THE “LIVING TOGETHER” ARGUMENT IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS CASE-LAW 1. THE QUESTION OF RELIGIOUS MINORITY RIGHTS IN EUROPE

The number of decisions upholding legislative measures restricting the right to wear religious symbols is mushrooming in Europe. In 2017, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled on the case of Achbita v. G4S Secure Solutions.1 It held that the internal rule of a private company prohibiting the visible wearing of any political, philosophical or religious sign in the workplace, specifically the Islamic headscarf, did not constitute direct discrimination based on religion or belief according to EU antidiscrimination law.2 It was found, however, that it could constitute a form of indirect discrimination, which may only be objectively justified by the legitimate aim of the neutrality of the

The number of decisions upholding legislative measures restricting the right to wear religious symbols is mushrooming in Europe.In 2017, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled on the case of Achbita v. G4S Secure Solutions. 1 It held that the internal rule of a private company prohibiting the visible wearing of any political, philosophical or religious sign in the workplace, specifically the Islamic headscarf, did not constitute direct discrimination based on religion or belief according to EU antidiscrimination law. 2 It was found, however, that it could constitute a form of indirect discrimination, which may only be objectively justified by the legitimate aim of the neutrality of the * PhD Candidate in Law, Market and Person, Ca' Foscari University of Venice, Dorsoduro 3246, 30123 Venezia (Italy); Doctoral Fellow (2018), Department of Ethics, Law and Politics, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity, Hermann-Föge-Weg 11, 37073 Göttingen (Germany), e-mail: tania.pagotto@unive.it 1 Samira Achbita, Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding v. G4S Secure Solutions NV, No. C-157/15 (EUCJ, 2017); Asma Bougnaoui, Association de défense des droits de l'homme (ADDH) v. Micropole SA, No. C-188/15 (EUCJ, 2017).
business, provided that the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary. 3On the other hand, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has reverted to the question of religious symbols covering the face in public spaces (burqa and niqab), adjudicating two cases involving the Belgian ban: it upheld the national legislative measures, appealing for the second time in its jurisprudence to the contested argument of "living together." 4his article focuses on the latter issue.It starts by recounting the history of the drafting process of legislation banning the full-face veil in Belgium and France and the pivotal notion of "living together" [Section 2].Secondly, it summarizes the facts of the three relevant cases adjudicated by the Court of Strasbourg: SAS v. France (2014), Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium, and Dakir v. Belgium (2017) [Section 3].Afterwards, the paper recalls the general principles protecting religious freedom under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) [Section 4].Thus, it explains the decisions of these cases paying attention to the way the Court used "living together" as a legal justification for the prohibition of the full-face veil [Section 5].Finally, on the basis of the aforementioned material, it argues two points: 1. the ECtHR did not offer in its decisions a robust legal analysis to legitimize this new argument and these cases represent a culmination of the tendency towards legal decisions based on abstract ideas [Section 6]; 2. an engaged Court should adopt a more fact-oriented approach, in view of the fact that the proportionality principle is expressly incorporated in the Convention [Section 7].

ITS ESSENCE AND CHARACTERISTICS
In this Section, the article describes the drafting process of the legislation banning the full-face veil in Belgium and France and briefly outlines the constitutional background surrounding it as well as the way the "living together" argument has emerged.Afterwards, it offers an analysis of its features and meaning.The topic of the full-face veil ban has been subject to a particularly high level of attention from commentators and constitutional lawyers.On the one hand, this issue relates to some of the fundamental pillars of the Belgian and French legal orders and raises questions on the compatibility of the full-face veil with the principles of laïcité, fraternity and dignity of women. 5On the other hand, there is discordance between the apparently neutral nature of the bans, which forbid the concealment of the face in public, and the people's specific preoccupation with the Islamic veil shown by the travaux preparatoires, which provide a record of the discussion that took place during the drafting of the legislation. 6This calls into question some doubts relating to the supposedly neutral nature of the ban and merits an enquiry into the possibility that it is discriminative on religious grounds. 7

BELGIUM
In Belgium, the drafting process of the full-face ban has been one of the flagship policies of the right-wing Vlaams Blok party. 8The first proposal dates back to 2004 and other attempts occurred between 2007 and 2010. 9Soon after the 2010 elections, the bill was approved by an overwhelming majority 10 and was subject to an extremely fast legislative process, involving only one of the two parliamentary Chambers. 11Questions concerning human rights and individual fundamental freedoms were not addressed in depth -it has been noted that the debate carried out amounted to no more than a "pure formality done out of respect for the required democratic debate."12

