“Seeing what is common.” Metaphors in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Analyses

Marek HETMAŃSKI

Katedra Ontologii i Epistemologii, Wydział Filozofii i Socjologii, Uniwersytet Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, pl. Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej 4, 20-031 Lublin, Poland , Poland

Abstract

The paper discusses the concept of metaphor according to Ludwig Wittgenstein reconstructed based on the remarks he made in his diverse writings which show consistency despite their separateness. The problem of the relations between the concepts of language as an image and language as a game is discussed, as well as their relationship with the metaphilosophical views of their author. First of all, the issue of imaging is discussed, including the metonymic and metaphorical presentations of reality using linguistic means such as words and texts, but also extra-linguistic means such as facial and body gestures, paintings, music, and even architecture, which Wittgenstein assigned a significant role in imagining human thinking and general concepts. The ostensive (deictic) function of gestures accompanying thinking is characterized. Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophical view is discussed, including his remarks on the inexpressibility and absurdity of the philosophical theses. Metaphorical statements used by the philosopher are also analyzed in their persuasive, stylistic, and cognitive functions.

 

Keywords:

metaphor, analogy, imagining, gesture, meaning, use, metaphilosophy