Indolence, Sequence, and Coincidence: On Non-obvious Accidents
Barbara CHYROWICZ
John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin , Polandhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-0919-3844
Abstract
The article discusses the so-called accidental effects of an action in cases when the accidental nature of such effects can be undermined given their foreseeability. Cases of this kind comprise those in which the only reason why an (indolent) subject calls an effect of their action accidental is that the they did not sufficiently discern the object of the act in question beforehand. Neither can effects of an action involving other subjects’ interference be considered as accidental, provided their responses were foreseeable. Coincidence is definitely unforeseeable, but one may still wonder whether taking specific action earlier had an impact on the later coincidences.
Keywords:
accident, effect, indolence, coincidence, responsibilityReferences
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