FRANCE
The French reflection on the meaning of the vivre ensemble concept, and more generally the ideal of République à visage découvert, represented, as expressed by Constantin Languille, an "ideal scene where all the arguments relating to the place of Islam in French society were expressed and opposed against each other." 13In France, as in Belgium, the proposal for a ban was first put forward by a right-wing party;14 though here it did go through a more sophisticated drafting process, involving experts, ad hoc commissions and decisions delivered by the highest judicial institutions. 15In 2010, the report of the Gerìn Commission was published,16 stating that the full veil infringed three constitutive principles of the French Republic -liberty, equality and brotherhood, since it represented a rejection of the common will to live together.17Shortly after, the Council of State expressed an opinion that a general ban had no certain legal basis and the idea of "living together" had no solid doctrinal background.Despite this, in 2010 the general ban was enacted by a great majority, 18 and was followed by a decision of the Conseil Constitutionnel,19 acknowledging its constitutionality. 20

FIRST MEANING OF THE CONCEPT OF "LIVING TOGETHER":
A PRE-CONDITION FOR COMMUNICATION AMONG INDIVIDUALS In both Belgian and French social, legal and political scenarios, the idea of "living together" comprises two aspects: one relates to communication, the other relates to the need to build a mutual trust necessary for the enjoyment of rights and liberties by all the members of society.
The first meaning of "living together" deals with the proposed benefits of people being able to communicate face to face, which is argued to be an essential aspect of verbal and non-verbal exchanges. 21s far as this argument is related to the wearing of the Islamic veil, this argument is not exclusive to the French and Belgian contexts, but it has been addressed and explored also by judges of different jurisdictions, such as in England and the Netherlands. 22hile the argument of interaction in society and the need to establish a proper environment for the best communication of individuals has been deployed particularly in the educational context, the second aspect of the "living together" concept has a wider significance and has been developed in relation to society as a whole.

THE SECOND MEANING OF "LIVING TOGETHER": A PRE-CONDITION TO ENTER SOCIETY
The second meaning of vivre ensemble originated in the writing on human sociology by the French Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas (1906-1995). 23Afterwards, it inspired the Belgian Guy Haarscher  (1946), who applied it specifically to the wearing of the full-face veil. 24n their view, the ability to see people's faces prevents the creation of a disruptive asymmetry between those who show themselves and those who do not.Most of all, the rapport de face à face is a minimal precondition for building mutual trust, for a peaceful cohabitation in society and is an essential ingredient of ethical behaviour. 25This idea was also cited during the French and Belgian political debate as a rationale in support of what is known as the burqa ban.Indeed, the French drafters of the 2010 law considered that the regular wearing of the veil corresponds to a systematic betrayal of the fundamental values of democracy and a threat to national cohesion. 26lso in Belgium, the legislature primarily pursued the creation of a proper space for social interaction between individuals, relying on the idea of reconnaître pour connaître. 27For example, the 2011 Report to Chambre Des Représentants de Belgique states that wearing the full-face veil constitutes a contravention of fundamental principles of civilisation and represents a systematic rejection of human interaction. 28

THE FACTS OF THE THREE CASES INVOLVING THE "LIVING TOGETHER" ARGUMENT: SAS, BELCACEMI AND OUSSAR, AND DAKIR
Although designed in neutral terms, as a matter of fact, the burqa and niqab bans impact primarily Muslim women who may have decided, independently, voluntarily and free from any pressure, to wear a full-face veil for religious reasons. 29It is not by chance that the cases involving the "living together" concept stemmed from situations related to practising Muslim women.The following section summarizes the relevant facts of Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium,Dakir v. Belgium and SAS v. France. 26  29 For example, the French law, on the one hand, sanctions with a fine and/or a course of citizenship education (Art.3) those who violate the law concealing their face; in addition, it punishes with one year of imprisonment and a large fine, anyone who forces another person, in various way, to cover the face (Art.4).The Belgian law establishes a penalty of 15 until 25 euros and 1 to 7 days of imprisonment those who appear in public with their face covered or unrecognizable (Art.2) but, notably, makes no provision for those ones forcing other to wear the veil.

