Non-parliamentary Representative Bodies in Post-Soviet Authoritarian States: Cases of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. A Comparative Study
Abstract
The following paper zooms in on the legal frameworks and the roles in the governance processes of non-parliamentary representative bodies in four post-Soviet authoritarian states: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan. These bodies – rooted in the principles of authoritarian and populist constitutionalism – serve as instruments to strengthen executive power while presenting a façade of democratic governance. The study highlights the diverse origins, organization, and functions of these institutions, including the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly, the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan, the People’s Kurultai of Kyrgyzstan, and the Halk Maslahaty of Turkmenistan. Despite differences in structure and legal mandates, these bodies share a common purpose: consolidating state authority to enhance formal societal representation. The paper reveals the instrumental role of these bodies in maintaining autocratic regimes, manipulating democratic norms, and ensuring regime stability through direct control by the executive power (the Presidents).
Keywords:
authoritarian constitutionalism, populist constitutionalism, post-Soviet constitutional law, non-parliamentary representative bodies, legislative power dynamics in the post-Soviet statesReferences
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