GRAMMAR OF THEOLOGY:
LOGICAL ARGUMENTATION
FROM ORIGEN TO THE CAPPADOCIAN FATHERS**

How much does thought depend on the language which formulates it? Is it possible to think and speak of an incomprehensible God? How can one ensure that theological discourse refers to an ontological reality and does not just manifest the idea of deity inherent in the human mind? All these methodological questions surfaced within different contexts and had long been debated by the Greek philosophers. Naturally enough they reappeared in the Christian agenda once initial efforts had begun towards the systematization and institutionalization of Christian teaching. The debate initiated by Arius after the Nicene Ecumenical Council, whilst at first more explicitly ontological, turned into a nit-picking discussion of logical and terminological nuances. Despite the fact that one of the main pillars of Eunomian teaching was his language theory, scholars have yet to evince quite as decisively the grammatical nature of the Cappadocian contra-argumentation. It is a purpose of my paper therefore to fill this gap and to sketch an overview of the grammatical argumentation of the Cappadocians. I will show that the principles of their argumentation are rooted in the exegetical techniques of Origen, which emerged from the methodology of Hellenic textual critics and grammarians.

To start, let us recall the linguistic and methodological aspect of the Eunomian teaching. After the Council of Nicaea the question of the correctness of divine names, such as unbegotten, begotten, the Father, the Son, remained unresolved. In particular, no decisive explanation had been given as to what these names really signified. In the First Apology† Eunomius ridicules people who talk about different significata of the divine names among which he mentions

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† The citations from Eunomius’ works are given from: Eunomius (Bishop of Cyzicus), The extant works, text and transl. by R.P. Vaggione, Oxford 1987.
essence, action and authority (οὐσία, ἐξουσία, ἐνέργεια)\(^2\). His indignation points to the direction of Post-Nicene discussions around the meaning of divine names. For instance, Athanasius of Alexandria in his *On the Councils of Ariminum and Selucia (De Synodis)* argued that the term ἀγέννητος has two different but equally valid meanings (σημαινόμενα): the first signifying "he who has no cause (τὸ μὴ ἔχων τὸν αἴτιον)", and the second signifying "he who is neither creation (ποιήμα), nor generation (κτίσμα)"\(^3\). Expectedly enough, this affirmation provoked a set of logical and theological questions concerning the definition of τὸ σημαινόμενον, which Eunomius didn’t hesitate to ask. Thus, in the *First Apology*, Eunomius censured people who:

> “stumble at the use of equivocal terms (ταῖς ὁμονομίαις προσπαίνοντας) and understand the essence to be one thing (ἔτερον μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν νοοῦντες) and the meaning of the word which designates it to be something else (ἔτερον δὲ τι παρ’ αὕτην τὸ σημαινόμενον)\(^4\).

This argument of Eunomius represents a typical example of a Peripatetic criticism of Stoic language theory. Ammonius, in his commentary *On Aristotle On Interpretation*, affirmed that nouns and verbs directly signify real objects and that “one should not invent anything in between thoughts and real objects (οὐδὲν ἔτερον δεῖ παρὰ ταῦτα ἐπινοεῖν μέσον τοῦ τε νοηματος καὶ τοῦ πράγματος)”; likewise the Stoics who invented the notion of λέκτον\(^5\).

The distinction between objects (τυγχάνοντα), things named or significata (πράγματα, σημαινόμενα, λεκτά, νοητά), and words or signifiers formed the basis of Stoic linguistics. This distinction was adopted by Hellenic grammarians. Pursuing the discussion of the correctness of names, the Stoics reached a compromise solution of this problem\(^6\), which was also supported by the grammarians\(^7\). They believed that names are correctly (i.e. φύσει) assigned (i.e. θέσει). They also taught that in the course of time the initial correctness of names, which basically attested an agreement of signifiers and significata, was blurred and such was the provenance of ambiguity and homonymy\(^8\). It was in conformity with the Stoic linguistics that grammarians believed in

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\(^4\) Eunomius, *Liber Apologeticus* 12, ed. and transl. by Vaggione, p. 49.


