Arguments for the Incompatibilist Theory of Agent-Causal Libertarianism
Mieszko TAŁASIEWICZ
Department of Logical Semiotics, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Warsaw, Krakowskie Przedmieście 3, 00-927 Warsaw, Poland , Polandhttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-1933-4759
Abstract
In the religious discourse, the concept of free will expresses the possibility of an unrestrained, affirmative or negative response to the call that God directs to us. The possibility of free will understood in this way is closely related to the capacity for initiating causal chains and thus it is incompatible with causal determinism and might be subsumed under the label of “agent-causal libertarianism.” In the paper I discuss three potential problems concerning this conception of free will: the problem of luck, the problem of empirical credibility, and the problem of God’s omniscience, with the conclusion that these problems are not unsurpassable. While the first and the last of the problems are barely addressed (by a couple of suggestions on how to proceed with further argumentation), the central part of the paper is devoted to giving a novel argument for empirical credibility of agent-causal libertarianism. The argument is based on the observation that agent-causalism is a better explanation of the fact that we are able to accurately predict our own long-term actions or the implementation of complex schedules than determinism. According to the latter, there must be a causal determinant for such long-term effects, namely the neurophysiological correlate of making a resolution, with a specific causal power, capable of maintaining that power for years to eventually produce its effect at a specific moment. Furthermore, the existence of this particular causal determination would have to be conscious: the subject may not know the mechanisms of its operation, but she is aware that her future action has just been determined by her resolution. The stipulation of such a long-term causal connection, correlated with the subject’s knowledge of it, is hardly plausible, considering that such a stable structure would suddenly appear in an open system like the brain, constantly bombarded with external stimuli interfering with internal processes. From the perspective of scientific methodology, it looks like a classic hypothesis ad hoc, lacking any other explanatory purpose except to save determinism. According to the agent-causalism, however, there is no need to postulate the existence of a causal connection between the adoption of a plan and its implementation or modification, because this conception allows us to assume that an acting person who, considering logical reasons, decides to continue or modify the implementation of her plan, simply initiates a new causal chain upon the implementation. The implementation, while causally separated from the previous plan, can nevertheless be predicted and explained by reference to a previously assumed rational structure.
Keywords:
determinism, incompatibilism, free will, agency, divine omniscience, the moral luck problemReferences
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Department of Logical Semiotics, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Warsaw, Krakowskie Przedmieście 3, 00-927 Warsaw, Poland https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1933-4759