THE FRENCH CASE: SAS (2014)
The case of SAS30 involved a French devout Muslim girl of Pakistani origin, who claimed that the 2010 French ban on the concealment of the face in public spaces31 constituted a violation of some of her fundamental freedoms under the European Convention.The applicant emphasised that neither her husband nor any member of her family put pressure on her to dress in such a way.Sometimes she wore the burqa or the niqab "not to annoy others but to feel at inner peace with herself."32After the French ban had come into force, she filed an application before the ECtHR claiming that it was a violation of her rights to private life (Art.8) and to freedom of religion (Art.9) separately and in conjunction with Art. 14 (prohibition of discrimination).33

THE BELGIAN CASES: BELCACEMI AND OUSSAR AND DAKIR (2017)
Ms Belcacemi and Ms Oussar had an experience similar to that of the applicant of SAS: they were two Muslim women accustomed to wearing the niqab in public spaces, on their own initiative and for religious reasons.When the Law of 1 June 2011 was enacted, 34 Ms Belcacemi decided at first to continue to wear the niqab; subsequently, feeling under pressure, she decided to avoid doing so. 35She declared that she had no other choice due to her fear of facing public, social stigma.Differently from the first applicant, Ms Oussar decided to stay at home, with the resulting restriction of her social interaction, private and community life. 36n the second case, Ms Dakir did not challenge the 2011 law, rather a by-law with a similar content, adopted in 2008 by three municipalities prior to the national ban. 37She had been wearing the full-face veil since the age of 16, a decision accepted by her husband and her family.She applied to the Conseil d'État 38 for the annulment of the ban 39 but her application was dismissed for the failure to satisfy a strict admissibility requirement.
The women filed an application before the Court of Strasbourg, claiming a violation of many of the Convention's rights: among the others, Art. 8 (right to respect for private and family life), Art. 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion) and Art. 10 (freedom of expression), separately and in conjunction with Art. 14 (prohibition of discrimination). 40orum externum, which involves the manifestation of a religion or a belief.The Convention specifies the circumstances in which worship, teaching, practice and observance may be limited by national authorities. 43To be legitimate, the restriction must be prescribed by law and be necessary in a democratic society; the limitation must be proportionate to its aim, namely public safety and order, protection of health, morals or the rights and freedoms of others. 44The Court scrutinizes a potentially impinging measure and checks its compliance with the Convention against these criteria.This is the essence of the proportionality test. 45n addition to that, other instruments assist the Court and play an important role in the conventionality control.With particular regard to Art. 9, the fact that generally the relations between a state and religious groups are to a great extent shaped by national history and traditions, 46 led the Court of Strasbourg to elaborate and use the concept of the margin of appreciation, in relation to religious matters. 47The Court grants the Member States of the Council of Europe some room to manoeuvre and combine in various ways both the Convention's standards and the national experiences. 48he margin of appreciation is neither pre-determined nor without any limits. 49Indeed its breadth is dependent on a number of factors, above all the presence of a consensus on a given subject among the Contract-ing Parties of the Convention.When the States of the Council of Europe regulate a certain matter in a similar fashion, the Court acknowledges the existence of a consensus and narrows down the margin of appreciation left to the respondent Government.When the practice of the European legal orders is different and there is no shared opinion, the Court recognizes the absence of the consensus on the matter at stake and exercises a degree of judicial restraint, granting a wider margin.

