On the Objective Basis of Morality, as Seen from the Perspective of the Personalistic Ethics of the Lublin School of Philosophy

Anna KRAJEWSKA

Abstract

The article describes the objective and rational basis of morality, as seen in the light of the ethical personalism developed in the Lublin School of Philosophy. The ground of the objective and rational nature of morality is the moral experience conceived as a direct cognitive grasp of human dignity. The moral experience is informed by a rational (intellectual) insight. While the dignity of a human person provides a rational basis of morality, the human nature is a rational basis of moral norms. However, since human beings are invariably challenged to act in particular, specific situations, neither the personalistic norm, nor the human nature provides sufficient ground to know how to act. Therefore, an action necessarily involves a practical judgment of conscience on the part of the acting subject. A judgment of conscience expresses the rationality of the subject and—due to its recourse to moral norms—makes a claim to being objective. The subject’s experience of the contingency of his or her being, which is inherent in the moral experience, calls for its metaphysical interpretation. This, in turn, is complemented in the article with reference to a theological perspective, prompted by the presence of moral contents in the Christian Revelation.