny sens specyficzny, albo ich sens Pawłowy odpowiednio tylko profilują, zależnie od kwestii, do rozwiązania której je aplikują. Przykładowo, Józef Gnilka tak opracowuje pojęcia człowieka wewnętrznego i zewnętrznego, starając się wyeksplikować to, co w nich w rozumieniu Apostoła Narodów, jak sądzi, istotne: „Człowiek zewnętrzny to człowiek fizyczny, ziemski; jego siły ulegają wyniszczeniu, jest narażony na choroby i zranienia, jest to ziemskie, kruche naczynie, w którym jest przechowywany cenny skarb. Mimo iż ta terminologia jest bardzo biska hellenistycznego obrazu świata, to jednak człowiek wewnętrzny nie oznacza tutaj rozumowania (*logismos*), który – jak u Platona – kieruje popędami, nie chodzi też o czynnik zapewniający niezachwianą postawę człowieka pośród zewnętrznych przeciwności; tego wewnętrznego człowieka należy tu niewątpliwie rozumieć w relacji do Chrystusa-*eikon*, w którego my mamy się przemieniać i już teraz jesteśmy przemienieni. Tym samym oczywiste jest, że wewnętrznego człowieka nie należy kojarzyć z dualistyczną relacją duszy do ciała ani też z odwieczną świetlistą iskierką, jaką według nauki gnostyków nosi w sobie człowiek. Obraz Chrystusa, którego odbicie ma w sobie Paweł – i każdy chrześcijanin – pochodzi od Boga i jest przyjmowany przez wiarę; stanowi dar i zadania. W człowieku

się wasze serce, wolne od wszelkiego nieszczęścia i pełne wszelkiej szczęśliwości. I radości waszej nikt wam nie zabierze¹³⁸. A kiedy serce wasze cieszyć się już będzie wraz ze mną, to ponieważ wraz ze mną się też smuciło, radości waszej nikt od was nie zabierze¹³⁹. Nie bójcie się, że radości, która wypełni wasze serce, zostanieie kiedyś pozbawieni. Nie bójcie się, że wielka radość, którą wam dam, pewnego razu zostanie od was odsunięta. Toż być nie może, iż kiedyś się ona skończy! Nie tak się ona zaczyna, żeby po wielu wiekach sięgnąć miała swego kresu. I nie będzie się ona wraz z upływem czasu pomniejszała, gdyż daje ją ten, w którym nie ma czasu. Nie może przecież wyczerpać się radość, która nie ma w sobie ani początku, ani końca! Tą to właśnie waszą radością ja jestem, który zawsze jestem tym, czym jestem. Z radości tej, jeśli już jej dostąpicie, nikt was odrzec nie zdoła, ponieważ nikt nie jest w mocy mnie odłączyć od was.

Do tej radości wprowadzany jest dnia dzisiejszego – po smutnej męce – błogosławiony Marceli i przed majestatem wiekuistego króla przedstawia się go jako żołnierza walecznego, niosącego w swoim ręku wiele zwycięskich palm. Albowiem umiera dziś, składając wspaniałe wyznanie wiary, męczennik i Boży kapłan – i przechodzi ze stajni do królestwa Bożego, naśladując w śmierci swojej narodziny Bożego Syna. Zaiste, bracia, narodziny błogosławionego Marcelego bardzo są podobne do narodzin Chrystusa! Podobne są co do czasu: pierwsze wszakże nie nastąpiły wcale długo po wtórych. Z kolei miejsce narodzenia się Chrystusa jest bardzo podobne do miejsca kaźni Marcelego. W takim bowiem miejscu drugi skończył, w jakim pierwszy się narodził. Bo tam wziął Chrystus początek swój czasowy¹⁴⁰, gdzie Marceli – początek życia, które nie będzie miało końca; i tam narodził się Marceli do wieczności, gdzie Chrystus istnieć zaczął w czasie¹⁴¹. Szopa przyjęła rodzące się dziecko – stodoła przyjęła zadęrganego męczennika. Znosił najwyższy majestat lichy posłanie – i znosił kapłan najwyższy zanieczyszczone mieszkanie. Zawinięte w biedne pieluszki leżało boskie dzieciątko – a odziana w wór kłujący uwijała się pogardzona niewinność. Narodzony Chrystus dla będących przy Nim zwierząt stał się widowiskiem – a Marceli, zwierzęta oporządzając, stał się dla nich pośmie-

wewnętrzny upodobniamy się do Chrystusa. Paweł może tu służyć za wzór” (J. Gnilka, *Paweł z Tarsu. Apostoł i świadek*, tłum. W. Szymona, Kraków 2001, s. 286).

¹³⁸ Por. J 16,22.

¹³⁹ Por. J 16,22.

¹⁴⁰ Łac. „Habuit ibi Christus temporale principium [...]”.

¹⁴¹ Łac. „[...] [U]bi fuit Christo exortus temporalis”. W jednym i drugim wypadku chodzi, rzecz jasna, o narodziny Chrystusa w ciele.

wiskiem. Narodzonemu w szopie boskiemu chłopięciu anielski chór śpiewa na wysokościach chwałę – konający dziś w stodole męczennik do chwały anielskiej wkracza. Wkracza do chwały, zaliczony do rzeszy obywateli niebios, lecz na ziemi pozostawia po sobie ten sam pokój, który zwiastowali ludziom aniołowie. W nim bowiem miecz wrogów – jakby wycięczony – spoczął; a skoro Kościół został oczyszczony, rozpalony piec się wystudził. Był wszelako Marceli ostatnim z kapłanów apostoelskich, który w epoce prześladowań wszczynanych przez władców pogańskich, składając świadectwo wiary, zasłużył na to, by zostać ukoronowanym. Spośród tychże kapłanów męczeński bój rozpoczął Piotr, ostatni zaś z nich, Marceli, mężnie walcząc, bój ów zakończył, a kończąc ów bój, osiągnął początku, który jest bez końca, który z Ojcem i Duchem Świętym żyje i króluje – Bóg przez wszystkie wieki wieków. Amen.

Z języka łacińskiego przełożył,
wstępem i komentarzami opatrzył
ks. Łukasz Libowski¹⁴²

¹⁴² Ks. mgr Łukasz Libowski, kapłan diecezji opolskiej, student studiów magisterskich z filologii klasycznej w Instytucie Literaturoznawstwa Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego Jana Pawła II oraz doktorant w Katedrze Historii Filozofii Starożytnej i Średniowiecznej w Instytucie Filozofii KUL; e-mail: lukasz.libowski@gmail.com; ORCID: 0000-0001-6175-0823.