CONCEPT
In the 2014 French case, the Grand Chamber recognized the existence of an interference with the applicant's rights but rejected the applicant's complaints.However, the Court did positively 50 reject three of the four arguments advanced by the French Government to justify the ban: public safety, 51 respect for women's dignity, 52 and gender equali-ty. 53At the same time, the Court justified the French ban by appealing to the "living together" concept, formulated at paragraph 121 of the decision. 54e face plays an important role in social interaction.It (The Court) can understand the view that individuals who are present in places open to all, may not wish to see practices or attitudes developing there which would fundamentally call into question the possibility of open interpersonal relationships, which, by virtue of an established consensus, forms an indispensable element of community life within the society in question.The Court is therefore able to accept that the barrier raised against others by a veil concealing the face is perceived by the respondent State as breaching the right of others to live in a space of socialisation which makes living together easier. 55e case of SAS raised the concerns of the legal doctrine for the risk of impairing the soul of the Convention. 56Two dissenting judges sharply questioned the concept of "living together" as "far-fetched and vague" 57 and the separate opinions delivered in the Belgian cases echoed the same criticism. 5853 The Court rejected the Government's argument stressing that "a State Party cannot invoke gender equality in order to ban a practice that is defended by women".At para.119.June Edmunds, "The Limits of Post-National Citizenship: European Muslims, Human Rights and the Hijab," Ethnic and Racial Studies 35, no.7 (July 2012): 1192.Zachary R. Calo, "Islamic Headscarves, Religious Pluralism, and Secular Human Rights," International Consortium for Law and Religion Studies Conference, Santiago, Chile, September 2011 (SSRN, 28 August 2011): 2, http://ssrn.com. 54This argument is not expressly mentioned by the Convention as permissible ground for limiting fundamental freedoms but was accepted by the Court as a legitimate aim, falling within the need to protect rights and freedom of others.It was mentioned in some documents published by the Council of Europe but has never been engaged by the Court to justify a restriction upon fundamental rights before SAS.See Yasha Lange, Living Together (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 2009). 55At para.121.Italics added. 56SAS has been considered one of the worst rulings of 2014: see the poll by the Strasbourg Observers blog at https://strasbourgobservers.com. 57See the joint partly dissenting opinion of judges Nussberger and Jäderblom in the case of SAS. 58See the separate opinion of judges Spano and Karakaş in Dakir.

THE BELGIAN CASES OF BELCACEMI AND OUSSAR, AND DAKIR: THE ENDORSEMENT OF SAS
In the 2017 judgements, the Court recalled and applied the principle established in SAS since the Belgian ban was expressed in legal terms similar to the French 2011 prohibition. 59he ECtHR confirmed the absence of a clear consensus at a European level and allowed a wide margin of discretion to the respondent State as to the necessity of a restriction on the right to manifest a religion or a belief. 60In both cases, ultimately, it stated that there had been no violation of Art. 9 and 8, the threshold of the minimal level of seriousness of ill-treatment had not been met in application of Art. 3, and the complaints under other provisions had been declared as manifestly ill-founded.The Court did find a violation of Art. 6, para. 1, in Dakir; however, this added nothing new to the debate on religious freedom. 61hese judgements confirmed that the Court accepts vivre ensemble as one of the legitimate aims relevant for Art. 9, para.2: the following Section describes the notion of "living together" and afterwards the main issues related to its incorporation into the Convention's system.

FIRST OBSERVATION:
A TENDENCY TOWARDS ABSTRACT IDEAS.

FROM BEHAVIOURS THROUGH SYMBOLS TO MODELS OF INTEGRATION
What seems the most problematic point of the French and Belgian decisions is that the Court accepted the "living together" rationale, while adopting a highly abstract justification and assuing a deferential attitude towards the member States.This Section argues that the ECtHR demonstrated a capacity to evaluate concrete circumstances and stick to the facts in some of its early decisions, in contrast to the current development of its jurisprudence on the Islamic veil.
On the one hand, the full-face veil has been defined as one of the "dilemma cases" discussed in the Strasbourg's courtrooms in recent years 62 and the great caution of the Court may be partly understandable.However, the Convention does not mention the idea of the minimal requirements of life in a society, nor does it make express reference to face-to-face communication.Moreover, the "breath-taking" 63 width of the margin of appreciation allowed by the Court in its interpretation of Convention compliance leads us to further reflections involving the abstract nature of the motivation given in the judgments.

