How Disinformation Can Influence a Nation: The Case of Romania
Stefano Lovi
University of International Studies of Rome UNINT , Italyhttps://orcid.org/0009-0009-9978-8689
Abstract
Disinformation is a major threat in the digital age, affecting politics, society, and the economy. Unlike misinformation, which is unintentional, disinformation is deliberately created to manipulate public opinion, destabilize governments, and influence elections. The rise of social media has amplified its impact, making false information spread rapidly without verification. Historically, disinformation has been used for political gain, from the forged Donation of Constantine to wartime propaganda and modern deepfake technology. Today, digital platforms, bots, and microtargeting strategies have transformed disinformation into a powerful tool for influencing public perception. A striking example is the case of Călin Georgescu in Romania. A nationalist and Eurosceptic politician, C. Georgescu gained popularity through social media, particularly TikTok, with anti-establishment rhetoric. However, investigations revealed coordinated disinformation campaigns, likely supported by Russia, to manipulate public opinion and destabilize Romania’s political landscape. These efforts included deepfake videos discrediting opponents, fake news articles, manipulated social media trends, and cyberattacks targeting independent media. As a result, Romania’s Constitutional Court annulled the first round of presidential elections, highlighting the dangers of digital interference in democracy. The European Commission launched an inquiry into TikTok for potentially violating the Digital Services Act by allowing manipulated content to spread. This case underscores the urgent need for stricter regulations on digital platforms, better fact-checking tools, and media literacy programs to counteract disinformation. A coordinated effort between governments, tech companies, and civil society is essential to protect democracy and ensure the integrity of public discourse.
Keywords:
disinformation, social media, Georgescu, electionsReferences
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University of International Studies of Rome UNINT https://orcid.org/0009-0009-9978-8689
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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