Recenzje

**Anne Bernet, *Monika Matka Św. Augustyna*, przekład Paweł Borkowski,
Wydawnictwo eSPe, Kraków 2020, s. 163**

Na temat św. Moniki ukazało się wiele opracowań, w tym polskich¹. Każde jednak nowe i dobre opracowanie jest nader użyteczne. Książka Anne Bernet poświęcona św. Monice jest mocno osadzona na realiach historycznych i geograficzno-kulturowym tle, a przede wszystkim przekazach historycznych, zwłaszcza na *Wyznaniach* św. Augustyna. Autorka przeprowadza wnikliwe analizy, pisze z pasją, ciekawie, z dużą dozą fantazji autorskiej. Opowieść tę przyjemnie się czyta, jest bardzo pouczająca, ale autorka nie uniknęła pewnych potknięć.

I tak pisze na s. 7, przyp. 11: „Oficjalny akt urodzenia Kościoła afrykańskiego datowany jest na rok 180, wtedy bowiem poniosło śmierć męczeńską czterech chrześcijan pochodzących z Madaury koło Tagasty. Jest to pierwszy zapisany ślad ich istnienia, z pewnością dawniejszego”. Tyle Autorka. Recenzent uważa inaczej. 17 lipca w 180 roku poniosła śmierć męczeńską w Kartaginie podczas prześladowania w północnej Afryce, grupa 12 chrześcijan, byli to scyllitańscy męczennicy. *Acta martyrum Scillitanorum* są najstarszymi pismami chrześcijańskimi w języku łacińskim. Poprośmy samego Świętego Augustyna o wyjaśnienie. Liczne

¹ P. Skarga, *Żywot św. Moniki*, w: *Żywoty Świętych*, t. 2, Kraków 1934, s. 232-237; A. Stępniewska, *Gdzie ty, tam i on*, VoxP 14 (1988) s. 125-132; J.J. Jundziłł, *Ideal żony i matki w „Wyznaniach” św. Augustyna a klasyczne wzorce rzymskie*, VoxP 15 (1988) s. 817-830; J. Milewska, *Monika jako ideał matki i żony w „Wyznaniach św. Augustyna*, w: *Partnerka, matka, opiekunka. Status kobiety w starożytności i w średniowieczu*, red. J.J. Jundziłł, Bydgoszcz 1999, s. 230-235; J. Mirewicz, *Monika – matka płacząca i pocieszona*, w: *Współtwórcy Europy*, Kraków 2003, s. 47-55; J.T. Typek, *Ogrody Mediolanu. Powieść historyczna*, Lublin – Zamość 2012; J.T. Typek, *Exultet Moniki. Powieść historyczna*, Lublin – Zamość 2013; A. Eckmann, *Monika z Tagasty jako humanistka i święta*, w: *Ut in omnibus glorificetur Deus. Księga pamiątkowa ofiarowana Siostrze Profesor Ambrozji Jadwidze Kalinowskiej OSB*, red. M. Jodkowski, Olsztyn 2013, s. 101-116; A. Stępniewska, *Gdzie ty, tam i on. Sen św. Moniki, matki św. Augustyna (Confessiones III 11, 19)*, w: A. Stępniewska, *Matki Ojców Kościoła*, Lublin 2015, s. 9-17.

Augustyńskie mowy (*sermones*) bowiem, wygłaszane z okazji wspomnienia rocznicy przelewu krwi przez chrześcijan, tworzą historię kultu męczenników i ukazują ich wielkość². Spośród najślawniejszych afrykańskich męczenników Augustyn wymienia św. Cypriana, czczonego we wszystkich krajach, wielkiego biskupa Kartaginy³, dwie znakomite kobiety: Perpetuę i Felicytę⁴, męczenników scylitańskich⁵, Theogenesa, biskupa Hippony⁶, Kastusa i Emiliusa⁷, diakona Mariana i lektora Jakuba⁸, Kwadrata, biskupa Uteki⁹, bogate matrony: Fabię Salsę i Kryspinę¹⁰, grupę „Viginti Martyres” i „Octo Martyres”¹¹, św. Feliksa i Genadiusza¹². Jeśli zaś chodzi o śmierć męczeńską „czterech chrześcijan pochodzących z Madaury koło Tagasty”, jak pisze autorka, dowiadujemy się o nich z korespondencji Augustyna z Maksymem z Madaury (*Ep.* 16 i 17, NBA 21, s. 76-87). Maksym podaje ich imiona: Miggin, Saname, Namfamon, Lucytas. Maksym dał w swym liście pewne sformułowanie, na podstawie którego wielu historyków starożytnego Kościoła twierdziło, że chrześcijańscy męczennicy cierpieli w Madaurze i ponieśli męczeństwo w tym samym czasie, co męczennicy ze Scillium, albo nawet wcześniej:

² A. Eckmann, *Kult męczenników afrykańskich w pismach św. Augustyna*, VoxP 50 (2010) s. 183-188.

³ Augustinus, *Sermo* 310, 1, NBA 33,632: „Spiritus Sanctus doceat nos in hac hora quae oporteat dicere; dicturi enim sumus aliquid de laude Cypriani gloriosissimi martyris, cuius Natalem hodie, sicut nostis, celebramus. Quod nomen sic frequentat Ecclesia, id est Natales, ut Natales vocet pretiosas martyrum mortes [...]. Quis enim hodie, non dicam in hac nostra civitate, sed plane per Africam totam transmarinasque regiones, non Christianus solum, sed Paganus, aut Iudaeus, aut etiam haereticus poterit inveniri, qui non nobiscum dicat Natalem martyris Cypriani? Quid est hoc, fratres? Quando natus sit, ignoramus; et quia hodie passus est, Natalem eius hodie celebremus. Sed illum diem non celebraremus, etsi nossemus”. Zob. też: Augustinus, *Sermones* 311-313; 313/A-313/F.

⁴ Augustinus, *Sermo* 280, 1, NBA 33, s. 98. Zob. też: Augustinus, *Sermones* 281-282.

