Judicial search for a legal definition of religion
Abstract
A prerequisite for the proper application of the law is a certain definition of the terms used in the law. A variable definition of a concept undermines the requirement of legal certainty, and an overly narrow or broad definition of a concept (compared with the general idea of its content) may lead to doubts about the fairness of legal regulation. Although the legal system uses the term “religion” relatively frequently, it does not generally define it explicitly. In most cases, this does not cause problems because there is no reasonable doubt as to whether we are dealing with a religious element. In hard cases, however, there is no choice but to decide where to draw the line between religion and other types of beliefs. The alternative is to stop distinguishing between them, thus depriving the religious element of its special legal status. The social sciences distinguish four basic approaches to the definition of a religious phenomenon. The substantive definition seeks to capture the content that a particular belief must satisfy in order to be labelled religious. The essentialist approach emphasises the experience of the believer. The functionalist definition notes the function that religion serves in the life of the believer. The analogical approach does not seek to capture the essence of religion but rather notes its manifestations and what different religions have in common. This article offers examples of the application of these theoretical approaches in jurisprudential practice. It also highlights the fact that courts work flexibly with the concept of religion and often give it a different content depending on the context under consideration.
Keywords:
religion, US Supreme Court, freedom of religion, European Court of Human Rights, conscientious objection, legal definition, Supreme Court of Canada, ECtHR, High Court of Australia, UK Supreme Court, Court of Justice of the EUReferences
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Charles University in Prague
JUDr., PhD, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy and Law, Catholic Theological Faculty, Charles University in Prague, Thákurova 3, CZ 160 00 Prague 6, Czech Republic
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1374-6488License
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