Moral Subjectivity and the Moral Status of Artificial Intelligence: A Philosophical and Psychological Perspective
Zbigniew WRÓBLEWSKI
Katedra Filozofii Przyrody i Nauk Przyrodniczych, Instytut Filozofii, Wydział Filozofii, Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II, Al. Racławickie 14, 20-950 Lublin, Poland , PolandPaweł FORTUNA
Katedra Psychologii Eksperymentalnej, Instytut Psychologii, Wydział Nauk Społecznych, Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II, Al. Racławickie 14, 20-950 Lublin, Poland , PolandAbstract
The paper is a voice in the discussion concerning the possibility of assigning moral status to technological artifacts driven by artificial intelligence. In the dimension of philosophical reflection, it refers to the debate on the understanding of the concept of "moral status" and the related possibility of extending the moral community to include artificial agents. In the psychological perspective, on the other hand, it presents the results of a study that examined the importance of factors relevant to the assignment of moral status, such as the features of artifacts, dimensions of mind perception, soul assignment and anthropocentric beliefs. The considerations are set in the context of currently implemented innovations, pop culture narratives shaping the image of artificial systems and discussions on the possibility of the emergence of the so-called superhuman artificial intelligence.
Keywords:
artificial intelligence, moral subject, moral status, mind perception, soul assignmentKatedra Filozofii Przyrody i Nauk Przyrodniczych, Instytut Filozofii, Wydział Filozofii, Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II, Al. Racławickie 14, 20-950 Lublin, Poland
Katedra Psychologii Eksperymentalnej, Instytut Psychologii, Wydział Nauk Społecznych, Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II, Al. Racławickie 14, 20-950 Lublin, Poland