⁵ *Possidii indiculus*, PL 46, 19; Denis, *Sermo* 16: *in natale sanctorum martyrum Scillitanorum*, MA I, s. 75-80.

⁶ Augustinus, *Sermo* 273, 7, NBA 33, s. 8.

⁷ Augustinus, *Sermo* 285, NBA 33, s. 134.

⁸ Augustinus, *Sermo* 284, NBA 33, s. 120.

⁹ Denis, *Sermo* 18, *habitus in natale martyris Quadrati*, MA I, s. 90-97.

¹⁰ Augustinus, *Enarratio in Psalmum* 120, 13, NBA 27, s. 1454; Augustinus, *Enarratio in Psalmum* 137, 3, NBA 28, s. 434.

¹¹ Augustinus, *De civitate Dei* 22, 8, 9, NBA 5/3, s. 336, 338; Augustinus *Sermo* 356, 10, NBA 34, s. 268.

¹² Augustinus, *De miraculis Sancti Stephani Protomartyris* 1, 2, PL 41, 834n.

Kto bowiem może znieść, aby dawano pierwszeństwo Migginowi przed Jowiszem gromowładnym, a Sanamie – przed Junoną, Minerwą, Wenerą i Westą, a przed wszystkimi bogami nieśmiertelnymi – co za niegodziwość – arcymęczennikowi Namfamonowi? Wśród nich cieszy się również nie mniejszą czcią Lucytas i inni niezliczeni o imionach wstrętnych dla bogów i ludzi. Oni bowiem, mając sumienie obciążone zbrodniczymi czynami, dodawali pod pozorem chwalebnej śmierci zbrodnie do swych zbrodni i w ten sposób zhańbieni znaleźli śmierć stosowną do swych obyczajów i czynów¹³.

Arcymęczennik (archimartyr) Namfamon jest, jak widać, centralną postacią w przytoczonym liście. Historycy starszego pokolenia, przyjmując termin „archimartyr” jako równoznaczny z „protomartyr”, uznali Namfamona za pierwszego męczennika Afryki¹⁴. Tymczasem termin „archimartyr” nie stanowi synonimu do terminu „protomartyr”. Zarówno *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* (TLL II 462), jak i Du Gange (*Glossarium Mediae et Infimae Latinitatis* I, s. 368; zob. też P. de Labriolle, *La reaction païenne. Etude sur polémique antichrétienne du I er au VI e siècle*, Paris 1950, s. 445) przytaczają jedynie fragment z listu Maksyma do Augustyna. To, co oba te słowniki mówią na ten temat, można przedstawić graficznie w sposób następujący: „archi” nie przedstawia punktu startowego w linii horyzontalnej, ale najwyższy punkt w linii wertykalnej. „Archi” i „proto” różnią się dokładnie jak „główny” i „pierwszy”. Namfamon był najważniejszym, a nie pierwszym z męczenników. Męczennicy, których wspomina Maksym, nie musieli cierpieć w tym samym czasie w Madaurze, co męczennicy w Scillium. Wczytując się w list Maksyma, można przyjąć, że znał on osobiście Namfamona, Miggina, Sanaę i Lucytasa i na podstawie tej osobistej znajomości uznał ich za łotrów. Jeśli więc Maksym znał osobiście tę grupę męczenników, musieli oni cierpieć w tym czasie, kiedy autor listu był młodym człowiekiem, który interesował się sprawami publicznymi. Można przypuszczać, iż ich śmierć nastąpiła w latach 340-380. Kim była ta grupa męczenników, która zasłużyła na tak gwałtowny w formie

¹³ Augustinus, *Ep.* 16, 2, NBA 21, s. 76 i 78: „Quis enim ferat Jovi fulmina vibranti praeferrī Migginem, Junoni, Minervae, Veneri, Vestaeque Sanaem et cunctis, proh nefas! diis immortalibus archimartyrem Namphamonem? inter quos Lucitas etiam haud minore cultu suspicitur, atque alii interminato numero (diis hominibusque odiosa nomina) qui conscientia nefandorum facinorum, specie gloriosae mortis, scelera sua sceleribus cumulantes, dignum moribus factisque suis exitum maculati repperunt”.

¹⁴ A. Eckmann, *Problemy filozoficzno-religijne w korespondencji św. Augustyna z Maksymem z Madaury*, „Roczniki Humanistyczne” 33/3 (1985) s. 103-123.

opis Maksyma? W opisie tym można dostrzec podobieństwo z antydonatystycznymi dziełami Optata i Augustyna. Sformułowania Maksyma odpowiadają temu, co mówi Optat o donatystach: „[...] personas vestras iam pro Deo habere noscuntur”¹⁵. Fraza Maksyma „alii interminato numero” odpowiada dokładnie donatystycznym bandom tego okresu. Optat pisze o cirkumcelionach uśmiercanych przez Taurinusa: „[...] in loco Octaviensi occisi sunt plurimi, detruncati sunt multi, quorum corpora usque in hodiernum per dealbatas aras aut mensas potuerunt numerari”¹⁶. Augustyn mówił o samobójstwach donatystów: „[...] isto modo tot milia moriuntur”¹⁷, a ich czyny charakteryzuje jako „horrenda facinora”¹⁸, „apertissima facinora et scelera”¹⁹, „tam magna scelera”²⁰, „nefanda scelera”²¹, „manifestis flagitiis et facinoribus perditis et inquinati”²², „pro sceleribus quibus violenter saeviunt nefarieque vivunt”²³. Augustyn mówi o męczennikach donatystach, że „specie gloriosae mortis” wybierają utratę życia²⁴, „Ista Cicumcellionum est insania, non martyrum gloria”²⁵. Paralelizm przytoczonych miejsc prowadzi do wniosku, by umieścić Namfamona i jego towarzyszy w połowie IV wieku. Ścisłe podobieństwa językowe Maksyma, Optata i Augustyna dowodzą, że Miggin, Sanae, Namfamon i Lucytas byli z pewnością cirkumcelionami. Ich śmierć nie jest niespodzianką. Podobny los spotkał Donata z Bagai i Markulusa²⁶. Maksym mógł doświadczyć ataków cirkumcelionów przeciw pogaństwu. Z pewnością widział ich atak na prawo i ład. Jego oburzenie z powodu naruszających zasady współżycia band przestępców nie jest większe niż Augustyna: „Vivunt ut latrones, mo-

¹⁵ Optatus, *De schismate donatistarum* 2, 21, CSEL 26, s. 59.

