Transhumanism and the Concept of the Person

Grzegorz HOŁUB

Katedra Bioetyki, Wydział Filozoficzny, Uniwersytet Papieski Jana Pawła II, ul. Kanonicza 9, 31-002 Cracow, Poland , Poland

Abstract

The present article addresses the topic of transhumanism. A special emphasis is put on the issue of personhood, as well as on the idea of uploading the human person into machines, in particular computers. In this respect, the paper refers in detail to the analyses advanced by Ray Kurzweil. Firstly, the law of accelerating returns is discussed. Secondly, ideas such as scanning a human individual, uploading of an individual into computers, radical enhancement of the human being, as well as downloading a human being into a new vessel, are examined. Thirdly, on the example of Ray Kurzweil’s approach, the concept of the person in transhumanism is scrutinized and critically assessed. It is argued that the notion of ‘person’ in transhumanism is derivative of naturalistic thinking. Thus the person is considered as a bundle of information which can be copied, transferred, enhanced and downloaded. Such projects result from a reductionist standpoint, since they assume that the human person is a one-dimensional reality whose existence is not governed by any higher rule or principle. The transhumanist concept of ‘person’ precludes grasping the complexity and richness of the personal reality. Moreover, the transhumanist perspective prevents the view of ‘person’ as an agent revealing her subjectivity through her actions and other manifestations; rather, it is mere manifestations of the person that are considered as determinants of her being. Hence, in the case of transhumanism we are dealing with the reversed metaphysical order which renders the personal reality as such nonexistent, or at most interprets it as a result of something else, i.e., of natural processes.

Keywords:

transhumanism, person, naturalism, Ray Kurzweil