The remuneration policy and risk profile of the investment firm
Szymon Okoń
Poznań University of Economics and Business , PolandAbstract
The experience of the recent financial crisis leads to reflections on the relevant mechanisms of risk reduction of an investment firms activity. Within the European Union, Directive 2010/76/EU (CRD III) introduced new rules regarding the remuneration policy for investment firms. The main goal is to reduce the risk of the investment firms activity. This is a prudential regulation. The author demonstrates that the abovementioned regulations will have limited impact on reducing the risk of the activities of these financial institutions as well as their implementation will be difficult for them in practice. The purpose of this article is to evaluate, from the point of view of an investment firm, proposed by the EU legislator approach to remuneration policy aimed at reducing the risk of the operation of this type of financial institution. In the first part of the following paper the grounds of the problem are presented. Then the concept of remuneration policy and its impact on capital adequacy requirements is analyzed. In the following part of the paper the areas subject to changes constituting a challenge for investments firms, in terms of their implementation in practice are delivered.
Keywords:
remuneration policy, risk profile, investment firmsReferences
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Poznań University of Economics and Business
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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