¹⁶ Optatus, *De schismate donatistarum* 3, 4, CSEL 26, s. 82.

¹⁷ Augustinus, *Contra Gaudentium Donatistarum Episcopum* I 29, 33, NBA 16/2, s. 482.

¹⁸ Augustinus, *Ep.* 134, 2, NBA 22, s. 122.

¹⁹ Augustinus, *Contra partem Donati post gesta* 17, 22, CSEL 53, s. 121: „[...] pro apertissimis facinoribus et sceleribus suis; Post collationem contra donatistas liber unus”. Por. Augustinus, *Contra partem Donati post gesta* 17, 22, NBA 16/2, s. 260.

²⁰ Augustinus, *Contra Cresconium* III 43, 47, NBA 16/1, s. 250.

²¹ Augustinus, *Contra Gaudentium* I 36, 46, NBA 16/2, s. 504, 506.

²² Augustinus, *De unico baptismo* 8, 14, NBA 16/1, s. 480.

²³ Augustinus, *Breviculus conlationis cum Donatistis* 3, 8, 13, NBA 16/2, s. 146.

²⁴ Augustinus, *Ep.* 88, 8; 105, 5; Augustinus, *Contra litteras Petiliani* 2, 184; Augustinus, *Contra Gaudentium* I 26, 29; 27, 31; Augustinus, *Contra Creconium* III 42, 46.

²⁵ Augustinus, *Contra Gaudentium* I 26, 29, NBA 16/2, s. 474.

²⁶ P. Monceaux, *Histoire littéraire l'Afrique chrétienne*, t. 4, Paris 1912, s. 155.

riuntur ut circumcelliones, honorantur ut martyres”²⁷. Reasumując krótką analizę korespondencji odnoszącej się do „męczenników” wymienionych przez Maksyma, należy stwierdzić, że te cztery osoby nie były ściśle mówiąc męczennikami, lecz cirkumcelionami, bo „martyres non facit poena, sed causa”²⁸. Datę ich należy przesunąć do około połowy IV wieku. Kultu oddawanego im przez donatystów nie można ograniczyć tylko do Madaury²⁹.

Na s. 46 pięknej opowieści o Monice czytamy: „W Madaurze nie było już wspólnoty chrześcijańskiej i odrodziło się pogaństwo”. Wydaje się, że była. Święty Augustyn w korespondencji ze swoim nauczycielem, Maksymem z Madaury, mówi o rozwoju religii chrześcijańskiej. Chrześcijaństwo odnosi zwycięstwo, ponieważ w Madaurze ma swój kościół³⁰.

Augustyn pisze w *Wyznaniach*, że Monika pragnąc ocalić syna, zwróciła się pewnego razu do biskupa, który uchodził za dobrego znawcę Pisma Świętego, aby zechciał podyskutować z jej synem i przywrócić go Kościołowi. Autor *Wyznań* nie wymienia z imienia biskupa. Tagasta w tym czasie nie była siedzibą biskupią. Mógł nim być Antygon, biskup Madaury, który w 349 roku przybył na synod do Kartaginy. Jednak biskup nie podjął dyskusji z Augustynem, pocieszając Monikę, że on też był w młodości manichejczykiem i kiedy przekonał się o fałszywości tej sekty, opuścił ją. Tak samo postąpi Augustyn. Kiedy jednak Monika nalegała, zniecierpliwiony odpowiedział: „Zostaw mnie, idź w pokoju. Nie może się to stać, żeby syn takich łez miał zginąć”³¹.

Autorka, pisząc o bujnym życiu Augustyna z aktorkami, artystkami, tancerkami (s. 58), wydaje się mocno przesadzać, ale to fantazja autorki, w opowieści jest to pewnie dozwolone. Augustyn pisze *Wyznania* jako młody biskup, więc patrzy na swą przeszłość bardzo krytycznie, oceniał siebie bardzo surowo. Spowiadał się Bogu w taki sposób, aby to ludzie słyszeli. Codziennie spowiadał się Stwórcy, bo bezpieczniej jest ufać Jego miłosierdziu niż własnej niewinności.

²⁷ Augustinus, *Ep.* 88, 8, NBA 21, s. 764; Augustinus, *Contra Gaudentium* I 28, 32, NBA 16/2, s. 480.

²⁸ Augustinus, *Enarratio in Psalmum* 34, 2, 13, NBA 25, s. 710; Augustinus, *Contra litteras Petiliani* VII 2.

²⁹ A. Eckmann, *Dialog Świętego Augustyna ze światem pogańskim w świetle jego korespondencji*, Lublin 1987, s. 153-162.

³⁰ Augustinus, *Ep.* 17, 5, NBA 21, s. 86.

³¹ Augustinus, *Confessiones* 3, 12, 21, NBA 1, s. 78; Św. Augustyn, *Wyznania*, tł. Z. Kubiak, Warszawa 1987, s. 61.

Autorka pisze też: „Od kiedy przestał wierzyć w Boga, wierzył w cokolwiek – to logiczne” (s. 82). Wydaje się, że i tu autorka w swej pięknej opowieści nie tylko przesadza, ale i myli się. Augustyn zawsze wierzył w Boga, wychowany w domu po chrześcijańsku³², w dzieciństwie został katechumenem, a od urodzenia żegnano go znakiem krzyża³³. Nawet kiedy oddalał się od Boga, nie przestał w Niego wierzyć. Był człowiekiem intelektu, wielkim myślicielem, wciąż szukał uzasadnienia swej wiary. Wiemy, że był też człowiekiem silnej woli i uczuć. Musimy też pamiętać, że Augustyn był wielkim artystą słowa³⁴ i dlatego potrafił przedstawić swoje przeżycia nader barwnie. Nikt w opisie tych stanów go nie przewyższył.

Autorka pięknie charakteryzuje na stronie 96 Monikę, ale nie tylko w tym miejscu, ale w ogóle. Pisze żywo, pięknym językiem (tutaj też zasługa tłumacza), z empatią ukazując świętą w kontekście historii, kultury i geografii. Czytelnik widzi św. Monikę, słyszy i z nią się solidaryzuje. Książka godna polecenia.