THE COURT HAS THE CAPACITY TO STICK TO THE FACTS: RE-READING EARLY DECISIONS ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RELATING TO BEHAVIORS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
It has been suggested that in the most recent case-law related to the Islamic headscarf, 64 the Court makes assumptions about female religious practices without proper investigation of the nature of women's preferences. 65Contrary to this trend, reading two earlier cases, related to the area of the forum internum and proselytism, 66 reveals that the Court is actually equipped with the sophisticated capacity to combine the abstract nature of the law with nuanced factual considerations. 676.1.1KOKKINAKIS V. GREECE (1993)   For example, in its first case on religious freedom, the matter of proselytism was brought to Strasbourg: in Kokkinakis v. Greece,68 the Court balanced the right to freedom of religion of Mr Kokkinakis, a Jehovah's witness convicted of proselytism, against the need to safeguard the rights and liberties of the proselytized. 69What is remarkable is the attempt to mark the difference between ordinary degrees of psychological influence among people ("proper proselytism") and dangerous and immoral behaviours ("improper proselytism"). 70This required isolating and giving prominence to certain human actions at the risk of being coercive.Thus, the Court drew a line between what is legal and what is not, putting an "inevitable ingredient of its interpretative practice" in the arena of the legal reasoning. 716.1.2LARISSIS V. GREECE (1998)   In a subsequent decision, the ECtHR returned to the issue of evangelization.In Larissis v. Greece, 72 it reflected on the psychological pressure exercised by the applicants, three senior officers of the Greek air force, convicted of proselytising airmen and civilians.Here the Court emphasised that the army may actually alter the perception of a conversation and switch it from "an innocuous exchange of ideas" to "a form of harassment or the application of undue pressure in abuse of power." 736.2 ON RELIGIOUS GARMENTS, THE COURT TOOK A MORE ABSTRACT APPROACH: THE ISLAMIC VEIL 6.2.1 DAHLAB V. SWITZERLAND (2001)   By contrast, in Dahlab the Court started to blur the proximity to facts.The Court dismissed, as manifestly ill-founded, the application of a Swiss primary school teacher, sacked because of her refusal to remove the hijab during her working hours.Even though the ECtHR admitted that it was very difficult to assess the impact that the wearing of a headscarf may have on the freedom of conscience and religion of very young children, finally it was persuaded by the need to safeguard pupils' conscience from the "impact that a powerful external symbol such as the wearing of a headscarf" could have.746.2.2 FOLLOWING CASE-LAW ON THE ISLAMIC VEIL 75 The abstract tendency can also be identified in the case-law on the Islamic veil, relating to individuals performing different tasks, such as university professors, 76 university students, 77 secondary school pupils, 78 or relating to different circumstances, such as sport classes 79 or the hospital environment 80 .A note of caution should be sounded when it comes to the importance of ensuring an appropriate learning environment to young pupils and children; nevertheless, it is hard to disagree when the evidence adduced is described as too weak 81 in respect of the overall legal reasoning and the parameters used by the Court to determine the breadth of the margin of appreciation. 823 FINALLY, THE "LIVING TOGETHER" CONCEPT: AN ABSTRACT EVALUATION

OF THE INTEGRATION MODEL
In the three cases on the "living together" concept as related to the full-face veil, what was at stake was not the obligation to dress in a neutral way, both in respect of the neutrality principle or safety considerations.Rather, the Court was called to take a position on the way a member state integrates minorities. 83n respect to the latter, many attitudes could be identified at the moment as a state's responses to different religious, cultural and ethnical demands, such as integration, assimilation, accommodation, or other forms of shared governance and the discussion is still open for debate. 84Nevertheless, the jurisprudence of Strasbourg is consistent in its conception of the states as neutral, impartial organizers and promoters of a peaceful coexistence of different religious faiths. 85espite this, the Court in the "living together" cases considered only briefly the risk of consolidating the stereotypes affecting the Muslim community and limited the exercise of the conventionality control due to the democratic decision-making process lying behind the adoption of the ban at the national level. 86Furthermore, it neither engaged in a concrete evaluation of that process nor did it question the pragmatic application of the full-face veil ban, ultimately respecting the "choice of a society" per se. 87he premises of this reasoning are uncertain: on the one hand, the Court does not have the authority to impose uniform social behavioural norms; 88 on the other hand, it seems to be an argument which is challenged by empirical evidence. 89Grounding the decision on questionable factual elements should have required a more exhaustive and meticulous motivation in the judgment, whatever the final outcome of the decision might have been.To do so, the Court could have exploited the opportunity to fully engage and commit itself to a more substance-oriented approach, as we will see in the following Section.A full engagement of the Court in evaluating concrete circumstances and a more substance-oriented judgement involving all the knowledge it gathers together could be beneficial for two reasons: establishing a favourable setting for a stricter Convention compliance check and, therefore, adopting decisions which are potentially less challenging for the Court's authority.second paragraph of the provision and therefore it is textually required by the Convention. 90In fact, assessing whether a specific measure promotes effectively the purpose it is supposed to pursue and examining its necessity in a given situation is a process informed by empirical evidence 91 and depends on the factual circumstances of each case. 92oreover, proportionality has been largely recognized as an essential tool to adjudicate hard cases such as those at stake: "the more serious a limitation of rights is, the more evidence the court will require that the factual basis of the limitation has been correctly established." 93