\(^6\) Cf. Diogenes Laertius, *Vitae philosophorum* VII 57 = SVF II 146.


\(^8\) Cf. idem, *De pronominibus* 38, 22, ed. R. Schneider, *Grammatici Graeci*, vol. 2/1, Leipzig 1878, transl. and commentary by W. Householder: *The syntax of Apollonius Dyscolus*, p. 91.
the sequential provenance of parts of speech, where nouns (personal names and appellatives), which signify substance, are succeeded by verbs signifying a certain state of substance.

Origen generally supported the language theory of Hellenic grammarians. Although he only once referred to λεκτά in the Commentary on Psalms, he rather frequently (more than 100 times) used the term σηματονομενον to designate “significatum”. For instance in the Commentary on John he advised a reader of Scripture to distinguish clearly between “the language (φωνή), meaning (σηματονομενα), and things (πράγματα), on which the meaning is based”. In the Commentaries on Genesis, Origen argued for the sequential provenance of parts of speech. He also supported the concept of the pristine language, which somewhat justified his idea of the divine origin of the Hebrew proto-language (viz. before the babble of languages in Gen 11). In such a way he affirmed that some of the Hebrew divine names (like Adonai and Sabaoth) help in the ascendance to God.

Pondering on this evidence Jean Daniélou and John Dillon assumed that Origen’s language theory could be affiliated with the voces magicae concept which emerged from the Chaldean Oracles and was held by the Neoplatonic theurgists. In spite of these beliefs, which, as J. Dillon demonstrated, come really close to the views held by the Neo-Platonists, Origen emphatically renounced the equation of the pagan rituals to the Christian prayer. He underscored the different mechanisms of the pagan and Christian worship. Whatever parallels might be seen between Origen’s conjectures on the revelatory origin of the Hebrew proto-language and the concept of voces magicae (lately elaborated by Iamblichus in the De mysteriis with regard to the Greek Magical Papyri) the practical appliance of the divine names in prayer and reciting of spells, described by Origen and the Neo-Platonists, reveal an apparent difference of their language theories. In such a way Origen emphasised that Christian prayer stands as far away from the magical spell as the inane sounds from the meaningful words. In the treatise Against Celsus (Contra Celsum) Origen also asserted that magical spell reveals its weakness in translation.

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9 Cf. idem, De constructione 4, 10, from: Householder, p. 228-229.
11 Cf. Origenes, Fragmenta in Psalmos 80, 1, 20.
13 Cf. idem, Commentarii in Genesim v. 20-25, PG 12, 88.
14 Cf. idem, Contra Celsum I 24.
17 Cf. Dillon, The magical power of names in Origen and later Platonism, p. 207-208.
which renders it powerless, while the Christian prayer remains powerful as long as one who says the prayer does it consciously:

“for the Lord of all languages (ὁ πάσης διαλέκτου κύριος) of the earth hears those who pray to Him in each different tongue, hearing, if I may so say, but one speech corresponding the meaning (ὡς μᾶς φωνής τῆς κατὰ τὰ σημαινόμενα ἄκοιμον), expressing itself in different dialects”18.

Besides, from Origen’s Biblical studies we learn that he had a sober scholarly approach to the common biblical nouns and to the divine names likewise. In the Commentary on John Origen encouraged the exegetes to investigate a contextual connotation (τοῦ σημαινομένου τῆς δύναμιν) of a divine name (ἐκ τῆς φωνῆς), since this name is meant not only figuratively but literally (οὐ τροπικοὶς ἀλλὰ κυρίως)19. The usage of τὸ σημαινόμενον in these two fragments is in tune with the Stoic understanding of the “thing signified”, which belongs to the intellectual reality and implies different connotations; however after actualization in a concrete grammatical context, it receives a literal meaning.