Ks. Augustyn Eckmann, Lublin – KUL

Bp Jan Śrutwa, *Kościół w epoce Wędrówek Ludów*, tom 1: *Kościół w szczytowej fazie wędrówek ludów*, Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego Jana Pawła II, Lublin 2021, ss. 399 + mapa

Dzieło jest kontynuacją wcześniejszej pracy księdza biskupa pt. *Dzieje Kościoła w Starożytności*, tom 1: *Epoka wielkich prześladowań*, tom 2: *Kościół w Cesarstwie Rzymskim*, Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego Jana Pawła II, Lublin 2018. Z ogromnym zainteresowaniem została przyjęta pierwsza dwutomowa publikacja opisująca najwcześniejszą historię Kościoła, z nie mniejszą – jak sądzę – popularnością będzie się cieszyć kolejny tom dziejów Kościoła napisany ze swadą i kompetencją. Można podziwiać pracowitość autora i korzystać z jego dorobku.

³² Augustinus, *Confessiones* 3, 4, 8, NBA 1, s. 62.

³³ Augustinus, *Confessiones* 1, 11, 17, NBA 1, s. 20.

³⁴ A. Eckmann, *Sztuka wymowy w teorii i praktyce św. Augustyna*, w: *Słowo Boga i drogi człowieka*, red. Z. Machnikowski, Tczew – Pelplin 1998, s. 155-174; A. Eckmann, *Św. Augustyn – wirtuoz języka i stylu (Epistola 150)*, VoxP 20-23 (1991-1992) s. 451-462.

Podobnie jak *Dzieje Kościoła w Starożytności* tak *Kościół w epoce wędrówek. Kościół w szczytowej fazie wędrówek* mocno opiera się na źródłach, bądź to już przełożonych na język polski, bądź to oryginalnych, które autor osobiście tłumaczy (czyni to często) na język polski, tutaj czasami brakuje mi tekstu źródłowego. Na podkreślenie zasługuje między innymi analiza „Reguły Świętego Benedykta” (s. 254n) – dobrze, gdyby była też dokumentacja łacińska. Na stronie 64 autor słusznie pisze: „Organizacja kościelna i język łaciński stały się pomostem pomiędzy starożytnością i średniowieczem w Europie”. Reguła św. Benedykta napisana po łacinie ma też nieprzemijające wartości. Trochę łaciny też przydałoby się dzisiejszemu czytelnikowi. A kolejne dzieło biskupa Jana Śrutwy będzie – jak sądzę – miało ich wiele.

Tekst źródłowy wpleciony w tok narracji pomaga bardzo w percepcji bogatego, często dość skomplikowanego materiału historycznego. Dzieje Kościoła stają się patrystyką, patrologią czy literaturą wczesnochrześcijańską albo i odwrotnie – ta literatura dokumentuje dzieje Kościoła. Czytelnik poznaje jego historię i osoby ją tworzące, fakty z życia jednostek, rodzin, rodów, ich powiązania. Wydaje się, że dzieje Kościoła w ten sposób ukazane stają się jakby żywe i łatwiejsze w ich przyjęciu. Przytoczenia świadków dziejów Kościoła ożywia historię. Czytelnik oczyma intelektu widzi te osoby, zwłaszcza czytając listy biskupów, papieży, cesarzy. Pisma te ukazują ich troskę o Kościół, zwłaszcza listy papieży Hormizdasa, Leona Wielkiego, ale i innych, także listy biskupów (np. Cezarego z Arles) są nader cenne, nawet jeśli błędzą, tak samo cesarza i pozostałych dostojników piastujących wysokie urzędy państwowe lub kościelne. Wciągają czytelnika w lekturę opowiadania i analizy tekstów. Stają przed nim często wybitne postacie. Kościół żyje i rozwija się nawet dzięki herezjom. Dzięki korespondencji znakomitych osobistości czytelnik poznaje wszechstronnie obraz Kościoła w V i VI wieku. Można by nakręcić film, bo fakty z życia Kościoła „się dzieją”. Biskup profesor Jan Śrutwa *est auctor, qui scibendo animos legentium et docet et delectat et movet*.

Dzieło biskupa Śrutwy ma nie tylko wymiaru naukowego (choć przede wszystkim tak), ale także pastoralny. Na przykład kiedy pisze o ucieczce przed Wandalami, przypomina zachętę biskupa Hippony, św. Augustyna, by duchowni zostali na miejscu. „Dzięki fizycznej obecności duchownych, żyjących ideałami Chrystusa, na wszystkich zstępuje – przez nich! – umocnienie i ochota przyjęcia świętej woli Bożej” (s. 22).

Autor, będąc znakomitym znawcą tamtych wydarzeń w Kościele, cały bogaty materiał historyczny podzielił na dwie części, a każdą z nich na rozdziały, a te z kolei na dalsze paragrafy. W pierwszej części ukazuje

aktywność Stolicy Apostolskiej na przełomie V-VI wieku, a w niej sytuację Kościoła na Zachodzie w II połowie V wieku, schizmę akacjańską na Wschodzie, unijne wysiłki papieża Hormizdasa, likwidację schizmy akacjańskiej. W drugiej części omawia czasy drugiego soboru konstantynopolitańskiego, a więc żywotność katolicyzmu na Zachodzie w I połowie VI wieku, Kościół w dobie ekspansji Bizancjum na Zachód, drugi sobór konstantynopolitański. Każda z tych części kończy się podsumowaniem. W zakończeniu pracy autor dzieła podaje wykaz skrótów, indeks osób, indeks nazw geograficznych, mapę, literaturę uzupełniającą, przez którą wskazuje na ciągłą potrzebę studium dziejów Kościoła w epoce wędrówek ludów. Podobnie jak w poprzednich publikacjach, w *Dziejach Kościoła w Starożytności* czytelnik poznaje wielkość papieży (Symplicjusz, Feliks III Gelazy, Hormizdas, Symmach) umiejętnie kierujących Kościołem, walczących o jego wolność w cesarstwie i na świecie, ich autorytet religijny, moralny i polityczny. Autor opisuje wydarzenia historyczne wewnątrz Kościoła i jego relacje z instytucjami zewnętrznymi, zwłaszcza z władcami cesarstwa rzymskiego i spoza cesarstwa.

