Effectiveness of Judicial Enforcement in the Swiss Legal System – Case Study

Bartosz Stróżewski

Alcide De Gasperi University of Euroregional Economy (WSGE) , Poland
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1057-3983


Abstract

The purpose of this article is to examine the effectiveness of enforcement in the Swiss legal system, with a particular focus on atypical enforcement proceedings that do not involve traditional bailiffs. The research questions focus on identifying the main procedures and institutions responsible for enforcement and assessing whether the system balances the interests of debtors and creditors while effectively executing the debt. The analysis showed that the Swiss model is based on well-regulated procedures and institutions, which leads to faster collection of debts without legal dispute. The system benefits from debt enforcement offices at the cantonal level, supervisory bodies and clear legislation. It was noted that the Swiss enforcement system can be a valuable point of reference for conducting a comparative legal analysis between Switzerland and Poland, with a suggestion to transfer some solutions to Polish law. The ideas concerning enforcement offices and the possibility to initiate enforcement proceedings without obtaining a title, which may facilitate procedures for entrepreneurs, are particularly interesting. The Swiss enforcement system appears to be less complicated and creditor-friendly, but at the same time takes into account the interests of debtors, leading to a balance between protecting the interests of both parties. The clarity and transparency of procedures have an impact on favorable resolution of disputes, and the simplicity of initiating enforcement also has a preventive effect. The author highlights the potential of the analysis of the Swiss system to derive general principles for the effectiveness of enforcement in different legal contexts.

Keywords:

debt enforcement, enforcement in Switzerland, enforcement proceedings, enforcement effectiveness, Swiss legal system



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Published
2024-12-20


Stróżewski, B. (2024). Efektywność egzekucji w systemie prawnym Szwajcarii – studium przypadku. Przegląd Prawno-Ekonomiczny, (4), 97–114. https://doi.org/10.31743/ppe.17548

Bartosz Stróżewski  bzstrozewski@gmail.com
Alcide De Gasperi University of Euroregional Economy (WSGE) https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1057-3983



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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.