OF AMICUS CURIAE BRIEFS
A judicial attitude strongly based on reality could also be facilitated by ensuring more opportunity for the submission of third party representations and subsequently taking position on the briefs submitted.
In the three cases we are commenting on, Amicus Curiae briefs were filed mostly by NGOs and Human Rights Centres.These organizations tried to widen the Court's knowledge by adding empirical material typical of sociological investigation to the debate. 94surveys, in-depth interviews, qualitative analyses and speeches involving women who actually wear different types of veil. 95In addition, they described in great detail the different legislative processes that took place in Belgium and France, explaining their specific features using a collection of expert opinions, the advice of the Council of State and making reference to the length and quality of the discussion in the parliamentary Chambers. 96heir attempt was threefold: firstly, drawing the attention of the Court to the evaluation of concrete circumstances at hand.Secondly, demonstrating that interaction between individuals is actually possible even while wearing a full-face veil.Thirdly, showing the erroneous assumption behind the French and Belgian bans insofar as the veil does not amount to a withdrawal from social interaction. 97he Court did not address this empirical material in the decisions and referred to it by means of a mere summary of the arguments presented.It expressed strong concerns relating to the risk of increasing intolerance and prejudice against Muslims 98 but it eventually declared, without a robust motivation, that permitting or prohibiting the full-face veil in public "constitutes a choice of society," 99 referring to the democratic process lying behind the adoption of the laws. 100eing more sensitive to the third parties' interventions could have been an interesting opportunity to reach an interesting balance and it could be beneficial as a response to the direct criticism relating to the Court's authority and legitimacy. 101

CONCLUSIONS
As it is quite recent in its jurisprudential elaboration, the contours of the "living together" argument remain still uncertain; the need to revisit 96 Human Rights Centre of Ghent University, "Written Submission by the Human Rights Centre of Ghent University in the Case of Dakir v. Belgium," 4. 97 In addition, they marked some Islamophobic attitudes emerged in the preparatory works of the 2010.Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium,para. 52;Dakir v. Belgium,para. 55. 99 SAS v. France,para. 153. 100 SAS v. France,Dakir v. Belgium,para. 55. 101 Allan R.S. Trevor, "Democracy, Legality, and Proportionality," in Proportionality and the Rule of Law, eds.Grant Huscroft, Bradley W. Miller and Gregoire Webber (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 211.its meaning and implications is strongly encouraged by many scholars, especially if future case-law will refer to it as one of the Strasbourg Court's principles on religious freedom, together with pluralism, diversity, tolerance, and reasonable accommodation.102 A stricter application of the proportionality test and a greater consideration of factual circumstances, giving prominence, for example, to the third parties' interventions, could help to prevent vivre ensemble 103 from a potential misuse and ensure that religious freedom will not be "beautiful and unattainable."104 zasadzie strony trzeciej.Byłoby to korzystne z dwóch powodów: ułatwiałoby zastosowanie testu proporcjonalności oraz chroniłoby Trybunał przed niebezpiecznym podważaniem jego autorytetu.

Słowa kluczowe:
2.1.THE LEGAL DISCUSSION: THE DRAFTING PROCESS OF THE LAWS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 7. SECOND OBSERVATION: PROPORTIONALITY AS EXPRESSLY REQUIRED BY THE CONVENTION, THE NEED FOR AN ENGAGED COURT, THE "LIVING TOGETHER" CONCEPT READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER CONVENTION PRINCIPLES
The most suitable tool to facilitate this engagement is the proportionality test which, in the case ofArt.8-11,isincorporated in the 87 Belcacemi and Oussar v. Belgium paras.53.Stéphanie Hennette Vauche, "Is French laïcité Still Liberal?The Republican Project under Pressure (2004-15)," Human Rights Law Review 17 no. 2 (2017): 285-312. 88Esther Erlings, "The Government Did Not Refer to It': SAS v. France and Ordre Public at the European Court of Human Rights," Melbourne Journal of International Law 16 (2015): 10, 21.
89See Brems, The Experiences of Face Veil Wearers in Europe and the Law.