Z uznaniem zatem należy przyjąć studium księdza biskupa Jana Śrutwy i trzeba wyrazić życzenie, by stało się inspiracją do napisania wielu prac przyczynkarskich i większych na temat Kościoła w epoce wędrówek ludów. Pragnę odnotować, że dzieło księdza profesora Śrutwy jest nader erudycyjne, podane w sposób prosty, wręcz obrazowy i przekonujący. Wiele można się dowiedzieć, doszkolić, doksztąpić i przyjemnie spożytkować. Autor daje kolejny nowy wkład w rozwój badań naukowych odnoszących się do dziejów Kościoła, tym razem w epoce wędrówek ludów. Nowe dzieło autora jest opracowaniem w pełni oryginalnym i misyjnym. Przedsięwzięcie księdza biskupa profesora Jana Śrutwy stanowi dostrzegalny twórczy wkład w rozwój polskiej i światowej historii Kościoła. Może być pomocne nie tylko historykom Kościoła i teologom uprawiającym patrologię z patrystyką, ale i humanistom zajmującym się historią i literaturoznawstwem. Dzieło księdza profesora Jana Śrutwy znajdzie z pewnością wielu czytelników wśród teologów i humanistów, historyków i filologów klasycznych, literaturoznawców i historyków kultury. Pozostaje tylko życzyć autorowi *plurimos faustosque annos*, by mógł kontynuować swoje piękne dzieło. Czekamy więc na kolejne tomy.

Tadeusz Gacia, Jarosław Marczewski, Agnieszka Strycharczuk, *Maioris ad limina templi... Poezja epigraficzna epoki karolińskiej. Badania i przekłady*, Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego Jana Pawła II, Lublin 2021, ss. 464

Recenzowana publikacja składa się z proemium (s. 5-8), wstępu (s. 8-18), trzech rozdziałów: „*Dum regeret Karolus...*”. *W świecie miecza i słowa* (s. 19-84), „*David amat vates...*” *W kręgu karolińskich poetów* (s. 85-130), „*Et relege titulos...*” *w kręgu poezji epigraficznej* (s. 131-192), aneksu, który zawiera „*Carmina epigrafica...*”, teksty łacińskie i ich przekłady (s. 193-419) z dodaniem objaśnień (s. 421-429). Ponadto zawiera bibliografię (s. 431-442), pomoce bibliograficzne, trzy pozycje określone jako inne (s. 442) oraz indeks osobowy (s. 443-462), wreszcie spis treści (s. 463-464).

Autorzy dobrym klasycznym zwyczajem dają na początku proemium w języku łacińskim, po czym we wstępie zarysowują zawartość znakomitego dzieła. W pierwszym rozdziale ukazują dynastię Karolingów (751-987) z konkretną misją. Związani z Kościołem Karolingowie tworzyli nową Europę na zasadach biblijnych i chrześcijańskich. *Regnum Europae* jako *imperium christianum* było pojęciem ideowym określającym przestrzeń dostępną królowi Franków oraz głoszonej przez niego nauce. Monarcha Franków na wzór Mojżesza, Eliasza i Dawida miał być nie tylko wodzem, prawodawcą i organizatorem państwa, ale także jego opiekunem i głosi-cielem słowa Bożego. Miał być wikariuszem Boga z misją sprawowania rządów nad całą Europą, miał pomagać niewierzącym w przyjęciu chrze-ścijaństwa. Wszystkie reformy karolińskie starały się o zjednoczenie zachodnich chrześcijan w ramach jednego Kościoła rzymskiego i pomóc im osiągnąć zbawienie. Chodziło zatem nie tylko o budowę nowych kościo-łów, tworzenie instytucji kościelnych, ale w ogóle o duchowo-kulturalne inicjatywy władcy i jego styl życia. Dbano o poziom życia chrześcijańskie-go, a możliwość jego podniesienia widziano w potrzebie zdobywania i roz-woju wiedzy. Taką rolę pełnił dwór Karola Wielkiego, stając się ośrodkiem intelektualnym w państwie i centrum kultury umysłowej. Słusznie autorzy podkreślają, że był on istotnym czynnikiem tzw. renesansu karolińskiego, w którym klasyczne autorytety pogodzone z chrześcijańskim światopoglą-dem. Przepisano dziesiątki tysięcy woluminów, zakładano szkoły różnego typu, mecenatem otoczono świątłych ludzi, którzy dzięki temu mogli roz-wijać i wykorzystać swoje talenty. Tego rodzaju działania przyczyniły się

też do podniesienia poziomu znajomości łaciny, co było niezwykle ważne, ale dotyczyło jedynie litery. Karolingowie pomyśleli jeszcze o duchowych przystaniach: kościołach i klasztorach, które gromadziły ludzi *in re et in spe*. Piękno kościołów przypominało o obecności w świątyni boskiego piękna, a klasztory stawały się potężnymi ośrodkami modlitwy wstawiennej. Autorzy słusznie podkreślają, że wspólnoty klasztorne spełniały rolę nie tylko przystani duchowej, ale także intelektualnej.

I o tym piszą autorzy w drugim rozdziale swej interesującej publikacji. Rozdział ten poświęcają poetom, którzy, niejako towarzysząc Karolowi Wielkiemu, pracują w służbie odnowy. Alkuin w jednym ze swoich listów do Karola nazwał Francję nie tylko „nowymi Atenami”, ale uznał, że stoi wyżej od Aten, bo jest obdarzona siedmioraką pełnią Ducha Świętego, która przewyższa wszelkie osiągnięcia ludzkiej natury (s. 87). Karol Wielki troszczył się o odnowę edukacji oraz o intelektualną i moralną formację przyszłych elit państwa (s. 91). Autorzy jako prekursorów karolińskiej odnowy wymieniają i krótko omawiają Bedę Czcigodnego, św. Bonifacego, Ekberta, Aelberta, których dorobek znalazł znakomitych kontynuatorów. Pierwszym z nich był Alkuin (ok. 735-806), o którym dał świadectwo jego uczeń Teodulf, iż posiadał on zdolność pisania wierszy lirycznych, był wspaniałym nauczycielem, melodyjnym poetą, człowiekiem, który był bogaty umysłem i skuteczny w pracy (s. 104). Na drugim miejscu wymieniają Pawła Diakona (720-799), który podobnie jak Alkuin był kimś znaczącym na dworze Karola. Piotr z Pizy w swym *carmen* nazywa go najmądrzejszym z poetów i wieszczów, błyszczącym znajomością różnych języków, po grecku czyta Homera, po łacinie – Wergiliusza, zna metra Horacego, Filona czyta po hebrajsku. Piotr był poetyckim sekretarzem Karola Wielkiego. Kolejnym poetą w służbie karolińskiej odnowy był Teodulf (ok. 750-821), karoliński Pindar, znawca poetów klasycznych i wczesnochrześcijańskich, dla którego „poezja i sztuka były niczym powietrze, którym oddychał” (s. 121). Na s. 120 czytamy: „[...] przypadek niełaski Teodulfa, przeprowadzając paralełę między doświadczeniami autorów epoki augustiańskiej i karolińskiej. Taki zabieg doprowadził do konkluzji, że współczesny Owidiusz wywołał gniew cezara geniuszem swej poezji”. Chodzi zapewne nie o epokę augustiańską, lecz augustowską. Czwartym poetą w służbie odnowy karolińskiej, któremu poświęcona jest poważna część książki, jest Raban Maur (780-856), człowiek o ogromnej erudycji i umiejętności przekazywania dorobku poprzednich pokoleń, zwłaszcza Ojców Kościoła. Autorzy w sposób ciekawy ukazują poezje wymienionych autorów jako narzędzie odnowy, podkreślając jej misję profetyczną