Despite of Origen’s leaning towards the Stoic linguistics his language theory embraced different philosophical concepts and hence should not be exclusively affiliated to any of them. However, I believe that a linkage with the relatively independent teaching of grammarians is a crucial component of Origen’s linguistic views. Given that the analytical techniques and relevant concepts of the grammarians emerged from their textual critique of the Homeric poems, it is simply natural that a closeness of professional interests (of Hellenic, Jewish and Christian exegetes) resulted in a similarity of their methods.

Now, let us see how the Cappadocians made use of the language theories of the Hellenic grammarians and Origen in their polemics with the Eunomians. Origen, Basil and Gregory Nazianzen in conformity with grammatical theory argued that the essence of a subject can be fully expressed by a predicate. In the Homilies on Jeremiah Origen applied this idea to the scriptural names of Christ saying that though the nature of Christ constitutes a single subject (τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον ἐν ἑστίν), it is conceived of in many names (τοῖς δὲ ἐπινοοῖς τὰ πολλὰ ὀνόματα), which represent different aspects of his nature20. In a similar manner, Gregory Nazianzen in his third theological oration professed that:

“although in accordance with a distinction in our thoughts (ἐπινοοῖς τισὶ διαφορούμεναι) we use distinct names (ὁνόματα) and that whatever is properly (κυρίως) called by this name really is God; and whatever he is in his

19 Idem, Commentarii in Joannem I 21, 125, SCh 120, 126.
nature (ὁ δ’ ἐν ἣ κατὰ φῶςν) is a true name for him – granted that real truth is contained in facts (ἐν πράγμασιν), not in names (μὴ ἐν ὀνόμασιν)”21.

Contemplating the reality beyond the hypostatic names, Basil and Gregory affirmed that the Father and the Son are relative names, which manifest an inherent unity of the divine persons because there is no way of imagining the Father without the Son or vice versa. In the 16th paragraph of *De filio* Gregory stated:

“Father is not a name either of an essence or of an action (οὔτε οὐσίας ὄνομα ὁ πατήρ, [...] οὔτε ἐνεργείας) [...]. But it is the name of the Relation in which the Father stands to the Son, and the Son to the Father (σχέσεως δὲ καὶ τοῦ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν ὁ πατήρ, ἢ ὁ υἱὸς πρὸς τὸν πατέρα)”22.

To clarify this statement, Gregory explained the term “relation” in conformity with Hellenic philosophical tradition23. He affirmed that a mere idea of the Father still brings in the idea of the Son (ὁ πατήρ· συνεισέξει τὸν υἱόν) and this fact of the relative connection between the ideas produces no changes in either of them, or as Gregory puts it:

“will not make it of a different nature, according to common ideas and the force of these names (οὐκ ἀλλοτρίωσει, κατὰ τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοιὰς καὶ τὴν τῶν κλήσεων τούτων δύναμιν)”24.

In order to understand precisely this relative mode of the Father-Son relationship we must establish a philosophical pattern of the relationship between essence and hypostasis. It was again Origen who introduced the term hypostasis in Christian theology25, while the Stoics instituted the notion in a philosophical context26.

Posidonius (131-51 BCE) defined hypostasis as an actualized being which comes into existence to manifest the eternal essence and its individual qualities in real phenomena. According to a paraphrase of Arius Didymus (1st century BCE-CE), Posidonius:

“said that the substance of the whole, i.e. matter (τὴν τῶν ὀλῶν ὀψίας καὶ ὀλήν) was without quality and without shape, in so far as in no way has it a form detached of its own (οὐδὲν ὑποτεταγμένον ἵδιον ἔχει σχῆμα), nor quality by itself either (οὐδὲ ποιότητα καθ’ αὐτήν), but always is in some

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25 Cf. Lampe, s.v. ὑπόστασις.

form and quality. For he said that substance differs from matter (διαφέρειν δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ὑλῆς), being the same in reality, in thought only (οὐσαν κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἐπινοεῖ μόνον)”27.