i programową (s. 129). Podkreślają, że u podstaw sukcesu państwa Karola Wielkiego stała triada nauka, praca i modlitwa.

Trzeci rozdział poświęcony jest nauce. Obraca się w kręgu poezji epigraficznej, która w epoce Karolingów nie tylko informowała o czymś, ale także pouczała, wychowywała. To dzięki niej zwiedzający świątynię mogli zapoznać się z osobami mającymi wpływ na funkcjonowanie państwa oraz z ludźmi świętymi. Największe zasługi w poezji epigraficznej ma Alkuin (s. 145). Znaczną grupę stanowią utwory związane z kościołami i świętymi. Autorzy podają też piękną ciekawostkę o autorze *autoepitafium*, w którym w przedostatnim wierszu wyznaje: „Miałem imię Alkuin, zawsze mądrość kochałem” (s. 150). Pokora jest cechą ludzi wielkich. Alkuin zapisał się w historii jako wielki nauczyciel praktyk dbający o wychowanie świątłych ludzi oraz poeta, zachowujący reguły metryczne i staranność stylu.

W twórczości epigraficznej Pawła Diakona rozpoznajemy przede wszystkim wybitnego uczonego, gramatyka i nauczyciela (s. 154). Poezja epigraficzna Teodulfa płonie miłością do poezji klasycznej. W większości jego utwory epigraficzne odnoszą się do różnego rodzaju przestrzeni architektonicznych. Poezja i sztuka były jego życiową potrzebą (s. 155-157). Według autorów szczególnie ciekawie przedstawia się poezja epigraficzna Rabana Maura, która samego poetę ukazuje jako człowieka nader wykształconego, umiejętnie posługującego się aparatem naukowo-literackim. Miłością Rabana była *lectio dulcis divinae legis* (s. 161).

Autorzy po przeglądzie treści kierują swoją uwagę na słownictwo. Świątynia (s. 162-165), po wielu określeniach świątyni autorzy wierszy dają tylko dwie nazwy, które odnoszą się do ołtarza: *ara* i *altare* (s. 165-168), następnie omawiają krzyże, relikwie świętych, odbłask wiecznego piękna. Ich kompetentne wyjaśnienia stanowią dobre wprowadzenie do lektury poezji opiewającej świat odległy o dwanaście wieków, a wciąż bliski ludziom myślącym nie tylko horyzontalnie, ale także wertykalnie. Tytuł omawianej publikacji („Maioris ad limina templi”), którego słowa pochodzą z poetyckiej Alkuina inskrypcji umieszczonej na drzwiach kościoła, zapraszającej podróżnego do odwiedzenia świątyni: „Qui te maioris ducant ad limina templi” (‘niechaj oni [patroni tego miejsca] cię wiodą w progi większej świątyni’ – *Carm.* 110, 18, s. 282 i 283). Nie ma już tych pięknych świątyni, które opisują poeci. Zniszczył je upływ czasu, a często też wrogowie wiary katolickiej. *Nihil novi sub sole*. Dziś dzieje się podobnie. Pozostała poezja. Horacy w swej odzie (3, 30, 1) pisze: „Exegi monumentum aere perennius” (‘wzniosłem pomnik trwalszy od spiżu’). Dzieła, które stworzyli poeci, są trwalsze niż materialne monumenty, są ponadczasowe. Dzieło naszych au-

torów, myślę o autorach recenzowanej książki, ich znakomite przybliżenie literackiej epoki karolińskiej, opublikowane w Towarzystwie Naukowym Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Jana Pawła II, winno znaleźć się w rękach ludzi słowa, poezji, sztuki, kochających piękno materialne i duchowe. Ono ubogaci każdego czytelnika.

Ks. Augustyn Eckmann, KUL – Lublin

Henryk Pietras, *Ortodoksja i herezje. Historia szukania prawdy w pierwszych wiekach Kościoła*, WAM, Kraków 2022, ss. 223

W obecnych czasach coraz popularniejsze staje się w literaturze teologicznej opisujące początki wiary chrześcijańskiej ukazywanie krętej drogi dochodzenia do prawdy. Bardziej kompleksowemu ujęciu procesu krystalizowania się *credo* chrześcijan służy szersze prezentowanie heterodoksyjnego punktu widzenia. Dlatego też książka Henryka Pietrasa *Ortodoksja i herezja* stanowi cenny wkład w propagowanie historii i teologii początków chrześcijaństwa w obecnym czasie we wskazanej perspektywie. Owa pozycja będąca w pewnym stopniu dopełnieniem książki *Herezje* tegoż autora trafnie i przystępnie pokazuje meandry rozważań o Bogu i człowieku w starożytności.

Książka *Ortodoksja i herezje* składa się z dziesięciu rozdziałów. Pierwsze trzy stanowią wprowadzenie, które uzmysławia czytelnikowi, że dzieło Jezusa Chrystusa i działalność Apostołów nie funkcjonowały w próżni, lecz w konkretnym momencie dziejów. Dlatego też autor opisuje tło kulturowe zarówno żydowskie, jak i greckie, jak również wskazuje na wynikające z tego powodu możliwości oraz trudności. Podobnie w rozdziale na temat Pisma Świętego autor kreśli perspektywę rozwoju interpretacji biblijnej od Filona Aleksandryjskiego, przez twórczość Orygenesusa i szerzej środowiska aleksandryjskiego, a także odmiennej strategii interpretacyjnej nurtu antiocheńskiego, aż po próby syntezy św. Augustyna i św. Hieronima.