This distinction between the οὐσία and ὑπόστασις gave rise to a tricky problem that concerned the understanding of hypostasis as an actualization of essence in its qualities. Thus, hypostasis was considered as something that manifests essence and at the same time is different from it. The qualities were understood as the functional characteristics of essence. A detailed explanation of this vision of essence is preserved in Origen’s Homily on Prayer:

“By qualities (ποιότητας) they mean distinctively like the actualities and the activities (τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ τὰς ποιήσεις) in which movements and relations of the essence have come to be (τὰς κινήσεις καὶ σχέσεις συμβεβηκέν)”28.

Interestingly enough this complex vision of the essence, which exists behind the real objects and actualizes itself in them, finds an echo in the sphere of logic and grammar. An informative account of this concept is preserved in Dexippus’ fourth-century Commentary on Categories29. Dexippus stated that “(τὸ ὑποκείμενον) «subject» has two senses, both with the Stoics and with the older philosophers (the Peripatetic and the Old Academy)”30. I have formalized his evidence in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st sense of subject (πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον):</th>
<th>qualityless matter (ἡ ἄποισις ὑλή)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>= a subject of proposition = potential body (δύναμει σῶμα), e.g., it (τί)</td>
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<tr>
<td>“one being the so-called primary subject (πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον), i.e. qualityless matter (ἡ ἄποισις ὑλή), which Aristotle calls «potential body» (δύναμει σῶμα)”31.</td>
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| 2nd sense of subject: qualified subject (ὑποκείμενον τὸ ποιόν) |
| actualization (ὑπόστασις) of the subject in the qualities, which are predicated of the subject (relative terms πρός τι λέγεσθαι), e.g., the bronze |
| “and the second type of subject is the qualified subject (ὑποκείμενον τὸ ποιόν)”32. |


31 Ibidem.

32 Ibidem.
This concept of essence, which finds its actualization in the qualities of real things, fitted a complex Christian vision of the divine essence. Basil used this idea in his polemics with Eunomius and for a formulation of his Christological teaching. In the Letter 38, he professed:

“That which is spoken of in the specific sense (τὸ ἴδιος λεγόμενον) is signified by the word «hypostasis» (τῷ τῆς ὑποστάσεως δηλούσθαι ῥήματι). For, because of the indefiniteness of the term, he who says «man» has introduced through our hearing some vague idea, so that, although the nature is manifested by the name (τὴν μὲν φύσιν ἐκ τοῦ ὄνοματος δελωθῆναι), that which subsists in the nature (τὸ δὲ ύφεστός) and is specifically designated by the name is not indicated (δηλούμενον ἴδιος ὑπὸ τοῦ ὄνοματος πράγμα μὴ σημαίνονται)… It is not the indefinite notion of essence (ὁὐχ ἡ ἀρίστος τῆς οὐσίας ἔννοια) which creates no definite image because of the generality of its significance (ἐκ τῆς κοινότητος τοῦ σημαίνομένου στάσιν), but the hypostasis, which is evident through the specific qualities”\textsuperscript{34}.

In conformity with Basil, Gregory Nazianzen also used the category of “relation” (σχῆσις) in his formulation of Christological doctrine. In the second theological oration he affirmed:

“He [sc. Christ] is word, because he is related to the Father (ἐξει πρός τὸν πατέρα) as word is to mind (πρός νοῦν λόγος), not only because of the unpassionate character of his birth (διὰ τὸ ἄπαθὲς τῆς γεννήσεως), but also because of the conjunction and conveying peculiar to this relationship (ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ συναφῆς, καὶ τὸ ἐξαγγελτικῶν). One could say too, perhaps, that his relationship is that of definition to term defined (ὁρὸς πρός τὸ ὀριζόμενον), since «word» has the meaning in Greek of «definition» (τοῦτο λέγεται λόγος)”\textsuperscript{35}.

\textsuperscript{33} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{35} Gregorius Nazianzenus, Oratio 30 (De Filio), 20, SCh 250, 266-268, transl. by Wickham – Williams, p. 179.
Now, having examined the logical and grammatical aspects of the argumentation of Origen, Basil and Gregory, let us return to the questions we posed at the beginning of this article and try to speculate on the answers which they might have given to them. How much does thought depend on the language which formulates it? From the evidence we have assembled above, it is apparent that Origen, Basil and Gregory supported the linguistic theories of the Hellenic grammarians, who believed in a direct and fundamental connection between language and thought. Ergo, the logical and grammatical rules of the correct formulation of thought likewise regulate the mental procedures.

A backbone of Apollonius’ syntaxis constituted an idea that regular organization (καταλληλότης) of the significata (νοητά) is reflected in regularity of the signifiers (sc. φοναι, words). It is notable that a derivate of a rather rare terminus technicus καταλληλότης (κατάλληλος) is quite as frequent in Origen’s opera as in Apollonius. A belief in the orderly organization of the universe also formed a foundation of Origen’s systematic theology. In the Commentary on John Origen affirmed that the whole Bible is one body, whose parts form a harmonious unity that is the word of God, which “consists of many ideas each of which is a part of the whole word”37. Gregory Nazianzen articulated even more clearly the concept of the fundamental orderly organization of the universe, which is mirrored in the systematic organization of knowledge. In his Oration 3238 he declared that:

“there is an order in elements (Τάξις ἐν στοιχείοις), which constitute the bodies (ξ ὁν τά σώματα)... It was order, then, that assembled the whole (Τάξις οὐν τὸ πᾶν συνεστήσατο). It is order that holds together the things of heaven and the things of earth; order among the things we perceive with our minds (τάξις ἐν νοητοῖς; τάξις ἐν αἰσθητοῖς); order among those we perceive with our senses”39.

It should not be overlooked however that the system or order which Origen and Gregory were talking about was a paradoxical one and this distinguished it from the syllogistic teaching of Eunomius. An axiomatic belief in the incomprehensibility of the divine essence rendered the logical and grammatical theological arguments of Origen and the Cappadocians as legitimate as one can expect to draw from the systematic philological analysis of the text. Thus, I would imagine that their response to our last question: How to think and speak of incomprehensible God and How to make sure that theological discourse

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36 Cf. Apollonius Dyscolus, De constructione orationis 2, 3ff., transl., by Householder, p. 90.
38 Cf. Gregorius Nazianzenus, Oratio 32 (De moderatione in disputando), 24-25.
refers to an ontological reality and does not just manifest the idea of deity inherent in the human mind? — might address a principal distinction between comprehensible and incomprehensible knowledge. According to Origen and the Cappadocians, comprehensible knowledge about God that one can extract from a philological analysis of the text of the Bible and incomprehensible knowledge about God cannot be rendered in words. Peculiarly consonant with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s famous motto (*Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* 7): “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent”⁴⁰, Gregory in his second theological oration stated that: “Since the divine essence is ineffable, we too will honour it by silence (ἐπεὶ δὲ ἄρρητα ἴν, καὶ ἴμιν σιωπῇ τιμῶσθο)”⁴¹.

(Summary)

The article outlines the philosophical and linguistic background of the Post-Nicene theological debates concerning the relationship between the Father and the Son. A sharp focus dwells of the provenance of the term hypostasis, the philosophical and grammatical understanding of the terms hypokeimenon and ousia and the Stoic definition of the signifier and thing signified. The article shows new aspects of the anti-Eunomian polemics of the Cappadocian fathers, which come into sight due to comparison of theological concepts with Hellenic linguistic and grammatical theories. In such a way, the comparison demonstrates methodological and technical strand of the theological argumentation of the Cappadocian fathers and their affinity for the exegetical methodology of Origen.

**Key words**: theological concepts, linguistic theories, Stoicism, Origen, Capadocian Fathers.

**Słowa kluczowe**: pojęcia teologiczne, teorie językowe, stoicyzm, Orygenes, Ojcowie Kapadoccy.

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