Kolejny, czwarty rozdział skupia się na naturze człowieka, a szczególnie na problemie grzechu pierworodnego. Pietras, wychodząc od biblijnej sceny z Księgi Rodzaju oraz z cytatu z listu do Rzymian (5,12), jak też uwzględniając starożytny pogląd o niewolnictwie, przeprowadza czytelnika

ka poprzez ścieżki nauki gnostyckiej, a także też pelagiańskich oraz koncepcji m.in. Ireneusza z Lyonu, Grzegorza z Nyssy czy też św. Augustyna, by wskazać, jak w różnorodny sposób starano się przez wieki dojść do spójnego opisu tajemnicy zła w człowieku. Bardzo cennym elementem tego rozdziału jest wskazanie na konteksty historyczno-filozoficzne, w jakich znajdowali się poszczególni twórcy, co pozwala lepiej zrozumieć zajmowane przez nich stanowiska.

Następne rozdziały, od piątego do ósmego, opowiadają o drodze ku wyrażeniu misterium Stwórcy. Mówią o mniej lub bardziej trafnych próbach pogodzenia ze sobą prawdy o Bogu jedynym z tajemnicą Trójcy Świętej, o trudnościach w przyjęciu Jezusa, który jest prawdziwym człowiekiem i prawdziwym Bogiem, jak też o trzeciej osobie Trójcy, Duchu Świętym. W rozdziałach tych, gdzie Pietras objaśnia proces dochodzenia do poszczególnych prawd wiary, również nie zabrakło celnych uwag, dzięki którym można uświadomić sobie ograniczenia zarówno ówczesnych teologów, jak i swoje własne wobec tajemnicy Niewysłowionego. Niemniej autor również trafnie wskazał na historyczno-polityczne uwikłania Kościoła, a także wewnątrzkościelne rywalizacje, które też miały swoje znaczenie w debatach na temat wiary. Godny odnotowania jest wysiłek, jaki autor podjął dla pokazania, jak poważnym problemem było wzajemne niezrozumienie bądź stosowanie niejasnych, a nawet wieloznacznych terminów np. *persona*, *hipostaza* czy *duch*.

Ostatnie dwa rozdziały traktują z kolei o wierze w życie wieczne oraz o Kościele. Opis różnorodnych koncepcji tego, co zazwyczaj nazywamy niebem, a także problem nadziei na powszechne zbawienie pokazuje czytelnikowi różnice w postrzeganiu tego zagadnienia kiedyś i dziś, a także uświadamia, choćby na przykładzie dokumentu Międzynarodowej Komisji Teologicznej z 2007 roku o możliwości zbawienia dla niemowląt umierających przed chrztem, że jest to problem, który do dziś nurtuje umysły. Cennym uzupełnieniem całości książki są krótkie biografie *personae dramatis*, a także bibliografia, dzięki której można łatwo odnaleźć całość cytowanych dzieł starożytnych autorów.

Walorem pracy Henryka Pietrasa jest częste sięganie do źródeł, przez co dobitnie obrazuje on poglądy poszczególnych teologów starożytności. Sięganie m.in. po orzeczenia synodów, ale też po wypowiedzi nieortodoksyjnych pisarzy pozwala czytelnikowi zobaczyć problem prawd wiary w możliwie najszerszym spektrum. Dodatkowo bardzo wartościowe jest podkreślenie uwarunkowań kulturowo-filozoficznych oraz ograniczeń pojęciowych i intelektualnych człowieka wobec Boga. Warto też zwrócić

uwagę na rozróżnienie pomiędzy formułami a prawdami wiary. Dla wskazania aktualności poruszanych kwestii autor kilkakrotnie podkreśla też, że w jego założeniu teologia to nauka eksperymentalna, niesprowadzająca się wyłącznie do opisanie historii doktryny, lecz polegająca na ciągłym spotykaniu się z osobą Boga i opisywaniu jej dostępnym dla siebie aparatem pojęciowym. Także dla uwrażliwienia na żywotność pewnych heretyckich poglądów autor przytacza przykłady z późniejszej historii oraz współczesne wypowiedzi papieża Franciszka. Przez to wszystko Pietras z pewnością nie wyczerpuje omawianych zagadnień, ale zachęca do podejmowania pokornego wysiłku szukania prawdy.

Książka *Ortodoksja i herezje* została napisana językiem żywym i potoczystym, czasem wręcz potocznym, dzięki czemu łatwo trafia do odbiorcy oraz stanowi miłą lekturę nawet dla osoby niekoniecznie biegłej w kwestiach wiary. Niemniej sędzę, że może ona być szczególnie przydatna dla studentów historii, patrologii oraz teologii jako pomoc w lepszym zrozumieniu złożonego i nieraz bardzo trudnego procesu poznawania po to, aby „nie milczeć o Bogu”.

ks. Piotr Wilk, Lublin – KUL

Bibliografie

Bp Andrzej Suski

Bibliografia do apokryfu „Józef i Asenet”

Apokryf, okreśłany skrótowo tytułem *Józef i Asenet* (JA), należy do piśmiennictwa judeo-hellenistycznego. Dzieło to występuje w dwóch recenzjach greckich: krótszej i dłuższej. Tekst krytyczny recenzji krótszej wydał Marc Philonenko (1968), z kolei Christoph Burchard wydał tekst krytyczny recenzji dłuższej (2003). Wokół tych wydań wywiązała się dyskusja, która toczy się nadal i dotyczy zwłaszcza problemu tekstu najbardziej zbliżonego do oryginału greckiego oraz kwestii środowiska, czasu i celu powstania apokryfu, jego formy literackiej, jedności dzieła złożonego z dwóch opowiadań, misteryjnej terminologii i symboliki, kontekstualności w odniesieniu do pism chrześcijańskich, ostatnio też interpretacji feministycznej.

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Zebrał i opracował
ks. Marcin Wysocki, Lublin – KUL

Wojciech Stawiszyński

Polska bibliografia antyku chrześcijańskiego 2021 **Z uzupełnieniami za rok 2020**

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